remaking the case for linking relief, rehabilitation and development

HPGHumanitarianPolicy Group

Remaking the case for linking relief, rehabilitation and developmentHow LRRD can become a practically useful concept for assistance in difficult places

Irina Mosel and Simon Levine

March 2014

HPG Commissioned Report

About the authors

Irina Mosel and Simon Levine are researchers with the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

Acknowledgements

Many thanks to Kathleen White for valuable early help in our research and thinking, and to Rachel Slater and Margie Buchanan-Smith for helping to stimulate our thinking on the problem of the practical application of LRRD as this paper was being prepared. Many people working in development and humanitarian action gave very generously of their time, knowledge and ideas in interviews. Thanks too to Barbara Kobler, Sebastian Wigele and Hanna Maier for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Particular thanks to BMZ for funding the study, and to GIZ for their constructive engagement during the writing of this paper. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of ODI, BMZ or GIZ.

Humanitarian Policy GroupOverseas Development Institute203 Blackfriars RoadLondon SE1 8NJUnited Kingdom

Tel. +44 (0) 20 7922 0300Fax. +44 (0) 20 7922 0399E-mail: [email protected]: http://www.odi.org/hpg

ISBN: 978 1 909464 67 4

© Overseas Development Institute, 2014

Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce materials from this publication but, as copyright holders, ODI requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication. This and other HPG Reports are available from www.odi.org.uk/hpg.

�

Introduction 1

WhydoweneedtothinkaboutLRRD? 3

2.1AshorthistoryoftheLRRDconcept 3

2.2Inter-relationsbetweendifferentconcepts 4

2.3ChallengestotheimplementationofLRRDandhowtheyhave 6

beenaddressed

2.4WhyisLRRDbackontheagenda? 8

WhatareothersthinkinganddoingwithregardtoLRRD? 9

CharacteristicsofcountriestargetedforTDAandthepractical 11implicationsforprogramming4.1CharacteristicsoftargetcountriesforTDA 11

4.2Practicalimplicationsforthewayassistanceisdelivered 11

WhatwouldagoodLRRDprogrammelooklike? 13

5.1KeyprinciplesofagoodLRRDprogramme 13

5.2Can‘LRRD-ness’beevaluated? 16

PracticalimplicationsoftakingLRRDseriously 17

References 21

1

2

3

4

5

6

Contents

�� Remakingthecaseforlinkingrelief,rehabilitationanddevelopment

�

1Introduction

Policymakersandaidactorshavebeengrapplingfordecadeswithquestionsofhowtobettersupportvulnerablepeopleaffectedbyprotractedorrecurrentcrises,andhowtocreateamoreseamlessfitbetweenshort-termlife-savinginterventionsandlong-termeffortstoreducechronicpovertyorvulnerability.Theideaoflinkingreliefanddevelopment,andlater‘linkingrelief,rehabilitationanddevelopment’(LRRD),seemsintuitivelysimple,buttherehasbeenmuchdebateabouthowitshouldbedefinedconceptually,howtoputitintopracticeandtheimplicationsthishasfortheaidarchitecture.WhileunderstandingofLRRDhasbecomeincreasinglysophisticated,evidencedbythegrowingamountofliteratureonthetopic,1theconcepthasbeenputintopracticeonlytoaverylimitedextent.Withthecurrentshiftofattentiontowards‘resilience’,therehashoweverbeenrenewedinterestintheconceptofLRRD.Manyseethecurrentfocusandpoliticalinterestthattheconceptofresiliencecommandsasthebestopportunityyettooperationalisethelinksbetweenreliefanddevelopment.

TheGermanFederalMinistryforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(BMZ)hasestablished

aspecialfundinginstrument2fortransitionaldevelopmentassistance(TDA)toprovideaidincountrieswhereatransitionfrompredominantlyemergencyaidtomorelonger-termdevelopmentisaimedfor,inprotractedcrisesandcountriesinconflictorathighriskofdisasters(BMZ,2013b).Interventionsbeingfinancedbythisorsimilarbudgettitleswillhavetodealwiththerangeofneeds,fromacutecrisistostructuralvulnerability,whicharethesubjectofLRRD.ThispaperhasbeencommissionedbyBMZtolookatthechallengestothepracticalimplementationofLRRD,theextenttowhichthesechallengeshavebeenovercomeandhowtheconceptcouldbemostusefullyemployedtoday.Itissignificant,weargue,thatsuchananalysisoriginatesfromadevelopmentagency3ratherthanahumanitarianone.ThispaperfindsthatthepracticaluptakeandimpactoftheideascontainedinLRRDcouldbetransformedifitwerenolongerthoughtofaslinkingdifferentkindsofaid,butratherasprovidingsupportholisticallyacrossawidespectrumofcircumstancesandneeds.

1 ForanoverviewoftheliteratureseeforexampleBuchanan-SmithandMaxwell(1994);Buchanan-SmithandFabbri(2005);HarmerandMacrae(2004);Steets(2011);OttoandWeingärtner(2013).

2 TDAisafundinginstrumentwithinBMZ’sdevelopmentassistance,butitisalsoastrategyandaprogrammaticconceptthatisvalidbeyondthebudgettitle.

3 Germangovernmentalassistanceisdeliveredbytwoministries.Developmentassistance(includingtransitionaldevelopmentassistance)isunderBMZ,whilstemergencyreliefisundertheGermanFederalForeignOffice(AA).

� Remakingthecaseforlinkingrelief,rehabilitationanddevelopment

�

2.1AshorthistoryoftheLRRDconcept

TherootsofthecurrentdebateonLRRDcanbetracedbacktothefoodsecuritycrisesinAfricainthe1980s.Muchoftheinitialthinkingwasinformedbythecontextofnaturaldisastersandfocusedlargelyonriskreductionefforts(Christoplos,2006).UnderlyingtheinitialconceptualisationofLRRDwasalinearone-waytransitionfromaphaseofrelieftoaphaseofdevelopment–the‘continuum’model.Accordingtothisthinking,‘links’mainlyentailedapplyingexitstrategiestopreparethegroundforthenextaidphase.Criseswereseenas‘outliers’disturbingthe‘normal’developmentpath.ThisearlyperiodofthinkingaboutLRRDwasdrivenbypreoccupationsthatremainstrongtoday:theperceivedincreaseinthefrequencyandintensityofdisasters,theincreasedneedforemergencyreliefandthestrainthiswasputtingonaidbudgets(Buchanan-SmithandMaxwell,1994).Throughoutthe1990s,this‘linear’conceptualisationofLRRDwasadaptedtorespondtothechallengesofwhatwerethenknownascomplexpoliticalemergencies.

Permeatingthisinitialanalysiswasaperceptionthatemergencieswerecostly,‘disrupting’or‘displacing’developmentanddemandinglongperiodsofrehabilitation(Buchanan-SmithandMaxwell,1994).Theideaputforwardwasthat‘linking’reliefanddevelopmentcouldhelpaddresssomeofthesechallenges:‘better“development”canreducetheneedforemergencyrelief;better“relief”cancontributetodevelopment;andbetter“rehabilitation”caneasethetransitionbetweenthetwo’(ibid.).Thelinkinthismodelwasarguablymoreanalyticalthanempirical,seekingtohighlightthatdevelopmentwasinsensitivetocrisisandthatemergencyaidwasshort-terminnatureandinsensitivetotheinterventionsthatfollowedit.Thisearlythinkingalreadypointedtoaneedtodomorethanworryabouthowtwoformsofaidwerelinked,buttoreformassistancealongthewholespectrum.

AnalystslikeBuchanan-SmithandMaxwell(1994),Longhurst(1994)andDuffield(1994)challengedtheideaofa‘linear’LRRDmodel,andtheconceptofanaid‘continuum’wasslowlyreplacedbythe‘contiguum’4modeloverthe1990s.Evenso,linearthinkingaboutLRRDhascontinuedtopermeatemostsubsequentpolicydiscussionsandformulations(ibid.;Buchanan-SmithandFabbri,2005).Theterm‘LRRD’implicitlyimplieslinearitybyfocusingonmovementfromonestagetoanotherinonedirection,ratherthanemphasisingdifferentwaysofworkingthatmayrequiremovementsin‘both’directionsandbetweenallofthedifferentstages.

ThekeyECCommunications5onLRRD(EC,1996;EC,2001)clearlydemonstratethepitfallsofthislinearapproach.WhilethefirstCommunicationin1996embracesthelinearityoftheconcept(thoughwithacautionaryfootnotehighlightingthattheterm‘contiguum’maybemoreappropriate),thesecondCommunicationof2001,whileinprincipleacceptingtheneedtoapplydifferentinstrumentssimultaneously,neverthelesscontinuestoemphasisethatfillingthe‘gaps’andavoiding‘greyzones’6ininternationalassistancewouldleadtobetteraid(EC,2001).7Naturally,theremediesproposedcentredmainlyaroundincreasingcoherenceandcoordinationamongthedifferentactorsinvolved.TheEuropeanConsensusonHumanitarianAidof2007reaffirmsthecommitmenttoLRRD,andwithittheneedtosmoothtransitionsandensurebetterlinksbetweendifferent

2 Whydoweneedtothink aboutLRRD?

4 The‘continuummodel’commonlyreferstoasequentialunderstandingofthetransitionfromrelieftodevelopment,whereasthe‘contiguummodel’impliesthatallinstruments(whetherrelief,rehabilitationordevelopment)maybeappropriatesimultaneously.

5 A‘Communication’isaEuropeanCommissionpolicydocument.

6 A‘greyzone’inthiscontextrefersmostcommonlytothepresumedfundinggapthatexistsbetweenhumanitariananddevelopmentassistanceinprotractedcrises.

7 SeealsoCispandVoice(2001).


formsofassistance(EC,2007).However,inthisfocusonthe‘greyzone’inaiddeliverytheconcernwasforbetterlinksinorderto‘fillthegaps’,ratherthanthewayinwhicheitherreliefordevelopmentassistanceactuallyworked.Moresignificantly,itdidnotaddressthefundamentalproblemthatdevelopmentassistanceisfrequentlyabsentinprotractedcrises,leavingitunclearwhatreliefshouldactuallybelinkingto.TheECCommunicationonResilience(EC,2012),althoughnotusingthelanguageofLRRD,dididentifyaneedforinvestmentinakindofdevelopmentassistance(i.e.resilience-building)inprotractedcrises,evenifitdidnotspecificallydiagnosetheproblemofitscurrentabsence.

Theso-called‘secondgeneration’ofLRRDapproaches(HarmerandMacrae,2004)ofthelate1990s,andinparticularafterthe9/11attacksintheUnitedStates,hasshiftedthefocustolinkingassistancemorecloselytopoliticalandsecurityobjectivesinfragilestates,andthediscoursearoundstabilisationandearlyrecovery(see ibid.;Baileyetal.,2009).Donorshaveintroduced‘wholeofgovernment’approaches,wheredifferentdepartments(political,security,economic),aswellasthoseresponsiblefordevelopmentandhumanitarianpolicy,workmorecloselytogether,attimesthroughcommonfundinginstrumentssuchastheUK’sConflictPool.TheprospectthatassistancecouldnowbemoreintimatelytiedtopoliticalandsecuritygoalshasraisedchallengesnotonlywithregardtoLRRD(andtheapplicationofhumanitarianprincipleswhenlinkinghumanitariananddevelopmentassistance)butalsowithregardtoaperceivederosionofthedistinctionbetweensecurityandforeignpolicyandaid.ThishasfundamentallychangedtheargumentstraditionallydrivingtheLRRDdebate,fromafocusonhowtobetteraddressneedsinrecurrentcrisestothepoliticalmotivationsbehindaidallocation(HarmerandMacrae,2004;Buchanan-SmithandFabbri,2005).

Manyofthechallengesidentifiedinthedecades-longLRRDdebatepersisttoday.Whiletherehavebeensomechangesinthewaythatreliefisdeliveredandconceptualised–forexamplethroughcashtransfersandastrongerfocusonexitstrategiesandsustainability–therehavebeenfewerchangesinthewaydevelopmentassistanceisbeingprovidedandtargetedinprotractedcrises,andbureaucraticandbifurcatedinstitutionalarrangementsremaininplace.

2.2Inter-relationsbetweendifferentconcepts

TherecentcomebackofLRRDowessomethingtoanumberofdifferentyetinterrelateddebates,whicharebrieflysummarisedbelow.8

Resilience.Manyseetherenewedinterestandpoliticalcapitalbehindtheconceptof‘resilience’asthebestopportunityyettoachieveprogressonLRRD.Muchofthediscourseonresilienceisaboutitbringingtogetherdevelopmentandhumanitarianactors(andothers),whichmakesLRRDoneofthemeansofachievingtheoverallgoalofresilience.(Theconceptofresilienceisbroader,notonlyencompassingpeopleincrisesbutalsothosevulnerabletocrises.)Resiliencemayalsoprovideagoodentrypointforintegratedprogramminganddialogueacrossdifferentsectors(OttoandWeingärtner,2013).Oxfam(2013:5),forexample,notesthat‘buildingresiliencewillmeanbreakingdownthebarriersbetweenhumanitariananddevelopmentapproachesmorefundamentallythaneverbefore.Responsestohumanitarianandeconomiccrisesneedtobebroughttogetherwithresponsestofosterlong-termdevelopment’,aviewechoedinalmostallwritingonresilience.(SeeLevineandMosel(2014)forafullerdiscussionofresilienceindifficultplaces,whichisthecoreprincipleofBMZ’sTDAstrategy.)

Theconceptofresiliencealsostressestheneedtoreformbothreliefanddevelopmentassistancesothattheycanworkmorecloselytogetherinthesamecountries.Hence,afocusonresiliencecouldprovideanopportunitytoa)reformdevelopmentassistanceandmakesurethatitisdeployedmoreofteninprotractedcrisesandpaysattentiontothemostvulnerable;andb)reformhumanitarianaidsothatitemphasisestheneedforlonger-termandjointplanningstrategieswiththedevelopmentsidebeyondjustexitstrategies(e.g.multi-yearhumanitarianfunding).9Thereisafrequentlystatedbeliefthataidforbuildingresiliencecanpreventcrisesand

8 ThissectionhighlightsonlysomeoftherelateddebateswhichtheauthorsfeelaremostimportantinrelationtoLRRD.SeeOttoandWeingärtner(2013)foramorecomprehensiveoverview.

9 DFIDhasintroducedfour-yearmulti-annualhumanitarianfunding,anddiscussionsareunderwaytowardsintroducingmulti-annualCAPs.

�

reducetheneedforemergencyrelief,10thoughcredibleevidencefortheprobablefutureimpactofinternationalaidforresilience-buildingontheneedsandcostsofhumanitarianreliefhasnotbeenproducedtosubstantiatethis.Resilience incrises,asopposedtoresiliencetocrises,isnotyethighenoughontheagenda.Resiliencecouldprovidenewimpetusforthinkingdifferentlyaboutaidincrises,bringingaboutanewfocusonhowdevelopmentaidlinkstoemergencyaidandhowemergencyaidlinkstodevelopment(whatwedescribebelowas‘two-wayLRRD’).Lastly,whereasLRRDreferstolinksbetweenkindsofaid,theconceptof‘resilience’refersdirectlytothelivesandcapacitiesofpeopleinsituationspronetocrises.Thisoughttohelpshiftthefocusofdiscussionawayfromhow‘we’organise‘our’aid,andtowardsthelivesofpeoplesufferingfromcrises.

Rights-based approaches.Rights-basedapproachesthatfocusonduty-bearers’responsibilitiesandpeople’sabilitytoclaimtheirrights,ratherthantheirneeds,havebeenidentifiedbysomeanalystsasmorepromisingavenuesforpracticalapplicationsoftheLRRDapproach(Buchanan-SmithandFabbri,2005;Slim,2000;Christoplos,2006).Suchapproachescanprovideaframeworkforlinkingreliefanddevelopmentbyshiftingthefocustounderlyingproblems,suchasthedenialofrightsandfreedomsthatisoftenattherootofvulnerabilityandpoverty.However,whiletheyprovideawelcomefocusongovernance,theypresupposetheexistenceoffunctioningnationalorlocalstateinstitutionsbothwillingandabletotakeuptheirresponsibilitiesfortheircitizens’welfare.Iftheseconditionsarepresentthenaprotractedcrisisisunlikely,sincesuchcrisesaretypicallyasymptomofweakorcontestedgovernanceoranabsenceofpoliticalinterestincitizens’needs.11Theseapproachescanhoweverbeusefulinemphasisingtheimportanceofchanginglocalinstitutionalrelationshipsandlinksbetweenpeopleandthestate(Christoplos,2006).

Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR).ThecloseassociationbetweenLRRDanddisasterspresentatthebeginningofthedebateinthe1980shasrecentlycomebackto

theforewiththeprominenceregainedbytheconceptofDRRintheaftermathofthe2004IndianOceantsunami,theWorldConferenceonDisasterReductioninKobeandtheHyogoFrameworkforActionin2005–andwithincreasingrecognitionofthelikelyconsequencesofclimatechange.TherelevanceofLRRDtoDRRliesinthecallfortheintegrationofmoredisasterriskreductionmeasuresindevelopmentassistance(so-calledDRR‘mainstreaming’).DRRhasusuallybeenusedwithalargelytechnicalfocus,withlessattentiontothepolitical,socialandeconomicaspectsunderpinningrepeatedcrises.12Theconceptisalsoalmostentirelyappliedtonaturaldisasters,thoughsomedonors,suchasDFID,arealsobeginningtousethetermDRRor‘disasterresilience’inconflictsettings(DFID,2012).TheconceptofDRRanditsfocusondifferentriskreductionmeasures–whileseekingtoreformthewaydevelopmentassistanceworksbymakingitmorerisksensitive–stilltendstoseecrisesasindependentlydetermined(‘stochastic’),ratherthancreatedatleastinpartbytheconditionsinasociety.Manywhohavebeencriticalofthispoliticallyblindapproacharehopingthatresiliencewillserveasawayofkeepingafocusonriskreductionindevelopment,butwithinastrongerunderstandingofvulnerability.Early recovery wasintroducedaspartofthehumanitarianreformprocessin2005,and‘earlyrecoveryclusters’weresetupwithintheemergencyresponsearchitecture.TheconceptismainlypromotedbytheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP),thedesignatedclusterlead,whichdefinesearlyrecoveryasa‘multidimensionalprocessguidedbydevelopmentprinciplesthatbeginsinahumanitariansetting,andseekstobuildonhumanitarianprogrammesandcatalysesustainabledevelopmentopportunities’(UNDP,2008).Conceptuallyitisunclearwhetherearlyrecoveryappliesto‘developmentalrelief’(i.e.makingreliefmore‘developmental’)orto‘rehabilitation’.Inpracticetheconcepthasbeenusedmainlyinreliefprogramming.Itfocusesonapplyingdevelopmentprinciplesearlyoninanintervention,aswellasensuringappropriateexitstrategiesforhandingovertonationalinstitutionsandorganisations.Theemphasisisnotonreformingthewayreliefanddevelopmentactorsworkinpractice.Theconceptisanadministrativecreationoftheaidbureaucracy,notanewanalytical

10EC(2013)goesevenfurtherthanhopingforthisasanoutcomebystatingthatthe‘determinantofsuccess[oftheActionPlanforResilienceinCrisisProneCountries]willbeareductioninhumanitarianneeds’.

11ThisparallelsAmartyaSen’soft-quotedobservationthatfaminesdonotoccurindemocracieswherethereisafreepress(e.g.Sen(1993),amongmanyothers).

12Foranin-depthanalysisofdisastersandriskfromapoliticallyinformedperspectiveofvulnerability,Wisneretal.(2003)remainsessentialreading.


tool.Asaresultithasbeencriticisedforbeingtoovaguetobeusefullyappliedtosituationsontheground,andassuchprovideslittlebywayofmeaningfulconceptualorpracticalguidancefortheapplicationofLRRD(Bailey,2011).

Rehabilitation.MuchoftheearlyliteratureonLRRDassigned‘rehabilitation’aspecialfunctionnotlimitedtorepairingthephysicaloreconomicdamagewroughtbycrises.Buchanan-SmithandMaxwell(1994),forexample,highlightthat‘rehabilitation’providesanopportunityfor‘morethanareturntothestatusquo’.TheECdefinesrehabilitationas‘anoverall,dynamicandintermediatestrategyofinstitutionalreformandreinforcement,ofreconstructionandimprovementofinfrastructureandservices,supportingtheinitiativesandactionsofthepopulationsconcerned,inthepolitical,economicandsocialdomains,andaimedtowardstheresumptionofsustainabledevelopment’.Rehabilitationwasinitiallyverymuchseenasthe‘bridge’betweenreliefanddevelopment(EC,1996):notjustaplaceholder‘inthemiddle’,butanapproachthathadadifferentcontentthaneitherreliefordevelopment,focusedonrebuildingstructuresandinstitutionsinabetterway.

Whiletherearemanyotherdefinitionsofrehabilitationintheliterature–andthereisstillconsiderableconfusionsurroundingtheconcept–onecommonelementisthe‘strategicdimensionofrehabilitation’(Dieci,2006),whichrequires‘theattentionofavarietyofactorswithdifferentmandates’anda‘combinationofdifferenttypesofintervention’.Therehabilitation‘phase’wasthusseenasaspecialopportunitytoengagein‘development’inmoretransformativewaysbecausethe‘system’maybeinastateoffluxorfragilitythatcanbecapitalisedon.Itisa‘windowofopportunity’–ratherthanaparticularsetofneedsthatpeoplehaveduringthatparticular‘phase’.Theideaofrehabilitationbecomesmoredifficulttoapplytoprotractedcrises,asthereisnotjustone‘window’afteracrisisbutseveral‘windows’thatmayopenorclose,dependingonthenatureofthecrisis/crises.(Re)-establishinginstitutionsisalsoafundamentallydifferenttaskincrisissettingsthaninnon-crisisenvironments.Rehabilitationisthusnotaseparate‘phase’distinctfromother‘phases’,norisita‘bridge’betweentwokindsofaid.Instead,itcouldmoreusefullybeseenasaparticularkindofdevelopmentwithinthedevelopment‘phase’,whichtakesintoaccounttheopportunitiesforsubstantivetransformationthatmayopenupbefore,duringoraftercrises.TheseideashavesincebeenpickedupinBuildBackBetterapproaches,thoughthereisasimilarlackofcommonunderstandingabouttheextent

towhichthisshouldbeatechnicalorpoliticalprocess,andhowshort-andlonger-termapproachesshouldfittogethertoachievetheobjectivesof‘buildingbackbetter’(Fan,2013).

ConnectednesswasincludedinthesevenOECDDACcriteriaforevaluatingaidincomplexemergencies(OECDDAC,1999).Thetermoriginallyreferredonlytoemergencyprogramming(i.e.projects)andstressedtheneed‘toensurethatactivitiesofashorttermemergencynaturearecarriedoutinacontextthattakeslonger-termandinterconnectedproblemsintoaccount’(ALNAP,2006).Itgrewoutofaconcernthatemergencyaidcouldunderminelonger-termstructuresandwouldneedtohandovertogovernmentorotheraidactorsassoonaspossible.Thetermishencelessaboutagapthanabout‘pre-transitioning’or‘pre-linking’fromrelieftowhatevercomesafterwards.Unliketheterm‘LRRD’,whichcanreferto‘two-waylinks’(thewayrelieflinkstodevelopmentassistanceanddevelopmentassistancelinkstorelief),connectednesshasbeenusedtodesignatea‘one-sidedlink’–namelytheneedtolinkemergencyaidmorecloselytolonger-termgoalsandstructures.

Thereisadearthofwritingaboutwhattodowiththeconceptof‘connectedness’.Thereisonlyonesetofguidelinesforthepracticalapplicationoftheterm(ALNAP,2006),whichsuggestsusingitinevaluationstogivemoreattentiontotheconceptsofsustainability,partnershipsandlocalownership.ALNAPstressesinitsguidethatevaluatorsshouldlookspecificallyatthenatureofpartnershipsbetweeninternationalandnationalNGOs,howtheycameaboutandhowtheyweresupported.Itemphasisesthatdevelopinglinksandcapacityisimportant(whetherwithlocalorganisationsorlocalornationalgovernmentsatalllevelsof‘civilsociety’).Connectednessinthissense–eventhoughconceptuallydifferentfromLRRD–becomesanimportantpartofthinkingaboutlinksbetweenreliefanddevelopment,aswellasbetweendevelopmentandrelief.

2.3ChallengestotheimplementationofLRRDandhowtheyhavebeenaddressed

Themostfundamentalchallengetooperationalising‘LRRD’remainsreconcilingthefundamentallydifferentinstitutionalcultures,assumptions,values,structuresand

�

waysofworkingthatcharacterisethe‘humanitarian’andthe‘development’‘communities’.Macrae(2012)describeshowthedividehasbeencreatedbytwofundamentallydifferentparadigms.Developmentassistanceintheimmediatepost-colonialperiodwasmainlydeliveredthroughgovernmentsandaimedatstrengtheningthem.Asawarenessgrewinthe1980sthatgovernmentswereoftenunableorunwillingtoprovidefortheircitizens,theaidarchitecturebecameincreasinglybifurcated:humanitarianaidwasmainlyaimedatsavingthelivesofindividuals,andhadtoworkaroundrecalcitrantgovernmentstodothis,whiledevelopmentassistancewasaimedatsupportingsystemsandinstitutionsandwasdeliveredprimarilythroughgovernments(Macrae,2012).Thisfundamentaldistinctionaroundwhoorwhataparticularkindofaidisforandhowitistobedeliveredcreatesobstaclestochangingthewayinwhichreliefanddevelopmentassistanceiscarriedout.Itmayalsoexplainthedifficultiesaidactorsfaceindeployingdevelopmentassistanceinconflictsettingswherethereisoftennogovernmentalstructuretoworkwith.Differentdonorcountries’institutionalarrangements,includingtheGermanaidarchitecture,whereBMZfocuseson‘developmentcooperation’andtheGermanForeignOfficeon‘emergencyrelief’,mirrorthisunderstandingofaid.

Thepracticalapplicationof‘LRRD’alsoraisesquestionsregardingtheindependenceandneutralityofhumanitarianaid,inparticularinthewakeofmovestowardsgreaterUNintegration(Metcalfeetal.,2011)andtheincreasedpoliticisationofaidsince9/11(HarmerandMacrae,2004).Manyhumanitarianactorswouldstillinsistthatnotworkingwithstateinstitutions(anddevelopmentactorswhoseresponsibilityitistobuildthecapacityoflocalinstitutions)isthebestwaytosafeguardhumanitarianprinciplesinconflict.However,asanalystssuchasMacrae(2012)argue,workingwithstateinstitutionsdoesnotmeanditchinghumanitarianprinciplesbuttakinghighlypragmatic,context-specificdecisionsonwhetherworkingwithlocalinstitutionsisintheinterestsofthemostvulnerable.AsCollinsonandElhawary(2012)pointout,‘humanitarianspace’hasalwaysbeendeeplypoliticalandhencestrongpoliticalandcontextanalysishasalwaysbeennecessary,particularlybyhumanitarians,inordertosafeguardhumanitarianprinciples.Workingwithcolleaguesfromthedevelopment‘side’could,asseveraldonorsandaidagenciesinterviewedforthisstudypointedout,ineffecthelpbothhumanitariansanddevelopment

actorsdividetasksmoreeasilyandmakedecisionsinapoliticallyinformedway.

AthirdchallengetooperationalisingLRRDhasbeenthelackofclarityabouttheproblemstheconceptisactuallytryingtoaddress.Therearenoagreeddefinitionsofwhattheconceptoranyofitscomponents–relief,rehabilitationanddevelopment–mean,orwhereeachcomponentstartsorends(OttoandWeingärtner,2013).Thisraisesthequestionofwhatitscomponents(‘R-R-D’)areactuallytryingtolinkupto,andwhethertheconceptactuallyreferstoa‘bridge’betweenreliefanddevelopment,andifsowhatkind.Itisalsounclearwhethertheconceptreferstoalineartransition(asitsnameseemstoimply)orwhetheritreferstonon-linear,unpredictablephasesthatoverlap.AsSteets(2011:3)highlights,theconcepthasbeenusedwithvaryingemphasistomeanoneofthreethings:1)theearlyapplicationofdevelopmentprinciplesinemergencysettings;2)a‘smoothtransition’fromemergencyaidandsustainableinterventionsontheground;and3)theintegrationofpreventionandDRRelementsindevelopmentcooperation.

LRRDcouldbetakentorefertoeitherabureaucraticorstructuralissue(e.g.afundingmechanism),aprogrammaticmechanism(aparticularkindofprogrammecontent)oramodality(i.e.anexitstrategyorthewayinwhichassistanceisdelivered).Thecommonlyheldideaofatemporalfundinggapbetweena‘humanitarian’anda‘developmental’phasehasprovenuntenable(Steets,2011).Instead,thereissomeevidencethatafundinggapexistsforrecoveryactivitiesandstrongevidencethatfragilestatesorstatesinprotractedcrisesdonotreceivesufficientdevelopmentsupport(ibid.).Thefundamentalproblemofreformingthewaydevelopmentassistanceisdeliveredinemergenciesandprotractedcriseshasyettobeaddressed–achallengerecognisedintheestablishmentofTDA.

AfourthchallengehasbeenthatLRRDreferssolelytothewayweorganiseouraid,ratherthantheneedstheaidissupposedtoaddress.WhilemuchhasbeenwrittenaboutthevariousconceptsofLRRD,thebiggestlacunaintheliteratureandresearchisinlookingatwhatLRRDactuallymeansforpeopleontheground,andhowtheycanbestbesupported(Buchanan-SmithandFabbri,2005).InthissenseLRRDhasbeenabout‘our’solutionscontributingto‘their’LRRD’,i.e.thelinksthatpeoplethemselvesmakewiththeinstitutions(formalorinformal)andorganisationsthataffecttheirdailylives(Christoplos,2006).


2.4WhyisLRRDbackontheagenda?

MuchoftheLRRDdebatehasbeendrivenbyhumanitarianactors(asisthecasewithresilience).Theconcepthasneverbecomeacentralpreoccupationofdevelopmentassistance.Thishasconsistentlyreinforcedthe‘one-way’linearityoftheconcept,asthekeypreoccupationhasbeenaboutlinksfromrelieftodevelopment(‘whendoIhandoverwhattowhom–andhow?’),ratherthanabouthowtodobetterdevelopmentincircumstanceswhereextremeneedsareentrenched.Theconcepthasthusmainlybeenusedtothinkaboutexitstrategies.

Effortstolinkreliefanddevelopmentdidnotworkinthepastbecauseineffectthemodelwassetuptoaddressthewrongproblem:crisescontinuedtobeperceivedasoutliersratherthanthenorm,andLRRDonlymadesenseinaworldwheresuddennaturaldisastersweredisturbing‘normal’developmentalprogress(Macrae,2012).Developmentassistancewasabsentinprotractedcrisesandwasnottargetedtothepeoplemostvulnerabletocrises.ThiswasdespitethefactthatsomeofthescholarshiponLRRDinthe1990salreadypointedto‘emergencyasnorm’(Maxwell,1994)anda‘crisisindevelopmentalism’,wherebythenormativeconceptofdevelopmentisunabletodealwith‘permanentemergencies’(Duffield,1994).Linksbetweenvulnerabilityanddeepstructuralinequalitiesinsocietieswerenotacknowledgedanddisasterswereseenas‘unfortunate’eventsratherthan‘symptomaticofpovertyandpoliticalcrises’(Macrae,2012).

Fundamentally,LRRD,inits‘one-sided’or‘linear’interpretation,wasthewrongsolutiontoastillpersistentproblem:howdoweprogrammedevelopmentassistanceincontextsofrecurrentorprotractedcrisesinfragileandoftenalsoconflict-affectedstates,whereneedsareextremeandconstantlyshiftinginanon-

linearway.RatherthantacklingthisproblemtheconceptofLRRDwasusedtofocusmuchmoreonlinkingdifferentkindsofaidandhowtoaddressthepresumed‘gap’betweenthem.

WearguethatthefundamentalissueofLRRDisnottofindanewcategoryorfundingmechanismtoputinthe‘middle’,buttofindadifferent wayofthinkingaboutdevelopmentinprotractedcrisesandhowtotargetthosemostvulnerabletofallingintocrisis.Manyofthesameproblemsarealsopartofthediscourseof‘resilience’.Thisdifferentwayofworkingwouldmeanthatdevelopment‘instruments’needtobecomemoreflexibleandadaptableinordertoengagewithroutineunpredictabilityandcrises,andpeople’schanginganddiverseneeds.

AreinterpretationoftheconceptofLRRDisneeded.This‘new’modelwouldessentiallynotbeaboutlinkingdifferentkindsofaid,butaboutfindingadifferentmodeloflong-termengagementthatcandealwithprotractedandrecurrentcrisesaspartofnormality.Ratherthanthinkingofpeopletransitioningoutofcrises,weneedtothinkofLRRDintermsof‘two-wayLRRD’whereoverlaps,linksortransitionsatboth‘ends’(the‘relief’andthe‘development’side)goinbothdirections;andmorecrucially,anewholisticapproachistakentogivingsupportacrosstheentirespectrumfromshorttermtolong-term(or‘relieftodevelopment’).Asdiscussedbelow,suchamodelwouldhavetofundamentallyreformthewaybothhumanitarianaidanddevelopmentprogrammingwork.Thispresentsprofoundchallengestotheprogrammeplanning,managementandevaluationtoolscurrentlyinuse.

Intherestofthispaper,wethususetheterm‘LRRD’initscommonusage,andspecificallyuse‘two-wayLRRD’forourproposedunderstandingoftheconcept.Theintentionisnottointroducenewjargon,butmerelytohighlightthelimitedwaythat‘LRRD’iscurrentlythoughtabout.

�

TheconceptofLRRDisusedmuchlesstodaythanitwasinthe1980sor1990s,thoughithasrecentlyseenaresurgenceamongmostlyEuropeandonorsinthecontextof‘operationalisingresilience’.InNorthAmericasimilarissuesareaddressedundertheconcept‘developmentalrelief’or‘relief-development’(Steets,2011).LRRDwasadoptedasoneofthe23principlesforGoodHumanitarianDonorship(GHD)in2003.

ThemajordrivingforcebehindthecontinueduseofLRRDasanorganisingconceptofaidremainstheEuropeanUnion.TheCommissionhashighlightedwaysofpracticallyapplyingLRRDinvariousCommunicationsovertheyears,mainlyaroundcoherence,coordinationandjointplanningandanalysis(cfEC,1996,2001,2007),andin2012theEuropeanParliamentalsopublishedapolicybriefingonLRRD(EuropeanParliament,2012).In2011,theCommissiondesigneda‘JointHumanitarianDevelopmentFramework(JHDF)’for‘transitionsituations’,whichhasbeenappliedasaplanningtooltoguideanalysissupportingtheSHAREinitiative.13EUinitiativesonLRRDareparticularlyprominentinthefieldoffoodsecurity,wheretheSHAREandAGIR14initiativesareseenasawayofimprovinghumanitariananddevelopmentinteraction,thoughtheseinitiativesarequitenewandfewpracticalsuccessescanbediscerned.15TheUShasgrappledwithsimilarchallengesinoperationalisingLRRDduetoinstitutional,conceptualandoperationalhurdles(Koddenbrock,2009).ThereisnolackofpolicycommitmenttoLRRD(theECandmanyEuropeandonorsincludingtheNetherlands,Germany,Sweden,Finland,Denmark

andIrelandhaveeitherexplicitlycommittedto,orexpressedaninterestin,usingtheconcepttoinformtheiraidstrategies),andseveraldonorcountrieshavecommissionedstudiesorreviewsonthe‘stateoftheart’ofLRRD.AmuchlongerdiscussiononLRRDcanbefoundinthesestudies(OttoandWeingärtner,2013;Steets,2011;Lassila,2009;SwissRedCross,2010).

Formanydonors,commitmentstoLRRDhavebeenrenewedundertheoverallframeworkofresilienceprogramming,withLRRDoftenakeyprincipleinoperationalisingresilience.Intervieweesforthisstudy,however,notedthatthisdidnotmeanthattheyweredoinganythingdifferently;instead,theysaw‘resilience’asausefulwayofengagingwithotherdonorsandwiththeirownministerstopromoteLRRDthinking.

Newinstrumentshavehelpedtomakehumanitarianfundinginparticularmoreflexibleandlonger-term:severaldonorsarelookingatmulti-yearfundingoptions(e.g.theECandDFID),ormulti-yearcommitmentswithyearlyrenewalsofgrants(Danida).Somedonorsaremovingawayfromprojectgrantsaltogetherinfavourofstrategicpartnershipagreements(DanidaandDFID)whichallowpartnersgreaterflexibilityinfundingandprogrammingcycles.TherearesomespecificbudgetlinesforLRRD,suchastheEuropeanInstrumentforStability,Norway’sgapbudgetlineandUSAID’sTransitionInitiatives.16Theuseoftheterm‘transitional’inBMZ’sTDAimpliesthatitisalsoseenasrelativelyshort-tomedium-termassistancedesignedtolinktolonger-termdevelopmentaid.OtherdonorshaveincreasedtheflexibilityofexistingfundsbypoolingresourcesoradaptingtheeligibilitycriteriaforfundssuchastheDutchStabilityFund,theDanishStabilisationFundandCanada’sPeaceandSecurityFund,orhavesetasideaspecificshareofhumanitarianordevelopmentfundsforrecovery(Steets,2011:30).OttoandWeingärtner(2013)findthatflexibilitywithinalreadyallocated

3 Whatareothersthinkingand doingwithregardtoLRRD?

13TheECinitiativeon‘SupportingHornofAfricaResilience’(SHARE)isajointhumanitarian–developmentprogrammethatstartedinresponsetothe2011HornofAfricafoodcrisis.

14TheGlobalAllianceforResilienceInitiative(AGIR)ispromotingresiliencebycreatingsynergiesbetweenemergencyaidandlonger-termdevelopmentinresponsetochronicfoodinsecurityintheSahel.

15ForafulloverviewofEUinitiativesinthefieldofLRRDseeOttoandWeingärtner(2013).

16Forafulloverviewanddetaileddescriptionoftheavailablefunds,seeSteets(2011:28ff).

�0 Remakingthecaseforlinkingrelief,rehabilitationanddevelopment

fundsormechanisms,suchasUSAID’s‘crisismodifiers’,17seemstoworkbetterthanflexibilityintheuseofdifferentornewfundingmechanisms.

VeryfewspecifictoolsorguidelineshavebeendevelopedforLRRD(OttoandWeingärtner,2013).Thisisparticularlysurprisinggiventhelongevityoftheconceptandtheampletheoreticaldiscussionsthattheconcepthasinspiredsincethe1980s.Thelackofalinkbetweentheoryandpracticewashighlightedbyevaluationsof‘LRRDprogrammes’aftertheIndianOceantsunami(Goyderetal.,2006;Brussetetal.,2006;Ternströmetal.,2006)whichfoundlittleevidencethatLRRDasaprinciplehaddrivenprogramminginpractice.LRRDpolicieswereseenas‘toovagueanddisconnectedfrompracticetomakeanytangibledifference’(Christoplos,2006:36).

Ininterviewsdonorsstressedthatcoordinationbetweenhumanitariananddevelopmentactors,aswellasjointplanningandcoordination,wereworkingbetteratthefieldlevelthanatheadquarters.Severaldonorshaveestablishedjointhumanitariananddevelopmentoffices;forexample,FAOemergencyofficesarenowpartoftheofficeofthedevelopmentrepresentative,andSIDAhasjointhumanitariananddevelopmentteamsinsomefragilestates(OttoandWeingärtner,2013:36).AlthoughECHOandDEVCOremainseparateinstitutions,bothinBrusselsandincountry,therehavebeenattemptsinthelasttwoyearstobringthetwotogetherforanalysisandplanningpurposes.18

Therehasalsobeensomeprogressineffortstodecentraliseplanning,analysisandresponsibilityforfundallocationtothecountrylevel.DFID,forexample,managesbothhumanitariananddevelopmentbudgetsatcountrylevel,anddecision-makingisfullydecentralised.DGECHOhasdecentralisedplanningandimplementationofprogrammestoits44countryandsixregionaloffices,thoughfundingdecisionsarestilltakeninBrussels(Steets,2011).TheAustraliangovernmenthasalsodecentralisedmanyofitsprogrammemanagementfunctionstothecountrylevel,includingfinancialandprogrammingauthority(ibid.).Insomecountries,suchasIndonesia,Australiaisfunding‘facilities’ratherthanprojects,withdecisionsabouthowfundsareusedfullylocatedatthecountrylevel.The‘PovertyReductionSupportFacility’inIndonesiasetstheoverallgoal,e.g.‘tosupporttheIndonesiangovernmentinsocialprotection’,butleavesopenthedifferentcomponentsbywhichthiswillbeachievedtoadapttochangingcontexts,needsandpartnershipsatcountrylevel.19

ThereremainverylimitedexamplesofinterventionswhichareexplicitlydesignedandspokenofasapracticalapplicationofLRRD.(Thereisaparallelherewithresilience,inthatmuchgoodpolicyformulationandprogrammingmaygoonwhichactuallyreflectstheprinciplesofLRRD,butmakesnoexplicitreferencetoLRRDorconnectednesstheory.)LRRDhasalsoremainedverymuchahumanitarianconceptformanydonors,andassuchmanyoftheperspectivesandapproacheshaveonlylimitedrelevancetoare-interpretationoftheconceptofLRRDwithafocusonchangingthewaydevelopmentassistanceworksinprotractedcrises

17A‘crisismodifier’allowsfortheinjectionofadditionalfundsshouldacrisisoccur.

18Asoneobservernoted,thisisdisappointinggiventhattheLRRDdebatehasbeengoingonformorethantwodecades,andthetwoofficesinBrusselsarewithinwalkingdistanceofeachother.

19Formoreinformationseehttp://www.grminternational.com/projects/poverty_reduction_support_facility.

��

4.1CharacteristicsoftargetcountriesforTDA

HarmerandMacrae(2004)definecountriesinprotractedcrisesasplaceswhere‘asignificantproportionofthepopulationisvulnerabletodeath,diseaseordisruptionoftheirlivelihoodsoveralongperiodoftime’.Governancestructuresareusuallyweak,withthestateunableorunwillingtoadequatelyprotectthepopulationfromthesethreats.FAO(2010;2012)highlightskeycharacteristicsofprotractedcrises,includinglongevity,thepresenceofconflict,weakgovernance,unsustainablelivelihoodsandthebreakdownoflocalinstitutions.

Whatdoesthismeanforengagementinthesecontexts?

• Thereareextremeandwidespreadneeds(wherethe‘normal’continuouslypassesemergencythresholds).

• Needsareoftenunpredictableandchangingrapidly,withdifferentsegmentsofthepopulationneedingverydifferentsupportatanygiventime.

• Insecurityisoftenhigh,asstatestructuresareweakandcontestedorhavebrokendowncompletely,leadingtoabsentorweakruleoflaw.

• Thereisoftendeepmistrustwithinsocietiesandbetweensocietiesandwhatisleftofstatestructures,andahighdegreeofpoliticisationofresources(includingaid).

Beyondthesebasiccharacteristics,countriesinprotractedcrisesoftendonotshareanycommonfeaturesorunderlyingfactorsthatmakethempronetocrises.Therearegoodreasonstobecautiousabout

devisingany‘blueprint’modelsofinterventionsintheseparticularcontexts,beyondsomebasicprinciplesofengagement.

4.2Practicalimplicationsforthewayassistanceisdelivered

Twomainproblemsneedtobetackled.First,mostengagementinprotractedcriseshasbeenfromahumanitarianangle,withshort-termgoals,ratherthanfromthedevelopmentside.Developmentassistancehasoftenbeenabsentorminimalincountriessufferingfromprotractedcrisesand,wherepresent,haslargelyfailedtotargetthosemostatriskoffallingintocrisis.Second,development‘instruments’areill-equippedtodealwithroutineunpredictabilityandarenotresponsiveenoughtochangingcircumstances.Asdiscussedbelow,currentprogrammemanagementandmonitoringtoolsaregearedtowardsmeasuringtheachievementofpredefinedoutcomesandoutputsandpenalisedeviationsfromsetprojectgoals.Underlyingcausesofvulnerabilityandhowtheserelatetothewiderpolitical,socialandeconomiccontextinaparticularsettingarepoorlyunderstoodandseldomtargetedbyprogramming.Akeycharacteristicofprotractedandrecurrentcrisesandcountriesin‘recovery’isthattheysufferfromlong-term,extremestructuralvulnerabilities.Afundamentalquestionguidinginterventionsin‘transitions’mightthenbetheextenttowhichaninterventionshouldseektoengagein‘transformative’issues,ratherthanjust‘restoringthestatusquo’.Docrises(evenifprotracted)presentopportunitiesforengaginginthe‘bigissues’andaddressingthe

4 Characteristicsofcountries targetedforTDAandthe practicalimplicationsfor programming


structuralinequalitiesthatdrivevulnerabilitiesinthesesocieties?

ThelevelandqualityofengagementwiththestatehasoftenbeenpresentedasoneofthekeydilemmasattheheartoftheLRRDproblem,withfundamentaldifferencesinthewayhumanitariananddevelopmentactorsapproachtheissue(cfSection1.3).Particularlyinprotractedcrisesorconflictsettings,wherethestateisoftenpartofaconflictandunableorunwillingtoprovideservicesandprotectiontoitscitizens,decidingwhetherandhowtoengagewiththestatemaynotbeeasy.Thishasfundamentalconsequencesforthewayinwhichprogrammesareconceived,theirsustainabilityandissuesof‘ownership’andaccountabilitytobeneficiaries(Koddenbrock,2009).

Thedichotomyofeitherhavingtoworkthroughthestateorworkarounditishoweverafalseone,fortworeasons.First,statesandgovernmentsarenotmonoliths.Evenincontextswherethestateispredatory,therewillusuallybepartsofthesystemorparticularinstitutions,bureaucratsorministrieswithwhichaidactorscanwork.Second,thechoiceisnotsimplybetweeneitherworkingthroughthestateorignoringit.Manykindsofrelationshiparepossible,includingbeingsupportivebutchallenging.Thepointofdepartureshouldbetofocusonhowbesttosupportpeople’scapacitytocopebetterinthefaceofcrisis.Ineachcontextthoroughpoliticalandinstitutionalanalysisisneededtodecidewhetherthiscanbeachievedbestbysupportingthestateorbysupportingpeople,civilsocietyactorsorotherformalorinformalstructures,eitherdirectlyorbyhelpingthemtoputpressureonthestate.Evaluationsofthe

responsetothe2004IndianOceantsunamihaveshownthatthemostimportantLRRDlinksaremadebetweenaffectedpeopleandtheformalorinformal,stateorprivateinstitutionstheydependoninthelongtermfortheirlivelihoodsandgeneralwellbeing(Christoplos,2006).Forgingtheselinksdemandsgoodknowledgeandunderstandingofthelocalcontextandlocalinstitutions,aswellasthepoliticalenvironment.

AnotherkeyprobleminoperationalisingLRRDhasbeenhowtodealwiththeinevitabletrade-offswhenrebuildingduringoraftercrises.Trade-offsarenotonlyduetolimitedresources,butalsoaboutchoicesaroundprioritisingobjectives.Forexample,choicessometimeshavetobemadebetweenmeetingshort-ormedium-termfoodsecurityorlivelihoodobjectivesthroughthedirectdeliveryofbasicservicesontheonehandand,ontheother,thelonger-termrehabilitationofstateandgovernancestructures,whichwouldbeachievedbysupportingagradualimprovementinthecapacityofstateinstitutionstodeliverthoseservices(FAO,2012).Intermsofaidprinciples,thereareoftentrade-offstobemadebetweenadherenceto‘humanitarianprinciples’versusothers,suchastheOECDDACprinciplesforengagementinfragilestates(whichhavestate-buildingastheiroverarchingprinciple).Thereareoftennoeasyor‘blueprint’solutionstothesequestions,ifonlybecauseasimpleappealtotheprimacyofhumanitarianprinciplesmustacknowledgethatthecharacterisationofanysituationas‘humanitarian’hasnoclear-cutcriteriatorelyon.Trade-offsneedtobeopenlyaddressedinallprogrammingandaidactorsneedtobemuchmorerealisticabouttheambitionsandgoalsthattheysetforthemselves.

��

5.1KeyprinciplesofagoodLRRDprogramme

ThispaperhasarguedthattherecanneverbegenericprogrammingforLRRD.EvaluationstudiesonLRRD(Goyderetal.,2006;Brussetetal.,2006;Ternströmetal.,2006)foundthatthekeytosuccessfulLRRDprogrammesislessinLRRDplanningorLRRD-specificapproaches,butininterventionsthathadstrongengagementandlocalpartnershipsonthegroundwerebestabletomarryshort-andlong-termperspectives.AgoodLRRDprogramme,inotherwords,isfirstandforemostagoodprogramme.However,somebroadprinciplescanbediscerned.

Flexibility: Inordertogenuinelyincorporatetheunpredictabilityanduncertaintyofcrisesintoprogramming(ratherthanassumingthatcrisesare‘outliers’),our‘tools’wouldneedtobecomemoreflexibleandadaptabletochangingcontexts.Asdiscussedabove,moreandmoredonorsareadoptingtheprincipleof‘flexibility’intheirprogrammes.Flexibilityhasusuallybeenusedtorefertofundingmechanismsthatcan‘flex’–i.e.getlargerorsmaller,orfundingfromdifferent‘pots’canberedirectedforotherpurposesthanoriginallydesignated.Withinthelatter,apopularconceptisthatof‘crisismodifiers’or‘contingencyfunds’,whichareoftenpartofpreapprovedinternalriskfinancingarrangementsindevelopmentfunds,andcanbeusedincaseofanemergencytoscaleupfundingforrapidresponseorearlywarningactivities.Thisishoweveroftennotsufficient.Crisismodifiersorcontingencybudgetlinesallowflexibilitywithalimitedpercentageofabudget,butpresupposethatthemainbudgetshouldcontinuetobeusedaccordingtotheoriginalplan–evenifcircumstanceshavechanged.Whilemulti-year,predictablefundingisimportant,realflexibilitywouldentailnotsimplychangingthewayprogrammesarefunded,butalsochangingthewayinwhichunpredictabilityanduncertaintyareintegratedintoprogramming itself.Thiswouldmeanintegratingkey

changestoboththemodalitiesofdeliveryandthecontentofprogrammeplanningandimplementation.

Realflexibilityforprogrammecontentwouldmeanencouragingandevendemandingresponsivenesstocontextualchanges,ratherthandiscouragingorpenalisingmodification.Donorsshouldbeholdingconversationswithimplementingpartnersandactivelydemandingtoseehowtheprogrammehasadaptedtochangesovertime.Flexibilityshouldalsobeadoptedatthelevelofimpact,meaningthattherewouldbeanexplicitprogrammeobjectivetopreparepeopleforanunpredictablefuturebygivingaidthatisrelevantinmanydifferentscenarios;bysupportingadaptivecapacity(Ludietal.,2012);andbyencouraging,ratherthanseekingtoprevent,peoplefromusinginterventionstoadvancetheirowndiverseobjectives.Thislevelofflexibilitymaydemand,forexample,adoptinghigher-levelprogrammeobjectivesthatcanbetailoredtosituationalchangesifneeded.Currently,the‘effectiveness’ofprogrammesisoftendefinedasmeetingstatic,predefinedobjectives.Input/output-basedlogframesstruggletodealwithchangesinaprogrammeasanecessaryadjustmenttochangingcircumstances.Programmeframeworksthatarebasedonbroadertheoriesofchangeandhigher-levelobjectivescouldallowfortheflexibilitynecessaryinrecurrentcrises.Australia’sfundingof‘facilities’insteadof‘projects’inIndonesiaillustratesthispointwell.Asthegoalthatistobeachievedinsucha‘facility’issetatamuchhigherlevel,itleavesmoreflexibilityintermsofthedifferentmeansandapproachesthatmightbeused.Risk taking and openness to learning: Aprogrammethatissensitivetocrisesandcontextualchangeswouldneedtobeflexibleenoughtotestwhatworksandwhatdoesnot.Thiswouldmeaninvestingextensivelyinlearningtoaccompanyaprogrammeandmonitortheeffectithaswhileitisbeingimplemented,pointtotheneedforcoursecorrectionsorsuggesttheterminationofallorpartsoftheprogrammeshoulditnotbehavingthedesiredeffect.Suchanapproachoftensitsuneasilywithcurrentprogrammecyclemanagement.

5 WhatwouldagoodLRRD programmelooklike?


Thorough context and political analysis: Agenuine‘two-wayLRRD’programmewouldrequirestrongcontextanalysis,includingathoroughunderstandingofthepoliticaleconomy,localpowerrelationsandthestructuralinequalitiesunderpinningvulnerabilityandpoverty.Forexample,BMZ’s2013policyforworkinginfragilecontexts(BMZ,2013a)makesconflictanalysisessential(pp.16and20).Strongcontextanalysisispremiseduponin-depthknowledgeofandgoodlinkswithlocalinstitutionsandorganisations

andthepeoplewhoaretobetheultimatebeneficiariesofaid.Therewouldneedtobeafundamentalrethinkingbothwithregardtothetimethat‘real’engagementandanalysistakes,andthewaythisengagementisdone.

Working with local institutions:Inordertogenuinelyreformthewaydevelopmentassistanceworksincrises,aidactorsalsoneedtobemuchmoreopenandreflectiveaboutthewaystheyengagewithlocalinstitutionsandorganisationsonanumberoflevels:therangeofpartners;thenatureoftherelationshipsformed;andtheextenttowhichtherelationshipsreflectrealityontheground.Thoughthereareofcourseexamplesofverydifferentpracticeinmanycountries,alltoooftenengagementislimitedtostateactorsor‘localNGOs’,organisationscreatedasvehiclestochannelinternationalaid.Inmanyprotractedcrises,abroaderperspectiveandunderstandingofthekindsofactorsthatarelocallyimportantandpotentiallyusefuliscrucial.Thesemayincludenotonlydifferentlevelsofthestate(local,regional,mid-levelbureaucrats)butalsootherformalandinformalinstitutions(traditionalauthorities,clanstructuresetc.),localcivilsocietygroups(beyondnationalNGOs)andbusinesses.21Crucialforsuchengagementwillbeagoodunderstandingoflocalpowerrelations.Ideally,relationswouldbebuiltwithorganisationsthatalsotakeaholisticapproachtoworkingacrossthewholerelief–developmentspectrum.Thisishoweveroftenchallenging.Relationshipsand/orpartnershipscanencourageorganisationstobuildmorelinkswithreliefanddevelopmentpartnersanddonors.

Asmentionedabove,awiderangeofpossiblerelationshipsareavailablewithbothstateandnon-stateinstitutions.Notallrelationshipsneedtobeoutrightpartnerships,i.e.wheresharedgoalsarepursuedtogether,andwhereeitherorganisationmaysacrificeoneoftheirgoalsforthesakeoftheother’s.Meaningfulrelationshipsorcollaborationstoagreaterorlesserdegreemaybemoreappropriateinprotractedcrises,particularwiththestateandprivatebusinesses.Guidingquestionsforsuchrelationshipswouldinclude:

Thereisarecentmovetowardsinvestingingeneratingreal-timelearningeitherwithinorasanaccompanimenttooperationalaidprogrammes.Theselearningcomponentsaredesignedtogeneratebothlocallyspecificlessonsfortheprogrammeitself–whichthenhastobedesignedwithsufficientflexibilitytotakeadvantageofthelearning–andmoregeneralorthematiclessonsforawideraudience.GoodexamplesofprogrammeswithinbuiltlearningpartnershipsincludesomeofDFID’sdevelopment,multi-yearhumanitarianandclimatechangeprogrammes,20andUSAID’sSahelResilienceLearningProject(SAREL).

TheDFIDAAWAZprogrammeinPakistanisarrangedaroundaconsortiumofimplementingpartnerswithoneresearchpartnerresponsibleforevidencecollectionandlearningasanintegralpartoftheconsortium.Thisresearchpartnercarriesoutresearchandcollectsevidence,monitorsimplementationandprogressandadvisesonchangesbasedoncontextanalysisandevidencecollected.Theprogrammeismulti-yearanddesignedinphases,withtheinceptionphaseoftenintendedforadditionalresearchaswellastriallingandtestingriskierprogrammeapproachesorcomponents.Theexplicitassumptionunderpinningthisprogrammedesignisthatcertainprogrammecomponentsmightchangesignificantlyorwillevenbediscontinuedafterinitialtrialifthecontextchanges.

Box1:Learningwhiledoing

20SeeDFIDPakistanBusinessCasefordetailedexplanationofthemodel.OtherexamplesincludeDFID’sBuildingResilienceandAdaptationtoClimateExtremesandDisastersProgramme(BRACED)andBuildingResilientCommunitiesinSomalia.

21Governmentalinternationalassistance,bothbilateralandmultilateral,tendstoseethecentralgovernmentasthenaturalpartner,particularlyfordevelopmentassistance.SomespecificfundinginstrumentssuchasTDAhavetheflexibilitytomoveawayfromthisandworkwithlocalgovernmentoroutsidethegovernmentaltogether.

��

• Overthelongterm,doestherelationshipbringaboutpositivechangeinthelivesofaffectedpeople?

• Doweunderstandanypossiblenegativeimpactsofestablishingrelationshipswithparticularinstitutions?Aremechanismsinplaceformonitoringthisandcouldtherisksbemitigated?

• Towhatextentarepartnerinstitutionsabletoserveaffectedpeopleinthelongterm,andwithwhatlegitimacy?

• Arepeople’slinkswiththeinstitutionsthatareimportantandmeaningfultotheminthelongertermbeingsupported(e.g.localorcentralgovernment,traditionalauthorities,informalstructures)?

Engagementisoftenintendedtobuildthecapacityoftheorganisation:itshouldratherbepremisedontheoverallgoaltoimprovethelivesofthepeoplewhohavetodealwithit.Anassessmentofwhether

strengtheningorengagingwithanorganisationwillcontributetoimprovingpeople’slives–andinwhatway–wouldbeanimportantfirststepinanyanalysisofhowbesttosupportthatorganisation.

Currentapproachesalsofocusoverlyon‘capacity-building’throughone-offengagementandanoverrelianceontransferringskills.Ananalysisofactualconstraintstofunctionalitywithinorganisationsmayfindverydifferentproblems,e.g.highstaffturnoverinlocalgovernment(seeforexampleWorldBank(2001)).InthecontextswhereTDAwillbeused,functionalityshouldalsobeforwardlooking,supportingtheadaptivecapacityoforganisationssotheycanadjustthemselvestoachangingfuture.Thereisaninevitabletensionbetweenworkingthroughexistingprocessesandnormstobringchangeandworkingtochallengeandtransformtheacceptednormswhichcreateor

UNICEFtooktheUgandangovernment’sSelfRelianceStrategy(SRS)asastartingpointandpaidtheset-upcostsforanationalmicrofinanceinstitutetostartworkinginNorthernUgandawhichcouldlendtorefugees(thoughnotexclusively,andineffectmostmoneywaslenttolocalgovernmentofficialsastheycouldguaranteeloanswiththeirregularsalary).Thishelpedindirectlytopayforcontinuityofservicesnotonlyforthelocalpopulationbutalsoforrefugees.Thiswasnevercalledan‘LRRDproject’,butittackledissuesfromalonger-termperspective,workedwithingovernmentpolicies(e.g.theSRSstrategy),and,ratherthanemergency-typeprogram-mingforvulnerablegroups,helpedprovideservicestoall–whileensuringthatrefugeeswereincludedinservicesthathadbeenidentifiedasusefulforthem.

DANIDAsupportedaPublicWorksProgrammewhichgavepeoplevouchersforworkwithwhichtheycouldgetfarmingsupplies.Thiswaslinkedtoalong-termnationalbusinesscreditprogrammesupportingsuppliers.DANIDAcombinedthiswithstrongadvocacyagainstthefreedistributionofseedsandtools,whichwasunderminingattemptstodevelopamarketthatcouldprovideasustain-ablesupplyofagriculturalinputsandservices.

Inseveralsituationsofdisplacement,NRChassetuplocalcounsellingcentrestoprovideinformation

andlegaladvicetoall(refugees,IDPs,locals),includingonhowtotackleunderlyingissuessuchasconflictoverlandandhowtoresolvedisputesconstructively.Thecentresalsohelpconnectpeopletostateservices,livelihoodopportuni-ties(e.g.jobcentresandvocationaltraining)andadviceonhowtoaccessland,therebyequippingpeoplewithinformationandknowledgeaswellasconnectingthemwithstateandnon-statestruc-tures.

ReintegrationandDevelopmentCentres(RDCs)inSouthSudanrunbywhatwasthentheGermanDevelopmentService(DED)establishedaninitialfocalpointforreturnees(returningIDPs,refugees,locals)undertheoverallauthorityofthelocalgovernment.Atthisfocalpointpeoplecouldgetconnectedtolocalgovernment,foundinformationonlivelihoodandtrainingopportunities(linkstoagovernmentjobsdatabaseaswellastoopportuni-tiesprovidedbyotherNGOs)andinformationonwheretogetaccesstocreditandbusinessgrants,aswellastheavailabilityoflocalservices(e.g.HIV/AIDStreatments).Theprojecttherebyencour-agedgreatercitizen–statelinksandengagement,andalsocreatedaspaceformutualexchangeanddialogue,whichenabledpeopletoexpresstheirdemandforservicesandallowedlocalgovernmentofficialstohearandengagewithcitizens.

Box2:WhatdogoodLRRDprojectslooklike?


maintaininequalityorvulnerability.Therearenosimplerulestodeterminehowtomanagethistension,excepttostresstheneedtobeawareofitandtomakeexplicitandreasonedchoices.

Joint analysis/planning and learning at country level:Ideally,farmorepeopleshouldbeinvolvedinaidplanning,includingacademicsandindividualsfromdifferentpartsofgovernment,andtheaspirationsofthepeople22affectedbycrisisshouldbethestartingpointforaidplanning.Decentralisationisgenerallyseenasconduciveto‘goodLRRD’becauseitispresumedthatstaffwillbe‘closertotheground’andhaveabetterunderstandingofthelocalcontext(Steets,2011;Otto&Weingärtner,2013).However,decentralisationoftenmeanshandingoverresponsibilitywithoutthepower(e.g.theresources)tomeetthoseresponsibilities,allowingthecentralauthoritytoabsolveitselfofaccountability.Itcannotbeassumedthatgovernmentstaffclosertoaconflictwillalwaysconductamoreimpartialanalysisorbeawareofallthenationalorregionalissuesofconcern.

Realistic programming: Moreclarityandamorerealisticunderstandingaboutwhataprogrammecanachieveisrequired.Inmostcases,peoplecontinuewiththeirlivesregardlessoftheoftenchaoticworkingsofaidprogrammes.Inthissense,ashiftawayfromapreoccupationwiththebureaucracyoftheaidindustryandafocusonwhataffectedpeoplearedoingalready,andhowtheiragencyandlinkstoinstitutionscanbestbesupported,wouldbeagoodstepforwardforthe‘LRRDdebate’.

Box2givessomeillustrationsofwhatmightberegardedasgoodLRRDprojects.Noneoftheseprojectswasexplicitlyintendedtobean‘LRRDproject’,buttheyaddressedstructuralneedsinemergencyorrecoverysituationsbyusingshort-terminterventionsdesignedfromalong-termperspective.Somecommoncharacteristicscanbediscerned:

• Identifyarealconstraintandtrytotackleitwithasfewexternalresourcesaspossible,andwithoutprovidingasubstituteservice.

• Establishlinksbetweenpeopleandlong-termself-sustainingformal/informalinstitutionsorstatestructureswhichhelpbuildlonger-termrelationships.

• Helppeopletoadapt–whetherthroughtheprovisionofinformation,skillsoradaptivecapacity.

• Respondtopressingneedswithashort-terminterventionwhichtakesalonger-termperspective.

• Activelyencouragesynergieswithotherreliefordevelopmentinterventions,statepoliciesortheprivatesector.

5.2Can‘LRRD-ness’beevaluated?

If,asweargue,theconceptofLRRDneedstobereinterpretedtomeanthatreliefand,especially,developmentassistanceismorecloselytargetedatpeople’sneedsinprotractedcrises,thenthereisno‘measure’or‘blueprint’modelbywhichonecanevaluateaprojectfor‘LRRD-ness’.‘LRRD-ness’shouldnotbea‘quality’ofaproject,butratherawayofapproachingasituation.Inthissensetheprojectwouldbeevaluatedforbeingagooddevelopmentproject–i.e.onethatiscloselytargetedatpreventingthemostvulnerablepeoplefromfallingintocrises–ratherthanforbeinggoodat‘LRRD’.

Thekeyaspectsthatevaluatorswouldlookoutforcouldinclude:

• Howsuitablewastheprogrammeforasituationwherecrisesare‘normal’?

• Howwellhastheprogrammemetthechangingneedsofthemostvulnerable?

• Howappropriatewasitsdesignforinsecureenvironmentswithaconstantlychangingcontext?

• Howwelldidtheprogrammeconsiderthepoliticisationofaidandresources?

• Howhaslong-termworkhelpedincrises,forexamplebyreducingaparticularproblemorriskorbysupportingpeoplesothattheycancopebetter?

• Howwellhastheprogrammeencouragedlinksonthegroundbetweenpeopleandinstitutionsororganisationsthatsupporttheminthelongerterm?

• Whereonlyshort-termaidwasgiven,couldsupporthavebeenmoreeffectiveifgiveninalonger-termway?

• Howadequatewerethestrategyprocesses,thelevelofcontextandpoliticalanalysis,theappropriatenessofthemodelsemployed,currentimpactandlikelyfutureimpact?

22Thesearerarelydocumented.SeeIFRC(2013)forarareexample.

��

6 Practicalimplicationsof takingLRRDseriously

Changingthewaythatprogrammesworkwillhaveimplicationsonmultiplelevelsandacrossdifferentdimensions.TheseincludethewaythatBMZcurrentlyworkswithdifferentdepartmentsandministries,aswellasresourceimplications,changestothelevelsandtypesofskillsneededforprogrammingandanalysis,thelevelsofinvestmentneededforanalysisandpoliticalunderstandingandstaffinglevels.

AtthestrategiclevelIfpeople’schangingneedsincrisissituationsaretobeaddressedinaholisticmannerbytheGermangovernment,itwillbeimportanttodevelopasinglecommonstrategyatthecountrylevel.Suchastrategymustbebasedonajointanalysisbyemergencyanddevelopmentactorsoftheinterplaybetweenchronicproblems,underlyingstructuralcausesandacutevulnerabilitiesorneeds.Thiscountry-levelstrategyshouldincludeananalysisofwhatcanbedoneoverthelongertermtoreduceproblems,andalsowhatwillbedoneintheshorttermasandwhencrisesoccur.TherearespecificissuesforGermanassistancebecausethedifferentministriesfordevelopmentandemergencyaiddonotalwaysworkinthesamecountries.Insuchcountries,analysiscandrawonclosecooperationanddiscussionswithotheragenciesincludingbilateralandmultilateraldonorspresentinthecountry.BMZmustrealisethepotentialoftheTDAwithamandatetoachievetwo-wayLRRD.Itcanbeusedtoinfluencechangeatmultiplelevels:

• asafund,tofinanceinterventionsthattakeaholistictwo-wayLRRDperspective;

• aspartofacountryportfoliooffunds,togiveatwo-wayLRRDperspectivemoreprominence,encouragingjointanalysisandworkingacrossthewholeemergency–developmentspectrum;

• bringingaboutchangewithintheoverallGermanaidarchitecturebyusingTDAtoencouragegreatercoordinationbetweenBMZandtheGermanFederalForeignOffice,bothatthestrategicandthecountryprogrammelevel;

• aspartofBMZ’soveralldevelopmentcooperation,pilotinggoodflexiblemodalitieswhichcanbeadoptedasmainstreamdevelopmentapproachesacrossmoreandmorecountries;and

• withintheaidsectorinternationally,exploitinginfluencewithotherdonors(andtheaid‘system’morebroadly)toencouragemorewidespreadpracticalapplicationof‘two-wayLRRD’.ThislatterobjectivewillrelyoncloserdirectcoordinationwithotherEuropeandonors,includingpotentialbilateralworkwithstrategicallychosenlike-mindedEUmemberstates.

Oneaidfund,orevenonedonor,cannotonitsownchangetheinternationalaidsystem.Itshouldseektobeanagentforchange,seeklike-mindedalliesanddevelopacoherentstrategy.

Attheprogramme/thematiclevelTheTDAwillhopefullybeusedforinnovativeprogramming,experimentingwithandlearningfromdifferentimplementationmodalitiesandflexible,longer-termapproachesthat‘track’andrespondtochangesinthelocalsituation.

Akeydilemmaistheextenttowhichdonors’developmentstrategyshouldfollowgovernmentdevelopmentpolicy–inparticularinprotractedcriseswherethegovernmentmaybeapartof,oracauseof,theproblem.Therearenoeasyanswerstothis,butdonorscanatleastensurethatthequestionhasbeenexplicitlyconsideredandadequatejustificationgivenforthechoicesmade.

Inmanycrises,fundinghorizonsareshortterm.EvenwheretheseareextendedthroughtheTDAorsimilarapproaches,thetimehorizonmaynotbeadequateforlearningaboutthelonger-termimpactsofinterventionsifmonitoringandevaluationislimitedtoprojecttimeframes.Itisessentialthatdonorsencourageandfinanceevaluationsorstudiesofthechangebroughtaboutbyinterventionsyearsaftertheyhaveended.


ImplicationsfortheaidarchitectureandaidbureaucracyFlexiblelong-termprogrammingthatcanalsorespondtoshort-termneedsdemandseithermoreflexibilityintherangeofprogrammes(fromrelieftodevelopment)thatonefundoragencysupports,orsignificantcooperationbetweendifferentfunds/organisations,suchasclosecooperationbetweenpartneragenciesoftheGermanFederalForeignOfficeandBMZinthefield.WhenfundingorganisationsthroughTDA,BMZshouldexpectthemtosayhowtheywouldhandlecrisesshouldemergencyreliefberequired.

Ideally,‘two-wayLRRD’workswithpartnersatthelocallevelwhocanimplementacrosstheentirerelief-to-developmentspectrum.However,itcanbechallengingtosustaintheserelationshipsgiventhatdifferentministriestendtoworkwithdifferentpartners,andfundingcontinuestobebifurcated.Thereisaneedtofindwaystobettersustaintheserelationshipsgivencurrentbureaucraticandfinancialconstraints,includingwithintheGermanaidarchitecture.

Workingacrossthespectrumwillentailcollaborationwithboththeemergencycoordinationsystem(i.e.theclustersystem)anddevelopmentcoordinationmechanisms(e.g.budgetsectorworkinggroups).Currently,thereissignificant‘silo-fication’intwoways:thedifferentsectorworkinggroupsanddifferentclustersworkintheirownsilos;andtheclustersystemasawholeanddevelopmentcooperationasawholedonottalktoeachotherenough.BMZcouldbecomeachampionandadvocateofgreaterflexibilitywithinandbetweenthetwosystems.

Ashasbeenarguedthroughoutthispaper,LRRDisnotaboutfillingagap,butaboutalackofconnectednessmoregenerallyfromallsides.AssistancemodalitiessuchasTDAcancontributetoasolutiontothe‘LRRDproblem’if,asitscurrentunderlyingstrategyimplies(BMZ,2013b),theyareseennotsimplyasamissinglinkinthe(one-way)chainoftransitionfromrelieftodevelopment,butasavehicleforspanningthespectrum,inparticularmakinglinksfromthedevelopmentsidetowardsthereliefsidewiththeabilitytocomplementotheraidmodalities.WhenTDAisappliedincountrieswhereotherfundinginstrumentsarealsobeingused,fromeitheremergencyordevelopmentassistance,asinglecoherentstrategyforthemallwillbeneeded:ifnot,

LRRDhasbeenontheperipheryoftheaidagendafordecades.Thereisobviouscommonsenseinlinkingupshorter-andlonger-termwaysofassistingvulnerablepeople,andnoonehaseverarguedagainstLRRD.Nevertheless,anddespiteanumberofpapersexaminingtheconcept,ithasnotsucceededinplayingasignificantroleinshapingthewayaidisplanned,managedoradministered.WhatevertheconstraintstoLRRDinone-off,short-termnaturaldisasters,thispaperarguesthat,indiffi-cultplaces,LRRDhasaparticularanddifferentimportance,andthatoneofthemainconstraintstowardsgreaterimplementationofitsprincipleshasbeenthatthedebatehastoooftenbeenheldinthewrongplaceandwithamisleadingpictureinmind.

Humanitarianactionhasworriedabouthowtolinktolonger-termdevelopment,anddonorshaveworriedabouthowtoestablishmecha-nismstofillthegap.Infact,theproblemislessagapbetweenemergencyanddevelopmentactionandmorethefactthatdevelopmentactionhastoooftenbeenmissingindifficultplaces.Fordifficultplaces,wherehumanitarianactionisalong-termreality,concernforLRRDprinciplesneedstobeseenpredominantlyindevelopmentcircles,andthemodelshouldbetofindwaysofengagingforthelongerterminwaysthatcanadapttocrises,eitherchanginghowaidisdelivered,becomingmoreorlessrelieforientedaccordingtotheneedsofchangingcircumstances,orcapableofadaptingtoandconnectingwithotherassis-tanceinterventionsusingdifferentmodalities.Inordertoachievethis,aid(whetherfrompeople’sowngovernmentorfrominterna-tionalagencies)needstobeguidedbyanoverallstrategythatencompassesthewholespectrum,fromlong-termsupporttoimmediateassistance.Thecallforsuchanoverallstrategyisnowfrequentlyheardbythoseconcernedwithresilience;forthisreason,politicalsupportforresilienceoffersanopportunityformakingLRRDprinciplesmeaningfulandinfluential–ifdiscussionsareheldintherightcircleswithapictureinmindthatreflectsrealityontheground.

��

thereisadangerthattherewillevenbethecreationofaneedforyetmorelinksbetweendifferentbudgetlinesandinstruments.

Relationships/partnershipsThispaperhasarguedthatrelationshipsandpartnershipsshouldbepremisedontheoverallgoalofimprovingthelivesofaffectedpeople.Buildingthecapacityofagovernmentaloranyotherinstitutionisnotinitselfnecessarilyofanybenefit.Thiswillrequireadegreeofsophisticationinmonitoringandevaluation,sinceasimplemeasureofanorganisation’s‘capacity’willnolongerbearelevantindicatorofprogress,exceptasanoutput,whichrequiresastronglogicalcasetoshowthatsuchanoutputwill(probably)leadtosomedesiredoutcomes.Itwillalsorequireexantewaysofjustifyingthechoiceoftheinstitutionswithwhichrelationshipsaremade.

Toolsandapproaches–the‘howwework’Theneedforprogrammemanagementtoolswhichcanhandleflexibility,riskandchangehasbeenstressed.Currently,programmetoolsalsoserveforaccountability(e.g.logframesandmonitoringreports).Thesetoolsarenotwelladaptedforhandlingflexibilityandafocusonhigher-levelobjectives.Thedemandsofaccountabilitycannotbecompromised,butnewwaysofansweringthemwillneedtobedeveloped.Thiswillalsoinvolveachangeintherelationshipbetweendifferentactorsintheaidsystem,e.g.donorswillhavetodemandprogrammemodificationfromoperationalagenciesratherthanwaittoberequestedbythemtoallowit.Thishasfurtherramificationsforstaffingandinformationlinks,especiallyfordonorswhocurrentlyrelyonimplementingpartnersfortheirknowledgeofhowsituationsarechangingontheground.

�0 Remakingthecaseforlinkingrelief,rehabilitationanddevelopment

��

ALNAP(2006)Evaluating Humanitarian Action Using the OECD-DAC Criteria: An ALNAP Guide for Humanitarian Agencies.London:ODI.

Bailey,S.,S.Pavanello,S.ElhawaryandS.O’Callaghan(2009)Early Recovery: An Overview of Policy Debates and Operational Challenges. London:ODI.

Bailey,S.(2011)Humanitarian Action, Early Recovery and Stabilisation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. London:ODI.

BMZ(2013a)Development for Peace and Security: Development Policy in the Context of Conflict, Fragility and Violence,StrategyPaper4.Bonn:FederalMinistryforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment.

BMZ(2013b)Strategy on Transitional Development Assistance: Strengthening Resilience – Shaping Transition,StrategyPaper6.Bonn:FederalMinistryforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment.

Brusset,E.,W.Pramana,A.Davies,Y.DeshmukhandS.Pedersen(2006)Links between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development in the Tsunami Response: Indonesia Case Study.London:TsunamiEvaluationCoalition.

Buchanan-Smith,M.andS.Maxwell(1994)‘LinkingReliefandDevelopment:AnIntroductionandOverview’,IDS Bulletin,vol.25:4.

Buchanan-Smith,M.andP.Fabbri(2005)Links between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development in the Tsunami Response: A Review of the Debate.London:TsunamiEvaluationCoalition.

Christoplos,I.(2006)Links between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development in the Tsunami Response: A Synthesis of Initial Findings.London:TsunamiEvaluationCoalition.

Christoplos,I.,M.NovakyandY.Aysan(2012)Risk, Resilience and Vulnerability at SIDA,SidaDecentralisedEvaluation2012:27.Stockholm:SIDA.

CISPandVOICE(2001)Linking Relief to Rehabilitation and Development: Ideas and Suggestions from European NGOs,November.

Collinson,S.andS.Elhawary(2012)Humanitarian Space: A Review of Trends and Issues,HPGReport32.London:ODI.

DFID(2011)Defining Disaster Resilience: A DFID Approach Paper.London:DFID.

DFID(2012)Minimum Standards for Embedding Disaster Resilience in DFID Country Offices,GuidanceNotepreparedbyCHASEforDFIDCountryOfficesandpartners.

Dieci,P.(2006)‘LinkingRelieftoRehabilitationandDevelopment:WhatDoesItMeanToday’,VOICE,Issue4,December.

Duffield,M.(1994)‘ComplexEmergenciesandtheCrisisofDevelopmentalism’,IDS Bulletin,vol.25:4.

EC(1996)Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD),COM(96)153final.

EC(2001)Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development – An Assessment,COM(2001)153final.

EC(2007)Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Towards a European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid;Brussels:COM(2007)317final.

EC(2012)‘TheEUApproachtoResilience:LearningfromFoodSecurityCrises’,ECCommunication.

EC(2013)Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries 2013–2020,SWD(2013)227final.

EuropeanParliament(2012)Policy Briefing: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development,Directorate-GeneralforExternalPolicies:PolicyDepartment,DGEXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2012_74,July2012.

FAO(2010)The State of Food Insecurity in the World: Addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises.Rome:FAO.

FAO(2012)Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises: An Overview.BriefpreparedfortheHighLevelExpertForum,Rome,13–14September.

Fan,L.(2013)Disaster as Opportunity? Building Back Better in Aceh, Myanmar and Haiti. London:ODI.

Goyder,H.,withC.Coventry,J.Adams,T.Kaiser,S.WilliamsandI.Smillie(2006)Links between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development in the Tsunami

References


Response: Policy Study.London:TsunamiEvaluationCoalition.

Harmer,A.andJ.Macrae(eds)(2004)Beyond the Continuum: The Changing Role of Aid Policy in Protracted Crises, HPGReport18.London:ODI.

Koddenbrock,K.(2009)‘TheWillToBridge?ECandUSApproachestoLinkingRelief,RehabilitationandDevelopment’,inJ.SteetsandD.S.Hamilton(eds),Humanitarian Assistance: Improving US–European Cooperation.WashingtonDC:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress.

Lassila,S.(2009)Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development – A Policy Perspective,MinistryforForeignAffairsofFinland,DepartmentforDevelopmentPolicy,January.

Levine,S.andI.Mosel(2014)Supporting Resilience in Difficult Places: A Critical Look at Applying the ‘Resilience’ Concept in Countries Where Crises Are the Norm.London:ODI.

Longhurst,R.(1994)‘ConceptualFrameworksforLinkingReliefandDevelopment’,IDS Bulletin,vol.25:4.

Ludi,E.,S.LevineandL.Jones(2012)Changing Focus? How To Take Adaptive Capacity Seriously,BriefingPaper71.London:ODI.

Macrae,J.(2012)‘TheContinuumIsDead,LongLiveResilience’,VOICE out loud,15May.

Maxwell,S.(1994)‘UnderstandingandManagingFoodShocks’,NRI/IFPRI,FoodPolicyinSub-SaharanAfrica.London:NaturalResourcesInstitute.

Maxwell,S.(2013)‘HowCantheEUTakeForwardtheResilienceAgenda:ATenPointPlan’,blog,http://www.simonmaxwell.eu.

Metcalfe,V.,A.GiffenandS.Elhawary(2011)UN Integration and Humanitarian Space: An Independent Study Commissioned by the UN Integration Steering Group. London/WashingtonDC:ODI/StimsonCenterCommissionedReport.

OECD-DAC(1999)Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies.Paris:OECD.

Otto,R.andL.Weingärtner(2013)Linking Relief and Development: More Than Old Solutions for Old Problems?.ChannelResearchonbehalfoftheDutchMinistryofForeignAffairs–IOB.

Oxfam(2013)No Accident: Resilience and the Inequality of Risk,OxfamBriefingPaper172,21May.

Sen,A.(1999)‘DemocracyasaUniversalValue’,Journal of Democracy,10.3.

Slim,H.(2000)‘DissolvingtheDifferencebetweenhumanitarianismanddevelopment:the

mixingofarights-basedsolution’inDevelopment in PracticeVol10,Nr.3&4

Steets,J.(2011)Donor Strategies for Addressing the Transition Gap and Linking Humanitarian and Development Assistance: A Contribution to the International Debate.

SwissRedCross(2010)LRRD Concept,June.

Ternström,B.etal.(2006)Links between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development in the Tsunami Response: Sri Lanka Case Study.London:TsunamiEvaluationCoalition.

UNDP(2008)Guidance Note on Early Recovery, ClusterWorkingGrouponEarlyRecoveryincooperationwiththeUNDG-ECHAWorkingGrouponTransition.Geneva:UNDP.

VOICE(2006)Focus: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD),Newsletter,Issue4,December.

VOICE(2012)Focus: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development,Newsletter,issue15May.

Wisner,B.,P.Blaikie,T.CannonandI.Davis(2003)At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability and Disasters. NewYork:Routledge.

WorldBank(2001)Ethiopia Woreda Study.VolumeI:MainPhase.

The Humanitarian Policy Group is one of the world’s leading teams of independent researchers and information professionals working on humanitarian issues. It is dedicated to improving humanitarian policy and practice through a combination of high-quality analysis, dialogue and debate.

Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce materials from this publication but, as copyright holders, ODI requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication. This and other HPG reports are available from www.odi.org.uk/hpg.

© Overseas Development Institute, 2014ISBN: 978 1 909464 67 4

Humanitarian Policy GroupOverseas Development Institute203 Blackfriars RoadLondon SE1 8NJUnited Kingdom

Tel. +44 (0) 20 7922 0300Fax. +44 (0) 20 7922 0399E-mail: [email protected]: http://www.odi.org//hpg

Cover photo© Flickr/Cristina Ghita

HPGHumanitarianPolicy Group

remaking the case for linking relief, rehabilitation and development

Documents