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Rem Rev I

1.Galicto vs Pres. Aquino

The Antecedent Facts

On July 26, 2010, Pres. Aquino made public in his first SONAthe alleged excessiveallowances, bonuses and other benefits of Officers and Members of the Board of Directors of the MWSSa GOCC. Subsequently, the Senate (Senate) an inquiry in aid of legislation on the reported excessivesalaries, allowances, and other benefits of GOCCs and government financial institutions (GFIs).

Based on its findings that officials and governing boards of various [GOCCs] and [GFIs] xx x have been granting themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and other

benefits [as well as other] irregular and abusive practices, the Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17urging the President to order the immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently excessiveallowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the governing boards of [GOCCs] and[GFIs].

Heeding the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7, entitledDirecting the Rationalization of the Compensation and Position Classification System in the [GOCCs]and [GFIs], and for Other Purposes. EO 7 provided for the guiding principles and framework toestablish a fixed compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs. A Task Forcewas also created to review all remunerations of GOCC and GFI employees and officers, while GOCCsand GFIs were ordered to submit to the Task Force information regarding their compensation. Finally,EO 7 ordered (1) a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation,

except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an

indefinite period to be set by the President,[9] and (2) a suspension of all allowances, bonuses andincentives of members of the Board of Direc tors/Trustees until December 31, 2010.[10]

EO 7 was published on September 10, 2010. It took effect on September 25, 2010 andprecluded the Board of Directors, Trustees and/or Officers of GOCCs from granting and releasing bonusesand allowances to members of the board of directors, and from increasing salary rates of and granting newor additional benefits and allowances to their employees.

The Petition

The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementationof EO 7, which was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,

based on the following arguments:

I.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS NULL AND VOID FOR LACK OFLEGAL BASIS DUE TO THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:

A. P.D. 985 IS NOT APPLICABLE AS BASIS FOREXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 BECAUSETHE GOVERNMENT-OWNED ANDCONTROLLED CORPORATIONS WERESUBSEQUENTLY GRANTED THEPOWER TO FIX COMPENSATION LONGAFTER SUCH POWER HAS BEENREVOKED BY P.D. 1597 AND R.A. 6758.

B. THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED ANDCONTROLLED CORPORATIONS DO NOT

NEED TO HAVE ITS COMPENSATION

PLANS, RATES AND POLICIES

REVIEWED BY THE DBM ANDAPPROVED BY THE PRESIDENTBECAUSE P.D. 1597 REQUIRES ONLYTHE GOCCs TO REPORT TO THE OFFICETO THE PRESIDENT THEIRCOMPENSATION PLANS AND RATESBUT THE SAME DOES NOT GIVE THEPRESIDENT THE POWER OF CONTROLOVER THE FISCAL POWER OF THEGOCCs.

C. J.R. NO. 4, [SERIES] 2009 IS NOT APPLICABLEAS LEGAL BASIS BECAUSE IT HAD NOTRIPENED INTO X X X LAW, THE SAME

NOT HAVING BEEN PUBLISHED.

D. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT J.R. NO. 1, S.2004 (sic) AND J.R. 4, S. 2009 ARE VALID,STILL THEY ARE NOT APPLICABLE ASLEGAL BASIS BECAUSE THEY ARE NOTLAWS WHICH MAY VALIDLYDELEGATE POWER TO THE PRESIDENTTO SUSPEND THE POWER OF THEBOARD TO FIX COMPENSATION.

II.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS INVALID FOR DIVESTING THEBOARD OF DIRECTORS OF [THE] GOCCS OF THEIR POWER TO FIX

THE COMPENSATION, A POWER WHICH IS A LEGISLATIVEGRANT AND WHICH COULD NOT BE REVOKED OR MODIFIED BY

AN EXECUTIVE FIAT.

III.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS BY SUBSTANCE A LAW, WHICH IS ADEROGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL PREROGATIVE AND IS

THEREFORE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

IV.

THE ACTS OF SUSPENDING AND IMPOSING MORATORIUM AREULTRA VIRES ACTS BECAUSE J.R. NO. 4 DOES NOT EXPRESSLY

AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT TO EXERCISE SUCH POWERS.

V.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS AN INVALID ISSUANCE BECAUSEIT HAS NO SUFFICIENT STANDARDS AND IS THEREFORE

ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE AND A VIOLATION OFSUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS.

VI.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 INVOLVES THE DETERMINATION ANDDISCRETION AS TO WHAT THE LAW SHALL BE AND IS

THEREFORE INVALID FOR ITS USURPATION OF LEGISLATIVE

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POWER.

VII.

CONSISTENT WITH THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT INPIMENTEL V. AGUIRRE CASE, EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS ONLY

DIRECTORY AND NOT MANDATORY.[12]

The Case for the Respondents

On December 13, 2010, the respondents filed their Comment. They pointed out thefollowing procedural defects as grounds for the petitions dismissal: (1) the petitioner lacks locus standi;(2) the petitioner failed to attach a board resolution or secretarys certificate authorizing him to questionEO 7 in behalf of PhilHealth; (3) the petitioners signature does not indicate his PTR Number, MandatoryContinuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance Number and Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

Number; (4) thejuratof the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping failed to indicate avalid identification card as provided under A.M. No. 02 -8-13-SC; (5) the President should be dropped as a

party respondent as he is immune from suit; and (6) certiorari is not applicable to this case.[13]

The respondents also raised substantive defenses to support the validity of EO 7. They claim thatthe President exercises control over the governing boards of the GOCCs and GFIs; thus, he can fix theircompensation packages. In addition, EO 7 was issued in accordance with law for the purpose ofcontrolling the grant of excessive salaries, allowances, incentives and other benefits to GOCC and GFIemployees. They also advocate the validity of Joint Resolution (J.R.) No. 4, which they point to as the

authority for issuing EO 7.[14]

Meanwhile, on June 6, 2011, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10149,[15] otherwiseknown as the GOCC Governance Act of 2011. Section 11 of RA 10149 expressly authorizes thePresident to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.

The Courts Ruling

We resolve to DISMISS the petition for its patent formal and procedural infirmities,

and for having been mooted by subsequent events.

A. Certiorari is not the proper remedy

Under the Rules of Court, petitions forCertiorari and Prohibition are availed of to question

judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or amandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy; instead a petition fordeclaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the

proper recourse to assail the validity of EO 7:

Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under adeed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affectedby a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any othergovernmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring anaction in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question ofconstruction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,thereunder. (Emphases ours.)

Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of Manila[16] is a case in point.[17] In

Liga, we dismissed the petition forcertiorari to set aside an EO issued by a City Mayor and insisted that a

petition for declaratory relief should have been filed with the RTC. We painstakingly ruled:

After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolve todismiss this petition forcertiorari.

First, the respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated unto themselves any judicial or quasi-judicialprerogatives. A petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules ofCivil Procedure is a special civil action that may be invoked only against atribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedureprovides:

SECTION 1. Petition forcertiorari. When any tribunal, board orofficer exercising judicial or quasi-judicialfunctions has acted without or in excess of itsor his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or anyplain, speedy, and adequate remedy in theordinary course of law, a person aggrievedthereby may file a verified petition in the

proper court, alleging the facts with certaintyand praying that judgment be rendered

annulling or modifying the proceedings ofsuch tribunal, board or officer, and grantingsuch incidental reliefs as law and justice mayrequire.Elsewise stated, for a writ ofcertiorari to issue, the following

requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, orofficer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board,or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with graveabuse of discretion amounting [to] lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3)there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinarycourse of law.

A respondent is said to be exercising judicialfunction wherehe hasthe power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights ofthe parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and

adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.

Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is a term which

applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers orbodies required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts,hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their officialaction and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.

Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial orquasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to somespecific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to suchrights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before atribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine thelaw and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.

The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal,

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board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Ascorrectly pointed out by the respondents, the enactment by the City Councilof Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance by respondent Mayor ofthe questioned executive order were done in the exercise of legislative andexecutive functions, respectively, and not ofjudicial or quasi-judicial

functions. On this score alone, certiorari will not lie.

Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petitionforcertiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of theunconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executiveorder. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over

which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction. Section 5,Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,

other public ministers and consuls, and over petitionsforcertiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, andhabeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal orcertiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may

provide, final judgments and orders of lowercourts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity ofany treaty, international or executive agreement,law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,

instruction, ordinance, or regulation is inquestion. (Italics supplied).

As such, this petition must necessar[ily] fail, as this Courtdoes not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief evenif only questions of law are involved.[18]

Likewise, in Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti TerrorismCouncil,[19] we similarly dismissed the petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging theconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007, since the

respondents therein (members of the Anti-Terrorism Council) did not exercise judicial or quasi-judicialfunctions.

While we have recognized in the past that we can exercise the discretion and rulemakingauthority we are granted under the Constitution, and set aside procedural considerations to permit parties

to bring a suit before us at the first instance through certiorari and/or prohibition,[21] this liberal policyremains to be an exception to the general rule, and thus, has its limits. In Concepcion v. Commission on

Elections (COMELEC),[22] we emphasized the importance of availing of the proper remedies andcautioned against the wrongful use of certiorari in order to assail the quasi-legislative acts of theCOMELEC, especially by the wrong p arty. In ruling that liberality and the transcendental doctrine cannottrump blatant disregard of procedural rules, and considering that the petitioner had other availableremedies (such as a petition for declaratory relief with the appropriate RTC under the terms of Rule 63 ofthe Rules of Court), as in this case, we categorically ruled:

The petitioners unusual approaches and use of Rule 65 of the

Rules of Court do not appear to us to be the result of any error in readingRule 65, given the way the petition was crafted. Rather, it was a backdoorapproach to achieve what the petitioner could not directly do in hisindividual capacity under Rule 65. It was, at the very least, an attempted

bypass of other available, albeit lengthier, modes of review that the Rules of

Court provide. While we stop short of concluding that the petitioners

approaches constitute an abuse of process through a manipulative readingand application of the Rules of Court, we nevertheless resolve that thepetition should be dismissed for its blatant violation of the Rules. Thetransgressions alleged in a petition, however weighty they may sound,

cannot be justifications for blatantly disregarding the rules of

procedure, particularly when remedial measures were available under

these same rules to achieve the petitioners objectives. For our part, we

cannot and should not in the name of liberality and the

transcendental importance doctrine entertain these types of

petitions. As we held in the very recent case ofLozano, et al. vs. Nograles,albeit from a different perspective, our liberal approach has its limits andshould not be abused.[23] [emphasis supplied]

B. Petitioner lacks locus standi .

Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest ina case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of thegovernmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whethera party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure thatconcrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the courtdepends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[24] This requirement ofstanding relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases orcontroversies.[25]

Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to raise a constitutional question when (1) he

can show that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegalconduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3 ) the injury islikely to be redressed by a favorable action.[26]

Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected bythe decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Byreal interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or afuture, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest ."[27]

To support his claim that he has locus standi to file the present petition, the petitionercontends that as an employee of PhilHealth, he stands to be prejudiced by [EO] 7, which suspends orimposes a moratorium on the grants of salary increases or new or increased benefits to officers andemployees of GOCC[s] and x x x curtail[s] the prerogative of those officers who are to fix and determinehis compensation.[28] The petitioner also claims that he has standing as a member of the bar in goodstanding who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of th e Philippine government are legally and

validly issued and implemented.

The respondents meanwhile argue that the petitioner is not a real party-in-interest sincefuture increases in salaries and other benefits are merely contingent events or expectancies.[29] The

petitioner, too, is not asserting a public right for which he is entitled to seek judicial protection. Section 9of EO 7 reads:

Section 9. Moratorium on Increases in Salaries, Allowances,Incentives and Other Benefits. Moratorium on increases in the rates ofsalaries, and the grant of new increases in the rates of allowances, incentivesand other benefits, except salary adjustments pursuant to Executive Order

No. 8011 dated June 17, 2009 and Executive Order No. 900 dated June 23,2010, are hereby imposed until specifically authorized by the President.[emphasis ours]

In the present case, we are not convinced that the petitioner has demonstrated that he has a personal

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stake or material interest in the outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is speculative and basedon a mere expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other benefitscannot but be characterized as contingent events or expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights tosalary increases and, therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assailEO 7. It has been held that as to the element of injury, such aspect is not something that

just anybody with some grievance or pain may assert. It has to be direct and substantial to make it worththe courts time, as well as the effort of inquiry into the constitutionality of the acts of another departmentof government. If the asserted injury is more imagined than real, or is merely superficial andinsubstantial, then the courts may end up being importuned to decide a matter that does not really justifysuch an excursion into constitutional adjudication.[30] The rationale for this constitutional requirement oflocus standi is by no means trifle. Not only does it assure the vigorous adversary presentation of the case;more importantly, it must suffice to warrant the Judiciarys overruling the determination of a coordinate,

democratically elected organ of government, such as the President, and the clear approval by Congress, inthis case. Indeed, the rationale goes to the very essence of representative democracies.[31]

Neither can the lack of locus standibe cured by the petitioners claim that h e is instituting thepresent petition as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws andorders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued. This supposed interest has been

branded by the Court inIntegrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP) v. Hon. Zamora,[32] as too general an interestwhich is shared by other groups and [by] the whole citizenry.[33] Thus, the Court ruled in IBPthat themere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedlytrue, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in that case. The Court made a similar ruling in Prof.

David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo[34]and held that the petitioners therein, who are national officers of theIBP, have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP, as aninstitution, or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No.

1017 and General Order No. 5.[35]

We note that while the petition raises vital constitutional and statutory questions concerningthe power of the President to fix the compensation packages of GOCCs and GFIs with possibleimplications on their officials and employees, the same cannot infuse or give the pe titionerlocus standiunder the transcendental importance or paramount public interest doctrine. In Velarde v. Social JusticeSociety,[36] we held that even if the Court could have exempted the case from the stringent locus standirequirement, such heroic effort would be futile because the transcendental issue could not be resolved anyway, due to procedural infirmities and shortcomings, as in the present case.[37] In other words, givingdue course to the present petition which is saddled with formal and procedural infirmities explained abovein this Resolution, cannot but be an exercise in futility that does not merit the Courts liberality. As weemphasized inLozano v. Nograles,[38] while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach tothe rule oflocus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of personal injury to the broader

transcendental importance doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused.[39]

Finally, since the petitioner has failed to demonstrate a material and personal in terestinthe issue in dispute, he cannot also be considered to have filed the present case as a representative ofPhilHealth. In this regard, we cannot ignore or excuse the blatant failure of the petitioner to provide aBoard Resolution or a Secretarys Certificate from PhilHealth to act as its representative.

C. The petition has a defectiveju rat.

The respondents claim that the petition should be dismissed for failing to comply withSection 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires the party or the counsel representing himto sign the pleading and indicate an address that should not be a post office box. The petition alsoallegedly violated the Supreme CourtEn Banc Resolution dated November 12, 2001, requiring counsels toindicate in their pleadings their Roll of Attorneys Number, their PTR Number and their IBP OfficialReceipt or Lifetime Member Number; otherwise, the pleadings would be considered unsigned anddismissible. Bar Matter No. 1922 likewise states that a counsel should note down his MCLE Certificate of

Compliance or Certificate of Exemption in the pleading, but the petitioner had failed to do so.[40]

We do not see any violation of Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as thepetition bears the petitioners signature and office address. The present suit was brought before this Courtby the petitioner himself as a party litigantand not through counsel. Therefore, the requirements underthe Supreme Court En Banc Resolution dated November 12, 2001 and Bar Matter No. 1922 do notapply. In Bar Matter No. 1132, April 1, 2003, we clarified that a party who is not a lawyer is not

precluded from signing his own pleadings as this is allowed by the Rules of Court; the purpose ofrequiring a counsel to indicate his IBP Number and PTR Number is merely to protect the public from

bogus lawyers. A similar construction should be given to Bar Matter No. 1922, which requires lawyers toindicate their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption; otherwise, the provision thatallows parties to sign their own pleadings will be negated.

However, the point raised by the respondents regarding the petitioners defective jurat iscorrect. Indeed, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, dated February 19, 2008, calls for a current identificationdocument issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual ascompetent evidence of identity. Nevertheless, we hasten to clarify that the defective jurat in theVerification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping is not a fatal defect, as we held in In-N-Out Burger,

Inc. v. Sehwani, Incorporated.[41] The verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement thatthe Court may waive.

D. The petition has been mootedby supervening events.

Because of the transitory nature of EO 7, it has been pointed out that the present case has alreadybeen rendered moot by these supervening events: (1) the lapse on December 31, 2010 of Section 10 of EO7 that suspended the allowances and bonuses of the directors and trustees of GOCCs and GFIs; and (2) the

enactment of R.A. No. 10149 amending the provisions in the charters of GOCCs and GFIs empoweringtheir board of directors/trustees to determine their own compensation system, in favor of the grant ofauthority to the President to perform this act.

With the enactment of the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, the President is now authorizedto fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs. The pertinent provisions read:

Section 5. Creation of the Governance Commission forGovernment-Owned or -Controlled Corporations. There is herebycreated an advisory, monitoring, and oversight body with authority toformulate, implement and coordinate policies to be known as theGovernance Commission for Government-Owned or-ControlledCorporations, hereinafter referred to as the GCG, which shall be attached tothe Office of the President. The GCG shall have the following powers andfunctions:

x x x x

h) Conduct compensation studies, develop and recommend to thePresident a competitive compensation and remuneration system which shallattract and retain talent, at the same time allowing the GOCC to befinancially sound and sustainable;

x x x x

Section 8. Coverage of the Compensation and PositionClassification System.The GCG, after conducting a compensation study,shall develop a Compensation and Position Classification System whichshall apply to all officers and employees of the GOCCs whether under theSalary Standardization Law or exempt therefrom and shall consist of classes

of positions grouped into such categories as the GCG may determine,

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subject to approval of the President.

Section 9. Position Titles and Salary Grades.All positions in thePositions Classification System, as determined by the GCG and as approved

by the President, shall be allocated to their proper position titles and salarygrades in accordance with an Index of Occupational Services, Position Titlesand Salary Grades of the Compensation and Position Classification System,which shall be prepared by the GCG and approved by the President.

x x x x

[N]o GOCC shall be exempt from the coverage of the Compensationand Position Classification System developed by the GCG under this Act.

As may be gleaned from these provisions, the new law amended R.A. No. 7875 and otherlaws that enabled certain GOCCs and GFIs to fix their own compensation frameworks; the law nowauthorizes the President to fix the compensation and position classification system for all GOCCs andGFIs, as well as other entities covered by the law. This means that, the President can now reissue an EOcontaining these same provisions without any legal constraints.

A moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of

supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.[42] [A]n actionis considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have

become academic or dead[,] or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is notentitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties x x

x. Simply stated, there is nothing for the x x x court to resolve as [its] determination x x x has beenovertaken by subsequent events.[43]

This is the present situation here. Congress, thru R.A. No. 10149, has expressly empowered the Presidentto establish the compensation systems of GOCCs and GFIs. For the Court to still rule upon the supposedunconstitutionality of EO 7 will merely be an academic exercise. Any further discussion of theconstitutionality of EO 7 serves no useful purpose since such issue is moot in its face in light of theenactment of R.A. No. 10149. In the words of the eminent constitutional law expert, Fr. Joaquin Bernas,S.J., the Court normally [will not] entertain a petition touching on

an issue that has become moot because x x x there would [be] no longer x x x a flesh and blood casefor the Court to resolve.

2. Cagas vs COMELEC

The petitioner and respondent Claude P. Bautista (Bautista) contested the position of Governor of theProvince of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections. The fasttransmission of the results led to the completion by May 14, 2010 of the canvassing of votes cast forGovernor of Davao del Sur, and the petitioner was proclaimed the winner (with 163,440 votes), withBautista garnering 159,527 votes.4

Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules andresolutions, Bautista filed an electoral protest on May 24, 2010 (EPC No. 2010 -42).5 The protest wasraffled to the COMELEC First Division.

In his answer submitted on June 22, 2010,6 the petitioner averred as his special affirmativedefenses that Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit on time; and that Bautista did not render adetailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of.

On August 13, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued the first assailed order denyingthe special affirmative defenses of the petitioner,7 viz:

After careful examination of the records of the case, thisCommission (First Division) makes the following observation:

1. Protestant paid the cash deposit amounting to one hundred thousandpesos (P100,000.00) on June 3, 2010 as evidenced by O.R. No.1118105; and

2. Paragraph nos. 9 to 28 of the initiatory petition filed by theProtestant set forth the specific details of the acts and omissions

complained of against the Protestee.

It is therefore concluded that the payment by the Protestant onJune 3, 2010 is a substantial compliance with the requirement of COMELECResolution No. 8804, taking into consideration Section 9(e), Rule 6 of saidResolution. Furthermore, the Protestant has likewise essentially compliedwith Section 7(g), Rule 6 of the a bove-mentioned Resolution.

In view of the foregoing, this Commission (First Division)RESOLVES to DENY the Protestees special affirmative defenses.

SO ORDERED.8

The petitioner moved to reconsider on the ground that the order did not discuss whether theprotest specified the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the elections, in violation of Section 2,

paragraph 2,9 Rule 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804,10 requiring all decisions to clearly anddistinctly express the facts and the law on which they were based; and that it also contravened Section7(g),11 Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 requiring a detailed specification of the acts oromissions complained of. He prayed that the matter be certified to the COMELEC en banc pursuant toSection 1,12 Section 5,13 and Section 6,14 all of Rule 20 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804.

The petitioner insisted that COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 had introduced therequirement for the detailed specification to prevent shotgun fishing expeditions by losingcandidates;15 that such requirement contrasted with Rule 6, Section 1 of the 1993 COMELECRules of

Procedure,16 under which the protest needed only to contain a concise statement of the u ltimate facts

constituting the cause or causes of action; that Bautistas protest did not meet the new requirement underCOMELEC Resolution No. 8804; and that inPea v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,17 theCourt upheld the dismissal of a protest by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) for notspecifically alleging the electoral anomalies and irregularities in the May 8, 1995 elections.

In his opposition,18 Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being merely interlocutory,could not be elevated to the COMELEC en banc pursuant to the ruling inPanlilio v. COMELEC;19 thatthe rules of the COMELEC required the initiatory petition to specify the acts or omissions constituting theelectoral frauds, anomalies and election irregularities, and to contain the ultimate facts upon which thecause of action was based; and thatPea v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunaldid not apply

because, firstly,Pea had totally different factual antecedents than this case, and, secondly, the omissionof material facts from Peas p rotest prevented the protestee (Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr.) from being apprised

of the issues that he must meet and made it eventually impossible for the HRET to determine which ballotboxes had to be collected.

On October 7, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued its second assailed order,20denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration for failing to show that the first order was contrary to

law, to wit:

The Protestees August 28, 2010 Motion for Reconsideration

with Prayer to Certify the Case to the Commission En Banc relative to the

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Order issued by the Commission (First Division) dated August 13, 2010 ishereby DENIED for failure to show that the assailed order is contrary to law

Without going into the merits of the protest, the allegations in

the protestants petition have substantially complied with the

requirements of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 that will warrant the

opening of the ballot boxes in order to resolve not only the issues raised

in the protest but also those set for th in the Protestees answer. When

substantial compliance with the rules is satisfied, allowing the protest to

proceed is the best way of removing any doubt or uncertainty as to the

true will of the electorate. All other issues laid down in the parties

pleadings, including those in the Protestees special and affirmativedefenses and those expressed in the preliminary conference brief, will

best be threshed out in the final resolution of the instant case .

The prayer to elevate the instant Motion for Reconsideration

to the Commission En Banc is DENIED considering that the 13 August

2010 Order is merely interlocutory and it does not dispose of t he instant

case with finality, in accordance with Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the

COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

SO ORDERED.

Not satisfied, the petitioner commenced this special civil action directly in this Court.

Issue

The petitioner submits that:

THE RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OFJURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE PROTEST FORINSUFFICIENCY IN FORM AND CONTENT.

The petitioner argues that Section 9,21 Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 obligedthe COMELEC First Division to summarily dismiss the protest for being insufficient in form and content;and that the insufficiency in substance arose from the failure of the protest to: (a) specifically state howthe various irregularities and anomalies had affected the results of the elections; (b) indicate in which ofthe protested precincts were pre-shaded bogus-ballots used; (c) identify the precincts where the PCOSmachines had failed to accurately account for the votes in favor of Bautista; and (d) allege with

particularity how many additional votes Bautista stood to receive for each of the grounds he protested. He

concludes that the COMELEC First Division gravely abused its discretion in allowing the protest ofBautista despite its insufficiency.

Moreover, the petitioner urges that the protest be considered as a mere fis hing expedition tobe outrightly dismissed in light of the elections being held under an automated system. In support of hisurging, he citesRoque, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,22 where the Court took judicial notice of theaccuracy and reliability of the PCOS machines and CCS computers, such that allegations of massive errorsin the automated counting and canvassing had become insufficient as basis for the COMELEC to entertainor to give due course to defective election protests.23 He submits that a protest like Bautistas cast doubton the automated elections.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and Bautista both posit thatthe COMELEC had the power and prerogative to determine the sufficiency of the allegations of anelection protest; and that certiorari did not lie because the COMELEC First Division acted within itsdiscretion. Additionally, the OSG maintains that the assailed orders, being interlocutory, are not the proper

subjects of a petition forcertiorari.

As we see it, the decisive issue is whether the Court can take cognizance of the petition forcertiorari.

Ruling

We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of

all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days fromthe date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter isdeemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last

pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission orby the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution orby law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be broughtto the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty d aysfrom receipt of a copy th ereof.

This provision, although it confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order orruling of the COMELEC, limits such power to afinaldecision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc,and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated,the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by aDivision of the COMELEC. The following cogent observations made inAmbil v. Commission on

Elections24 are enlightening, viz:

To begin with, the power of the Supreme Court to reviewdecisions of the Comelec is prescribed in the Constitution, as follows:

Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a

majority vote of all its members any case or matterbrought before it within sixty days from the date of itssubmission for decision or resolution. A case or matter isdeemed submitted for decision or resolution upon thefiling of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required

by the rules of the commission or by the commissionitself. Unless otherwise provided bythis constitution orby law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commissionmay be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the

aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copythereof. [emphasis supplied]

We have interpreted this provision to mean fin al orders,

rul ings and decisionsof the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its

adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. This decision must be a final

decision or resoluti onof the Comelec en banc,not of a division, certainly

not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has no

power to review via certiorari , an interlocutory order or even a final

resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections.

The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec enbanc may be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the special civil action ofcertiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, now expressly

provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

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form and substance and was a sham for having allegations couched in general terms, stating:

InMiguel v. COMELEC, the Court belittled the petitionersargument that the protestant had no cause of action, as the allegations offraud and irregularities, which were couched in general terms, were notsufficient to order the opening of ballot boxes and counting of ballots. TheCourt states the rules in election protests cognizable by the COMELEC andcourts of general jurisdiction, as follows:

The rule in this jurisdiction is clear andjurisprudence is even clearer. In a string of categorical

pronouncements, we have consistently ruled that whenthere is an allegation in an election protest that wouldrequire the perusal, examination or counting of ballots asevidence, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court toorder the opening of the ballot boxes and the examinationand counting of ballots deposited therein.

In a kindred case,Homer Saquilayan v. COMELEC, the Courtconsidered the allegations in an election protest, similar to those in this case,as sufficient in form and substance.

Again, inDayo v. COMELEC, the Court declared that allegationsof fraud and irregularities are sufficient grounds for opening the ballot boxesand examining the questioned ballots. The p ronouncement is in accordancewith Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code, which reads:

Judicial counting of votes in election contest.Where allegations in a protest or counter-protest sowarrant, or whenever in the opinion of the court in theinterests of justice so require, it shall immediately orderthe book of voters, ballot boxes and their keys, ballotsand other documents used in the election be brought

before it and that the ballots be examined and the votesrecounted.

In this case, the COMELEC Second Division found that theallegations in the protest and counter-protest warranted the opening of thecontested ballot boxes and the examination of their contents to settle at oncethe conflicting claims of petitioner and private respondent.

The petitioner adds that with the Court having noted the reliability and accuracy of thePCOS machines and consolidation/canvassing system (CCS) computers inRoque, Jr. v. Commission on

Elections,30 Bautistas election protest assailing the system and procedure of counting and canvassing ofvotes cast in an automated system of elections should be immediately dismissed.

We are not persuaded.

Roque, Jr. v. Commission on Elections does not preclude the filing of an election protest tochallenge the outcome of an election undertaken in an automated system of elections. Instead, the Courtonly ruled there that the system and procedure implemented by the COMELEC in evaluating the PCOSmachines and CCS computers met the minimum system requirements prescribed in Section 7 of RepublicAct No. 8436.31 The Court did not guarantee the efficiency and integrity of the automated system ofelections, as can be gleaned from the following pronouncement thereat:

The Court, however, will not indulge in the presumption that nothing would go wrong, that a successfulautomation election unmarred by fraud, violence, and like irregularities would be the order of the momenton May 10, 2010. Neither will it guarantee, as it cannot guarantee, the effectiveness of the votingmachines and the integrity of the counting and consolidation software embedded in them. That task

belongs at the first instance to Comelec, as part of its mandate to ensure clean and peaceful elections. Thisindependent constitutional commission, it is true, possesses extraordinary powers and enjoys aconsiderable latitude in the discharge of its functions. The road, however, towards successful 2010automation elections would certainly be rough and bumpy. The Comelec is laboring under very tighttimelines. It would accordingly need the help of all advocates of orderly and honest elections, of all menand women of goodwill, to smoothen the way and assist Comelec personnel address the fears expressedabout the integrity of the system. Like anyone else, the Court would like and wish automated elections to

succeed, credibly.

3. Ysidro vs De Castro

Petitioner is the incumbent bargaining agent for the bargaining unit comprised of the regular monthly-paidrank and file employees of the three divisions of San Miguel Corporation (SMC), namely, the San MiguelCorporate Staff Unit (SMCSU), San Miguel Brewing Philippines (SMBP), and the San Miguel PackagingProducts (SMPP), in all offices and plants of SMC, including the Metal Closure and Lithography Plant inLaguna. It had been the certified bargaining agent for 20 yearsfrom 1987 to 1997.

Respondent is registered as a chapter of Pambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang Pilipino (PDMP). PDMPissued Charter Certificate No. 112 to respondent on 15 June 1999.5 In compliance with registrationrequirements, respondent submitted the requisite documents to the BLR for the purpose of acquiring legal

personality.6 Upon submission of its charter certificate and other documents, respondent was issued

Certificate of Creation of Local or Chapter PDMP-01 by the BLR on 6 July 1999.7

Thereafter, respondentfiled with the Med-Arbiter of the DOLE Regional Officer in the National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR),three separate petitions for certification election to represent SMPP, SMCSU, and SMBP. 8 All three

petitions were dismissed, on the ground that the separate petitions fragmented a single bargaining unit.9

On 17 August 1999, petitioner filed with the DOLE-NCR a petition seeking the cancellation ofrespondent's registration and its dropping from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations. In its petition,

petitioner accused respondent of committing fraud and falsification, and non-compliance with registrationrequirements in obtaining its certificate of registration. It raised allegations that respondent violatedArticles 239(a), (b) and (c)10 and 234(c)11 of the Labor Code. Moreover, petitioner claimed that PDMP isnot a legitimate labor organization, but a trade union center, hence, it cannot directly create a local orchapter. The petition was docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-9908-007-IRD.12

On 14 July 2000, DOLE-NCR Regional Director Maximo B. Lim issued an Order dismissing the

allegations of fraud and misrepresentation, and irregularity in the submission of documents by respondent.Regional Director Lim further ruled that respondent is allowed to directly create a local or chapter.However, he found that respondent did not comply with the 20% membership requirement and, thus,ordered the cancellation of its certificate of registration and removal from the rolls of legitimate labororganizations.13 Respondent appealed to the BLR. In a Decision dated 19 February 2001, it declared:

As a chartered local union, appellant is not required to submit the number of employees and names of allits members comprising at least 20% of the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate.Thus, the revocation of its registration based on non-compliance with the 20% membership requirementdoes not have any basis in the rules.

Further, although PDMP is considered as a trade union center, it is a holder of Registration Certificate

No. FED-11558-LC issued by the BLR on 14 February 1991, which bestowed upon it the status of alegitimate labor organization with all the rights and privileges to act as representative of its members for

purposes of collective bargaining agreement. On this basis, PDMP can charter or create a local, in

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accordance with the provisions of Department Order No. 9.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision of the Regional Directordated July 14, 2000, canceling the registration of appellant San Miguel Packaging Products EmployeesUnion-Pambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang Pilipino (SMPPEU-PDMP) is REVERSED and SETASIDE. Appellant shall hereby remain in the roster of legitimate labor organizations.14

While the BLR agreed with the findings of the DOLE Regional Director dismissing the allegations offraud and misrepresentation, and in upholding that PDMP can directly create a local or a chapter, itreversed the Regional Director's ruling that the 20% membership is a requirement for respondent to attain

legal personality as a labor organization. Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration with theBLR. In a Resolution rendered on 19 June 2001 in BLR-A-C-64-05-9-00 (NCR-OD-9908-007-IRD), theBLR denied the Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed its Decision dated 19 February 2001. 15

Invoking the power of the appellate court to review decisions of quasi-judicial agencies, petitioner filedwith the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Proceduredocketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66200. The Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated 9 March 2005, dismissedthe petition and affirmed the Decision of the BLR, rulin g as follows:

In Department Order No. 9, a registered federation or national union may directly create a local bysubmitting to the BLR copies of the charter certificate, the local's constitution and by-laws, the principaloffice address of the local, and the names of its officers and their addresses. Upon complying with thedocumentary requirements, the local shall be issued a certificate and included in the roster of legitimatelabor organizations. The [herein respondent] is an affiliate of a registered federation PDMP, having been

issued a charter certificate. Under the rules we have reviewed, there is no need for SMPPEU to show amembership of 20% of the employees of the bargaining unit in order to be recognized as a legitimate laborunion.

x x x x

In view of the foregoing, the assailed decision and resolution of the BLR are AFFIRMED, and the petitionis DISMISSED.16

Subsequently, in a Resolution dated 16 January 2006, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's Motion forReconsideration of the aforementioned Decision.

Hence, this Petition forCertiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court where petitioner raises the

sole issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLEERROR IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS NOT REQUIRED TO SUBMIT THE

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AND NAMES OF ALL ITS MEMBERS COMPRISING AT LEAST 20%OF THE EMPLOYEES IN THE BARGAINING UNIT WHERE IT SEEKS TO OPERATE.

The present petition questions the legal personality of respondent as a legitimate labor organization.

Petitioner posits that respondent is required to submit a list of members comprising at least 20% of theemployees in the bargaining unit before it may acquire legitimacy, citing Article 234(c) of the Labor Codewhich stipulates that any applicant labor organization, association or group of unions or workers shallacquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate

labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on the following requirements:

a. Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;

b. The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address of the labor organization, the minutes ofthe organizational meetings and the list of the workers who participated in such meetings;

c. The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in thebargaining unit where it seeks to operate;

d. If the applicant union has been in existence for one or more years, copies of its annual financial reports;

and

e. Four (4) copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant union, minutes of its adoption orratification and the list of the members who participated in it.17

Petitioner also insists that the 20% requirement for registration of respondent must be based not on thenumber of employees of a single division, but in all three divisions of the company in all the offices and

plants of SMC since they are all part of one bargaining unit. Petitioner refers to Section 1, Article 1 of theCollective Bargaining Agreement (CBA),18 quoted hereunder:

ARTICLE 1

SCOPE

Section 1. Appropriate Bargaining Unit. The appropriate bargaining unit covered by this Agreementconsists of all regular rank and file employees paid on the basis of fixed salary per month and employed

by the COMPANY in its Corporate Staff Units (CSU), San Miguel Brewing Products (SMBP) and SanMiguel Packaging Products (SMPP) and in different operations existing in the City of Manila andsuburbs, including Metal Closure and Lithography Plant located at Canlubang, Laguna subject to theprovisions of Article XV of this Agreement provided however, that if during the term of this Agreement, aplant within the territory covered by this Agreement is transferred outside but within a radius of fifty (50)kilometers from the Rizal Monument, Rizal Park, Metro Manila, the employees in the transferred plantshall remain in the bargaining unit covered by this Agreement. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner thus maintains that respondent, in any case, failed to meet this 20% membership requirementsince it based its membership on the number of employees of a single division only, namely, the SMPP.

There is merit in petitioner's contentions.

A legitimate labor organization19 is defined as "any labor organization duly registered with theDepartment of Labor and Employment, and includes any branch or local thereof."20 The mandate of theLabor Code is to ensure strict compliance with the requirements on registration because a legitimate labororganization is entitled to specific rights under the Labor Code, 21 and are involved in activities directlyaffecting matters of public interest. Registration requirements are intended to afford a measure of

protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly -by-night unionswhose sole purpose is to control union funds or use the labor organization for illegitimate ends.22Legitimate labor organizations have exclusive rights under the law which cannot be exercised by non-legitimate unions, one of which is the right to be certified as the exclusive representative 23 of all theemployees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining. 24 Theacquisition of rights by any union or labor organization, particularly the right to file a petition forcertification election, first and foremost, depends on whether or not the labor organization has attained the

status of a legitimate labor organization.

25

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A perusal of the records reveals that respondent is registered with the BLR as a "local" or "chapter" ofPDMP and was issued Charter Certificate No. 112 on 15 June 1999. Hence, respondent was directlychartered by PDMP.

The procedure for registration of a local or chapter of a labor organization is provided in Book V of theImplementing Rules of the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 9 which took effect on 21June 1997, and again by Department Order No. 40 dated 17 February 2003. The Implementing Rules asamended by D.O. No. 9 should govern the resolution of the petition at bar since respondent's petition forcertification election was filed with the BLR in 1999; and that of petitioner on 17 August 1999. 26

The applicable Implementing Rules enunciates a two-fold procedure for the creation of a chapter or alocal. The first involves the affiliation of an independent union with a federation or national union orindustry union. The second, finding application in the instant petition, involves the direct creation of alocal or a chapter through the process of chartering.27

A duly registered federation or national union may directly create a local or chapter by submitting to theDOLE Regional Office or to the BLR two copies of the following:

(a) A charter certificate issued by the federation or national union indicating the creation or establishmentof the local/chapter;

(b) The names of the local/chapter's officers, their addresses, and the principal office of the local/chapter;and

(c) The local/chapter's constitution and by-laws; Provided, That where the local/chapter's constitution andby-laws is the same as that of the federation or national union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly.

All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified under oath by the Secretary or the Treasurer ofthe local/chapter and attested to by its President.28

The Implementing Rules stipulate that a local or chapter may be directly created by a federation ornational union. A duly constituted local or chapter created in accordance with the foregoing shall acquirelegal personality from the date of filing of the complete documents with the BLR. 29 The issuance of thecertificate of registration by the BLR or the DOLE Regional Office is not the operative act that vests legal

personality upon a local or a chapter under Department Order No. 9. Such legal personality is acquiredfrom the filing of the complete documentary requirements enumerated in Section 1, Rule VI.30

Petitioner insists that Section 3 of the Implementing Rules, as amended by Department Order No. 9,violated Article 234 of the Labor Code when it provided for less stringent requirements for the creation ofa chapter or local. This Court disagrees.

Article 234 of the Labor Code provides that an independent labor organizationacquires legitimacy onlyupon its registration with the BLR:

Any applicant labor organization, association or group of unions or workers shall acquire legal personalityand shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations uponissuance of the certificate of registration based on the following requirements:

(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;

(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address of the labor organization, the minutesof the organizational meetings and the list of the workers who participated in such meetings;

(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in thebargaining unit where it seeks to operate;

(d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or more years, copies of its annual financialreports; and

(e) Four (4) copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant union, minutes of its adoption orratification, and the list of the members who participated in it. (Italics supplied.)

It is emphasized that the foregoing pertains to the registration of an independent labor organization,association or group of unions or workers.

However, the creation of a branch, local or chapter is treated differently. This Court, in the landmark caseofProgressive Development Corporation v. Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment,31 declaredthat when an unregistered union becomes a branch, local or chapter, some of the aforementionedrequirements for registration are no longer necessary or compulsory. Whereas an applicant for registrationof an independent union is mandated to submit, among other things, the number of employees and namesof all its members comprising at least 20% of the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks tooperate, as provided under Article 234 of the Labor Code and Section 2 of Rule III, Book V of theImplementing Rules, the same is no longer required of a branch, local or chapter.32 The intent of the law in

imposing less requirements in the case of a branch or local of a registered federation or national union is toencourage the affiliation of a local union with a federation or national union in order to increase the localunion's bargaining powers respecting terms and conditions of labor.33

Subsequently, inPagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Trajano34 where the validity of Department Order No. 9 wasdirectly put in issue, this Court was unequivocal in finding that there is no inconsistency between theLabor Code and Department Order No. 9.

As to petitioner's claims that respondent obtained its Certificate of Registration through fraud andmisrepresentation, this Court finds that the imputations are not impressed with merit. In the instant case,

proof to declare that respondent committed fraud and misrepresentation remains wanting. This Court had,indeed, on several occasions, pronounced that registration based on false and fraudulent statements anddocuments confer no legitimacy upon a labor organization irregularly recognized, which, at best, holds onto a mere scrap of paper. Under such circumstances, the labor organization, not being a legitimate labor

organization, acquires no rights.

35

This Court emphasizes, however, that a direct challenge to the legitimacy of a labor organization based onfraud and misrepresentation in securing its certificate of registration is a serious allegation which deservescareful scrutiny. Allegations thereof should be compounded with supporting circumstances and evidence.The records of the case are devoid of such evidence. Furthermore, this Court is not a trier of facts, and thisdoctrine applies with greater force in labor cases. Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-

judicial bodies, such as the BLR, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined tospecific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality.36

Still, petitioner postulates that respondent was not validly and legitimately created, for PDMP cannotcreate a local or chapter as it is not a legitimate labor organization, it being a trade union center.

Petitioner's argument creates a predicament as it hinges on the legitimacy of PDMP as a labor

organization. Firstly, this line of reasoning attempts to predicate that a trade union center is not a

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legitimate labor organization. In the process, the legitimacy of PDMP is being impugned, albeit indirectly.Secondly, the same contention premises that a trade union center cannot directly create a local or chapterthrough the process of chartering.

Anent the foregoing, as has been held in a long line of cases, the legal personality of a legitimate labororganization, such as PDMP, cannot be subject to a collateral attack. The law is very clear on this matter.Article 212 (h) of the Labor Code, as amended, defines a legitimate labor organization37 as "any labororganization duly registered with the DOLE, and includes any branch or local thereof."38 On the otherhand, a trade union center is any group of registered national unions or federations organized for themutual aid and protection of its members; for assisting such members in collective bargaining; or for

participating in the formulation of social and employment policies, standards, and programs, and is dulyregistered with the DOLE in accordance with Rule III, Section 2 of the Implementing Rules.39

The Implementing Rules stipulate that a labor organization shall be deemed registered and vested withlegal personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. Once a certificate of registration isissued to a union, its legal personality cannot be subject to collateral attack.40 It may be questioned only inan independent petition for cancellation in accordance with Section 5 of Rule V, Book V of theImplementing Rules. The aforementioned provision is enunciated in the following:

Sec. 5. Effect of registration. The labor organization or workers' association shall be deemed registeredand vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. Such legal

personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but may be questioned only in an independentpetition for cancellation in accordance with these Rules.

PDMP was registered as a trade union center and issued Registration Certificate No. FED-11558-LC bythe BLR on 14 February 1991. Until the certificate of registration of PDMP is cancelled, its legal

personality as a legitimate labor organization subsists. Once a union acquires legitimate status as a labororganization, it continues to be recognized as such until its certificate of registration is cancelled orrevoked in an independent action for cancellation.41 It bears to emphasize that what is being directlychallenged is the personality of respondent as a legitimate labor organization and not that of PDMP. This

being a collateral attack, this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain questions indirectly impugning thelegitimacy of PDMP.

Corollarily, PDMP is granted all the rights and privileges appurtenant to a legitimate labor organization,42and continues to be recognized as such until its certificate of registration is successfully impugned andthereafter cancelled or revoked in an independent action for cancellation.

We now proceed to the contention that PDMP cannot directly create a local or a chapter, it being a trade

union center.

This Court reverses the finding of the appellate court and BLR on this ground, and rules that PDMPcannot directly create a local or chapter.

After an exhaustive study of the governing labor law provisions, both statutory and regulatory, 43 we findno legal justification to support the conclusion that a trade union center is allowed to directly create a localor chapter through chartering.Apropos, we take this occasion to reiterate the first and fundamental duty ofthis Court, which is to apply the law. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply thelaw does not include the power to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein.44

Presidential Decree No. 442, better known as the Labor Code, was enacted in 1972. Being a legislation onsocial justice,45 the provisions of the Labor Code and the Implementing Rules have been subject to severalamendments, and they continue to evolve, considering that labor plays a major role as a socio-economic

force. The Labor Code was first amended by Republic Act No. 6715, and recently, by Republic Act No.9481. Incidentally, the term trade union centerwas never mentioned under Presidential Decree No. 442,even as it was amended by Republic Act No. 6715. The term trade union centerwas first adopted in theImplementing Rules, under Department Order No. 9.

Culling from its definition as provided by Department Order No. 9, a trade union centeris any group ofregistered national unions or federations organized for the mutual aid and protection of its members; forassisting such members in collective bargaining; or for participating in the formulation of social andemployment policies, standards, and programs, and is duly registered with the DOLE in accordance withRule III, Section 2 of the Implementing Rules. 46 The same rule provides that the application for

registration of an industry or trade union center shall be supported by the following:

(a) The list of its member organizations and their respective presidents and, in the case of an industryunion, the industry where the union seeks to operate;

(b) The resolution of membership of each member organization, approved by the Board of Directors ofsuch union;

(c) The name and principal address of the applicant, the names of its officers and their addresses, theminutes of its organizational meeting/s, and the list of member organizations and their representatives whoattended such meeting/s; and

(d) A copy of its constitution and by-laws and minutes of its ratification by a majority of the presidents of

the member organizations, provided that where the ratification was done simultaneously with theorganizational meeting, it shall be sufficient that the fact of ratification be included in the minutes of theorganizational meeting.47

Evidently, while a "national union" or "federation" is a labor organization with at least ten locals orchapters or affiliates, each of which must be a duly certified or recognized collective bargaining agent;48 atrade union center, on the other hand, is composed of a group of registered national unions orfederations.49

The Implementing Rules, as amended by Department Order No. 9, provide that "a duly registeredfederation or national union" may directly create a local or chapter. The provision reads:

Section 1. Chartering and creation of a local/chapter. A duly registered federation or national unionmay directly create a local/chapter by submitting to the Regional Office or to the Bureau two (2) copies of

the following:

(a) A charter certificate issued by the federation or national union indicating the creation or establishmentof the local/chapter;

(b) The names of the local/chapter's officers, their addresses, and the principal office of the local/chapter;and

(c) The local/chapter's constitution and by-laws; provided that where the local/chapter's constitution andby-laws is the same as that of the federation or national union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly.

All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified under oath by the Secretary or the Treasurer ofthe local/chapter and attested to by its President.50

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Department Order No. 9 mentions two labor organizations either of which is allowed to directly create alocal or chapter through chartering a duly registered federation or a nationalunion. Department Order

No. 9 defines a "chartered local" as a labor organization in the private sector operating at the enterpriselevel that acquired legal personality through a charter certificate, issued by a duly registeredfederation ornational union and reported to the Regional Office in accordance with Rule III, Section 2-E of theseRules.51

Republic Act No. 9481 or "An Act Strengthening the Workers' Constitutional Right to Self-Organization,Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 442, As Amended, Otherwise Known as the LaborCode of the Philippines" lapsed52 into law on 25 May 2007 and became effective on 14 June 2007.53 This

law further amends the Labor Code provisions on Labor Relations.

Pertinent amendments read as follows:

SECTION 1. Article 234 of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Codeof the Philippines, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

ART. 234. Requirements of Registration.A federation, national union or industry or trade union centeror an independent union shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privilegesgranted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based onthe following requirements:

(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;

(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address of the labor organization, the minutesof the organizational meetings and the list of the workers who participated in such meetings;

(c) In case the applicant is an independent union, the names of all its members comprising at least twentypercent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate;

(d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or more years, copies of its annual financialreports; and

(e) Four copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant union, minutes of its adoption orratification, and the list of the members who participated in it.

SECTION 2. A new provision is hereby inserted into the Labor Code as Article 234-A to read as follows:

ART. 234-A. Chartering and Creation of a Local Chapter. A duly registered federation or nationalunion may directly create a local chapter by issuing a charter certificate indicating the establishment of thelocal chapter. The chapter shall acquire legal personality only for purposes of filing a petition forcertification election from the date it was issued a charter certificate.

The chapter shall be entitled to all other rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization only uponthe submission of the following documents in addition to its charter certificate:

(a) The names of the chapter's officers, their addresses, and the principal office of the chapter; and

(b) The chapter's constitution and by-laws: Provided, That where the chapter's constitution and by-laws are

the same as that of the federation or the national union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly.

The additional supporting requirements shall be certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer of thechapter and attested by its president. (Emphasis ours.)

Article 234 now includes the term trade union center, but interestingly, the provision indicating theprocedure for chartering or creating a local or chapter, namely Article 234-A, still makes no mention of a"trade union center."

Also worth emphasizing is that even in the most recent amendment of the implementing rules,54

there wasno mention of a trade union center as being among the labor organizations allowed to charter.

This Court deems it proper to apply the Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Under thismaxim of statutory interpretation, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. When certain

persons or things are specified in a law, contract, or will, an intention to exclude all others from itsoperation may be inferred. If a statute specifies one exception to a general rule or assumes to specify theeffects of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects are excluded. 55 Where the terms are expresslylimited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. 56Such is the case here. If its intent were otherwise, the law could have so easily and conveniently included"trade union centers" in identifying the labor organizations allowed to charter a chapter or local. Anythingthat is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom, and a meaning that does not appear nor isintended or reflected in the very language of th e statute cannot be placed therein.57 The rule is restrictive inthe sense that it proceeds from the premise that the legislating body would not have made specificenumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those

expressly mentioned.58Expressium facit cessare tacitum.59 What is expressed puts an end to what isimplied. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object or thing omitted must have beenomitted intentionally.

Therefore, since under the pertinent status and applicable implementing rules, the power granted to labororganizations to directly create a chapter or local through chartering is given to a federation or nationalunion, then a trade union center is without authority to charter directly.

The ruling of this Court in the instant case is not a departure from the policy of the law to foster the freeand voluntary organization of a strong and united labor movement,60 and thus assure the rights of workersto self-organization.61 The mandate of the Labor Code in ensuring strict compliance with the proceduralrequirements for registration is not without reason. It has been observed that the formation of a local orchapter becomes a handy tool for the circumvention of union registration requirements. Absent theinstitution of safeguards, it becomes a convenient device for a small group of employees to foist a not-so-

desirable federation or union on unsuspecting co-workers and pare the need for wholeheartedvoluntariness, which is basic to free unionism. 62 As a legitimate labor organization is entitled to specificrights under the Labor Code and involved in activities directly affecting public interest, it is necessary thatthe law afford utmost protection to the parties affected. 63 However, as this Court has enunciated in

Progressive Development Corporation v. Secretary of Department of Labor and Employment, it is not thisCourt's function to augment the requirements prescribed by law. Our only recourse, as previouslydiscussed, is to exact strict compliance with what the law provides as requisites for local or chapterformation.64

In sum, although PDMP as a trade union center is a legitimate labor organization, it has no p ower todirectly create a local or chapter. Thus, SMPPEU-PDMP cannot be created under the more lenientrequirements for chartering, but must have complied with the more stringent rules for creation andregistration of an independent union, including the 20% membership requirement.

4. Dipad vs Sps. Olivan

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Due to a collision between the car of petitioner spouses Dipad and the passenger jeep owned byrespondents, the former filed a civil action for damages before the sala of Municipal Trial Court (MTC)Judge Clavecilla.

During trial, Roberto Dipad mentioned in his direct testimony that because he was not able to make use ofhis vehicle for his buy-and-sell business, he suffered damages by way of lost income for three months

amounting to 40,000.2

Then, during cross-examination, the defense required him to produce his

personal copy of his ITRs for the years 2001, 2002 and 2003.3

Dipad vehemently objected on the ground of confidentiality of the ITRs. He also claimed that the demandtherefor was incriminatory and in the nature of a fishing expedition.

By reason of the opposition, Judge Clavecilla suspended the trial and required petitioners to show theirbasis for invoking the confidentiality of the ITRs. After the parties submitted their respective Commentson the matter, the MTC in its 3 February 2005 Order required the production of the ITRs.

Aggrieved, the spouses Dipad filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Clavecilla.Thereafter, they instituted a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the RTC, assailing the 3February 2005 Order of the MTC for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

or excess of jurisdiction. In that Petition, they opposed Judge Clavecillas ruling in this wise:4

x x x [T]he respondent Judge stated in his order dated February 3, 2005 (Annex G) in Civil Case No.

11884 that the cited provision does not apply, stating that what is being requested to be produced isplaintiffs copy of their tax returns for the years 2001 to 2003 x x x, thereby ordering the plaintiffstherein, now the petitioners, to furnish defendants counsel within five (5) days f rom receipt of this ordercopy of their income tax returns for the years 2001 to 2003, inclusive.

We beg to differ to such holding, because if a copy of a taxpayers r eturn filed with the Bureau of InternalRevenue can be open to inspection only upon the order of the President of the Philippines, such provision

presupposes the confidentiality of the document; and with more reason that the taxpayer cannot becompelled to yield his copy of the said document. (Emphasis in the original)

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, it is indubitable that compelling the petitioners to produce petitioner Roberto Dipads Income Tax

Returns and furnish copies thereof to the private respondents would be violative of the provisions of the

National Internal Revenue Code on the rule on confidentiality of Income Tax return as discussed above xx x. (Underscoring supplied)

In its 6 May 2005 Decision,5

the RTC dismissed the Rule 65 Petition for being an inappropriate remedy.According to the trial court, the errors committed by Judge Clavecilla were, if at all, mere errors of

judgment correctible not by the extraordinary writ of certiorari, but by ordinary appeal. Petitioners moved

for reconsideration, but their motion was denied by the RTC.6

Hence, this appeal.

The issue presented in this case is straightforward. Petitioners insist that that the RTC committedreversible error in dismissing their Rule 65 Petition as an improper appeal, since grave abuse of discretionamounting to excess of jurisdiction was committed by MTC Judge Clavecilla when he required the

production of their ITRs.7

In support of their claim and to prove the confidentiality of the ITRs they cite Section 71 of the NationalInternal Revenue Code, which reads:

Section 71.Disposition of Income Tax Returns, Publication of Lists of Taxpayers and FilersAfter theassessment shall have been made, as provided in this Title, the returns, together with any correctionsthereof which may have been made by the Commissioner, shall be filed in the Office of the Commissionerand shall constitute public records and be open to inspection as such upon the order of the President of

the Philippines, under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Finance, uponrecommendation of the Commissioner.

The Commissioner may, in each year, cause to be prepared and published in any newspaper the listscontaining the names and addresses of persons who have filed income tax returns.

They also quote fromNational Internal Revenue Code (2001) authored by Epifanio G. Gonzales and

Celestina M. Robledo-Gonzales:9

The general rule is that despite a court order, copies of the income tax returns cannot be furnished in viewof the prohibition contained in Section 332 (now Section 2 86) of the Tax Code.

However, under Section 11 of Regulation 33 of the Department of Finance the Commissioner of Internal

Revenue may furnish copies of income tax returns for use as evidence in court litigation when thegovernment of the Philippine Islands is interested in the result.

Thus, in the case ofCu Unjieng vs. Posadas, 58 Phil. 360, which involves the production of income taxreturns in a criminal case, the Supreme Court held that copies of the returns can be furnished therein

because a criminal case is a sort of a case in which, above all others, the government, as a corporaterepresentative of all society, is highly and immediately interested.

But in a civil case where the government is not interested in the results, no income tax returns or taxcensus statements may be furnished the courts even if the production thereof is in obedience to the courtorder (see BIR Ruling No. 4, S. 1971).

RULING OF THE COURT

The appeal is lacking in merit.

Upon perusal of the reference, we find that petitioners inaccurately quoted the commentary.10

The

portions they lifted from the annotation purport to explain Section 270 of the NIRC.11

The provision prohibits employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) from divulging the tradesecrets of taxpayers. Section 270 obviously does not address the confidentiality of ITRs. Thus, petitioners

cannot rely on the inappropriate provision, the Decisions including the cited Cu Unjieng v. Posadas,12

therulings of the BIR, or issuances of the Department of Finance that apply that provision.

Furthermore, in contrast to the interpretation by petitioners of the commentary that ITRs cannot bedivulged, their very reference characterizes Section 71 as an exception to the rule on the unlawful

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divulgence of trade secrets:13

Exceptions or acts which do not constitute unlawful divulgence of trade secrets.

(a) Section 71 of the Tax Code makes income tax returns public records and opens them to inspectionupon order of the President of the Philippines. x x x.

This Court then reminds the counsels of their duty of candor, fairness and good faith when they face thecourt. Canon 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility instructs that a lawyer shall not knowingly

misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper; the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or thetext of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repealor amendment; or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.

Nevertheless, we proceed to the contention of petitioners against the RTCs dismissal of their Rule 65

Petition. In this regard, we stress that it is basic in our jurisdiction that a petition for certiorari under Rule

65 is not a mode of appeal.14

The remedy, which is narrow in scope,15

only corrects errors of

jurisdiction.16

Thus, if the issue involves an error of judgment, the error is correctible by an appeal via

a Rule 45 petition, and not by a writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.17

As defined in jurisprudence, errors of jurisdiction occur when the court exercises jurisdiction not

conferred upon it by law.

18

They may also occur when the court or tribunal, although it has jurisdiction,

acts in excess of it or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.19

On the contrary, errors of judgment are th ose that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

They include errors of procedure or mistakes in the courts findings20

based on a mistake of law or of

fact.21

Here, it is patently clear that petitioners do not question whether the MTC has jurisdiction or authority toresolve the issue of confidentiality of ITRs. Rather, they assail the wisdom of the MTCs very judgmentand appreciation of the ITR as not confidential. Specifically, they claim that the ruling violated the

provisions on the NIRC on the alleged rule on confidentiality of ITRs.

Based on the definitions above, we conclude similarly as the RTC that if there is an error to speak of, theerror relates only to a mistake in the application of law, and not to an error jurisdiction or grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. The only error petitioners raise refers to Judge Clavecillasmistake of not applying Section 71, which allegedly prohibits the production of ITRs because ofconfidentiality. Certainly, as correctly posited by the court a quo, if every error committed by the trialcourt is subject to certiorari, trial would never come to an end, and the docket will be clogged adinfinitum.

5. Miguel Arroyo vs DOJ

Acting on the discovery of alleged new evidence and the surfacing of new witnesses indicating theoccurrence of massive electoral fraud and manipulation of election results in the 2004 and 2007 NationalElections, on August 2, 2011, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of acommittee jointly with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary investigation on

the alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2 007 elections.5

On August 4, 2011, the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 6406

naming three (3) of itsprosecutors to the Joint Committee.

On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constitutinga Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud andmanipulation cases. The Joint Committee and the Fact-Finding Team are composed of officials from theDOJ and the Comelec. Section 2 of the Joint Order lays down the mandate of the Joint Committee, to wit:

Section 2.Mandate.The Committee shall conduct the necessary preliminary investigation on the basisof the evidence gathered and the charges recommended by the Fact-Finding Team created and referred toin Section 4 hereof. Resolutions finding probable cause for election offenses, defined and penalized underthe Omnibus Election Code and other election laws shall be approved by the Comelec in accordance withthe Comelec Rules of Procedure. For other offenses, or those not covered by the Omnibus Election Codeand other election laws, the corresponding criminal information may be filed directly with the appropriate

courts.7

The Fact-Finding Team,8

on the other hand, was created for the purpose of gathering real, documentary,and testimonial evidence, which can be utilized in the preliminary investigation to be conducted by theJoint Committee. Its specific duties and functions as enumerated in Section 4 of the Joint Order are as

follows:

. a) Gather and document reports, intelligence information, and investigative leads from official as wellas unofficial sources and in