remedial law reviewer - rules 1-14

7/23/2019 Remedial Law Reviewer - Rules 1-14

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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW

I. JURISDICTION

How do you distinguish residual jurisdiction from residual prerogative?

What is residual jurisdiction? Jurisdiction of a court in spite losing its jurisdiction because of the perfection of an appeal still retainsit for purposes of preserving the rights of the parties.

A is the plaintiff and B is the defendant. Trial court ruled in favor B. A appeals. Before the records are transferred to the appellate courtthe trial court retains jurisdiction.

How can that particular trial court e!ercise such jurisdiction? "an an e!ecution be granted e! parte? #o. $n what action can the trialcourt act upon? %otion for e!ecution pending appeal. $nce appeal is perfected and the records of the case have been transmitted to theappellate court there is no more e!ercise of residual jurisdiction. But in case of e!ecution as a matter of right once jurisdiction is lost itcan never be regained. #onetheless under &ule '( the writ of e!ecution can be granted by the trial court only.

How can the trial court if it has already lost its jurisdiction still e!ercise the same? )n the e!ercise of residual jurisdiction.

What is residual prerogative?

There are ' principles involved in concurrent jurisdiction*

+. Hierarchy of "ourts,-. upreme "ourt is not a trier of facts, and'. Transcendental )mportance

General rule: Jurisdiction is conferred by law.

Exception: The jurisdiction of upreme "ourt is conferred by the Constitution.

19! "onstitution# Article VIII# $ection %& The upreme "ourt shall have the following powers* !!!

-. &eview revise reverse modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the &ules of "ourt may provide final judgments andorders of lower courts in*

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty international or e!ecutive agreement law presidential decreeproclamation order instruction ordinance or regulation is in /uestion. 0'ote: this is the e!clusive original jurisdiction of theupreme "ourt.1

b. All cases involving the legality of any ta! impost assessment or toll or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. 0 'ote: This refers

to "2s appellate jurisdiction. o this power to &eview &everse &evise %odify and Affirm is within the appellate powers of thejurisdiction of the upreme "ourt.1

c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. 0 'ote: The 3or higher4 clause no longer appliesbecause the death penalty is suspended1

e. All cases in which only an error or /uestion of law is involved.

'. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may re/uire. uch temporary assignment shall note!ceed si! months without the consent of the judge concerned.

5. $rder a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

6. 7romulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights pleading practice and procedure in all courtsthe admission to the practice of law the integrated bar and legal assistance to the under8privileged. uch rules shall provide asimplified and ine!pensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall notdiminish increase or modify substantive rights. &ules of procedure of special courts and /uasi8judicial bodies shall remain effectiveunless disapproved by the upreme "ourt.

9. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the "ivil ervice :aw.

(Revie)*# (Reverse*# (Revise*# (Modi+,* or (A++ir-*must be defined separately and distinctly*

+. &eview ; consists of &everse &evise %odify or Affirm. The term review is a catch8all provision. &eview means to ta)#>


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-. &everse ; overturn a favorable judgment to an unfavorable one or vice versa

'. &evise ; revision not a simple amendment

5. %odify ; modification or amendment

6. Affirm ; accept the decision of the lower body

(on appeal or certiorari* . to what


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The factual milieu obtaining in Tijam and in this case are worlds apart. As found by the "A defendants2 appearance before the &T" waspursuant to and in compliance with a subpoena issued by that court in connection with petitioner2s application for a T&$. $ndefendants2 supposed agreement to sign the nderta


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warrant issued by the &T" but he posted bail and was granted temporary liberty. 7etitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.7etitioner filed a %otion to Nuash the )nformation alleging that as mandated by "A #o. 5F in relation to ection + 7I #o. +-- andection (6 of &A #o. 9(G6 the court martial not the &T" had jurisdiction over criminal cases involving 7#7 members and officers.

7ending the resolution of the motion petitioner re/uested the "hief of the 7#7 for his reinstatement. nder &A #o. 9(G6 hissuspension should last for only (F days and having served the same he should now be reinstated. 7etitioner filed a motion in the &T"for the lifting of the order of suspension. &T" denied the motion. Trial proceeded and the prosecution rested its case. 7etitionerpresented his evidence. He filed an %T". "iting &epublic v. Asuncion he argued that since he committed the crime in the performanceof his duties the andiganbayan had e!clusive jurisdiction over the case.

&T" denied the %TI. )t however ordered the conduct of a preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the crime charged was

committed by the petitioner in relation to his office as a member of the 7#7. The prosecution manifested that it was no longerpresenting any evidence in connection with the petitioner2s motion. )ts evidence showed that the petitioner did not commit the offensecharged in connection with the performance of his duties as a member of the 7hilippine "onstabulary.

&T" declared that the petitioner committed the crime charged while not in the performance of his official function. &T" added thatupon the enactment of &.A. #o. G(G6 the issue had become moot and academic. The amendatory law transferred the jurisdiction overthe offense charged from the andiganbayan to the &T" since the petitioner did not have a salary grade of 3-G4 as provided for in or byection 50a10+1 0'1 thereof. &T" nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend the )nformation pursuant to the ruling in &epublic v.Asuncion and &.A. #o. G(G6. The amendment consisted in the inclusion of an allegation that the offense charged was not committed bythe petitioner in the performance of his dutiesKfunctions nor in relation to his office.

The petitioner filed a %& of the order. He asserted that &.A. #o. G(G6 could not be applied retroactively. &T" declared that based onthe petitioner2s evidence he was on official mission when the shooting occurred. &T" ordered the public prosecutor to file a &e8Amended )nformation and to allege that the offense charged was committed by the petitioner in the performance of hisdutiesKfunctions or in relation to his office, and conformably to &.A. #o. G(G6 to thereafter transmit the same as well as the complete

records with the stenographic notes to the andiganbayan.

The 7residing Justice of the andiganbayan ordered the E!ecutive "ler< of "ourt to return the records of "riminal "ase to the court oforigin. nder 7.I. #o. +9F9 as amended by &.A. #o. G(G6 the &T" retained jurisdiction over the case considering that the petitionerhad a salary grade of 3-'.4 urthermore the prosecution had already rested its case and the petitioner had commenced presenting hisevidence in the &T", following the rule on continuity of jurisdiction the latter court should continue with the case and render judgmenttherein after trial.

)ssue*Whether or not the 7residing Justice of the andiganbayan properly remanded the case to the &T".

&uling*@es. The petitioner contends that when the amended information was filed with the &T" on ebruary 9 +((+ 7.I. #o. +9F9 was still ineffect. nder ection 50a1 of the decree the andiganbayan had e!clusive jurisdiction over the case against him as he was charged withhomicide with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal and the crime was committed while in the performance of his duties. He

further asserts that although 7.I. #o. +9F9 as amended by 7.I. #o. +9+ and by &.A. #o. G(G6 provides that crimes committed bymembers and officers of the 7#7 with a salary grade below 3-G4 committed in relation to office are within the e!clusive jurisdiction ofthe proper &T" the amendment thus introduced by &.A. #o. G(G6 should not be applied retroactively. This is so the petitioner assertsbecause under ection G of &.A. #o. G(G6 only those cases where trial has not begun in the andiganbayan upon the effectivity of thelaw should be referred to the proper trial court.

The private complainant agrees with the contention of the petitioner. )n contrast the $ffice of the pecial 7rosecutor contends that the7residing Justice of the andiganbayan acted in accordance with law when he ordered the remand of the case to the &T". )t asserts that&.A. #o. G(G6 should be applied retroactively. Although the andiganbayan had jurisdiction over the crime committed by the petitionerwhen the amended information was filed with the &T" by the time it resolved petitioner2s motion to dismiss on July '+ +((6 &.A. #o.G(G6 had already ta


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However +or t2e $andigana,an to 2ave exclusive jurisdiction under t2e said la) over cri-es co--itted , pulico++icers in relation to t2eir o++ice# it is essential t2at t2e +acts s2o)ing t2e inti-ate relation et)een t2e o++ice o+ t2eo++ender and t2e disc2arge o+ o++icial duties -ust e alleged in t2e In+or-ation& )t is not enough to merely allege in the)nformation that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion of law.C--D The amended )nformation filed with the &T" against the petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relationbetween his office and the discharge of his duties. Hence the &T" had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on #ovember -5+((6 it ordered the re8amendment of the )nformation to include therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime inrelation to office. &.A. #o. G(G6 amending 7.I. #o. +9F9 was already in effect and under ection - of the law*

)n cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 3-G4 or higher as prescribed in thesaid &A #o. 9G6 or 7#7 officers occupying the ran< of superintendent or higher or their e/uivalent e!clusive jurisdiction thereof

shall be vested in the proper &T" %eT" %T" and %"T" as the case may be pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided inB7 Blg. +-(.

nder the law even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a position corresponding to asalary grade below 3-G4 the proper &T" or %T" as the case may be shall have e!clusive jurisdiction over the case. )n this case thepetitioner was a 7olice enior )nspector with salary grade 3-'.4 He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal.Hence the &T" had e!clusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to ections -F and '- of B7 Blg. +-( as amended byection - of &.A. #o. G9(+.

The petitioner2s contention that &.A. #o. G(G6 should not be applied retroactively has no legal basis. )t bears stressing that &.A. #o.G(G6 is a substantive procedural law which may be applied retroactively.

Asia3s E-erging Dragon vs D45":Doctrines: There is no question as to the jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig City over the subjectmatter and parties in Civil Case No !!"#$ The RTC can e%ercise original jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance of writsof certiorari& prohibition&mandamus& quo warranto& habeas corpus and injunction'#To recall& the Petition of ()DC before the RTC of

Pasig City was for the declaration of nullity of proceedings& mandamus and injunction The RTC of Pasig City li*ewise hadjurisdiction over the parties& with the voluntary submission by ()DC and proper service of summons on the D+TC ,ecretary and theP-(C Chairman and members

,pecial rights granted to original proponent in public biddings The special rights or privileges of an original proponentcome into play only when there are other proposals submitted during the public bidding of the infrastructure project (s can begleaned from the plain language of the statutes and the .RR The original proponent has: /#0 the right to match the lowest or mostadvantageous proposal within $1 wor*ing days from note thereof& and /"0 in the event that the original proponent is able to matchthe lowest or most advantageous proposal submitted& then it has the right to be awarded the project The second right or privilege iscontingent upon the actual e%ercise by the original proponent of the first right or privilege -efore the project could be awarded tothe +riginal proponent& he must have been able to match the lowest or most advantageous proposal within the prescribed period2ence& when the original proponent is able to timely matched the lowest or most advantageous propos 3ith all things being equal& itshall enjoy preference in the awarding of the infrastracture project

.t is without question that in a situation where there4s no other competitive bid submitted for the -+T project that the project

would be awarded to the original proponent thereof 2owever& when there are competitive bids submitted& the original proponentmust be able to match the most advantageous or lowest bid5 only when it is able to do so will the original proponent enjoy thepreferential right to the award of the project over the other bidder

.t is already an established fact in (6(N 7 P.(TC+ /"1180 that (C failed to match the more advantageous proposalsubmitted by P.(TC+ by the lime the $19day wor*ing period e%pired on " November #;;! and since it did not e%ercise its right tomatch the most advantageous proposal within the prescribed period& it cannot assert its right to be awarded the project

0acts:AEI" submitted an unsolicited proposal /original proponent0 to the >overnment through the I$T"KC%anila )nternationalAirport Authority 0%)AA1D for the development of #A)A )nternational 7assenger Terminal ))) 0#A)A )7T )))1 under a build8operate8and8transfer arrangement pursuant to &A 9(6G as amended by &A GG+ 0B$T :aw1.

The consortium composed of 7eopleLs Air "argo and Warehousing "o. )nc. 07aircargo1 7hil. Air and >rounds ervices )nc. 07A>1and ecurity Ban< "orp. 0ecurity Banovernment filed an e!propriation case as regards #A)A )7T ))) which the "ourt granted.

Because of these rulings AEI" claims that being the recogni=ed and unchallenged original proponent of the #A)A )7T ))) 7roject ithas the e!clusive clear and vested statutory right to the award thereof.

A petition for mandamus was filed by ()DC

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$ustantial Issue:AEI" is not entitled to a writ of mandamus there being no specific certain and clear legal right to be enforcednor duty to be performed that is clearly and peremptorily enjoined by law or by reason of official station. While the "ourt may concedethat AEI" as the original proponent already e!pended resources in its preparation and negotiation of its unsolicited proposal themere fact thereof does not entitle it to the instant award of the #A)A )7T ))) 7roject. AEI" was aware that the said project would haveto undergo public bidding and there e!isted the possibility that another proponent may submit a more advantageous bid which itcannot match, in which case the project shall be awarded to the other proponent and AEI" would then have no means to recover thecosts and e!penses it already incurred on its unsolicited proposal. )t was a given business ris< that AEI" overnment shall cause theclosure of #inoy A/uino )nternational Airport 7assenger Terminals ) and )) as international passenger terminals.

c. With respect to e!isting concession agreements between %)AA and international airport service providers regarding certainservices or operations the +((G "oncession Agreement and the A&"A uniformly provide that such services or operations will notbe carried over to the #A)A )7T ))) and 7)AT"$ is under no obligation to permit such carry over e!cept through a separateagreement duly entered into with 7)AT"$.

d. With respect to the petitioning service providers and their employees upon the commencement of operations of the #A)A )7T )))they allege that they will be effectively barred from providing international airline airport services at the #A)A Terminals ) and ))as all international airlines and passengers will be diverted to the #A)A )7T ))). The petitioning service providers will thus becompelled to contract with 7)AT"$ alone for such services with no assurance that subsisting contracts with %)AA and otherinternational airlines will be respected.

&espondent 7)AT"$ further alleges that this "ourt is without jurisdiction to review the instant cases as factual issues are involvedwhich this "ourt is ill8e/uipped to resolve.

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%oreover 7)AT"$ alleges that submission of this controversy to this "ourt at the first instance is a violation of the rule on hierarchy ofcourts. They contend that trial courts have concurrent jurisdiction with this "ourt with respect to a special civil action for prohibitionand hence following the rule on hierarchy of courts resort must first be had before the trial courts. urther arbitration proceedingsfiled by 7)AT"$ have already commenced.

Issue* 3hether direct resort to the ,upreme Court was a proper remedy5

Ruling*@E. The ru$e on hierarchy of courts *i$$ not a$so #reent this Court fro" assu"ing jurisdiction oer the cases at!ar. The said rule may be rela!ed when the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or)2ere exceptional andco-pelling circu-stances justi+, avail-ent o+ a re-ed, )it2in and calling +or t2e exercise o+ t2is "ourt3s pri-ar,

jurisdiction&)t is easy to discern that e!ceptional circumstances e!ist in the cases at bar that call for the rela!ation of the rule. Bothpetitioners and respondents agree that these cases are of transcendental importance as they involve the construction and operation ofthe country2s premier international airport. %oreover the crucial issues submitted for resolution are of first impression and they entailthe proper legal interpretation of "1 constitutes the duly elected presidents of highly8urbani=ed cities provincial chapters themetropolitan %anila "hapter and metropolitan political subdivision chapters.

ection 5(' of that law provides that 3the liga at the municipal city provincial metropolitan political subdivision and national levelsdirectly elect a president a vice8president and 6 members of the board of directors.4 All other matters not provided for in the lawaffecting the internal organi=ation of the leagues of :>s shall be governed by their respective constitution and by8laws which mustalways conform to the provisions of the "onstitution and e!isting laws. :iga adopted and ratified its own "onstitution and By8laws to

govern its internal organi=ation. :iga adopted and ratified its own Election "ode. :iga came out with its "alendar of Activities and>uidelines in the )mplementation of the :iga Election "ode of -FF- setting the synchroni=ed elections for highly urbani=ed citychapters such as the :iga "hapter of %anila together with independent component city provincial and metropolitan chapters.

&espondent "ity "ouncil of %anila enacted $rdinance #o. F'( eries of -FF- providing for the election of representatives of theIistrict "hapters in the "ity "hapter of %anila and setting the elections for both chapters 'F days after the barangay elections. :igasent respondent %ayor of %anila a letter re/uesting him that said ordinance be vetoed considering that it encroached upon or evenassumed the functions of the :iga through legislation a function which was clearly beyond the ambit of the powers of the "ity "ouncil.%ayor signed and approved the city ordinance.

)ssue*Whether or not the :iga properly filed the case directly with the upreme "ourt.

&uling*#o. Although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari in essence it see)#>


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" will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts and e!ceptional andcompelling circumstances justify the availment of the e!traordinary remedy of writ of certiorari calling for the e!ercise of its primaryjurisdiction. 7etitioner2s reliance on 7imentel v. Aguirre is misplaced because the non8observance of the hierarchy8of8courts rule wasnot an issue therein. Besides what was sought to be nullified in the petition for certiorari and prohibition therein was an act of the7resident which would have greatly affected all :>s. When an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringedthe "onstitution settling the controversy becomes the duty of this "ourt. The same is true when what is seriously alleged to beunconstitutional is an act of the 7resident who in our constitutional scheme is coe/ual with "ongress.

8anna2 $errana vs $andigana,an: 7etitioner was a student of the 78"ebu 0government scholar1 appointed by 7residentJoseph Estrada as a student regent of 7 to serve a one8year term. 7etitioner with her siblings and relatives registered with the E"the $ffice of the tudent &egent oundation )nc. 0$&)1. $ne of the projects of the $&) was the renovation of the in=ons Hall

Anne!. Estrada gave 7+6FFFFFF to the $&) as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds was the$ffice of the 7resident. The renovation of in=ons Hall Anne! failed to materiali=e. The succeeding student regent filed a complaint for%alversation of 7ublic unds and 7roperty with the $ffice of the $mbudsman. $mbudsman found probable cause to indict petitionerand her brother Jade )an erana for estafa.

7etitioner moved to /uash the information* 0a1 the andiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa, 0b1 petitioner is not a public officerwith alary >rade -G and she paid her tuition fees, 0c1 the offense charged was not committed in relation to her office, 0d1 the funds in/uestion personally came from 7resident Estrada not from the government.

andiganbayan denied petitioner2s motion for lac< of merit. Accused8movant2s claim that being merely a member in representation ofthe student body she was never a public officer since she never received any compensation nor does she fall under alary >rade -G isof no moment in view of the e!press provision of ection 5 of &A #o. -5( which provides*

ec. 5. Jurisdiction ; The andiganbayan shall e!ercise e!clusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving*

0A1 ! ! ! 0+1 $fficials of the e!ecutive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher otherwise classified as >rade P-GPand higher of the "ompensation and 7osition "lassification Act of +(( 0&epublic Act #o. 9G61 specifically including*

! ! ! ! 0g1 7residents directors or trustees or managers of government8owned or controlled corporations state universities oreducational institutions or foundations.

Thus andiganbayan has original e!clusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials enumerated in subsection 0g1irrespective of their salary grades because the primordial consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the nature of theirresponsibilities and functions.

)ssueWhether or not the andiganbayan may try a government scholaranQQ accused along with her brother of swindling government funds.

&uling*@es. The jurisdiction of the andiganbayan is set by 7.I. #o. +9F9 as amended not by &.A. #o. 'F+( as amended. &.A. #o. 'F+( is a

penal statute approved on August +G +(9F. The said law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons ali


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&esolution issued by the B$& authori=ing her to contract with then Estrada, and that her acts were not ratified by the governing bodyof the state university. &esultantly her act was done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office.

)t is a!iomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information. %ore than that jurisdiction is not affected by thepleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer a motion to dismiss or a motion to /uash. $therwise jurisdictionwould become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent.

The information alleged in no uncertain terms that petitioner being then a student regent of .7. Pwhile in the performance of herofficial functions committing the offense in relation to her office and taarcia his wife petitioner "larita children )an "arl Juan 7aulo and Timothy %ar< had allegedly amassedand ac/uired the &epublic through the $ffice of the $mbudsman 0$%B1 pursuant to &A +'G( filed with the andiganbayan 0B1 on$ctober -( -FF5 a petition for the forfeiture of those properties. "ivil "ase #o. F+(' was followed by the filing of another forfeiturecase docood >overnment to file independent civil actions separate from the criminal actions.

A forfeiture case under &A +'G( arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a plunder case thus negating the notion thatthe crime of plunder absorbs the forfeiture cases. )n a prosecution for plunder what is sought to be established is the commission of thecriminal acts in furtherance of the ac/uisition of ill8gotten wealth. $n the other hand all that the court needs to determine bypreponderance of evidence under &A +'G( is the disproportion of respondent2s properties to his legitimate income it beingunnecessary to prove how he ac/uired said properties. The forfeitable nature of the properties under the provisions of &A +'G( does notproceed from a determination of a specific overt act committed by the respondent public officer leading to the ac/uisition of the illegalwealth.>iven the foregoing considerations petitioner2s thesis on possible double jeopardy entanglements should a judgment of convictionensue in "rim. "ase -+FG collapses entirely. Iouble jeopardy as a criminal law concept refers to jeopardy of punishment for thesame offense suggesting that double jeopardy presupposes two separate criminal prosecutions. 7roceedings under &A +'G( are torepeat civil in nature. As a necessary corollary one who is sued under &A +'G( may be proceeded against for a criminal offense. Thusthe filing of a case under that law is not barred by the conviction or ac/uittal of the defendant in "rim. "ase -+FG for plunder.

)ssue -*

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Whether or not andiganbayan ac/uired jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and her children.

&uling -*#o. 7etitioner argues that the B did not ac/uire jurisdiction over her person and that of her children due to a defective substitutedservice of summons. ec. G &ule +5 of the +((G &evised &ules of "ivil 7rocedure clearly provides for the re/uirements of a validsubstituted service of summons thus* E". G. ubstituted service.)f the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time asprovided in the preceding section Cpersonal service on defendantD service may be effected 0a1 by leaving copies of the summons at thedefendant2s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or 0b1 by leaving the copies at defendant2soffice or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.A court must ac/uire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by its decision or orders. alid service of summons by

whatever mode authori=ed by and proper under the &ules is the means by which a court ac/uires jurisdiction over a person.ummons for orfeitures ) and )) were served personally on %aj. >en. "arlos lores >arcia who is detained at the 7#7 Ietention"enter who acen. >arcia at the 7#7 Ietention "enter. However such substituted services ofsummons were invalid for being irregular and defective.)n %anotoc v. "ourt of Appeals we broen. >arcia did not comply with the first - re/uirements mentioned above for a valid substituted serviceof summons. %oreover the third re/uirement was also not strictly complied with as the substituted service was made not atpetitioner2s house or residence but in the 7#7 Ietention "enter where %aj. >en. >arcia is detained even if the latter is of suitable ageand discretion. Hence no valid substituted service of summons was made.The stringent rules on valid service of summons for the court to ac/uire jurisdiction over the person of the defendants however admitsof e!ceptions as when the party voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by asalve=. 7latinum sought to collect payment for the airline ticalve= was levied upon and sold.

Jose 7anlilio filed a motion to intervene in the "ivil "ase claiming that >alve= had e!ecuted in his favor a chattel mortgage over hershares of stoc< in the %anila 7olo "lub to secure her loan and that >alve= had already delivered to him the stoc< certificates. &T"

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denied 7anlilio2s motion for intervention because 0+1 a decision had already been rendered in this case and that the only matters atissue is the propriety of the e!ecution, 0-1 it will only delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and 0'1the )ntervenor2s rights may be fully protected in a separate action.

&T" declared the e!ecution sale null and void due to irregularities in the conduct thereof.

7anlilio filed against >alve= a collection case with application for a writ of preliminary attachment of the %anila 7olo "lub shares. Thecase was raffled to Branch +59 of the &T" of %a


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ignored such demand prompting respondent to file with the &T" %a) 07eriod* ept. +(69 ; $ct. +(6G, Amount* '.+%1. They failed to pay so >) foreclosed the mortgages.

ome of these properties were later sold in a public auction at a bid price of 6.-%. (+ lots were e!pressly e!cluded from the auctionsince the lots were sufficient to pay for all the mortgage debts. The sale was annotated in such a way that the e!cluded lots from theauction are specifically indicated.

An Affidavit of "onsolidation of $wnership was e!ecuted by defendant >) over Uulueta2s lots including the lots which as earlier

stated were already e!cluded from the foreclosure. >) sold these properties to @or) argues that the action was barred by tatute of :imitations andKor :aches and that the complaint did notstate a cause of action. antiago died during the pendency of the trial so his wife replaced him. "ourt decided in favor of antiago ; Glots 0sorry hindi ine!plain ng case


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)efore us is a *etition for Re$ie!under Rule + of the Rules of Court, assailing the Iecember -FFF Iecisionandthe #ovember -F -FF+ &esolution of the "ourt of Appeals in "A8>& 7 #o. 6G5(9.

0A"5$* $n August - +(9' herein 7etitioner Raton filed a re/uest with the Iistrict $ffice of the Bureau of orestry in 7uerto 7rincesa7alawan for the re8classification of a piece of real property apilango filed a homestead application. &espondent %anuel 7alanca Jr. was issuedHomestead 7atent on %arch ' +(GG of ombrero )sland. &espondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful possessors of theirrespective portions and have declared said portions for ta!ation purposes and that they have been faithfully paying ta!es thereon fortwenty years. Respondents contend t2at t2e petitioner 2as no legal capacit, to sue inso+ar as t2e island is concerned

ecause an action +or reconve,ance can onl, e roug2t , t2e o)ner and not a -ere 2o-estead applicant and t2atpetitioner is guilt, o+ estoppel , lac2es +or 2is +ailure to assert 2is rig2t over t2e land +or an unreasonale andunexplained period o+ ti-e&

In t2e instant case# petitioner seeuested +or its conversion +ro- +orest land to agricultural land&?

&espondents filed their Answer with pecial andKor Affirmative Iefenses and "ounterclaim in due time. $n June 'F +((( they alsofiled a %otion to Iismiss on the ground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial court2s $rder to amend his "omplaint so hecould thus effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased &espondent >apilango. The %otion to Iismiss was granted by the&T" in its $rder dated July -( +(((.

7etitioner2s %otion for &econsideration of the July -( +((( $rder was denied by the trial court in its &esolution dated Iecember +G+((( for being a third and prohibited motion. )n his 7etition for "ertiorari before the "A petitioner charged the trial court with graveabuse of discretion on the ground that the denied %otion was his first and only %otion for &econsideration of the aforesaid $rder.

Ruling o+ t2e "ourt o+ Appeals * )nstead of limiting itself to the allegation of grave abuse of discretion the "A ruled on t2e-erits&)n the Assailed &esolution the "A ac)#>


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t2e rig2ts o+ t2e parties# pending t2e disposition o+ t2e case on appeal& W2at t2e "A re+erred to as residualprerogatives )ere t2e general residual po)ers o+ t2e courts to dis-iss an action -otu proprio upon t2e grounds-entioned in $ection 1 o+ Rule 9 o+ t2e Rules o+ "ourt and under aut2orit, o+ $ection C o+ Rule 1 o+ t2e sa-e rules&

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of therelief sought. The /uestion is did the "omplaint sufficiently allege an action for declaration of nullity of the free patent and certificateof title or alternatively for reconveyance? $r did it plead merely for reversion? 52e "o-plaint did not su++icientl, -a)#>


16/56

The "$%E:E"2s econd Iivision denied "unanan2s petition in a &esolution dated %arch 9 -FF. )t ruled that* 0+1 the resolution ofthe motion for e!ecution pending appeal is part of the residual jurisdiction of the &T" to settle pending incidents, the motion was filedprior to the e!piration of the period to appeal and while the &T" was still in possession of the original record, and 0-1 there is goodreason to justify the e!ecution of the Iecision pending appeal as 7ecson2s victory was clearly and manifestly established.

7ecson thus as


17/56

II. RU1S ' TO 2 3inc. '44' Reised Ru$e on Su""ary Procedure5

+. +ctions6 "eaning and co""ence"ent

When is an action commenced? pon the timely payment of the correct doc


18/56

value thereof to serve as basis for the receiving cler< in computing and arriving at the proper amount of filing fee due thereon asre/uired under ection G of this "ourt2s en banc resolution of F5 eptember +((F.

$t& Louis @niversit,# Inc& vs "oarruias: "obbarubias is an associate professor of petitioner and a member of the nion. hewas placed on forced leave by petitioner pursuant to a provision in the "BA which provides that* 3ection G.G. or teaching employeesin college who fail the yearly evaluation the following provisions shall apply* 0a1 Teaching employees who are retained for ' cumulativeyears in 6 years shall be on forced leave for + regular semester during which period all benefits due them shall be suspended.4"obbarubias resorted to the grievance machinery but failed to resolve the dispute. &espondent then filed a case for illegal forced leaveor suspension with the #"%B. 7arties eventually submitted the case for A. A dismissed the case. &espondent received the A2sdecision on #ovember -F -FFG.

$n Iecember 6 -FFG "obarrubias filed with the "A a petition for review under &ule 5' but failed to pay the re/uired filing fees and toattach to the petition copies of the material portions of the record. "A dismissed the petition on January +5 -FF due to procedurallapses. &espondent received the "A resolution on January '+ -FF. $n ebruary +6 -FF respondent filed a motion forreconsideration and attached to her motion copies of the material portions of the record and the postal money orders for 75-'F.FF.he argued that the ground upon which her petition was dismissed was technical. "A reinstated her petition finding that respondentsubstantially complied with the rules by paying the appeal fee in full and attaching the proper documents in her motion forreconsideration. : insists that the A decision had already become final for failure of respondent to pay the doc


19/56

)ssues* hould the computation for payment of doc


20/56

)f A the plaintiff leases unto B a parcel of land for a period of 6 years. pon the e!piration of the period of 6 years the obligation of B isto return the parcel of land to A. B does not return the parcel of land. There is only one violation* failure to return the parcel of land toA. How may A violate the principle of one suit for a single cause of action? )f A files 0+1 an action for the recovery of the property and 0-1another case for damages for failure to surrender the property.

S#$itting a sing$e cause of action

When there is a splitting of a single cause of action what is the remedy of B? A motion to dismiss under &ule +9.

Rule 1# $ection 1# eB That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause,

Rule C# $ection & $plitting a single cause o+ action e++ect o+& )f two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the samecause of action the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.

But if judgment has already been rendered the remedy of B is motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata.

Rule 1# $ection 1#+BThat the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment !!!

Joinder of causes s Joinder of #arties

There are 5 re/uirements for joinder of causes of action*

Rule C# $ection %& Hoinder o+ causes o+ action& A party may in one pleading assert in the alternative or otherwise as manycauses of action as he may have against an opposing party subject to the following conditions*

0a1 The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties,

&ule on joinder of parties* Rule ;# $ection & 6er-issive joinder o+ parties& All persons in whom or against whom any right torelief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to e!ist whether jointly severally or in thealternative may e!cept as otherwise provided in these &ules join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint where any/uestion of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action, but the court may ma)#>


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The remedy of B is 0#$T A %$T)$# T$ I)%)1 to file a motion to amend 0or omit?1 or e! parte to drop. Also the court itself candrop it because the court cannot proceed.

Rule C# $ection & Misjoinder o+ causes o+ action& %isjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. Amisjoined cause of action may on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court be severed and proceeded with separately.

A is a resident of N" and B is a resident of %anila. The real property which is offered as security in the real estate mortgage is located inBaguio. Where should the case be filedK what is the venue of the action? )f + staction and -ndaction are for sum of money 'rdaction is forrecovery of real property can you join them? @es. The venue is at the option of the plaintiff. @ou can join real and personal actions,there is no prohibition under joinder of causes of action. However you cannot join an ordinary civil action with a special civil action.

That has to be dropped.

C. Parties to Cii$ +ctions

Rule ;# $ection 1& W2o -a, e parties plainti++ and de+endant& $nly natural or juridical persons or entities authori=ed bylaw may be parties in a civil action. The term PplaintiffP may refer to the claiming party the counter8claimant the cross8claimant or thethird 0fourth etc.1 party plaintiff. The term PdefendantP may refer to the original defending party the defendant in a counter8claimthe cross8defendant or the third 0fourth etc.1 party defendant.

Who may be parties? #atural persons 0what ma


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$": &elucio is not an indispensable or necessary party. The first cause of action is for judicial appointment as administratri!. Theadministration of the property of the marriage is entirely between the spouses to the e!clusion of all other persons. There is no right8duty relation between :ope= and &elucio that would support a cause of action. The second cause of action is for an accounting which isarises from or is an incident of marriage. As &elucio has nothing to do with the marriage no cause of action can e!ist. The third cause ofaction is for forfeiture of AlbertoLs share in the property mentioned. )t does not involve the issue of validity of the co8ownership betweenAlberto and &elucio. The issue is whether there is basis in law to forfeit Alberto2s share if any there be in property co8owned by himwith &elucio. The asserted right to forfeit e!tends to AlbertoLs share alone. :ope= sought support but a stranger cannot be compelled togive support. As to the claim for moral damages the claim is against Alberto. To sustain a cause of action for moral damages thecomplaint must have the character of an action for interference with marital or family relations under the "ivil "ode.

A real party in interest is one who stands 3to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit.4 &elucio would not be affected by any

judgment. )f &elucio is not a real party in interest she cannot be an indispensable party. An indispensable party is one without whomthere can be no final determination of an action.

#or can &elucio be a necessary party in the pecial 7roceedings. A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to bejoined as party if complete relief is to be accorded those already parties or for a complete determination or settlement of the claimsubject of the action.

"2ina 7an


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rulings of the :A and the #:&" thereby declaring :otte as the real employer and that GJ who engaged in labor8only contracting wasmerely the agent of :otte.

)ssue* WK# GJ is an indispensable party and should have been impleaded in respondents2 petition in the "A.

$":@es. An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action and who shall bejoined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties isnecessary to vest the court with jurisdiction which is Pthe authority to hear and determine a cause the right to act in a caseP.

Without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of anindispensable party renders all subse/uent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act not only as to the absent

parties but even as to those present.

GJ is an indispensable party. )t is a party in interest because it will be affected by the outcome of the case. :A and #:&" found GJ solelyliable as the employer. "A rendered :otte jointly and severally liable with GJ who was not impleaded by holding that the former is thereal employer. )ts decision directly affected GJ.

'avarro vs Escoido: )n eptember +- +(( respondent Raren >o filed - complaints before the &T" for replevin andKor sum ofmoney with damages against #avarro. Raren prayed that the &T" issue writs of replevin for the sei=ure of - motor vehicles in #avarro2spossession.

#avarro leased from plaintiff a certain motor vehicle as evidenced by a :EAE A>&EE%E#T W)TH $7T)$# T$ 7&"HAE enteredinto by and between RA&>$ E#TE&7&)E then represented by its %anager >:E## >$ and &$>E& #AA&&$. #avarro issuedpost dated checo. ince it was Raren >o who filed the complaints andnot >lenn >o she was not a real party8in8interest and the complaints failed to state a cause of action.

#avarro posits that the &T" erred when it ordered the amendment of the complaint to include >lenn >o as a co8plaintiff instead ofdismissing the complaint outright because a complaint which does not state a cause of action cannot be converted into one with a causeof action by a mere amendment or a supplemental pleading. )n effect &T" created a cause of action for Raren >o when there was noneat the time she filed the complaints.

)ssue* Whether Raren T. >o is the real party in interest considering that it was her husband who signed the lease agreement and thelease contracts were in Rargo Enterprises2 name a trade name without a juridical personality.

$":@es. The central factor in appreciating the issues presented in this case is the business name Rargo Enterprises. The name appearsin the title of the "omplaint where the plaintiff was identified as PRA&E# T. >$ doing business under the name RA&>$E#TE&7&)EP and this identification was repeated in the first paragraph of the "omplaint.7aragraph - defined the business RA&>$E#TE&7&)E underta


24/56

E"$#I 7$)#T* As the registered owner of Rargo Enterprises Raren is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured by ajudgment in this case. "ontrary to #avarro2s contention Raren is the real party8in8interest and it is legally incorrect to say that her"omplaint does not state a cause of action because her name did not appear in the :ease Agreement that her husband signed in behalfof Rargo Enterprises.

TH)&I 7$)#T* >lenn and Raren >o are effectively co8owners of Rargo Enterprises and the properties registered under this name,hence both have an e/ual right to see< possession of these properties. Applying Article 55 of the "ivil "ode which states that Pindefault of contracts or special provisions co8ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this TitleP we find further support inArticle 5G of the "ivil "ode that allows any of the co8owners to bring an action in ejectment with respect to the co8owned property.

)n sum in suits to recover properties all co8owners are real parties in interest. However pursuant to Article 5G of the "ivil "ode and

relevant jurisprudence any one of them may bring an action any o may bring an action against #avarro to recover possession of the Rargo Enterprises8leased vehicles which theyco8own. This conclusion is consistent with Article +-5 of the amily "ode supporting as it does the position that either spouse may acton behalf of the conjugal partnership so long as they do not dispose of or encumber the property in /uestion without the other spouse2sconsent.

$&TH 7$)#T* >lenn >o is not strictly an indispensable party in the action to recover possession of the leased vehicles he onlyneeds to be impleaded as a pro8forma party to the suit based on ection 5 &ule 5 of the &ules.

Even assuming that >lenn >o is an indispensable party to the action we have held in a number of cases that the misjoinder or non8joinder of indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground for dismissal of action. The proper remedy when a party is left out is to

implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action. The court either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party may order theinclusion of the indispensable party or give the plaintiff opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include indispensable parties. )fthe plaintiff to whom the order to include the indispensable party is directed refuses to comply with the order of the court thecomplaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the courtLs own motion. $nly upon unjustified failure or refusal toobey the order to include or to amend is the action dismissed.

Rule ;# $ection 9& 'onjoinder o+ necessar, parties to e pleaded& Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted anecessary party is not joined the pleader shall set forth his name if


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What are the re/uirements in a class suit? The cause of action is common to many parties and the parties are so numerous that it is veryimpractical to bring them all before the court.

A party in a class suit is one representing a class which has common issues to be threshed out while a representative party is not really aparty in interest. He is only representing one who is the real party in interest.

Death or se#aration of a #arty

)n a suit where a party dies whether he is the plaintiff or the defendant what does the rule provide during the pendency of the case? )tis the obligation of the lawyer of the decedent to inform the court about the death within thirty days. )f he does not that is not a ground

for the dismissal of the case. The adverse party2s counsel is now obligated to do the job of the counsel for the decedent.

)n the first case where the counsel for the decedent has the duty to inform the court he has to substitute that without the appointmentof an e!ecutor or administrator. But when it is the counsel of the adverse party who substitutes it is re/uired that there must be ane!ecutor or administrator appointed.

The appointment of the e!ecutor or administrator cannot be done easily by motion. @ou have to file a separate petition for that undersettlement of estate proceeding.

There is a sanction on the part of the lawyer who does not comply with this obligation.

To compare that with section +G it includes resignation and incompetence and it refers to a public officer. The public officer %A@ 0notmandatory1 substitute or discontinue the case.

Rule ;# $ection 1& Deat2 o+ part, dut, o+ counsel& Whenever a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not thereby

e!tinguished it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty 0'F1 days after such death of the fact thereof and togive the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. ailure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground fordisciplinary action.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased without re/uiring the appointment of an e!ecutor oradministrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty 0'F1days from notice.

)f no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specifiedperiod the court may order the opposing party within a specified time to procure the appointment of an e!ecutor or administrator forthe estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuringsuch appointment if defrayed by the opposing party may be recovered as costs.

Rule ;# $ection 1!& Deat2 or separation o+ a part, )2o is a pulic o++icer& When a public officer is a party in an action inhis official capacity and during its pendency dies resigns or otherwise ceases to hold office the action may be continued andmaintained by or against his successor if within thirty 0'F1 days after the successor ta


26/56

)ssue* Whether &T" lost jurisdiction over the case upon the death of 7edro Joa/uin.

$":#o. When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not e!tinguished the &ules of "ourt re/uire a substitution of thedeceased 0ection +9 of &ule '1. The rule on the substitution of parties was crafted to protect every party2s right to due process. Theestate of the deceased party will continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative.%oreover no adjudication can be made against the successor of the deceased if the fundamental right to a day in court is denied.

The "ourt has nullified not only trial proceedings conducted without the appearance of the legal representatives of the deceased butalso the resulting judgments. )n those instances the courts ac/uired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or theheirs upon whom no judgment was binding.

This general rule notwithstanding a formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear participatein the case and present evidence in defense of the deceased. These actions negate any claim that the right to due process was violated.

)n "hittic< v. "A failure of the heirs to substitute for the original plaintiff upon her death led to the nullification of the trial court2sIecision. The latter had sought to recover support in arrears and her share in the conjugal partnership. The children who allegedlysubstituted for her refused to continue the case against their father and vehemently objected to their inclusion as parties. Because hedied during the pendency of the case they were bound to substitute for the defendant also. The substitution effectively merged thepersons of the plaintiff and the defendant and thus e!tinguished the obligation being sued upon.

The present case is not similar much less identical to the factual milieu of "hittic


27/56

Trial on the merits was already concluded before petitioner died. ince &T" was not informed of the petitioner2s death it may not befaulted for proceeding to render judgment without ordering his substitution. )ts judgment is thus valid and binding upon petitioner2slegal representative or successors8in8interest insofar as his interest in the property subject of the action is concerned.

)n another vein the death of a client immediately divests the counsel of authority. Thus in filing a #otice of Appeal petitioner2s counselof record had no personality to act on behalf of the already deceased client who it bears reiteration had not been substituted as a partyafter his death. The trial court2s decision had thereby become final and e!ecutor no appeal having been perfected.

Contractua$ /oney c$ai"s

Rule ;# $ection C& Action and contractual -one, clai-s& When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract

e!press or implied and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time ofsuch death it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgmentobtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these &ules for prosecuting claims against theestate of a deceased person.

When the defendant dies pendente lite the case shall not be dismissed but shall move on up to entry of judgment. This is a 8turnfrom the +(9F &ules of "ourt where the case must be dismissed. The reason is to e!pedite the proceeding.

A final judgment is different from an entered judgment. Even if there is an appeal the appeal continues. Even if there is a petition forreview after the appeal the petition continues. )t must conclude up to entry of judgment.

After entry of judgment what is the ne!t move of the judgment obligee? $rdinarily you avail of &ule '( 0E!ecution of Judgment1.Here do you avail of &ule '(? #o. there is a cross8reference to &ule 9 which provides the 5 matters claimable under the estate*

+. All claims for money against the decent arising from contract e!press or implied whether the same be due not due or

contingent,-. All claims for funeral e!penses,'. E!pense for the last sic


28/56

)n the absence of any rule the agreement of the parties will govern. ee 6aci+ic "onsultants 62ilippines# Inc& 66IB vs$c2on+eld

)n the absence of any agreement you distinguish whether the action is real or personal. )f it is a personal action the venue is theresidence of the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs or the residence of the defendant or any of the defendants at the option of theplaintiff. )f it is a real action the venue is where the property is located.

Rule # $ection 1& Venue o+ real actions& Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or interest therein shall becommenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved or a portion thereofis situated.

orcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein thereal property involved or a portion thereof is situated.

Rule # $ection C& Venue o+ personal actions& All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of theprincipal plaintiffs resides or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides or in the case of a non8resident defendantwhere he may be found at the election of the plaintiff.

Rule # $ection ;& Venue o+ actions against nonresidents& )f any of the defendants does not reside and is not found in the7hilippines and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or any property of said defendant located in the 7hilippines theaction may be commenced and tried in the court of the place where the plaintiff resides or where the property or any portion thereof issituated or found.

Rule # $ection & W2en Rule not applicale& This &ule shall not apply.

0a1 )n those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise, or

0b1 Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the e!clusive venue thereof.

6aci+ic "onsultants 62ilippines# Inc& 66IB vs $c2on+eld:enue stipulation is just for the convenience of the parties. )t is notrestrictive unless it includes an e!clusivity clause. The word shall2 does not denote that the stipulation is e!clusive. A stronger wordthan shall must be used. Words that may be used* 3e!clusive4 3in no other place4.

chonfeld was a non8resident "anadian citi=en. He was employed by 7acific "onsultants )nternational of Japan 07")J1 as ector%anager of 77) in the 7hilippines. His salary was paid partly by 77) and 7")J. Henrichsen president of 77) and director of 7")Jtransmitted a letter of employment to chonfeld re/uesting him to accept and affi! his conformity. The letter provides* in case of any/uestion of interpretation of the conditions of employment as well as any /uestion arising between the employee and the companywhich is in conse/uence of or connected with his employment which cannot be settled amicably should be finally settled by the "ourtof Arbitration in :ondon through written submissions.

chonfeld arrived in the 7hilippines and was given the status of a resident alien. :ater Henrichsen informed chonfeld that his

employment had been terminated effective August 5 +(((. He was however informed via email to stay put in his job until even afterAugust 6 until such time that he would be able to report on certain projects and discuss all the opportunities he had developed. Hecontinued his wor< until $ctober + +(((.

chonfeld filed several money claims with 77) and also filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the :abor Arbiter. 7")J and 77) fileda %otion to Iismiss on the ground of improper venue* He was a "anadian citi=en employed and dismissed by 7")J whose principaloffice is in Japan and the letter of employment was e!ecuted in Japan. nder le! loci contractus the complaint should have been filedin To


29/56

"orrelate this with &ule + regarding the non8application of the &ules to naturali=ation cases land registration cases cadastral caseselection cases insolvency proceedings.

$ection & In )2at case not applicale& These &ules shall not apply to election cases land registration cadastral naturali=ationand insolvency proceedings and other cases not herein provided for e!cept by analogy or in a suppletory character and wheneverpracticable and convenient.

)n 4ng "2ia vs Repulic $ng "hia was the foreigner who applied to be a naturali=ed ilipino citi=en. )t was granted by the trialcourt. The government through the $> appealed the case. )n the appellate court the &epublic offered certain pieces of documentaryevidence which were not offered in the trial court. $ng "hia /uestioned that claiming the evidence should not be admitted since they

were never offered. $": )n naturali=ation cases applying &ule + the &ules of "ourt are not applicable but only in suppletory character.

nder &ule 6 as well you have to ta)#>


30/56

)f I impleads @ I would be a fourth8party plaintiff and @ would be a fourth8party defendant.

" can also file a complaint 0a third party complaint1. I can file a fourth party complaint.

I can answer the third8party complaint through an answer to a third party complaint. When I answers that is also an answer to theoriginal complaint because there could be no third8party complaint without the original complaint.

The claim of B against A is a separate and distinct pleading called the counterclaim. The counterclaim is not the answer, it is thecomplaint of the defendant against the plaintiff. A2s answer to the counterclaim is not the reply. The reply is the response to the answerbut the answer to the counterclaim is an answer to the counterclaim of the defendant as against the plaintiff.

E ; intervenor

E is an outsider, an intervenor under &ule +(. He is never impleaded by any of the parties. He impleads himself. &ule +( provides thathe must have interest in the subject matter 0if the case is for recovery of property he must have an interest in the property ex: he maybe the ownerKmortgagorKmortgageeKpossessor of the property1.

@ou must never confuse an intervention with an interpleader. The basic distinction is that while an intervenor E has interest in thesubject matter an interpleader has no interest in the subject matter.

+. :inds of P$eadings

Rule # $ection 1& 6leadings de+ined& 7leadings are the written statements of the respective claims and defenses of the partiessubmitted to the court for appropriate judgment.

Rule # $ection C& 6leadings allo)ed& The claims of a party are asserted in a complaint counterclaim cross8claim third 0fourthetc.18party complaint or complaint8in8intervention.

Third8party defendant is someone different from the original parties for purposes of contribution indemnification or subrogation. Theanswer must already include allegations against the original complaint.

Co"#$aint and +ns*er

Rule # $ection ;& "o-plaint& The complaint is the pleading alleging the plaintiffLs cause or causes of action. The names andresidences of the plaintiff and defendant must be stated in the complaint.

Rule # $ection & Ans)er& An answer is a pleading in which a defending party sets forth his defenses.

The complaint constitutes the allegations or the claim of the plaintiff against the defendant. The defendant2s answer is the response tothe claim of the plaintiff. The answer constitutes defenses.

Defenses6 Negatie and +ffir"atie

Rule # $ection %& De+enses& Iefenses may either be negative or affirmative.

0a1 A negative defense is the specific denial of the material fact or facts alleged in the pleading of the claimant essential to his cause orcauses of action.

0b1 An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter which while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in thepleading of the claimant would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him. The affirmative defenses include fraud statute oflimitations release payment illegality statute of frauds estoppel former recovery discharge in ban


31/56

)n criminal cases there are no pleadings e!cept the information. The information is read under &ule ++9 before the start of the trial0during arraignment1 and then the accused puts up an affirmative defense 0 ex& self8defense in a murder case1. )t amounts to saying thathe admits the allegations. When this happens there is reverse trial. There is no need to prove that the accused


32/56

property is properly subject to a foreclosure sale. This is in consonance with the doctrine that to authori=e a temporary injunction theplaintiff must show at least prima facie a right to the final relief.

Counterc$ai"s6 Co"#u$sory and Per"issie

Rule # $ection & "ounterclai-& A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party.

Rule # $ection !& "o-pulsor, counterclai-& A compulsory counterclaim is one which being cogni=able by the regular courtsof justice arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing partyLs claimand does not re/uire for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot ac/uire jurisdiction. uch acounterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof e!cept that in an original action

before the &egional Trial "ourt the counter8claim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount.

"ounterclaim ; it is neither an answer nor a reply. )t is the complaint of the defendant against the plaintiff. )t is a totally separatepleading.

- for non8remittance of premiums. Alday set8up a counterclaim saying > didn2t pay her bonuses commissions. And because of thecomplaint she suffered sleepless nights wounded feelings etc. > said since the counterclaim is permissive and Alday did not paythe doc)#>


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accompanied by payment of the doc%" were incorporated in its Answer with "ompulsory "ounterclaim in accordancewith ection of &ule ++ the rule that was effective at the time the Answer with "ounterclaim was filed. ec. on e!istingcounterclaim or cross8claim states 3A compulsory counterclaim or a cross8claim that a defending party has at the time he files his

answer shall be contained therein.4At the time 7>%" filed its Answer incorporating its counterclaims against R$>)E it was not liable to pay filing fees for saidcounterclaims being compulsory in nature. However effective August +9 -FF5 under ec. G &ule +5+ as amended by A.%. #o. F58-8F58" doc


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%ercado filed an urgent manifestation and motion see)#>


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shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party under oath specifically denies them and sets forth what he claims to be the factsbut the re/uirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or whencompliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.

. Parts of a P$eading

Rule !# $ection 1& "aption& The caption sets forth the name of the court the title of the action and the doc)#>


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ailure to comply with the foregoing re/uirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatorypleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice unless otherwise provided upon motion and after hearing.The submission of a false certification or non8compliance with any of the underta


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decision with finality. 7etitioners filed an %& but it was denied by the #:&". An entry for judgment was issued by the #:&" statingthat the resolution had become final and e!ecutory.

7etitioners filed a petition for certiorari under &ule 96 before the "A. "A dismissed the petition for certiorari and affirmed #:&". Their%& was also denied by the "A. 7etitioners aver that the "A should have granted the petition and decided the case on the meritsconsidering that they had belatedly complied with the re/uirement of a certification for non8forum shopping.

)ssue* Whether the "A was correct in summarily dismissing the petition for being filed without a certification for non8forum shopping

$": #o. #on8compliance with the re/uired certification is fatal. To curb the malpractice of forum shopping ection 6 &ule G of the+((G &ules of "ivil 7rocedure ordains that a violation thereof would constitute contempt of court and be cause for the summary

dismissal of the petition without prejudice to the ta)#>


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+ctiona!$e Docu"ents

Rule # $ection !& Action or de+ense ased on docu-ent& Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written instrumentor document the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading and the original or a copy thereof shall beattached to the pleading as an e!hibit which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading or said copy may with li


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documentary evidence with regard to the actual weight of the cargo loaded at the port of origin and that unloaded at the port ofdestination in effect rebuts the presumption in favor of the figure indicated in the bill of lading.

Rule # $ection 9& 4++icial docu-ent or act& )n pleading an official document or official act it is sufficient to aver that thedocument was issued or the act done in compliance with law.

S#ecific denia$

Rule # $ection 1& $peci+ic denial& A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does notadmit and whenever practicable shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where adefendant desires to deny only a part of an averment he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the

remainder. Where a defendant is without


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0a1 Effect of order of default. A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subse/uent proceedings but not to ta


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plaintiff can go to the court and file a motion to declare the defendant in default. )t is a litigated motion and it must comply withsections 5 6 and 9 of &ule +6.

The plaintiff may also be declared in default in a case where the defendant files a permissive counterclaim 0thus the plaintiff must filean answer1. What is the effect if a party is declared in default? He loses his personality before the court. When he loses his personalitybefore the court he can no longer participate in the proceedings.

How can he regain his personality before the court? There is only one way according to the " which was discussed in 7anco de 4rovs 5ansipe8-51 with theTechnical upport ervice of the "$A.He submitted a re/uest for : for G5 wor


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)n a letter dated eptember +9 -FF' the "ommission "hairman informed 7aler that he was being dropped from the roll of employeeseffective said date due to his continuous 'F8day absence without leave and in accordance with ection 9' "ivil ervice "ommission0""1 %emorandum "ircular #o. +5 s. +(((. 7alerLs son received the letter on eptember -' -FF'.

7aler moved for reconsideration but this was denied on ebruary -F -FF5 on the ground that it was filed beyond the +68dayreglementary period. The denial was received by 7alerLs son on %arch + -FF5.

$n appeal the "" reversed and set aside the "ommission "hairmanLs decision. The "ommission filed a motion for reconsiderationbut this was denied by the "". This constrained petitioner to file with the "A a petition for review under &ule 5' of the &ules of "ourt.ince 7aler had in the meantime already reached the compulsory age of retirement on July - -FF6 and was no longer entitled toreinstatement the "A affirmed with modification "" resolutions. 7etitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by

the "A.

)ssue* Whether or not the "" was correct to entertain 7aler2s appeal despite it being filed beyond the +68day reglementary period.

$":@es. ection G- of "" %emorandum "ircular #o. +( s. +((( provides for the period of appeal for non8 disciplinary actions to wit*ection G-. When and Where to ile. 8 A decision or ruling of a department or agency may be appealed within fifteen 0+61 days fromreceipt thereof by the party adversely affected to the "ivil ervice &egional $ffice and finally to the "ommission 7roper within thesame period. !!!

7alerLs son received the letter from the "ommission "hairman denying 7aler2s %& on %arch + -FF5. Thus 7aler2s had until April --FF5 within which to file his appeal with the "". )t was filed however only on April 6 -FF5. #evertheless the "" entertained theappeal in the interest of substantial justice.

We agree with the "". We uphold its decision to rela! the procedural rules because 7alerLs appeal was meritorious. When substantialjustice dictates it procedural rules may be rela!ed in order to arrive at a just disposition of a case. The purpose behind limiting the

period of appeal is to avoid unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to controversies. A one8day delay asin this case does not justify denial of the appeal where there is absolutely no indication of intent to delay justice on the part of 7aler andthe pleading is meritorious on its face. )t bears stressing that the case before the "" involves the security of tenure of a public officersacrosanctly protected by the "onstitution. 7ublic interest re/uires a resolution of the merits of the appeal instead of dismissing thesame based on a strained and inordinate application of ection 5( 0a1 of the "" &evised &ules of 7rocedure.

4a-inal vs "astillo: Henry $aminal filed a complaint for collection against &espondents 7ablito and >uia "astillo with the &T".The summons together with the complaint was served upon Ester raginal secretary of %rs. "astillo. &espondents filed their rgent%otion to Ieclare ervice of ummons )mproper and :egally Iefective2 alleging that the heriffLs &eturn has failed to comply withection 0+1 &ule +5 of the &ules of "ourt or substituted service of summons.

7etitioner filed an $mnibus %otion to Ieclare &espondents in Iefault and to &ender Judgment because no answer was filed by thelatter. &espondents filed the following* a. $mnibus %otion Ad "autelam to Admit %otion to Iismiss and Answer with "ompulsory"ounter8claim, b. rgent %otion to Iismiss, and c. Answer with "ompulsory "ounter8"laim. The judge denied the %otion to Iismissadmitted their Answer and set the pre8trial. &espondents filed an rgent %otion to )nhibit Ad "autelam2 against Judge CUapatosD.

Judge CUapatosD denied the motion. C&espondentsD filed an rgent $mnibus %otion for &econsideration. Judge CUapatosD ruled thatCrespondents2D $mnibus %otion Ad "autelam to Admit %otion to Iismiss and Answer with "ounterclaim2 was filed outside the periodto file answer hence he 0+1 denied the %otion to Admit %otion to Iismiss and Answer, 0-1 declared CrespondentsD in default, and 0'1ordered $aminal to present evidence e!8parte CfailingD which the case will be dismissed.

Judge CUapatosD ruled in favor of the petitioner. &espondents filed with the "A a 7etition for certiorari. "A ruled that &T" did notvalidly ac/uire jurisdiction over respondents because the summons had been improperly served on them. )t based its finding on theheriff2s &eturn which did not contain any averment that effort had been e!erted to personally serve the summons on them beforesubstituted service was resorted to.

)ssue* Whether the trial court ac/uired jurisdiction over respondents although summons was served upon the secretary.

$":@es. The receipt of the summons by the legal secretary of the respondents is deemed proper because they admit the actual receiptthereof but merely /uestion the manner of service. %oreover when they as


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regular place of business. )t is li


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"ommon liability is the very essence for contribution. "ontribution is a payment made by each or by any of several having a commonliability of his share in the damage suffered or in the money necessarily paid by one of the parties in behalf of the other or others. Therule on common liability is fundamental in the action for contribution. The test to determine whether the claim for indemnity in athird8party complaint is whether it arises out of the same transaction on which the plaintiff2s claim is based or the third8partyplaintiff2s claim although arising out of another or different contract or transaction is connected with the plaintiff2s claim.

The claims of the respondent as plaintiff in the &T" against the petitioner as defendant therein arose out of the contracts of lease andsale, such transactions are different and separate from those between Becthel and the petitioner as third8party plaintiff for theconstruction of the latter2s project in %auban Nue=on where the e/uipment leased from the respondent was used by the petitioner.The controversy between the respondent and the petitioner on one hand and that between the petitioner and Becthel on the other are

thus entirely distinct from each other. There is no showing in the proposed third8party complaint that the respondent


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Re-ington Industrial $ales "orp vs "A: 7etitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages arising from breach ofcontract. Among the defendants is respondent British teel. &espondent moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that itfailed to state a cause of action against it. &T" denied the motion to dismiss as well as the %&. &espondent filed a petition for certiorariand prohibition before "A claiming that the complaint did not contain a single averment that respondent committed any act or is guiltyof any omission in violation of petitioner2s legal rights. Apart from the allegation in the complaint2s 3Jurisdictional acts4 that*

+.F6. Iefendants British teel 0Asia1 :td. and erro Trading >mbh while understood by the plaintiff as mere suppliers of goods fordefendant ): are impleaded as party defendants pursuant to ection +' &ule ' of the &evised &ules of "ourt

no other reference was made to respondent that would constitute a valid cause of action against it. ince petitioner failed to plead any

cause of action against respondent as alternative defendant under ection +' &ule ' &T" should have ordered the dismissal of thecomplaint insofar as respondent was concerned.

7etitioner sought to amend its complaint by incorporating therein additional factual allegations constitutive of its cause of actionagainst respondent. 7ursuant to ection - &ule +F petitioner maintained that it can amend the complaint as a matter of right becauserespondent has not yet filed a responsive pleading thereto. 7etitioner filed a %anifestation and %otion with the "A stating that it hadfiled a %otion to Admit Amended "omplaint together with said Amended "omplaint before the &T". Hence petitioner prayed that theproceedings in the special civil action be suspended.

&T" granted petitioner2s %otion to Admit Amended "omplaint. "A granted the writ of certiorari and ordered the respondent judge todismiss without prejudice the "omplaint against respondent.

"an a complaint still be amended as a matter of right before an answer has been filed even if there was a pending proceeding for itsdismissal before the higher court?

$":@es.ection - &ule +F e!plicitly states that a pleading may be amended as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is served.This only means that prior to the filing of an answer the plaintiff has the absolute right to amend the complaint whether a new cause ofaction or change in theory is introduced. The reason for this rule is implied in the subse/uent ection ' of &ule +F. nder thisprovision substantial amendment of the complaint is not allowed without leave of court after an answer has been served because anymaterial change in the allegations contained in the complaint could prejudice the rights of the defendant who has already set up hisdefense in the answer.

"onversely it cannot be said that the defendant2s rights have been violated by changes made in the complaint if he has yet to file ananswer thereto. )n such an event the defendant has not presented any defense that can be altered or affected by the amendment of thecomplaint in accordance with ection - of &ule +F. The defendant still retains the un/ualified opportunity to address the allegationsagainst him by properly setting up his defense in the answer. "onsiderable leeway is thus given to the plaintiff to amend his complaintonce as a matter of right prior to the filing of an answer by the defendant.

The right granted to the plaintiff under procedural law to amend the complaint before an answer has been served is not precluded bythe filing of a motion to dismiss or any other proceeding contesting its sufficiency. Were we to conclude otherwise the right to amend a

pleading under ection - &ule +F will be rendered nugatory and ineffectual since all that a defendant has to do to foreclose thisremedial right is to challenge the ade/uacy of the complaint before he files an answer.

%oreover amendment of pleadings is favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice in order to determine everycase as far as possible on its merits without regard to technicalities. This principle is generally recogni=ed to speed up trial and saveparty litigants from incurring unnecessary e!pense so that a full hearing on the merits of every case may be had and multiplicity ofsuits avoided.

The remedy espoused by the "A in its assailed judgment will precisely result in multiple suits involving the same set of facts and towhich the defendants would li)#>


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+"end"ents s Su##$e"enta$ P$eadings

$ection & $upple-ental pleadings& pon motion of a party the court may upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as arejust permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions occurrences or events which have happened since the dateof the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto within ten 0+F1 days from notice of the order admittingthe supplemental pleading.

&egarding supplemental pleadings these are availed of after the fact.

after the fact2 ; if something new transpired after the pleadings have been already in the hands of the court then you don2t file anamended pleading but rather a supplemental pleading.

nder the &ules of Evidence &ule +-( 0What #eed #ot Be 7roved1 judicial notice and judicial admissions need not be proved. As tothe latter they are admissions in the pleadings.

Rule 1C9# $ection & Hudicial ad-issions& An admission verbal or written made by the party in the course of the proceedingsin the same case does not re/uire proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpablemista


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$ection 9& "ounterclai- or crossclai- arising a+ter ans)er& A counterclaim or a cross8claim which either matured or wasac/uired by a party after serving his pleading may with the permission of the court be presented as a counterclaim or a cross8claim bysupplemental pleading before judgment.

$ection 1& 4-itted counterclai- or crossclai-& When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim or a cross8claim throughoversight inadvertence or e!cusable neglect or when justice re/uires he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim or cross8claimby amendment before judgment.

$ection 11& Extension o+ ti-e to plead& pon motion and on such terms as may be just the court may e!tend the time to pleadprovided in these &ules.

The court may also upon li)#>


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)f it is granted the plaintiff has +F days within which to file the bill of particular.

)f it is denied the defendant only has the balance of the period but the period shall not be less than 6 days. Hence the doctrine laiddown inDo-ingo 'e,pes vs "Aor the fresh day period rule does not apply in &ule +-. The same doctrine does not apply as well in&ule +9 or %otion to Iismiss and &ule 95 or &eview of the judgment of "$A or "$%E:E". These are the only instances when the freshday period rule does not apply.

The defendant received a copy of the summons on %arch +. He has until %arch +9 within which to file the answer. )nstead of filing theanswer on %arch - he filed a bill of particulars. )t was denied. When should the defendant file his answer? Within +5 days from hisreceipt of the notice of the denial of the order. )f you receive it on April then start counting +5 days in April.

uppose instead of filing it on %arch - you file it on %arch +6 0+ day before the e!piration of the period to file the answer1 and it wasdenied. He has 6 days. )f he receives it on April 6 he still has 6 days within which to file or up to April +F.

D. Ru$e '( ? 9i$ing and Serice of P$eadings, Judg"ents and other #a#ers

$ection 1& "overage&

remedial law reviewer - rules 1-14

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