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The summer o 2008 challenged gasoline retailers.

Crude oil prices had climbed to unprecedented

heights over the rst hal o the year, peaking in

July beore tumbling sharply aterward. Partly in

response to the high prices, crude oil and petroleum prod-

uct inventories were at unusually low levels as the hurricaneseason began. In late August, Hurricane Gustav tore through

the middle o the oil-producing region in the Gul o Mexico.

More than 95 percent o oshore oil and gas platorms were

shut down beore the storm arrived. Less than two weeks ater

Gustav, Hurricane Ike threatened another direct hit to the Gul

regions energy production acilities.

Weigles, a chain o convenience stores in the Knoxville, TN

area, was having a hard time nding gasoline supplies ater

Gustav. According to contemporary news reports, the approach

o Ike turned the situation rom dicult to nearly impossible.

Weigles buyers typically bought wholesale gasoline in spot mar-

kets rather than through long-term contracts. The strategy paido in slightly lower costs most o the time, helping the stores

keep their retail gasoline prices low. The catch is, when wholesale

supplies get tight, spot prices can really jump.

On Thursday, two days beore Ike made landall on the Texas

coast, owner Bill Weigle said his wholesale costs increased by 85

cents per gallon and that was when he could nd gasoline to

buy. The storage tanks that usually served Knoxville were dry and

Weigles had to have whatever gasoline they could nd trucked in

rom other cities. Some o his stores had run out o gasoline, too.

He told reporters that his stores may have to increase prices at

the pump by $0.85 to $1 by Friday. The next morning, Weigles

raised prices or regular-grade gasoline at several stores by about

80 cents, rom an average near $3.70 per gallon to about $4.50

per gallon.Pilot Travel Centers, a Knoxville-based national chain, and

other area gasoline retailers ound themselves in the same gen-

eral condition. More than one area Pilot station sold gasoline or

as much as $4.99 per gallon the weekend that Ike came ashore.

Gasoline prices spiked almost everywhere in the country because

o the two storms, but the spike was sharpest in Knoxville. Dur-

ing Hurricane Ikes weekend, the Knoxville area had the highest

gasoline prices in the United States.

On the Friday that Weigles and other retailers were raising

retail prices, Tennessees attorney general, Bob Cooper, issued a

statement reminding Tennesseans that the state remained under

a declared state o emergency. Cooper warned consumers to beon the lookout or price gouging and invited them to report

suspected incidents o it. Even beore the statement, price com-

plaints were being received by the state. Many more calls came in

over the next several days. Overall, Tennessee received more that

4,000 price complaints during the emergency period.

The Tennessee attorney generals oce and the states Depart-

ment o Commerce and Insurance examined the complaints and

launched investigations into the prices charged by 17 gasoline

retailers in the state. Seven months ater Hurricane Ike struck

the Gul Coast, the state announced that 16 o the 17 companiesMichael Giberson is an instructor with the Center or Energy Com-merce in the Rawls College o Business at Texas Tech University.

The Problem withPrice Gouging LawsI ial icig dig a gcy hical?

By miChael giBeRson | Texas Tech University

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had entered into settlements. The companies denied wrongdoing

but agreed to pay civil penalties and oer reunds. The attorney

generals oce led suit against the one company that reused tosettle, Weigles. A year later, Weigles also settled, agreeing to make

$57,000 in payments to the state and oering consumer reunds.

As had many o the parties that settled a year sooner, Weigles

denied wrongdoing and said it settled only to avoid the costs and

risks inherent in protracted litigation with the state.

Gasoline retailers are not the only targets o price gouging

laws. Prices charged on everything rom hotel rooms, to electric

generators, to bottled water have been occasions or legal action.

Duke University economist Michael Munger reported that ater

Hurricane Fran hit central North Carolina in 1996, our men sell-

ing ice were arrested near Raleigh or charging a price much higher

than the $1.75 per bag price that prevailed in the area beore thestorm. Munger said some consumers were angered by the price, but

almost no one reused to pay. Ater all, without power and unsure

when the power would return, ice was much more valuable to the

consumers than it had been just beore the storm.

The price gouging laws o Tennessee and North Carolina, and

those o the 30 or so other states with similar laws on the books,

are something o a puzzle or economists. Economists usually

point to public goods or special interests as the mobilizing orce

behind regulations. Price controls, including price gouging laws,

almost certainly reduce overall economic welare. And while price

controls sometimes create the concentrated benets sought by

interest groups, the benets and costs o price gouging laws are

widely dispersed and uncertain in impact hardly the kind oprize lobbyists usually pursue.

Instead, price gouging laws appear more akin to laws banning

the sale o horse meat or human consumption, Blue laws that

prevent the sale o certain items on Sunday, or laws that once pro-

hibited interracial marriage. The laws put the orce o government

behind eorts to prevent people rom entering into agreements or

transactions that lawmakers nd objectionable. One more puzzle:

unlike Blue laws and interracial marriage bans, laws against price

gouging are not ading away as society becomes more accepting o

personal dierences. Instead, price gouging laws emerged relatively

recently, are spreading geographically, have become more expansive

in scope, and are becoming more requently invoked.Economists and policy analysts opposed to price gouging laws

have relied on the simple logic o price controls: i you cap price

increases during an emergency, you discourage conservation o

needed goods at exactly the time they are in high demand. Simul-

taneously, price caps discourage extraordinary supply eorts that

would help bring goods in high demand into the aected area.

In a classic case o unintended consequences, the law harms the

very people whom lawmakers intend to help. The logic o supply

and demand, so clear to economists, has had little eect on price

gouging policies.IlluStratIonbyMorganballard

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Price Gouging Laws

In popular usage, consumers complain about price gouging

just about anytime they do not like a price. A casual scan o let-

ters to the editor and online columnists will reveal price goug-

ing claims or everything rom 3-D movie tickets, to resh-cut

fowers, to cables or high-denition televisions. Recently, when

gasoline prices in Alaska trended up over several months to 40

or 50 cents per gallon above the national average, state legisla-

tors charged that reners were price gouging.

More typically, however, price gouging claims involve three

actors:

a price deemed unairly high,

an emergency or dicult situation, and

a product or service useul in responding to the emergency.

Price gouging laws can be more restrictive, sometimes dening

one or more o the three actors more clearly:

a price increase in excess o some threshold,

a declared state o emergency, and

a specic set o necessary or useul products or services.

In Caliornia, or example, the price gouging law prohibits

charging a price more than 10 percent higher than the price

charged prior to a declared state o emergency or consumer ood

items, goods and services used or emergency cleanup, medical

supplies, home heating oil and gasoline, and other goods and

services in particular demand in post-emergency situations.

Many state laws permit retailers to pass along higher wholesale

costs while price gouging laws are in eect, so long as the retailers

margin does not increase.

The irst state law explicitly directed at price gouging wasenacted in New York in 1979, in response to increases in home

heating oil prices during the winter o 19781979. New Yorks law

initially applied to retailers oering consumer goods and services

vital and necessary or the health, saety, and welare o consum-

ers at an unconscionably excessive price, and applied during an

emergency declared by the governor. Just three states passed similar

laws in the 1980s: Hawaii in 1983, and Connecticut and Mississippi

in 1986. Then, 11 more states added anti-price gouging laws or

regulations in the 1990s and 16 states ollowed in the 2000s.

When price gouging laws are revised, the tendency is or the

scope o the law to be broadened, the penalties to become more

punitive, and the conditions under which the laws are applied tobecome less restrictive. The New York law was amended in 1995

to include repairs made on an emergency basis and to increase

the maximum ne rom $5,000 to $10,000. In 1998, New York

amended the law again to include prices on wholesale and inter-

mediate goods. Mississippi amended its law in 1994 to classiy

some violations o the law as elonies and clariy that the emer-

gency need not happen within the state or the law to be invoked.

Connecticut amended its price gouging statues in October 2005

to include any period in which an imminent abnormal market

disruption is reasonably anticipated, increased the maximum

ne, and specied that the term seller included a supplier,

wholesaler, distributor, or retailer.

Changes that narrow the scope o price gouging laws are less

common, but they do occur. A year ater Utah passed its price

gouging law, it was amended to speciy that the emergency must

occur in Utah or the law to be invoked. In 2010, Connecticut

amended its law to provide sae harbor rom price gouging pros-

ecution to energy retailers whose margins do not increase. Also in

2010, Georgia amended its law to require the governor to speciy

in the declaration o emergency just which goods and services will

be subjected to price gouging controls.

The Ethics of Price Gouging

Many people eel price gouging is morally wrong. The remarks

o newspaper columnists and state legislators provide ready evi-

dence on this topic. Survey research by Daniel Kahneman, Jack

Knetsch, and Richard Thaler, published in the American Economic

Review, urther establishes this point: most respondents ound

price increases during dicult times to be unair, except in casesin which retailers were only passing along cost increases.

More recent research suggests that these unairness judg-

ments are driven primarily by emotional responses to the price

increases. Careul examination o the ethics o price gouging

raises questions or these emotion-driven judgments. The ethical

case or limiting price gouging is weaker than it may appear.

Harvard political philosophy proessor Michael Sandel opened

his 2009 book Justice: Whats the Right Thing to Do? with the debate

over price gouging that ollowed in the wake o Hurricane Char-

ley. The storm hit Florida in 2004, killing 22 people and causing

$11 billion in damages. Sandel said arguments or and against

price gouging laws revolved around three ideas: maximizingwelare, respecting reedom, and promoting virtue.

Opponents o price gouging laws ocus on welare and ree-

dom, Sandel said, but neglect considerations o virtue. Sandel

cited a September 2004 op-ed by Thomas Sowell to illustrate the

welare point. In it, Sowell said the problem with price gouging

laws was that they keep goods and services rom being used where

they are most needed; people will be better o without price caps.

An August 2004 op-ed by columnist Je Jacoby provided a quote

in support o the reedom argument: It isnt gouging to charge

what the market will bear. It isnt greedy or brazen. Its how goods

and services get allocated in a ree society.

Both Sowell and Jacoby noted the emotion behind pricegouging laws, but dismissed the relevance o emotion or decid-

ing public policy. Sandel suggested that emotion plays a more

signicant role:

Much public support or price-gouging laws comes rom some-

thing more visceral than welare or reedom. People are outraged

at vultures who prey on the desperation o others and want them

punished not rewarded with windall prots. [This] outrage is

more than mindless anger. It gestures at a moral argument worth

taking seriously. Outrage is the special kind o anger you eel when

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you believe that people are getting things they dont deserve. Outrage

o this kind is anger at injustice.

Sandel characterizes the virtue argument or price gouging

laws as ollows:

Greed is a vice, a bad way o being, especially when it makes people

oblivious to the suering o others. More than a personal vice, it isat odds with civic virtue. In times o trouble, a good society pulls

together. Rather than press or maximum advantage, people look

out or one another. A society in which people exploit their neighbors

or nancial gain in times o crisis is not a good society. Excessive

greed is thereore a vice that a good society should discourage i it can.

Price-gouging laws cannot banish greed, but they can at least restrain

its most brazen expression, and signal societys disapproval o it. By

punishing greedy behavior rather than rewarding it, society arms

the civic virtue o shared sacrice or the common good.

Sandels summary o the virtue argument is revealing both or

what it includes and or what it leaves out. He not only acknowl-

edged the role o emotion in motivating price gouging laws, in hisview the anger and outrage toward price gouging plays a special

role in revealing the morality o the antiprice gouging position.

Sandels virtue argument does not justiy itsel in terms o

results. The role o the law is to arm the civic virtue o shared

sacrice or the common good. No emphasis is put into examin-

ing whether arming civic virtue in this way has been eective in

inspiring shared sacrice or promoting the common good.

Deenders o price gouging laws sometimes concede the mate-

rial benets o allowing merchants reedom to set their own prices,

even during emergencies, but they still avor the laws in order to

stand on the side o virtue. Yet the question o which side is the side

o virtue is not so simple. Emergencies and natural disasters are bydenition periods o threat, suering, and sacrice. I it is admitted

that giving merchants the reedom to pick their own prices does

a better job than alternative ways o getting goods and services to

where they are needed, then intererence with that pricing reedom

raises serious questions. Intererence harms precisely those persons

who have been already harmed by the disaster, a result that suggests

neither shared sacrice nor promotion o a common good.

University o San Diego philosophy proessor Matt Zwo-

linski made this point in a 2008 paper examining the ethics o

price gouging. His ull analysis is more subtle, challenging price

gouging ethics on both airness and consequentialist grounds.

I it is true that emergencies are times that a society ought toexercise special care or those members o society in harms way,

then, Zwolinski argues, it is at odds with airness to place a par-

ticularized obligation to sacrice on a discrete segment o society,

namely merchants. Addressing the particular hardships aced by

the poor during emergencies, Zwolinski said, is a task better let

to government agencies or charities.

Zwolinski added that a predictable consequence o price goug-

ing laws is that some merchants, nding their ability to recover

costs compromised, will decide not to sell at all rather than to sell

at a loss. Merchants will lose the opportunity to prot and con-

sumers will lose the opportunity to decide or themselves whether

the good or service would have been worth the higher price. The

possibility o merchants shutting down rather than operating is

more than academic speculation. The South Carolina attorney

generals oce ound that during price spikes ollowing Hur-

ricanes Gustav and Ike, some station owners reported that to

avoid bad publicity they simply shut their doors instead o pur-

chasing gasoline at elevated prices.

The South Carolina report on price gouging also indicated

that some retail stations went to extraordinary lengths to secure

supplies during the emergency even though they were uncertain

as to whether they would recover their costs. Zwolinski argued

that while such eorts may be laudable, merchants are not under

an ethical obligation to do so. In act, merchants ace no ethical

obligation to remain open during emergencies, even though

closing may contribute to hardships among some potential con-

sumers. And i merchants may ethically close, Zwolinski pointed

out, it can hardly be unethical or merchants to remain open but

oer goods at a higher-than-usual price. By remaining open even

with high prices, the merchant is providing potentially helpulopportunities or consumers in need.

Price Gouging Laws as Public Policy

I the ethical case against price gouging is weak, perhaps there

are alternative justications or the policy. True, many people

eel that price increases during emergencies are unair, but

policy analysis requires more than a survey o public sentiment.

Proposed laws ought to be examined or their consistency

with the proper role and scope o government activity, or the

danger that popular programs may erode minority rights, and

or the eectiveness o the proposed law in achieving the goalsannounced. Yet examination o legislative records and newspa-

per accounts or several states with price gouging laws reveals

little in the way o detailed policy analysis.

As previously noted, New York passed the nations rst price

gouging law in response to sharp increases in home heating oil

costs during the winter o 19781979. Newspaper accounts sug-

gest the bill was motivated by a desire to protect consumers. To

policymakers it simply appeared wrong to hike prices on consum-

ers undergoing weather-related hardships, and the law sought to

protect consumers rom such prices. The apparent simplicity o

both the laws goals and the approach advocated may have insu-

lated the proposal rom thorough policy analysis.Texas passed its price gouging legislation in 1995, in the orm

o a ew lines in a tort reorm bill that proposed substantial

changes to the states Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Though

the tort reorm debate captured both headlines and legislator

attention, little notice was given to the section that declared it a

alse, misleading, or deceptive act or practice to sell uel, ood,

medicine, or another necessity at an exorbitant or excessive price

during an emergency declared by the governor.

South Carolina was one o seven states that passed antiprice

gouging laws in late 2001 or 2002, primarily in response to reports

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o price gouging ater the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

Among many other things, the South Carolina Homeland Security

Act o 2002 imposed penalties o up to $1,000 and as many as 30

days in prison or charging an unconscionable price or 30 days

ater a declaration o emergency by the president or governor, or

or 15 days ater the attorney general issues a notice o abnormal

disruption o the market. Most o the public debate over the

Homeland Security Act concerned the expansion o the states law

enorcement authority; as in Texas, the price gouging provisions

were a barely discussed part o a much larger bill.

When price gouging legislation reached the foor o the Utah

State Senate in 2005, bill sponsor Patrice Arent cited price goug-

ing reports rom Florida as motivation, said a majority o states

had price gouging laws, and expressed a desire to provide such

protection to Utah consumers. Discussions o the bill revealed

that the state legislators were aware o the potential or the price

controls to interere with both ordinary business practices and

the possible extraordinary eorts businesses may undertake dur-

ing emergencies. Arent responded that the legislation included

accommodations to address concerns o Utah businesses toavoid interering with such eorts.

Utah had aced just two declared emergencies in the previous

15 years and a single episode o an extreme price or tree removal

was mentioned by Arent. Had a ormal cost-benet analysis o

the Utah law been conducted, both the costs and benets would

have been minimal. The Utah public was not calling or such pro-

tection and lobbyists did not pursue it. Rather, Arent advocated

or the bill on the grounds that it would be good or the state to

protect consumers rom price gouging, and on the grounds that

other states were already doing it.

Consequences of Price Gouging Law

Economic analysis o the eects o price gouging laws reveals

concerns on both the demand and supply sides o the market.

As already noted, price constraints will discourage conservation

o goods at exactly the time they are in especially high demand.

Simultaneously, price caps discourage extraordinary eorts to

bring goods in high demand into the aected area. As Sowell

explained, price gouging laws keep goods rom being used

where they are most needed. It is a result not intended by state

legislators, but completely predictable.

In a 2007 Journal of Competition Law and Economics paper, David

Montgomery, Robert Baron, and Mary Weisskop present athorough examination o the eects o price gouging laws. Their

assessment o a proposed national price gouging law concluded

a national law would have increased total economic losses dur-

ing Hurricanes Katrina and Rita by nearly $2 billion, mostly

rom intererence with incentives to bring goods and services to

areas where they are most needed. In addition, they ound that a

national price gouging law would have let more o the economic

burden o the storms on the states most directly hit, Louisiana

and Mississippi, while moderating the economic consequences

or the rest o the nation.

This damage-concentrating eect o price gouging laws is

especially troubling, but it is a predictable result o suppress-

ing price increases. Higher prices motivate a supply response:

wholesalers divert supplies headed or neighboring markets into

areas o suddenly higher prices, and the eect is that supplies in

neighboring areas are reduced and prices rise a bit in response. As

supplies are diverted toward the disaster-struck region, the harms

suered in the area are diminished a degree. Yes, consumers in

disaster-struck areas would rather not pay our times the usual

price or ice or 30 percent more or gasoline, but they generally

would be better o having the opportunity to do so rather than

having no opportunity to buy ice or gas at all.

There are urther unintended consequences. It can be easier

or large retailers to mobilize a response to a localized disaster

than or smaller merchants. A nationwide chain can divert

shipments intended or its stores in other areas and even move

merchandise rom other stores to resupply stores in the aected

area. These options explain in part why some large retailers are

able to limit price increases during declared emergencies. A small

mom-and-pop store or even a regional chain in an aected areawill have ewer low-cost resupply options available. The result?

Price gouging laws are more burdensome or small retailers than

or nationwide chains.

Helping Consumers?

It may be objected that while price gouging laws are price

controls, they are price controls limited in scope and dura-

tion, and hence unlikely to cause signicant harm. In addition,

states attorneys general seem somewhat restrained in their

application o the laws. At least it is the case that state attorneys

general receive thousands o consumer price complaints eachyear, but relatively ew complaints lead to investigations and

ewer still yield settlements or lawsuits. Many state laws make

allowances or retailers to pass along higher wholesale costs, at

least so long as the retailers prot margin does not increase. In

addition, some large chain retailers would pursue a policy o no

price increases or relevant consumer goods during emergen-

cies, with or without a law. In such cases, price gouging laws

may present little added burden, at least or large retailers, but

also little benet to consumers. Perhaps other policies would

be better targets or reorm.

Price gouging laws remain problematic. First, it is ar rom

clear that the application o current laws causes little economicharm. Relatively little economic research has examined the eects

o price gouging laws on businesses or consumers. However,

Montgomery, Baron, and Weisskops systematic estimate o the

potential eects o a national price gouging law did nd that such

a law would have substantially increased the damages rom disas-

ters like Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In addition, because the law

would hamper the price signals that motivate supply responses

rom outside the aected area, most o this addition harm would

be concentrated in the states directly hit by the storms.

Second, it seems dicult to pin down a clear description o

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price gouging. State laws requently employ imprecise terms

such as unconscionable, exorbitant, or unreasonably exces-

sive, and provide ew specic criteria to identiy when a price ts

those descriptions. Even in states that specically permit retail-

ers to pass along cost increases, not all cost increases are treated

equally. Merchants are then let unsure as to how much prices can

increase under the law. Weigles and other Knoxville-area gasoline

retailers were surely aware o Tennessees law against charging a

price grossly in excess o a price generally charged immediately

prior to the emergency, except to the extent a merchant is pass-

ing along increased costs; apparently the Tennessee attorney

general and the retailers had diering views on what constituted

increased costs. States that ail to speciy when price increases

violate the law ail to provide a well-tailored law to protect con-

sumers. Instead, vague price gouging laws add to the uncertainty

aced by merchants operating in disaster-aected areas.

Third, while price gouging laws may be somewhat limited in

scope and duration, those limits are being eroded. Price gouging

laws are increasingly being applied to a broader sets o goods and

services, penalties are becoming harsher, the laws are invokedmore requently, and they are in orce or longer periods o time.

No state with a price gouging law has repealed it, and states lack-

ing a price gouging law continue to ace legislative proposals to

enact such laws. Federal price gouging legislation has been pro-

posed repeatedly over the past several Congresses.

Finally, on moral grounds not well captured by economic

analysis, the nature o price gouging laws is to hinder actions that

would tend to aid persons in desperate conditions. Capped prices

tend to discourage conservation o needed goods or services. One

amily, evacuated rom its home, may reserve two hotel rooms at

a capped rate when they would have taken one at higher prices;

late-arriving evacuees will nd ewer rooms available. Similarly,capped prices tend to discourage extraordinary eorts to resup-

ply an area with vitally needed goods or services. Some shop own-

ers in aected areas will shut down rather than operate during

times o stress, eectively taking goods o the market rather than

making them available to consumers. Fewer individuals outside

o the aected areas will risk their time and money bringing ice,

electric generators, or other goods into storm-ravaged areas i

they risk arrest and nes or charging unconscionable prices.

Conclusion

I public policy ought especially to protect persons duringperiods o emergency and that is the claim o some advo-

cates o price gouging laws then price gouging laws should

be repealed i it is ound that they lead to more harm than

good or such persons. Advocates o price gouging laws rec-

ognize the strong emotions that motivate antiprice gouging

attitudes and claim this emotion highlights the moral serious-

ness o price increases during emergencies. But a sustained

examination o the ethics o price gouging nds the moral

case against price gouging to be weak. When the consequences

o anti-gouging regulations are considered instead o just the

intentions o their advocates, moral considerations likely weigh

against, rather than or, price gouging laws.

The straightorward economic analysis o Montgomery,

Baron, and Weisskop concluded that a nationwide price goug-

ing law would exacerbate the eects o natural disasters and tend

to concentrate the harm in the locations most directly hit by

the disasters. Or, to rame this point dierently, in the absence

o price gouging laws, the natural workings o the price system

would be to reduce the overall harm resulting rom a disaster and

share the harm remaining across a larger part o the population.

Price gouging laws hinder this natural response.

The irony here or the virtue argument described by Sandel is

acute. It is the special claim o the virtue argument that it intends

to promote a civic virtue o shared sacrice or the common good,

yet price gouging laws are destructive on both points. Because

price gouging laws interere with price signals, resources rom

outside o the disaster-aected area are not so readily mobilized.

Rather than promoting a shared sacrice in response to a disaster,

economic damage tends to be more localized. A urther result o

interering with price signals is that ewer resources get to wherethey are most needed, and thereore the common good is harmed

rather than promoted.

I the virtue argument or price gouging laws ails, we are let

with welare and reedom considerations. Here the case against

price gouging laws is substantial. Price controls interere with the

ability o merchants and consumers to settle reely on the prices

at which they will trade. Price controls also reduce economic wel-

are: by limiting price increases in areas harmed by emergencies,

the laws discourage conservation o goods and services precisely

when they are needed most and discourage extraordinary eorts

to bring goods in high demand into the aected area.

Laws proscribing price gouging intend to enorce a moral viewthat says it is wrong to take advantage o anothers pain or ones

own gain. The intention may be laudable, but the results o the

laws clearly are not. Merchants and consumers would be better

o without price gouging laws.

rEadIngS

An Analysis o the Enactment

o Anti-Price Gouging Laws, by

Cale Wren Davis. Montana State

University, 2008.

Bring on the Price Gougers, by

Je Jacoby. Boston Globe, August 22,

2004.

Fairness as a Constraint on

Prot Seeking: Entitlements in the

Market, by Daniel Kahneman, Jack

L. Knetsch, and Richard Thaler.

American Economic Review, Vol. 76,

No. 4 (September 1986).

How Price Gouging Helps Flo-

ridians, by Thomas Sowell. Tampa

Tribune, September 15, 2004.

Justice: Whats the Right Thing to Do?

by Michael J. Sandel. Farrar, Straus

and Giroux, 2009.

Potential Eects o Proposed

Price Gouging Legislation on the

Cost and Severity o Gasoline

Supply Interruptions, by W. D.

Montgomery, R. A. Baron, and M. K.

Weisskop. Journal of Competition Law

& Economics, Vol. 3 No. 3 (2007).Price Gouging Report , prepared by

the Oce o the Attorney General,

State o South Carolina. July 25, 2009.

The Ethics o Price Gouging,

by Matt Zwolinski. Business Ethics

Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3 (2008).

The Price Is Wrong: Understanding

What Makes a Price Seem Fair and the

True Cost of Unfair Pricing, by Sarah

Maxwell. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,

2008.