remedies under tcc compiled digests

8/3/2019 Remedies Under Tcc Compiled Digests

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Taxation II Prof.MovidoA2010

REMEDIES UNDER THE TCC

JAO V CAROMERO: October 6, 1995

FACTS:

The Office of the Director, Enforcement and Security Services(ESS), Bureau of Customs, received information regarding thepresence of untaxed vehicles and parts in the premises ownedby Pat Hao located along Quirino Avenue, Paranaque and

Honduras St., Makati. After conducting a surveillance of thetwo places, respondent Major Jaime Maglipon, Chief of Operations and Intelligence of the ESS, recommended theissuance of warrants of seizure and detention. DistrictCollector of Customs Titus Villanueva issued the warrants of seizure and detention.

Maglipon coordinated with the local police to assist in theexecution of the respective warrants of seizure anddetention.The team searched the two premises. They werebarred from entering the place, but some members of the teamwere able to force themselves inside and were able to inspectthe premises and noted that some articles were present whichwere not included in the list contained in the warrant. Amendedwarrants of seizure and detention were subsequently issuedby Villanueva.Consequently customs personnel started hauling the articlespursuant to the amended warrants.

Narciso Jao and Bernardo Empeynado filed a case for Injunction and Damageswith prayer for Restraining Order andPreliminary Injunction before RTC Makati Branch 56 on August

27, 1990 against respondents. On the same date, the trialcourt issued a Temporary Restraining Order.Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that RTChas no jurisdiction over the subject matter, claiming that it wasthe Bureau of Customs that had exclusive jurisdiction over it.RTC denied motion to dismiss.Respondents filed MFR . MFR was denied.CA set aside the questioned orders of the trial court andenjoined it from further proceeding with the Case. Theappellate court also dismissed the said civil case.

ISSUE:WON the RTC has jurisdiction over cases questioning thevalidity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by theBureau of Customs

HELD:The RTC is devoid of any competence to pass upon thevalidity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedingsconducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings .The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedingshas exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine allquestions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial Courts are precludedfrom assuming cognizance over such matters eventhrough petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.It is likewise well-settled that the provisions of the Tariff andCustoms Code and RA 1125 "An Act Creating the Court of Tax

Appeals," specify the proper fora and procedure for theventilation of any legal objections or issues raised concerningthese proceedings.

Actions of the Collector of Customs are appealable to theCommissioner of Customs, whose decision, in turn, issubject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Courtof Tax Appeals and from there to the Court of Appeals.

The rule that Regional Trial Courts have no review powersover such proceedings is anchored upon the policy of placingno unnecessary hindrance on the government's drive, not onlyto prevent smuggling and other frauds upon Customs, butmore importantly, to render effective and efficient the collectionof import and export duties due the State, which enables thegovernment to carry out the functions it has been instituted toperform.

The illegality of a seizure by the Collector of Customs does notdeprive the Bureau of Customs of jurisdiction thereon.

The allegations of petitioners regarding the propriety of theseizure should properly be ventilated before the Collector of Customs. We have had occasion to declare:The Collector of Customs when sitting in forfeiture

proceedings constitutes a tribunal expressly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear and determine the subject matter of such proceedings without any interference from the Court of First Instance. (Auyong Hian v. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., 19SCRA 10).

ENRILE vs VINUYAFERNANDO; January 30, 1971

NATURECertiorari and prohibition proceeding

FACTS- The then Collector of Customs of the Port of Manilaissued a warrant of seizure and detention against theCadillac car involved in this case, the owner-claimantbeing a certain Rodolfo Ceza, as the taxes and dutieshad not been paid.lh/CITE> The warr- It was moreover shown in the petition that the owner,Rodolfo Ceza, had sold such car to one Francisco Deefrom whom respondent Vinuya acquired the same.- Vinuya filed a complaint for replevin in the sala of respondent Judge on the ground of alleged illegality ofthe seizure which, in the opinion of respondents, didnot confer jurisdiction on the Collector of Customs.

- Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the groundthat forfeiture proceedings had already been institutedbefore the Collector of Customs who has the sole

jurisdiction to determine questions affecting thedisposition of property under seizure as well as theabsence of a cause of action. This was denied for lackof merit. Thus this petition.

ISSUEWON the court of first instance is vested with

jurisdiction to entertain a complaint for replevin for therecovery of a Cadillac car, subject of a seizure andforfeiture proceeding in the Bureau of Customs

HELDNO. The prevailing doctrine is that the exclusive

jurisdiction in seizure and forfeiture cases vested in theCollector of Customs precludes a court of first instancefrom assuming cognizance over such a matter. Thishas been so, as noted, since Pacis v. Averia.

Reasoninga. The existence of the power and the regularity of theproceeding taken under it are distinct from each other.

The governmental agency concerned, the Bureau ofCustoms, is vested with exclusive authority. Even if itbe assumed that in the exercise of such exclusivecompetence a taint of illegality may be correctlyimputed, the most that can be said is that undercertain circumstances the grave abuse of discretionconferred may oust it of such jurisdiction. It does notmean however that correspondingly a court of firstinstance is vested with competence when clearly in thelight of the above decisions the law has not seen fit todo so.lh/CIJFOAJOJbefore thb. "the Court of First Instance should yield to the

jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs. The jurisdiction

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Taxation II Prof.MovidoA2010

of the Collector of Customs is provided for in RepublicAct 1937i which took effect on July 1, 1957, much laterthan the Judiciary Act of 1948ii. It is axiomatic that alater law prevails over a prior statute.c. Moreover, on grounds of public policy, it is morereasonable to conclude that the legislators intended todivest the Court of First Instance of the prerogative toreplevin a property which is a subject of a seizure andforfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff andCustoms Code. Otherwise, actions for forfeiture of property for violation of Customs laws could easily beundermined by the simple devise of replevin."d. Section 2303 of the Tariff and Customs Code

requires the Collector of Customs to give to the ownerof the property sought to be forfeited written notice of the seizure and to give him the opportunity to beheard in his defense. This provision clearly indicatesthe intention of the law to confine in the Bureau of Customs the determination of all questions affectingthe disposal of property proceeded against in a seizureand forfeiture case. The judicial recourse of theproperty owner is not in the Court of First Instance butin the Court of Tax Appeals, and only after exhaustingadministrative remedies in the Bureau of Customs."e Collector of Customs is not final. An appeal lies to theDISPOSITION

The writ of certiorari prayed for is granted, respondent Judge being clearly without jurisdiction.

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i "The Tariff and Customs Code, in Section 2530 thereof, lists the kinds of property subject to forfeiture. At the same time, in Part 2 of Title VI thereof, it provides

for the procedure in seizure and forfeiture cases and vests in the Collector of Customs the authority to hear and decide said cases. The Collector's decision isappealable to the Commissioner of Customs whose decision is in turn appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals. An aggrieved party may appeal from a judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals directly to this Court.

ii Section 44(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 lodges in the Court of First Instance original jurisdiction in all cases in which the value of the property in controversy

amounts to more than ten thousand pesos. This original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, when exercised in an action for recovery of personal property which is a subject of a forfeiture proceeding in the Bureau of Customs, tends to encroach upon, and to render futile, the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs inseizure and forfeiture proceedings. This is precisely what took place in this case. lh

ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. V RICAFORT ET ALG.R. NO. 166901

CALLEJO, SR.; October 27, 2006

FACTS-Section 1, RA No. 8506 provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to import, cause the importation of, register, causethe registration of, use or operate right-hand drive vehicles-Noel Tabuelog et al are duly-licensed importers of vehicles, who, between April and May 1998, imported 72 secondhandright-hand drive buses-When the shipment arrived at the Port of Manila, the District Collector of Customs impounded the vehicles and orderedthem stored at the warehouse of the Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI)-Conformably with Section 2607 of the Tariff and Customs Code, the District Collector of Customs issued Warrants of Distraint against the shipment and set the sale at public auction-On October 28, 1998, the Secretary of Justice rendered an opinion stating that shipments of right hand wheel vehiclesloaded and exported at the port of origin before February 22, 1998 were not covered by RA No. 8506 unless the same wereloaded and imported after said date.-On November 11, 1998, the importers, filed a complaint with the RTC of Parañaque City, against the Secretary of Finance,Customs Commissioner, et al for replevin-The RTC granted the application for a writ of replevin on a bond of P12,000,000.00.-The Chief of Customs Police and four (4) customs policemen prevented the Sheriff and the policemen assisting him fromtaking custody of the vehicles, claiming that the District Collector of Customs had jurisdiction over the vehicles.-On motion of the plaintiffs, the court issued an order directing the PNP Director to assist the Sheriff in implementing thewrit it issued-The District Collector of Customs agreed to transfer the custody of the vehicles to the RTC, on the condition that therequired taxes, dues, and other charges be paid.-On November 27, 1998, the defendants, through the OSG, filed a motion seeking the reconsideration of the RTC Order onthe ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the vehicles subject of seizure and detention before the Bureau of Customs. The ATI filed a motion for the court to allow the vehicles to remain in its warehouse.-On December 1, 1998, the ATI filed a Third-Party Claim over the shipment, alleging that it had a lien over the vehicles foraccumulated and unpaid storage and arrastre charges, and wharfage dues-Before the court could resolve the motions, plaintiffs filed a "Motion/Notice to Dismiss/Withdraw Complaint" against thedefendants on the ground that they had agreed to the implementation of the writ of replevin

-ATI filed a Motion for Intervention and for Admission of its Complaint-in-Intervention, alleging that it had a lien on thevehicles for accumulated storage and arrastre charges and wharfage dues.-On April 27, 1999, the court issued an Order dismissing the complaint-The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration. For its part, ATI filed a motion for clarification of the order, and also pleaded forthe court to admit its Complaint-in-Intervention-On September 23, 1999, the RTC issued its Order dismissing the Complaint-in-Intervention-ATI filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied on July 31, 2000.-ATI filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA-On November 30, 2004, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The appellate court ruled thatthe RTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by respondents, since the Collector of Customs sitting in seizure andforfeiture proceedings had the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions relating on the seizure andforfeiture of dutiable goods. Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the main case, it was also bereft of authority to hear thethird-party claim or the complaint-in-intervention filed by ATI.-ATI filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied, hence, this petition

ISSUE

WON the lower courts erred in dismissing ATI's petition

HELDNo.-Section 602 of the TCC provides that the Bureau of Customs shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over seized and forfeitedcars. It is tasked to enforce tariff, and supervise and control customs law and all other laws, rules and regulations relatingto the tariff and customs administration; and to supervise and control all import and export cargoes, loaded or stored inpiers, terminal facilities, including container yards and freight stations, for the protection of government revenues. UnderSection 2301 of the TCC, the Collector of Customs is empowered to make a seizure of cargoes and issue a receipt for thedetention thereof -Section 2530. Property Subject of Forfeiture Under Tariff and Customs Laws. Any vehicle, vessel or aircraft, cargo, articleand objects shall, under the following conditions be subject to forfeiture: (f) Any article the importation or exportation of which is effected or attempted contrary to law, or any article of prohibited importation or exportation, and all other articleswhich, in the opinion of the Collector, have been used, are or were entered to be used as instruments in the importation or



exportation of the former.-In Jao v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon thevalidity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwiseinterfere with these proceedings. It is the Collector of Customs, sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings, who hasexclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. Actionsof the Collector of Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of Customs, whose decision, in turn, is subject to theexclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals and from there to the Court of Appeals.-The rule that Regional Trial Courts have no review powers over such proceedings is anchored upon the policy of placing nounnecessary hindrance on the governments drive, not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon Customs, but moreimportantly, to render effective and efficient the collection of import and export duties due the State, which enables the

government to carry out the functions it has been instituted to perform.-The RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for replevin by respondents herein, issue the writ of replevinand order its enforcement. The RTC should have dismissed the petition for replevin at the outset.-While it is true that the District Collector of Customs allowed the release of the vehicles and the transfer thereof to thecustody of the RTC upon the payment by the private respondents of the required taxes, duties and charges, he did notthereby lose jurisdiction over the vehicles; neither did it vest jurisdiction on the RTC to take cognizance of and assume jurisdiction over the petition for replevin.-The RTC cannot be faulted for dismissing petitioners complaint-in-intervention. Considering that it had no jurisdiction overrespondents action and over the shipment subject of the complaint, all proceedings before it would be void. The RTC hadno jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint-in-intervention and act thereon except to dismiss the same. Moreover,considering that intervention is merely ancillary and supplemental to the existing litigation and never an independentaction, the dismissal of the principal action necessarily results in the dismissal of the complaint-in-intervention. Likewise, acourt which has no jurisdiction over the principal action has no jurisdiction over a complaint-in-intervention.

Pacis v. PamaranFernando; 15 March 1974

56 SCRA 16FactsPacis is the Acting Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila. The case is prohibition proceeding against Assistant CityFiscal of Manila, Manuel R. Pamaran.Respondent Ricardo Santos is the owner of a Mercury automobile, model 1957. It was brought into this country without thepayment of customs duty and taxes, its owner Donald James Hatch being tax-exempt. It was from him that respondentSantos acquired said car.He paid P311.00 for customs duty and taxes. Land Transportation Commission reported that such automobile was a "hotcar." By virtue thereof, petitioner Pacis, ascertained that although the amount of P311.00 was already paid for customsduty, the amount collectible on said car should be P2,500.00, more or less. Pacis instituted seizure proceedings and issueda warrant of seizure and detention. Ricardo Santos filed a criminal complaint for usurpation of judicial functions with theCity Fiscal of Manila handled by Pamaran.

IssueWON the Collector of Customs has the authority to issue the warrant of seizure

Held Yes, as Acting Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, he had the requisite authority for the issuance of the contestedwarrant of seizure and detention for the automobile owned by respondent Ricardo Santos. It is to be admitted that theconstitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure must not be eroded or emasculated. The right toprivacy so highly valued in civilized society must not be diluted. Only upon compliance then with the proper requisitesmandated by law should one's possessions be subject to seizure. That much is clear. Under the 1935 Constitution theintervention of a judge was well-nigh indispensable. So it was under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Philippine AutonomyAct of 1916. Even then, however, as shown by the leading case of Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, a 1920 decision, it was theaccepted principle following the landmark case of Boyd v. United States that the seizure of goods concealed to avoidthe duties on them is not embraced within the prohibition of this constitutional guarantee. More to the point. Ina recent decision of this Court, Papa v. Mago, where the seizure of alleged smuggled goods was effected by a police officerwithout a search warrant, this Court, through Justice Zaldivar, stated: "Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companionpolicemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a component court. The Tariff andCustoms Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having policeauthority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land,inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine

any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and searchand examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibitedarticle introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant insaid cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said 'dwelling house may be enteredand searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace . . . .' It is our considered view,therefore, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authorityunder the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws." The plenitude of the competence vested in customs officials is thus undeniable. No such constitutional question then canpossibly arise. So much is implicit from the very language of Section 2205 of the Tariff and Customs Code. It speaks foritself. It is not susceptible of any misinterpretation. The power of petitioner is thus manifest. It being undeniable then thatthe sole basis for an alleged criminal act performed by him was the performance of a duty according to law, there is not theslightest justification for respondent Assistant City Fiscal to continue with the preliminary investigation after his attentionwas duly called to the plain and explicit legal provision that did not suffer at all from any constitutional infirmity. The



remedy of prohibition lies.

What was done by petitioner was strictly in accordance with settled principles of law. No doubt need be entertained then asto the validity of the issuance of the warrant of seizure and detention. His liability for any alleged usurpation of judicialfunction is non-existent. Such imputation was definitely unfounded. Even if however the matter were less clear, the claimthat the search and seizure clause was in effect nullified is hardly impressed with merit. Considering that what is involved isan alleged evasion of the payment of customs duties.

DispositionWHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition prayed for is granted and the successor of respondent Manuel R. Pamaran, now a

criminal circuit court judge, or any one in the City Fiscal's Office of the City of Manila to whom the complaint againstpetitioner for usurpation of judicial functions arising out of the issuance of the warrant of seizure and detention, subject-matter of this litigation, has been assigned, is perpetually restrained from acting thereon except to dismiss the same. Nocosts.

BOAC V PEOPLEG.R. No. 180597

VELASCO; November 7, 2008

NATUREAppeal by certiorari under Rule 45

FACTS- Raul Basilio Boac, Ramon Betuin Golong, Cesar Fantone Beltran, Roger Alcantara Basadre, and Benjamin CastanedaAlfonso are members of the PNP-CIDG.- They were charged with violation of Sec. 2203 in relation to Sec. 3612 of the Tariff and Customs Code in that withoutlawful authority or delegation from the Collector of Customs, they flagged down, searched and seized three (3) containervans consigned to Japan Trak surplus (Kakiage Surplus).- Atty. Lourdes V. Mangaoang, then Customs District Collector of Cagayan de Oro City, testified that the CIDG operatives(herein petitioners) did not have a written authority from the Commissioner of Customs or the District Collector. Accordingto her, Golong claimed that they had clear orders from Boac to open and search the vans. She instructed her personnel toopen the vans only to show that there was nothing illegal in their contents. She prepared a letter of protest addressed toBoac but it was ignored; hence, she filed the instant case.- For the defense, Boac testified that on July 27, 2004, he was in Manila on leave. Beltran allegedly informed him that threecontainer vans with contrabands were released by the BOC; thus, Boac instructed Golong and his team to flag down thesubject vans. After the inspection of the vans and without finding any contraband, Boac directed Golong to leave thepremises.- The Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioners. The anti-graft court ruled that petitioners belong to the category of officersin Sec. 2203(d); thus, they needed a written authority from the Commissioner of Customs or District Collector in order toconduct searches, seizures and arrests. In this case, the court said, the prosecution established the lack of said writtenauthority; even Beltran and Golong admitted that they did not have any authorization to search the vans.- Petitioners assert that they did not conduct any search, seizure, or arrest; hence, there was no violation of the Tariff andCustoms Code. During the search conducted in the consignee’s warehouse on July 28, 2004, the employees of the owner

of the shipment unloaded the goods under BOC personnel supervision. Petitioners allege that they only witnessed thesearch; they did not make any seizures or arrests. After searching the first van and half of the second van without anycontraband being found, Customs Police Yamit and Godoy decided to stop the search despite the request of petitioners tocontinue. Since the Customs Police were already leaving the area, Boac instructed his team to leave the vicinity.- Petitioners further claim that the police’s authority to stop, search, and effect seizure and arrest, if necessary, is no longerexclusively vested on the Collector of Customs. Regular PNP members are generally empowered by law to effect arrests inaccordance with Republic Act No. (RA) 6975.- Petitioners contend that they were investigating a possible connivance of smugglers with some corrupt customspersonnel. They maintained that their act of flagging down the container vans was not connected with the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, smuggling being a form of economic sabotage which is within the powers of the PNP-CIDG tomonitor and investigate. Thus, according to them, no prior authority from the Collector of Customs is required inperforming their duties as police officers. Besides, they said they immediately coordinated with the Customs Police for thelatter to conduct the actual search of the container vans; hence, there was no violation of Sec. 2203.

ISSUEWON petitioners are guilty of the crime charged

HELDNOReasoning- Petitioners should be acquitted of the charge. The prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyondreasonable doubt. In this case, it is clear that petitioners neither searched the container vans nor effected seizure andarrest.- It should be noted that the container vans were brought to the consignee’s warehouse and not to the CIDG headquarters.On July 28, 2004, the container vans were searched but not by petitioners. The search was actually conducted by CustomsPolice Yamit and Godoy on July 28, 2004. The Customs Police held the keys of the vans. Furthermore, the vans wereopened without the presence of the PNP-CIDG’s team leader, Inspector Golong. The search was under the direction of theCustoms Police because when the Customs Police decided to stop the search, petitioners acceded and left the premises.- The foregoing testimony, which Golong corroborated, was not disputed by the prosecution. It is thus very clear that thesearch was not done by petitioners but by the Customs Police. Petitioners did not seize anything nor arrested anybody.



They merely observed the search which they requested to be undertaken to check for contrabands. Notably, the consigneedid not file any complaint against petitioners.- The information charged petitioners for illegally flagging down, searching, and seizing the three container vans on July 27,2004. Petitioners, however, could not also be held liable for these acts. It is a fact that no search and seizure of the vanswas done on the night of July 27, 2004. The act of flagging down the vehicles is not among those proscribed by Sec. 2203of the Tariff and Customs Code. Mere flagging down of the container vans is not punishable under the said law.- As regards the second issue, there is no conflict between the aforequoted provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code andRA 6975, as amended. The jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Customs is clearly with regard to customs duties. Shouldthe PNP suspect anything, it should coordinate with the BOC and obtain the written authority from the Collector of Customsin order to conduct searches, seizures, or arrests.

Disposition Decision reversed and set aside.

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