Religious messages and economic behavior in Islam

Loukas Balafoutas, Mehdi Feizi, Helena Fornwagner, Tarek Jaber-Lopez, Nematollah Ozbak, Monika Pompeo, Björn Vollan

EEECON workshop

University of Innsbruck - 26. June 2019

• Pro-social norms and Religion

• Christianity: ten commandments, “love and universal humanity”, “love your neighbor as yourself. There is no commandment greater than these” (Mark 12:31)

• Islam: “Humankind shall pursue the highest good for self and others, and thereby fulfills the purpose of creation in service and worship of God” (51:56)

• Religious dimension in many large scale conflicts

Religion and social preferences: initial thoughts

Initial thoughts (cont.)

• A worship effect can be found frequently in media coverage of religiously motivated conflict after prayers

• Monday demonstrations in GDR, 1989/90

• Friday riots during the Arab Spring

• Riots after prayers in many different country contexts recently

Religion and social preferences: initial thoughts

Broadly speaking there are (at least) two effects that are related to worship and may affect social preferences:

• A positive effect may arise due to the content of the worship (e.g., sermon, prayer, holy scripts): be prosocial and fair to all

• A negative effect may arise due to increased salience of group identity, leading to discrimination or hostility against out-group (parochial altruism)

• Shariff and Norenzayan (2007), Sachs (2009), Ahmed and Salas (2011): priming with religion increases generosity

• Randolph-Seng and Nielsen (2007), Mazar et al. (2008): religious priming makes people less prone to cheating

• Horton et al. (2010), Ahmed & Salas (2011): priming increases cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma

• Tan and Vogel (2008): more religious subjects are trusted more and are more trustworthy

• But bear in mind, all of these studies concern the religious in-group

Experimental evidence: priming

Experimental evidence: priming

• On the negative side, when we include behavior towards the out-group, religious priming can promote discrimination. Negative attitudes towards the out-group in Bushman et al., 2007; Preston et al., 2010; Johnson et al., 2011

• Evidence for Palestinians and Israeli settlers that attending religious services positively predicted a combination of willing martyrdom and out-group hostility, but regular prayer did not (Ginges et al., 2009)

Experimental evidence: sermons and rituals

• Condra et al. (2019): effect of religious authority on giving in Afghanistan

• Donations more frequent, but average amount donated lower, when solicitor dressed as cleric as opposed to civilian

• However, short sermon by cleric brings reciting from the Qur’an brings the amount back up – evidence of a “sermon effect”, or a “scripture effect”

• Henning et al. (2019): Controlled field experiment to study behavior in simple

games before and after church

• Behavior towards in-group and out-group by manipulating first name of partner

• Evidence for out-group discrimination before church in Addis

• Increased giving to Muslims after church: prosocial effect of worship, no discrimination

Our Contribution

• Objective: Examine the effect of messages delivered during religious worship on social and time preferences, by manipulating the content of the sermon in mosques.

• In mosques, in cooperation with imams

• Location: Mazar-i-sharif, Afghanistan

• Failed attempts so far:

• Mosques in Innsbruck and Tyrol

• Moques in Palestine (extremely sensitive)

• Grande Mosquée de Paris (we got very close)

• Rome (used as pilot)

Design: the games

Game 1: Allocation task

• You have 300 AFN. Decide how you would like to split this amount of moneybetween the next three recipients. The sum that you will send to YOURSELF will bethe sum that you will receive, the sum that you send to the Red Crescent will be sentby us to the Red Crescent and the sum that you send to the Red Cross will be sentalso by us to the Red Cross. You can write any sum between 0 and 300 in the boxesbut the sum must be 300.

Red crescent Red Cross YOURSELF

AFN AFN AFN

€1 = AFN 90

Game 2: Religious donation task

• You have 250 AFN. Decide how much you want to keep for yourself or donate to thecommunity of the mosque El-Fath. The sum that you will send to YOURSELF will bethe sum that you will receive, the sum that you send to the community will be sent by usto the mosque. You can write any sum between 0 and 250 in the boxes but the sum mustbe 250.

Mosque YOURSELF

AFN AFN

€1 = AFN 90

Game 3: Time preference task

• You have 250 AFN. You must decide how many of these 250 AFN you want to receive inone week (please write the amount into the box 1 WEEK) and how much you want toreceive in 8 weeks (please write the amount into the box 8 WEEKS). You can write anysum between 0 and 8 in the boxes but the sum must be 250.

• Know that:

- The sum you write in 1 WEEK you will receive in one week.

- The amount you write in 8 WEEKS you will receive DOUBLE in 8 weeks.

1 WEEK

AFN

8 WEEKS

AFN

€1 = AFN 90

Design: treatments and hypotheses

Treatments• Control treatment: Imam adds neutral sermon at the end of prayers, i.e.Ramadan

“O you who have believed, decreed upon you is fasting as it was decreed upon those before you that you may become righteous” (Surah Baqarah 2:183)

• Tolerance treatment: Imam adds short sermon on the importance of tolerance in general and religious tolerance in particular.

"If they [the enemies] keep out of your way and do not fight you, and offer you peace, then Allah does not allow you any course [of action] against them.” (Surah An-Nisa 4:90)

• Afterlife treatment: Imam adds short sermon on life after death.

The people who are supposed to go to Hell forget all the blessings that have been seen in the world and the people who are supposed to go to Heaven forgot all miseries. This way, on the Last Judgment, God establishes justice among his servants in the resurrection ground.

Hypotheses

• H1: A sermon that is centered around tolerance reduces discrimination (Game 1)

• H2: A sermon that is centered around afterlife increases donations to charity(Game 1)

• H3: A sermon that is centered around afterlife increases donations to a religious institution (Game 2)

• H4: A sermon that is centered around afterlife increases patience (Game 3)

• H5: All effects listed in Hypotheses 1-4 are stronger for participants whoare more regular mosque attendees

Design: logistics and procedures

Mazar-i-Sharif

Logistics and procedures

• Three mosques, one per treatment, simultaneously and on a single day

• N=84 (Control), N=84 (Tolerance), N=82 (Afterlife)

• Repeated data collection impossible due to security concerns

• Randomization checks along a number of observable characteristics collected in post-experimental survey:

Age, Ethnicity, Education, Income, Self-reported religiosity, Frequency of prayers.

• Unfortunately, randomization failed in some respects

Randomization checks

Control (N=84) Tolerance (N=84) After Life (N=82) Control vs. Tolerance Control vs. Afterlife

Variable Mean Std. Min Max Mean Std. Min Max Mean Std. Min Max

Age 33.07 14.72 15 80 24.7 14.2 13 81 33.71 14.59 18 71 ***

Tajik ethnicity 0.79 0.41 0 1 0.9 0.3 0 1 0.73 0.46 0 1 *

Education 10.23 3.99 6 16 10.0 3.9 6 16 10.23 3.65 6 16

Frequency Prayers 5.49 1.09 0 6 5.5 1.3 0 6 5.45 0.94 0 6 *

Religiosity 9.24 1.61 1 10 8.1 2.5 1 10 7.96 2.26 1 10 *** ***

Income 4.07 2.18 1 10 4.8 3.1 1 10 5.21 1.78 1 10 ***

Logistics and procedures: Timing

1. At end of sermon, Imam announced the experiment. Attrition rates were practically zero.

2. Our RA explained the games in front of entire group.

3. Participants divided in 8 groups and each group was supervised by one assistant

4. Effort to preserve anonymity, subjects did not talk to each other and followed the rules. Sheets included consent form on front page.

5. Assistants gave out questionnaires and helped subjects fill them out.

6. Payment took place, unless time preference task was chosen.

Logistics and procedures

• Experiment ran on a Sunday, between the prayer of Duhur (noon) and Asr (afternoon) to get more people to stay.

• All mosques and Imams were Sunnis.

• Everything was in their local dialect from Farsi, which was fully understandable for all subjects.

• Subjects showed no sign of not understanding these simple games.

• However, most could not answer the questionnaire alone. Therefore, assistants helped each subject, one by one, to understand and fill out the questionnaire.

• No sign of mistrust regarding delayed payment.

Results

Game 1: Discrimination

** *****

Control Treatment Tolerance Treatment Afterlife Treatment

Game 1: Red Crescent

**

*

Game 1: Red Cross

Game 1: Yourself

**

*

Regressions for Game 1(1) (2) (3) (4)

Crescent -

Cross

Crescent - Cross

(pray every day)Money kept

Money kept

(pray every day)

Tolerance sermon 4.417 5.386 -8.761 -12.86

(0.56) (0.61) (-0.75) (-1.01)

Afterlife sermon 10.43 7.302 -22.40 * -41.40 ***

(1.35) (0.75) (-1.94) (-2.97)

Age -0.037 -0.154 -0.486 -0.345

(-0.16) (-0.59) (-1.44) (-0.93)

Education 0.361 0.513 -2.981** -2.221

(0.41) (0.49) (-2.28) (-1.47)

Frequency of prayer 2.672 -5.687

(0.91) (-1.29)

Income -0.597 -1.472 -2.119 -0.532

(-0.45) (-0.98) (-1.08) (-0.25)

Religiosity 2.219 1.812 -1.402 -2.788

(1.43) (0.94) (-0.60) (-1.01)

constant -26.15 -2.251 280.8 *** 243.1 ***

(-1.09) (-0.09) (7.81) (6.90)

N 245 181 245 181

Game 2: Altruism/Donations to mosque

***

K-S: ***

***

Regressions for Game 2(1) (2)

Donation to mosqueDonation to mosque

(pray every day)

Tolerance sermon -6.039 -2.561

(-0.61) (-0.23)

Afterlife sermon 34.19 *** 51.96 ***

(3.48) (4.33)

Age 0.851 *** 0.892 ***

(2.96) (2.78)

Education 2.104 * 3.027 **

(1.89) (2.33)

Frequency of prayer 5.025

(1.34)

Income 1.780 0.565

(1.06) (0.31)

Religiosity -1.553 -0.428

(-0.79) (-0.18)

constant 6.811 18.62

(0.22) (0.61)

N 245 181

Findings so far

• Contrary to H1, the tolerance sermon has no effect on discrimination.

• In line with H2, and H3 the afterlife sermon makes participants more willing to donate to charity, as well as to the mosque.

• In line with H5, the effect of the sermon is stronger for participants who attend religious services more regularly.

Game 3: Time Preferences

KS: *

**

**

Allocation in 1 week

Regressions for Game 3(1) (2)

Amount in one weekAmount in one week

(pray every day)

Tolerance sermon 19.85* 9.239

(1.68) (0.74)

Afterlife sermon 25.52** 13.52

(2.19) (0.99)

Age 0.0532 0.227

(0.16) (0.63)

Education -0.644 1.699

(-0.49) (1.16)

Frequency of prayer 0.369

(0.19)

Income 2.579 2.759

(0.58) (1.32)

Religiosity -0.667 -1.525

(-0.29) (-0.57)

constant 175.9*** 172.3***

(4.86) (5.01)

N 245 181

Time preferences

• Contrary to H4, the afterlife treatment increases the amount received after one week (lower patience)

• Possible explanations?

• Reminder of death

• Haram

Outlook

• One of very few studies manipulating messages sent by religious authorities

• Evidence of effect on social behavior: sermon on afterlife increases altruism

• Discrimination persists despite of sermon (contrary to Henning et al.)

• Second study coming up in Iran

• Replicate existing treatments, or implement new ones

Thanks for listening!

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