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Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India1
Regulator’s role in enhancing transparency in informing
the public – The Mayapuri Accident
R. BhattacharyaSecretary, Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB)
Director, Industrial Plants Safety Division, AERB
&
Director, Information & Technical Services Division, AERB
Mumbai, India
email: [email protected]
International Experts’ Meeting on Enhancing
Transparency and Communication
Effectiveness in the event of a Nuclear or
Radiological Emergency
18-20 June, 2012
Vienna, Austria
1
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India2
Outline
� About AERB
� Handling Radiation Emergencies
� Mayapuri Radiological accident
� About the Accident
� Public communication
� Challenges faced
� Lessons Learnt
� Effectiveness and Transparency in Public Communication
2
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India3
Evolution of Nuclear & Radiation Safety Regulation
� Mid fifties: Self regulation (APSARA : 1956)
� Sixties: Safety monitoring and surveillance by designated groups
in BARC [Health Physics Division (DAE facilities); Directorate of
Radiation Protection(non-DAE facilities)]� Based on DRP’s review DAE used to issue NOC for import of radioactive sources
to institutions
� 1971: Radiation Protection Rules promulgated� Director, DRP as competent authority
� 1972: DAE – Safety Review Committee� RAPS-1 Commissioning
� All DAE Units
� 1983: Atomic Energy Regulatory Board
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Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India4
Means of Public Information
� Annual Report: information on consents issued, occupational exposure,
industrial safety statistics, radioactive discharges, environmental dose,
significant events, enforcement actions, safety promotional activities etc.
� Newsletters: information on quarterly activities
� Website
� Press Releases
� Interviews
� Awareness Programmes
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Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India5
Emergency in Radiation Facilities
Have limited environmental impact. Normally the actionsrequired are;� Rescue the injured
� Access control by cordoning the area
� Contain the radioactive source
� Decontamination of the affected area
� Safe disposal of the damaged source
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Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India6
o Identification, Recovery, accounting, affected area monitoring & Disposal of Radioactive Source
o Rescue & Relief: Rescue, Evacuate , Exposure assessment, Medical Aid etc as per guidelines
o Large scale Decontamination & Rehabilitation: Provide shelters, decontamination of areas and buildings
o Habitat clearance
Emergencies involving Orphan sources
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Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India7
Response to Radiological Emergency
Public, Media Other Stake Holders: IB, Police etc
Radiological Incident : Information
Mobilize Resources :• NDMA, SDMA, DDMA• CMG• AERB• DAE ERCs (22)• MHA
Coordinate Actions Through :• District authorities• NDRF• SDRF / DDRF• Other Resources
After Information DC/DM (DDMA) to take Full Charge of the situation
7
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India9
Action on 1st information: April 7-9, 2010 (Initial Phase)
� April 7, 2010 (afternoon) message received at AERB from a
Hospital at Delhi – An owner (32 yrs) of a junk shop suspected of
injuries from exposure to radiation (along with medical report)
� April 7, 2010 (evening) two officers from AERB monitored the
area in & around the junk shop and found high levels of radiation
(~20 mGy/h). They segregated contaminated junk, shielded with
available steel plates & cordoned off the area.
� Crisis Management Group (CMG) of Department of Atomic Energy was activated
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India10
� April 8, 2010, CMG convened a meeting. Planning & Coordination
for source recovery operation was finalized. A team of officers of
AERB, other DAE units, National Disaster Response Force (NDRF)
and police was formed.
� In the night hours of April 9, 2010 the team could identify the
source (Cobalt-60), locate and recover all sources present in the
shop (about 90 % of total inventory)
� The recovered sources were transferred into shielding flask and
sent to Narora Atomic Power Station (NAPS), nearest DAE unit for
safe & secure storage and further investigation.
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India11
Action on 2nd information: April 13-14, 2010
� On April 13, 2010 at about 16:00 hrs a surveillance check by DelhiEmergency Response Centre (ERC) revealed elevated radiation level ata nearby closed junk shop.
� In the night hours of April 14, 2010 the team could identify, locate andrecover two pencils and a multiple source cage with capacity toaccommodate 48 pencils (about 10 % of total inventory). Recoveredsources were transferred to NAPS in a shielding flask.
� The team also carried out radiation survey of about 800 shops. General
radiation level observed was near background (80 – 180 nGy/h). The
owner of the shop and his coworkers did not show any sign of radiation
injury.
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India12
Action on 3rd information April 16-17, 2010
� On April 16, 2010 information was received that a person has been
admitted to a hospital of Delhi with localized radiation injury.
� The team recovered the source from the wallet of the injured person
and transferred to shielding flask and transported to NAPS, Narora
Infrastructure
� Delhi Police Force
� Emergency Response Centres (ERCs)
� National Disaster Response Force (NDRF)
� Experts from units of Department of Atomic Energy (DAE)
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India13
• A team of medical officers from Department of Atomic Energy
(DAE) provided guidance to the local hospitals in treatment of the
injured persons.
• Out of seven, one succumbed to the radiation injuries. Other six
persons have been discharged from the hospitals on various dates,
last one being on May 24, 2010.
• In a campaign to screen the individuals (for medical management)
suspected to have received high doses, bio-dosimetry (CA test) of
more than 40 blood samples of the persons having even a remote
connection with the incident was carried out. None of them have
shown any significant exposure to radiation.
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India14
Estimated dose due to single exposure and INES
reporting
14
Worker Dose (Gy)
Worker 1 3.7
Worker 2 0.6
Worker 3 0.4
Worker 4 1.6
Worker 5 1.8
Worker 6 1.2
Worker 7 1.3
Event Reported as INES Level-4
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India15
� 1969: Professor of Chemistry Dept, Delhi University imported Gamma
Cell-220 research irradiator (containing Co-60) from Atomic Energy of
Canada Limited, Canada. Authorisation issued by DRP, BARC
� 1985: Professor retired. The gamma cell, thereafter remained unused.
� February 2010: Delhi university auctioned the gamma cell to a scrap
dealer (based on decision made by a committee of professors) and
purchased by a junk material dealer of Mayapuri, Delhi.
� April, 2010: This Gamma Cell was dismantled by local workers, none of
these workers showed any symptoms of radiation effects. Worker ‘5’, who
died on April 29, 2010 of radiation injuries, had worked on the SS part
(cage with pencils) after getting it from the dealer who had dismantled it.
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What had happened?????
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India16
More about the ill-fated gamma cell...
� Self contained dry source storage irradiator with a cylinder source
cage which can hold 48 pencils.
� Housed 16 pencils shielded by 3 tons of Pb
� Each pencil had 7 slugs and 2 dummy spacers.
� Total activity content of the cell: 3978 Ci
(as of Aug, 1969)
� Activity content in pencil: 276Ci
� Activity content in slug: 20-87 Ci
� Authorisation issued by DRP in 1970. Undertaking by Delhi University:
“radiation sources of gamma cell will not be sold, rented or
transferred to any other institution”.
Since Gamma cell is considered as inherently safe equipment, it was not
subjected to periodic regulatory inspection as is done for other sources.
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Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India17
April 16
• A team of AERB & Board of Radiation & Isotope Technology (BRIT) officers
conducted the inspection.
• Team could identify a 48 slot cage of a self contained dry storage irradiator
(gamma cell) and its pencils
• The gamma cell was not manufactured in India
• Low activity level found in source pencils indicated that they might have been
manufactured 30-40 years ago
May 3&4
• A team of AERB & BRIT officers conducted further inspection.
• All the sources of the gamma cell (112 slugs from 16 pencils) were identified &
accounted for.
Inspection of recovered sources at
Narora Atomic Power Station (NAPS)
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India18
Projected assessment of radiation dose
Radiological status due to presence of contamination mainly
in soil on the road in front of the shop and neighbouring
shops, from where Co-60 sources were recovered:
� Before removing the contaminated soil and
concretisation: < 10 mSv/a
� After decontamination and concretization: < 1mSv/a
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Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India20
Safe recovery operation of discovered sources
5:30 hrs, April 9, 2010
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India21
Relocating the flask to appropriate position
5:40 hrs, April 9, 2010
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India23
Source recovery operation Phase 2 (April 13-14, 2010)
Shop No. D-127, 1:00 hrs April 14, 2010
Source identification operation
Total 7
man-mSvwhole body dose
received in
recovery
operation
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India25
Source cage photographed at NAPS, One source pencil fitted to one
of the slots ( recovery from Phase 2)
Photographs snapped at NAPS on April 16, 2010 during investigation
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India27
Operation decontamination – Phase -1
Radiation level at shutter D2/32
23:00 hrs, May 15, 2010
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India2828
Radiation fields brought
down from 0.5mSv/hr-
1mSv/hr to 15µSv/hr at
the entrance door where
majority of sources were
found.
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India30
Team involved in decontamination operation Phase -2
May 22-24, 2010
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India3131
Source pencils transported in a lead container for proper disposal
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India32
What went wrong????
• Violation of Radiation Protection Rules and Safe Disposal of
Radioactive Wastes Rules by DU
• Lack of awareness on use of sources amongst DU staff
• Non availability of trained personnel at DU (Chemistry Dept.)
• Carelessness on the part of DU
• User of the gamma cell retired about 25 years back
32
Police has filed complaint against the Professors of the committee
involved in auction of the gamma cell which is sub-judice.
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India33
• Identification and ‘cordoning off’ of shops / area
• Prompt recovery of sources
• Survey of all shops in the junk market
• Conducted awareness programme for junk shop dealers
• Distribution of leaflets on precautionary measures for shop dealers
• Guidance and support to medical staff of hospitals in Delhi
• Initiation of regulatory action against DU
• Accounting of all sources of gamma cell & their safe storage
• Accounting of other sources available with DU
• Decontamination of junk, floor of shop & 50 m. road
Actions taken: short term
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India34
Measures taken after the accident
� Installation of radiation detection systems at entry/exit of airports,
sea-ports, inland container depots and other land ports.
� Further efforts to bring legacy sources (which may have been in
existence from periods when regulatory controls were still in the
evolving stage) under regulatory control by scanning old records.
� Installation of Web based Communication system (ARIS) for
strengthening regulatory control on radiation facilities initiated.
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Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India35
Measures taken after the accident
� Updating the inventory of sources (computerisation of database) based on
inputs from
� Ministry of HRD / UGC
�
� Ministry of Health
� Ministry of Industries
� Coal Authority of India Ltd.
� Oil and Natural Gas Commission
� Source suppliers and
� Response to advertisements issued in newspapers periodically
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Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India36
Measures taken after the accident
� Members of scrap association were sensitized to monitor the scrap for
radiation. On May 6, 2010 AERB organized an awareness programme for
scrap dealers and workers of Mayapuri scrap market.
� The requirement of pre-shipment inspection certificate for consignments
imported to India declaring that they do not contain any type of hazardous,
toxic waste, radioactive contaminated waste has been notified by concerned
ministry.
� Enhanced regulatory control by increasing frequency of inspections and
establishment of Regional Centres by AERB.
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Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India37
Challenges faced during this period….1/3
� Concerns/ Apprehensions amongst public:
� Extent and nature of hazard
� Health status of affected persons
� A malicious act?
� Imported metal scrap?
� Anger of the public.
� Selective hearing and understanding by public during a crisis
� Effectiveness of regulatory control system questioned
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Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India38
Challenges faced during this period….2/3
� ‘Diverse opinions’ in news channels
� Half-baked information
� Sensitization by media
� Delay in ascertaining facts. If the flow of information is
perceived as slow, the media could be fed with less reliable
sources and speculation such as:
� “India is being used as the dumping ground for disused sources”
� “The number of source pencils retrieved is a small fraction of the
original number and many source pencils are still missing”
� The NGO Greenpeace reported on May 14th 2010, after three
weeks of first reporting of the incident, that at certain locations in
the scrap yard, the radiation levels were much higher (5000 times
the background) -Re-surfacing of anxiety amongst the local population
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India39
� High pressure on the regulator to provide quick information-‘responsibly’ without causing heightened fear to too many agencies.
� Requirement of support from local organisations.
� The most effective way of conveying doses / levels of contamination / releases to public.
� ‘micro’, ‘milli’, ‘Mega’ ‘Tera’; Bq, Sv. ………….. are daunting
� phrases like ‘…. so many times natural background’ or
‘…. so many times normal limit’……. can be incomprehensible and alarming.
� What needs to be conveyed is perspective on health impact of such doses / releases etc.
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Challenges faced during this period….3/3
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India4040
Reported certain hotspots of 500µSv/hr while background was 0.1µSv/hr
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India44
...and the challenges were addressed by prompt
communication with media and public
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Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India45
Different means of communication used during and
after the incident
� Press releases issued at periodic intervals.
� Interviews by Top AERB officials
� AERB website updated regularly.
� Parliament sessions attended by AERB officials to respond
to the queries.
� Telephonic Queries of media responded .
� Radiation awareness programme was organized by AERB in
coordination with Public Awareness Division (PAD) of
Department of Atomic Energy(DAE) and other agencies.
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Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India46
Awareness Programmes
Senior Officer from AERB delivering lecture at Delhi University
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India4747
Addressing delegates at One-Day awareness programme conducted for research facilities handling open radioisotopes
Awareness Programmes
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India49
• ITDB initial notification on the incident was sent on April 22, 2010
• ITDB update of incident was sent on May 10, 2010
• INES provisional rating and final rating were sent
• Presentation at IAEA on the subject on May 18, 2010
Communication to International bodies
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India50
Typical parliament questions
� Whether it is a fact that radioactive cobalt-60 had been sold to
the scrap dealer by Delhi University in April 2010?
� the number of people affected by coming in contact with Cobalt
60 so far?
� the steps being taken by Government so that such incidents may
not occur in the future ?
� Whether Government has formulated any policy on radiation so
far on disposal of biomedical and radioactive waste?
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Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India56
The Success Story: transparency in Public
Communication
� The swift and effective action - an important role in confidence
and credibility building with the locals.
� Speedy retrieval of the radioactive source pencils;
identification of source device & confirmation of recovery of
all radioactive material - a big deterrent for negative press
coverage
� Continuous and updated press releases by AERB - Allayed
misgivings and fears of radiation amongst general public.
� Awareness campaigns at the site- proved extremely useful to
ease the tensions
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Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India57
Some lessons…
57
� Special nature & requirement of public information during emergency
� Quick response required
� All information may not be available
� Situation of duress
� Pre-requisites for successful crisis communication
� Pre - existing healthy relation between authorities and public
- trust, openness, rapport, channels of communication
� Preparedness developed during peace time:
- Strategies and procedures based on past experience
- “Emergency communication cell”, which can be activated quickly when needed
- Access to reliable & timely information and data from the field / monitoring provisions
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India58
...lessons for regulatory body
� NGOs and media should be made aware and the regulator should
gain more trust and credibility.
� Regulator should release quick and authentic information in order
to avoid mis-reporting by the media.
� Regulator should build relations with the media.
� Regulator must develop the capability to sensitively deal with the
affected and angry people to ensure the safety of
Spokesperson(s).
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Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India59
Tasks in hand for enhancing the Public Information during
Emergency scenarios
� Increasing public awareness on nuclear & radiation safety
� Public involvement in emergency preparedness
� Creation of robust infrastructure for response and clearly
identified fall back provisions (evacuation routes, shelters,
decontamination centers, medical treatment etc.)
� Capacity building by NDMA
� Addressing the observed deficiencies in the exercises
conducted by NDMA
� Establishment of a monitoring & response cell at AERB
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Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India60
Communication - Process
Detection Processing Declaration
Channel(s)
Reception Interpretation Feedback
>> Transparency
>> Effectiveness
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India61
Enhancing Transparency
� Timely / Advance Detection of
Emergency
� Reliable Source
� Quick Response
� Fast Processing of
Information
� Computer Based Systems
� Knowledge Database
Support
� Analysis of Consequences
� Un-biased Declaration (disclosure)
of information
� Regular / timely updation of
Information
� Direct access to non-sensitive
information
� General Measures
� Interaction with other bodies
� Management Support
� Avoiding exaggerations / rumors
� Enforcing Legal / Regulatory
Framework
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India62
Enhancing Effectiveness
� Reliable and Robust Channel (s)
� Redundant and Dedicated
Networks
� Noise / Congestion-free
Transmission
� Ensuring Last Mile Connectivity
� Ensured Reception
� Technology Dissemination
� Multiple Mode of
Communication
� Accurate feedback Mechanism
� Correct Interpretation by
recipient(s)
� Public Education &
Awareness
� Consideration to local
language / culture / rituals
� Selective Messaging (instead
of broadcast)
� Indentifying receiver’s location
(GPRS…?)
� Off-site Help-lines