rem 1 brondial notes

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REMEDIAL LAW I (BRONDIAL)

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CIVIL PROCEDURE

I. JURISDICTION

How do you distinguish residual jurisdiction from

residual prerogative?

What is residual jurisdiction? Jurisdiction of a court in

spite losing its jurisdiction because of the perfection of

an appeal still retains it for purposes of preserving the

rights of the parties.

A is the plaintiff and B is the defendant. Trial court ruled

in favor B. A appeals. Before the records are transferred

to the appellate court, the trial court retains jurisdiction.

How can that particular trial court exercise such

jurisdiction? Can an execution be granted ex parte? No.

On what action can the trial court act upon? Motion for

execution pending appeal. Once appeal is perfected,

and the records of the case have been transmitted to

the appellate court, there is no more exercise of

residual jurisdiction. But in case of execution as a matter

of right, once jurisdiction is lost, it can never be

regained. Nonetheless, under Rule 39, the writ of

execution can be granted by the trial court only.

How can the trial court, if it has already lost its

jurisdiction, still exercise the same? In the exercise of

residual jurisdiction.

What is residual prerogative?

There are 3 principles involved in concurrent

jurisdiction:

1. Hierarchy of Courts;

2. Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; and

3. Transcendental Importance

General rule: Jurisdiction is conferred by law .

Exception: The jurisdiction of Supreme Court is

conferred by the Constitution.

1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme

Court shall have the following powers: xxx

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appea

or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may

provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of

any treaty, international or executive agreement, law

presidential decree, proclamation, order, instructionordinance, or regulation is in question. (Note: this is the

exclusive original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.)

b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,

assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation

thereto. (Note: This refers to SC’s appellate jurisdiction

So this power to Review, Reverse, Revise, Modify and

Affirm is within the appellate powers of the jurisdiction

of the Supreme Court.)

c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is

in issue.

d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is

reclusion perpetua or higher. (Note: The “or higher”

clause no longer applies because the death penalty is

suspended)

e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is

involved.

3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other

stations as public interest may require. Such temporaryassignment shall not exceed six months without the

consent of the judge concerned.

4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a

miscarriage of justice.

5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and

enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice

and procedure in all courts, the admission to the

practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance

to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a

simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy

disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the

same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify

substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts

and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless

disapproved by the Supreme Court.


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6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in

accordance with the Civil Service Law.

“Review”, “Reverse”, “Revise”, “Modify” or “Affirm”

must be defined separately and distinctly:

1.

Review – consists of Reverse, Revise, Modify orAffirm. The term review is a catch-all provision.

Review means to take cognizance of the decision,

but does not cover resolution of the lower body.

Review means to look into.

2. Reverse – overturn a favorable judgment to an

unfavorable one or vice versa

3. Revise – revision, not a simple amendment

4. Modify – modification or amendment

5. Affirm – accept the decision of the lower body

“on appeal or certiorari” – to what kind of appeal is it

referring to?

The word “appeal” is by ordinary appeal. The word

“certiorari” is “appeal by certiorari” as a mode of appeal

under Rule 45 because when you speak of “review,

revise, reverse, modify, or affirm” it is in the exercise of

appellate jurisdiction of the SC; it must have come from

a lower court and not an original action under Rule 65which is a special civil action and not a mode of appeal.

The modes of appeal under Rule 41 section 2 are:

1. Ordinary Appeal;

2. Petition for review; and

3. Appeal by certiorari

But the kind of certiorari mentioned is a mode of appeal

because when you speak of Review, Reverse, Revise,

Modify and Affirm, it is the exercise of appellate

jurisdiction.

How could it be an original action when it is certiorari?

Certiorari there refers to Rule 65 because Rule 65 is a

special civil action, it is not a mode of appeal.

What is a mode of Appeal by certiorari? Rule 45. So the

statement there on appeal—ordinary appeal or

certiorari---appeal by certiorari---it cannot be a specia

civil action because it is appellate jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court.

In civil actions, you do not go to the Supreme Court by

ordinary appeal. In criminal actions, there is notice by

appeal to the Supreme Court. There is no moreautomatic appeal because of the removal of the death

penalty, but it does not mean you can no longer appea

to the Supreme Court. You can still do so by notice of

appeal and when you speak of the Constitution, it

applies to both civil and criminal cases.

Lourdes L. Eristingcol vs CA: Petitioner is an owner of a

residential lot in Urdaneta Village, Makati City. On the

other hand, [respondent Randolph] Limjoco, [Lorenzo]

Tan and [June] Vilvestre were the former president and

chairman of the board of governors, construction

committee chairman and village manager of [UrdanetaVillage Association Inc.] UVAI, respectively. UVAI is an

association of homeowners at Urdaneta Village.

Petitioners action against UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and

Vilvestre is founded on the allegations that in

compliance with the National Building Code and after

UVAI’s approval of her building plans and acceptance of

the construction bond and architect’s fee, Eristingco

started constructing a house on her lot with “concrete

canopy directly above the main door and highway”; that

for alleged violation of its Construction Rules andRegulations (or “CRR”) on “Set Back Line” vis-a-vis the

canopy easement, UVAI imposed on her a penalty of

P400,000 and barred her workers and contractors from

entering the village and working on her property; that

the CRR, particularly on “Set Back Line,” is contrary to

law; and that the penalty is unwarranted and excessive.

The parties reached a temporary settlement whereby

UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre executed an

undertaking which allowed Eristingcol’s workers

contractors and suppliers to leave and enter the village

subject only to normal security regulations of UVAI.

UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre filed a motion to

dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subjec

matter of the action. They argued that it is the Home

Insurance Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) which has

jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes involving

homeowners associations, pursuant to Exec. Order No


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535, Series of 1979, as amended by Exec. Order No. 90,

Series of 1986.

Petitioner alleged, among others, that UVAI, Limjoco,

Tan and Vilvestre did not comply with the mandatory

provisions of Secs. 4 and 6, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of

Civil Procedure and are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC after they voluntarily appeared

therein “and embraced its authority by agreeing to sign

an Undertaking.”

RTC denied the MTD holding that its jurisdiction may

not be assailed “after they voluntarily entered their

appearance, sought reliefs therein, and embraced its

authority by agreeing to sign an undertaking to desist

from prohibiting (Eristingcol’s) workers from entering

the village.” It applied the doctrine enunciated in Tijam

v. Sibonghanoy. CA dismissed the complaint for lack of

jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether it is RTC or Housing and Land Use Regulatory

Board (HLURB) having jurisdiction over the subject

matter of the complaint.

Ruling:

HLURB. As regards the defendants’ supposed embrace

of the RTC’s jurisdiction by appearing thereat and

undertaking to desist from prohibiting Eristingcol’s

workers from entering the village, suffice it to state thatthe invocation of the doctrine in Tijam, et al. v.

Sibonghanoy, et al. is quite a long stretch.

The factual milieu obtaining in Tijam and in this case are

worlds apart. As found by the CA, defendants’

appearance before the RTC was pursuant to, and in

compliance with, a subpoena issued by that court in

connection with petitioner’s application for a TRO. On

defendants’ supposed agreement to sign the

Undertaking allowing petitioner’s workers, contractors,

and suppliers to enter and exit the village, this

temporary settlement cannot be equated with full

acceptance of the RTC’s authority, as what actually

transpired in Tijam.

The landmark case of Tijam is, in fact, only an exception

to the general rule that an objection to the court’s

jurisdiction over a case may be raised at any stage of the

proceedings, as the lack of jurisdiction affects the very

authority of the court to take cognizance of a case. In

that case, the Surety filed a Motion to Dismiss before

the CA, raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the

first time—15 years after the action was commenced in

the CFI of Cebu. Indeed, in several stages of the

proceedings in the CFI, as well as in the CA, the Surety

invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtainaffirmative relief, and even submitted its case for a fina

adjudication on the merits. Consequently, it was barred

by laches from invoking the CFI’s lack of jurisdiction.

To further highlight the distinction in this case, the TRO

hearing was held on February 9, 1999, a day after the

filing of the complaint. On even date, the parties

reached a temporary settlement reflected in the

Undertaking. 15 days thereafter, defendants, including

Limjoco, filed a MTD. Certainly, this successive and

continuous chain of events cannot be characterized as

laches as would bar defendants from questioning theRTC’s jurisdiction.

Duero vs CA: According to Duero, private respondent

Bernardo Eradel occupied Gabriel Duero’s land in

Surigao del Sur. As shown in the tax declaration, the

land had an assessed value of P5,240. Despite repeated

demands, Eradel refused to leave. Duero filed before

the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession and

Ownership against Eradel and Apolinario and Inocencio

Ruena. Duero and Ruenas executed a compromise

agreement, stating that the Ruenas bound themselvesto respect the ownership of Duero. Eradel was not a

party to the agreement, and he was declared in default

for failure to file his answer to the complaint. Duero

presented his evidence ex parte. RTC ruled in his favor.

Eradel filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has

been occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio

Laurente, Sr. He explained that he turned over the

complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest

belief that as landlord, the latter had a better right to

the land and was responsible to defend any adverse

claim on it. However, RTC denied the motion for new

trial.

A RED Conflict Case, an administrative case between

Duero and applicant-contestants Romeo, Artemio and

Jury Laurente, remained pending with the Office of the

Regional Director of the DENR in Davao City. It was

forwarded to the DENR in Agusan del Sur. Duero filed


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before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment,

reiterating the same allegation in his Motion for New

Trial. He averred that unless there is a determination on

who owned the land, he could not be made to vacate

the land. Also, the judgment of the RTC was void

inasmuch as the heirs of Artemio, who are indispensable

parties, were not impleaded. The grandchildren ofArtemio who were claiming ownership of the land, filed

a Motion for Intervention. RTC denied the motion. RTC

denied the Petition for Relief from Judgment. In an MR,

Duero alleged that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the

case, since the value of the land was only P5,240 and

therefore it was under the jurisdiction of the MTC. RTC

denied the MR.

Duero filed a Motion for Execution, which the RTC

granted. Entry of Judgment was made of record and a

writ of execution was issued by the RTC. Duero filed his

petition for certiorari before the CA. CA gave due courseto the petition, maintaining that Eradel is not estopped

from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC when Eradel

filed with said court his MR And/Or Annulment of

Judgment.

Issue:

Whether private respondent was estopped from

assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC after he had filed

several motions before it.

Ruling:No. It was Duero who filed the complaint before the

RTC, believing that the RTC had jurisdiction. RA 769117

amending BP 129 had already become effective, such

that jurisdiction already belongs not to the RTC but to

the MTC. Eradel, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken

belief that since he was merely a tenant of the Artemio,

his landlord, gave the summons to a Hipolito Laurente,

one of the heirs of Artemio, who did not do anything

about the summons. For failure to answer the

complaint, Eradel was declared in default. He then filed

a Motion for New Trial in the RTC and explained that he

defaulted because of his belief that the suit ought to be

answered by his landlord. He stated that he had

evidence to prove that he had a better right than Duero

because of his long, continuous and uninterrupted

possession as bona-fide tenant-lessee. But his motion

was denied. He tried an alternative recourse. He filed

before the RTC a Motion for Relief from Judgment. RTC

denied his motion, hence he moved for reconsideration

of the denial. In his MR, he raised for the first time the

RTC's lack of jurisdiction. This motion was denied. Erade

raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case

was already on appeal, but when the case, was stil

before the RTC that ruled him in default, denied his

motion for new trial and for relief from judgment, and

denied his 2 MRs. After RTC still refused to reconsiderthe denial of Eradel's motion for relief from judgment, it

went on to issue the order for entry of judgment and a

writ of execution.

The lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action

cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their

silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent

Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court

over the action at any stage of the proceedings and

even on appeal. RTC should have declared itself barren

of jurisdiction over the action. Even if Eradel actively

participated in the proceedings before said court, thedoctrine of estoppel cannot still be properly invoked

against him because the question of lack of jurisdiction

may be raised at anytime and at any stage of the action.

As a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not a

question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an

issue of conferment as a matter of law. Also, neither

waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction

upon a court, barring highly meritorious and exceptiona

circumstances.

Estoppel must be applied only in exceptional cases, asits misapplication could result in a miscarriage of justice

Duero filed his complaint before a court without

appropriate jurisdiction. Eradel, a farmer whose tenancy

status is still pending before the administrative agency,

could have moved for dismissal of the case on

jurisdictional grounds. But the farmer could not be

expected to know the nuances of jurisdiction and

related issues. This farmer ought not to be penalized

when he claims that he made an honest mistake when

he initially submitted his motions before the RTC, before

he realized that the controversy was outside the RTC's

cognizance. To hold him in estoppel as the RTC did

would amount to foreclosing his avenue to obtain a

proper resolution of his case. He would be evicted from

the land prematurely, while RED Conflict Case would

remain unresolved. Such eviction on a technicality if

allowed could result in an injustice, if it is later found

that he has a legal right to till the land he now occupies

as tenant-lessee.


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Gonzaga vs CA: Facts: In 1970, petitioners purchased a

parcel of land from private respondent Lucky Homes,

Inc. The lot was specifically denominated as Lot No. 19

and was mortgaged to SSS as security for their housing

loan. Petitioners started the construction of their house

on Lot No. 18, as private respondent mistakenlyidentified Lot No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Private respondent

informed petitioners of such mistake but the latter

offered to buy Lot No. 18 to widen their premises. Thus,

petitioners continued with the construction of their

house. However, petitioners defaulted in the payment

of their housing loan from SSS. Lot No. 19 was

foreclosed by SSS and petitioners’ certificate of title was

cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of SSS.

After Lot No. 19 was foreclosed, petitioners offered to

swap Lot Nos. 18 and 19 and demanded from private

respondent that their contract of sale be reformed and

another deed of sale be executed with respect to LotNo. 18, considering that their house was built therein.

However, private respondent refused. Thus, petitioners

filed, on June 13, 1996, an action for reformation of

contract and damages with the RTC.

On January 15, 1998, RTC dismissed the complaint for

lack of merit. RTC held that the reformation of

instruments or the swapping of Lot 18 and Lot 19 is no

longer feasible considering that plaintiff is no longer the

owner of Lot 19, otherwise, defendant will be losing Lot

18 without any substitute therefore. Upon the otherhand, plaintiff will be unjustly enriching himself having

in its favor both Lot 19 which was earlier mortgaged by

him and subsequently foreclosed by SSS, as well as Lot

18 where his house is presently standing. What plaintiff

had bought from the defendant is Lot 19 which parcel of

land has been properly indicated in the instruments and

not Lot 18 as claimed by the plaintiff. The contracts

being clear and unmistakable, they reflect the true

intention of the parties, besides the plaintiff failed to

assail the contracts on mutual mistake, hence the same

need no longer be reformed.

On June 22, 1998, a writ of execution was issued by the

trial court. Thus, on September 17, 1998, petitioners

filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution,

alleging that RTC had no jurisdiction to try the case as it

was vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory

Board (HLURB) pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision and

Condominium Buyers Protective Decree). Conformably,

petitioners filed a new complaint against private

respondent with the HLURB. Likewise, on June 30

1999, petitioner-spouses filed before the CA a petition

for annulment of judgment, on the ground that RTC had

no jurisdiction to try and decide the Civil Case.

CA denied the petition for annulment of judgment,relying mainly on the jurisprudential doctrine of

estoppel as laid down in the case of Tijam vs

Sibonghanoy.

Issue: Whether or not the principle of estoppel may be

applied even though RTC had no jurisdiction to decide

the Civil Case.

Ruling: Yes. While an order or decision rendered

without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed

at any stage, active participation in the proceedings in

the court which rendered the order or decision will barsuch party from attacking its jurisdiction. As we held in

the leading case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy: “A party may

be estopped or barred from raising a question in

different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak

of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record,

and of estoppel by laches. Xxx It has been held that a

party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure

affirmative relief against his opponent and, after

obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate, or

question that same jurisdiction x x x x [T]he question

whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subjectmatter of the action or of the parties was not important

in such cases because the party is barred from such

conduct not because the judgment or order of the court

is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the

reason that such a practice can not be tolerated ––

obviously for reasons of public policy.”

A party’s active participation in all stages of the case

before the trial court, which includes invoking the

court’s authority to grant affirmative relief, effectively

estops such party from later challenging that same

court’s jurisdiction.

It was petitioners themselves who invoked the

jurisdiction of the RTC by instituting an action fo

reformation of contract against private respondents. It

appears that, in the proceedings before the trial court,

petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from start to

finish. Not even once did petitioners ever raise the


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issue of the court’s jurisdiction during the entire

proceedings which lasted for 2 years. It was only after

RTC rendered its decision and issued a writ of execution

against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue

of jurisdiction ─ and it was only because said decision

was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus effectively

waived their right to question the courts jurisdictionover the case they themselves filed.

Petitioners should bear the consequence of their act.

They cannot be allowed to profit from their omission to

the damage and prejudice of the private respondent.

This Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a

party submitting his case for decision and then

accepting the judgment but only if favorable, and

attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if not.

Public policy dictates that this Court must strongly

condemn any double-dealing by parties who aredisposed to trifle with the courts by deliberately taking

inconsistent positions, in utter disregard of the

elementary principles of justice and good faith. There is

no denying that, in this case, petitioners never raised

the issue of jurisdiction throughout the entire

proceedings in the trial court. Instead, they voluntarily

and willingly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of

said court. It is now too late in the day for them to

repudiate the jurisdiction they were invoking all along.

Escobal vs Garchitorena: Petitioner was conductingsurveillance operations on drug trafficking at a

beerhouse. He got involved in a shooting incident,

resulting in the death of Rodney Nueca. An amended

Information was filed with the RTC charging petitioner

with murder. RTC preventively suspended petitioner

from the service under PD No. 971, as amended by PD

1847. General Headquarters of the PNP preventively

suspended the petitioner from the service until the case

was terminated. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a

warrant issued by the RTC but he posted bail and was

granted temporary liberty. Petitioner pleaded not guilty

to the offense charged. Petitioner filed a Motion to

Quash the Information alleging that as mandated by CA

No. 408, in relation to Section 1, PD No. 1822 and

Section 95 of RA No. 6975, the court martial, not the

RTC, had jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP

members and officers.

Pending the resolution of the motion, petitioner

requested the Chief of the PNP for his reinstatement

Under RA No. 6975, his suspension should last for only

90 days, and, having served the same, he should now be

reinstated. Petitioner filed a motion in the RTC for the

lifting of the order of suspension. RTC denied the

motion. Trial proceeded, and the prosecution rested itscase. Petitioner presented his evidence. He filed an

MTC. Citing Republic v. Asuncion, he argued that since

he committed the crime in the performance of his

duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction

over the case.

RTC denied the MTD. It, however, ordered the conduct

of a preliminary hearing to determine whether or not

the crime charged was committed by the petitioner in

relation to his office as a member of the PNP. The

prosecution manifested that it was no longer presenting

any evidence in connection with the petitioner’s

motion. Its evidence showed that the petitioner did not

commit the offense charged in connection with the

performance of his duties as a member of the Philippine

Constabulary.

RTC declared that the petitioner committed the crime

charged while not in the performance of his officia

function. RTC added that upon the enactment of R.A

No. 7975, the issue had become moot and academic

The amendatory law transferred the jurisdiction ove

the offense charged from the Sandiganbayan to the RTCsince the petitioner did not have a salary grade of “27”

as provided for in or by Section 4(a)(1), (3) thereof. RTC

nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend the

Information pursuant to the ruling in Republic v

Asuncion and R.A. No. 7975. The amendment consisted

in the inclusion of an allegation that the offense charged

was not committed by the petitioner in the

performance of his duties/functions, nor in relation to

his office.

The petitioner filed a MR of the order. He asserted that

R.A. No. 7975 could not be applied retroactively. RTC

declared that based on the petitioner’s evidence, he

was on official mission when the shooting occurred

RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended

Information and to allege that the offense charged was

committed by the petitioner in the performance of his

duties/functions or in relation to his office; and,

conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmit the


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same, as well as the complete records with the

stenographic notes, to the Sandiganbayan.

The Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan ordered the

Executive Clerk of Court to return the records of

Criminal Case to the court of origin. Under P.D. No.

1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, the RTC retained jurisdiction over the case, considering that the

petitioner had a salary grade of “23.” Furthermore, the

prosecution had already rested its case and the

petitioner had commenced presenting his evidence in

the RTC; following the rule on continuity of jurisdiction,

the latter court should continue with the case and

render judgment therein after trial.

Issue:

Whether or not the Presiding Justice of the

Sandiganbayan properly remanded the case to the RTC.

Ruling:

Yes. The petitioner contends that when the amended

information was filed with the RTC on February 6, 1991,

P.D. No. 1606 was still in effect. Under Section 4(a) of

the decree, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive

jurisdiction over the case against him as he was charged

with homicide with the imposable penalty of reclusion

temporal, and the crime was committed while in the

performance of his duties. He further asserts that

although P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861

and by R.A. No. 7975 provides that crimes committed bymembers and officers of the PNP with a salary grade

below “27” committed in relation to office are within

the exclusive jurisdiction of the proper RTC, the

amendment thus introduced by R.A. No. 7975 should

not be applied retroactively. This is so, the petitioner

asserts, because under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, only

those cases where trial has not begun in the

Sandiganbayan upon the effectivity of the law should be

referred to the proper trial court.

The private complainant agrees with the contention of

the petitioner. In contrast, the Office of the Special

Prosecutor contends that the Presiding Justice of the

Sandiganbayan acted in accordance with law when he

ordered the remand of the case to the RTC. It asserts

that R.A. No. 7975 should be applied retroactively.

Although the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the

crime committed by the petitioner when the amended

information was filed with the RTC, by the time it

resolved petitioner’s motion to dismiss on July 31, 1995

R.A. No. 7975 had already taken effect. Thus, the law

should be given retroactive effect.

The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is

determined by the allegations in the Information or the

Complaint and the statute in effect at the time of thecommencement of the action, unless such statute

provides for a retroactive application thereof. The

jurisdictional requirements must be alleged in the

Information. Such jurisdiction of the court acquired at

the inception of the case continues until the case is

terminated.

Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D

No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction

in all cases involving the following:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II

Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public

officers and employees in relation to their office,

including those employed in government-owned o

controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed

with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law

is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for

six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 ….

However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive

jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed

by public officers in relation to their office, it is

essential that the facts showing the intimate relation

between the office of the offender and the discharge

of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It

is not enough to merely allege in the Information that

the crime charged was committed by the offender in

relation to his office because that would be a conclusion

of law.[22] The amended Information filed with the RTC

against the petitioner does not contain any allegation

showing the intimate relation between his office and

the discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had

jurisdiction over the offense charged when on

November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment of

the Information to include therein an allegation that the

petitioner committed the crime in relation to office. R.A


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No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect

and under Section 2 of the law:

In cases where none of the principal accused are

occupying positions corresponding to salary grade “27”

or higher, as prescribed in the said RA No. 6758, or PNP

officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher,or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall

be vested in the proper RTC, MeTC, MTC, and MCTC, as

the case may be, pursuant to their respective

jurisdiction as provided in BP Blg. 129.

Under the law, even if the offender committed the

crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a

position corresponding to a salary grade below “27,” the

proper RTC or MTC, as the case may be, shall have

exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the

petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary

grade “23.” He was charged with homicide punishable

by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive

jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to

Sections 20 and 32 of BP Blg. 129, as amended by

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.

The petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7975 should

not be applied retroactively has no legal basis. It bears

stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural

law which may be applied retroactively.

Asia’s Emerging Dragon vs DOTC: Doctrines: There is noquestion as to the jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig City

over the subject matter and parties in Civil Case No.

66213. The RTC can exercise original jurisdiction over

cases involving the issuance of writs of certiorari,

prohibition,mandamus, quo warranto, habeas

corpus and injunction.51 To recall, the Petition of AEDC

before the RTC of Pasig City was for the declaration of

nullity of proceedings, mandamus and injunction. The

RTC of Pasig City likewise had jurisdiction over the

parties, with the voluntary submission by AEDC and

proper service of summons on the DOTC Secretary and

the PBAC Chairman and members.

Special rights granted to original proponent in

public biddings. The special rights or privileges of an

original proponent come into play only when there are

other proposals submitted during the public bidding of

the infrastructure project. As can be gleaned from the

plain language of the statutes and the IRR. The original

proponent has: (1) the right to match the lowest or most

advantageous proposal within 30 working days from

note thereof, and (2) in the event that the origina

proponent is able to match the lowest or mos

advantageous proposal submitted, then it has the right

to be awarded the project. The second right or privilege

is contingent upon the actual exercise by the original proponent of the first right or privilege. Before the

project could be awarded to the Original proponent, he

must have been able to match the lowest or most

advantageous proposal within the prescribed period

Hence, when the original proponent is able to timely

matched the lowest or most advantageous propos. With

all things being equal, it shall enjoy preference in the

awarding of the infrastracture project.

It is without question that in a situation where

there’s no other competitive bid submitted for the BOT

project that the project would be awarded to theoriginal proponent thereof. However, when there are

competitive bids submitted, the original proponent must

be able to match the most advantageous or lowest bid;

only when it is able to do so will the original proponent

enjoy the preferential right to the award of the project

over the other bidder.

It is already an established fact in AGAN V.

PIATCO (2004) that AC failed to match the more

advantageous proposal submitted by PIATCO by the lime

the 30-day working period expired on 28 November

1996.8 and since it did not exercise its right to match themost advantageous proposal within the prescribed

period, it cannot assert its right to be awarded the

project.

Facts: AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal (origina

proponent) to the Government through the

DOTC/[Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA)

for the development of NAIA International Passenger

Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-operate-and-

transfer arrangement pursuant to RA 6957 as amended

by RA 7718 (BOT Law).

The consortium composed of People's Air Cargo and

Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds

Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security

Bank) (collectively, Paircargo Consortium ) also

submitted their competitive proposal to the PBAC . PBAC

awarded the project to Paircargo. AEDC objected.

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In Agan Case, SC rules that in view of the absence of the

requisite financial capacity of the Paircargo Consortium,

predecessor of respondent PIATCO, the award by the

PBAC of the contract for the construction, operation and

maintenance of the NAIA IPT III is null and void.

In Gingoyon Case, Government filed an expropriationcase as regards NAIA IPT III, which the Court granted.

Because of these rulings, AEDC claims that, being the

recognized and unchallenged original proponent of the

NAIA IPT III Project, it has the exclusive, clear, and

vested statutory right to the award thereof.

A petition for mandamus was filed by AEDC.

Substantial Issue: AEDC is not entitled to a writ

of mandamus, there being no specific, certain, and clear

legal right to be enforced, nor duty to be performedthat is clearly and peremptorily enjoined by law or by

reason of official station. While the Court may concede

that AEDC, as the original proponent, already expended

resources in its preparation and negotiation of its

unsolicited proposal, the mere fact thereof does not

entitle it to the instant award of the NAIA IPT III Project.

AEDC was aware that the said project would have to

undergo public bidding, and there existed the possibility

that another proponent may submit a more

advantageous bid which it cannot match; in which case,

the project shall be awarded to the other proponentand AEDC would then have no means to recover the

costs and expenses it already incurred on its unsolicited

proposal. It was a given business risk that AEDC

knowingly undertook.

Procedural Issues:

Late filing

The present claim of AEDC is rooted in the Decision of

this Court in Agan. However, AEDC filed the Petition at

bar only 20 months after the promulgation of the

Decision in Agan on 5 May 2003. As the revised Rules

now stand, a petition for certiorari may be filed within

60 days from notice of the judgment, order or

resolution sought to be assailed.42 Reasonable time for

filing a petition for mandamus should likewise be for the

same period. The filing by the AEDC of its petition

for mandamus 20 months after its supposed right to the

project arose is evidently beyond reasonable time and

negates any claim that the said petition for the

extraordinary writ was the most expeditious and speedy

remedy available to AEDC.

Res judicata

AEDC's Petition is that it is already barred by res

judicata. AEDC entered into a compromise agreement

with the Government.

Because of the compromise agreement among the

parties, there was accordingly a judicial settlement of

the controversy, and the Order, dated 30 April 1999, of

the RTC of Pasig City was no less a judgment on the

merits which may be annulled only upon the ground of

extrinsic fraud. Thus, the RTC of Pasig City, in the same

Order, correctly granted the dismissal of Civil Case No

66213 with prejudice. AEDC, however, invokes the

purported pressure exerted upon it by then President

Joseph E. Estrada, the alleged fraud committed by the

DOTC, and paragraph 2 in the afore-quoted JointMotion to Dismiss to justify the non-application of the

doctrine of res judicata to its present Petition.

There is res judicata because:

First, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City, dismissing Civi

Case No. 66213, was issued on 30 April 1999. The Joint

Motion to Dismiss, deemed a compromise agreement

once approved by the court is immediately executory

and not appealable.

Second , the Order of the RTC of Pasig City dismissing

Civil Case No. 66213 pursuant to the Joint Motion to

Dismiss filed by the parties constitutes a judgment on

the merits.

Third, there is no question as to the jurisdiction of the

RTC of Pasig City over the subject matter and parties in

Civil Case No. 66213. The RTC can exercise origina

jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance of writs

of certiorari, prohibition,mandamus, quo

warranto, habeas corpus and injunction. To recall, the

Petition of AEDC before the RTC of Pasig City was for

the declaration of nullity of

proceedings, mandamus and injunction. The RTC of

Pasig City likewise had jurisdiction over the parties,

with the voluntary submission by AEDC and proper

service of summons on the DOTC Secretary and the

PBAC Chairman and members.

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Lastly, there is, between Civil Case No. 66213 before the

RTC of Pasig City and the Petition now pending before

this Court, an identity of parties, of subject matter, and

of causes of action.

Agan vs PIATCO: The contract for the construction and

operation for the NAIA IPT III was awarded to PIATCO.Petitioners, who are employees of service providers at

the MIAA and NAIA Terminal I and II, and service

providers themselves, assail:

a. the provisions in the 1997 Concession Agreement

and the ARCA which grant PIATCO the exclusive

right to operate a commercial international

passenger terminal within the Island of Luzon,

except those international airports already existing

at the time of the execution of the agreement.

b.

The contracts further provide that upon thecommencement of operations at the NAIA IPT III,

the Government shall cause the closure of Ninoy

Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminals I

and II as international passenger terminals.

c.

With respect to existing concession agreements

between MIAA and international airport service

providers regarding certain services or operations,

the 1997 Concession Agreement and the ARCA

uniformly provide that such services or operations

will not be carried over to the NAIA IPT III andPIATCO is under no obligation to permit such carry

over except through a separate agreement duly

entered into with PIATCO.

d. With respect to the petitioning service providers

and their employees, upon the commencement of

operations of the NAIA IPT III, they allege that they

will be effectively barred from providing

international airline airport services at the NAIA

Terminals I and II as all international airlines and

passengers will be diverted to the NAIA IPT III. The

petitioning service providers will thus be compelled

to contract with PIATCO alone for such services,

with no assurance that subsisting contracts with

MIAA and other international airlines will be

respected.

Respondent PIATCO further alleges that this Court is

without jurisdiction to review the instant cases as

factual issues are involved which this Court is ill-

equipped to resolve.

Moreover, PIATCO alleges that submission of this

controversy to this Court at the first instance is a

violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts. They

contend that trial courts have concurrent jurisdictionwith this Court with respect to a special civil action for

prohibition and hence, following the rule on hierarchy

of courts, resort must first be had before the tria

courts. Further, arbitration proceedings filed by PIATCO

have already commenced.

Issue: Whether direct resort to the Supreme Court was a

proper remedy;

Ruling:

YES. The rule on hierarchy of courts will not also

prevent this Court from assuming jurisdiction over thecases at bar. The said rule may be relaxed when the

redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate

courts or where exceptional and compelling

circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and

calling for the exercise of this Court’s primary

jurisdiction. It is easy to discern that exceptiona

circumstances exist in the cases at bar that call for the

relaxation of the rule. Both petitioners and respondents

agree that these cases are of transcendenta

importance as they involve the construction and

operation of the country’s premier international airportMoreover, the crucial issues submitted for resolution

are of first impression and they entail the proper lega

interpretation of key provisions of the Constitution, the

BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations

Thus, considering the nature of the controversy before

the Court, procedural bars may be lowered to give way

for the speedy disposition of the instant cases.

Liga ng mga Barangay vs Atienza: Liga is the nationa

organization of all the barangays in the Philippines,

which pursuant to Section 492 of RA No. 7160 (LGC),

constitutes the duly elected presidents of highly

urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the metropolitan

Manila Chapter, and metropolitan political subdivision

chapters.

Section 493 of that law provides that “the liga at the

municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan politica

subdivision, and national levels directly elect a


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president, a vice-president, and 5 members of the board

of directors.” All other matters not provided for in the

law affecting the internal organization of the leagues of

LGUs shall be governed by their respective constitution

and by-laws, which must always conform to the

provisions of the Constitution and existing laws. Liga

adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-laws togovern its internal organization. Liga adopted and

ratified its own Election Code. Liga came out with its

Calendar of Activities and Guidelines in the

Implementation of the Liga Election Code of 2002,

setting the synchronized elections for highly urbanized

city chapters, such as the Liga Chapter of Manila,

together with independent component city, provincial,

and metropolitan chapters.

Respondent City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance

No. 8039, Series of 2002, providing for the election of

representatives of the District Chapters in the CityChapter of Manila and setting the elections for both

chapters 30 days after the barangay elections. Liga sent

respondent Mayor of Manila a letter requesting him

that said ordinance be vetoed considering that it

encroached upon, or even assumed, the functions of the

Liga through legislation, a function which was clearly

beyond the ambit of the powers of the City Council.

Mayor signed and approved the city ordinance.

Issue:

Whether or not the Liga properly filed the case directlywith the Supreme Court.

Ruling:

No. Although the instant petition is styled as a petition

for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this

Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the

questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus,

partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief

over which this Court has only appellate, not original,

jurisdiction. As such, this petition must necessary fail, as

this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a

petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of

law are involved.

Even granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe

for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a

clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts. No special and

important reason or exceptional and compelling

circumstance has been adduced by the petitioner or the

intervenor why direct recourse to this Court should be

allowed.

This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of

certiorari (as well as of prohibition, mandamus, quo

warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not

exclusive, but is concurrent with the RTC and CA incertain cases.

People v. Cuaresma: This concurrence of jurisdiction is

not to be taken as according to parties seeking any of

the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of

the court to which application therefor will be directed

There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is

determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves

as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for

petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard

of that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that

petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs againstfirst level (“inferior”) courts should be filed with the

RTC, and those against the latter, with the CA. A direct

invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue these

writs should be allowed only when there are special and

important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set

out in the petition. This is a policy necessary to prevent

inordinate demands upon SC’s time and attention which

are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive

jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the

Court’s docket.

Santiago v. Vasquez: the propensity of litigants and

lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our

judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Cour

must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an

imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (2

it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay,

intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases

which in some instances had to be remanded o

referred to the lower court as the proper forum unde

the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve

the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.

SC will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress

desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts,

and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify

the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of

certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary

jurisdiction. Petitioner’s reliance on Pimentel v. Aguirre

is misplaced because the non-observance of the


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hierarchy-of-courts rule was not an issue therein.

Besides, what was sought to be nullified in the petition

for certiorari and prohibition therein was an act of the

President, which would have greatly affected all LGUs.

When an act of the legislative department is seriously

alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the

controversy becomes the duty of this Court. The sameis true when what is seriously alleged to be

unconstitutional is an act of the President, who in our

constitutional scheme is coequal with Congress.

Hannah Serrana vs Sandiganbayan: Petitioner was a

student of the UP-Cebu (government scholar) appointed

by President Joseph Estrada as a student regent of UP,

to serve a one-year term. Petitioner, with her siblings

and relatives, registered with the SEC the Office of the

Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the

projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons

Hall Annex. Estrada gave P15,000,000 to the OSRFI asfinancial assistance for the proposed renovation. The

source of the funds was the Office of the President. The

renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.

The succeeding student regent filed a complaint for

Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the

Office of the Ombudsman. Ombudsman found probable

cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian

Serana for estafa.

Petitioner moved to quash the information: (a) the

Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b)petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27

and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged

was not committed in relation to her office; (d) the

funds in question personally came from President

Estrada, not from the government.

Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for lack of

merit. Accused-movant’s claim that being merely a

member in representation of the student body, she was

never a public officer since she never received any

compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27,

is of no moment, in view of the express provision of

Section 4 of RA No. 8249 which provides:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise

exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(A) x x x (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying

the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise

classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the

Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989

(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

x x x x (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers

of government-owned or controlled corporations, state

universities or educational institutions or foundations.

Thus, Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction

over all offenses involving the officials enumerated in

subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades,

because the primordial consideration in the inclusion of

these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and

functions.

Issue

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan may try a

government scholaran** accused, along with her

brother, of swindling government funds.

Ruling:

Yes. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is set by P.D

No. 1606, as amended, not by R.A. No. 3019, as

amended. R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on

August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain acts of

public officers and private persons alike which

constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead

thereto. Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, al

prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed

with the Sandiganbayan. R.A. No. 3019 does not containan enumeration of the cases over which the

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A

No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with

the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with

prohibition on private individuals. P.D. No. 1606, as

amended, defines the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended,

defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for

their penalties.

Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with

Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-

paying student. This is bereft of merit. It is not only the

salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction

over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. While

the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with

Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically


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includes other executive officials whose positions may

not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by

express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of

the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of

the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express

provision of law.

Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the

Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,

directors or trustees, or managers of government-

owned or controlled corporations, state universities or

educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls

under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out,

the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board

of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express

mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as

contemplated by P.D. No. 1606. Moreover, it is well

established that compensation is not an essential

element of public office. At most, it is merely incidentalto the public office. The administration of the UP is a

sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the

Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental

function by providing advanced instruction in literature,

philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving

professional and technical training. Moreover, UP is

maintained by the Government and it declares no

dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.

The offense charged was committed in relation to public

office, according to the Information. Petitioner arguesthat even assuming that she is a public officer, the

Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the

offense because it was not committed in relation to her

office. According to petitioner, she had no power or

authority to act without the approval of the BOR. She

adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR

authorizing her to contract with then Estrada; and that

her acts were not ratified by the governing body of the

state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a

private capacity and not in relation to public office.

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the

averments in the information. More than that,

jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories

set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a

motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash. Otherwise,

jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely

upon the whims of defendant or respondent.

The information alleged, in no uncertain terms that

petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P., "while in

the performance of her official functions, committing

the offense in relation to her office and taking

advantage of her position, with intent to gain,

conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a

private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfullyand feloniously defraud the government x x x."

Clarit Garcia vs Sandiganbayan: To recover unlawfully

acquired funds and properties in the amount of

P143,052,015.29 that retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia

his wife, petitioner Clarita, children Ian Carl, Juan Paulo

and Timothy Mark had allegedly amassed and acquired

the Republic, through the Office of the Ombudsman

(OMB), pursuant to RA 1379, filed with the

Sandiganbayan (SB) on October 29, 2004 a petition for

the forfeiture of those properties. Civil Case No. 0193

was followed by the filing of another forfeiture case,docketed as Civil Case No. 0196, this time to recover

funds and properties amounting to P202,005,980.55

Civil Case No. 0196 would eventually be raffled also to

the Fourth Division of the SB. Civil Case No. 0193 shal

be referred to as Forfeiture I and Civil Case No. 0196 as

Forfeiture II.

Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the

filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the Garcias and 3

others with violation of RA 7080 (plunder) under an

Information dated April 5, 2005 which placed the valueof the property and funds plundered at

P303,272,005.99. Docketed as Crim. Case No. 28107,

the Information was raffled off to the Second Division of

the SB. The plunder charge, as the parties’ pleadings

seem to indicate, covered substantially the same

properties identified in both forfeiture cases.

Issue 1:

Whether or not SB 4Th Division has jurisdiction over the

subject matter of Forfeitures I and II as both cases are

covered or included in the plunder case against the

Garcias.

Ruling:

Yes, the plunder case did not absorb the forfeiture

cases. Petitioner claims that the filing of the main

plunder case, with its automatic forfeiture mechanism

in the event of conviction, ousted the SB 4th Division of

its jurisdiction over the subject matter of the forfeiture


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cases. The inclusion of the forfeiture cases with the

plunder case is necessary, so petitioner claims, to

obviate possible double jeopardy entanglements and

colliding case dispositions. Prescinding from these

premises, petitioner would ascribe grave abuse of

discretion on the SB 4th Division for not granting its

separate motions to dismiss the 2 forfeiture petitionsand/or to consolidate them with the plunder case on

the foregoing ground.

Petitioner’s posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being

absorbed by the plunder case, thus depriving the 4th

Division of the SB of jurisdiction over the civil cases, is

flawed by the assumptions holding it together, the first

assumption being that the forfeiture cases are the

corresponding civil action for recovery of civil liability ex

delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB 4th Division in its

May 20, 2005 Resolution, the civil liability for forfeiture

cases does not arise from the commission of a criminaloffense, thus:

Such liability is based on a statute that safeguards the

right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired

properties. The action of forfeiture arises when a

“public officer or employee *acquires+ during his

incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly

out of proportion of his salary x x x and to his other

lawful income x x x.” Such amount of property is then

presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.

Thus “if the respondent *public official+ is unable toshow to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully

acquired the property in question, then the court shall

declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and

by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall

become property of the State. x x x

EO 14, Series of 1986, albeit defining only the

jurisdiction over cases involving ill-gotten wealth of

former President Marcos, his immediate family and

business associates, authorizes under its Sec. 3 the filing

of forfeiture suits under RA 1379 which will proceed

independently of any criminal proceedings. The Court,

in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, interpreted this provision

as empowering the Presidential Commission on Good

Government to file independent civil actions separate

from the criminal actions.

A forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of

action separate and different from a plunder case, thus

negating the notion that the crime of plunder absorbs

the forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder, what

is sought to be established is the commission of the

criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-

gotten wealth. On the other hand, all that the court

needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence,

under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondent’sproperties to his legitimate income, it being

unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties

The forfeitable nature of the properties under the

provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a

determination of a specific overt act committed by the

respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of

the illegal wealth.

Given the foregoing considerations, petitioner’s thesis

on possible double jeopardy entanglements should a

judgment of conviction ensue in Crim. Case 28107

collapses entirely. Double jeopardy, as a criminal lawconcept, refers to jeopardy of punishment for the same

offense, suggesting that double jeopardy presupposes

two separate criminal prosecutions. Proceedings unde

RA 1379 are, to repeat, civil in nature. As a necessary

corollary, one who is sued under RA 1379 may be

proceeded against for a criminal offense. Thus, the

filing of a case under that law is not barred by the

conviction or acquittal of the defendant in Crim. Case

28107 for plunder.

Issue 2:Whether or not Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction

over the persons of petitioner and her children.

Ruling 2:

No. Petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire

jurisdiction over her person and that of her children due

to a defective substituted service of summons. Sec. 7

Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure

clearly provides for the requirements of a valid

substituted service of summons, thus: SEC. 7

Substituted service.—If the defendant cannot be served

within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding

section [personal service on defendant], service may be

effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the

defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age

and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving

the copies at defendant’s office or regular place o

business with some competent person in charge

thereof.


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A court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the

latter to be bound by its decision or orders. Valid

service of summons, by whatever mode authorized by

and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a

court acquires jurisdiction over a person.

Summons for Forfeitures I and II were served personally

on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at

the PNP Detention Center, who acknowledged receipt

thereof by affixing his signature. Substituted service of

summons for both Forfeitures I and II were made on

petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at

the PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted

services of summons were invalid for being irregular and

defective.

In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, we broke down the

requirements to be:

(1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the

party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must

show that defendant cannot be served promptly or

there is impossibility of prompt service within a

reasonable time. Reasonable time being “so much time

as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably

prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the

contract or duty requires that should be done, having a

regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to

the other party.” Moreover, the sheriff must showseveral attempts for personal service of at least 3 times

on at least 2 different dates.

(2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must

describe in the Return of Summons the facts and

circumstances surrounding the attempted personal

service.

(3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable

age and discretion residing at defendant’s house or

residence; or on a competent person in charge of

defendant’s office or regular place of business.

From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no

valid substituted service of summons was made on

petitioner and her children, as the service made through

Maj. Gen. Garcia did not comply with the first 2

requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted

service of summons. Moreover, the third requirement

was also not strictly complied with as the substituted

service was made not at petitioner’s house or residence

but in the PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen. Garcia

is detained, even if the latter is of suitable age and

discretion. Hence, no valid substituted service of

summons was made.

The stringent rules on valid service of summons for the

court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the

defendants, however, admits of exceptions, as when the

party voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of

the court by asking affirmative relief. In the instant case,

the Republic asserts that petitioner is estopped from

questioning improper service of summons since the

improvident service of summons in both forfeiture cases

had been cured by their (petitioner and her children

voluntary appearance in the forfeiture cases. The

Republic points to the various pleadings filed by

petitioner and her children during the subject forfeiturehearings. We cannot subscribe to the Republic’s views.

Special appearance to question a court’s jurisdiction is

not voluntary appearance (Sec. 20, Rule 14). The

pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture

cases do not show that she voluntarily appeared

without qualification. Petitioner filed the following

pleadings in Forfeiture I: (a) motion to dismiss; (b

motion for reconsideration and/or to admit answer; (c)

second motion for reconsideration; (d) motion to

consolidate forfeiture case with plunder case; and (e)motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I. And in

Forfeiture II: (a) motion to dismiss and/or to quash

Forfeiture II; and (b) motion for partial reconsideration.

The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to

dismiss, were filed by petitioner solely for specia

appearance with the purpose of challenging the

jurisdiction of the SB over her person and that of her 3

children. Petitioner asserts therein that SB did not

acquire jurisdiction over her person and of her 3

children for lack of valid service of summons through

improvident substituted service of summons in both

Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II. This stance the petitioner

never abandoned when she filed her motions for

reconsideration, even with a prayer to admit thei

attached Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam dated

January 22, 2005 setting forth affirmative defenses with

a claim for damages. And the other subsequent

pleadings, likewise, did not abandon her stance and


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defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper

substituted services of summons in the forfeiture cases.

Evidently, from the foregoing Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the

1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner and

her sons did not voluntarily appear before the SB

constitutive of or equivalent to service of summons.

Platinum Tours and Travel, Inc. vs Panlilio: Platinum

filed a complaint for a sum of money with damages

against Pan Asiatic Travel Corporation (PATC) and its

president Nelida Galvez. Platinum sought to collect

payment for the airline tickets which PATC bought from

it. RTC of Makati City, Branch 62, rendered a judgment

by default in favor of Platinum and ordered PATC and

Galvez to solidarily pay Platinum. A writ of execution

was issued on motion of Platinum. Pursuant to the writ,

Manila Polo Club Proprietary Membership Certificate in

the name of Galvez was levied upon and sold.

Jose Panlilio filed a motion to intervene in the Civil Case

claiming that Galvez had executed in his favor a chattel

mortgage over her shares of stock in the Manila Polo

Club to secure her loan and that Galvez had already

delivered to him the stock certificates. RTC denied

Panlilio’s motion for intervention because (1) a decision

had already been rendered in this case and that the only

matters at issue is the propriety of the execution; (2) it

will only delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights

of the original parties; and, (3) the Intervenor’s rights

may be fully protected in a separate action.

RTC declared the execution sale null and void due to

irregularities in the conduct thereof.

Panlilio filed against Galvez a collection case with

application for a writ of preliminary attachment of the

Manila Polo Club shares. The case was raffled to Branch

146 of the RTC of Makati City. Panlilio again attempted

to intervene in the other Civil Case, this time by

incorporating in his complaint a motion to consolidate

both Civil Cases.

Judge Salvador Tensuan of Branch 146 granted the

motion for consolidation on condition that Judge

Roberto Diokno of Branch 62 would not object thereto.

Judge Diokno allowed the consolidation of the 2 cases

and setting for hearing Panlilio’s application for a writ of

preliminary attachment.

Platinum moved to reconsider the order of Judge

Diokno but its motion was denied.

Platinum filed a petition for certiorari at the CA

assailing, among others, the order of Judge Diokno

allowing the consolidation of Civil Cases. CA annulled

the assailed order but left it to Judge Diokno to decidewhether to return the Civil Case to Judge Tensuan, or to

keep it in his docket and decide it as a separate case.

Platinum filed a motion for partial reconsideration of

the decision of the CA, praying that the Civil Case be

returned to Branch 146 or re-raffled to another RTC

Branch of Makati. Said motion was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not RTC-Branch 62’s basis for acquiring

jurisdiction over the civil case was extinguished when

Judge Diokno’s July 23, 1996 order allowing the

consolidation of the two cases was annulled and setaside.

Ruling:

No. Since jurisdiction is the power to hear and

determine a particular case, it does not depend upon

the regularity of the exercise by the court of that powe

or on the correctness of its decisions.

Panlilio’s collection case falls within the jurisdiction o

the RTC of Makati, Branch 62. The fact that the CA

subsequently annulled Judge Diokno’s order grantingthe consolidation, did not affect the jurisdiction of the

court which issued the said order.

“Jurisdiction” should be distinguished from the

“exercise of jurisdiction.” Jurisdiction refers to the

authority to decide a case, not the orders or the

decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court

has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter

as in the instant case, the decision on all questions

arising from the case is but an exercise of such

jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the

exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment

which does not affect its authority to decide the case,

much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the

case.

Moreover, the instant petition is premature and

speculative. Had Platinum waited until Judge Diokno

decided on what to do with Civil Case No. 96-365, the


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parties would have been spared the trouble and the

expense of seeking recourse from this Court, which in

turn would have had one petition less in its docket. The

unfounded fear that Civil Case No. 96-365 would unduly

delay the final resolution of Civil Case No. 94-1634, if

the former were retained by Branch 62, made Platinum

act with haste.

Manila Bankers vs Ng Kok Wei: Respondent Eddy Ng

Kok Wei is a Singaporean businessman who ventured

into investing in the Philippines. On November 29,

1988, respondent, in a Letter of Intent addressed to

petitioner, expressed his intention to purchase a

condominium unit at Valle Verde Terraces. On

December 5, 1988, respondent paid petitioner a

reservation fee of P50,000 for the purchase of a 46-

square meter condominium unit valued at P860,922.00.

On January 16, 1989, respondent paid 90% of the

purchase price or P729,830.00.

Petitioner executed a Contract to Sell in favor of the

respondent. The contract expressly states that the

condominium unit “shall substantially be completed and

delivered” to the respondent “within 15 months” from

February 8, 1989 or on May 8, 1990, and that “(S)hould

there be no substantial completion and fail(ure) to

deliver the unit on the date specified, a penalty of 1% of

the total amount paid (by respondent) shall be charged

against (petitioner)”.

Considering that the stipulated 15-month period was at

hand, respondent returned to the Philippines in April,

1990.

In a letter dated April 5, 1990, petitioner informed

respondent of the substantial completion of his

condominium unit, however, due to various

uncontrollable forces (such as coup d‘ etat attempts,

typhoon and steel and cement shortage), the final

turnover is reset to May 31, 1990.

Meanwhile, on July 5, 1990, upon receipt of petitioner’s

notice of delivery dated May 31, 1990, respondent again

flew back to Manila. He found the unit still

uninhabitable for lack of water and electric facilities.

Once more, petitioner issued another notice to move-in

addressed to its building administrator advising the

latter that respondent is scheduled to move in on

August 22, 1990.

On October 5, 1990, respondent returned to the

Philippines only to find that his condominium unit was

still unlivable. Exasperated, he was constrained to send

petitioner a letter dated November 21, 1990 demandingpayment for the damages he sustained. Petitione

ignored such demand, prompting respondent to file

with the RTC, Makati City, a complaint against the

former for specific performance and damages.

During the pendency of the case, respondent finally

accepted the condominium unit and on April 12, 1991,

occupied the same. Thus, respondent’s cause of action

has been limited to his claim for damages.

RTC found petitioner liable for payment of damages due

to the delay in the performance of its obligation to therespondent. CA affirmed and denied the MR.

Issue:

Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:

Yes. On petitioner’s contention that the RTC has no

jurisdiction over the instant case, Section 1 (c) of PD No

1344, as amended, provides:

“SECTION 1. – In the exercise of its functions to regulatethe real estate trade and business and in addition to its

powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the

National Housing Authority [now Housing and Land Use

Regulatory Board (HLURB) shall have exclusive

jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following

nature: x x x

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractua

and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision

lots or condominium units against the owner

developer, dealer, broker or salesman. x x x.”

Thus, it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction. We have

consistently held that complaints for specific

performance with damages by a lot or condominium

unit buyer against the owner or developer falls under

the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.


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the same is therefore certified and released as

agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land

Act.

Records show that on November 8, 1996, [R]espondent

Juan Fresnillo filed a homestead patent application for a

portion of the island. Records also reveal that[R]espondent Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead

application. Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued

Homestead Patent on March 3, 1977 of Sombrero

Island. Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and

lawful possessors of their respective portions and have

declared said portions for taxation purposes and that

they have been faithfully paying taxes thereon for

twenty years. Respondents contend that the petitioner

has no legal capacity to sue insofar as the island is

concerned because an action for reconveyance can

only be brought by the owner and not a mere

homestead applicant and that petitioner is guilty ofestoppel by laches for his failure to assert his right over

the land for an unreasonable and unexplained period

of time.

In the instant case, petitioner seeks to nullify the

homestead patents and original certificates of title

issued in favor of the respondents covering certain

portions of the Sombrero Island as well as the

reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. The

petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right to file

an application for homestead patent over the wholeisland since it was he who requested for its conversion

from forest land to agricultural land."

Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or

Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim in due time. On

June 30, 1999, they also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the

ground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial

court’s Order to amend his Complaint so he could thus

effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased,

Respondent Gapilango. The Motion to Dismiss was

granted by the RTC in its Order dated July 29, 1999.

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the July 29,

1999 Order was denied by the trial court in its

Resolution dated December 17, 1999, for being a third

and prohibited motion. In his Petition for Certiorari

before the CA, petitioner charged the trial court with

grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied

Motion was his first and only Motion for

Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals: Instead of limiting itself

to the allegation of grave abuse of discretion, the CA

ruled on the merits. In the Assailed Resolution, the CA

acknowledged that it had erred when it ruled on themerits of the case. Nonetheless, the Complaint was

dismissed motu proprio by the challenged Resolution of

the CA Special Division of five members – with two

justices dissenting – pursuant to its "residua

prerogative" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of

Court.

Issues

1. Is the Court of Appeals correct in resolving the

Petition for Certiorari based on an issue not

raised (the merits of the case) in the Petition?

2.

Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking itsalleged ‘residual prerogative’ under Section 1

Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in

resolving the Petition on an issue not raised in

the Petition?"

The Court’s Ruling: The Petition has no merit.

Propriety of Ruling on the Merits: This is not the first

time that petitioner has taken issue with the propriety

of the CA’s ruling on the merits. The CA even corrected

itself in its November 20, 2001 Resolution. Suffice it tosay that the appellate court indeed acted ultra

jurisdictio in ruling on the merits of the case when the

only issue that could have been, and was in fact, raised

was the alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by

the trial court in denying petitioner’s Motion fo

Reconsideration. Settled is the doctrine that the sole

office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of

jurisdiction. Such writ does not include a review of the

evidence, more so when no determination of the merits

has yet been made by the trial court, as in this case.

IMPORTANT! Dismissal for Prescrip

rem 1 brondial notes

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