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Cybersecurity by the #s Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 October 2016

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Page 1: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Cybersecurity by the #s Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium – Vanuatu

20 October 2016

Page 2: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Cybersecurity by the #s Network Security

• A view from the logical

layer

• Network Security

• What are we up against?

• The cybersecurity

ecosystem

CERT | CSIRT

• Incident Response

• Coordination

• Information Sharing

• Building a CERT

• Components of a

CERT/CSIRT

• The Road Forward

Page 3: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

A view from the logical layer

https://www.icann.org/news/multimedia/1563

Page 4: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

The fundamental challenge

00101000 01101001 01101110 00101001 01110011 01100101 01100011 01110101 01110010 01101001 01110100 01111001 00100000 01100010 01111001 00100000 01100100 01100101 01110011 01101001 01100111 01101110

(in)Security by Design

https://blog.apnic.net/2015/07/07/mapping-the-internet-in-the-asia-pacific/

Page 5: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Confidentiality Integrity Availability

SE

CU

RIT

Y

prevents unauthorized use or

disclosure of information

safeguards the accuracy and

completeness of information

authorized users have reliable and timely access to

information

Goals of Information Security

Page 6: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Terms: Breaking it down

• Threat

– Any circumstance or factor with the potential to cause harm

– a motivated, capable adversary

• Vulnerability

– A weakness in a system; in procedures, design, or implementation

that can be exploited

• Software bugs, design flaws, operational mistakes

• Risk

– The probability that a particular vulnerability will occur

– The severity (impact) of that occurrence

= likelihood x consequences

Page 7: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Security tradeoffs

• Services offered vs. security provided

– Each service offers its own security risk

– The more services, the less security

• Ease of use vs. security

– Every security mechanism causes inconvenience

– The more “plug n play”, the less security

• Risk of loss vs. Cost of security

– Assets carry value and risk of loss

– The higher the value, the higher the security cost

• These factors can be balanced in a comprehensive security

policy

Page 8: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

What are we up against?

Page 9: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

What can the attackers do?

• Eavesdropping – Listen in on communications

• Masquerading – Impersonating someone else

• Forgery – Invent or duplicate/replay information

• Trespass – Obtain unauthorised access

• Subversion – Modify data and messages in transit

• Destruction – Vandalise or delete important data

• Disruption – Disable or prevent access to services

• Infiltration – Hide out inside our machines

• Hijacking – “Own” and use machines for nefarious

purposes

Page 10: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

And why do they do it?

Motivation Examples

Knowledge driven • Recreational

• Research

Issue-based • Hacktivism

• Patriotism

Antisocial • Revenge

• Vandalism

Competitive • Theft of IP

• Damage to competitors

Criminal • Theft of assets

• Extortion

Strategic • Espionage

• State-driven or sponsored

Page 11: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

And, how to they do it?

• Targeting the user

– Masquerading

– “Phishing”

– DNS Cache Poisoning

• IP Address “spoofing”

• Disruption

– DoS attacks

– DDoS attacks

Page 12: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

“Phishing”

• “Fishing” for information such as usernames, passwords,

credit card details, other personal information

• Ex: Forged emails apparently from legitimate enterprises,

direct users to forged websites.

Page 13: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

DNS Cache Poisoning

The Internet

www.apnic.net www.apnic.net?

www.apnic.net

199.43.0.44

DNS

175.98.98.133 203.119.102.244

199.43.0.44

☹ ︎

Page 14: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Securing websites – SSL certificates

The Internet

www.apnic.net

www.apnic.net?

203.119.102.244

DNS

175.98.98.133 203.119.102.244

☺ ︎ SSL

Page 15: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Securing DNS – DNSSEC

The Internet

www.apnic.net

www.apnic.net?

DNS

175.98.98.133 203.119.102.244 ☺ ︎

203.119.102.244

SEC

Page 16: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Misusing IP Addresses…

The Internet Global Routing Table

4.128/9

60.100/16

60.100.0/20

135.22/16

Global Routing Table

4.128/9

60.100/16

60.100.0/20

135.22/16

199.43.0.0/24

Announce

199.43.0.0/24

R

202.12.29.0/24

Traffic

199.43.0.0/24

☹ ︎

Page 17: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Misusing IP Addresses…

The Internet Global Routing Table

4.128/9

60.100/16

60.100.0/20

135.22/16

Global Routing Table

4.128/9

60.100/16

60.100.0/20

135.22/16

202.12.29.0/24 …

Announce

202.12.29.0/24

R

202.12.29.0/24

RPKI

☺ ︎

Page 18: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

IP address spoofing

Internet ISP

203.119.102.244

175.98.98.133

Request

Src: 175.98.98.133

Dst: 203.119.102.244

Response

Src: 203.119.102.244

Dst: 175.98.98.133

☺ ︎

Page 19: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

IP address spoofing

Internet ISP

203.119.102.244

175.98.98.133

Response

Src: 203.119.102.244

Dst: 199.43.0.44

199.43.0.44

Request

Src: 199.43.0.44

Dst: 203.119.102.244

☹ ︎

Page 20: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

DoS attack: Amplification

Internet ISP

203.119.102.244

175.98.98.133

199.43.0.44

Request

Src: 199.43.0.44

Dst: 203.119.102.244

☹ ︎

Response

Src: 203.119.102.244

Dst: 199.43.0.44

BIG

PAYLOAD

Request

Src: 199.43.0.44

Dst: 203.119.102.244

Request

Src: 199.43.0.44

Dst: 203.119.102.244

Request

Src: 199.43.0.44

Dst: 203.119.102.244

Request

Src: 199.43.0.44

Dst: 203.119.102.244

Response

Src: 203.119.102.244

Dst: 199.43.0.44

BIG

PAYLOAD

Response

Src: 203.119.102.244

Dst: 199.43.0.44

BIG

PAYLOAD

Response

Src: 203.119.102.244

Dst: 199.43.0.44

BIG

PAYLOAD

Response

Src: 203.119.102.244

Dst: 199.43.0.44

BIG

PAYLOAD

Page 21: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Defeating IP spoofing – BCP38

Internet ISP

203.119.102.244

175.98.98.133

☺ ︎

BCP38 (2000)

Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service

Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing

ISP

Request

Src: 199.43.0.44

Dst: 203.119.102.244

Page 22: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

DDoS attack: Distributed DoS

Internet ISP

☹ ︎“Botnet”

Page 23: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Network Security In A Nutshell

• Ensuring Confidentiality's, Integrity, Availability

• Building a risk management approach

• Implemented through cybersecurity program

C

I

A

• Security as a process

• Technology, people, and process

Page 24: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

The Bigger Picture

Network & Information Security

Cybersecurity

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Users

Public Safety

Regulators

Operators Vendors

Software

CERTs

Internet Security Ecosystem

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Asia-Pacific

CERTs

Page 27: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Asia-Pacific

CERTs

Page 28: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Incident Response Security Incident

• A computer security incident is a violation or imminent threat of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices

• Examples: – An attacker commands a botnet to send high volumes of connection requests to a

web server, causing it to crash

– Users are tricked into opening a “quarterly report” sent via email that is actually malware; running the tool has infected their computers and established connections with an external host.

– An attacker obtains sensitive data and threatens that the details will be released publicly if the organization does not pay a designated sum of money.

(Source: NIST SP800-61Incident Handling Guide)

Page 29: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

1. Preparation – Preparing to handle

Incidents

– Preventing Incidents

2. Detection and Analysis

Source: http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf

Stages of Incident Handling

3. Containment, Eradication

& Recovery

4. Post Incident Activities

Page 30: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Asia-Pacific

CERTs

Page 31: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Coordination

Source: NIST Computer Security Incident Handling Guide

Page 32: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Asia-Pacific

CERTs

Page 33: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Information Sharing

• Trusted Group

• Sharing of threat intelligence

• Co-ordinated Response

• Reach out to the community

Page 34: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Why a Team?

• Dedicated resources for Incident Management

– Dedicated Service(s)

– Human Resources

– Specific Polices and SOPs

– Expertise & Skillsets

• Structured Incident Management / Handling Procedures

• Integration with other activities Internal & External to the

organization

– SOC / IT

– CERTs / ISACs etc

Page 35: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Building a

- CERT

- CSIRT

Page 36: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Defining a CSIRT …is a team that performs, coordinates, and supports the response to

security incidents that involve sites within a defined constituency

• In ways which the specific community agrees to be in its

general interest

• Team = Organization that does Incident Response (IR)

work!

• Must react to reported security incidents or threat faced by

the constituency

Page 37: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Defining a CSIRT …is a team that performs, coordinates, and supports the response to

security incidents that involve sites within a defined constituency

• Mandate & Terms of Reference

• Defined Structure

• Operational Capacity

Page 38: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

38

Components

of a CERT/CSIRT

Page 39: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Constituency

• Who is the Team meant to serve?

• Constituency help defines:

– What is the purpose & nature of the CSIRT

– Who is the CSIRT Serving

– What types of security incidents the CSIRT handles

– What are the relationship with other CSIRTs

• Constituencies might overlap

– Co-ordination is key

– CSIRT of the “Last Resort”

Page 40: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Different Types of CSIRTs

• National CSIRTs

• Coordination Centers

• Analysis Centers

• Enterprise CSIRTs

• Vendor Teams

• Incident Response Providers

• Regional CERTs

Source: US-CERT https://www.cert.org/incident-management/csirt-development/csirt-faq.cfm

Page 41: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Policies & SOPs

• Specific for Incident Response & Handling

• Definition of Security Incidents and Related Terms

• Define Scope, Roles & Responsibilities

• Sharing of Information within the organization or with external parties

• What to do in the event of a security incident – Specific SOP for dealing with different types of incidents

– Forms, Templates, Required information

– How to reach you outside office hours

• Dealing with Crisis – Escalation (Internal & External)

– Dealing with the Media /Press

• Setting Realistic Expectations – Dealing with Service Providers

Page 42: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Team Structure

• Team Models – Central Incident Response Team

– Distributed Incident Response Team

– Co-ordination Team

• Functions / Workflow – Incident Reporting

• Report from internal or external

– Incident Analysis • What is happening, Impact, Patterns

– Incident Response • Containment, Eradication & Recovery

• Post-Incident Activity / Recommendations

• How many people do we need in a team?

Page 43: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Services

• Incident Handling & Response – Core activity

• Advisory / Notification – Issue advisory relevant to constituency

• Education and Awareness – Promoting best practices – Policies and SOPs

– Cyber Security Exercises

• Information Sharing – i.e. Global / Regional CSIRTs groups, ISACS

• Other Services – Reactive

– Proactive – Security Quality Management

Page 44: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Types of Services Example

* Enterprise CSIRT *

Proactive Services Reactive Services Security Quality

Management Services

• Security Alerts

• Security Reporting

• Security Diagnosis

• Monitoring of

Websites

• Vulnerability Handling

• Incident Handling

• Artifact Handling

• Security Consultation

• Security Education

• Security Training

• Evaluation of

Technologies

Source: NTT-CERT

https://conference.apnic.net/data/39/150304_ntt-cert-activity_1425447986.pdf

Page 45: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Tools & Facilities • Basically two categories of tools

– Managing Incident Reports

– Tools for analysis

• Handling & Managing Incidents Reported – Able to collect & store incidents reported

– Track status, produce reports

– Function of system can be mapped to SOP

– Encryption tools for secure communication

• Security Incidents Monitoring & Analysis – Tools for processing or analyzing logs, binaries, network traffic

– Forensics Tools

– Tools for information sharing

– Labs / Separate resources for analysis / testing

– Tools in the Public domains (i.e. Passive DNS)

• Office / Work facilities – Secure room, Office facilities, etc

• Good Resource: FIRST Membership Site Visit: http://www.first.org/membership/site-visit-V1.0.pdf

Page 46: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Building Relationships

• Internal – Early buy-in from leadership and constituency

– Costing • The cost tends to vary based on a lot of factors

– Size of team

– Services provided

– Nature of Organisation • Start Small

– Using open source tools

– Scale up as capability and need grows

• External – Becoming of a part of a trusted community

• Attending Meetings / Conferences

• Capacity Development (Training)

Page 47: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Asia-Pacific

CERTs

Page 48: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Road Forward

“Establishment of a National

Computer Emergency

Response Team (CERT) that is

capable of dealing with relevant

Cybersecurity threats for

citizens, tourists, businesses

and government in Vanuatu”

Page 49: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Lets stay engaged!

Klée Aiken

External Relations Manager

[email protected]

Adli Wahid

Security Specialist

FIRST Board Member

[email protected]

Upcoming security engagements:

• APCERT Conference | Tokyo, JP

• 24 to 27 Oct 2016

• NGN Forum | Suva, FJ

• 1 to 3 Nov 2016

• Technical Assistance | Suva & Nadi, FJ

• 24 to 26 Nov 2016

• PacNOG 19 | Nadi, FJ

• 28 Nov to 2 Dec

Page 50: Regulatory Internet Governance Symposium Vanuatu 20 ... · • State-driven or sponsored . And, how to they do it? • Targeting the user – Masquerading – “Phishing” – DNS

Tankio tumas! Questions?