regulations safety aviation australian air … · 8000.011 defence aviation safety regulations. ......

AUSTRALIAN AIR PUBLICATION

8000.010

DEFENCE OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS MANUAL

AL Status: 7 Original Date of Issue: 4 Dec 12

GN Davies, AO, CSC Air Marshal Defence Aviation Authority Issuing Authority Date: 15 Jul 16

Sponsor: DACPA File Reference: AB19146494

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Important Notice

RESPONSIBILITIES OF DISTRIBUTEE

AMENDMENTS TO PUBLICATIONS

PUBLICATION MANAGEMENT

1. This publication, although issued as an Australian Air Publication (AAP), is authenticated by the Defence Aviation Authority because the content has Tri-Service significance and authority. The single Service markings have been replaced by their Tri-Service equivalents as part of the formation of a proper, structured, binding Defence Publication System for airworthiness, aircraft, aircraft related equipment and other ‘air’ matters under the authority of DI(G) ADMIN 20-31.

2. Procedures for the management, control and amendment of AAPs are outlined in AAP 5030.001 Defence Aviation and Australian Air Publication Systems and Specifications Manual.

Intellectual Property Protection

3. This publication is protected by Commonwealth of Australia Copyright. The contents of this publication may also be protected by other Intellectual Property Protection mechanisms, Government to Government Agreements and/or Third Party Transfer restrictions; such as Original Equipment Manufacturer’s Copyright and/or International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

Notice to Contractors

4. This publication is issued to Contractors for information only and is to be returned intact on completion of contract to the relevant Commonwealth Contracting Authority.

Special Publication Instructions (SPI) Promulgated Publication Sponsor Changes

5. SPI promulgated publication sponsor changes are to be recorded in the table below:

DATE SPI NO NEW SPONSOR

COPYRIGHT COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

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Publication Improvement Report and ReplyAO 011 Revised 20 Apr 16

Defending Australia and its National Interestswww.defence.gov.au

AO 011 - Page 1 of 2 1.7.4

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20 Apr 16, 14:48:27

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Defending Australia and its National Interestswww.defence.gov.au

AO 011 - Page 2 of 2

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AAP 8000.010 Change Status Page

CHANGE STATUS PAGE

AL 7 i

NOTE

• When amended, the Defence written portion of the text affected by an AL is identified by amendment indicators detailed in AAP 5030.001, Section 4, Chapter 2.

Page No AL

PRELIMINARY PAGES

Change Status Page i to iii 7

Notes to Readers i to ix 7

Amendment Certificate i to ii 0

Foreword i to ii 5

Table of Contents i to x 7

BODY MATTER PAGES

SECTION 1

CHAPTER 1 1 to 6 7

A-1 to A-2 5

CHAPTER 2 1 to 4 5

CHAPTER 3 1 to 2 0

SECTION 2

CHAPTER 1 1 to 6 4

CHAPTER 2 1 to 14 7

CHAPTER 3 1 to 13 4

CHAPTER 4 1 7

CHAPTER 5 1 7

CHAPTER 6 1 to 13 6

CHAPTER 7 1 to 3 3

CHAPTER 8 1 7

CHAPTER 9 1 to 2 0

SECTION 3

CHAPTER 1 1 to 4 5

CHAPTER 2 1 to 4 2

CHAPTER 3 1 to 3 7

CHAPTER 4 1 to 3 5

CHAPTER 5 1 to 2 0

CHAPTER 6 1 to 6 7

CHAPTER 7 1 to 2 2

CHAPTER 8 1 4

CHAPTER 9 1 to 2 5

SECTION 4

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SECTION 4 (cont)

CHAPTER 2 1 to 4 7

CHAPTER 3 1 to 2 0

CHAPTER 4 1 0

CHAPTER 5 1 2

CHAPTER 6 1 to 2 5

CHAPTER 7 1 to 2 4

CHAPTER 8 1 to 2 5

CHAPTER 9 1 to 6 4

SECTION 5

CHAPTER 1 1 to 4 7

CHAPTER 2 1 to 2 3

CHAPTER 3 1 to 5 7

CHAPTER 4 1 to 2 7

CHAPTER 5 1 to 7 7

CHAPTER 6 1 7

CHAPTER 7 1 to 4 0

CHAPTER 8 1 to 5 6

SECTION 6

CHAPTER 1 1 to 3 5

A-1 to A-2 0

1A1 0

1A2 0

CHAPTER 2 1 to 9 6

A-1 to A-6 0

CHAPTER 3 1 to 7 5

SECTION 7

CHAPTER 1 1 to 6 7

SECTION 8

CHAPTER 1 1 to 16 7

SECTION 9

CHAPTER 1 1 to 38 7

SECTION 10

CHAPTER 1 1 to 10 5

SECTION 11

CHAPTER 1 1 to 6 7

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AL 7 iii

POST PAGES

Page No AL

Glossary 1 6

List of Abbreviations 1 6

COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE

Certified that the publication has been page checked in accordance with the details on this page and the relevant Listof Effective Pages.

100% correct or with the following configuration errors

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.................................................................... Rank or Title and Name

Date............................... ......................................................Appointment and Unit or Section

PUBLICATION INSPECTION RECORD

Certified that an annual inspection has been carried out and any anomalies reported to the Publications Manager in accordance with AAP 5030.001, Section 7, Chapter 6.

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15 Jul 16

AAP 8000.010 Notes to Readers

AL 7 i

NOTES TO READERS

This AAP is managed in accordance with AAP 5030.001 - Defence Aviation and Australian Air Publication Systems and Specifications Manual. Reference must be made to this publication for Unit management of AAP.

Media

This publication is only available in soft copy on the AAP On-Line Library website. Printed versions are not provided. Any printed copies that might be made are uncontrolled and will have a printed warning automatically printed as part of the print process to ensure awareness.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES – AMENDMENT LIST 7

Major Changes

OAREG 2.1.4 — Flight Authorisation – Complete Revision. AMC/GM provided in s3c6. (PIRR 14-8029 / AB19954847)

OAREG 2.2.7 — Flying Displays Operating Limitations– Complete Revision. AMC/GM provided in s4c2. (PIRR 16-8051 / AB26543400)

OAREG 2.3 — Qualifications and Training: b. (3) a current aircrew medical — Incorporated into OAREG 2.3.5 (PIRR 14-8038 / AB21783374).

OAREG 2.3.5 — Aviation Medicine and Medical Fitness for Flight — Complete revision AMC/GM provided in s5c3. (PIRR 14-8038 / AB21783374).

OAREG 4 — Flight Test): - Complete revision. AMC/GM provided in s7 (PIRR 15-8007 / AB22000347)

OAREG 5 — Non Defence Registered Aircraft (NDRA): - Complete revision (MILAVREG 5 incorporated into OAREG 5). AMC/GM provided in s8c1 (PIRR 14-7034 / AB22520067)

OAREG 8 – Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) – Complete revision (MILAVREG 8 incorporated into OAREG 8). AMC/GM provided in s11c1 (PIRR 15-7806)

Minor Changes

Sect 5, Chap 1 – include Air Refuelling Operator (ARO) as a non-pilot aircrew qualification.

Sect 5, Chap 4 – clarify guidance for the use of electronic logbooks.

Sect 9, Chap 1 – include Air Dispatcher (AD) and Parachute Rigger (RIG PRCHT) as an Air Cargo Delivery qualification.

Edits

Sect 5, Chap 6 - reference to CRM policy corrected to Defence Aviation Safety Manual due cancelled DI(G) OPS 40-4.

Typos, outdated references, name changes, etc as required. Edits are not identified with amendment list ‘mark up side bars’.

Sect 9 Chap 1 - AWR suitability for flight assessment simplified and paragraphs 255 and 256 merged

- Glossary

New or revised definitions of note are: Above Obstacles, Crowd Line, Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) Flight Test, Flying Display, Height Above Obstacles Within, Includes, May, Minimum Separation Distance, Must, Negative training, Opposition Manoeuvre, Should, Significant Change, Sponsor, Suitability for Flight, Qualification.

Deleted terms are: Synthetic Training Device, Single Aircraft Handling Display, Formation Handling Display, Aircraft Operational Display

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ii AL 7

- List of Abbreviations

New Abbreviations: AO, FSTD, HAOW, MSD

Removed Abbreviations:

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AL 7 iii

PREVIOUS AMENDMENT LISTS

Previous amendment lists are provided for change tracking and situational awareness of regulatory development.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES – AMENDMENT LIST 6 Major Changes

- Sect 2 Chap 2

OAREG 2.2.16 — Provision and Use of Oxygen on Defence Aircraft – Complete revision. AMC/GM provided in s5c8. (PIRR 15-8008 / AB24397545).

- Sect 2 Chap 6

OAREG 6.1.2 — Aerodromes – Complete revision; including information from AAP 7001.048, Annex A to S5C2, that was moved into GM in this chapter or the DASP Master Glossary (PIRR 15-8018 / AB24217412).

6.1.2.p–r — Obstacles – Complete revision, including an example obstacle data requirement for a Defence aerodrome in support of OAREG 6.1.2.q; available from the ACPA website. (PIRR 15-8018 / AB24217412).

OAREG 6.1.7 — Maritime Control Service introduced. See s9c1 and DASP Master Glossary (PIRR-15-7017 / AB24978978).

Minor Changes

- Sect 2 Chap 2

OAREG 2.2.7 a.(1)(b)i — crowd distance extension consideration added (PIRR-15-8019 / AB24891492).

- Sect 2 Chap 6

6.1.2.e. (1) iii. — ‘Type’ renamed ‘Coverage Area’ to align with ICAO conventions (PIRR 15–8010 / AB24217412).

OAREG 6.1.10.a and 6.1.10.b: added ‘based personnel’ to provide clarity. ‘…SAF based personnel providing ATM/ABM service…’.

- Sect 4 Chap 2

New para 8. Crowd display infringement guidance added (PIRR-15-8019 / AB24891492).

- Sect 5 Chap 5

Guidance updated IAW Aviation Medicine Working Group consultation. Annexes A–D have been consolidated into chap 5 and are now deleted. TMUCD merged into TMUFF. (PIRR 14-8038 / AB21783374).

- Sect 6 Chap 2

Para 20 last line deleted – ‘Where non-compliance is identified by the compliance finder, an Issue Paper should be raised for OAA and TAA consideration in accordance OAREG 3.2 paragraph 3.2.8—Defence Airworthiness Issue Papers’ – as sufficient guidance exists at paras 39–42 (PIRR-15-8020 / AB25160573).

- Sect 9 Chap 1

OAREG 6.1.2.e (1) – ‘Type’ renamed ‘Coverage Area’ to align with ICAO conventions (PIRR 15–8010 / AB24217412)

Para 169 – OAREG 6.1.4.a – GM added to clarify OAA responsibility (AB22682347).

OAREG 6.1.7 — ATM – GM and AMC revised to include Maritime Control Service (MCS).

AvSS determinations previously advised in AAP 7001.048 s5c2 Annex A have been moved under the relevant OAREG GM to improve useability.


Removed. Direction provided to use of AAP 7001.048 DASP List of Abbreviations via hyperlink.

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iv AL 7

- Glossary

Removed. Direction provided to use AAP 7001.048 DASP Master Glossary or the Australian Defence Glossary via hyperlink.


- Defence State Register renamed Defence Register throughout the document (PIRR–14–7033 / AB22691634)

Glossary and Foreword

Sect 1: C1a, C2

Sect 2: C2, C4

Sect 3: C1, C4, C9

Sect 4: C6, C8

Sect 5: C4

Sect 6: C1, C2, C3

Sect 7: C1, C2, C3

Sect 10: C1

Minor Changes

- Sect 7 Chap 2

Para 26 and Annex A – Deleted annex providing example document – Approval to Conduct Operational Evaluation and referred readers to the ACPA website in lieu (PIRR 15-8014 / AB22637291).

Edits


- Glossary

Glossary terms in this document have been synchronised to DASP Master Glossary as published into AAP 7001.048 (AL6).


- Sect 1 Chap 1

para 13 – DASP Master Glossary introduced (PIRR 14-7032 / AB21399105).

para 29 – DASP Regulatory Change Process introduced (AB20565663).

- Sect 2 Chap 1

OAREG 1.1.3.b – RCP replaces NPRM process (AB20565663).

- Sect 2 Chap 2

OAREG 2.2.9 – Carriage of personnel in Defence aircraft – complete revision (PIRR 14-8021 / AB20660751). Replaces:

Deleted 2.2.9 – Carriage of passengers in defence crew stations

Deleted 2.2.10 – Carriage of passengers in dedicated passenger seats

Deleted 2.2.11 – Operational contingency loading.

OAREG 2.2.15 – Operational Clearance – complete revision (PIRR 14-8021 / AB21236229).

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AL 7 v

- Sect 3 Chap 3

Deleted para 6 – OCL Officer key appointment deleted IAW new OAREG 2.2.9 (PIRR 14-8021 / AB20660751).

- Sect 4 Chap 7

Operational Clearance GM – complete revision (PIRR 14-8021 / AB21236229).

- Sect 4 Chap 7 Annex A

Deleted entire Annex – all GM has been incorporated into Chap 7 (PIRR 14-8021 / AB21236229).

- Sect 4 Chap 9

Carriage of personnel in Defence aircraft GM and AMC- complete revision (PIRR 14-8021 / AB21236229).

- Glossary (AB20565663)

All terms from AAP 7001.048, AAP 7001.053, AAP 8000.010, and AAP 6734.001 are consolidated in the new DASP Master Glossary.

New or revised definitions of note are: acceptable level of safety, acceptable means of compliance, adequate aerodrome, Air and Space Interoperability Council, aircraft controller, aircrew, aviation medical officer, aviation medicine, crew, dangerous goods, Defence aircraft, exemption, flight crew, foreign register, guidance material, low flying, mission crew, mission essential passenger, operational clearance, segregated airspace, separations assurance, state aircraft (clarification note added), waiver, other edits.

Deleted terms are operational contingency loading, contingency loading and supplementary crew.

To afford recognition of terms that are being introduced in this AL that are not sourced from another DASP publication, terms that have been imported from the eTAMM or DASM Glossaries are not marked with an AL bar, unless the definition has been amended.

Minor Changes

- Table of contents

page iii – Carriage of personnel in Defence aircraft

page ix – Carriage of personnel in Defence aircraft

page xiii – DASP Master Glossary

- Sect 1 Chap 1

para 8 – DASP terminology. Aviation support systems added to align with AAP 7001.048.

para 9 – Guidance Material (GM) and Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) replaces ‘associated guidance’. Sentence order rewritten for clarity.

para 11 – DASP terminology. Applicability aligned to DI(G) OPS 02-2.

para 22 – OAREG GM. Amended to DASP terminology to reflect operators are competent and authorised vice fit to perform.

para 24 – introduces outcome based regulation term.

para 25.b (1) – inserted the word delegated to clarify which aircraft an OAAR is responsible for.

para 28 – Exemptions clarified.

para 31.d – GM provided as relates to OAA and OAAR delegations when reading regulation.

para 32.d – GM for the use of the word ‘should’ provided.

para 33 – new terms introduced for GM, AMC and alternate AMC.

para 36 – how to obtain information, clarification and formal advice amended.

Deleted old para 34 – 35 – modification of REGS by AD deleted as RCP now treats this issue.

Deleted old para 36 – details for OAREG implementation by individual Service deleted as OAREG 2.1.7 treats OIP.

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Deleted old para 36 – covered individual Service regulation implementation was redundant as this is regulated under OAREG 2.1.7.

- Sect 2 Chap 1

OAREG 1.1.1.b – (Through DACPA) added.

OAREG 1.1.2.a – ‘Authoritative’ replaced with ‘Formal’; ‘by a person authorised by the OAR’ replaced with ‘by DACPA’.

OAREG 1.1.2.b – ‘Authoritative’ replaced with the word ‘Formal’.

OAREG 1.2.1.b (2) – airworthiness instrument replaces individual listings of the various instruments.

OAREG 1.2.1.b (4) – the word ‘temporary’ deleted in front of ‘airworthiness instrument’.

OAREG 1.2.1.d (1) – airworthiness instrument replaces individual listings of the various instruments.

OAREG 1.2.1.d (2) – airworthiness instrument replaces individual listings of the various instruments.

OAREG 1.2.2.b – airworthiness instrument replaces individual listings of the various instruments.

OAREG 1.2.2.f – airworthiness instrument replaces individual listings of the various instruments. Footnote added advising AvSSC is not an airworthiness instrument.

- Sect 2 Chap 2

OAREG 2.1.5 GM moved to Sect 3 Chap 8.

OAREG 2.1.6 GM moved to Sect 3 Chap 8.

OAREG 2.1.6.c – OAA exemption changed to OAA waiver to align with Glossary exemption and waiver definitions.

OAREG 2.16.e (4) DASM AMC moved to Sect 3 Chap 8.

OAREG 2.1.7c (4) “28 day” inserted in front of AIRAC cycle for clarification.

- Sect 2 Chap 3

OAREG 3.5.2.a (6) – TCDS requirement added (PIRR 13-8009).

- Sect 2 Chap 6

OAREG 6.1.10.b – SAF ATM – ‘with’ changed to ‘providing’ to align with 6.1.10.a - ABM.

- Sect 3 Chap 8

complete revision – GM incorporated from OAREG 2.1.5 and OAREG 2.1.6.

- Sect 4 Chap 2 Annex C

para 2.c – OIP reference replaced with a command authority. (PIRR 14-8015).

para 3.c – OIP reference replaced with a command authority. (PIRR 14-8015).

para 4 – 2nd sentence redrafted to improve clarity and ensure awareness that Defence can impose additional requirements to the Act.

- Sect 5 Chap 1

para 3 – 1st sentence redrafted for clarity and brevity.

para 4 – relevant definitions identified and GM provided to look in the Glossary as appropriate.

para 7.a – ‘aircrew’ replaced with ‘crew’ as per Glossary definitions.

para 12 – non-pilot crew qualifications expanded to include UAS RP and UAS AVO.

Deleted old paras 24 – 26 with references to single service publications.

- Sect 5 Chap 8

para 13 – Ejection System Aircraft use of oxygen, amended from ‘at all times during flight’ to ‘to the maximum extent practical during flight’ (PIRR 14-8014).

- Sect 6 Chap 3

para 24 – added GM for OAREG 3.5.2a(6) incorporating review of TCDS. (PIRR 13-8009).

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AL 7 vii

para 25 – inserted GM sentence ‘The TCDS should be reviewed and amended if necessary’. (PIRR 13-8009).

- Sect 9 Chap 1

para 1 – compliance transition period added.

para 14 – heliport and aerodrome design standards acceptable means of compliance updated to reflect the eARDM.

para 20 – heliport and aerodrome design standards acceptable means of compliance updated to reflect the eARDM. Deficiency recording introduced.

para 22 – updated GM on aerodrome certification. Paragraph formatting changed only to enhance clarity of existing words.

Table 1-1 – Aerodrome Manual requirements. Non-compliance requirement added.

para 167.c – HCO definition. Added words ‘and authorised’ to align with other ATS personnel descriptions.

para 178 – SAF ABM tactical services clarified. Reference to AvSS determination added.

OAREG 6.1.10.b SAF ATM. – ‘with’ changed to ‘providing’ to align with OAREG 6.1.10.b s2c6.

para 180 – last sentence, ‘multiples numbers and types of aircraft’ changed to ‘more than three aircraft’. Provides clarity of service requirements for larger air capable ships.

- Sect 10 Chap 1

para 28 – UAS RP aircrew descriptor changed to flight crew to align to Glossary definitions.


revised list of abbreviations includes: ALoR, ALoS, AMC, ASIC, DGTA, DGTA-ADF, EASA, GM, SFARP.

Edits


AMENDMENT LIST 3

Section 2 Chapter 7 – Revised Unmanned Aircraft Systems regulation supporting the introduction of a four tier categorisation scheme for the airworthiness management of Defence UAS.

Section 10 Chapter 1 – New Chapter for Unmanned Aircraft Systems guidance.

Section 5 Chapter 2 – Appointment of FISO external to CFS. Wording in paragraph 10 reordered to reflect actual intent.

Glossary

Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) and Remote Pilot (RP) added to reflect the changes from OAREG 7.

AMENDMENT LIST 2

CH47 COI Recommendations

OAREG 2.2.10 – Carriage of Passengers in Defence Aircraft has been amended to include the requirement for enduring passenger manifests.

A new regulation Operational Contingency Loading (OCL) has been commissioned as OAREG 2.2.11.

Operational Contingency Loading Officer (OCLO) has been added to guidance at Section 3 Chapter 3– Appointment of Key Staff.

A new guidance chapter at Section 4 Chapter 9 for Carriage of Passengers in Defence Aircraft, which incorporates elements of Section 4 Chapter 5– Aircraft Crewing.

OAREG 2.2.14 – Deviation from authorised roles has been subsumed into OAREG 2.2.15 – Operational Clearance.

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Other

OAREG 2.2 – Operations has been amended to allow the OAA to endorse OIP vice issue.

OAREG 2.2.4 – Cargo has been amended to align with OAREG 6. Guidance for dangerous goods is now at Section 9 Chapter 1.

OAREG 2.3 – Qualifications and Training has been updated to reflect contempory practise and OAREG 2.3.2 –Initial non-pilot qualifications has been commissioned.

Aeronautical Life Support Equipment (ALSE) officer has been added to guidance at Section 3 Chapter 3–Appointment of Key Staff .

OAA delegations for aviation medicine training extensions has been clarified at Section 5 Chapter 3.

Glossary

A number of changes within the glossary to reflect the additions and changes from AAP 7001.048 – Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual, MILAVREG 7 terms and CH47 COI recommendations.

List of Abbreviations

A number of changes within the List of Abbreviations to reflect the additions and changes from AAP 7001.048 – Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual and MILAVREG 7 terms.

AMENDMENT LIST 1

Section 2

Re-issue of OAREG 6.

OAREG 6 contains 69 regulations that include:

a. Aerodrome OAREGs, many of which afford the OAA the ability to ensure operational priorities drive resource allocations from service providers, ensuring resources are directed to the most relevant area.

b. OAREGs that make existing documents enduring, such as the Manual of Air Traffic Services (MATS).

c. OAREGs that apply a common approach to personal competency management, seven of which already have an existing compliance system.

d. Other OAREGs that either formalise existing methodology to ensure civil interoperability, or are required to ensure ASS does not compromise suitability for flight.

Section 8

Placeholder for information, guidance and examples to assist in understanding and implementing OAREG 5.

Section 9

Guidance significantly expanded to support the re-issue of OAREG 6. Addition of regulator proposed templates to assist OAAs in the development of the required documentation (for example Aerodrome Manuals and Wildlife Hazard Management Plans).

Guidance format changed to improve readability by linking associated guidance paragraphs to the applicable regulation.

Glossary

A number of changes within the glossary to reflect the additions and changes from AAP 7001.048 – Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual and OAREG 6.


A number of changes within the List of Abbreviations to reflect the additions and changes from AAP 7001.048 – Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual and OAREG 6.

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AL 7 ix

AMENDMENT LIST 0

Section 5

Creation of guidance to incorporate DI(AF) OPS 2-1, ABR 5150 and SI(AVN) OPS Part 2.

Creation of guidance to incorporate DI(G) OPS 28-3.

Creation of guidance to incorporate DI(G) OPS 22-2 and DI(AF) OPS 2-2.

Creation of guidance to incorporate DI(G) OPS 28-1.

Glossary

A number of changes within the glossary to reflect the additions and changes from DI(G)OPS 02-2 – Defence Aviation Safety Program and AAP 7001.048 – Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual.


A number of changes within the List of Abbreviations to reflect the additions and changes from DI(G)OPS 02-2 – Defence Aviation Safety Program and AAP 7001.048 – Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual.

Incorporation of other Instructions/Instruments

The following DI(G), DI(AF) and ADs have been incorporated into this document:

a. DI(G)OPS 05-2 – Flypasts and Flying Displays.

b. DI(G)OPS 22-2 – Temporary Medical unfitness for Flying and Aircraft Control Duties.

c. DI(G)OPS 28-1 – Use of light aircraft by Defence personnel on duty.

d. DI(G)OPS 28-3 – Standards of flying instruction in the Australian Defence Force.

e. DI(AF)OPS 1-11 – Carriage of passengers in crew station on RAAF aircraft.

f. DI(AF)OPS 2-1 – Aircrew – qualification, categorisation and employment.

g. DI(AF)OPS 2-2 – Initial and refresher aircrew aviation medicine training.

h. DI(AF)OPS 3-2 – Low Flying.

i. DI(AF)OPS 3-5 – Use of oxygen in aircraft.

j. AD 002/2004 – OAA/OAAR approval of aeronautical life support equipment and flying clothing for use by ADF personnel.

k. AD 002/2008 – Short term and ad hoc lease of civilian heritage aircraft by the Australian Defence Force.

l. AD 006/2009 – Parachute operations from Australian registered civil aircraft leased, hired or chartered by the ADF.

m. CAF Directive 17/10 – Australian Cadets – Flying Operations.

Other

A number of various instruments examples produced as annexes have been deleted and guidance has been provided to guide individuals to the ACPA intranet website for current versions of instruments and other airworthiness and safety documents.

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AAP 8000.010(AM1) Amendment Certificate

i

AMENDMENT CERTIFICATE

It is certified that the amendments promulgated in the undermentioned Amendment Lists have been incorporated in this copy of the Publication:

Amendment List Amended By

No Date of Issue Printed Name Signature Date

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

17 Sep 14 Elizabeth Low Elizabeth Low 17 Sep 14

27 Apr 15 Elizabeth Low Elizabeth Low 01 May 15

24 Sep 13 Pauline Clevett P.Clevett 4 Oct 13

8 Jul 14 Elizabeth Low Elizabeth Low 29 Jul 14

8 Sep 15 Pauline Clevett P.Clevett 10 Sep 15

30 Nov 15 Pauline Clevett P.Clevett 1 Dec 15

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Typewritten Text

elizabeth.low

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15 Jul 16

elizabeth.low

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Elizabeth Low

elizabeth.low

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Elizabeth Low

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AAP 8000.010(AM1) Amendment Certificate

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AAP 8000.010 Foreword

FOREWORD

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1. The Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP) reflects a single integrated policy that addresses both the Airworthiness Management System (AMS) and the Aviation Safety Management System (ASMS). Airworthiness is a concept, the application of which defines the condition of an aircraft and supplies the basis for judgement of the suitability for flight of that aircraft in that it has been designed, constructed, maintained and operated to approved standards and limitations, by competent and authorised individuals, who are acting as members of an approved organisation and whose work is both certified as correct and accepted on behalf of Defence. Aviation safety is the state of freedom from unacceptable risk of injury to persons or damage to aircraft and property. The ASMS enhances operational capability by ensuring preservation of personnel and equipment through continuous improvement in aviation safety management.

2. The Defence concept of airworthiness is a unified one, which views aviation safety as an outcome of safely operating aviation systems that are fit for the purpose for which they are used. Operational airworthiness is a concept that deals with the operation of aviation systems while technical airworthiness is concerned with the aviation systems being fit for purpose. Jointly, the two concepts provide the basis upon which an acceptable level of risk to aircrew, other Defence members and employees, the public and Defence assets can be established for Defence Aviation. To the casual observer, operational airworthiness is outwardly evident in the manner in which flying operations are conducted. Actual flying operations have an intuitively direct and often immediate bearing on aviation safety, but they are really the end result of a comprehensive process designed, implemented and managed to ensure a safe and militarily effective outcome.

3. In conducting aviation operations, Defence has a duty of care to its personnel and to the Australian public. Defence also has an obligation to maintain and deliver military power and to preserve the human and materiel assets that deliver it. The Defence operational airworthiness framework is designed to ensure that Defence Aviation operations are accomplished safely and with due regard to military necessity.

4. The rules and limitations that govern Defence Aviation reflect societal attitudes to safety, so their written form and accepted interpretations will vary with time and circumstance. Concerning the latter, because society’s tolerance for risk is responsive to national interests including military exigencies, the framework is designed to provide commanders with the freedom to sometimes accept higher levels of risk in order to better exploit the capabilities of Defence aviation systems. A related design goal is that, under routine circumstances, the framework should not constrain commanders with unduly cumbersome or prescriptive requirements. Defence places trust in the qualities and competencies of its commanders. Notwithstanding their abilities, to assist commanders make informed judgements on such matters, the Defence airworthiness concept requires that risks to aviation operations be properly understood and managed through a systemic process of analysing, evaluating and controlling risks. To ensure that these goals are met, provision exists within the Defence airworthiness framework for mandatory ongoing review and improvement of airworthiness regulations.

5. While Defence members will normally operate Defence registered aircraft, the operational airworthiness framework allows for situations where Defence members may be required to operate non-Defence registered aircraft. Conceptually, the principles underpinning the safe operation of non-Defence registered aircraft are identical to those for Defence registered aircraft. Non-Defence registered aircraft must be airworthy according to a recognised airworthiness regime and may only be operated by competent and authorised personnel observing approved rules.

6. The development of a single ADF Airworthiness Manual was endorsed in the 1998 ADF Review of Aviation Safety Management. The subsequent ADF Airworthiness Manual, AAP 7001.048 (AM1), was developed and authorised for use under DI(G) OPS 02-2 – ADF Airworthiness Management. The ADF Airworthiness Manual promulgated details regarding the ADF Airworthiness framework, airworthiness management processes and regulation. The initial regulation set comprised the Military Aviation Regulations (MILAVREGs) and later incorporated the ADF Operational Airworthiness Regulations (OAREGs).as publication amendments in 2001.

7. In October 2004 an Operational Airworthiness Policy Review Committee (OAPRC) endorsed an initiative to establish a tiered structure of regulation. Subsequently the extant OAREGs were extracted from the ADF Airworthiness Manual and reviewed, in order to establish them in a stand alone document. In August 2005, the OAREGs became the foundation of the ADF Operational Airworthiness Manual AAP 8000.010. During this development activity, a review of all Defence Instructions (DI) which contain Operational Airworthiness regulatory information was undertaken.

8. In October 2011, DI(G) OPS 2-2 – Defence Aviation Safety Program was revised to reflect a single integrated policy that addresses both the Airworthiness Management System and the Aviation Safety Management Systems. Other significant changes associated with reissue of the DI(G) OPS 2-2 – Defence Aviation Safety Program included

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AAP 8000.010 Foreword

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formally expanding the scope of the DASP to include non-Defence registered aircraft that are engaged by Defence, and a number of Aviation Support Systems (AvSS). This theme flowed through to re-issue of the AAP 7001.048 (AM1) Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual in September 2012 and to the re-issue of AAP 8000.010 Defence Operational Airworthiness Manual in December 2012.

9. The re-issued Defence Operational Airworthiness Manual includes the results of extensive work to collate disparate Operational Airworthiness regulatory material into a single authoritative publication. This activity included a review of all Defence Instructions (DI) which contained Operational Airworthiness regulatory information. Whilst the initial work was successful this activity remains on going process.

10. In October 2013 MILAVREG 6 – Aviation Support Systems was re-issued to provide the Defence Aviation community with pragmatic policy and guidance for airworthiness management of AvSS. This subsequently provided the framework for the re-issue of OAREG 6 – Aviation Support Systems. OAREG 6 expands upon the MILAVREG 6 requirements by regulating operational aspects of AvSS.

11. Information and guidance on operational airworthiness matters further to that provided in this manual should be obtained from ACPA staff in the first instance.

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AAP 8000.010 Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION TO DEFENCE OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS

CHAPTER 1 DEFENCE OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS

Introduction

Basis and authority

Purpose

Applicability

Background

Definitions

Structure and content of this manual

Defence Operational Airworthiness Framework

Overview

Responsibilities

Operational Airworthiness Regulations

Exemptions

Regulatory Development

Implementation by Aircraft Type

Guidance to the Regulations

Rules of interpretation

Precedence

Additional information or clarification

Annex A - Operational Airworthiness Management Plans

CHAPTER 2 ROLE OF OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITIES

Operational airworthiness appointments

Roles and responsibilities

Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA)

Operational Airworthiness Regulator (OAR)

Operational Airworthiness Authority (OAA)

Operational Airworthiness Authority Representative (OAAR)

Acquisition Operational Airworthiness Authority Representative (OAAR(Acq))

Flight Test Approval Authority (FTAA)

Delegation of operational airworthiness authority

Delegation powers

Delegation of authority

Competency requirements for authorities

Delegation of OAAR Authority

CHAPTER 3 OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE

Compliance assurance requirements Regulatory requirement Compliance assurance by the OAR Compliance assurance by Operational Airworthiness Authorities Compliance assurance requirements Sup

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SECTION 2 OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATIONS

CHAPTER 1 OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITY

Operational Airworthiness Regulation 1.1–Applicability and rule making

Exemptions

Formal operational airworthiness advice

Regulatory development

Operational Airworthiness Regulation 1.2–Operational Airworthiness Authority

Responsibilities of the OAA for Aviation System operations

Delegation of operational airworthiness authority

Delegation of OAAR authority

Operational Airworthiness Regulation 1.3–Operational airworthiness compliance assurance

OAR compliance assurance of OAA/FTAA

OAA/FTAA compliance assurance of subordinate aviation operations

Compliance assurance

Operational Airworthiness Regulation 1.4–Flight Test Approval Authority

Responsibilities of the FTAA for Aviation System operations

Delegation of flight test approval authority

Delegation of FTAAR authority

CHAPTER 2 CONDUCT OF FLYING OPERATIONS

Operational Airworthiness Regulation 2.1–Flying Management System

Implementation Appointment of Key Staff Management of the SOI Aircrew competency system Flight authorisation Aviation Risk Management (AVRM) Aviation safety management Management of Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP) Reserved Management of aeronautical life support equipment (ALSE)

Operational Airworthiness Regulation 2.2–Operations

Implementation

Flying rules for special missions and tasks

Aircraft crewing

Aircraft captaincy

Cargo

Aircraft loading

Low flying

Flying Display Operating Limitations

Carriage and use of electronic equipment

Carriage of personnel on Defence aircraft

Use of aircraft role equipment

Use of flying clothing and aeronautical life support equipment

Operational Clearance

Provision and Use of Oxygen on Defence Aircraft

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Operational Airworthiness Regulation 2.3–Qualifications and training

OAREG 2.3–Qualifications and training

Implementation

Initial pilot qualifications Initial non-pilot qualifications Qualifications for specific roles or duties Standards of training and instruction Aviation medicine and medical fitness for flight Crew resource management training Aviation safety training Aviation risk management training Role specific training Aircrew logbooks

CHAPTER 3 NEW AVIATION SYSTEMS AND MODIFICATION

OAREG 3.1–Changes to aircraft Configuration, Role and Environment

Changes to an aircraft Type Design

Changes to an aircraft Configuration, Role or Environment

Minor design or Non-Substantial operational changes

OAREG 3.2–New aircraft and Major changes to Type Design

Operational airworthiness management strategy

OAA endorsement of the Statement of Requirement

Operational airworthiness Compliance Findings

Test and evaluation

Aviation safety issues arising from flight operations prior to Service Release

Human factors

Aircrew publications

Airworthiness Issue Papers

OAA recommendation for Type Certification

OAREG 3.3–Operation of a new aircraft or Major change prior to Service Release

Airworthiness Directives

Application for a Special Flight Permit

OAA recommendation for issue of a Special Flight Permit

OAREG 3.4–Service Release for new aircraft and Major changes to Type Design

OAA Recommendation for Service Release

OAREG 3.5–New or modified Configuration, Role or Environment

Conduct of Supplemental Role Approval

OAA approval of a Supplemental Role

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CHAPTER 4 FLIGHT TEST AND EVALUATION

OAREG 4a–Flight Test Permit to authorise conduct of Defence Flight Test

OAREG 4b–Flight Test Plans

OAREG 4c–Defence Personnel participating in a non-Defence Flight Test

OAREG 4d–Test Activity presented at next Air Worthiness Board Review

CHAPTER 5 OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT OF NON-DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT

OAREG 5.1–Operation of non-Defence registered aircraft by Defence organisations

OAREG 5.2–Operation of non-Defence registered aircraft by Defence personnel

OAREG 5.3–Operation of Foreign Military aircraft in Australian airspace

CHAPTER 6 AVIATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS

OAREG 6.1 – Aviation Support Systems

Personnel competency management Aerodromes Aerodrome rescue and Fire Fighting

Aeronautical Information

Air Battle Management

Air Cargo Delivery

Air Traffic Management

Air Weapons Range

Meteorology

Ship Aviation Facilities

Terminal Attack Control

CHAPTER 7 UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

OAREG 7– Unmanned Aircraft Systems

OAREG 7.1–UAS Management OAREG 7.2–Unmanned Aircraft Systems - Operations

CHAPTER 8 FLIGHT SIMULATION TRAINNG DEVICE

OAREG 8 – Flight Simulation Training Device Management

CHAPTER 9 OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS OF AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT

OAREG 9 - RESERVED

SECTION 3 FLYING MANAGEMENT SYSTEM GUIDANCE

CHAPTER 1 OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS FOR THE CONDUCT OF FLYING OPERATIONS

Foundations of operational airworthiness

Overview

Flying organisations

Operating standards and limitations

Aircrew qualification and authorisation

Operation of non-Defence registered aircraft

Elements of OAREG 2

Suspension of flying operations

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CHAPTER 2 FLYING MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Flying Management System elements

Organisational implementation

Documentation of the Flying Management System

CHAPTER 3 APPOINTMENT OF KEY STAFF

OAREG 2.1.1–Appointment of key staff

Promulgation of airworthiness appointments Review of appointees

CHAPTER 4 MANAGEMENT OF THE SOI

OAREG 2.1.2–Management of the SOI

The Statement of Operating Intent Definitions SOI development In-service management of the SOI Deviations from the SOI Changes to the SOI

Review of proposed changes to the SOI Issue of the modified SOI

Airworthiness Board review of the SOI

CHAPTER 5 MANAGEMENT OF AIRCREW COMPETENCY

Reserved

CHAPTER 6 FLIGHT AUTHORISATION

OAREG 2.1.4–Flight Authorisation

CHAPTER 7 AVIATION RISK MANAGEMENT

OAREG 2.1.5–Aviation Risk Management

Applicable defence Instructions

CHAPTER 8 AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT

OAREG 2.1.6–Aviation Safety Management

Acceptable means of compliance

CHAPTER 9 PRODUCTION AND MANAGEMENT OF OIP

OAREG 2.1.7–Management of orders, instructions and publications (OIP)

OIP sponsorship responsibilities OIP development and promulgation Deviating from OIP standards

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SECTION 4 FLYING OPERATIONS AIRWORTHINESS GUIDANCE

CHAPTER 1 LOW FLYING

OAREG 2.2.1–Flying rules for special missions and tasks

OAREG 2.2.6–Low flying

Low Flying Orders and Responsibilities Low Flying Areas, Routes and Charts

Low flying areas Low flying routes Low flying charts

Survey Requirements Survey of low flying areas and low flying routes

Obstructions

Minimum Separation

Flight Authorisation

Conduct of Flight at low altitude

CHAPTER 2 FLYPASTS AND FLYING DISPLAYS


OAREG 2.2.7–Flying displays operating limitations

CHAPTER 3 AIRBORNE EMERGENCY TRAINING

OAREG 2.3–Qualification and training

Emergency training

Practice engine failures

Multiple emergency training

Considerations

CHAPTER 4 SPECIAL AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION


Applicable Defence Instructions

CHAPTER 5 AIRCRAFT CREWING

OAREG 2.2.2–Aircraft crewing

OAREG 2.2.9–Carriage of personnel in Defence aircraft

Aircraft crews

Crew Composition

Responsibilities

Defence member acting as crew on non-Defence aircraft

CHAPTER 6 AIRCRAFT CAPTAINCY

OAREG 2.2.2–Aircraft captaincy

Aircraft captains

Authority

Duties and responsibilities of the aircraft captain

In-flight transfer of captaincy

CHAPTER 7 OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

OAREG 2.2.15–Operational clearance, guidance material and acceptable means of compliance

CHAPTER 8 AERONAUTICAL LIFE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT

Guidance

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CHAPTER 9 CARRIAGE OF PERSONNEL IN DEFENCE AIRCRAFT

OAREG 2.2.9–Carriage of personnel in Defence aircraft, guidance material and acceptable means of compliance

SECTION 5 OTHER FLYING MANAGEMENT SYSTEM GUIDANCE

CHAPTER 1 AIRCREW QUALIFICATIONS AND CATEGORISATION

OAREG 2.3.1–Initial pilot qualifications

OAREG 2.3.2–Initial non-pilot qualifications

OAREG 2.3.3–Qualifications for specific roles or duties

Qualifications Award of aircrew qualifications

Pilot qualifications Non-pilot aircrew qualifications Special non-pilot aircrew qualifications—Instructional duties

Categorisation Categorisation Scheme

CHAPTER 2 STANDARDS OF FLYING INSTRUCTION IN DEFENCE

OAREG 2.3.4–Standards of training and instruction

Defence Authorities

Responsibilities of Commanding Officer Central Flying School

Flying Instructor Qualification

Flying Instructor Employment

Flying Instructor Certification

Assessments

Training standardisation visits

CHAPTER 3 AVIATION MEDICINE TRAINING

OAREG 2.3.5a–Aviation medicine training

OAREG 2.3.5b–Aviation medical certificate.

CHAPTER 4 AIRCREW LOGBOOKS

OAREG 2.3.10–Aircrew and Aviation Support System operator logbooks

Logbook entries

Monthly logbook certification

End of tour and annual aircrew reporting

Protection of logbooks

Disposal of logbooks

CHAPTER 5 MEDICAL FITNESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

OAREG 2.3.5c–Medical Fitness Management System

CHAPTER 6 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE AVIATION CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

OAREG 2.3.6–Crew resource management training

CHAPTER 7 OPERATION OF NON-DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT

OAREG 5–Operation of non-Defence registered aircraft

Qualification Requirements Appropriate Aircraft Types

Aircraft Hire Aircraft ownership

Individuals Responsibility Aviation safety

Flying Safety occurrences and accidents

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Aviation Safety Occurrence Reporting (ASOR) Incidents resulting in damage, personal injury or death

Australian Cadets – Flying Operations

CHAPTER 8 PROVISION AND USE OF OXYGEN IN AIRCRAFT

OAREG 2.2.16 acceptable means of compliance and guidance material

SECTION 6 AIRWORTHINESS GUIDANCE FOR NEW OR MODIFIED AVIATION SYSTEMS

CHAPTER 1 OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT

OAREG 3.2–New aircraft and major changes to type design

Operational airworthiness requirements development

The capability ‘life cycle’

Operational airworthiness inputs to the Needs Phase and the Requirements Phase

The Statement of Operating Intent

Operational recognition of foreign National Airworthiness Authorities and Military Airworthiness Authorities

Annex A – Statement of Operating Intent

Appendix 1 – SOI flight profile details

Appendix 2 – Aircraft configuration details

CHAPTER 2 OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT DURING ACQUISITION

OAREG 3.1–Changes to aircraft configuration, role and environments

OAREG 3.2–New aircraft and major changes to type design

OAREG 3.3–Operation of new aircraft or major change prior to service release

OAREG 3.4–Service release for new aircraft or major changes to type design

New aircraft and the acquisition process

Operational airworthiness appointments for the Acquisition Phase

Operational Support Networks

Operational airworthiness strategy

Operational airworthiness inputs to Type Certification Management of operational assessments

Operational compliance findings Test and evaluation Aviation safety

Human factors Aircrew OIP Operational inputs to Airworthiness Issue Papers OAA recommendations for AMTC or STC Operational airworthiness inputs to Service Release

Annex A – Process flowcharts – New aircraft and changes to aircraft configuration, role and environment

CHAPTER 3 CHANGES TO AN AIRCRAFT’S OPERATING ROLE OR ENVIRONMENT

OAREG 3.1–Changes to aircraft configuration, role and environments

OAREG 3.5–New or modified configuration, role or environment

Initiation and classification of operational changes Initiation

Technical initiated changes Operational initiated changes

Classification of operational changes

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Example operational change classification Management of a Substantial operational change

Objective of Supplemental Role Approval

Referral of flying activities to an FTAA

Criteria for Supplemental Role Approval

Review process

Management of Non-Substantial operational changes

Test and evaluation of Non-Substantial changes

SECTION 7 FLIGHT TEST

CHAPTER 1

OAREG 4.a – Flight Test Permits

OAREG 4.b – Flight Test Plans

OAREG 4.c – Defence Personnel in Non-Defence Flight Test

OAREG 4.d – Flight Test Activity Presented at Next Airworthiness Board Review

SECTION 8 NON-DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT

CHAPTER 1

OAREG 5.1 – Operation of Non-Defence Registered Aircraft by Defence Organisations

OAREG 5.2 – Operation of Non-Defence Registered Aircraft by Defence Personnel

OAREG 5.3 – Operation of Foreign Military Aircraft In Australian Airspace

SECTION 9

CHAPTER 1 AVIATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS GUIDANCE MATERIAL AND ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE

OAREG 6.1 AvSS

OAREG 6.1.2 Aerodromes

OAREG 6.1.3 Aerodrome Rescue and Fire Fighting

OAREG 6.1.4 Aeronautical Information

OAREG 6.1.5 Air Battle Management

OAREG 6.1.6 Air Cargo Delivery

OAREG 6.1.7 Air Traffic Management

OAREG 6.1.8 Air Weapons Range

OAREG 6.1.9 Meteorology

OAREG 6.1.10 Ship Aviation Facilities

OAREG 6.1.11 Terminal Attack Control

OAREG 6.1.12 Joint personnel recovery

OAREG 6.1.13 Medical

SECTION 10 UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

CHAPTER 1

SECTION 11 FLIGHT SIMULATION TRAINING DEVICE

CHAPTER 1

OAREG 8.a – FSTD IOP

OAREG 8.b – FSTD Management System Sup

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DASP MASTER GLOSSARY

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

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AAP 8000.010 Sect 1 Chap 1

AL 7 1

DEFENCE OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS

INTRODUCTION

1. The safe operation of Defence Aviation is managed through a structured framework of regulations and allied responsibilities, directed at key individuals across the Defence Organisation, through the Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP). The DASP framework provides for a system of independent review to assess compliance with airworthiness requirements as well as gauge the effectiveness and suitability of the framework itself.

2. The DASP supports safe operation based on the premise of aviation being safe by operating aircraft where risk is eliminated or otherwise minimised so far as reasonably practicable, whilst allowing commanders the latitude to exploit the capability of Defence Aviation in support of national interests. The DASP provides the framework for making judgements relating to managing risk in the context of capability, underpinning decisions by Service Chiefs and Group Heads regarding operational suitability and operational effectiveness. While the DASP is broad and has many activities, it acknowledges that required operational outcomes must be weighed against the potential for harm to people and/or property.

3. The DASP comprises two airworthiness domains, operational and technical, together with an accident investigation capability and human factors expertise. Chief of Air Force, appointed by the Secretary (SEC) and the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) is the Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA), and head of the DASP.

4. Whilst the Defence AA is responsible for establishing and managing the DASP as a whole, specific responsibilities have been further delegated. Responsibility for Defence technical airworthiness is assigned to Director General Technical Airworthiness (DGTA), who is both the Technical Airworthiness Regulator (TAR) and Technical Airworthiness Authority (TAA). Responsibility and authority for the safe operation of Defence Aviation primarily rests with the Operational Airworthiness Regulator (OAR), three Operational Airworthiness Authorities (OAA) and OAA Representatives (OAAR) when delegated. Specific responsibility and authority for the safe operation of Defence Aviation Flight Test and Evaluation activity rests with the Flight Test Approval Authorities (FTAA). The Director of Defence Aviation and Air Force Safety (DDAAFS) is responsible for the aviation accident investigation capability and human factors expertise.

BASIS AND AUTHORITY

5. The DASP is articulated at a high level through Defence Instruction (General) Operations (DI(G) OPS 02–2—Defence Aviation Safety Program) and thence AAP 7001.048—Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual. DI(G) OPS 02–2 includes the overarching airworthiness management requirements and authority for the AAP 7001.048, which describes the structure of the DASP, as well as its processes and underpinning philosophy. AAP 7001.048(AM1) also promulgates the Military Aviation Regulations (MILAVREG), which collectively give effect to the Defence airworthiness framework. Both publications derive authority from the Defence Act 1903.

6. MILAVREG 1— Defence Aviation Safety Program Management defines the applicability of the MILAVREG and describes the exemptions and assigned responsibilities within the DASP. In particular, MILAVREG 1.4—Operational Airworthiness Regulator, requires the OAR—Deputy Chief of Air Force (DCAF)—to establish, maintain and interpret the operational airworthiness framework.

7. MILAVREGs are supported by the following:

a. Technical Airworthiness Regulations (TAREG) govern the design, construction and maintenance of Defence Aviation, and establish the basis for the Defence technical airworthiness framework.

b. Operational Airworthiness Regulations (OAREG) govern Defence aviation operations and provide the components for the operational airworthiness framework.

8. TAREG are promulgated in AAP 7001.053—electronic Technical airworthiness management manual (TAMM) that also includes guidance material. Though not regulatory, the technical framework is supported by airworthiness design standards which are contained in AAP 7001.054—electronic Airworthiness design requirements manual (ADRM), and Defence aviation maintenance management procedures for aircraft, aviation support systems (AvSS) and aeronautical product (AP) which are contained in AAP 7001.059—ADF aviation maintenance management manual.

9. Under the DASP, the OAR promulgates OAREG supplemented by guidance material (GM) and acceptable means of compliance (AMC) in AAP 8000.010.

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PURPOSE

10. AAP 8000.010 presents Defence’s operational airworthiness framework and promulgates the OAREG along with supporting guidance material on the applicability and application of the OAREG and acceptable means of compliance for achieving desired regulation outcomes.

APPLICABILITY

11. This publication is applicable to all Defence Personnel and organisations engaged in, or seeking to engage in, the conduct or support of Defence Aviation operations.

BACKGROUND

12. This latest issue of AAP 8000.010 has been developed to reflect the implementation of the DASP. Accordingly, there should be no requirement for established aviation organisations to conduct a major rework of existing orders, instructions and procedures to maintain regulatory compliance. Complementing this change, some supporting information has been rewritten to improve its value and relevance. Additionally, a comprehensive review of relevant Defence Instructions (DI) has resulted in the migration of regulatory and guidance content into this publication. Affected DI’s are anticipated to be progressively cancelled or amended to direct the reader to this manual for authoritative operational airworthiness content.

DEFINITIONS

13. AAP 7001.048 – Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual provides the authority for and contains the DASP Master Glossary that applies to all aspects of Defence Aviation and provides the authoritative source material for use by Defence aviation documents for aviation related terms. The DASP Master Glossary is reproduced in the AAP 8000.010 – Defence Operational Airworthiness Manual Glossary.

STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF THIS MANUAL

14. This manual provides its information through the following sections:

a. Section 1 – Defence Operational Airworthiness. Section 1 provides an overview of the Defence operational airworthiness framework together with information, guidance and examples on the role of the OAA/FTAA. This section also provides information and guidance on operational airworthiness compliance assurance. In doing so, this section contains information, guidance and examples to assist in understanding and implementing OAREG 1.

b. Section 2 – Operational Airworthiness Regulations. Section 2 contains the OAREG.

c. Sections 3 to 5 – Guidance on OAREG 2. Sections 3 to 5 contain information, guidance and examples to assist in understanding and implementing OAREG 2—Conduct of flying operations. Section 5 contains guidance on OAREG 5 –Non-Defence registered aircraft.

d. Section 6 – Guidance on OAREG 3. Section 6 contains information, guidance and examples to assist in understanding and implementing OAREG 3—New aviation systems and modification.

e. Section 7 – Guidance on OAREG 4. Section 7 contains information, guidance and examples to assist in understanding and implementing OAREG 4—Flight Test.

f. Section 8 – Guidance on OAREG 5. Section 8 contains information, guidance and examples to assist in understanding and implementing OAREG 5 – Non-Defence Registered Aircraft.

g. Section 9 – Guidance on OAREG 6. Section 9 contains information, guidance and examples to assist in understanding and implementing OAREG 6-Aviation Support Systems.

h. Section 10 – Guidance on OAREG 7. Section 10 contains information, and guidance to assist in understanding and implementing OAREG 7-Unmanned Aircraft Systems.

i. Section 11 – Guidance on OAREG 8. Section 11 contains information, guidance and examples to assist in understanding and implementing OAREG 8 – Flight Simulation Training Device.

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DEFENCE OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS FRAMEWORK

OVERVIEW

15. As a component of the DASP, the Defence operational airworthiness framework comprises a formal structure of regulations and associated responsibilities. The Defence operational airworthiness framework is similarly self-regulating and incorporates provisions to assure compliance and maintain its effectiveness and suitability.

16. The Defence operational airworthiness framework, established by the OAR, serves to ensure that Defence Aviation operations are conducted:

a. in approved roles

b. with correct mission equipment

c. by competent and authorised individuals

d. according to approved procedures and instructions

e. under a system of supervision and monitoring.

17. The framework must achieve these objectives while permitting commanders to exploit the capability of Defence Aviation in the national interest.

18. The Defence operational airworthiness framework is established and managed by the OAR. Each OAA, FTAA and their delegates are responsible for complying with the framework.

RESPONSIBILITIES

19. The OAR is accountable to the Defence AA for establishing and managing the operational airworthiness element of the DASP.

20.

21. Chapter 2 further details the roles and responsibilities of the OAA, FTAA and other operational airworthiness audience groups.

OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATIONS

22. Airworthiness regulations take the form of rules covering the design, construction, maintenance and operation of Defence aviation systems. OAREG ensure the operation of Defence Aviation is performed to meet the goals of the operational airworthiness framework by ensuring that aircraft and aviation support system operators are competent and authorised to perform assigned missions.

23. The OAREG cover the following functions:

a. OAREG 1 – Operational Airworthiness Authority. Management and administration of operational airworthiness.

b. OAREG 2 – Conduct of Flying Operations. Management of flying operations, operational rules, and training and qualification of aircrew.

c. OAREG 3 – New Aviation Systems and Modification. Changes to an aviation system’s configuration, role and environment.

d. OAREG 4 – Flight Test. Authorisation and conduct of Flight Test activities.

e. OAREG 5 – Non-Defence Registered Aircraft.

f. OAREG 6 – Aviation Support Systems.

g. OAREG 7 – Unmanned Aircraft Systems.

h. OAREG 8 – Flight Simulation Training Devices.

i. OAREG 9 – Aviation Safety.

24. OAREG are drafted to be explicit, but are not so prescriptive as to deny the flexibility to apply them in such a way as to strike an appropriate balance between operational safety and the delivery of military capability to support national interests. Outcome based regulation is normally used to achieve this outcome where possible.

25. Each OAREG consists of elements that correspond to the functions performed by audience groups as follows:

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a. Operational Airworthiness Authorities (OAA). Each OAA exercises operational airworthiness authority, including:

(1) Determinations regarding the operational airworthiness of Defence aircraft.

(2) Determinations regarding operational aspects of AvSS.

(3) Making informed decisions on the treatment of risk.

b. Operational Airworthiness Authority Representatives (OAAR) and Aviation Organisations. OAAR and executive staff in aviation organisations are responsible for operational airworthiness management of aviation operations, including:

(1) Implementing a Flying Management System (FMS) for delegated aircraft types and AvSS within their commands.

(2) Operation within approved rules and limitations.

(3) Qualification and training of aircrew, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) operators and AvSS operators.

c. OAAR Acquisition (OAAR(Acq)) and Acquisition Organisations. OAAR(Acq) and authorities in acquisition organisations are responsible for operational airworthiness management of acquisition and modification activities, including:

(1) Determination of changes to Configuration, Role or Environment (CRE).

(2) Operational airworthiness management to achieve Type Certification during acquisition of new aviation systems or following a Major change to the Type Design.

(3) Operation of new aviation systems or following a Major change to the Type Design prior to Service Release (SR) (i.e. operations under a temporary Airworthiness Instrument).

(4) SR for new aviation systems or a Major change to the Type Design.

(5) Operational airworthiness management of new or changed CRE.

(6) Accreditation and modification of Synthetic Training Devices (STDs).

(7) Accreditation and modification of ASS.

d. Flight Test Approval Authorities (FTAA). FTAA are responsible for the airworthiness management of Defence Flight Test activities. FTAA manage operational airworthiness of Flight Test activities, which require:

(1) Operations in support of Supplemental Role Approval.

(2) Operation of an aircraft beyond normal operating limitations.

(3) Operation of an aircraft in a modified configuration prior to or without:

(a) SR of a Minor change to the Type Design IAW TAREG; or

(b) issue of a Special Flight Permit (SFP) or SR for a new aircraft or a Major change to the Type Design.

26. The function and relationship of the audience groups described in paragraph 25 is shown in Figure 1-1. Nominally, different functions are performed at each audience level, although these functions are interrelated.

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Level 3

Level 2

Level 1 Defence

AA

OAAs OAR

TAR/TAA

OAARs / OA Management of Defence State

Registered Aircraft Types

and Aviation Support Systems

AwB

DARs / Technical Management of Aircraft Types

Acquisition Organisations

OA management of non - Defence

Registered Aircraft Types

Management of Flight Test

Activi ty

F TAA s.

Figure 1–1 Levels of Airworthiness Function in the Defence Aviation Safety Program

27. In the context of the DASP, operational airworthiness regulation and management activity occurs at Levels 2 and 3.

Exemptions

28. OAREG 1.1.1 provides for exemptions to the OAREG under suitably extenuating or operationally compelling circumstances. Should such a situation arise, the commander is responsible for notifying the OAR (through DACPA) in writing, through the relevant OAA/FTAA as soon as possible.

Regulatory Development

29. Regulatory development is conducted under the DASP Regulatory Change Process (RCP) as detailed in AAP 7001.048 – Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual.

Implementation by Aircraft Type

30. OAREG are implemented by aircraft type through the following means:

a. Flying Management Systems. FMS are developed by the OAA/FTAA for each aircraft type under their management and are required to be in place before SR. The systems consist of processes, practices, rules, delegations and competency requirements necessary to achieve operational airworthiness.

b. Operational Airworthiness Management Plans. Operational Airworthiness Management Plans (OAMP) document the FMS for each aircraft type and are approved by the OAA/FTAA or OAAR/FTAAR. The OAMP explains the strategy and scope of activities required to achieve and maintain operational airworthiness prior to and following SR. The OAMP should compliment an Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plan (AAMP) IAW MILAVREG 2 to provide a cohesive basis for airworthiness and safety. The OAMP identifies the organisational arrangements, delegations, personnel, processes and supporting networks established to satisfy OAREG. OAMP also identify the approved Statement of Operating Intent (SOI). The OAMP may serve as a mechanism through which the OAR may formally assess compliance of the OAA/FTAA with the OAREG. Guidance on the structure and content of an OAMP is contained in annex A. Sup

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Rules of Interpretation

31. Within the regulations presented in this publication, unless the context states otherwise:

a. words importing the singular include the plural

b. words importing the plural include the singular

c. words importing the masculine gender include the feminine

d. where an airworthiness authority may delegate responsibility, the reader should assume this has occurred. For example, where text states ‘the OAA must …’ the reader may assume ‘the OAAR must….’.

32. Within the regulations presented in this publication the words:

a. ‘must’ is used in the imperative sense

b. ‘may’ is used in the permissive sense to state authority or permission to do the act prescribed, and the words ‘no person may’ or ‘a person may not’ mean that no person is required, authorised or permitted to do the act described

c. ‘includes’ means ‘includes but is not limited to’

d. ‘should’ is used to imply an act or process identified for inclusion in a desired outcome is complied with unless sound reasoning may determine otherwise.

33. In these regulations the terms:

a. ‘Guidance material’ (GM) is used to provide non-binding explanatory and interpretation material on how to achieve the requirements contained in the regulation. It contains information, including examples, to assist the user in the interpretation and application of the regulation.

b. Acceptable means of compliance’ (AMC) is used to provided a non-binding compliance method that can serve as a means by which the requirements contained in the regulation can be met.

c. Alternative AMC. Airworthiness authorities / commanders may elect to show compliance with the regulation using an alternative AMC. Should alternative AMC be used, notification to the Defence AA/OAR (through DACPA) or the TAR as appropriate will afford appropriate oversight of regulatory outcomes and also assist continuous improvements of the relevant regulations.

34. Force Element Group (FEG) is used within these regulations to universally include Fleet Air Arm, AAvnTC and 16 Avn Bde.

Precedence

35. Within these regulations, where any conflict occurs, a regulation always precedes guidance material.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR CLARIFICATION

36. Clarification of the intent or applicability of an OAREG may be directed to ACPA regulations staff via [email protected]. ACPA regulations staff may only provide informal advice. If formal advice is required this should be included in the request for information to ACPA staff, who will seek formal advice via DACPA IAW MILAVREG 1.10.

Annex:

A. Operational Airworthiness Management Plans

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OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT PLANS

INTRODUCTION

1. An OAMP may be used by an OAA to document the operational airworthiness management arrangements of all Defence Aviation within the scope of the OAA’s appointment, or under the OAA’s airworthiness management. This annex provides guidance on the structure and content of an in-service OAMP.

SCOPE OF AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITY

2. The scope of the OAA’s airworthiness authority should be described. This should include the aviation systems under the OAA’s command, and reference to the appointing document. Any aviation systems under the management of the OAA which are not listed in the delegation should be identified. In these instances, the OAMP issued by the OAA with airworthiness management responsibility for each aviation system should be referenced. The OAMP is authoritative in terms of any direction it provides to subordinate elements within the OAA’s command.

CERTIFICATION OF AVIATION SYSTEMS

3. The Certification status of each Aviation System should be maintained. Any current ADs issued by the Defence AA, or other Directives issued by the OAA or the TAA should be referenced, including the duration or criteria for cancellation. Reference to the current corresponding SOIs should be provided, including identification of the approving authority. For most Aviation Systems the Defence register, maintained by ACPA, would provide suitable information and may be referenced by the OAMP.

OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT

4. This section should describe the strategy to manage the operational airworthiness of the aviation systems under the management of the OAA. This should include Defence registered and non-Defence registered aircraft, UASs, AvSS, and aviation systems which are under the command of the OAA, but that are not within the scope of the OAA’s airworthiness management responsibility. The strategy should identify the system of appointment and management arrangements to ensure compliance with OAREGs.

5. Command Level OAMP. An OAA may be assigned operational airworthiness authority for many aviation systems with widely varying operational characteristics and roles, eg F/A–18A and C–130J. Whilst the principles of the OAREGs are common across all systems, the application of OAREGs to individual systems, or groups of similar systems, may be quite different. Accordingly, the OAA may delegate responsibility to several OAARs to manage most of the operational airworthiness aspects of individual systems, or groups of similar systems. Where this is the case, the delegated OAARs would be responsible for maintaining OAMPs that identify all the necessary airworthiness management arrangements to meet OA requirements: principally the requirements of OAREG 2—Conduct of flying operations. The Command level OAMP should then reference the subordinate OAMPs managed by each OAAR and briefly describe their scope. Command Level OAMPs should also identify any significant acquisition activity and describe how this is being managed. Similarly, the scope of delegation of acquisition OAARs (OAAR (Acq)) should be identified, including reference to the corresponding AAMPs.

6. Group Level OAMP. Where the scope of delegation is not broad, an OAA may choose to not delegate any OAARs for the airworthiness management of in-service aviation systems. In this case the Command Level OAMP will require substantially more detail to describe the system of appointments, orders and instructions that are required to satisfy OAREGs. Guidance on OAMP content in these cases is described in section 3, chapter 2—Flying Management System. The requirements for a Group Level OAMP are similar to those managed by OAARs within a broader Command.

7. Operation of Defence Aviation outside delegated authority. Situations may arise where an aircraft is operated under the command of an OAA or OAAR who has not been delegated operational airworthiness management, or only partial operational airworthiness management for the system (eg PC9/A aircraft used by AOSG and those used for FAC purposes by ACG). In such cases the OAMP should reference the OAMP under which the aviation system is managed and detail how compliance is being maintained with that OAMP. Where the command requirements dictate that the aircraft is operated in new or substantially modified roles, the OAMP should describe who is to maintain the operational airworthiness of the Aircraft Type when operated in those roles. For example, the aircrew currency and competency requirements for PC9/A operations in the training role are defined by CDR AFTG. However, currency and competency requirements for PC9/A operations in a FAC role may be best determined by an OAAR within ACG. Any MoA or MoU that agrees or delineates the operational airworthiness management responsibilities in such cases shall be documented in the OAMP.

8. Aviation Support Systems. Each OAA with management responsibility for an AvSS is also responsible for the operational airworthiness of the system in relation to the operation of aircraft. Accordingly, the OAMP should

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identify the airworthiness management arrangements which assure the operational airworthiness of the system in accordance with OAREGs. Where this has been delegated to an OAAR, the OAMP should reference the subordinate OAMP and briefly describe the scope and any unique arrangements supporting the airworthiness of the system.

DELEGATION OF AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITY

9. The OAMP should include a list of delegations provided by an OAA. The list should identify the reference to the Letter of Delegation and the duration if the delegation is limited. Any unusual or special conditions under which the delegation was issued should be identified. For example, if an exemption was sought from the OAR to enable delegation to an OAAR who did not fully meet the prerequisite qualifications, the exemption reference should also be identified.

FLIGHT TEST

10. The scope of any operation evaluation or flight test activity authorised by the OAA or FTAA should be identified. This should include reference to any MoA or MoU between the OAA and FTAA for the recognition of competency within the OAA’s organisation for the conduct of operational evaluation. Where the responsibility for airworthiness management has largely been delegated to an OAAR, the OAMP should detail the scope of operational evaluation activity able to be conducted under the authority of the OAAR.

EXEMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL CLEARANCES

11. The OAMP should identify any exemptions to OAREGs granted by the OAR. Where the responsibility for airworthiness management has largely been delegated to an OAAR, the OAMP should detail any limitations to the OAARs ability to authorise an Operational Clearance.

ACQUISITION

12. The function of the OAA in relation to the acquisition of a new aircraft or a Major change to the Type Design should be described. This should take cognisance of AAMPs issued under the MILAVREGs, within the AAP 7001.048—Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual, and any AAMP managed by an OAAR (Acq). Where an OAAR(Acq) has not been delegated, the OAMP should identify the airworthiness management arrangements supporting compliance with OAREG 3—New aviation systems and modification.

COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE

13. The OAMP should identify any arrangements, procedures and processes used to assure the compliance of subordinate elements with applicable OAREGs. This should include identification of a schedule of compliance assurance activity, and the location of results of compliance assurance which identify the current state of ‘health’ of subordinate flying organisations with respect to compliance with OAREGs.

CROSS REFERENCE TO REGULATIONS

14. A cross reference of instructions and orders which satisfy OAREGs should be included in the OAMP. Where the responsibility for airworthiness management has largely been delegated to an OAAR the cross reference for substantial sections of the OAREGs may be covered by referencing the appropriate OAAR delegations.

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ROLE OF OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION

1. An important feature of the DASP is the incorporation of the accountability principle, which holds that individuals and organisations are responsible for their actions and may be required to explain them to others. Accountability is associated with delegated authority and is distinct from responsibility. Commanders may assign responsibilities to their staff, but this will not diminish their accountability. Commanders remain ultimately accountable for the actions of their staff. Another principle featuring within the DASP is the promotion of operational flexibility through the devolution of authority to an appropriate level. This is achieved by permitting Commanders to delegate defined elements of their authority to their staff. Within the operational airworthiness and technical airworthiness frameworks these principles are moderated by the requirement that airworthiness is only managed and administered by individuals with suitable experience and competence.

2. The operational airworthiness framework is established and managed by the OAR. The OAAs and OAARs are responsible for applying this framework. OAAs are appointed for all Defence Aviation, which include:

a. Defence registered aircraft types

b. non-Defence registered aircraft types

c. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)

d. AvSS that impact operational airworthiness.

3. OAA are responsible to their respective, or otherwise nominated, Service Chief or Group Head for the operational airworthiness of aviation systems under their management. They are also responsible for the provision of authoritative advice to the Defence AA on matters concerning the assigned aviation systems.

4. OAA are supported by officers under their command and/or management who have been delegated by the OAA with defined, or specified, operational airworthiness authority. These individuals are known as Operational Airworthiness Authority Representatives (OAAR).

PURPOSE

5. This chapter describes the role of airworthiness authorities and their place within the operational airworthiness framework.

OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS APPOINTMENTS

6. Defence officers are appointed to roles within the operational airworthiness framework according to their competence, experience and position within the command structure pursuant to DI(G) OPS 02–2— Defence Aviation Safety Program. The nature of an individual’s airworthiness management responsibility determines the responsibility for applying airworthiness regulations.

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7. The operational airworthiness appointments, the corresponding appointing authorities, the instrument of appointment and delegation powers are listed in Table 2–1 and the role of each appointment is described in the following paragraphs.

Appointment Appointing Authority

Instrument of Appointment

Ability to Delegate Authority

Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA) SEC/CDF DI(G) OPS 02–2 No

Operational Airworthiness Regulator ( OAR) SEC/CDF DI(G) OPS 02–2 No

Operational Airworthiness Authority (OAA) Defence AA Letter of Appointment

Yes

Flight Test Approval Authority (FTAA) Defence AA Letter of Appointment

Yes


OAA Letter of Delegation

No

OAAR – Acquisition (OAAR (Acq)) OAA Letter of Delegation

No

Flight Test Approval Authority Representative (FTAAR)

FTAA Letter of Delegation

No

Table 2–1 Operational Airworthiness Appointments

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA)

8. The Chief of Air Force is appointed as the Defence AA by the SEC/CDF through DI(G) OPS 02–2.

9. The Defence AA is accountable to the SEC/CDF for the establishment, management and monitoring of the DASP. Through this system, which encompasses operational airworthiness and technical airworthiness frameworks, the Defence AA provides the authority, and is accountable, for the operation of all Defence Aviation systems.

10. The Defence AA cannot delegate authority for airworthiness management, nor is such delegation required. The SEC and CDF, through DI(G) OPS 02–2 make appropriate appointments to support the Defence AA in the execution of the DASP management role.

11. Notwithstanding paragraph 10, the Director Airworthiness Coordination and Policy Agency (DACPA) represents the Defence AA on matters concerning Airworthiness Management. DACPA may interpret MILAVREGs on behalf of the Defence AA and provide authoritative advice on their management and interpretation.

Operational Airworthiness Regulator (OAR)

12. Deputy CAF is appointed as the OAR by SECCDF through DI(G) OPS 02–2.

13. The OAR is accountable to the Defence AA for establishing and managing the operational airworthiness element of the DASP. MILAVREG 1.4 requires the OAR to establish and maintain an operational airworthiness framework and a management framework for the operation of AvSS, which in practice means the development, issue and interpretation of OAREGs.

14. The OAR has no power to delegate authority for airworthiness regulatory management.

15. Notwithstanding paragraph 14, DACPA represents the OAR on matters concerning operational airworthiness. DACPA may interpret OAREGs on behalf of the OAR and provide authoritative advice on their management and interpretation.

Operational Airworthiness Authority (OAA)

16. OAAs are appointed by, and accountable to the Defence AA and are responsible to their relevant Service Chief or Group Head for the operational airworthiness of aviation systems under their management as follows:

a. The operational airworthiness of aviation systems under their management and within the scope of their appointment;

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b. Compliance with OAREGs;

c. Providing authoritative advice to the Defence AA on matters concerning their aviation systems;

d. Making recommendations to the Defence AA regarding the promulgation of airworthiness instruments for aviation systems that are within the scope of their delegation; and

e. Making informed decisions on the treatment of risks.

17. The scope of airworthiness authority appointed to the OAA in terms of the applicable aviation systems should be described in the OAMP issued by the OAA. Any aviation systems under the management of the OAA that are not identified in the OAA’s appointment should also be identified. In these instances, the OAMP issued by the OAA who has airworthiness management responsibility for the aviation system should be referenced.

18. Where a new aviation system is being introduced into service, the existing OAA, or new OAA, under whose management the aviation system will be operated following its SR is responsible for ensuring adequate application of the OAREGs to the management of the system.

19. OAAs may delegate operational airworthiness management responsibilities for specified aviation systems to a representative (OAAR or OAAR (Acq)) through a Letter of Delegation.

20. The responsibilities of OAAs are further addressed in MILAVREG 1.5—Operational Airworthiness Authorities, OAREG 1.2—Operational Airworthiness Authority and OAREG 1.3—Operational airworthiness compliance assurance.


21. OAARs are appointed by, and are responsible to, their respective OAA for performing prescribed operational airworthiness functions on the OAA’s behalf. An OAAR derives authority through a Letter of Delegation from the OAA. As delegated by the OAA, an OAAR:

a. exercises prescribed operational airworthiness management responsibilities; and

b. provides advice regarding the operational airworthiness of in-service aviation systems.

22. An OAAR has no power to further delegate authority for airworthiness management, although an appointed individual may act on behalf of an OAAR in the OAAR’s absence.

Acquisition Operational Airworthiness Authority Representative (OAAR (Acq))

23. Whereas an OAAR is primarily concerned with in-service aircraft types, an OAAR (Acq) is concerned with the operational airworthiness impact of the design characteristics of new aviation systems, or one undergoing a Major change to its Type Design or a Substantial operational change.

24. An OAAR (Acq) may be appointed by the responsible OAA to provide advice regarding airworthiness issues associated with new or modified aviation systems, and to exercise management responsibilities as delegated by the OAA. Normally, the appointment is made at the inception of an acquisition project. The existing OAA, or new OAA, under whose management the aviation system will be operated following its SR is the OAA responsible for managing such aviation systems.

25. As with OAARs, an OAAR (Acq) derives authority through a Letter of Delegation from the OAA and an OAAR (Acq) has no power to further delegate airworthiness management authority.

Flight Test Approval Authority (FTAA)

26. FTAAs are appointed by the Defence AA and are responsible for the airworthiness of in-service Defence aircraft allocated for the purposes of Flight Test.

27. FTAAs are authorised to conduct unique flying operations to provide operational and technical assurance of aviation systems for operational use. This will normally be in support of Flight Test prior to SR of a new aircraft or a Major change to the Type Design, or prior to Supplemental Role Approval by an OAA.

28. The responsibilities of FTAAs are covered in MILAVREG 1.8—Flight Test Approval Authority and OAREG 4—Flight test and further addressed in Section 5. Within the scope of their appointment, FTAAs may delegate Flight test approval authority to suitably experienced and qualified representative (FTAAR). Sup

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DELEGATION OF OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITY

DELEGATION POWERS

29. The operational airworthiness framework promotes operational flexibility through the devolution of authority to the lowest appropriate level, but only OAAs and FTAAs are permitted to delegate airworthiness authority to a representative; and then only within the confines of OAREGs.

30. There are two fundamental components implicit to the delegation of operational airworthiness authority:

a. the authority to determine the operational acceptability of a new or changed aviation system; and

b. the acceptance of risks to operational airworthiness greater than those experienced within an established operational risk basis.

31. Delegated representatives may assign management responsibilities and appoint individuals to assist with executing this authority; however, the accountability for the determination of operational acceptability and risk acceptance rests with the delegated OAAR or FTAAR.

Delegation of authority

32. An OAA or FTAA may delegate operational airworthiness authority for aviation systems for which they retain overall responsibility. Delegation to a representative is confined to a specified scope of airworthiness management activities and is made through a Letter of Delegation. An example Letter of Delegation to an OAAR, OAAR (Acq) can be found on the ACPA website.

33. Where an OAA chooses to not delegate airworthiness management responsibilities to an OAAR (Acq), the authority for activities required under OAREG 3—New aircraft and modification defaults to the OAA.

34. An OAMP, which is approved by the OAA, will normally be used to identify all operational airworthiness delegations associated with the in-service management of each aviation system. The OAMP should include a list of delegations provided by the OAA, identifying the reference to the delegating document and the duration of the delegation if it is not on-going. Any unusual or special conditions under which the delegation was issued should also be identified. For example, if an exemption was sought from the OAR to enable delegation to an OAAR who does not fully meet the prerequisite qualifications, the exemption reference should be identified. Guidance for compiling an in-service OAMP is included in section 1, chapter 1, annex A.

35. OAREG 1.2.2—Delegation of Operational Airworthiness Authority prescribes the circumstances and mechanisms through which OAAs may delegate operational airworthiness authority.

36. OAREG 1.4.2—Delegation of Flight Test Approval Authority prescribes the circumstances and mechanisms through which an FTAA may delegate flight test approval authority.

Competency requirements for authorities

37. Guidance regarding the level of experience and competence normally required for an OAA and FTAA is provided in AAP 7001.048(AM1)—Defence Aviation Safety Program manual section 4, chapter 1.

38. AAP 7001.048(AM1) does not stipulate the level of experience and competence required of an OAAR but OAREG 1.2.2—Delegation of Operational Airworthiness Authority requires that an OAAR possesses an ‘appropriate aircrew background’ and ‘suitable professional development’. The selection of OAARs is therefore a matter of judgement for the OAA, but OAAs must set the scope and level of OAAR delegation according to the representative’s experience and competence. In this regard, the guidelines in AAP 7001.048(AM1) for the level of experience and competence for OAAs would serve as a reference point. Accordingly, OAARs would normally be aircrew members who have broad and extensive operational experience with the applicable aviation system, and who possess high levels of experience and knowledge of the Defence airworthiness regulatory framework.

Delegation of OAAR/FTAAR authority

39. While an OAAR/FTAAR has no powers of delegation, an OAA may, during a period of absence, appoint a suitable individual to act on behalf of the OAAR. OAREG 1.2.3—Delegation of OAAR authority and OAREG 1.4.3– Delegation of FTAAR authority prescribes the circumstances under which such appointments may be made. Supers

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SECTION 1

CHAPTER 3

OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE

INTRODUCTION

1. The effectiveness of the DASP is governed by the suitability of, and the level of compliance with, the regulations that underpin it. Organisations that operate within the framework seek to maintain regulatory compliance in two ways. Firstly, by developing and implementing organisational systems supported by policies and instructions that observe and implement the regulations. Secondly, by developing feedback mechanisms or compliance assurance mechanisms to verify that the policies and instructions have been followed and that the policies and instructions remain suitable for the purpose of meeting regulatory requirements.

2. Compliance assurance for the operational airworthiness framework contributes to aviation safety by identifying potential areas of concern that may then be evaluated further and addressed if necessary. Compliance with OAREGs also mitigates systemic and human errors which dominate the hazards to aviation safety. Compliance assurance is a systematic means of monitoring organisations that operate within the framework for their level of observance and understanding of the regulatory system as indicated by their policies and instructions, and their adherence to them. A natural consequence of compliance assurance is that it also provides insight into the suitability of the regulations themselves, which is essential for their ongoing development.

PURPOSE

3. This chapter explains how compliance with the OAREG is assured.

COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS

Regulatory requirement

4. All Defence, civilian and contractor personnel and organisations operating within the Defence operational airworthiness framework are required to comply with the OAREGs. The level of compliance is subject to ongoing review at multiple levels within the framework. The results of these reviews are used to develop the regulations as well as refine the processes and procedures that support the implementation of the OAREGs.

5. OAREG 1.3—Operational airworthiness compliance assurance. The regulation requires the OAR to assess the policies and instructions established by each OAA/FTAA for the degree of compliance of those policies and instructions with the OAREGs. In turn, OAA/FTAAs are required to direct programs that assess the compliance of subordinate organisations with the OAA/FTAA’s operational airworthiness policies and instructions. Compliance assurance programs involve the performance and reporting of activities such as compliance assurance, both on-site and desk-top, evaluations and interviews.

Compliance assurance by the OAR

6. Compliance assurance of OAA/FTAAs is required to provide confidence to the OAR that Defence aviation operations are being conducted by the OAA/FTAAs’ organisations in accordance with the OAREGs. The degree to which OAA/FTAAs and subordinate organisations meet the regulations is monitored and reported by ACPA on behalf of the OAR.

7. Normally, compliance assurance of OAA/FTAAs is achieved through the review of OAA/FTAA organisations by ACPA staff. The results of ACPA review serves as a measure of the OAA/FTAA’s organisational compliance with regulatory requirements and of the effectiveness of the OAA/FTAA’s policies and instructions. Reviews also act to provide a level of confidence that appropriate arrangements are in place to support subordinate organisations compliance with regulations. Where the arrangements are not adequate, review findings will include recommendations for corrective action.

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8. Compliance assurance of OAA/FTAAs through ACPA review require:

a. a desk-top evaluation of OAA/FTAAs policies, Standing Instructions, compliance assurance records, and documentation relating to the management of operational airworthiness;

b. the compliance assurance evaluation of OAA/FTAA management systems and staff;

c. witnessing of compliance assurance conducted by OAA/FTAAs, or their delegates, of the OAA/FTAA’s and subordinate organisations; and

d. interviews with executive and line operators responsible for conducting aviation operations.

9. Significant discrepancies detected during OAR compliance assurance activities may indicate that the particular OAA/FTAA has an operational AMS that does not provide an adequate basis for the conduct of safe operations by subordinate elements. This would result in formal notification to the OAR and the applicable OAA/FTAA.

Compliance assurance by Operational Airworthiness Authorities

10. OAA/FTAAs are required to ensure that their own organisations comply with internal operational airworthiness policies and instructions. Compliance assurance by OAA/FTAAs, or their delegates, entails the systematic and routine review of operating elements (groups, regiments, squadrons or flights as applicable) to assess the element’s compliance with the OAA/FTAA’s polices and instructions relating to operational airworthiness.

11. The OAA/FTAA’s OAMP should identify the arrangements, procedures and processes established to assure compliance with OAREGs. A compliance assurance schedule should be included in the plan. Guidance for compiling an in-service OAMP can be found on the ACPA website. Note that OAREG 1.3 paragraph 1.3.3—Compliance assurance provides the requirements for compliance assurance that could appropriately be incorporated into the OAMP.

Compliance assurance requirements

12. OAREG 1.3 paragraph 1.3.3 prescribes the requirements for conducting and reporting on compliance assurance. Compliance assurance activities are required to be conducted at least annually; although the application of a risk based approach may result in an increase or decrease to the period between reviews for some organisations or operational activities. Compliance assurance activities are required to be conducted against defined criteria and by qualified staff who are substantially independent of the area being reviewed. Such a requirement may be achieved by cross participation in Force Element Group (FEG) based compliance assurance activities from other FEGs or Commands. Nominally, the OAA/FTAA should be able to assure the OAR that compliance assurance activities have been free from any prejudice of command influence, or resulting from direct involvement of auditors with systems being reviewed. While OAA/FTAA compliance assurance activities of subordinate aviation operations are single-Service command responsibilities, cross-service and cross-FEG participation enhances compliance assurance independence and is a valuable way to share the benefits of compliance assurance.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE

13. Further information and guidance on OAR or OAA/FTAA compliance assurance activities should be obtained from ACPA or relevant OAA/FTAA staff in the first instance.

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OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITY

OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATION 1.1 – APPLICABILITY AND RULE MAKING

POLICY

Defence aviation operations are conducted within an organisational structure that provides the required capability with acceptable levels of risk and minimum regulatory constraint. The organisation conducting operations does so within a framework that ensures that qualified personnel, who are competent to perform the required roles, are authorised to fly for specified operations within approved limitations and instructions.

Operational airworthiness is managed within a framework of regulations and instructions directed at individuals and organisations and supported by guidance appropriate to the intended audience. Widespread participation in the rule making process is required to ensure regulations are realistic and appropriate to control the risk to safety of aviation operations.

SCOPE

This regulation prescribes the applicability of the regulations and the processes and requirements for rule making and exemption.

AIRWORTHINESS BASIS

Those organisations and individuals who manage and conduct activities within the context of Defence aviation must be defined to ensure no ambiguity exists with respect to their responsibility for aviation safety. The application of exemptions and the process for rule making must be controlled to ensure an appropriate safety basis is established for compliance with these regulations.

OAREG 1.1– APPLICABILITY AND RULE MAKING

1.1.1 Exemptions

a. A person or organisation must not operate in a manner contrary to these regulations unless expressly permitted by an exemption granted in writing by the OAR.

b. Any person or organisation seeking an exemption from these regulations must submit a written request to the OAR (through DACPA) through the applicable OAA/FTAA.

1.1.2 Formal Operational Airworthiness Advice

a. Formal operational airworthiness advice is advice issued in writing on behalf of the OAR by DACPA.

b. Formal operational airworthiness advice carries the authority of the OAR.

1.1.3 Regulatory Development

a. Any interested person may petition the OAR to issue, amend or repeal a regulation irrespective of whether it is a substantive regulation or amendment.

b. Regulation change proposals must be processed IAW the DASP Regulation Change Process (RCP) as detailed in AAP 7001.048 – Defence Aviation Safety Program.

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OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATION 1.2 – OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITY

POLICY

Operational airworthiness is managed by appointed individuals who possess the operational experience and competence to exercise authority relating to the operational airworthiness of Defence Aviation, such that the Aviation System is operated in approved roles, with correct mission equipment, by competent and authorised individuals, according to approved procedures and instructions, under a system of supervision and monitoring.

SCOPE

This regulation prescribes the responsibilities of individuals appointed to act as an OAA for Defence Aviation.

AIRWORTHINESS BASIS

Exercise and delegation of authority assures safety through appointment of competent individuals who possess the experience to make sound decisions relating to operational airworthiness when supported by an operational airworthiness management framework.

OAREG 1.2 – OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITY

An OAA is accountable to the Defence AA and responsible to relevant Service Chief or Group Head for the operational airworthiness management and delegation of authority for Aviation Systems under their command or management.

1.2.1 Responsibilities of the OAA for Aviation System Operations

a. An OAA must ensure, for in-service operations under their command or management, that:

(1) Aviation Systems are managed in accordance with OAREG 2.

(2) Aviation Systems operating under a Temporary Airworthiness Instrument are managed in accordance with the requirements and provisions of that instrument.

(3) Operational airworthiness authority is only delegated in accordance with OAREG 1.2.2.

(4) Flight Test activities are referred to a FTAA in accordance with OAREG 4; and

(5) Compliance assurance of subordinate aviation operations as required by OAREG 1.3 is conducted to ensure compliance with these regulations.

b. An OAA must ensure, for new Aviation Systems, or Aviation Systems undergoing Major modification, that:

(1) Operational airworthiness authority is only delegated in accordance with OAREG 1.2.2.

(2) Activities leading to issue of an airworthiness instrument or SR are managed in accordance with OAREG 3.

(3) Aviation Systems operating under a temporary airworthiness instrument are managed in accordance with the requirements and provisions of that instrument.

(4) Flight test activities contributing to issue of an airworthiness instrument are referred to a FTAA in accordance with OAREG 4.

c. An OAA must only provide a recommendation for Defence AA issue of a temporary airworthiness Instrument following:

(1) Consideration of a recommendation from the TAA in respect of the proposed operations under the temporary airworthiness instrument, if applicable.

(2) Completion of the activities required by OAREG 3 such that the OAA is satisfied that the Aviation System is, and will continue to be, operationally airworthy for the proposed scope and duration of flying operations.

d. An OAA must only provide a recommendation for Defence AA issue of an airworthiness instrument following:

(1) Consideration of a recommendation from the TAA in respect of the proposed operations under the airworthiness instrument.

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(2) Completion of the activities required by OAREG 3 such that the OAA is satisfied that the Aviation System is operationally airworthy for operations under the relevant airworthiness instrument.

1.2.2 Delegation of Operational Airworthiness Authority

a. An OAA may delegate a specified scope of operational airworthiness authority in regard to the in-service operational management of an Aviation System to an OAAR.

b. An OAA may appoint an OAAR(Acq) to exercise a specified scope of operational airworthiness authority for activities leading to issue of an airworthiness instrument for an Aviation System as required by OAREG 3.

c. Except as otherwise allowed by the OAR, an OAA must only delegate OAAR responsibilities to persons who:

(1) Are appointed to a command or executive position within the chain of command of a Defence organisation responsible for Aviation System operations, or the acquisition of a new Aviation System or undergoing a Major modification.

(2) Are a Commonwealth employee, either Defence or Australian Public Service (APS).

(3) Possess an appropriate aircrew background and professional development suitable for appointment as an OAAR.

d. An OAA must issue delegations under this regulation in writing, specifying the scope and limitations associated with the delegation.

e. An OAA must provide the OAR representative (DACPA) a copy of any formal OAAR or OAAR(Acq) delegation.

f. An OAA must not delegate responsibility for recommendations to the Defence AA in respect of issue of any airworthiness instrument.1

1.2.3 Delegation of OAAR Authority

a. An OAAR must not further delegate airworthiness authority.

b. A person may act on behalf of an OAAR in their absence if:

(1) The OAA has provided a written authorisation to the person to act on behalf of the OAAR in their absence within specified limits.

(2) The person is satisfied that sufficient justification exists for acting on behalf of the OAAR in their absence, and that they will be acting within the limits specified by the OAA.

(3) Any decisions made by the person on behalf of the OAAR are reviewed and endorsed by the OAAR as soon as practicable on their return.

(4) They meet the eligibility criteria in OAREG 1.2.2.c.

1 An AvSS Certificate issued under MILAVREG 6 is not an airworthiness instrument.

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OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATION 1.3 – OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE

POLICY

Organisations within the scope of the regulations implement processes and procedures to assure airworthiness through regulatory compliance. The objective of compliance assurance is to assess the degree of compliance with and understanding of, the regulatory system by end user organisations. Compliance assurance also provides a feedback mechanism through which the effectiveness of the regulations can be assessed.

SCOPE

This regulation prescribes the compliance assurance program requirements within the operational AMS.

AIRWORTHINESS BASIS

Compliance assurance contributes to aviation safety by identifying potential areas of concern and assists with corrective actions to prevent incidents resulting from systemic failures.

OAREG 1.3 – OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE

The OAR must establish compliance assurance program activities (eg compliance assurance, both on-site and desk-top, evaluations, etc) to assess the degree of compliance of operational airworthiness policies and instructions of each OAA/FTAA with the OAREG. OAA/FTAA must direct compliance assurance for organisations responsible for operating each Aviation System under their management.

OAR COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE OF OAA/FTAA

a. OAR compliance assurance program must be managed by DACPA.

1.3.2 OAA/FTAA Compliance Assurance of Subordinate Aviation Operations

a. OAA/FTAA compliance assurance must ensure that operating elements (wings, regiments, flights, squadrons, etc) are routinely reviewed to verify compliance with instructions relating to operational airworthiness.

1.3.3 Compliance Assurance

a. Compliance assurance activities conducted under OAREGs 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 must be:

(1) Conducted within a period not to exceed one year, or on the basis of a risk-based compliance assurance plan which has been endorsed by the OAR.

(2) Based upon defined criteria, which have been approved by the OAR or OAA/FTAA as appropriate, that are made available to the reviewed group prior to the commencement of the compliance assurance activity.

(3) Conducted by competent auditors who are substantially independent of the command or management process under scrutiny.

(4) Formally documented to record the outcomes and corrective actions required, with a report provided to the reviewed group or organisation.

b. Results of compliance assurance activity required by this regulation must be:

(1) Retained by the staff of the OAR and OAA/FTAA in accordance with Defence archival requirements.

(2) Provided to the OAR for information within 30 working days.

(3) Provided to ACPA prior to Airworthiness Board review.

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OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATION 1.4 – FLIGHT TEST APPROVAL AUTHORITY

POLICY

Flight test activities are managed by appointed individuals who possess the experience and competence to exercise authority relating to the flight test of Defence Aviation systems such that the Aviation System will be operated safely in accordance with approved instructions and by competent individuals.

SCOPE

This regulation prescribes the responsibilities of individuals appointed to act as an FTAA for Defence Aviation.

AIRWORTHINESS BASIS

Exercise and delegation of authority assures safety through appointment of competent individuals who possess the experience to make sound decisions relating to flight test when supported by an operational airworthiness management framework.

OAREG 1.4 – FLIGHT TEST APPROVAL AUTHORITY

An FTAA is accountable to the Defence AA and responsible to the relevant Service Chief or Group Head for the operational airworthiness management and delegation of flight test authority for Aviation Systems under their command or management.

1.4.1 Responsibilities of the FTAA for Aviation System Operations

a. An FTAA must ensure, for Flight Test of in-service systems, that:

(1) Aviation Systems are managed in accordance with OAREG 2.

(2) Aviation Systems operating under a Temporary Airworthiness Instrument are managed in accordance with the requirements and provisions of that instrument.

(3) Flight test approval authority is only delegated in accordance with OAREG 1.4.2.

1.4.2 Delegation of Flight Test Approval Authority

a. An FTAA may delegate a specified scope of flight test approval authority in regard to the in-service operational management of an Aviation System to an FTAA Representative (FTAAR).

b. Except as otherwise allowed by the OAR, an FTAA must only delegate FTAAR responsibilities to persons who:

(1) Are appointed to a command or executive position within the chain of command of a Defence organisation responsible for flight test operations,

(2) Are a Commonwealth employee (either Defence or APS.

(3) Possess an appropriate aircrew background and professional development suitable for appointment as an FTAAR.

c. An FTAA must issue delegations under this regulation in writing, specifying the scope and limitations associated with the delegation.

d. An FTAA must provide to the OAR representative of the (DACPA) a copy of any formal FTAAR delegation.

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1.4.3 Delegation of FTAAR Authority

a. An FTAAR must not further delegate flight test approval authority.

b. A person may act on behalf of an FTAAR in their absence if:

(1) The FTAA has provided a written authorisation to the person to act on behalf of the FTAAR in their absence within specified limits.

(2) The person is satisfied that sufficient justification exists for acting on behalf of the FTAAR in their absence, and that they will be acting within the limits specified by the FTAA.

(3) Any decisions made by the person on behalf of the FTAAR are reviewed and endorsed by the FTAAR as soon as practicable on their return.

(4) They meet the eligibility criteria in OAREG 1.4.2b.

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CONDUCT OF FLYING OPERATIONS

OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATION 2.1 – FLYING MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

POLICY

Defence Aviation operations are conducted within an organisational structure that provides the required capability with hazards and risks eliminated, or otherwise minimised, so far as reasonably practicable (SFARP). The organisation conducting operations does so within a framework that ensures that qualified personnel, who are competent to perform the required roles, are authorised to fly for specified operations within approved limitations and instructions.

SCOPE

This regulation prescribes the organisational requirements for conducting Defence Aviation operations.

AIRWORTHINESS BASIS

Structured organisations with appointed individuals to manage approved processes and instructions are unlikely to precipitate multiple systemic failures that collectively contribute to incidents involving loss of life or aircraft.

OAREG 2.1 – FLYING MANAGEMENT SYSTEM1

The OAA/FTAA must ensure a flying management system (FMS) is maintained for delegated aircraft type under the Defence AA appointment that includes mechanisms to control:

a. appointment of key staff

b. management of the SOI

c. aircrew competency

d. flight authorisation

e. aviation risk management

f. aviation safety management

g. management of Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP)

h. management of Flight Simulation Training Devices (FSTDs).

IMPLEMENTATION

2.1.1 Appointment of Key Staff

a. OIP issued under this regulation must ensure that:

(1) key appointments in the management of flying operations are identified

(2) the initial and continuing eligibility criteria for each appointment are identified

(3) the responsibility and authority of each appointment is clear and unambiguous

(4) appointed individuals receive written authorisation which includes any limitations to their responsibility or authority.

1 Guidance material is contained in Section 3.

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2.1.2 Management of the SOI

a. OIP issued under this regulation must ensure that:

(1) The SOI for each aviation system is maintained to reflect all authorised CRE parameters for that aircraft type or system.

(2) Proposed changes to the SOI are:

i. provided to the aircraft Design Acceptance Representative (DAR) for consideration of any impact of the change on technical airworthiness or SR considerations

ii. provided to the TAA for making recommendation under MILAVREG 1.7

iii. approved by the OAA/FTAA

iv. approved changes to the SOI are progressed in accordance with OAREG 2.1.2.b.

b. In conjunction with advice from the aircraft DAR, changes to the SOI must be assessed in accordance with OAREG 3.1—Changes to aircraft Configuration Role and Environment and managed in accordance with the provisions of that regulation.

c. Deviations from the SOI required for extenuating or wartime operations must be managed in accordance with OAREG 2.2—Operations.

2.1.3 Aircrew Competency System

a. The aircrew competency system must ensure that:

(1) aircrew are trained and qualified in accordance with OAREG 2.3—Qualifications and training

(2) aircrew maintain currency on the required aircraft type

(3) aircrew are competent to perform their assigned roles.

b. OIP issued under this regulation must ensure that aircrew currency requirements are identified, including:

(1) minimum currency criteria

(2) methods of maintaining and regaining currency

(3) identification of circumstances and authority for extension.

c. Aircrew competency requirements are identified, including:

(1) competency for all aircraft roles and operations

(2) training and assessment requirements for initial award and maintenance of competency

(3) criteria that define a lapse in competency, including the requirements for requalification.

d. All aircrew qualifications and award of competencies are recorded as required by OAREG 2.3—Qualifications and training.

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2.1.4 Flight Authorisation2

a. The OAA/FTAA must establish a flight authorisation system that ensures the assessment of suitability for flight of Defence aircraft missions.

b. A Flight Authorisation Officer must be Type Rated to undertake flight authorisation duties.

2.1.5 Aviation Risk Management (AVRM)3

a. An AVRM process must be applied to all flying and aircraft related operations.

b. OIP issued under this regulation must ensure that:

(1) The AVRM practices to be applied in all flying and aircraft related operations are defined.

(2) The level of flight authorisation for each residual risk level is identified.

(3) Unit Commanding Officers develop and maintain Mission Risk Profiles (MRP) for aircraft operating under their command.

(4) Compliance assurance review of the conduct of AVRM, including review of MRP, is performed.

2.1.6 Aviation Safety Management4

a. Aviation safety practices must be applied to all flying and aircraft related operations.

b. A Unit Aviation Safety Officer (UASO) must be appointed in accordance with OAREG 2.1.1.

c. A UASO must complete an approved course in aviation safety prior to appointment, unless the OAA issues a waiver.

d. The aviation safety management system must ensure that:

(1) Aircrew undergo an aviation safety training program in accordance with OAREG 2.3—Qualifications and training.

(2) Aircraft operational hazards and safety occurrences are reported and investigated.

(3) Potential hazards are identified and averted.

(4) Deficiencies identified from any source are corrected.

e. OIP issued under this regulation must ensure that:

(1) Aviation safety policy for all flying and aircraft related operations is defined.

(2) Crew duty limits are specified, including consideration of:

i. the aircraft type, role and operating environment as specified in the SOI

ii. crew workload and mission profiles

iii. disruptions to circadian rhythm due to changes in time-zones or shifts to and from night flying

iv. normal and augmented crew operations.

(3) Maximum crew duty limits are only varied by the OAA/FTAA.

(4) The responsibilities of unit personnel in regard to aviation safety management are defined.

(5) UASO appointments are identified, including the responsibility and authority of the appointees.

(6) Hazard and occurrence investigation procedures and reporting requirements are identified.

2 Guidance material is contained in Section 3 Chapter 6. 3 Guidance material is contained in Section 3 Chapter 8. 4 Guidance material is contained in Section 3 Chapter 8.

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2.1.7 Management of Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP)5

GUIDANCE

• For the purpose of this regulation air operational OIP includes the following:

(a) Aircrew manuals specific to the aircraft type.

(b) General aircrew publications.

(c) Defence Instructions.

(d) Standing Instructions.

(e) Flying Orders, Special Flying Instructions and Standard Operating Procedures.

(f) Flight Information Documents (FID) publihsed as part of the Defence Aeronautical Information Package (AIP) under OAREG 6.1.4.b.

a. The OIP Management System must ensure that:

(1) All air operational OIP are:

i. applicable, accurate and approved

ii. maintained in good and legible order

iii. accessible to personnel in a format and medium appropriate to the operational environment

iv. applicable to the scope and level of the operation being conducted

v. supported by a master document or record allowing the amendment status and document completeness to be ascertained.

(2) Each Defence produced document contains or displays:

i. authority for use

ii. document name

iii. document number

iv. date of issue and currency (amendment status)

v. sponsor details.

b. For OIP specific to aircraft type, the OIP Management System must ensure that:

(1) OIP sponsors are appointed to ensure all OIP are applicable and authorised.

(2) There are documented agreements established with relevant engineering authorities to ensure that any amendments to OIP that affect operating instructions, aircrew and/or limitations are not issued before technical endorsement from an appropriate person within the engineering authority.

(3) Foreign Source Data (FSD), other than that incorporated into the authorised publication management systems (AAP, NAP or DAP), are approved by the OAA/FTAA prior to use.

c. OIP issued under this regulation must ensure that:

(1) OIP management appointments in accordance with OAREG 2.1.1 are identified, including their responsibility and authority.

(2) A list of OIP sponsors and approval authorities is maintained.

(3) A list of OAA/FTAA approved sources of FID is maintained.

(4) Periodic review criteria are defined (Defence AIP will follow the 28 day AIRAC cycle).

5 Guidance material on the production and management of OIPs is contained in Section 3 Chapter 9. Guidance material on Defence AIP is contained Sect 9 Chap 1.

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(5) Publication management records are accurately maintained, controlled and made accessible to applicable personnel and organisations.

(6) OIP distribution requirements are defined.

2.1.8 Reserved

2.1.9 Management of Aeronautical Life Support Equipment (ALSE)

a. The OAA/FTAA must ensure an ALSE management system is established that includes:

(1) Appointment of an ALSE manager under OAREG 2.1.1.

(2) ALSE is authorised to reflect the roles and environmental parameters contained in the SOI.

(3) OIP contain details of authorised ALSE and appropriate guidance on its use for the aircraft type.

(4) In conjunction with the aircraft DAR, proposed changes to the SOI are assessed for any impacts they may have on ALSE.

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OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATION 2.2 – OPERATIONS

POLICY

Defence Aviation operations are conducted in accordance with limitations and instructions deemed necessary to assure safety of flight. This system of operational rules provides a basis for training and operations that are consistent and authorised.

SCOPE

This regulation prescribes minimum operating requirements and processes for Defence registered aircraft.

AIRWORTHINESS BASIS

Flying rules, limitations and instructions are derived from engineering design limitations and the relevant SOI. Experience in aviation practice and operation of an aircraft type contribute to the foundation of knowledge regarding operating limitations. These form the basis of a system of rules and instructions which are mandatory to provide a known level of safety for the conduct of operations.

OAREG 2.2 – OPERATIONS

Defence registered aircraft must be operated:

a. within the approved SOI CRE parameters

b. in accordance with prescribed Type Certificate and SR limitations

c. in accordance with the procedures in Defence AIP (General Planning Australia and Flight Information Handbook Australia), except as required by the NAA of the state of operation

d. as detailed in the Aircraft Flight Manual and applicable OIP

e. in accordance with OIP endorsed by the OAA under this regulation.

IMPLEMENTATION

2.2.1 Flying Rules for Special Missions and Tasks6

a. OIP issued under this regulation must ensure that, where applicable, rules and requirements are defined that address:

(1) flypasts and flying displays

(2) formation flying

(3) airborne emergency training

(4) missions and tasks involving search and rescue and aeromedical evacuation

(5) missions and tasks involving civil and community support activities

(6) missions and tasks involving use of automated flight control, Communication, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) and Air Traffic Management Systems (ATMS)

(7) flights involving interaction with UAS

(8) any other task or mission which requires special consideration.

b. Flying rules and requirements with applicability under this regulation must be based upon an AVRM assessment conducted in accordance with OAREG 2.1—Flying Management System.

6 Guidance material is contained in Section 4.

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2.2.2 Aircraft Crewing

a. Defence registered aircraft must be crewed in accordance with minimum and normal crew compositions promulgated by the OAA/FTAA.

b. Aircraft crews operating Defence registered aircraft must be trained, qualified, competent and authorised in accordance with OAREG 2.1—Flying Management System and OAREG 2.3—Qualifications and training.

c. Foreign military aircrew operation of Defence registered aircraft must only be approved by the OAA/FTAA on the basis that the aircraft will be operated in accordance with the requirements of a Defence FMS.

d. Civilian aircrew operation of Defence registered aircraft must only be approved by the OAA/FTAA on the basis of7:

(1) Identification and attainment of prerequisite civil and military training, qualifications and competency.

(2) Familiarity and adherence to applicable Defence, single-Service and type related OIPs.

(3) Identification and provision of flying clothing and ALSE necessary to crew the aircraft type.

(4) Approval is provided under the appropriate flight authorisation system.

GUIDANCE

• Non-Defence registered aircraft covered by Implementation Procedure for Australian Civil Registered Aircraft Operated as State Aircraft and Aircrew Licensing may be operated in accordance CASA/Defence agreement, see ACPA website for details.

2.2.3 Aircraft Captaincy

a. An aircraft captain must be assigned for each flight and must be either of the following:

(1) qualified for appointment on the aircraft type as a captain as determined by the commander of the operating unit

(2) a qualified pilot undergoing an approved conversion training course on the aircraft type

(3) a trainee pilot undergoing an approved pilot training course.

b. An aircraft captain must be responsible for the safe and effective operation of the aircraft in carrying out the assigned task.

c. An aircraft captain must:

(1) ensure they have received sufficient pre-flight detail by way of tasking information, authorisation guidance, mission briefing, or curriculum description

(2) conduct an adequate pre-flight briefing for any crew

(3) ensure the aircraft and ancillary equipment is serviceable, and the aircraft is duly released by maintenance and accepted for the flight

(4) ensure the requirements of all OIPs relating to the aircraft and its operation are observed and obeyed

(5) ensure the flight is conducted in accordance with authorised sequences, and relevant OIP

(6) deal with occurrences outside the scope of the flight authorisation in accordance with the flight manual, SI and the principles of good airmanship

(7) use all the resources at their disposal to ensure the safe recovery of their aircraft, crew and passengers

(8) contact the authorising officer for advice and guidance when necessary to deviate from the flight authorisation given, as soon as circumstances allow

(9) conduct a post-flight crew debrief

7 For medical certificate requirements, refer to OAREG 2.3.5

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(10) notify the authorising officer of any unusual occurrences or deviations from the flight authorisation

(11) comply with post-flight documentary requirements.

d. OIP issued under this regulation must identify:

(1) the responsibilities of aircraft captains

(2) the authority of the aircraft captain in all circumstances relating to flying operations

(3) the responsibilities of the aircraft captain in relation to cargo and passengers

(4) considerations for flight authorisation regarding firearms and ammunition carried aboard Defence registered aircraft, the authorised degree of weapon readiness and method of carriage

(5) the circumstances and requirements under which an in-flight transfer of captaincy may occur, including a mechanism to record the transfer in the appropriate documentation.

2.2.4 Cargo

a. Cargo must only be carried on Defence registered aircraft in accordance with OAREG 6.1.6–Air Cargo Delivery.

b. Cargo must only be carried as an external load when the load has been appropriately prepared and authorised for flight as documented in OIP approved under OAREG 2.1.7 and OAREG 6.1.6.

2.2.5 Aircraft Loading

a. Aircraft must only be loaded in accordance with OIP managed in accordance with OAREG 2.1—Flying Management System and OAREG 6.1.6 – Air Cargo Delivery.

b. OIP issued under this regulation must ensure, prior to being flown, the aircraft captain confirms that:

(1) aircraft weight and balance is within limits defined in approved OIP

(2) the weight and balance limits will remain within those limits throughout the flight

(3) all cargo is stowed and/or rigged in accordance with approved OIP

(4) aircraft equipment is stowed in approved positions and secured

(5) Any consignment of cargo classed as dangerous goods has been managed in accordance with the requirements OAREG 6.1.6.

2.2.6 Low Flying8

a. This regulation does not apply to non-Defence registered aircraft being operated by Defence aircrew; such operations are to be in accordance with the relevant civil air rules and regulations.

b. An OAA must promulgate OIP which cover low flying detailing:

(1) low flying areas

(2) routes

(3) minimum heights

(4) separation requirements

(5) limitations of each aircraft type

(6) use of any specialised equipment (such as Terrain-Following radar, GPWS, vision enhancing equipment).

GUIDANCE

• OAREG 2.2.6.a is not applicable to non-Defence registered aircraft covered by Implementation Procedure for Australian Civil Registered Aircraft Operated as State Aircraft and Aircrew Licensing, see ACPA website for details.

8 Guidance material is contained in Section 4 Chapter 1.

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2.2.7 Flying Displays Operating Limitations9

a. The OAA must establish a system that ensures aircraft conducting flying displays do not compromise the suitability for flight.

b. The OAA must ensure that objects released from Defence aircraft during flying displays will not compromise suitability for flight.

2.2.8 Carriage and Use of Electronic Equipment10

GUIDANCE

• In the context of this regulation, ‘electronic equipment’ includes all electrical equipment that may be operated in flight by a passenger or crew member, which is not part of an authorised role fit or has not been authorised or cleared for flight in the relevant aircraft. Electronic equipment may include:

(a) personal electronic devices such as laptop computers or CD players

(b) communication devices such as mobile telephones and wireless transmitters

(c) medical or monitoring equipment not authorised as role equipment for an Aeromedical role.

a. Electronic equipment must only be carried and used in accordance with OIP issued by the OAA/FTAA.

b. OIP issued under this regulation must ensure that:

(1) the requirements for carriage and operation of non-standard electronic devices for operational use by aircrew are defined

(2) the requirements for carriage and operation of portable electronic devices by passengers are identified.

2.2.9 Carriage of Personnel on Defence Aircraft11

a. The OAA/FTAA must ensure a system is established that assures the carriage of personnel in Defence aircraft will not compromise suitability for flight.

b. The OAA/FTAA must establish a system that ensures a requirement to carry personnel using non–standard aircraft restraint and seating (NSARS) is conducted safely.

c. The OAA/FTAA must ensure that records of personnel carried in Defence aircraft are raised, maintained and preserved.

2.2.10 Reserved

2.2.11 Reserved

2.2.12 Use of Aircraft Role Equipment

a. The OAA/FTAA must ensure that aircraft role equipment must only be carried and operated in accordance with approved OIP.

GUIDANCE

• Role equipment is any equipment, other than installed aircraft components, required to be operated in an aircraft during flight, as distinct from equipment being carried as cargo

9Guidance material is contained in Section 4 Chapter 2.

10 Technical guidance material is contained in AAP 7001.053. 11 OAR Decision Brief of 16 Dec 14 (AB20660751). Guidance material is contained in Sect 4 Chap 9.

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2.2.13 Use of Flying Clothing and Aeronautical Life Support Equipment12

a. Defence registered aircraft must only be operated with ALSE in accordance with the applicable OIP.

b. OIP issued under this regulation must:

(1) specify minimum standards of flying clothing to be worn for flight operations with aircraft types under their management

(2) identify occasions where alternate Defence uniforms may be used during flying operations, where applicable

(3) specify minimum standards of dress and grooming such that the risk of FOD, entanglement or snagging hazards are minimised.

c. The use of ALSE must be approved and documented by the OAA/FTAA.

d. Before approving the use of ALSE or flying clothing on Defence registered and non-Defence registered aircraft the OAA/FTAA must conduct and document the following:

(1) ALSLMU recommendation that the equipment is suitable for use in the operational application and environment

(2) Advice from the CENGR of the SPO or clearance under the civil aviation regulations, for affected aircraft types, that the proposed equipment/clothing does not compromise the certification basis for aircrew accommodation, including but not limited to emergency egress requirements

(3) Pre-flight inspection and on-going maintenance requirements are defined in authorised publications

(4) Operating procedures are defined in authorised aircrew publications

(5) Aircrew and maintenance training, endorsement and currency requirements are defined, documented and implemented

(6) Administrative requirements appropriate for recording and monitoring of the equipment have been implemented

(7) AVRM assessment has been conducted to demonstrate that the technical and operational integrity of the equipment proposed for use is acceptable in the operational context.

2.2.14 Reserved

2.2.15 Operational Clearance13

a. The OAA must establish an Operational Clearance management system to ensure that approval to operate an aviation system outside the system’s approved configuration, role, environment, limitation or condition is conducted safely.

b. The OAA must ensure Operational Clearances are presented at the next scheduled Airworthiness Board.

2.2.16 Provision and Use of Oxygen on Defence Aircraft14

a. The OAA/FTAA must establish an oxygen management system that ensures appropriate provision and use of oxygen systems on Defence aircraft.

b. The OAA/FTAA must ensure that flight crew who are occupants of flight crew seats on flight crew compartment duty use supplemental oxygen above 10 000 ft cabin altitude.

c. The OAA/FTAA must ensure passengers and crew not regulated under 2.2.16.b use supplemental oxygen whenever:

12 Guidance material is contained in section 4, chapter 8. 13 OAR Decision Brief of 18 Feb 15 (AB21236229). Guidance material is contained in section 4, chapter 7. 14 OAR Decision Brief of 06 Oct 15 (AB24397545). Guidance material is contained in Section 5 Chapter 8.

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(1) flight above 10 000 ft cabin altitude but not above 13 000 ft cabin altitude exceeds 30 minutes, or

(2) flight is above 13 000 ft cabin altitude.

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OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATION 2.3 – QUALIFICATIONS AND TRAINING

POLICY

Only trained and qualified people who are competent and current to fly in the intended roles must operate Defence aircraft.

SCOPE

This regulation prescribes airworthiness requirements for minimum aircrew qualification and training.

AIRWORTHINESS BASIS

The design and safe operation of Aviation Systems is predicated upon being crewed by personnel who have sufficient knowledge and experience to operate an aircraft in the intended role. Known standards of qualification and competence provide a minimum operating basis to assure safety of flight.

OAREG 2.3 – QUALIFICATIONS AND TRAINING

a. The OAA/FTAA must ensure that minimum Defence aircrew qualification and currencies include15:

(1) successfully completed a prescribed qualifying course for the relevant aircraft type or system or are undergoing a course of instruction conducted by a qualified instructor in accordance with an approved curriculum

(2) been deemed competent and current by the operating unit commander for the roles and duties to be performed.

IMPLEMENTATION

2.3.1 Initial Pilot Qualifications

a. The Commander Air Force Training Group (CDR AFTG) must coordinate with each OAA to initiate and maintain Defence basic fixed wing flying curriculums.

b. The OAA must establish an approved course of training for award of initial pilot qualifications.

2.3.2 Initial non–Pilot Qualifications

a. The OAA must endorse and coordinate the implementation of Defence initial non–pilot curriculums.

2.3.3 Qualifications for Specific Roles or Duties

a. The OAA/FTAA must endorse OIP detailing aircrew currency requirements for aircraft crew duties.

b. The OAA/FTAA must ensure that OIP issued under this regulation will base award of role/duty qualifications upon approved training and assessment criteria that includes:

(1) pre-requisite competencies are defined and met

(2) role specialisation training is defined and conducted

(3) the authority for award or cancellation is identified

(4) the requirements for recording and monitoring competence are defined

(5) criteria that define a lapse in role or crew duty skills are defined, including requirements for requalification.

15 For Aviation Medicine Training and Medical Certificate requirements, refer to OAREG 2.3.5.

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2.3.4 Standards of Training and Instruction16

a. The CDR AFTG must coordinate with each OAA/FTAA to develop standards for the provision of flying instruction for all Defence aircrew, including training provided through STDs.

b. The OAA/FTAA must ensure flying instructors under their management are accredited in accordance with standards set by CDR AFTG.

c. The OAA/FTAA must ensure that the minimum authority for the award of flying instructor qualifications is the Commanding Officer of the flying unit providing the training.

d. The OAA must coordinate with the Royal Australian Air Force Central Flying School (RAAF CFS) to periodically assess the competency and standardisation of Defence flying instructors.

e. The OAA/FTAA must ensure that personnel selected for non-pilot airborne instructional duties receive training appropriate to the instructional duties.

f. The OAA/FTAA must ensure that OIP issued under this regulation includes:

(1) the validity of flying instructor qualifications prior to requalification

(2) conditions that might permit the extension of the validity of flying instructor qualifications.

2.3.5 Aviation Medicine and Medical Fitness for Flight17

a. The OAA/FTAA must ensure aircrew are trained in aviation medicine awareness prior to conducting flight operations in a military Configuration Role or Environment with a training currency not exceeding 5 years.

b. The OAA/FTAA must ensure aircrew, aircraft controllers and remote pilots have a current aviation medical certificate that is:

(1) For aircrew: valid for a period not greater than 12 months.

(2) For aircraft controllers and remote pilots: valid for a period not greater than 24 months.

c. The OAA/FTAA must establish a medical fitness management system that ensures aircrew, aircraft controllers and remote pilots maintain medical fitness standards for flying related duties.

2.3.6 Crew Resource Management Training

a. The OAA/FTAA must ensure that crew resource management (CRM) training is conducted in accordance with approved OIP that includes:

(1) CRM practices to be employed

(2) CRM training objectives and assessment criteria

(3) requirements for currency and requalification.

2.3.7 Aviation Safety Training

a. The OAA/FTAA must ensure that aviation safety training is conducted in accordance with approved OIP that includes:

(1) aviation safety training objectives and assessment criteria

(2) requirements for currency and requalification.

2.3.8 Aviation Risk Management Training

a. The OAA/FTAA must ensure that aviation risk management training is conducted in accordance with approved OIP.

2.3.9 Role Specific Training

a. The OAA/FTAA must ensure that role specific training is conducted in accordance with approved OIP.

16 Guidance material is contained in Section 5 Chapter 2. 17 Guidance material for OAREG 2.3.5a, b is contained in Section 5 Chapter 3. and OAREG 2.3.5c is contained in Section 5, Chapter 5.

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GUIDANCE

• Related instructions for rotary wing aeromedical evacuation training are contained in DI(G) OPS 03–2—Rotary wing aeromedical evacuation training in the Australian Defence Force.

2.3.10 Aircrew Logbooks18

a. All aircrew must maintain a Defence flying logbook.

b. Aircrew logbooks must be managed in accordance with OAREG 2.1—Flying Management System and this OAREG.

c. OIP issued under this regulation must ensure that:

(1) a record of the member’s endorsed qualifications

(2) a record of all flight time undertaken as authorised crew or flight crew of a military aircraft, a civil aircraft under hire or lease to Defence or a civil aircraft provided for any other military purpose

(3) a record of flight time in approved FSTDs

(4) the logbook of an authorised crew or flight crew member is not carried on an aircraft when the member is flying on that aircraft.

d. In the event of an accident or incident, the operating unit commander must provide all involved aircrew logbooks to an authorised person upon request.

18 Guidance material is contained in Section 5 Chapter 4.

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NEW AVIATION SYSTEMS AND MODIFICATION

OAREG 3.1 – CHANGES TO AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION, ROLE AND ENVIRONMENT

POLICY

Changes to aircraft can affect the original airworthiness certification basis. Changes which have a high impact on the certification basis require a higher degree of oversight to those which have a low impact.

SCOPE

This regulation prescribes criteria for classification and management of changes to an aircraft’s Type Design, Configuration, Role and Environment.

AIRWORTHINESS BASIS

Changes which substantially alter the Type Design, Configuration, Role and Environment of an aircraft present a higher risk due to the complexity or magnitude of the change. The extra oversight and involvement of appropriate agencies and authorities provides a high degree of assurance of airworthiness.

OAREG 3.1 – CHANGES TO AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION, ROLE AND ENVIRONMENT1

An OAA must ensure that changes to an Aircraft’s Type Design, Configuration, Role and Environment (CRE) are classified and managed to provide an acceptable level of airworthiness oversight by appropriate agencies and authorities relative to the impact of the change on the CRE of the Aviation System.

3.1.1 Changes to an Aircraft Type Design

a. Changes to an aircraft Type Design must be classified as either ‘Major’ or ‘Minor’ by the applicable aircraft DAR or the TAA in accordance with Technical Airworthiness Regulations.

b. New aircraft, or changes to an existing aircraft Type Design classified as Major in accordance with OAREG 3.1.1a must undergo Type Certification and SR in accordance with OAREG 3.2—New aircraft and Major changes to Type Design and OAREG 3.4—Service Release for new aircraft and Major changes to Type Design.

c. Changes to an existing aircraft Type Design classified as Minor in accordance with OAREG 3.1.1a must be assessed in accordance with OAREG 3.1.2 and managed in accordance with the provisions contained therein.

GUIDANCE

• The decision of whether a design change is either Major or Minor affects the degree of airworthiness oversight applied to the design change.

• Minor design changes are generally addressed at the SPO level with operational airworthiness consideration by the OAAR through the Configuration Control Board.

• Major design changes require a higher level of airworthiness oversight including review and recommendations from the TAA and OAA, and approval by the Defence AA.

1 Guidance is provided in section 6.

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3.1.2 Changes to an Aircraft Configuration, Role, or Environment (CRE)

a. Changes to an aircraft’s CRE must be judged as either ‘Substantial’ or ‘Non-Substantial’ in accordance with the provisions of this Regulation, and cognisant of advice from the aircraft DAR in respect of the impact of the change on technical airworthiness.

b. Except as provided under OAREG 3.1.2c, the OAA must assume all changes to an aircraft’s CRE are ‘Non-Substantial’.

c. The OAA must seek classification of a change to the CRE from an FTAA if:

(1) the change introduces a new CRE to the aircraft type; or

(2) the change modifies an existing CRE such that there is an appreciable effect on aircrew training curriculums, competency management, cockpit workload, human-machine-interface or flight authorisation considerations.

d. New aircraft or Substantial changes to an aircraft’s existing CRE resulting from a Major change to the Type Design must be managed in accordance with OAREG 3.2—New aircraft and Major changes to Type Design, OAREG 3.3—Operation of a new aircraft or Major change prior to SR and OAREG 3.4—Service Release for new aircraft and Major changes to Type Design.

e. Substantial changes to a CRE, including those resulting from a Minor change to the Type Design, must be managed in accordance with OAREG 3.5—New or modified Configuration, Role or Environment.

f. Non-Substantial changes to an existing CRE, including those resulting from a Minor change to the Type Design, must be managed in accordance with OAREG 3.1.3.

3.1.3 Minor Design or Non–Substantial Operational Changes

a. An OAA must appoint an aircrew member as a representative for consideration of operational airworthiness aspects of Minor design changes or Non-Substantial operational changes to an aviation system.

b. Non-Substantial operational changes must be managed within the FMS through review and amendment to orders, instructions and procedures, and through adjustments to training curriculums.

c. For Minor design changes, the appointed aircrew member must participate in Configuration Control Boards for aviation systems and provide advice to the SPO on the operational airworthiness considerations of proposed modifications, including impact on cockpit workload, impact on mission suitability of the aviation system, and training and publications requirements, prior to Design Acceptance.

GUIDANCE

• Design Acceptance for Minor design changes to in-service aircraft types is managed at the SPO/FEG level.

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OAREG 3.2 – NEW AIRCRAFT AND MAJOR CHANGES TO TYPE DESIGN

POLICY

New aircraft or Major technical changes require a re-evaluation of the certification basis to ensure airworthiness in the altered configuration. New aircraft and Major changes require an equivalent examination of the operational airworthiness aspects of the system to ensure continuing suitability for the SOI CRE.

SCOPE

This regulation prescribes requirements for management of operational airworthiness certification due to a new or substantially altered CRE resulting from a Major change to the Type Design.

AIRWORTHINESS BASIS

Airworthiness management and oversight of the introduction of a new aircraft or Major change assures safety of flight through rigorous examination of the aircraft’s suitability to operate in the intended CRE.

OAREG 3.2– NEW AIRCRAFT AND MAJOR CHANGES TO TYPE DESIGN

An OAA must ensure an operational airworthiness framework is maintained for new aircraft acquisitions or Major changes to Type Design. The AAMP must ensure:

a. The necessary appointments and agencies are identified and authorised to perform functions to support operational airworthiness management by the OAA.

b. The CRE and planned usage are documented in a SOI which has been endorsed by the TAA and approved by the relevant OAA.

c. The Defence SOR, which includes the certification basis, is endorsed by the OAA.

d. Operational airworthiness Compliance Finding is performed.

e. Mechanisms are in place to assess critical aspects of the new aircraft, or Major change to support Design Acceptance, by the aircraft DAR including:

(1) suitability for CRE

(2) acceptability of Test and Evaluation activity to provide operational airworthiness Compliance Finding evidence

(3) human factors

(4) flying safety

(5) aircrew publications.

f. Mechanisms are in place to assess arrangements in support of SR, as required by OAREG 3.4—Service Release for new aircraft and Major changes to Type Design.

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3.2.1 Operational Airworthiness Management Strategy

a. The OAA must endorse a documented strategy to meet the requirements of this regulation.

GUIDANCE

• Airworthiness is managed in the context of the CRE and planned usage. These aspects are documented in the SOI and provide a basis of operations against which Type Certification and SR are judged. Guidance for development of the SOI is provided in section 6, chapter 1.

• The OAA should appoint a Commonwealth Test Pilot who has the necessary role background and flight test experience to represent Defence on matters relating to the safety of flight test activity, and the adequacy of test activity to demonstrate that airworthiness requirements have been met. The OAA may appoint other specialist operational representatives (eg flight test specialists or mission specialists) to support the OAAR(Acq) and Test Pilot in the conduct of their responsibilities with respect to the Type Certification and SR of new or modified aircraft.

3.2.2 OAA Endorsement of the Statement of Requirement

a. The OAA must endorse the SOR. The SOR must:

(1) be consistent with the SOI

GUIDANCE

• The Certification Basis is a checklist, or matrix, of airworthiness requirements applicable to the aircraft design, role and environment. The certification basis normally forms a part of the SOR.

(2) contain a Certification Basis that provides an adequate basis for airworthy flight operations

(3) require the contracted agency to demonstrate the suitability for airworthy flight operations, by Defence aircrew, for the CRE defined in the SOI.

GUIDANCE

• The SOR forms the basis for the acquisition, or Major modification, of an aircraft, including the means by which airworthiness of a new or modified aircraft will be demonstrated. OAA and TAA involvement in the development of the SOR is essential to an efficient Type Certification process.

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3.2.3 Operational Airworthiness Compliance Findings

a. Compliance Findings must be made on the basis of the TAREGs and managed by the aircraft DAR.

b. The operational element of each Compliance Finding must be made by an authorised person or agency identified in accordance with OAREG 3.2—New aircraft and Major changes to Type Design.

c. The operational element of Compliance Findings which relate to aircraft flying qualities and crew workload in respect of the SOI CRE must be made by a Commonwealth Test Pilot or equivalent flight test specialist identified in accordance with OAREG 3.2—New aircraft and Major changes to Type Design.

d. Compliance Finding results must be made available to the aircraft DAR.

e. The OAA must ensure that any operational issue identified as a result of Compliance Finding activity is only closed after:

(1) the operational aspects of the design are subsequently found to meet the certification basis requirement

(2) the relevant OAA has determined that an equivalent level of safety has been established, or

(3) the relevant OAA has accepted the reduction in the level of safety where compliance with an operational airworthiness element of the certification basis has not been established.

f. Operational issues identified as a result of Compliance Finding activity must be documented in an Defence Airworthiness Issue Paper managed in accordance with OAREG 3.2.8.

g. Authorised persons responsible for Compliance Finding must ensure that any aspect where the aviation system is not considered suitable for flight in SOI roles and environment, beyond that determined by operational airworthiness compliance findings, are advised to the OAA.

GUIDANCE

• Defence airworthiness Compliance Findings are normally managed by the DAR in accordance with the TAREGs. The operational aspects of compliance findings are addressed in these Regulations. The key mechanism for providing operational airworthiness compliance findings is through conduct of a flight test clearance program. While foreign services (eg USAF, USN and RAF) may conduct dedicated programs prior to release for Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E), Defence typically accomplishes the same through contractor Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) and a limited Acceptance Test and Evaluation (AT&E) program conducted prior to aircraft acceptance.

3.2.4 Test and Evaluation

a. The OAA/FTAA must ensure that acquisition related Test and Evaluation activities are performed in accordance with OAREG 4—Flight Test.

b. The OAA must ensure that the scope of Test and Evaluation activity specified in the Defence SOR is assessed by a Commonwealth Test Pilot or equivalent flight test representative identified in accordance with OAREG 3.2 as adequate for the operational aspects of Type Certification and SR.

GUIDANCE

• The Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) is a Project document, typically, subordinate to a Systems Engineering Management Plan. There are aspects of the TEMP that contribute to the operational suitability of the aircraft or modification. These may require specific consideration by the OAA.

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3.2.5 Aviation Safety Issues Arising from Flight Operations Prior to Service Release

a. The OAA/FTAA must ensure that any incidents or accidents that occur during the acquisition phase are adequately investigated and that any identified hazards have been appropriately addressed by the contractor.

b. The OAA/FTAA must ensure any such accidents or incidents are reported to the aircraft DAR as soon as practicable after occurrence.

GUIDANCE

• Aviation safety occurrences prior to SR may have occurred either during contractor flight trials or during Defence flight operations under a SFP. While aviation safety is the concern of the contractor prior to delivery to Defence, Defence is interested in the closure of any actions arising from aviation-safety incidents or accidents that may have occurred during contractor flight operations.

3.2.6 Human Factors

a. The OAA must ensure human factors associated with the operation of the Aviation System are assessed by a Defence Test Pilot or equivalent flight test representative identified in accordance with OAREG 3.2—New aircraft and Major changes to Type Design.

b. The assessment of human factors required by OAREG 3.2.6a must determine whether factors including ergonomics, anthropometric limitations, cognitive and physiological workload render the system safe for use by Defence aircrew in the SOI CRE.

c. The results of any assessment of human factors must be made available to the aircraft DAR.

GUIDANCE

• Human factors are a significant aspect of the type certification of a new design, or a variation to an existing CRE. While Human factors affect all aspects of system operation and maintenance, the focus in regard to operational airworthiness is concerned with safety of flight in the SOI CRE and roles.

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3.2.7 Aircrew Publications

a. The OAA must ensure aircrew publications delivered with the Aviation System adequately document all operating limitations and procedures deemed necessary to safely operate the system, as identified during system design and flight test.

b. The adequacy of aircrew publications in respect to OAREG 3.2.7.a must be advised to the aircraft DAR.

c. Aircrew publications are to be approved by the OAA prior to Service Release.

3.2.8 Airworthiness Issue Papers (AwIP)

a. Prior to Type Certification, the OAA must ensure that all outstanding non-compliances against the certification basis are being managed in accordance with an approved AwIP.

b. The OAA must ensure AwIP are reviewed by:

(1) the relevant specialist persons or agencies as identified in accordance with OAREG 3.2—New aircraft and Major changes to Type Design

(2) an appropriate representative of the end-user operational organisation.

GUIDANCE

• AwIP are raised as a result of non-compliance against the certification basis to identify design or certification issues identified during Aviation System development and test, that require consideration by operational and technical airworthiness authorities. For example, a manufacturer may offer a throttle gate with or without certain electronic protection, for which the OAA and TAA will need to consider specialist advice regarding the airworthiness implications (safety of flight in the role and the environment) of the offered system, before deciding whether either is suitable.

• Additional guidance on AwIP is contained in AAP 7001.048—Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual.

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3.2.9 OAA Recommendation for Type Certification

a. The OAA may provide a recommendation for Type Certification to the Defence AA if satisfied that the evidence submitted under OAREG 3.2.9b forms a satisfactory basis for safe flying operations within the SOI CRE.

b. Prior to providing an OAA recommendation for Type Certification the OAA must ensure they are provided with:

(1) A supporting recommendation by the TAR in respect of the technical aspects of the Type Certification of the new aircraft or Major change.

(2) A document containing the operational airworthiness management strategy to meet the requirements of OAREG 3.2—New aircraft and Major changes to Type Design.

(3) The approved SOI.

(4) A document which summarises the accomplishments against the operational airworthiness management strategy including:

i. reference to the approved SOI and summary of any changes made to account for the CRE and planned usage

ii. a summary of the operational compliance finding activity which demonstrates that the elements of the certification basis are acceptable and the system is operationally suitable for the approved CRE

iii. a summary of the test and evaluation activity which demonstrates that the activity has been sufficient to show compliance with the certification basis and identify all necessary operating limitations and procedures

iv. a summary of human factors assessments which demonstrate that the system can be safely operated in the intended CRE by Defence aircrew

v. a summary of flying safety incidents which demonstrates that each incident has been adequately addressed

vi. a summary of assessment of aircrew publications which demonstrates that all limitations and procedures necessary to safely operate the system have been captured

vii. a list of current issue papers which are being managed to resolve outstanding airworthiness issues

viii. any exemptions to these regulations granted in writing by the OAR

ix. a recommendation regarding the extent to which the OAAR(Acq) considers the aviation system suitable for flight in the SOI CRE.

GUIDANCE

• The documents and evidence required to achieve an OAA recommendation for Type Certification are a subset of those required for submission to the Airworthiness Board prior to Defence AA issue of an AMTC. The full requirements for a submission to the Airworthiness Board are contained in AAP 7001.048.

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OAREG 3.3 – OPERATION OF A NEW AIRCRAFT OR MAJOR CHANGE PRIOR TO SERVICE RELEASE

POLICY

New aircraft or Major technical changes usually require operation prior to Service Release for a limited scope of operations necessary to assure aspects of the design as suitable for the intended CRE. A Temporary Airworthiness Instrument may be issued in these circumstances to permit operations on the basis that the type certification activity (OAREG 3.2) and flying management arrangements (OAREG 3.3) are sufficient to support a specified limited scope of operations.

SCOPE

This regulation prescribes operational airworthiness requirements for issue of a Temporary Airworthiness Instrument to support a limited scope of operations.

AIRWORTHINESS BASIS

Operations where the type certification activity is incomplete, or the FMS is insufficiently mature, require oversight through examination of the type certification activity and flying management arrangements in relation to the scope of operations sought. Safety is assured through limiting flight operations to a level supported by the state of type certification activity and flying management arrangements.

OAREG 3.3 – OPERATION OF A NEW AIRCRAFT OR MAJOR CHANGE PRIOR TO SERVICE RELEASE

Except as allowed by OAREG 4, an aircraft must only be operated prior to SR under a Temporary Airworthiness Instrument. Applications for Temporary Airworthiness Instruments must only be made when the activities and FMS arrangements required by OAREG 3.2—New aircraft and Major changes to Type Design and OAREG 3.4—Service Release for new aircraft and Major changes to Type Design are sufficiently complete to assure airworthiness for the scope of operations being sought.

3.3.1 Airworthiness Directives

a. Where necessary, an OAA must seek advice from the OAR regarding the applicability, scope, and requirements for issue of an AD to permit flying operations prior to SR.

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3.3.2 Application for a Special Flight Permit

a. An application for a SFP must be endorsed by the relevant OAA in accordance with these regulations.

b. The OAA must only endorse an application for a SFP when the activities required by OAREG 3.2—New aircraft and Major changes to Type Design and OAREG 3.4—Service Release for new aircraft and Major changes to Type Design are sufficiently complete to assure airworthiness for the scope of operations being sought.

c. Prior to endorsing the application for a SFP, the OAA must ensure that the SFP application:

(1) Identifies the scope and purpose of flight proposed under the SFP.

(2) Includes an AVRM plan applicable to the proposed scope of the SFP and identifying necessary risk treatments.

(3) Contains reference to aircrew orders, instructions, procedures and flight checklists applicable to the proposed scope of flight operations.

(4) Identifies the maturity of the FMS under which operations are sought, applicable to the scope and purpose of the SFP, including:

i. the qualification and competency standards for aircrew to operate the aircraft

ii. identification of those aircrew meeting the listed competency criteria who can operate the aircraft under the SFP

iii. the flight supervision and authorisation process to be applied to operations under the SFP

iv. identification of an officer, or officers, within the operating organisation who have responsibility for authorisation of all flights under the SFP

v. the provision for proactive and reactive flying safety measures.

GUIDANCE

• An application for an SFP is normally originated by the acquisition organisation.

3.3.3 OAA Recommendation for Issue of a Special Flight Permit

a. An OAA may provide a recommendation for issue of a SFP to the Defence AA once satisfied that the evidence submitted under OAREG 3.3.3.b forms a satisfactory basis to assure airworthiness for the scope of operations being sought.

b. Prior to recommending the issue of an SFP, the OAA must ensure that they are provided with:

(1) A supporting recommendation by the TAA in respect of the technical aspects of the scope of operations sought under the SFP.


(3) A document which summarises the achievements made against the operational airworthiness management strategy appropriate to the scope of operations sought under the SFP.

(4) An application for an SFP meeting the requirements of OAREG 3.3.2.

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OAREG 3.4 – SERVICE RELEASE FOR NEW AIRCRAFT AND MAJOR CHANGES TO TYPE DESIGN

POLICY

The conduct of initial flight operations requires that the Aviation System is considered airworthy for the proposed SOI roles and environment and that an adequate FMS has been established to support the airworthiness of ongoing operations.

SCOPE

This regulation prescribes requirements for implementation of operational airworthiness infrastructure necessary to support Service Release (SR) of a new aircraft or Major change to Type Design.

AIRWORTHINESS BASIS

Airworthiness management and oversight of the supporting arrangement for the introduction of a new aircraft or Major change ensures safety of flight through rigorous examination of the capacity of the FMS to support operations by competent and authorised personnel at a defined and manageable rate of effort.

OAREG 3.4 – SERVICE RELEASE FOR NEW AIRCRAFT AND MAJOR CHANGES TO TYPE DESIGN

Prior to SR, the OAA must ensure that:

a. A FMS has been established which meets the requirements of OAREG 2.1—Flying Management System to the extent necessary to safely manage flight operations within the SOI roles and environment.

b. A system of operational rules, limitations and instructions have been documented in relevant OIP, as required by OAREG 2.2—Operations, which are approved by the OAA as appropriate to safely conduct flight operations.

c. The training, qualification, and competency criteria have been established in accordance with OAREG 2.3—Qualifications and training and have been approved by the OAA as appropriate to safely operate the aircraft.

d. There are sufficient trained aircrew to manage and operate the Aviation System at the expected rate of effort, within the SOI roles and environment.

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3.4.1 OAA Recommendation for Service Release

a. The relevant OAA may provide a recommendation for SR to the Defence AA once satisfied that the evidence submitted under OAREG 3.4.1b indicates that the operational organisation is suitably prepared and resourced to commence flight operations at a defined and manageable rate of effort.

b. Prior to recommending SR, an OAA must ensure they are provided with:

(1) A supporting recommendation by the TAA in respect of the technical aspects of SR of the new aircraft or Major change.


(3) A document which summarises the accomplishments against the operational airworthiness management strategy including:

i. a description of the scope of flying to be undertaken following SR

ii. a summary of the status of each element of the FMS

iii. the approval status and availability of OIP necessary to safely conduct flight operations

iv. the approval status of training and qualification requirements

v. a summary of the AVRM conducted to address initial operations including appropriate risk mitigation

vi. the availability of sufficient competent aircrew.

(4) If necessary, a list of recommended SR limitations resulting from:

i. the immaturity of the FMS

ii. technical issues affecting the aircraft’s suitability for the SOI CRE

iii. operational limits resulting from T&E activities performed prior to Type Certification.

GUIDANCE

• The OAA may recommend SR subject to certain operational limitations. Such limitations may result from incomplete test and evaluation, equipment availability or performance limitations, or limitations relating to the maturity of the FMS.

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OAREG 3.5 – NEW OR MODIFIED CONFIGURATION, ROLE OR ENVIRONMENT

POLICY

New or modified aircraft CRE may not require a Major change to the Type Design. Similarly, a technically straightforward design change may cause a substantial change to the role or method of operation. Where a substantial change to an aircraft CRE does not justify a Major design change, sufficient operational airworthiness oversight must be applied through a structured evaluation of the impact of such changes.

SCOPE

This regulation prescribes requirements for management of changes to CRE which do not require a Major change to the Type Design.

AIRWORTHINESS BASIS

Airworthiness management and oversight of substantial changes to an aircraft CRE ensures safety through evaluation of the impact of the change on the management and conduct of operations.

OAREG 3.5 – NEW OR MODIFIED CONFIGURATION, ROLE OR ENVIRONMENT

An OAA must ensure that substantial changes to an aircraft’s CRE undergo Supplemental Role Approval to ensure the impact on flying operations is adequately assessed and managed.

3.5.1 Conduct of Supplemental Role Approval (SRA)

a. An OAA must ensure that flying activity in support of SRA is referred to an FTAA when:

(1) Flight Test is required prior to SR of a Minor design change resulting from a CRE change

(2) the impact of the change requires assessment by qualified test staff

(3) operation of the aircraft beyond approved flight limitations is required to support the CRE change, or

(4) Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) to develop new tactics, operational procedures or training procedures is required.

b. The FTAA may endorse an OT&E plan in support of OAREG 3.5.1a.(3) for conduct under the originating OAA once the FTAA is satisfied that the proposed operations can be safely conducted within the relevant FMS.

c. An OAA may conduct the testing required under OAREG 3.5.1.a(1) and OAREG 3.5.1.a(4) where the OAA is compliant with the competency framework identified by the FTAA under OAREG 4.2 for the nature and extent of operations required.

3.5.2 OAA Approval of a Supplemental Role

a. Prior to approval of a Supplemental Role, the OAA must be satisfied that:

(1) Confirmation has been received from the aircraft DAR that adequate technical and logistics arrangements have been implemented in respect of the impact of the change on technical airworthiness.

(2) The relevant FMS is adequate to safely manage flight operations in the new or modified role.

(3) Any additional rules, limitations or instructions have been documented in relevant OIP and are appropriate to safely conduct flight operations in the new or modified role.

(4) Any additional training, qualification and competency criteria have been established and are appropriate to safely operate the aircraft in the new or modified role.

(5) There are sufficient trained aircrew to manage and operate the Aviation System in the new or modified role at the expected rate of effort.

(6) The Type Certification Data Sheet (TCDS) has been reviewed and amended if required.

b. The OAA must ensure all approved Supplemental Roles are presented at the next scheduled Airworthiness Board.

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FLIGHT TEST

OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATION 4.0 – FLIGHT TEST

OAREG 4.0 – FLIGHT TEST1

a. The OAA/FTAA must issue a Flight Test Permit that will authorise the conduct of Defence flight test in a manner that will not compromise suitability for flight.

b. The OAA/FTAA must ensure that flight test plans are established to support the safe and effective conduct of Defence flight test.

c. The Defence Organisation Head engaging Defence personnel in non-Defence flight test must ensure that risk to participating Defence personnel arising from flight test activity has been eliminated, or otherwise reduced, so far as is reasonably practicable.

d. The OAA/FTAA must ensure that all Defence and non-Defence flight test activity is presented at the next scheduled Defence AA Airworthiness Board Review.

1 OAREG 4 guidance is contained in Section 7 Chapter 1

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OPERATION OF NON-DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT

OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATION 5 – OPERATION OF NON-DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT (NDRA)1

OAREG 5.1 – OPERATION OF NON-DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT BY DEFENCE ORGANISATIONS

a. The Sponsor that purchases, wet leases, dry leases, charters or authorises operation of a non-Defence registered aircraft by or on behalf of Defence must ensure the aircraft’s operation is subject to the regulatory requirements of a Defence AA recognised NAA/MAA.

b. The Sponsor that purchases, wet leases, dry leases, charters or authorises operation of a non-Defence registered aircraft by or on behalf of Defence must implement safety controls to the operation of non-Defence registered aircraft such that it is reasonably expected that suitability for flight will not be compromised.

c. The Sponsor that purchases, wet leases, dry leases, charters or authorises operation of a non-Defence registered aircraft by or on behalf of Defence must suspend flight operations when suitability for flight is believed to be compromised.

d. The Defence AA must approve any Defence operation of a non–Defence registered aircraft to be operated under an Experimental Certificate of Airworthiness.

OAREG 5.2 – OPERATION OF NON-DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT BY DEFENCE PERSONNEL a. Defence personnel that operate a non-Defence registered aircraft on behalf of Defence must comply

with the Defence AA recognised NAA or MAA regulatory requirements and any further controls imposed by the relevant Sponsor.

OAREG 5.3 – OPERATION OF FOREIGN MILITARY AIRCRAFT IN AUSTRALIAN AIRSPACE a. The Sponsor who approves a foreign military aircraft to operate within Australian airspace as part of

Defence exercises, capability trials or under other sustained operations must ensure that the foreign aircraft operation will not compromise suitability for flight.

b. The Sponsor who approves a foreign military aircraft to operate within Australian airspace must suspend the foreign military aircraft flight operation when there is concern that suitability for flight may be compromised.


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AVIATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS

OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATION 6 – AVIATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS1

OAREG 6.1 – AVSS a. The OAA must ensure AvSS compliance activities comply with OAREG 1.3.

b. The OAA must ensure an operational document established as required under OAREG 6:

(1) complies with OAREG 2.1.7 – OIP

(2) includes a reference to any ICAO Annex used as an acceptable means of compliance, and the established means for communicating future ICAO amendments to the document sponsor.

6.1.1 – Personnel Competency Management a. The OAA must ensure AvSS service providers establish a personnel competency management system

that trains and authorises operational staff to provide the service.


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6.1.2 – Aerodromes a. The OAA must approve any classification of an aerodrome as a heliport and ensure the classification is

recorded in the relevant aerodrome manual and on the AvSSC.

b. The OAA must categorise Defence aerodromes as either:

(1) Defence certified

(2) Defence registered

(3) Defence unregistered.

c. The OAA must ensure each certified or registered aerodrome holds an individual AvSSC that reflects the aerodrome category.

d. The OAA must provide DACPA with a copy of each aerodrome AvSSC.

Aerodrome manual e. The OAA must ensure an aerodrome manual is established for each certified or registered aerodrome

that:

(1) details operational procedures, plans and essential information used to maintain and operate the aerodrome including:

i. public information required for flight planning or other operational needs

ii. the ARFF level of protection required in support of aerodrome operation

iii. the obstacle data Coverage Area information

(2) details the personnel authorised to provide aerodrome information intended for public use to the Defence AISP

(3) is approved in accordance with the command and management design for the Defence Base supporting the aerodrome

(4) is reviewed annually.

Public information f. The OAA must ensure that public information for each certified or registered aerodrome:

(1) required for flight planning or other operational needs is documented in the aerodrome manual, and

(2) is provided to the Defence AISP for publishing in the Defence AIP.

g. The OAA must ensure Defence AIP aerodrome information is current and consistent with the aerodrome manual.

h. The OAA must ensure a system is established that ensures the ongoing integrity and validity of unregistered aerodrome data published for public use.

Low visibility procedures (LVP) i. The OAA must ensure LVP are established for each certified aerodrome that ensures safe surface

movements.

j. The OAA must determine the LVP requirements for each registered aerodrome.

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Movement area inspections k. The OAA must ensure personnel who conduct movement area inspections are appropriately trained.

l. The OAA must ensure movement areas for certified aerodromes are inspected:

(1) daily (prior to flight activity occurring)

(2) immediately before last light (when night flying is planned)

(3) monthly.

m. The OAA must determine the movement area inspection requirements for each registered aerodrome.

Foreign Object Debris (FOD) n. The OAA must ensure a FOD prevention program is established for each certified aerodrome.

o. The OAA must determine the FOD prevention program requirements for each registered aerodrome.

Obstacles2 p. Obstacle data. The DEPSEC E&IG must ensure:

(1) Required obstacle data for an aerodrome is acquired.

(2) A master database for aerodrome obstacle data is retained for the aerodrome.

(3) The obstacle data, including all changes, is provided to the Defence AISP.

(4) The obstacle data is validated annually or less often if the OAA agrees.

(5) Consultation with the relevant aerodrome manual approval authority for known land use proposals that may result in new aerodrome obstacle hazards.

q. Obstacle data requirements. The DEPSEC E&IG must ensure obstacle data is acquired for each Defence aerodrome as follows:

(1) Certified aerodromes or certified heliports:

(a) the primary runway(s)

(b) as determined by the OAA, any secondary runway(s)

(c) a minimum of 10 km circumference from the aerodrome reference point, unless the OAA determines a larger distance is required.

(2) As determined by the OAA for each registered aerodrome.

r. Reserved.

Airside access control s. The OAA must ensure all personnel who require airside access are qualified and authorised.

2 OAR Decision Brief of 08 Oct 15 (AB24217412). Guidance material is contained in Section 9 Chapter 1.

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Manoeuvring area t. The OAA must ensure aerodrome works/maintenance activities conducted on the manoeuvring areas

are supervised by qualified and authorised personnel.

u. Vehicle control. The OAA must ensure vehicle operations on the manoeuvring area:

(1) are equipped with an appropriate radio

(2) establish radio communication before entering a manoeuvring area

(3) are in receipt of an ATC clearance when an ATS is provided at the aerodrome, or comply with Common Traffic Advisory Frequency (CTAF) procedures if the aerodrome is uncontrolled

(4) maintain a continuous listening watch on the ATS assigned or CTAF required frequency

(5) give way to aircraft unless ATC directs otherwise, or the pilot of the aircraft has agreed to give way

(6) are compliant with any other local aerodrome vehicle requirements.

Movement area v. Vehicle control. The OAA must ensure vehicles used to access movement areas are equipped with

safety lighting to indicate the presence of vehicles or mobile plant on the movement area.

w. Speed control. The OAA must ensure the following maximum movement area vehicle speed limits are not exceeded:

(1) Runways and taxiways: 70 km/h, unless a higher speed is operationally required.

(2) All aprons: 40 km/h.

(3) Within 10 metres of any aircraft: 10 km/h.

(4) Within 5 metres of any aircraft: 5 km/h.

x. Aircraft arrestor systems. The OAA must ensure aircraft limitations pertaining to the aircraft type’s ability to trample raised or partially raised aircraft arrestor cables is advised to the aerodrome’s ATS provider.

Wildlife Hazard Management Plan (WHMP) y. The OAA must ensure a WHMP is established for each certified aerodrome.

z. The OAA must determine the WHMP requirements for each registered aerodrome.

Aerodrome Emergency Plan (AEP) aa. The OAA must ensure an AEP is established for each certified aerodrome.

bb. The OAA must determine the AEP requirements for each registered aerodrome.

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6.1.3 – Aerodrome Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) a. The OAA must ensure:

(1) An operational document is established that details ARFF procedures.

(2) The constraints for ARFF to operate elsewhere other than on the supported aerodrome are established and published in the aerodrome manual.

(3) Aerodrome emergency access roads are provided that facilitate ARFF achieving a response time not exceeding three minutes to any point of each operational runway, in optimum visibility and surface conditions from the ARFF base station.

(4) The ARFF level of protection required in support of aerodrome operations is established and published in the aerodrome manual.

(5) A reliable communication system is established that allows direct communications between the ARFF base station, ATC tower, the ARFF vehicles and other required emergency response services.

(6) Personnel who provide an ARFF service comply with OAREG 6.1.1.

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6.1.4 – Aeronautical Information a. The OAA must approve use of aeronautical information or data obtained from entities other than the

Defence AISP.

b. The OAA must ensure the published Defence AIP includes:

(1) Publications that advise those flight procedures and airspace requirements used to conduct flight nationally and internationally.

(2) Aeronautical data in support of mission planning products.

(3) Enroute charts, both national and international as required.

(4) Visual charts used for navigation and planning purposes.

(5) Terminal charts containing information on departure and approach procedures for:

(a) each certified aerodrome

(b) each registered aerodrome (as determined by the OAA)

(c) each operationally relevant overseas aerodrome (as determined by the OAA).

(6) any other matter of lasting relevance relating to the facilitation of air traffic.

c. The OAA must ensure the Defence AIP states the Defence AA as the publishing authority.

d. The OAA must approve authorisations for specialised flight procedures that form part of the Defence AIP or civil AIP that may be used by Defence aviation, including obtaining TAA recommendations when required.

e. The OAA must ensure personnel who design aeronautical instrument procedures used for conduct of flight comply with OAREG 6.1.1.

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6.1.5 – Air Battle Management (ABM) a. The OAA must ensure an operational document is established that details ABM procedures.

b. The OAA must ensure personnel who provide an ABM service comply with OAREG 6.1.1.

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6.1.6 – Air Cargo Delivery (ACD) a. The OAA must ensure an operational document is established that details ACD procedures.

b. The OAA must approve any waiver for IATA identified dangerous goods (DG) that are not configured and handled in accordance with IATA regulations unless the Defence ACD document has authorised a different procedure.

c. The OAA must ensure that personnel who configure, load and unload air cargo comply with OAREG 6.1.1.

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6.1.7 – Air Traffic Management (ATM) a. Air traffic service (ATS). The OAA must ensure an operational document is established that:

(1) details ATS procedures and air traffic control (ATC) separation standards

(2) is harmonised with ICAO and national civil practice.

b. The OAA must ensure Defence ATS providers within Australian airspace resolve differences between AIP Australia, Defence AIP and the Defence ATS documents in accordance with the following document hierarchy:

(1) AIP Australia and Defence AIP take precedence over the Defence ATS document.

(2) For military aircraft, Defence AIP has precedence over AIP Australia and the Defence ATS document.

c. Any reduction of air traffic separation standards prescribed in the Defence ATS document must be approved by the OAA for the effected aircraft type.

d. ATC license. The OAA must ensure personnel providing an ATC service possess an ATC license that complies with ICAO Annex 1 – Personnel Licensing.

e. The OAA must ensure the ATC license:

(1) clearly indicates ICAO compliance has been achieved

(2) specifies the OAR as the licensing authority

(3) is issued by the OAA.

f. The OAA must ensure an operational document is established that details Battlefield Airspace Control (BAC) procedures.

g. The OAA must ensure personnel providing an ATS comply with OAREG 6.1.1.

h. Airspace management. The OAA must ensure an operational document is established that details airspace management procedures to ensure safe, orderly and efficient use of Defence administered airspace.

i. The OAA must ensure airspace requirements for Defence administered Prohibited, Restricted and Danger (PRD) areas are established and include:

(1) Vertical airspace requirements.

(2) Lateral airspace boundary requirements.

(3) The hours of airspace activation required for the training area.

(4) The Restricted Area (RA) civil access status.

(5) Identification and contact information for the coordinating authority for each airspace.

(6) The level of ATS, if active, that will be provided to civil aircraft should access to the RA be approved.

j. The OAA must ensure Defence PRD requirements are provided to the CASA Office of Airspace Regulation.

k. The OAA must ensure the Defence (Special Undertakings) Act 1952 is not used for the relatively routine activities of declaring airspace for military raise, train, sustain (RTS) requirements.

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6.1.8 – Air Weapons Range (AWR) a. The OAA must ensure an operational document is established that details AWR airspace safety

procedures.

b. The OAA must ensure AWR activities involving delivery of ordnance employ an AWR airspace safety officer.

c. The OAA must ensure personnel who provide an AWR airspace safety service comply with OAREG 6.1.1.

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6.1.9 – Meteorology (MET) a. The OAA must ensure an operational document is established that details Defence generated MET

product development and MET product delivery procedures.

b. The OAA must ensure Defence personnel who provide a MET service comply with OAREG 6.1.1.

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6.1.10 – Ship Aviation Facilities (SAF) a. The OAA must ensure SAF based personnel providing an ABM service comply with OAREG 6.1.5 –

ABM.

b. The OAA must ensure SAF based personnel providing a MCS service comply with OAREG 6.1.7 – ATM.

c. The OAA must ensure personnel who provide air capable ship based ARFF comply with OAREG 6.1.1.

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6.1.11 – Terminal Attack Control (TAC) a. The OAA must ensure an operational document is established that details TAC procedures.

b. The OAA must ensure personnel who provide a TAC service comply with OAREG 6.1.1.

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AL 3 1

SECTION 2

CHAPTER 7

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATION 7 – UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

POLICY

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) provide an array of capabilities which allow commanders to exploit aviation assets without risk to human crews. The Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP) Airworthiness Management System (AMS) applies to all Defence UAS. The relevant OAA is responsible for operational airworthiness management of a UAS.

TRANSITION RESPONSIBILITIES

Compliance assurance events against OAREG 7 will align with the scheduled AwB from 2015 onwards. Should an UAS not be scheduled for an AwB in 2015, the first formal compliance assurance events against the amended regulations will align with the scheduled OAA/OAAR compliance assurance activities.1

The OAA must complete categorisation/re-categorisation determination process of existing UAS, delegated/or under their oversight, by 30 Jun 15.

The OAA may continue to operate an existing UAS IAW approved UASOP until 30 Jun 15, should transition to the revised regulations be impractical or unachievable beforehand.

SCOPE

The outcome of OAREG 7 is to enable Defence UAS operations to be conducted at acceptable levels of safety and, where appropriate, to a level As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).2 OAREG 7 expands upon MILAVREG 7 requirements by regulating operational aspects of the UAS Airworthiness framework.

MILAVREG 7 regulates the requirements for Defence UAS Categorisation. The Categorisation of Defence UAS underpins the Airworthiness framework of UAS, such that the level of airworthiness management oversight applied to Defence UAS operations is commensurate with the operational role of the system and the resultant risks posed to people on the ground, other aircraft and property. To ensure correct application of OAREG 7, an understanding of the MILAVREG 7 UAS Categorisation determination is essential.

OAREG 7 is comprised of the following regulations:

a. OAREG 7.1 – UAS Management.

b. OAREG 7.2 – UAS Operations.

OAREG 7 guidance is contained in Section 10 Chapter 1.

OAREG 7.1–UAS MANAGEMENT

7.1.1 UAS general

a. The OAA must ensure UAS compliance activities comply with OAREG 1.3.

b. The OAA must ensure that UAS operational documents comply with OAREG 2.1.7 – OIP.

c. The OAA must periodically review a UASOP where an AwB under MILAVREG 4 is not required.

d. The OAA must periodically review a Category 4 UAS management system.

7.1.2 UAS Statement of Operating Intent (SOI)

a. The OAA must ensure an SOI for Category 1 and 2 UAS is issued.

b. The OAA must ensure OIP that defines the CRE for Category 3 and 4 UAS is issued.

1 Defence AA Decision Brief: Publish DASP UAS Regulation Amendments as an Airworthiness Directive of 7 Jul 14 - AB18514571 2 DI(G) OPS 02-2 – Defence Aviation Safety Program

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7.1.3 UAS Risk Analysis

a. The OAA must ensure a risk analysis is conducted in support of an event requiring UAS Categorisation under OAREG 7.2.1.

7.1.4 UAS Air Traffic Management Plan (ATMP)

a. The OAA must ensure an ATMP management system is established that assures UAS Category 1, 2 or 3 airspace use is appropriate for the authorised activity.

7.1.5 UAS Flying Management System (FMS)

a. The OAA must ensure an FMS is maintained for Category 1 and 2 UAS in accordance with OAREG 2.1.

b. The OAA must ensure a flying management system is established for Category 3 and 4 UAS.

7.1.6 UAS Operating Permit

a. In complying with MILAVREG 7.1 and MILAVREG 3.7, the OAA must initiate a UASOP change or reissue when:

(1) a technical change to the Category 2 or 3 UAS has been made which is equivalent to a Major change to the Type Design; or

(2) an operational change to the Category 2 or 3 UAS has been made which is equivalent to a Substantial change to CRE.

7.1.7 Operation of non–Defence registered UAS

a. The OAA must ensure that operation of a non-Defence registered UAS by or on behalf of Defence, or by a foreign military within Australian airspace, are conducted in accordance with the requirements of MILAVREG 7, OAREG 7, MILAVREG 5 and OAREG 5.

OAREG 7.2 –UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS – OPERATIONS

7.2.1 UAS Categorisation – General

a. In complying with MILAVREG 7.1, an OAA must:

(1) make UAS Category 1 or 2 categorisation recommendations to the Defence AA:

(a) prior to introduction into Service of a UAS, or

(b) when a planned change to the CRE is likely to result in a change to the approved Category of an in-service UAS.

(2) make categorisation determinations for Category 3 and 4 UAS prior to commencement of operations.

GUIDANCE

• IAW MILAVREG 7, carriage of human passengers or weapons on any UAS category requires Defence AA approval.

• Deviations to the operation of a UAS beyond the scope of the UASOP should be managed in accordance with OAREG 2.2.15—Operational Clearance.

7.2.2 Category 1 UAS Operation

a. The OAA must ensure Category 1 UAS are operated in accordance with the requirements of OAREG 2.2—Operations.

b. The OAA must ensure Category 1 UAS are operated in accordance with the approved airworthiness instrument and supporting documents.

c. The OAA must ensure a Category 1 UAS Remote Pilot (RP) is trained and qualified in accordance with OAREG 2.3—Qualifications and training, or an equivalent training and qualification system.

d. A Category 1 UAS RP must be a qualified military Pilot, or hold equivalent civilian IFR Pilot qualifications.

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7.2.3 Category 2 UAS Operation:

a. The OAA must ensure Category 2 UAS are operated in accordance with the requirements of OAREG 2.2—Operations.

b. The OAA must ensure Category 2 UAS operations present a lower risk than Category 1 UAS to other airspace users, people and property when operated in the approved CRE.

c. The OAA must ensure Category 2 UAS are operated in accordance with the approved UASOP and supporting documents.

d. The OAA must ensure a Category 2 UAS Remote Pilot (RP) is trained and qualified in accordance with OAREG 2.3 – Qualifications and training, or an equivalent training and qualification system.

e. A Category 2 UAS RP must be a qualified military Pilot, or hold equivalent civilian IFR Pilot qualifications, unless the UAS flight will be constrained to CAT 3 UAS airspace, people and property limitations.


a. The OAA must ensure Category 3 UAS operations present a lower risk than Category 2 UAS to other airspace users, people and property when operated in the approved CRE.

b. The OAA must ensure Category 3 UAS are operated in accordance with the requirements of the approved UASOP and supporting documents.

c. The OAA must ensure a Category 3 UAS register is maintained.

d. The OAA must ensure a Category 3 UAS Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) is trained and qualified in accordance with OAREG 2.3—Qualifications and training, or an equivalent training and qualification system.


a. The OAA must ensure Category 4 UAS operations present a negligible risk to other airspace users, people and property.

b. The OAA must ensure Category 4 UAS are operated by approved and competent personnel.

c. The OAA must ensure a Category 4 UAS register is maintained.

d. The OAA must ensure a Risk Management Plan is maintained for the operation of Category 4 UAS.

7.2.6 Category 4 UAS Manager

a. The OAA must comply with OAREG 2.1.1 if appointing a Category 4 UAS Manager.

b. An OAA appointed Category 4 UAS Manager must ensure that UAS are operated:

(1) in accordance with the categorisation requirements,

(2) by approved and competent personnel,

(3) under a Risk Management Plan, and

(4) in accordance with any additional requirements of the OAA.

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FLIGHT SIMULATION TRAINING DEVICES

OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATION 8 – FLIGHT SIMULATION TRAINING DEVICES (FSTD)1

OAREG 8 – FLIGHT SIMULATION TRAINING DEVICE MANAGEMENT

a. The OAA must approve a Flight Simulation Training Device Installation Operating Permit prior to use of the Flight Simulation Training Device in support of flight crew training, qualification or currency.

b. The OAA must ensure a Flight Simulation Training Device Management System is established that details the implementation and ongoing in service management of the Flight Simulation Training Device.


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SECTION 2

CHAPTER 9

OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS OF AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT

RESERVED

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OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS FOR THE CONDUCT OF FLYING OPERATIONS

Applicable Regulations

OAREG 2—Conduct of flying operations

INTRODUCTION

1. Regulations applying to Defence Aviation operations are contained within OAREG 2—Conduct of flying operations. OAREG 2 addresses the management of flying operations, operational matters and the competency and authorisation of aircrew. OAA/FTAAs and OAARs are responsible for implementing these regulations, which includes the development of subordinate local and aviation-system-specific OIP.

2. The guidance contained in this section, together with sections 4 and 5, is provided to assist in the interpreting and implementing of OAREG 2. The guidance material is discretionary, and should not be treated as mandatory.

PURPOSE

3. This chapter explains the rationale and intent of OAREG 2—Conduct of flying operations. Later chapters and sections provide focused guidance on each element of OAREG 2 where developed operational practice has been documented at the Defence level.

APPLICABILITY

4. This chapter is concerned with OAREG 2, which under the DASP is applicable to all Defence Aviation operations, including those where Defence Personnel operate non-Defence registered aircraft.

FOUNDATIONS OF OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS

OVERVIEW

5. Operational airworthiness is concerned with ensuring aircraft are operated in approved roles, with correct mission equipment, by competent and authorised individuals, according to approved procedures and instructions, under a system of supervision and monitoring. This is achieved in practical terms through a structure of three interconnected elements:

a. Competent flying organisation

b. Approved operating standards and limitations

c. Qualified and authorised aircrew.

6. Figure 1-1 illustrates how these interconnected elements, together with their constitute parts, form the foundations upon which Defence’s operational airworthiness concept is put into effect. These three elements are further elaborated in the following paragraphs.

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Figure 1–1 Foundations of operational airworthiness

FLYING ORGANISATIONS

7. The aviation community has learnt from experience that aircraft accidents are normally the result of a linked sequence of errors, omissions or failures; the prevention of any one of which would have broken the ‘chain’ and stopped the accident from occurring. The community has also learnt that such ‘chains-of-failure’ are unlikely to develop within structured organisations where activities are performed and supervised by appointed individuals in accordance with refined processes and instructions. The likelihood of accidents is further reduced where such organisations are subjected to ongoing (internal and external) assessments of their performance and compliance with prescribed requirements. For this reason, Defence Aviation operations are required to be conducted by personnel working within flying organisations that are assessed, approved and routinely reappraised to operate particular Aviation Systems in defined roles in accordance with approved requirements.

8. Flying organisations provide local guidance, training, supervision and monitoring of individual aircrew to ensure they are competent and authorised to conduct specific flying operations. To support the performance of this role, Defence flying organisations are required to establish and abide by local management practices, rules, orders and instructions regarding flying operations. They are also required to develop training and qualification requirements appropriate to the operations they conduct. Collectively, such administrative arrangements, or elements, form the organisation’s ‘Flying Management System’. OAREG 2.1—Flying Management System identifies the key elements of a FMS and the following chapter of this manual provides guidance on its implementation.

9. FMSs may be local in focus, but to allow organisations to safely operate with one another, and to provide for the movement of personnel between them, there must be some consistency or commonality across organisations. For this reason, FMSs are subject to Defence-wide requirements relating to operational rules and pre-requisite training and qualification standards. These considerations are the subject of OAREG 2.2—Operations and OAREG 2.3—Qualifications and training respectively. Similar logic applies to non-Defence registered aircraft operated by Defence personnel, which is why OAREG 5—Operational Airworthiness Management of non-Defence registered aircraft ties the operation of non-Defence registered aircraft back to OAREGs 2.1.

OPERATING STANDARDS AND LIMITATIONS

10. Serious losses experienced by its maritime industry prompted British government initiatives in the 1880s to protect its citizenry. It did so by controlling risk through instituting seaworthiness rules that provided a considered and approved code of common standards and practices. When aircraft began to fly in the early 1900s, it was a natural progression to extend this initiative and establish airworthiness rules. Initially, aviation rules were focused on protecting citizens on the ground, but as priorities changed, the rules were extended to protect passengers and crew. Aviation rules evolve over time as authorities develops a better understanding of the associated risks, including those

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relating to technology, human limitations and environmental factors such as weather. Society’s perceptions also play a role, so aviation rules are heavily influenced by public expectations and the subjective reasoning of parties with differing views, priorities and backgrounds. The process is essentially one where the benefits of aviation activities are weighed against the risks. In prescribing airworthiness rules, the DASP aims to meet the objective that Defence Aviation is conducted at an acceptable level of risk.

11. Operational rules establish boundaries for the conduct of aviation operations. Defence operating standards and limitations are the set of approved guidelines, instructions and restrictions within which aircraft are to be operated by personnel belonging to a flying organisation. Such criteria are derived from a collective wisdom that encompasses the engineering, medical and operational fields; with the latter including the military arena. Operating standards and limitations may be high-level and general in nature or specific to an Aircraft Type, operating locality, competency level, mission category or flying organisation. The common feature is that operating standards and limitations should all promote the attainment of a known level of safety for aviation operations. They should also be consistent with one another and not susceptible to mixed interpretations or subject to arbitrary development. Notwithstanding this, the nature of the considerations behind operating standards and limitations means that they are not always permanent; they may change as more becomes known about human behaviour and aircraft design or as other factors come into play, such as adjustments in societal priorities.

12. The Defence airworthiness concept promotes the devolution of operational rule development and monitoring to the flying organisation level where practicable. This allows commanders the flexibility to exercise discretion and judgement in managing the safe operation of aviation systems they are familiar with in roles and environments they are accustomed to and approved for. There remains, though, a need for operational rules to be based on minimum and consistent criteria, so Defence airworthiness regulations are intended to prescribe common minimum requirements which are then supported by more focused and tailored rules developed for individual flying organisations.

13. At the level of a flying organisation, standards and limitations whether locally and externally developed may take a number of forms including, among others, flight manuals, SR limitations, Standing Orders, authoritative Flight Information Documents and rules governing crew training and currency, low flying, air displays, cargo carriage, the use of role equipment and others. Collectively, such documentation comes under the title of OIP, the subject of OAREG 2.1.7—Management of Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP). Other MAAs and NAAs may use the term Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA) in lieu of OIP.

14. Defence operational airworthiness requirements regarding operating standards and limitations are prescribed by OAREG 2.2. As shown by Figure 1-1, Defence operational airworthiness requirements cover a range of areas. Guidance on implementing OAREG 2.2 is provided in section 4.

AIRCREW QUALIFICATION AND AUTHORISATION

15. The safety of aviation systems depends upon them being designed, constructed, maintained and operated by personnel who are competent and authorised to do so. The abilities of the end-user are key design considerations for any item of equipment, but this is a particularly important principle in aviation. Designers, however, still need to presume a certain level of proficiency or competency in operators and this manifests itself in design parameters covering such matters as handling characteristics, cockpit and control layouts and the coverage of automated systems. Defining and attaining these operator abilities is a prerequisite to achieving known minimum levels of operational safety and effectiveness.

16. To help meet operational safety and effectiveness minima, Defence only permits aviation systems to be operated by qualified and authorised individuals who have been assessed as competent and fit to operate a particular type of aviation system in specified roles. However, since Defence aircraft may be operated in multiple roles (many of which may be unusually demanding) it may be not be feasible for aircrew flying a particular type to be competent in all of its intended roles. There may necessarily be a range of competencies required within a flying organisation. Furthermore, some roles that may be technically possible for an aircraft to perform may not be approved for a particular flying organisation because it is not practicable for its personnel to become and stay competent in performing the roles.

17. Competency in the context of Defence airworthiness refers to the capacity of an individual to effectively and safely complete a task to a required standard of performance through the application of appropriate skills, knowledge and attitude. For aircrew, competency is achieved and recognised through a controlled and progressive process of training, accumulated experience and formal assessments.

18. Since competency is measured against a standard of performance, flying organisations must determine what these standards are. Certain competencies are regarded as essential for the safe operation of all aircraft, so these are set under Defence-wide arrangements or articulated through common principles. For example, Defence has common principles relating to minimum levels of training and proficiency required to safely operate aircraft in general. There are also minimum training and qualification requirements stipulated for medical fitness and general aviation

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operations, such as basic flying training, crew resource management (CRM) and aviation safety. Flying organisations are responsible for establishing local requirements that relate more particularly to the organisation’s operating environment, roles and aviation systems. Competency requirements must be sufficient in scope and detail to provide a suitable degree of confidence that a known level of safety can be achieved in flying operations when aviation systems are operated by personnel with prescribed qualifications and levels of experience and proficiency.

19. Defence operational airworthiness requirements regarding competency levels and the management of local competency assurance regimes are prescribed by OAREG 2.3. Guidance on implementing OAREG 2.3 is provided in section 5.


20. Where Defence personnel operate non-Defence registered aircraft, the principles that underpin the Defence concept of operational airworthiness remain relevant. That is, acceptable levels of operational safety still depend upon the aircraft being flown in accordance with approved standards and limitations by qualified and authorised individuals working within an effective flying organisation.

21. As with operations involving Defence aircraft, commanders will need to make determinations about criteria that must be satisfied in order to obtain a desired level of safety in the operation of non-Defence registered aircraft. Conformance to applicable civil aviation requirements covering crew competency and operating standards and limitations is mandatory in making such determinations, but additional criteria may need to be developed under some circumstances. Moreover, though non-Defence registered aircraft may be operated under arrangements that incorporate a level of oversight by a civil flying organisation, Defence flying organisations will nonetheless need to supplement civil requirements with their own to ensure that Defence personnel continue to receive suitable guidance, supervision and monitoring. The nature of such supplementation will depend upon the situation and the associated degree of risk.

22. Operational airworthiness requirements regarding the operation of non-Defence registered aircraft by Defence members are prescribed by OAREG 5, the regulatory basis for which is derived from MILAVREG 5.7—Operation of non-Defence registered aircraft.

ELEMENTS OF OAREG 2

23. OAREG 2 brings the concept of operational airworthiness to effect by articulating the foundation elements as a regulatory set, as shown at Figure 1-1. The elements, their coverage and the location of applicable guidance material are as follows:

a. OAREG 2.1—Flying Management System. OAREG 2.1 addresses required organisational and managerial aspects of the FMS. The following chapters of this section provide guidance to this regulatory element.

b. OAREG 2.2—Operations. OAREG 2.2 prescribes minimum operating requirements and processes for Defence registered aircraft. Section 4 provides guidance to this regulatory element.

c. OAREG 2.3—Qualifications and training. OAREG 2.3 specifies requirements for the qualification and training of Defence aircrew and aviation system operators. Section 5 provides guidance to this regulatory element.

24. Additional elements of this regulation serve as a roadmap for the applicability of the principle elements to systems other than Defence registered aircraft.

SUSPENSION OF FLYING OPERATIONS

25. There will be occasions when the airworthiness of aircraft or aircrew, or the organisational infrastructure supporting them, is such that reasonable doubt exists regarding the safety of continued operations. If an OAA/FTAA, OAAR, or operational commander judges this to be the case, an appropriate and expected response is to suspend or restrict flying operations as befits the circumstances.

26. MILAVREG 2.6—Suspension of flying operations contains requirements for the suspension of flying operations. The process for identifying and resolving airworthiness issues responsible for causing or threatening the suspension of flying operations is described in AAP 7001.048—Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual section 4, chapter 3.

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SECTION 3

CHAPTER 2

FLYING MANAGEMENT SYSTEM


OAREG 2.1—Flying Management System

INTRODUCTION

1. Defence Aviation activities are conducted within an organised framework of authority and instructions. This framework enables commanders to exercise capability with assurance of the airworthiness of their aviation assets. The airworthiness framework surrounding the conduct of operations is termed a ‘Flying Management System’.

PURPOSE

2. This chapter provides guidance on the establishment of an FMS.

APPLICABILITY

3. This guidance is applicable to all Defence organisations conducting flying operations.

FLYING MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ELEMENTS

4. The key elements of an FMS are those identified within OAREG 2.1. These are as follows:

a. Appointment of Key Staff. Key staff are those personnel appointed or delegated by commanders to be responsible for managing or controlling some aspect of the FMS. Appointment responsibilities are usually based on performance of a specified function; for example, flight authorisation officers. All Key Staff appointments are made in writing at the appropriate command level. Further guidance is provided in chapter 3.

b. Management of the Statement of Operating Intent (SOI). The SOI defines the approved roles and environment for the aircraft type. Guidance on the content and structure of an SOI is contained at Chapter 4. An SOI for each aircraft type is managed within the FMS where the OAA for the type resides. Management of the SOI ensures that any changes or variations are appropriately handled, and ensures the SOI remains up-to-date and valid.

c. Aircrew competency. For each aircraft type, aircrew competency and currency standards must be defined and recorded. Management of aircrew competency within the FMS ensures that prerequisite qualifications are obtained, aircrew currency is achieved, and that aircrew are competent to perform their assigned roles.

d. Flight authorisation. Flight authorisation underpins safe flying operations by assuring that all contributing factors to operational airworthiness have been considered, and an appropriate basis exists for safe flying operations. The FMS ensures that the flight authorisation process is defined, controlled and recorded. Further guidance on flight authorisation is provided in chapter 6.

e. Aviation risk management (AVRM). AVRM is a documented process to assess risks to safety resulting from aviation operations. Whilst the AVRM process is documented via AAP 6374.001—Defence Aviation Safety Manual and associated subordinate single-Service instructions, the FMS ensures the process is applied locally and that operations are authorised at the appropriate level. Additional guidance on AVRM management is included in the Defence Aviation Safety Manual.

f. Aviation safety management. Aviation safety management includes education, incident prevention and correction, and investigative functions aimed at promoting a ‘safety culture’ within the Defence aviation community. The FMS ensures aviation safety principles are applied and incidents or potential hazards are investigated, reported and prevented. Further guidance on flying safety management is provided the Defence Aviation Safety Manual. Sup

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g. Management of Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP). OIP collectively document all limitations, instructions, procedures, processes and rules necessary to operate an aircraft type. OIP includes all documents which are essential for operation of an aircraft type in the approved roles, or are authoritative in terms of providing a framework of orders and information to facilitate safe operations. Management of OIP ensures they are accurate, available and authorised. Additional guidance on OIP management is included in chapter 9. Other MAAs and NAAs may use the term Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA) in lieu of OIP.

h. Management of Synthetic Training Devices. Some aspects of flying training are performed via ground based simulation devices. Where these systems are utilised in lieu of actual flying, the training value provided must be validated, and the basis of validation maintained. The FMS ensures that such devices are managed to assure the continued validity of the simulated curricula. Additional guidance on the management of STDs is included AAP 7001.048(AM1) Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual.

5. Each element of the FMS, when cohesively managed in relation to aircraft types, collectively contributes to the conduct of airworthy operations. Whilst the FMS provides the framework for managing day-to-day operations, the system is directly supported by defined operational rules as required by OAREG 2.2—Operations and pre-requisite training and qualification requirements as addressed by OAREG 2.3—Qualifications and training. These regulations prescribe a consolidated list of rules and standards which are required to support the safety of operations for applicable aircraft types. The FMS should be constructed on the basis of these rules and requirements and continually assure compliance.

6. The interaction of the FMS elements described in the preceding paragraphs is expanded further in Figure 2-1. Operational airworthiness management can be considered an interdependent system with the aim of enabling safe and effective aviation operations. An important feature is the role of the defensive mechanisms inherent to the FMS which are designed to allow a culmination of activities to result in safe flying operations.

Figure 2–1 Context of the Flying Management System

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ORGANISATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION

7. Implementation of an FMS for an aircraft type occurs at various command levels within an overall flying organisation. The custodian of the system is the OAA, or if delegated, the OAAR, who is responsible for the operational airworthiness management of the aircraft type. Implementation of the FMS by the OAA or OAAR may vary widely depending on the variety or complexity of the subordinate units operating the aircraft types. The OAA, OAAR and commanders at different levels may appoint Key Staff to manage aspects of the system according to their experience and position within the flying organisation.

8. Unit Level implementation. Unit Level management is the lowest level of implementation of the system. The flying unit is primarily concerned with the day-to-day conduct of operations and as such should define authorisation and supervision processes, and operational procedures particular to specialist roles performed by the unit. Operating units should provide advice to higher level command on the effectiveness of the FMS arrangements directed by the Wing or Group level. Compliance with the FMS requirements should mainly be assessed at the operating unit level.

9. Wing(E) Level implementation. Within Defence, a Wing (as it is termed by Air Force) is typically associated with a specific aircraft type. Accordingly, airworthiness management at this level may satisfy the majority of the regulatory requirements for an FMS. Although the SOI may be managed at a higher level, the Wing Level organisation should be the custodian of the aircraft roles and environment. The Wing may provide advice to the OAAR on any necessary changes to the SOI, or identify new roles. With a number of operating units utilising the same aircraft type, the Wing may also be best placed to define and standardise currency and competency criteria, manage OIP and training devices, and define policy and processes for AVRM and aviation safety.

10. Group(E) Level implementation. Flying management at Group Level (which is the next level above Wing) should include those functions generic to the operation of all aircraft types within the OAA’s or OAAR’s delegation. These might include the:

a. definition and approval of pre-requisite training and qualification criteria for the broader discipline of flying operations, for example, fast-jet operations, Army helicopters, transport aircraft, etc;

b. management of the SOIs for each aircraft type within the OAA’s appointment or OAAR’s delegation; and

c. management of Group Level OIP applicable to operations involving the aircraft types and roles within the OAA’s appointment or OAAR’s delegation.

NOTE

• Where the OAA is at Group(E) Level and is responsible for a small number of aircraft types, the management system may be more specific. The OAA may implement a system similar in nature to that normally utilised by a Wing operating a similar number of aircraft types or flying units.

11. Management of Aircraft Types across Command boundaries. In some situations, a flying organisation will operate an aircraft type which is mainly flown by a separate sub-element of the flying organisation. For example, the PC-9/A is predominantly operated by AFTG. However AOSG also operate PC-9/A aircraft for the purposes of conversion, instructor and flight test training. A flying organisation may also operate an aircraft type where operational airworthiness of the type is the responsibility of an OAA or OAAR outside of that organisation’s chain of command (eg example PC9/A aircraft operated in the FAC role, and Army aircraft operated by AOSG). In these situations, operational airworthiness authority does not challenge the command chain. Rather, it provides commanders with a source of authoritative advice upon which to base decisions which impact airworthiness. In such cases the flying management arrangements which have been implemented to manage an aircraft type should be effective across command boundaries where they remain valid for the roles performed by the external organisation. Such organisations, by their nature, may perform unique roles beyond those typically conducted during ‘normal operations’. In this case, the organisation may become the custodian or subject matter expert for the roles they perform. The overall FMS for the aircraft type should therefore be augmented by processes or standards defined by the unique organisation.

12. Flexibility. There are no fixed requirements which specify how an FMS must be implemented. Ultimately, the distribution of flying management responsibility at group level and below should suit the operational circumstances of the organisation and seek to standardise flying practice in consideration of the intended roles and the impact on operational airworthiness of each aircraft within the scope of the delegation.

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DOCUMENTATION OF THE FLYING MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

13. The OAA or OAAR should document the FMS within an OAMP. The OAMP should:

a. describe the strategy to manage the operational airworthiness of the aircraft types within scope of the OAA’s or OAAR’s airworthiness management responsibility;

b. identify any unique operational circumstances affecting the management of the aircraft type;

c. for a large organisation, describe how the FMS has been implemented at each level within the flying organisation;

d. identify who may appoint Key Staff;

e. identify the custodians or sponsors of specialist roles or functions within the organisation;

f. describe any relationships with external organisations that assist in the operational airworthiness management of an aircraft type under the management of the OAA or OAAR; and

g. provide a compliance cross reference of orders and instructions necessary to meet OAREG requirements.

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APPOINTMENT OF KEY STAFF


OAREG 2.1.1—Appointment of key staff

INTRODUCTION

1. Flying organisations contribute to the safety of Defence Aviation by providing local guidance, training, supervision and monitoring to help ensure that only competent and authorised personnel operate aviation systems. Their contribution occurs through the interaction of people, processes and information. Defence views the people formally involved in this interaction as ‘Key Staff’. All appointed personnel who support the safe operation of Aviation Systems, such as flight authorisation officers, flight examination officers, aircraft captains, standards officers, and others, are considered to be Key Staff.

2. Key Staff are not casually appointed. They must be suitably competent to manage, train and supervise others, and, in turn, must be subject to ongoing supervision and assessment of their competency and performance. They must also understand that they are Key Staff and be formally made aware of their responsibilities and delegations. This requires that those appointments important to the safe management of flying operations be identified, and the associated eligibility criteria and authority delegations determined and made known within the organisation.

3. OAREG 2.1.1 promulgates Defence requirements concerning the appointment of Key Staff.

PURPOSE

4. This guidance is intended to assist flying organisations understand and implement regulatory requirements concerning the appointment of Key Staff.

APPLICABILITY

5. This guidance is applicable to all Defence Aviation organisations.

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OAREG 2.1.1

The OAA must ensure that key appointments in the management of flying operations are identified in OIP, including that the following criteria (1) the initial and continuing eligibility criteria for each appointment are identified, (2) the responsibility and authority of each appointment is clear and unambiguous; and (3) appointed individuals receive written authorisation which includes any limitations to their responsibility or authority.

6. Personnel who are appointed with airworthiness management responsibilities in support of flying operations play an essential role in the overall management of the FMS. OAA policy supporting such Key Staff should reflect both qualifications and experience deemed appropriate to the particular role. Key Staff includes:

a. Flight Authorisation Officers. Flight authorisation officers are responsible for the flight authorisation of all aircraft operations or simulator flights undertaken by the unit.

b. Aircraft Captains. A captain is a qualified first pilot on type who has been judged by the CO/OC to be suitable for regular appointment as an aircraft captain for a specific range of operational and other tasks relevant to that unit and aircraft type.

c. Aviation Safety Officer (ASO). An ASO is a specialist personnel (eg aircrew, JBAC or air defence officers, as applicable to the organisation) appointed at the Command, Group and Wing level and are responsible for management and maintenance of flying safety practices and operational airworthiness frameworks within the operating organisations. Such duties might include, flying safety practices are applied to all flying and aircraft operations; including flying safety training, crew duty limits are being enforced, operational hazards and incident reporting and investigation, and correction of identified deficiencies and SME on operational airworthiness matters.

d. Flying Instructor. A flying instructor is a pilot who has been assessed as competent to give flying instruction. Flying instructors may be further classified as:

(1) Qualified Flying Instructor (QFI). A QFI is a pilot who has postgraduate qualifications to carry out instruction, including dual instruction, in aircraft or FS.

(2) Qualified Helicopter Instructor (QHI). A QHI is a pilot who has postgraduate qualifications to conduct instruction, including dual instruction, in helicopters or FS.

(3) Fighter Combat Instructor (FCI). An FCI is a pilot who has postgraduate qualifications to carry out instruction, including dual instruction and instruction in operational procedures and tactics in fighter and lead-in fighter aircraft and simulators.

(4) Operational Flying Instructor (OFI)1. An OFI is a pilot who has postgraduate qualifications and holds a current category to carry out instruction, including dual instruction, in operational aircraft or FSs.

e. Instrument Rating Examiner (IRE). An IRE is a pilot who may conduct instrument flight tests for the award of an instrument rating. A Senior Instrument Rating Examiner (SIRE) is a QFI, FCI or OFI authorised to renew IRE ratings and to conduct instrument flight tests.

f. Standardisation Officer (STANDO). A STANDO is responsible to operating unit CO for monitoring and reporting on aircrew compliance with OIPs, and providing guidance for standardisation of unit flying operations.

g. Check Captain. A check captain is an experienced qualified captain on type who may supervise the operational training and performance of other pilots in aircraft or STD. Check captains may not carry out dual or remedial flying instruction.

h. VIP Captain. A VIP captain is a pilot who may act as a captain of an aircraft operating as a Special Purpose flight.

i. Unit Maintenance Test Pilot (UMTP). A UMTP is a pilot who may carry out post-maintenance flight testing of an aircraft, which is described in AAP 7001.059—ADF aviation maintenance management manual section 3, chapter 5—Maintenance test flights.

j. Test and Evaluation (T&E) Specific Appointments. T&E specific appointments are personnel responsible for the planning, management and safe conduct of Force Element Group (FEG) T&E activities.

1 •Guidance is contained in section 5 chapter 2.

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k. Qualified Test Pilot (QTP). A QTP is a pilot who has postgraduate qualifications to carry out research, development, test or evaluation of an aircraft.

l. Aircrew Manuals Officer (ACMO). An ACMO is an experienced personnel responsible to the applicable Aircrew Manual Sponsor for the conduct of selected tasks associated with the issue, amendment and management of aircrew manuals.

m. Aeronautical Life Support Equipment (ALSE) Officer. An ALSE officer is responsible for oversight of the approved ALSE management system.

n. Single Service Aviation Medical Advisor (SSAMA): An OAA key appointment who represents a single Service, is recognised by the Surgeon General ADF as being qualified to provide authoritative aviation medical advice and is responsible for the implementation of aviation medicine policies.

PROMULGATION OF AIRWORTHINESS APPOINTMENTS

7. There are several methods in which key airworthiness appointments may be promulgated, and the most suitable will be dependent in the purpose of the appointment and the manner in which the FMS has been established. A minimum set of qualification and experience requirements should be established to ensure appointments have the basic knowledge necessary to adequately discharge operational airworthiness responsibilities. Personnel identified to fulfil these responsibilities should provide statements of compliance against the established criteria to allow an informed decision from the OAA regarding the appointment. The following list, although not exhaustive, provides different ways in which airworthiness appointments can be disseminated:

a. Letter of Appointment. Personnel may be appointed/delegated in writing by the OAA though the issue of a formal Minute or Letter to the individual.

b. Operational Airworthiness Management Plan (OAMP). The OAMP may be used as the mechanism for identifying personnel with airworthiness appointments. In this instance, the OAMP itself should contain within it the qualification and experience requirements associated with the appointment. Where this method is used, the OAMP need to be revised and re-issued by the OAA whenever an appointment is altered, to ensure it remains current.

c. Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIPs). Appointments may be promulgated through the OIPs which define the scope and boundaries of the FMS (eg Standing Instructions (SIs), Flying Orders (FOs) or Special Flying Instructions (SFIs)).

d. Operation Order. Where the appointment of airworthiness responsibilities is linked to a specific operational requirement with a defined duration, it may be appropriate for appointments to be delegated airworthiness responsibilities through an Operation Order. The Order should be endorsed by the OAA.

8. Regardless of the method used, the scope of responsibility and any specific conditions or limitations associated with the appointment should be made clear and formally captured.

REVIEW OF APPOINTEES

9. All operational airworthiness appointees must undergo review at designated regular intervals to ensure they continue to meet the qualification and experience requirements through the period of their appointments. This is of particular importance for appointments that may require continual training or familiarisation to satisfy competencies. The OAA should establish, through the FMS, a process to initiate review to assess if retention of operational airworthiness responsibility is justified. The periodicity of such reviews should be determined by the level of risk.

10. The performance of staff discharging operational airworthiness responsibilities should be monitored and corrective actions taken should any deficiencies be identified. Where an individual no longer meets the minimum requirements associated with an appointment, the OAA or nominated delegate should temporarily suspend or limit the appointment until the deficiencies are satisfactorily addressed.

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MANAGEMENT OF THE SOI


OAREG 2.1.2—Management of the SOI

INTRODUCTION

1. For each aircraft type, Operational Airworthiness is managed within the boundaries of the aircraft’s approved role, environment and planned usage. These parameters are documented in the SOI and provide an ongoing frame of reference or basis against which the aircraft’s continued safe operation may be managed. What is more, an aircraft’s AMTC and SR are judged against its SOI in that the approvals and arrangements introduced to support its safe operation are predicated upon the parameters documented in the SOI.

2. The SOI for an aircraft type is established or amended during the acquisition or modification process, which is why the topic is also treated under OAREG 3—New aviation systems and modification. In-service SOIs are managed by the applicable OAA and OAAR.

PURPOSE

3. This chapter describes the in-service management of SOI.

APPLICABILITY

4. This chapter is applicable to Defence flying organisations managing Defence registered aircraft.

THE STATEMENT OF OPERATING INTENT

5. The SOI is the authoritative document that outlines an aircraft type’s approved roles, operating envelope, usage spectrum and operating environment. The SOI should clearly specify these parameters and also differentiate between tasks for which the aircraft type has been certified and tasks that are planned, but will require certification action before flight can be authorised.

6. The SOI is established or amended through the new aircraft acquisition or modification process and is managed in-service by the applicable OAA and OAAR.

7. Section 6, chapter 1, annex A contains guidance on the content and structure of an SOI.

DEFINITIONS

8. Role. A role can be defined as the function or purpose assigned to or required or expected from a system. In this sense, the roles of an aircraft system relate to its intended operational effect. These may include, for example, the following: Combat, Combat Support, Air Logistics Support or Surveillance. Role differs from the concept of capability in that capability is seen as the ability to achieve a desired operational effect in a nominated environment, within specified time, and to sustain that effect for a designated period. Capability is delivered by systems that incorporate people, organisation, doctrine, collective training, platforms, materiel, facilities, in-service support and command and management. As such, role is an intrinsic attribute of capability.

9. Environment. The environment refers not only to the specific areas within which an aircraft type is expected to conduct the established roles and tasks in, but rather the totality of the surroundings and conditions of operations. The environment encompasses elements such as the expected weather during operations, meteorological extremes, the operational interfaces and the conditions surrounding these (ie, ship-borne operation, airspace and ground settings, potential threats, etc.).

10. Design Flight Envelope. The design flight envelope is defined by the OEM, is accepted through certification by the DAR, and is the outermost boundary of flight conditions to which an aircraft may be flown and remain airworthy.

11. Operational Flight Envelope. The operational flight envelope is the outermost boundary to which Defence intends to operate a specific aircraft type in service. To further mitigate safety risks or preserve the aircraft’s operating life, this envelope may be more restrictive than the Design Flight Envelope. An example of when Defence could operate to an Operational Flight Envelope that is considerably more restrictive than the Design Flight Envelope may occur with fleet addition aircraft. The OAA may decide, in the interests of risk management, to operate a fleet addition aircraft that has certain increased design limits to the same operational limits as the in-service aircraft with lower design limits. In such cases the OAA would require that aircrew publications and cockpit instrumentation for all aircraft of the type be consistent with the Defence operational flight envelope.

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12. Service Flight Usage Spectrum. The SOI defines the service flight usage spectrum, consisting of the defined operating flight profiles for each task, and encompasses the flight conditions over which the aircraft can be operated in service without exceeding the design flight envelope. In the instance of an SOI being prepared for an aircraft type for which a design flight envelope has not yet been defined, the SOI would be based on the Commonwealth design requirement, and may be subject to change following advice from the OEM.

SOI DEVELOPMENT

13. The SOI is developed during the acquisition or modification of the aircraft type. Further guidance regarding the development and validation of the SOI during the acquisition phase is provided in the guidance to OAREG 3 in section 6, chapter 1, which also includes guidance on the minimum required structure and content of an SOI.

IN-SERVICE MANAGEMENT OF THE SOI

14. Defence flying organisations operating Defence registered aircraft are responsible for maintaining the currency of the SOI’s content, including authorised roles, tasks and intended operating environment, for all aircraft the organisation operates. While the SOI should reflect actual operation, there is provision to identify or forecast intended development in the SOI.

15. The SOIs should be reviewed on a regular basis by the relevant OAAR and DAR, to ensure the roles and environment described remain applicable to the capability.

DEVIATIONS FROM THE SOI

16. Any deviations from the established SOI should be managed in accordance with Operational Clearances as described by OAREG 2.2.14—Operational Clearance.

17. In the case of extenuating or wartime operations, deviations from the SOI required are managed in accordance with OAREG 2.2—Operations.

CHANGES TO THE SOI

18. Changes to the SOI may arise from new operational requirements such as a new role may be assigned for an aircraft type or the aircraft type is designated to be deployed to a new environment. As an illustration, Army CH–47D Chinooks were deployed to Afghanistan in a combat role; however the aircraft type was only previously approved for Combat Support and Combat Service Support roles. The requirements to perform an additional role lead to a rapid acquisition program to modify the aircraft to be capable of safely undertaking it.

19. Proposed changes to the SOI should be referred to the DAR of the aircraft type to determine the technical airworthiness implication of the operational change. Operational changes with Minor or no technical impact, but assessed as Substantial in accordance with OAREG 3.1—Changes to aircraft configuration, role and environment will undergo Supplemental Role Approval in accordance with OAREG 3.5—New or modified Configuration, Role or Environment. As a part of this process, and after Supplemental Role Approval by the OAA, the SOI will be amended with the new or modified Configuration, Role or Environment and associated content.

20. For operational changes assessed as having a Major technical impact by the DAR, the management of the SOI will become inherent in the Supplemental Type Certification and SR processes regulated by OAREG 3.4—Service Release for new aircraft and Major changes to Type Design.

21. In conjunction with advice from the aircraft DAR, changes to the SOI must be assessed in accordance with OAREG 3.1 and managed in accordance with the provisions of that regulation.

Review of proposed changes to the SOI

22. Proposed changes to the SOI should be reviewed by all stakeholders, including the:

a. DAR and TAA (if required)

b. single-Service capability manager

c. affected operational units

d. operational support network representative, where applicable.

Issue of the modified SOI

23. Following review the SOI should be amended to include the new or modified configuration, roles and environments. The amended SOI must be endorsed by the TAA and approved by the OAA.

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AIRWORTHINESS BOARD REVIEW OF THE SOI

24. The Airworthiness Board will review the currency and validity of the SOI during reviews of continuing airworthiness management.

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SECTION 3

CHAPTER 5

MANAGEMENT OF AIRCREW COMPETENCIES

RESERVED

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FLIGHT AUTHORISATION


OAREG 2.1.4—Flight authorisation

OAREG 2.1.4.a

The OAA/FTAA must establish a flight authorisation system that assures the assessment of suitability for flight of Defence aircraft missions.

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that Defence aircraft missions are authorised, supervised and flown by appropriately trained, fit and competent individuals, on aircraft within the approved Configuration Role and Environment (CRE) where risk is eliminated or otherwise minimised so far as reasonably practicable (SFARP).

2. Flight crew are qualified to operate Defence aircraft after they have been assessed as competent and fit to do so. However, owing to the complexity of Defence aviation1 and limitations of the operational aviation safety assurance framework2, without an independent flight authorisation decision, real-time threats to operational aviation safety may easily bypass preventative controls within the Flying Management System (FMS). The lack of an independent flight authorisation decision will likely force sole reliance on flight crew post-event recovery action3 to maintain safe flight operations (Figure 1).

3. Flying organisations are therefore responsible for making real time, suitability for flight determinations through a structured and formal process. This assures the preventative controls within the FMS are intact, the outcome of which is that flight crew are authorised to perform specific roles in a particular aircraft type within a planned environment and timeframe.

Figure 1 – Flight Authorisations role in the FMS

1 Aircraft configuration, crew composition, environmental conditions and individual mission requirements vary frequently. 2 Airworthiness Board is primarily retrospective analysis, compliance assurance and auditing activities currently focus on organisational implementation of regulation. 3 Bow-Tie Methodology

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4. An effective flight authorisation system should include controls that ensure:

a. A suitability for flight assessment made by a qualified, competent and authorised officer.

b. The acceptance of authority for the safe and effective conduct of the aircraft flight by a competent and fit Aircraft Captain.4

5. System controls address the hazards that are present when Defence aircraft are operated by authorised flight crew.

6. The flight authorisation system should afford maximum flexibility to support Defence aircraft operations.

7. ADF Currency Flying Scheme (ACFS). Participants of the ACFS may not have previously held a flight authorising appointment, or have access to an appropriate Flight authorisation officer. Therefore, unless the OAA directs otherwise, in addition to any civil requirements, ACFS participants are expected to self-authorise using the guidance and AMC provided under this regulation.

8. Flexibility provision 1. OAREG 2.1.4 does not apply to non-Defence registered aircraft flights that are solely conducted by non-Defence flight crew under a recognised MAA or NAA. In such cases, the relevant NAA or MAA requirements apply.

AMC 1 to OAREG 2.1.4.a – Flight Authorisation System Controls

9. Flight authorisation system controls should include:

a. Approval authorities. Delegation of authority to command personnel for the management of the flight authorisation system. Approval authorities should be able to:

(1) appoint a suitable Flight Authorisation Officer(s) (FLTAUTHO) within the operating unit

(2) approve the duties, responsibilities and limitations of a FLTAUTHO via a written delegation.

b. FLTAUTHO suitability criteria. Effective flight authorisation draws heavily on aviation experience, technical mastery and proven decision making attributes. Accordingly, a potential FLTAUTHO candidate requires both time and aviation experience to develop. Candidate suitability should be assessed against OAA/FTAA defined criteria that ensure only appropriately trained, competent and experienced individuals are selected and appointed as a FLTAUTHO. Selection criteria may include:

(1) Minimum qualification and competency: For flight crew, competency is achieved and recognised through a controlled and progressive process of training, accumulated experience. A potential FLTAUTHO may have demonstrated competency across the spectrum of operations for an aircraft type prior to being delegated the authority to authorise. Where a FLTAUTHO is experienced in a niche role of a particular type, the FLTAUTHO may be granted permissions to authorise specific types of flight only.

(2) Specialisation. The OAA/FTAA may specify what flight crew specialisations are suitable for FLTAUTHO duties; however, whenever practicable the FLTAUTHO should be a pilot.

(3) Flying Supervision training: Authorisation should only be delegated to an officer who satisfactorily completes OAA/FTAA endorsed flying supervision training that should include:

(a) Human factors.

(b) Defence Aviation Safety Program and Regulations.

(c) Aviation safety hazards.

(d) Contemporary risk management.

(e) Accidents/incidents study of related aircraft types.

(f) FLTAUTHO roles and responsibilities.

(g) Supervision of Aircrew.

c. Periodic review. All FLTAUTHO appointments should undergo review at regular intervals not exceeding 24 months to ensure qualification and competency requirements for the appointment are valid.

4 Although the Aircraft Captain is granted authority, it is expected that the minimum required flight crew to complete the task are also qualified, fit and competent.

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d. Restrictions on further delegation. A FLTAUTHO may not further delegate their authority except as provided within the limits of their appointment.

e. Flight Authorisation responsibilities executed through the normal chain of command. FLTAUTHO appointment should not be lower than the designated flying supervisor level; however, limited term delegations to a lower level may be necessary to meet specific requirements. Procedures should identify the responsibilities associated with flight authorisation and identify suitable personnel within the chain of command to discharge that responsibility.

f. Detachment Commander. When aircraft are deployed, flight authorisation may be delegated to the Detachment Commander or the most suitably qualified flight crew member, or both. The appointing officer should ensure clear guidance on any limits of the FLTAUTHO appointment.

g. Self–authorisation. Under certain circumstances it may be necessary for authorising officers to authorise flights where they are acting as the Aircraft Captain, commonly referred to as ‘self–authorisation’. As self–authorisation excludes the independent mechanism for identifying potential factors that may lead to an aircraft accident, self–authorisation should only occur when another FLTAUTHO is not available. Regardless of the reason for doing so, the default position should always be to obtain independent flight authorisation whenever practicable. If a suitably qualified FLTAUTHO is not available and self–authorisation is necessary, the Aircraft Captain should attempt to discuss the sortie profile with a qualified flight crew member to provide some measure of independent oversight. Whenever self–authorisation occurs, use of a check list based process to ensure all considerations are assessed should occur. OIP supporting this control should list the circumstances under which self-authorisation may be performed.

h. Non-unit personnel. Wherever possible, all flights should be authorised by a unit based FLTAUTHO; however, an operational requirement may exist which necessitates the authorisation of flight operations by a higher headquarters or an associated training unit. OIP supporting this control should list the circumstances under which authorisation by non-unit personal may be performed.

i. Maintenance test flight. Before authorising any maintenance test flight, the FLTAUTHO should:

(1) Be acquainted with maintenance practices and the applicable flight test schedule.

(2) Ensure that the Aircraft Captain meets minimum qualifications and is familiar with relevant requirements and OIP supporting the safe and effective conduct of the test flight.

j. Non-executive flying instructor. To meet curriculum objectives for solo and mutual flights during pilot training, student pilots are tasked as Aircraft Captain. Accordingly, the CO of a flying training unit may delegate the flight authorisation of solo and mutual flights by student pilots to approved flying instructors. This should be limited to those flights required by the approved flying training curriculum and promulgated within OIP. Restrictions should be applied to such delegations based on:

(1) The experience of the flying instructor.

(2) The specific nature of relevant flights within the curriculum.

(3) Receiving flying supervision training, or unit equivalent training.

(4) Ability of unit flying executives to maintain close scrutiny of the overall flight authorisation process, particularly in regard to external factors such as weather.

(5) Use of a check list based process to ensure all considerations are assessed.

k. Flight crew disclosure requirements. For flight authorisation to be effective, the FLTAUTHO requires sound and up-to-date knowledge. Therefore, crew disclosure of any factors that could potentially compromise suitability for flight is essential. Accordingly, crews should advise the FLTAUTHO, Aircraft Captain or other senior crew members of anything that may affect a particular member’s medical, psychological or technical mastery to perform flying related duties.

l. Flight outside CRE limitations. Planned flight outside an aircraft’s approved CRE requires additional planning, training, and clearance prior to execution and should be limited to flight test or operational clearance approvals. Sup

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m. Low flying. Flight authorisation and supervision of low flying operations should ensure that:

(1) Specific authorisation is required for all low flying/terrain flight operations.

(2) The minimum heights to be flown, along with any route restrictions, are entered in the flight authorisation record.

(3) Flights are planned to avoid populated areas and operating mines, quarries or other industrial centres.

(4) Weather aspects have been considered where applicable.

(5) Flight crew are aware of:

i. The height and lateral separation limitations as well as obstacles and other known hazards.

ii. Their aircraft's performance and capability in relation to the likely ground and air hazards.

iii. Known sensitive areas or other airspace concerns.

n. Other flights of a hazardous nature. Other hazardous flights that may require specific authorisation limitations include:

(1) operational missions

(2) flight crew training

(3) flight test

(4) carriage of certain types of dangerous cargo

(5) display flying.

o. Verbal authorisation. Authorisation or changes to flight authorisation may be given verbally; however, the details of any verbal flight authorisation should be recorded in the flight authorisation record as soon as practicable. Wherever possible, the Aircraft Captain should leave a written record of a verbal authorisation on the ground with a responsible person prior to the flight.

p. Flight authorisation record. A record of flight authorisation is documented via use of a hard copy form, soft copy form or an electronic means. The flight authorisation record may not be carried on the aircraft conducting the task, unless a duplicate copy is handled by an authorised procedure. The record should include:

(1) identifiable acknowledgements by the FLTAUTHO and the Aircraft Captain

(2) relevant flight details

(3) any specific limitations applied to the flight.

q. Flight authorisation record retention. Flight authorisation records should be retained as a permanent record of flying activity. When no longer required by the unit, flight authorisation records are archived. An acceptable means of compliance to preserve records is adherence to the relevant Commonwealth Records Management Policy issued under the Archives Act 1983.

AMC 2 to OAREG 2.1.4.a – Flying Supervision

10. Flight crew supervision includes the full spectrum of the aviation activity (Safety and Mission). The Flying Supervisor should be familiar with the competencies, capabilities and personal disposition of all crew that may require authorisation. Such knowledge forms the very basis for sound flight authorisation decision making.

11. Flying supervision ensures that the controls inherent within the FMS are being adhered to on a daily basis at unit level. Flying supervisor controls may be applied (days-weeks in advance) during mission planning and execution. These include5:

a. Minimum levels of crew qualification. Minimum flight crew composition and qualification requirements are specified in OIP that supports the specific mission types of a particular aircraft type.

b. Assigning flight crew to tasks. Air tasking and mission scheduling are distinct from flight authorisation. Aircraft Captains and crews are assigned to a particular task after supervisor assessment

5 These controls are normally implemented by the command chain and unit flying supervisors

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of the nature of the task, the potential risk, and the suitability of the individuals. Crew structure decisions in terms of cockpit gradient, crew cohesion and other associated crew resource management issues may be required. Crew selection should occur at unit level to ensure that specific individual crew limitations and abilities associated with the task/mission are considered.6

c. Risk management. Standard Aviation Risk Management (AVRM) planning for flights/profiles may be created to assist in eliminating or minimising risk SFARP.

AMC 3 to OAREG 2.1.4.a – Flight Authorisation Officer

12. Flight authorisation ensures that the FMS controls are in place on a flight by flight basis. FLTAUTHO controls include:

a. Suitability for flight assessment. FLTAUTHO considerations involve a range of factors that ensure an overall suitability for flight determination. Considerations may include:

(1) Individual suitability. Self assessment to ensure the FLTAUTHO is appropriate to authorise the flight.

(2) Flight safety risks. Considering all factors arising from the CRE that have the potential to compromise suitability for flight and being satisfied that the flight will be conducted whereby residual risk is eliminated or otherwise minimised SFARP.

(3) Crew are medically fit to fly. The Aircraft Captain’s and crew’s medical status is known including temporary medical unfitness for flying (TMUFF) related duties considerations. This includes psychological fitness and the disposition of crew members in terms of individual human factors, including abnormal stresses and external influences which might compromise suitability for flight.

(4) Crew are trained, competent and current. The Aircraft Captain and crew authorised for each flight meet the currency, competency and training criteria relevant to the flying operation to be conducted, specifically considering aircrew competency and currency in the specific operation which is to be conducted.

(5) Crew are prepared. Crew have received, or will receive, adequate instructions, information and/or tasking details to complete the flight safely and effectively.

(6) Crew duty limitations. The flight can be performed in accordance with approved crew duty limits.

b. Flight authorisation briefing. The FLTAUTHO briefing should provide unambiguous instructions and guidance to allow the Aircraft Captain to make well-balanced decisions, while avoiding unnecessary interference with the Aircraft Captain’s legitimate decision-making responsibilities.

c. Flight authorisation record. Flight is not authorised until the flight authorisation record is documented and signed, except as allowed under verbal authorisation.

d. Flight monitoring. The minimum requirement is:

(a) The FLTAUTHO or other suitable person maintains oversight of the flight until its completion.

(b) The Aircraft Captain advises the FLTAUTHO of any deviation from the bounds of the flight authorisation as soon as practicable.

e. Post-flight. The Aircraft Captain is responsible for ensuring that the post-flight details are entered in the flight authorisation record as soon as practicable after flight.

6 Cognisant of the requirement to develop flight crew experience, additional supervising crew members may be utilised to assure suitability for flight whilst developing junior crew.

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OAREG 2.1.4.b

A Flight Authorisation Officer must be Type Rated to undertake flight authorisation duties.

13. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that the FLTAUTHO has technical mastery7 on the applicable aircraft type.

14. In addition to other OAA/FTAA specified FLTAUTHO selection criteria, being Type Rated ensures a FLTAUTHO holds appropriate aircraft knowledge and experience that includes:

a. Demonstrated competency in the aircraft type’s CRE.

b. Awareness of the human factors requirements of the aircraft type.

c. Awareness of the particular aircraft type ‘nuances’.

15. Flexibility provision 1. The OAA/FTAA may issue a waiver against the Type Rating if the FLTAUTHO holds or has held a Type Rating for a similar aircraft or has the technical mastery required to compensate for the lack of specific Type Rating. This exemption provides flexibility to risk manage cases where strict adherence to the regulation cannot be achieved.

16. Flexibility provision 2. The FTAA is exempt from OAREG 2.1.4.b for flight test activities.

AMC 1 to OAREG 2.1.4.b – Type Rating

17. The regulation requires initial Type Rating only. Ongoing currency requirements may be specified by the OAA/FTAA.

7 Technical mastery is the combination of an individual’s training, knowledge, experience and skills that ensures their ability to carry out a specific employment function with a high level of competence. (Source: ADG)

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SECTION 3

CHAPTER 7

AVIATION RISK MANAGEMENT


OAREG 2.1.5—Aviation risk management

APPLICABLE DEFENCE INSTRUCTIONS

1. AAP 6734.001 Defence Aviation Safety Manual prescribes the policy for aviation risk management (AVRM) in Defence.

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AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT


OAREG 2.1.5—Aviation risk management

OAREG 2.1.6—Aviation safety management

1. The Australian risk management standard (AS/NZS 4360) describes risk management as the culture, processes and structures that are directed towards the effective management of potential opportunities and adverse effects.

2. Acceptable means of compliance. AAP 6374.001—Defence Aviation Safety Manual provides contemporary Defence aviation safety policy and risk management tools.

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PRODUCTION AND MANAGEMENT OF OIP


OAREG 2.1.7—Management of Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP)

INTRODUCTION

1. The Defence operational airworthiness concept requires that Aviation Systems be operated to approved standards and limitations. OIP promote the attainment of a known level of safety for aviation operations rules by establishing boundaries for the conduct of aviation operations.

PURPOSE

2. This chapter provides guidance for production and management of aviation publications within a FMS.

NOTE

• The System of Defence Instructions Manual (SoDIMAN) and single-Service DIs contain guidance on the production and control of Orders and Instructions.

APPLICABILITY

3. This guidance is applicable to all aviation publications developed and maintained at the Group, Wing and Unit levels as part of the FMS supporting operational airworthiness.

OIP SPONSORSHIP RESPONSIBILITIES

4. AAP 7000.001CD—Defence aviation publication management manual (DAPMM) section 1, chapter 2—Production, maintenance and control of Defence aviation publications and AAP 5030.001CD—Defence aviation and Australian Air Publication systems and specifications manual section 2, chapter 3—Sponsor’s responsibilities provide guidance about the responsibilities of a Publication Sponsor in the management of Defence aviation publications. A system for management and review of OIP and data used in the operation of Defence registered aircraft is documented in AAP 7000.001CD.

5. Responsibilities of the OIP sponsor include:

a. maintaining a relationship with the Authorised Engineering Organisations (AEO) to ensure that there is appropriate review and approval of information that affects technical airworthiness and safety of flight. This may require the development of processes and procedures for:

(1) determination of which types of information require review and approval by the AEO, and

(2) the development, review and approval of OIP and the determination of which OIP requires review and approval by the AEO.

b. conducting an annual review of all assigned air operational publications;

c. timely coordination of amendment action

d. obtaining engineering endorsement for applicable amendments

e. advising units on operation of the Defence Aviation Publication System

f. reviewing aircraft accident and incident reports and ASORs relevant to their operations to ascertain if deficiencies exist in extant air operational publications

g. facilitate compliance with specifications and standards relating to air operational publications.

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OIP DEVELOPMENT AND PROMULGATION

6. Air operational publications shall be developed and promulgated in accordance with the following documents as required:

a. DI(G) OPS 02–2—Defence Aviation Safety Program

b. DI(G) ADMIN 20–31—Defence aviation publication management policy

c. DEF(AUST) 5629B—Production of military technical manuals – Standard

d. AAP 5030.001CD—Defence aviation and Australian Air Publication systems and specifications manual

e. AAP 5030.004—RAAF publications system – Orders and Instructions

f. AAP 7001.001CD—Defence aviation publication management manual (DAPMM)

g. AAP 7001.053— electronic Technical Airworthiness Management Manual (eTAMM)

h. AAP 8000.010—Defence operational airworthiness manual

i. ABR 1—RAN publication policy and procedures manual

j. DI(AF) ADMIN 6–8—Production and control of Australian Air Publications.

DEVIATING FROM OIP STANDARDS

7. If the format of a publication requires deviating from the approved standards, the Sponsor shall formally request a waiver of the standards from the appropriate standards authority IAW AAP 5030.001(CD) section 4, chapter 2—Publication standard. The request for a waiver should include a statement of:

a. reasons for deviating from the standard

b. details of the document properties or information being varied

c. the extent to which the publication is to be varied from the standard

d. the anticipated duration of the change (temporary, permanent or until a particular event)

e. the known costs necessary to implement the change.

8. Where the appropriate standards authority approves a deviation from the applicable standard, that approval document shall be retained by the sponsor on the applicable publication’s administration file and Aviation Publications Management Authority advised.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE

9. Further information and guidance on the management of OIP should be obtained from ACPA staff in the first instance. Specialist advice about the production, control and management of aviation publications should be sought from Aerospace Materiel Systems Project Office (AMSPO).

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SECTION 4

CHAPTER 1

LOW FLYING


OAREG 2.2.1—Flying rules for special missions and tasks

OAREG 2.2.6—Low flying

INTRODUCTION

1. To ensure the Defence’s operational air capability, aircrew must be able to operate effectively at low altitude, by day and by night. However, the tactical advantages of low altitude operations need to be balanced against the increased flight safety hazards associated with training and operating at low altitude.

PURPOSE

2. This chapter provides guidance for the planning, authorisation and safe and effective execution of low altitude operations by Defence.

APPLICABILITY

3. This chapter provides guidance to all Defence aircrew employed as aircrew in aircraft operated by Defence, including foreign military personnel authorised as aircrew in those aircraft. Members undergoing initial aircrew training are considered to be aircrew for the purposes of this guidance. Although instructions issued at Command level and below may prescribe further limitations and experience limits to address specific role requirements, they remain subordinate to OAREG 2.2.

LOW FLYING

LOW FLYING ORDERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

4. The OAA should promulgate Standing Instructions (SI) detailing minimum low flying heights and lateral separations for each aircraft type within their respective Command.

5. Variations to peacetime low flying limitations may be authorised by the OAA to meet operational requirements in time of conflict. The OAA should determine and promulgate low flying limitations for operations using:

a. Terrain-Following Radar; and

b. Vision enhancing equipment.

LOW FLYING AREAS, ROUTES AND CHARTS

Low flying areas

6. OAAs should nominate suitable appointments at each Flying Base for the management of low flying issues. These appointments should promulgate approved low flying areas (LFA) for their respective bases in the appropriate SI. Areas selected for promulgation as LFA should be:

a. surveyed to identify and locate all hazardous obstructions;

b. where possible, clear of promulgated instrument approaches;

c. as clear as possible of hazardous obstructions, and

d. as clear as possible from aerodrome Obstacle Limitation Surfaces (OLS)

7. Where an approved LFA infringes the PANS OPS and aerodrome OLS, the nominated appointment should promulgate and implement local procedures that ensure positive separation is maintained between aircraft operating in the LFA and aircraft conducting instrument approaches, including practice instrument approaches.

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Low flying routes

8. Commanding Officers (CO) of flying units are responsible for approving low flying routes (LFR) outside designated LFAs. LFR’s should be planned to avoid aerodromes by at least the CTR/CTAF-R boundary, and other known landing areas by a minimum of 3 nm or 1500 feet above ground level (AGL). Routes should also be planned to avoid sensitive and noise nuisance areas.

Low flying charts

9. OAA Base delegates should maintain master reference charts for:

a. promulgated local LFA; and

b. promulgated LFR used by aircraft operating from that base.

10. The charts should be kept current and made available to all base and transient aircrews. CO of local flying units should be responsible for ensuring that master copies of these reference charts are maintained and displayed at an appropriate place within the unit.

11. The reference charts should display the following information:

a. approved LFA and weapons ranges;

b. all known obstacles within 5 nm of the LFA or LFR ;

c. areas of major air activity, including conflicting instrument approaches; and

d. noise sensitive areas.

SURVEY REQUIREMENTS

Survey of low flying areas and low flying routes

12. The purpose of surveying a LFA or LFR is to safely pinpoint, and record the location of, overhead wires and other obstructions that present a significant hazard to aircraft operating at low altitude in the vicinity. Consequently, a Base delegate should promulgate a maximum period between surveys. If an LFA/LFR has not been surveyed within that period, it should be regarded as unsurveyed for the purposes of paragraph 17. Depending on the frequency of use of the area or route and the likelihood of hazard variation, commanders are to exercise their judgment on the possible need for additional surveys and the timing of surveys before use of the area or route.

13. Conduct of surveys. Commanders responsible for conducting surveys of intended LFA and LFR should ensure:

a. that a thorough pre-flight investigation is undertaken to ascertain whether any inconspicuous hazards exist (this investigation should include liaison with appropriate authorities);

b. the crews employed and aircraft utilised are suitable for the task and authorised in accordance with the appropriate SI;

c. the crews exercise due care and conduct a thorough aerial inspection of any ridgeline, with the aim of detecting wire supports, before flying below the height of that ridgeline (ie low flying); and

d. on completion of the survey, the aircraft captain should submit a report to the appropriate commander detailing the nature and location of all located hazards, together with an indication of the captain's confidence in the validity of the report. RAAF Aeronautical Information Service (AIS) should be notified of any significant changes or new data uncovered on the survey.

14. After the survey has been completed, the following details should be recorded on the appropriate master hazard chart:

a. the survey date and required date of resurvey;

b. hazardous obstructions, in particular, wires;

c. instrument approach paths; and

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Obstructions

15. Under Australian CAR, obstructions can be built up to a height of 110 m (360 feet) AGL without notification to aviation authorities. The RAAF AIS maintains a database of obstructions for Australia and has access to offshore obstruction data. RAAF AIS is responsible for coordinating with Federal, State, and local authorities as well as commercial utility organisations, and for sourcing existing and proposed obstruction information. Digital obstruction data held at RAAF AIS is available for planning flying operations. RAAF aeronautical charts depict obstructions higher than 150 feet (JOG–A) and 200 feet (TPC and ONC) AGL and the Chart Amendment Document consolidates all significant obstruction amendments to JOG–A, TPC, and ONC charts. New LFA and LFR data derived from surveys should be forwarded to RAAF AIS at [email protected].

MINIMUM SEPARATION

16. OAAs should define low flying minimum separation heights and distances for aircraft types under their command, within the following areas:

a. Surveyed LFA and LFR;

b. Unsurveyed LFR;

c. Low Flying over water;

d. Flypasts and flying displays; and

e. Built-up areas.

17. The following minimum heights apply to all fixed wing peacetime low flying operations:

a. Surveyed LFA and LFR. Operations within a promulgated LFA and on a promulgated LFR may be authorised to a height not below 150 feet.

b. Unsurveyed LFR. Operations over land which are conducted over unsurveyed routes or areas, or for which the surveys are not current, may not be authorised to a height below 250 feet.

c. Low flying over water. Aircraft fitted with serviceable and operating ground proximity devices (eg radar altimeters) and operating over open water may be authorised to not below 100 feet. Aircraft operating over water by day without radar altimeters are not to be authorised below 250 feet. Night minima should be promulgated by OAAs, or their nominated Representatives, in SI.

d. Flypasts and flying displays. During flypasts and flying displays, the minimum height limitations promulgated in OAREGs are to be observed.

e. Built–up areas. Aircraft are not to be authorised for flight below 1000 feet HAOW 600 meters built-up areas without the approval of OAAs, or their nominated Representives, as appropriate.

FLIGHT AUTHORISATION

18. Specific low flying authorisation is required for all low flying/terrain flight operations. The requirement for this authorisation encompasses situations such as flying near a ridgeline within the minimum lateral separation, but at a height of 500 feet or more above the surface, or any object on it, directly below the aircraft. For all low flying operations, the minimum lateral separation is to be specified with the authorisation; eg 200 feet Height Above Obstacles Within (HAOW) 400 m. For recurrent type operations (such as using LFA and LFR) the minimum vertical and lateral separation is to be determined by the relevant appointment and may be promulgated in the appropriate SI.

19. Army Aviation rotary assets are is not required to specify lateral separation distances for authorisation purposes due to the relatively low airspeeds and the ability to stop and hover. Lateral separation distances and clearances are promulgated in the aircraft Pilot Handling notes.

20. When authorising aircrew to conduct low altitude flight in LFAs administered by other Services, authorising officers should ensure that the currency and survey requirements of this guidance have been met by the appropriate administering agency. If these requirements cannot be met, the appropriate LFA is to be regarded as being unsurveyed for the purposes of paragraph 17 until the area can be surveyed to the published requirements.

21. Where master charts describe LFA or LFR, they may be referred to in the Flight Authorisation system by abbreviation or number, eg PEA WLFA or 2FTS LFR 15. Similarly, where aircraft operations are routinely conducted at low altitude within a particular unit or wing, standard annotations may be promulgated in the respective Unit or Wing Standing Instructions for use in the Flight Authorisation system.

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CONDUCT OF FLIGHT AT LOW ALTITUDE

22. When operating at low altitude, aircrew should carry, in their aircraft, charts indicating applicable hazards as shown on the appropriate master maps. As part of their pre-flight preparation, aircrew should validate these low flying charts against master charts held at the unit.

23. Whilst low flying, aircrew should:

a. observe the authorised minimum height for the flight unless weather or an emergency dictates otherwise;

b. be cognisant of their aircraft's performance and capability and exercise vigilance to avoid ground and air hazards;

c. avoid known terminal air traffic areas by at least the distance defined in paragraph 8;

d. avoid built-up or closely settled areas;

e. avoid operating mines, quarries or other industrial centres; and

f. avoid, as far as practicable, farmhouses, livestock and known sensitive areas.

24. If flight below the authorised height is necessary for any reason, the captain of the aircraft should report the details to the authorising officer as soon as practicable after landing.

Related orders and instructions

AC SI(OPS) 03-02 — Low Flying

ABR 5150 — Flying Regulations and Instructions

SI(AVN) OPS 03-208 — Terrain Flight

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FLYPASTS AND FLYING DISPLAYS


OAREG 2.2.7 — Flying Displays Operating Limitations

OAREG 2.2.7.a

The OAA must establish a system that ensures aircraft conducting flying displays do not compromise the suitability for flight.

1. Purpose. Throughout any type of display flying, the safety of spectators and other personnel is paramount. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that flying displays are conducted without damage to the aircraft involved, at an appropriate position from spectators and structures to ensure 1st, 2nd or 3rd party risk is mitigated from :

a. rotor/jet downwash or jet blast

b. a mishandled sequence

c. an aircraft malfunction

d. high-speed aerodynamics.

2. For the purpose of this regulation unless stated otherwise, flying displays include flypasts.

3. Without specific approval from the approving authority, Defence aircraft may not engage in any aerobatics or manoeuvring display over any city, town or densely inhabited district. In most cases, this will preclude flying displays, but not flypasts, over any regatta, race meeting or similar event. The adequacy of a display venue is to be considered in all cases and specifically addressed in any application submitted to the approving authority as appropriate for approval to conduct a flying display. Particular attention should be given to the availability of clear areas appropriate to the likely consequences of airborne emergencies.

4. Helicopter flying displays may involve operations conducted in the avoid area of the height velocity diagram. Helicopter flying displays must be planned and conducted in a manner that does not expose spectators to the consequences of a loss of power while operating the avoid area of the height velocity diagram.

NOTE

Throughout OAREG 2.2.7.a, minimum heights have been referenced to height above obstacles within (HAOW) without a lateral distance provided as flying display lateral distances will vary. As such, lateral distance calculations control should be determined within by OAA issued OIP.

AMC 1 to OAREG 2.2.7.a - Crowd Line Management

5. A Crowd Line will normally be provided by an event organiser for air shows. Depending on the event’s nature, the event organiser may not fully understand the implications of aircraft flying displays from a safety point of view. There may be times when the crowd line (or similar) needs to be determined by planning staff and the aircraft captain due to the nature of the event, such as a car race. In this circumstance, the aircraft captain and event organiser should work together to determine the position of all potential spectators, personnel, and structures at the time of the display. Locations of spectators and structures may also change over the course of the event. This may warrant a site assessment and/or airborne recce prior to the display.

6. Crowd Line Infringement. There may be circumstances requiring some people to be closer to the aircraft than the designated crowd line. In such cases, the aircraft captain should ensure the display organiser has provided a safety briefing to the exposed people so that appropriate precautions may be taken. For example, helicopter downwash may require display signs to be firmly fastened or removed prior to the air display Assumptions should not be made that the same level of controls such as site preparation, FOD awareness to that of military controlled environments will be in place. If the aircraft captain is unsure such a safety briefing has occurred, the crowd line measurements should be modified to include those people and objects who would have been outside the crowd line.

7. Flying display sequences. Flying display sequences may not take place over the main crowd without specific OAA approval, unless the display is a single aircraft in erect flight, not below 500 feet HAOW, when positioning for the beginning of, or on departure from, a display. Sup

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AMC 2 to OAREG 2.2.7.a – Safe Distance from Spectators and Structures

Fixed Wing Aircraft

8. Excluding flypasts, the normal separation distance between fixed wing aircraft and the crowd line is a minimum of 200 metres Further risk assessment should be conducted on:

a. Elements of the display with significant vector towards the crowd line, taking into account the complexity of the manoeuvre and/or formation type/size.

b. Personnel and fragile objects (eg: marquees or advertising hoarding) closer than the crowd line to ensure their safety is not compromised.

Rotary Wing Aircraft

9. Excluding flypasts, the normal separation distance between helicopters and the crowd line should be a minimum of 200 metres. Further risk hazard analysis should be conducted regarding the location of people and fragile objects such as marquees or advertising hoarding, that are closer than the crowd line to ensure personnel safety is not compromised. The minimum distance may be reduced for:

a. Hovering. For normal take off and landing and transitional manoeuvres, the minimum distance should be not less 65m. This distance is based on a medium weight helicopter (eg S-70 / MRH-90) and should be adjusted using RM for helicopters of differing all up weight but can be reduced if RM allows.

b. Low speed manoeuvring. The normal minimum distance should be 100m.

c. Underslung load. The normal minimum distance whilst carrying an underslung load should be 100m.

10. Rotor downwash effect will vary with channelling/funnelling objects (such as buildings, concrete barriers etc), which must be accounted for by the aircraft captain during display planning and execution (assessing the risk of rotor downwash). This may require the minimum distance to be based on the channelling/funnelling object

11. Rotor downwash effect area is influenced by ambient wind. The separation distance should be increased downwind by an additional 20 m per 10 knots of wind1 .

AMC 3 to OAREG 2.2.7.a – Speed limitation

12. Aircraft should not exceed:

a. Mach 0.90 or 550 Knots Indicated Air Speed, whichever is least, so as to avoid accidental generation of a sonic disturbance during manoeuvres. Aircraft flying at or approaching this limit should reduce speed further before initiating any manoeuvre to avoid in inadvertent sonic disturbances.

b. 300 KIAS, or operate at high power settings, when approaching the display area from the rear of the crowd.

AMC 4 to OAREG 2.2.7.a – Height Limitations

Fixed Wing Aircraft

13. The following height minima apply to fixed wing aircraft participating in flying displays:

a. Aerobatic manoeuvres. Aerobatic manoeuvres, except spinning, may be performed down to a minimum of 500 feet HAOW.

b. Non–aerobatic manoeuvres. Low level runs or flypasts may not be conducted below 200 feet HAOW.

c. Spinning. Recovery to erect flight should be completed by 1000 feet HAOW.

Rotary Wing Aircraft

14. The following height minima should be applied to helicopters participating in flying displays:

a. Display manoeuvres. Display manoeuvres (wingovers/pedal turns) may be performed down to a minimum of 100 feet HAOW.

1 1 S-70B-2 N24-006 (875) Rotor Downwash Incident (DDAAFS/OUT/2015/AB23962744 and DSTO Rotor Downwash Modelling, AB26272152.

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b. Low speed handling manoeuvres. Low speed handling manoeuvres may be performed down to a minimum of 50 feet HAOW except for live winching demonstrations which may be conducted at a height that provides the maximum degree of safety for the wireman (person being winched).

c. Flypasts. Low level runs or flypasts may be flown to a minimum of 100 feet HAOW.

AMC 5 to OAREG 2.2.7.a – Flying Display Weather Minima

15. Pilots should maintain clear of cloud and a visibility suitable for the display at all times to ensure suitability for flight will not be compromised. This ensures that aircraft remain in a position to provide visual separation with other display aircraft, terrain, structures and to aid in the maintenance of situational awareness throughout.

16. The flight authorisation officer and aircraft captain should establish minimum weather in advance based on the complexity and location of the display. Where practicable, the event planner should be included in the planned weather determinations.

AMC 6 to OAREG 2.2.7.a – Flying Display Limitations and Approval

17. Flying Display Limitations and Approval controls include:

a. identification of approval authorities for flying displays that include aerobatics or opposition manoeuvres

b. any additional limitation that is deemed necessary to further restrict aircraft flying display operations.

18. High level approval, administrative and indemnity insurance aspects of flying displays can be found in the Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Manual.

AMC 7 to OAREG 2.2.7.a – Flight Conduct

19. In addition to OAREG 2.1.4, flight authorisation and conduct should include2:

a. Officer in Charge (OIC) display. Where a display involves aircraft from different Services/Commands/Units, an OIC display is to be nominated. The OIC display is to coordinate all flying displays and flypasts.

b. Communications. To aid in situation awareness, ensuring the display aircraft should have continuous communication with the event organiser or similar (such as unit personnel at the event) during the display.

c. AVRM. Where the display sequence is not fully covered in existing MRPs, further risk management is completed to ensure all known risks are minimised SFARP.

d. Public Awareness. Ensure there is a mechanism to allow for public awareness of upcoming flying displays and flypasts where required. This is to ensure a duty of care to the public’s safety who may not aware of the event, and to reduce the potential for adverse publicity.

e. Display sequence. The display sequence is to be discussed with the flight authorisation officer IAW OAREG 2.1.4, paying particular attention to and specifying in detail each authorised manoeuvre. Any changes to a display sequence are to be approved by the flight authorisation officer, thoroughly briefed and practised before being incorporated in a display.

f. Briefings. A comprehensive crew briefing is to be given before any practice or display flight. The briefing is to cover all instructions, orders, procedures and sequences relevant to the flight, paying particular attention to:

(1) Noise sensitive areas which are to be avoided.

(2) The location and height of obstacles in and near the area of operations including channelling/funnelling objects.

(3) The location of the crowd line, spectators and applicable display axis (orientation of display).

(4) The specific limitations on aircraft operations detailed in this regulation such as:

(a) Height minimums.

(b) Manoeuvring and operating limitations (speed, ‘G’, roll rates, aircraft systems etc)

2 AMC 1 to OAREG 2.1.4.a – Flight Authorisation System Controls - Section 3, Chapter 6

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(c) Distance from crowd line.

(d) Weather minimums and considerations.

(e) Contingency procedures.

(f) RMP/MRP constraints.

(g) Ground Special Effects (such as pyrotechnics, smoke etc).

(h) Other expected airborne traffic.

g. Minimum height. The minimum height and lateral distance to be maintained from the surrounding terrain and obstacles is to be entered in the Flight Authorisation documentation.

AMC 8 to OAREG 2.2.7.a –Formation Flying Display

20. Specific limitations and restrictions for formation flying displays are:

a. opposition manoeuvres involving vectors towards the crowd are prohibited except as specifically authorised by the OAA

b. new manoeuvres or sequences may not:

(1) be practised without OAA approval

(2) be performed in public without OAA approval.

c. The OAA may promulgate the minimum qualifications of pilots selected for formation aerobatic teams.

AMC 9 to OAREG 2.2.7.a – Historic and dedicated defence public relations aircraft

21. The OAA should promulgate delegates for the planning and approval of flying displays by:

a. those operated by RAN Historic Flight

b. the Museum of Army Aviation Flying

c. the RAAF Museum

d. the RAAF Balloon.

OAREG 2.2.7.b

The OAA must ensure that objects released from Defence aircraft during flying displays will not compromise suitability for flight.

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that objects that are released from aircraft during flying displays are appropriately approved and will not compromise suitability of flight.

AMC 1 to OAREG 2.2.7.b

2. The following controls may ensure safe release of objects during flying displays:

a. specific OAA approvals are required

b. the object to be released has technical and operational clearance for release from the participating aircraft

c. the release of objects is included in the Risk Management for the display

d. ensuring all safety distance requirements are observed.

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SECTION 4

CHAPTER 3

AIRBORNE EMERGENCY TRAINING


OAREG 2.3—Qualification and training

INTRODUCTION

1. Aircraft emergency training operations, in particular practice engine failures, are demanding sequences requiring a high degree of aircrew competence and situational awareness. Also, multi-engine Defence aircraft may need to be flown operationally with one or more engines shutdown, or simulated inoperative. Due to the special nature and inherent risk of those operations, Defence provides specific guidance on the conduct of airborne emergency training, in particular flight with one or more engines shutdown or simulated inoperative.

PURPOSE

2. This guidance describes the minimum restrictions to be applied to the conduct of airborne emergency training in Defence aircraft.

APPLICABILITY

3. This chapter applies to all personnel conducting practice emergency training in Defence aircraft or aircraft operated by Defence units. Although instructions issued at Command level and below may prescribe further limitations to address specific role requirements, those instructions remain subordinate and are to comply with any applicable OAA, single-Service or Defence instructions.

DEFINITIONS

4. Emergency training. Emergency training is the ground and airborne training for, and practice of, emergency procedures.

5. Emergency Procedures. Where both ‘Emergency Procedures’ and ‘Abnormal Procedures’ are defined for an aircraft type, for the purpose of this chapter the term ‘Emergency Procedures’ includes both.

6. Practice asymmetric. Practice asymmetric is the simulated failure or intentional power reduction of one or more engines of a multi-engine aircraft such that the resultant thrust vector is no longer along the aircraft centreline.

EMERGENCY TRAINING

7. All aircrew are required to operate aircraft proficiently in accordance with normal and emergency procedures prescribed in the aircraft flight manual. To gain proficiency in performing emergency procedures, aircrew need training and practice in emergency situations.

8. To the maximum extent practicable, emergency training is to be conducted in a simulator. Where this is not possible due to the lack of a suitable simulator, or because of simulator limitations or inadequacies, airborne emergency training may be conducted in aircraft to the extent approved by the OAA.

9. Practice emergencies are normally limited to simulating those events described in the aircraft flight manual and conducted in accordance with the emergency procedures promulgated in that manual. Practice emergency sequences designed to simulate emergencies not described in the aircraft flight manual should be reviewed and approved by the OAA prior to being conducted.

PRACTICE ENGINE FAILURES

10. General. Airborne engine failures are simulated by retarding the throttle or power control lever to idle, or to a setting which simulates engine shutdown. Some engine emergency scenarios may involve an intermediate setting to simulate a limited power or power restriction scenario. Flying organisations should promulgate in appropriate OIP the procedures and limitations for the simulation of an engine failure and for subsequent actions, including engine operating limitations, committal and overshoot heights, and engine restart and warm-up procedures.

11. Single–engine aircraft. The deliberate airborne shutdown or stopping of an engine in single-engine aircraft during emergency training is not usually permitted.

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12. Multi–engine aircraft. Within their respective commands, an OAA should ensure that a suitable education program is in place to cover multi-engine theory, such as asymmetric aerodynamics. The OAA should ensure that all asymmetric flying training is conducted in accordance with appropriate Command, Group, Wing or Unit Standing Instructions (SIs). Those SIs should detail procedures and limitations for asymmetric training in all multi-engine aircraft types under command, and include:

a. methods to be employed for the simulation of engine failure(s);

b. procedures and limitations for asymmetric flying training, including double asymmetric training (if permitted); and

c. aircraft type limitations for asymmetric training operations including minimum:

(1) heights,

(2) speeds, and

(3) weather criteria.

MULTIPLE EMERGENCY TRAINING

13. The reliability of modern aircraft and aircraft systems are such that the simultaneous failure of critical, independent systems is extremely unlikely. Accordingly, airborne emergency training involving multiple emergencies should not be required.

GUIDANCE

• A system failure that would normally lead to an associated failure and which cannot be safely practised should be described and discussed as part of emergency training.

CONSIDERATIONS

14. Weather conditions. To the maximum extent possible, airborne emergency training is to be conducted in VMC. In the case of emergency training involving failure of the pilot's primary attitude reference, flight in IMC should be prohibited. Where such flight in IMC is permitted, a qualified and current safety pilot monitoring full panel instruments should be prescribed to occupy a control seat with fully-functioning dual controls.

15. Pilot qualifications. Wherever possible, airborne emergency training should be conducted under the supervision of a pilot with instructional or supervisory experience (eg FCIs, OFIs, QFIs, QHIs, or Check Captains). Pilots should not be permitted to perform unsupervised airborne emergency training without specific authorisation. In all practice scenarios, aircrew should be briefed and familiar with appropriate emergency procedures prior to airborne emergency training.

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SECTION 4

CHAPTER 4

SPECIAL AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION


OAREG 2.2.1—Flying rules for special missions and tasks

APPLICABLE DEFENCE INSTRUCTIONS

OPS 03–2—Rotary wing aeromedical evacuation training in the Australian Defence Force prescribes the policy for rotary wing aeromedical evacuation training in Defence.

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SECTION 4

CHAPTER 5

AIRCRAFT CREWING


OAREG 2.2.2—Aircraft crewing

OAREG 2.2.9—Carriage of passengers in Defence aircrew crew stations

OAREG 2.2.10—Carriage of passengers in dedicated passenger seats

INTRODUCTION

1. To maintain the operational airworthiness integrity of Defence flying activities, aircraft operating within the scope of the DASP must be manned by an appropriate number of crew meeting specified qualification and currency requirements and who have been authorised to conduct the SOI approved role.

PURPOSE

2. This chapter provides guidance on crewing of aircraft operations within the scope of the DASP.

APPLICABILITY

3. This guidance is applicable to all Defence flying operations.

AIRCRAFT CREWS

CREW COMPOSITION

4. Aircrew crew composition (normal and minimum) should be identified for the different tasks or missions a capability may perform and stipulated in relevant Orders, Instructions or Publications.

Responsibilities

5. Disclosure. For flight authorisation to be effective, it must be based on sound and up-to-date knowledge. It is therefore essential that all aircrew fully disclose any factors that could potentially compromise flight safety. Accordingly, aircraft crews should advise flight authorisation officers, or other crew member if necessary, of anything that may affect a particular member’s medical, psychological or professional fitness to fly. Where this involves sensitive personal issues, authorising officers are to respect any reasonable requests for confidentiality.

6. Aviation safety occurrences. All crew members have a responsibility to clearly advise the aircraft captain of any circumstance that may compromise the safety of a flight. Where the captain does not properly report a flight safety compromise or breach, it is incumbent on the other crew members to ensure that the authorising officer and aviation safety officer are informed.

Defence member acting as crew on non-Defence aircraft

7. Defence aircrew may fly on duty as crew in aircraft operating outside of the scope of the DASP provided the flight will further their Service knowledge and experience and that any pre-conditions imposed by the operating authority are satisfied.

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AIRCRAFT CAPTAINCY


OAREG 2.2.3—Aircraft captaincy

INTRODUCTION

1. The aircraft captain is in the unique position of being the only person on the aircraft who must be aware of all the factors and operational constraints affecting their particular flight. The aircraft captain is in assigned command of the aircraft and is legally responsible for the safe and effective operation of the aircraft in performing its mission. Being accountable for the safety of the aircraft and its crew and passengers while underway, the captain has authority over all persons on board, regardless of their rank.

PURPOSE

2. This chapter describes the responsibilities of aircraft captains operating Defence registered and non-Defence registered aircraft in Defence operations.

APPLICABILITY

3. This guidance applies to all Defence personnel appointed as ‘aircraft captain’ for the purposes of conducting Defence operations using either Defence registered or non-Defence registered aircraft.

AIRCRAFT CAPTAINS

AUTHORITY

4. Within the bounds of section 28 of the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (DFDA), all other legal orders and the scope of the flight authorisation, the authorised aircraft captain has total responsibility for the safe and effective operation of an aircraft. The aircraft captain therefore has authority over all persons on board, irrespective of rank, for the period of operation of the aircraft.

5. Flying instructors. In any aircraft in which dual controls are fitted and instruction is being given, the instructor should be designated as aircraft captain, and has authority, irrespective of rank, over the student or pilot to whom instruction is being given in all matters concerning the operation of the aircraft.

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AIRCRAFT CAPTAIN

6. An aircraft captain is responsible for the effective operation of the aircraft in meeting the assigned task. In particular, the captain is to:

a. ensure that they have received sufficient pre-flight detail by way of tasking information, authorisation guidance, mission briefing, and/or curriculum description

b. conduct an adequate pre-flight briefing for any crew

c. ensure the requirements of all orders, instructions, regulations and publications relating to the aircraft and its operation are observed

d. conduct a post-flight crew debrief

e. notify the authorising officer of any unusual occurrences or deviations from the flight authorisation.

7. Aircraft marshalling. While taxiing an aircraft under the guidance of a marshaller, the aircraft captain retains overall responsibility for its safe operation. The aircraft captain should follow the marshaller’s directions except where the aircraft captain considers that, in so doing, the safety or effective operation of the aircraft would be compromised. The aircraft captain should stop the aircraft at once if, whilst receiving marshalling directions, sight of, or confidence in, the marshaller is lost.

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GUIDANCE

• The general procedures for marshalling aircraft are contained in AAP 7001.059—electronic Aviation Maintenance Management Manual (eAMMM) section 3 chapter 12.

8. Aircraft serviceability and flight safety. The aircraft captain is responsible for ensuring that the aircraft serviceability state, as indicated by the Maintenance Release and associated documentation, is adequate for the safe conduct of the flight.

9. In–flight occurrences. Occurrences outside the scope of the flight authorisation should be handled in accordance with the flight manual and applicable OIP if possible. Where that guidance is insufficient or inappropriate, aircraft captains should exercise their best judgement and use all the resources at their disposal to ensure the safe recovery of their aircraft, crew and passengers. As soon as circumstances allow, the authorising officer should be contacted for advice, or informed, when a captain finds it necessary to deviate from the flight authorisation given. During normal peacetime operations, captains should give overriding consideration to flight safety during any deviation from flight authorisation.

10. Passenger and cargo requirements. The aircraft captain is responsible for all aspects associated with the carriage of passengers and cargo, appropriate Service specific OIP and other approved publications relevant to the carriage of passengers and cargo.

IN-FLIGHT TRANSFER OF CAPTAINCY

11. The in-flight transfer of aircraft captaincy is an undesirable practice which should be avoided if possible. However, where the in-flight transfer of aircraft captaincy becomes necessary for the successful completion of a task, the authorising officer should:

a. clearly indicate to both pilots the point in the flight that aircraft captaincy transfer is to occur

b. record the transfer details in appropriate documentation.

12. To make sure there is no uncertainty concerning who is acting as aircraft captain at various stages of the flight or task, all pilots involved should:

a. advise all crew members on intended aircraft captaincy transfer arrangements during the pre-flight briefing

b. conduct a formal ‘hand-over/take-over’ of the aircraft captaincy

c. advise all crew members when the aircraft captaincy transfer is actually completed.

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OAREG 2.2.15 — OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

GUIDANCE MATERIAL AND ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE

1. Compliance Period. OAA compliance with OAREG 2.2.15 is required by 1 Oct 15.

2. Definitions. Terms applicable to this regulation are defined in the Glossary.

OAREG 2.2.15.a

The OAA must establish an Operational Clearance management system to ensure that approval to operate an aviation system outside the system’s approved configuration, role, environment, limitation or condition is conducted at an acceptable level of safety.

3. The intent of this regulation is to ensure that directed mission objectives that require Defence to operate an aviation system outside of the system’s approved configuration, role, environment (CRE), limitations or conditions are conducted at an acceptable level of safety (ALoS). In such compelling cases, Operational Clearance is the mechanism that is used to facilitate a formal airworthiness approval in support of the required aviation activity, including any related mission training.

4. In certain circumstances an Operational Clearance may also be appropriate to permit the continued operation of an aviation system whilst enduring approvals are being sought under relevant regulation, and there is sound expectation that the normal approval requirements

1 will be achieved. For example, required test and evaluation (T&E)

has been conducted, the results are satisfactory and use of the tested system may provide significant benefits to a successful mission outcome; however, the processing of other regulatory requirements is expected to progress beyond an acceptable timeline in comparison with operational needs, thereby impacting mission success. In this case, an Operational Clearance might be assessed, and if found acceptable, approved to allow the aviation system to operate concurrently with the progression of the normal approval process.

5. The Operational Clearance management system should:

a. Be a formal, documented process. Any products supporting a decision to approve an Operational Clearance should be made available for peer review. An acceptable means of compliance for making documents available for peer review is providing awareness of the Operational Clearance via the DRN or DSN as appropriate.

b. Provide a rigorous and disciplined review of all relevant aspects that affords the Commander effective decision making advice so that the aviation activity is conducted at ALoS, including how the activity might compromise each element of suitability for flight.

6. The Operational Clearance management system may include:

a. Command Authority Guidance. The Operational Clearance is an airworthiness mechanism which is approved by a suitably trained and well informed airworthiness authority. However, the decision to approve an aviation activity is ultimately made by an Operational Commander, vice an airworthiness authority. The OAA should ensure that, where the command chain and airworthiness authorities are separated,2 a mechanism is established to clearly communicate and transfer the risk associated with the employment of an aviation system under an Operational Clearance to the relevant Operational Commander.

b. Risk Management Process. The Operational Clearance management system, including all supporting documentation, should be focussed primarily on the assessment and management of risk. An acceptable means of compliance (AMC) for risk management processes is the AAP 6734.001–Defence Aviation Safety Manual (DASM). The system should limit DASM or any other alternate AMC inclusions to generic statements so that changes in the AMC need not force changes to the Operational Clearance management system, and to ensure only the most recent safety policy is utilised. For example, avoid reference to ALARP or SFARP; rather, refer to the more generic terms such as ALoS and/or acceptable levels of risk (AloR).

c. Operational Assessment. Operational advice may consist of any and all areas relevant to the operations, such as air cargo delivery criteria, use of non-standard ALSE, additional PPE requirements, and other FMS considerations. If available, use of external SME advice regarding operational assessment should be used to supplement the decision making process. Operational assessment may include:

1 For example OAREG 3. 2 For example, an aviation system force assigned under command of CJOPS.

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(1) Human factors/medical assessment. Medical advice may include physiological and psychological effects upon crew during the conduct of the aviation activity. Assessment should also include considerations such as health and fitness, fatigue, NVG physiology, the physiology of crew safety equipment, human factors and human-machine-interface (HMI) considerations.

(2) Training assessment. When assessing training requirements, in addition to aviation system crew members, the management system should consider mission essential passengers and/or personnel, civil agencies such as Airservices Australia, and any others that may be relevant.

(3) OIP assessment. Consideration should be given to the breadth of planned changes and how comprehensive OIP documentation should be in order to support the Operational Clearance.

d. Technical Assessment. Engineering advice is critical to a rigorous Operational Clearance assessment. Such advice can ensure that any changes or modifications to an aviation system configuration that may deviate from the approved design are identified and can be treated if necessary. At minimum, the technical assessment will inform the command deliberation of an Operational Clearance. Thus the OAA should ensure that a TAA assessment is provided unless it cannot be practicably obtained. Where engineering advice could not be practicably obtained, the TAA should be informed of the Operational Clearance approval so that a retrospective technical assessment can be made.

e. Other assessments may also include:

(1) Logistics assessment. When assessing logistics support, in addition to how much, how many and when a product can be delivered; also assess supportability, maintainability, reliability and commonality of the product.

(2) Prior experience assessment. Applicable prior experience within Defence, another Military Airworthiness Authority (MAA) or National Airworthiness Authority (NAA) or other aviation system units may be relevant to the Operational Clearance assessment.

(3) Safety assessment. Safety advice can provide safety-related reports of incidents/accidents, which may be relevant to the type of operations that are under consideration. DDAAFS may be able to assist with data analysis or advice.

(4) Flight test assessment. An FTAA may be engaged to advise, review and support any required activities for the aviation system which might arise from the Operational or Technical assessments. For example, an FTAA may inform the risk associated with not proceeding with T&E prior to approving the operational clearance, or inform the operational assessment identified with respect to HF / HMI considerations, stores clearance and aviation medicine aspects, or reach into global flight test communities for further advice.

(5) Any other requirements the OAA may deem necessary.

OAREG 2.2.15.b

The OAA must ensure Operational Clearances are presented at the next scheduled Airworthiness Board.

7. The intent of this regulation is to provide oversight and review of Operational Clearance approvals by AwB Members so that an overall appreciation of the decision making processes supporting the assessed aviation system can be included in the final AwB outcome. The intent is not to second guess command decisions; rather to enhance the AwB’s ability to assess airworthiness management of the aviation system as a whole, including any urgent capability requirements.

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AERONAUTICAL LIFE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT


OAREG 2.2.13—Use of flying clothing and aeronautical life support equipment

INTRODUCTION

1. The regulation promulgates the process to be used by OAAs and OAARs for approval of Aeronautical Life Support Equipment (ALSE) and flying clothing in aviation activities (Defence and Non-Defence registered aircraft).

PURPOSE

2. This chapter provides guidance on the airworthiness considerations applicable to the assessment of unauthorised ALSE.

APPLICABILITY

3. This guidance is applicable to the OAA approval of aircrew life support equipment and flying clothing for use in the conduct of Defence aviation operations.

GUIDANCE

4. ALSE differs from flying clothing in that ALSE requires servicing via a technical maintenance plan. ALSE includes the following:

a. Safety Equipment. Includes: Air Sea Rescue Kits, helmets, locator beacons and radios, personal flotation devices, cold water immersion suits, underwater breathing devices, survival aids and survival kits.

b. Mission Equipment. Includes: Anti-G suits, Night Vision Goggles, protection of eyes from laser threats, oxygen masks and restraint systems.

5. Flying clothing is generally non technical equipment and includes flying suits – both single and two piece, thermal clothing, boots, jackets, gloves and watches. Flying clothing is managed by Soldier Modernisation SPO (SMSPO) in Land Systems Division, CASG.

6. ALSE Advice. The Aeronautical Life Support Logistics Management Unit (ALSLMU) is the Defence Centre of Expertise for ALSE. The ALSLMU Senior Design Engineer is appointed by DGTA as the Defence Airworthiness Standards Representative (ASR) for Defence ALSE. The ASR is required to prescribe and interpret airworthiness standards and provide authoritative airworthiness advice regarding ALSE. ALSE ALSLMU can provide advice on ALSE fitment eg earplugs or helmets, current capability and review ALSE requests. ALSLMU can also provide information on the various airworthiness issues associated with the use of ALSE which will improve the quality of the OAA/OAAR ALSE decision making process. Advice can be sought directly from the SDE/ASR of ALSLMU.

7. Procurement of ALSE. The normal process to procure ALSE is as follows:

a. FEG HQ to submits a request to the Director or OC of the supporting SPO with funding.

b. The supporting SPO request ALSLMU support from HQAC (A8), who is ALSLMUs sponsor. A copy of the request to the ALSLMUs SPO Director who is OC MPSPO.

8. Operational ALSE Authorisation. The normal process for ALSE authorisation is for the Design Acceptance Representative (DAR also known as the CENGR) of the supporting SPO for Defence registered aircraft and civil agencies for non–Defence registered aircraft to accept the technical risk and the OAR to accept the operational risk. When authorising ALSE the following should be taken into account.

a. Fit For Purpose. The authorising agency shall satisfy itself that the proposed system is able to satisfactorily meet requirements and/or that the probability and consequences of any identified deficiencies are acceptable in the context of the need. Operational requirements include colourings and markings; durability, fire protection characteristics, weather, dust and sand proofing, buoyancy.

b. ALSE Integration. How does the equipment fit with other worn ALSE. Does it interfere with operations.

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c. Aircraft Integration. Impacts imposed by the wearing of the equipment on aircraft ingress, egress and impact on normal operations. This may include using a rescue winching equipment, weapons use etc.

d. Environmental conditions. Effect of wearing and maintaining ALSE in adverse temperature and humidity conditions (all potential climatic and aircraft environmental conditions).

e. Emergency Conditions. Are the Aircrew able to exit the aircraft in an emergency wearing the ALSE. This includes underwater egress. Post emergency egress implications should also be considered, such as buoyancy, integration with parachute systems, winching equipment etc.

f. Advice. Recommendation from ALSLMU that the equipment is fit for purpose and integrates with other ALSE and advice from the aircraft DAR (or civil authority) that the equipment integrates with the aircraft and does not compromise technical airworthiness.

g. Logistics. The integrated logistics support arrangements in place including engineering venues, maintenance venues, spares parts and replacement items.

h. Funding. Funding shall be identified before any ALSE is transferred to the CASG for support.

i. Publications. Maintenance and Aircrew procedures are in place. This includes pre-flight inspections, maintenance requirements, and operating procedures.

j. Training. Aircrew and maintenance training and currency requirements are defined.

9. Crashworthiness. Consideration of the crashworthiness of the equipment for aircrew seated and restrained at crew stations and unrestrained (beyond that provided by the standard loadmaster harness) in the cargo compartment is necessary. The aircraft Sponsor SPO or DGTA can provide further information on Crash Protection. ALSLMU can provide advice on restraint straps and harnesses.

10. Sources of Guidance. When considering requests for approval to use non-approved ALSE, approving authorities should make use of the guidance currently available regarding the introduction to service of aviation equipment. Approval authorities will find the following reference materials provide invaluable supporting information to assist in the decision making process to approve or otherwise non-standard ALSE:

a. AAP 7001.053—electronic Technical Airworthiness Management Manual (eTAMM). The eTAMM provides the Technical Airworthiness Regulations applicable to Defence aviation operations. The ALSE ASR is authorised in regulation one.

b. AAP 7001.054—electronic Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (eADRM). The eADRM provides guidance on the design requirements for technical airworthiness applicable to Defence aviation.

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OAREG 2.2.9 – CARRIAGE OF PERSONNEL IN DEFENCE AIRCRAFT


1. Superseded Regulations. The following regulations were superseded by AL4 –OAREG 2.2.9:

a. OAREG 2.2.9 – Carriage of passengers in defence crew stations

b. OAREG 2.2.10 – Carriage of passengers in dedicated passenger seats

c. OAREG 2.2.11 – Operational contingency loading

d. AD 008/2009 – Carriage of Passengers in RAAF Transport Aircraft.

2. Compliance Period. OAA compliance with OAREG 2.2.9 is required by 1 Oct 15.

3. Definitions. Terms applicable to this regulation are defined in the Glossary.

OAREG 2.2.9.a – The OAA/FTAA must ensure a system is established that assures the carriage of personnel in Defence aircraft will not compromise suitability for flight.

4. The intent of this regulation is to ensure that carriage of personnel on Defence aircraft using approved aircraft restraints and seating systems is conducted so that suitability for flight is not compromised, with emphasis on managing acceptable levels of risk regarding loss of life or injury to personnel carried on the aircraft.

5. Exemption. OAREG 2.2.9 does not apply to flight crew, who are managed under other approved OIP, such as the aircraft flight manual.

6. Equipment Inclusion. Carriage of personnel includes any required equipment a person must use or control to achieve an assigned mission outcome. For example, parachutes or dive equipment. Such equipment is restrained by the owning person, with direction and assistance of a relevant crew member as may be appropriate. Equipment handed over to flight crew to restrain is treated as cargo and not managed under this regulation.

7. Acceptable Means of Compliance. Aircraft configuration and mission requirements will vary. The system controls should:

a. Address the hazards that are present when personnel are carried on Defence aircraft.

b. Vary depending on whether the person is classified as mission crew or passenger, noting mission crew may not have the equivalent training as flight crew regarding aircraft operations.

c. Where appropriate, consider and utilise requirements that exist to support carriage of personnel in civil registered aircraft. For example, a civil registered A340 used to transport troops will already be under CASA oversight, alleviating the need for Defence to produce additional controls, or minimising any additional treatments that may be desired.

8. The requirements of the Commonwealth Work Health and Safety Act 2011 should also be considered when developing solutions to OAREG 2.2.9.

System Controls

9. System controls supporting development of a carriage of personnel control system may include:

a. Approval authorities. A system that delegates decisions to carry personnel on Defence aircraft using approved restraints and seating to airworthiness appointments and/or relevant command appointments.1 Approval authorities should be able to:

(1) determine the classification of personnel

(2) approve the carriage of personnel2

(3) if required, assess documentation that supports judgement of an individual’s fitness for flight and the suitability of the aircraft for carriage of such personnel.

b. Safety assessments. Consideration of safety risks apply equally regarding personnel carriage on operations or during training. Similarly, when engaged on operations, in addition to the aircraft

1 Delegation via command authority is less restrictive than delegation via airworthiness appointments, thereby affording increased flexibility. 2 In deciding whether a passenger will be granted carriage, the guiding principle for the approving authority is that such carriage is of benefit to, or in the interests of, Defence. Where delegated approving authorities have any doubt as to the eligibility of an applicant for travel on Defence aircraft, the request should be forwarded to a higher authority for decision.

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captain, the operational commander should be jointly responsible for minimising the safety risk to personnel.

c. Dedicated seats or crew stations. Personnel should only be carried in dedicated seats or crew stations in accordance with an aircraft’s approved SOI CRE3. Considerations include:

(1) passenger capacity and seating configurations

(2) any passenger capacity limitations due to restricted access to emergency exits by cargo or role equipment

(3) requirement for the use of seatbelts, harnesses and aircraft fittings and equipment.

d. Classification of personnel. Personnel are classified as crew or passengers, from which risk levels should be determined. Classifying personnel travelling in Defence aircraft with precision assures that the requirement for an individual’s presence onboard an aircraft is balanced against the hazards of the aviation activity4. For example, a mission essential passenger might warrant acceptance of more risk than a passenger, as one must fly while the other need not.

e. Classifying sub-categories of passengers. When not classified as mission essential, passenger sub-categories can improve awareness of increased risks regarding carriage of a particular passenger type in a crew station or in a specific aircraft type. For example, opportunity travel, VIP, Defence personnel, foreign Defence personnel, Commonwealth employees, external service providers, other non-Defence personnel.

f. Restricting non-Defence personnel from acting as crew. Non-Defence personnel should not be permitted to fly as crew on Defence aircraft without approval from an appropriate authority.

g. Training mission crew and mission essential passengers. Identifying and training personnel who travel frequently on Defence aircraft may be considered a way of managing increased risk exposure.

h. Restrictions regarding flights of a hazardous nature. Unless classified as crew or a mission essential passenger, personnel should be not be authorised for carriage on flights of a hazardous nature. Hazardous flights may include test flights, low level operations, operational missions, certain types of dangerous cargo carriage and display flying.

i. Restrictions regarding flight crew stations. Before approving carriage of passengers in flight crew stations, where the presence of the passenger could compromise flight safety, consideration should be given to:

(1) the potential for passengers to access aircraft systems or equipment which may jeopardise the aircraft safety

(2) the possibility of interference with essential crew functions.

j. Pre-flight briefings. Defence has a duty of care for the carriage of passengers who may be unaware of basic aircraft safety requirements. Personnel should be briefed on aspects relating to passenger safety by an authorised person, normally a crew member. At a minimum, all personnel should be instructed on how to use restraint and seating systems and how to operate relevant safety systems, such as emergency oxygen masks. Consideration should be given to comfort breaks, repositioning within the aircraft during flight and other reasons a person may be required to move within an aircraft during flight time. Additionally, an authorised person should brief passengers seated in crew stations on:

(1) flight profiles and sequence of events, especially those sequences that may cause concern

(2) emergency procedures

(3) any controls or switches that the passenger may be asked to operate

(4) securing or stowage of loose items.

k. Personnel are fit to fly. This particulalry applies to fast jet aircraft as such aircraft will expose individuals to higher physiological stresses than transport aircraft or rotary wing aircraft. Medical checks should be considered on advice of medical SME.

l. Use of aeronautical life support equipment (ALSE) and/or personal protective equipment (PPE). Use of such ALSE and PPE includes training in its use prior to flight.

3 Carriage of personnel may be authorised in non-standard aircraft seating under OAREG 2.2.9.b. 4 Definitions for crew, passenger and mission essential are requirements of the COI into the CH–47F crash in AFG 30 May 11 – recommendations 8 and 9.

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m. Minimum levels of qualification. Minimum flight crew composition and qualification requirements should be specified that support the safe carriage of passengers

n. Restricting the carriage of loose articles. Requirements for carriage, stowing and restricted items should be defined to ensure FOD hazards are minimised.

o. Personnel supervision requirement. Ratio of supervising flight crew to passengers is defined, particularly with respect to cabin crew vs. passengers on those flights dedicated to passenger transport activities. While CASA standards provide an acceptable means of compliance for this ratio, mission requirements may dictate differing ratios from civil practice.

p. Requirements for the carriage of infants, sick or injured personnel, and handicapped personnel. Any increased requirement for supervising crew members, or competent passengers, to assist in the evacuation of personnel with limited mobility should be considered.

10. Compliance Examples. Examples of a management system supporting the carriage of personnel in Defence aircraft may include:

a. Example 1: An OAA/FTAA of transport aircraft types with dedicated passenger seats that operate in a CRE substantially similar to an equivalent civil aircraft type, may choose to implement appropriate controls from civil aviation that may include:

(1) Delegated approval authorities for crew and passengers.

(2) Passenger capacity, ratio of supervising crew and crew qualifications are consistent with civil standards for operation of a similar aircraft type.

(3) Verbal passenger briefs and briefing cards meet an acceptable civil standard consistent with a similar aircraft type.

(4) Provisions for the carriage of loose articles on-board the aircraft meet an acceptable civil standard consistent with a similar aircraft type.

(5) Special provisions for carriage of infants, sick or injured persons, and handicapped persons meet civil standards consistent with a similar aircraft type.

(6) The quantity and type of available survival equipment meets an acceptable civil standard consistent with a similar aircraft type.

(7) Minimum requirements for passenger medical fitness for flight are defined.

(8) Any other controls necessary to manage specific hazards identified.

b. Example 2: An OAA/FTAA of aircraft types with dedicated passenger seats, but operating in a specific military configuration and/or role that does not lend itself to drawing from civil aviation controls, may choose to implement appropriate controls that include:

(1) Delegated approval authorities for crew and passengers.

(2) The passenger capacity and seating configurations are defined.

(3) Requirements for numbers and type of supervising crew are defined, including crew qualifications and currency requirements.

(4) Passenger briefing requirements are defined, as applicable to the role or mission.

(5) Requirement for the use of seatbelts, harnesses and aircraft fittings and equipment are identified.

(6) Requirements for stowage of loose articles and passenger related cargo are identified.

(7) Survival equipment appropriate to the task or mission is carried.

(8) Requirements for the carriage of sick or injured personnel are defined.

(9) Any passenger capacity limitations due to restricted access to emergency exits by cargo or role equipment are identified.

(10) Minimum requirements for passenger medical fitness for flight are defined.

(11) Requirements for the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) appropriate to the task or mission are defined.

(12) Any other controls necessary to manage specific hazards identified.

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OAREG 2.2.9.b – The OAA/FTAA must establish a system that ensures a requirement to carry mission essential personnel using non–standard aircraft restraint and seating (NSARS) is conducted at an acceptable level of safety.

11. The intent of this regulation is to ensure that when use of non-standard aircraft restraints and seating (NSARS) may be required, the aviation activity is authorised and conducted at an acceptable level of safety (ALoS).

12. Personnel should be secured in certified aircraft restraint and seating systems whenever possible; however, Defence will have operational requirements5 that may require use of NSARS systems. Previously such a scenario was referred to as contingency loading; however, this term is no longer used as it implies use of NSARS is an unplanned activity, which is not always the case. An example of an unplanned activity, whether an emergency situation or a contingency operation, might be a flood or fire evacuation of more passengers than an aircraft has certified seating for in order to save lives with little or no planning notice. Such activity is not regulated under OAREG 2.2.9; rather, such activities would be better managed under primacy of command6.

13. History. The Black Hawk 221 Board of Inquiry report found that over time, activities involving the carriage of unrestrained or improperly restrained passengers and equipment had become the norm when conducting training for Special Operations tasks. The normalisation of such activities made it difficult for participants to identify and mitigate risks. The recommendation from the report, which the then CDF accepted, was:

• A review of Operational Contingency Loading (OCL) requirements for Black Hawk operations be conducted to ensure that safety of passengers is not being unnecessarily compromised or sacrificed in trying to gain operational capability. The need is to provide safe operating systems and that any contingent loading should only be considered in operational extremis. The review should ensure that ADF complies as best it can and certainly within the spirit and intent of current OH&S requirements.

14. The subsequent CDF direction was aimed at Army Aviation; however, is equally applicable to all Defence aviation activities:

• CA, in consultation with CAF is to review OCL requirements for aviation operations, to ensure OCL in training is limited to that which is necessary to meet specific training objectives. The review is to be conducted with cognisance of extant Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S) requirements and AVRM principles.

15. That advice recognises that use of NSARS systems are required in training in order to meet specific training and/or readiness objectives. It is clear from the direction that all Defence organisations were to conduct a review to determine their training requirements. Where carriage of personnel using NSARS is considered necessary to achieve mission objectives, the NSARS management system is intended to treat known hazards, mitigate risk and ensure use of NSARS is conducted under appropriate authorisation at ALoS.

16. NSARS Criteria. Use of NSARS should only occur where alternate methods of mission execution present greater safety risk. NSARS requirements are based on criteria that may include:

a. The required configuration of the aircraft provides insufficient seating for the number of mission essential passengers.

b. The required configuration of the mission essential passenger’s equipment being carried restricts use of the approved restraint and seating system.

c. One or more passengers are required to perform a mission essential function that cannot be achieved if limited to the approved restraint and seating system.

d. The mission requires personnel in excess of the aircraft’s maximum approved seating. This may involve the removal of some or all seats in order to load mission essential passengers and their personal equipment up to the maximum lift carrying capacity of the aircraft.

17. NSARS Management System. The NSARS management system should define controls that may include:

a. Approval authorities. The OAA may agree with commanders on who should approve NSARS activity; however, the approval of NSARS activities remains a joint responsibility as follows:

(1) The commander of the passenger being carried should accept the risks associated with the reduced level of safety provided. Where an operational commander is not readily apparent, is unavailable, or will not have sufficient knowledge of the NSARS risks, the decision to approve an NSARS activity should fall to the chain of command under which the aircraft is operated, which includes the aircraft captain. For example, for a passenger being winched from a

5 Operational requirements include training activities to enable operations to be conducted at ALoS. 6 DI(G) OPS 02-2 – Defence Aviation Safety Program

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submarine by a helicopter, the aircraft captain may be better placed to accept the risk on behalf of the passenger than the submarine commander.

(2) The OAA retains responsibility for the continuing operational airworthiness of the aircraft during the NSARS activity and the safety of passengers when carried in approved restraint and seating systems. The OAA approval is executed through the existing FMS via the command chain, flight authorisation (for planned NSARS activities) and ultimately the aircraft captain.

b. Activity identification. The OAA should identify and establish a comprehensive list of defined NSARS activities supported by the FMS. The OAA may, where appropriate, approve specific NSARS activities for each delegated aircraft type. Examples might include parachuting, rappelling, helicopter casting, diver drop insertions and winching.

c. Risk management. An acceptable means of compliance for risk management processes is the AAP 6734.001–Defence Aviation Safety Manual (DASM). The system may limit DASM inclusions to broad awareness statements so that changes in the DASM need not force changes to the NSARS management system, and to ensure only the most recent safety policy is utilised. NSARS risk management should focus on the likelihood that death or injury to mission essential passengers or crew in the event of violent aircraft motion, heavy landing or aircraft crash may be increased when using NSARS. So that the commander considering approval of an NSARS activity can do so with certainty, the system should provide precise guidelines as to what level of risk is acceptable at each command level authority. Should such advice already exist in other OIP, a direction to that OIP is sufficient.

d. OAREG 2.2.9.a. Other controls provided under OAREG 2.2.9.a guidance that are suitable or adaptable to support the NSARS management system.

18. Compliance example. An OAA/FTAA of an aircraft type with dedicated passenger seats, but operating in a specific military configuration and/or role that requires the use of NSARS, may choose to implement appropriate controls that include:

a. Delegated NSARS approval authorities for both crew and passengers, including linking risk levels to approval authority levels.

b. Specifying responsibilities of aircraft captains for both planned and unplanned NSARS activities.

c. Requirement for the use of NSARS is identified.

d. Maintaining an approved list of NSARS activities for the type, which should include the NSARS passenger capacity, configuration and a supporting mission risk profile (MRP).

e. Requirements for numbers and type of supervising crew are defined, including crew qualifications.

f. Passenger briefing requirements are defined, as applicable to the role or mission.

g. Requirements for stowage of loose articles and passenger related cargo are identified.

h. Survival equipment appropriate to the task or mission is carried.

i. Requirements for the carriage of sick or injured personnel are defined.

j. Any passenger capacity limitations due to restricted access to emergency exits by cargo or role equipment are identified

k. Minimum requirements for passenger medical fitness for flight are defined.

l. Requirements for the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) appropriate to the task or mission are defined.

m. Any other controls necessary to manage specific hazards identified.

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OAREG 2.2.9.c – The OAA/FTAA must ensure that records of personnel carried in Defence aircraft are raised, maintained and preserved.

19. The intent of this regulation is to ensure that manifests, once raised and recorded, are not destroyed prematurely. The COI into the CH-47D crash in AFG 30 May 11 – Recommendation 10 – required that consideration be given to maintaining a record of passengers carried on ADF aircraft to afford the ability for future reference to such manifests. Such information can be invaluable assistance to accident investigations and WH&S matters.

20. Lack of a formalised process for raising and preserving a manifest should not be used as a means to stop an operational outcome, as long as the data can be made available at a future date. For example, a passenger who may require a change of flight at short notice, but the passenger manifest has been closed. Rather than not allowing the passenger on the flight, a temporary means may be used to record the passenger details and the manifest be amended when possible. If a passenger record system is not available, the crew manifest system may also be used to capture the passenger data.

21. Exemption. Regulatory compliance requires the ability to understand an operation before commencement of the aviation activity. Scenarios may exist where the operational commander or aircraft captain may not be able to formally document passengers in order to comply with this regulation. For example, emergency evacuation of personnel from a dangerous environment where planning is unable to properly identify passenger names and numbers in advance. In such cases, the operational commander and/or the aircraft captain should make decisions regarding safe passenger carriage. If possible, the crew may notify operations staff enroute to the intended landing point, or post landing, of the manifest requirement so that arrangements to create a record post flight.

22. Acceptable Mean of Compliance. An acceptable means of compliance to preserve records is adherence to the relevant Commonwealth Records Management Policy issued under the Archives Act 1983.

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AIRCREW QUALIFICATIONS AND CATEGORISATION


OAREG 2.3.1—Initial pilot qualifications

OAREG 2.3.2—Initial non-pilot qualifications

OAREG 2.3.3—Qualifications for specific roles or duties

INTRODUCTION

1. For Defence aircrew to be employed in a specific role, they must be adequately trained and proficient in that role. To allow Defence levels of proficiency and readiness to be assessed, uniform definitions and limitations must be applied Defence wide when discussing aircrew qualifications and categorisation.

PURPOSE

2. This chapter provides guidance on aircrew qualifications, categorisation requirements and limitations on the employment of aircrew.

APPLICABILITY

3. This chapter provides guidance to all Defence personnel and foreign military personnel employed as aircrew on Defence aircraft. Members undergoing initial aircrew training are considered to be aircrew for the purposes of this guidance.

DEFINITIONS

4. For the purposes of OAREG 2 the following definitions apply and are contained in the glossary: aircrew, crew, flight crew, ATC. The following definitions also apply but are not contained within the Glossary.

5. Qualification. Aircrew are considered qualified when they have successfully completed the relevant approved training syllabus and been awarded the appropriate aircrew qualification.

6. Categorisation. Categorisation (CAT) is an indication of a member’s proficiency in a flying role and is indicated by the award of one of the following categories:

a. Cat A—Select

b. Cat B—Highly Proficient

c. Cat C—Proficient

d. Cat D—Converted to Type

e. Cat U—Uncurrent and/or under training.

7. Crewing of Aircraft. The following definitions of aircraft crewing are to be used:

a. Multi–crew. The term ‘multi-crew’ refers to an aircraft crewed by both pilot and non-pilot crew.

b. Single pilot. The term ‘single pilot’ refers to the crewing of an aircraft by one pilot, even though other pilot positions may be available and occupied by non-pilot crew members.

c. Two pilot. Two pilot crewing refers to the operation by two pilots of an aircraft fitted with dual flying controls.

d. Dual. The term ‘dual’ refers to a flight under the command of a Qualified Flying Instructor (QFI), Fighter Combat Instructor (FCI), or Operational Flying Instructor (OFI) for the purpose of conducting flying instruction. On dual sorties, only a QFI, FCI or OFI may be authorised as captain.

e. Solo. The term ‘solo’ refers single pilot, no other crew.

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QUALIFICATIONS

8. Aircrew and Aviation Support System operator qualifications are determined in accordance with OAREG 2.3 supported by OAA endorsed OIP.

AWARD OF AIRCREW QUALIFICATIONS

9. The authority to award aircrew brevet and qualifications is listed in the appropriate approved training syllabus, and is normally delegated to the Commanding Officer (CO) of the unit conducting the training course. All awards of aircrew qualifications are recorded in the member’s Flying Log book or other authorised electronic means.

Pilot Qualifications

10. Basic Qualifications. The two basic pilot qualifications are as follows:

a. Captain. A captain is a qualified first pilot on type who has been assessed as suitable for regular appointment as an aircraft captain for a specified range of operational and other tasks relevant to that unit and aircraft type.

b. Co–pilot. A co-pilot is a qualified first pilot on type who has been assessed to be suitable for regular appointment as a support pilot for a specified range of operational and other tasks relevant to that unit and aircraft type. A co-pilot may perform specific functions of the captain:

(1) under the direct supervision of the authorised aircraft captain; and

(2) in accordance with Command, Wing and/or Unit Standing Instructions (SI).

11. Special Pilot Qualifications. The following are special qualifications relevant to the pilot category:

a. Instrument Rating Examiner (IRE). An IRE is a pilot who may conduct instrument flight tests for the award of an instrument rating. A Senior Instrument Rating Examiner (SIRE) is a QFI, FCI or OFI authorised to renew IRE ratings and to conduct instrument flight tests.

b. Flying Instructor. A flying instructor is a pilot who has been assessed as competent to give flying instruction in accordance with Command, Wing and/or Unit Standing Instructions (SI) Flying instructors are to be subject to an annual flying instructor competency assessment conducted by a Flying Instructor Standardisation Officer:

(1) QFI. A QFI is a pilot who has postgraduate qualifications to carry out instruction, including dual instruction, in aircraft or FS.

(2) FCI. An FCI is a pilot who has postgraduate qualifications to carry out instruction, including dual instruction and instruction in operational procedures and tactics in fighter and lead-in fighter aircraft or FSs.

(3) OFI. An OFI is a pilot who has postgraduate qualifications and holds a current category to carry out instruction, including dual instruction, in operational aircraft or FSs.

c. Check captain. A check captain is an experienced qualified captain on type who may supervise the operational training and performance of other pilots in aircraft or FSs.

d. VIP captain. A VIP captain is a pilot who may act as a captain of an aircraft operating as a Special Purpose flight.

e. Qualified Test Pilot (QTP)/Unit Maintenance Test Pilot (UMTP). A QTP is a pilot who has postgraduate qualifications to carry out research, development, test or evaluation of an aircraft.

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Non-Pilot Aircrew Qualifications

12. For the purposes of this regulation, non-pilot crew is extended to include ground based UAS personnel who are integral to airborne flight operations. The following are qualifications relevant to the non-pilot category:

a. Aviation Warfare Officer

b. Aircrewman and Aircrewman Technician

c. Warfare Officer

d. Air Combat Officer

e. Flight Test Engineer

f. Flight Test Systems Specialist

g. Airborne Electronics Analyst

h. Flight Engineer

i. Loadmaster

j. Crew Attendant

k. UAS Remote Pilot

l. UAS Air Vehicle Operator

m. Air Refuelling Operator

n. Other specialist crew nominated by the OAA.

Special Non-Pilot Aircrew Qualifications—Instructional Duties

13. Selected non-pilot aircrew maybe employed in non-pilot instructional duties providing undergraduate type conversion and postgraduate aircrew training. Aircrew selected for these duties are to have completed an Instructional Technique Course.

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CATEGORISATION

14. Aircrew are categorised in accordance with OAREG 2.3 supported by OAA endorsed OIP.

15. All aircrew, employed in a flying role, are to be awarded a categorisation indicating their proficiency in that role.

16. Aircrew categories to be utilised by Defence Aviation are:

a. Cat A—Select. Cat A is to be awarded to aircrew who:

(1) display a consistent standard of excellence and effectiveness of the highest levels practicable within a particular role (with the aircraft and equipment in use) and, in particular, have displayed outstanding leadership and tactical or instructional ability where relevant to the role;

(2) displays comprehensive and extensive professional knowledge in that role; and

(3) have extensive experience in the role.

b. Cat B—Highly Proficient. Cat B is to be awarded to aircrew who:

(1) display a consistently high-level of effectiveness, particularly in respect of leadership and tactical or instructional ability where relevant to that role;

(2) display a comprehensive professional knowledge within the role; and

(3) have substantial experience in the role.

c. Cat C—Proficient. Cat C is to be awarded to aircrew who have achieved at least the minimum level of operational effectiveness, professional knowledge and experience to function competently in all aspects of the role in peace and in war.

d. Cat D—Converted to Type. Cat D is to be awarded to aircrew who have converted to type, but who do not meet the requirements of Cat C.

e. Cat U—Under Training or Uncurrent. Cat U is to be applied to aircrew who are undergoing conversion, refresher or other training, or are not current.

17. Where useful for management purposes, an aircrew member’s categorisation may be qualified to indicate differing levels of proficiency in different aspects of the role.

CATEGORISATION SCHEME 24

18. OIP issued by the relevant OAA, should detail the management of the categorisation scheme for pilot and non-pilot aircrew.

19. Award of Category. Aircrew categories, should be awarded IAW the relevant OIP. Individual Commands may determine policy for the award and renewal of aircrew Cat A.

20. Category Validity and Recording. Aircrew categories, including Cat A, remain valid for a 12 month period; however, they may be revised at any time by a nominated authority. Changes of category are to be recorded.

21. Medical Fitness. Refer to OAREG 2.3.5.

22. Pilot’s Instrument Rating. For a pilot to be operationally competent, the member should be rated to safely operate the aircraft by sole reference to the aircraft instruments. The following associations between instrument ratings and operational aircrew categories should be adhered to when developing and managing unit categorisation schemes:

a. Cat A and B captains should maintain a Qualified Instrument Rating; and

b. Cat C and D captains, and co-pilots, may hold a minimum of a Qualified/Restricted Instrument Rating.

23. Cancellation. If at any time the aircrew member is considered to have become ineligible, or displays performance below the standard required to hold a particular category, rating or appointment, their category can be cancelled.

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SECTION 5

CHAPTER 2

STANDARDS OF FLYING INSTRUCTION IN DEFENCE


OAREG 2.3.4—Standards of training and instruction

INTRODUCTION1 1. Defence flying training systems rely on the quality and integrity of flying instructors to implement authorised standards and procedures and achieve predictable and effective results. All Defence instructors employed in the aviation environment are assessed for competency against jointly agreed criteria. Flying instructors include airborne and non-airborne instructors associated with an airborne aviation system.

2. The maintenance of flying instructor standards is vital for the maintenance of both Defence air capabilities and flying safety. By ensuring both the competency and standardisation of flying instructors, Defence can reduce variance in flying performance between individuals, and consistently deliver standardised flying training.

PURPOSE3

3. This guidance provides guidance on the training, assessment and qualification of aircrew employed as Defence flying instructors. This instruction applies to personnel engaged in flying instruction conducted in aircraft, UAS and STDs.

DEFENCE AUTHORITIES5

4. Commander Air Force Training Group (CDR AFTG) is the Defence authority for the establishment and maintenance of a joint Airborne Instructor Occupational Specification. In reviewing the document, CDR AFTG consults with single Service flying training authorities. Commanding Officer (CO) Central Flying School (CFS) is the Defence authority for assessment and standardisation of Defence airborne instructors.

5. The single service OAAs are responsible for the standardisation and compliance assurance of all flying instruction undertaken by the respective service.

6. Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) CFS. RAAF CFS is Defence’s Centre of Excellence for airborne instructional techniques, and CFS is responsible for the competency assessment and standardisation of airborne instruction within Defence. This instruction does not imply any authority to assess standards for tactical employment of service aircraft, which remains the responsibility of the appropriate OAA for particular aircraft types.

Responsibilities of Commanding Officer Central Flying School 9

7. RAAF. In conjunction with unit commanders, CO CFS maintains a system of standardisation and certification of all RAAF flying instructors.

8. Navy and Army. In conjunction with single Service training authorities, CO CFS may establish and manage an appropriate system of standardisation and Flying Instructor Standardisation Officer (FISO) delegations to Navy and Army, to satisfy the assessment needs of each Service. CO CFS is also responsible for the conduct of training standardisation visits to Navy and Army flying training organisations, on behalf of each OAA.

FLYING INSTRUCTOR QUALIFICATION11

Flying instructor employment11

9. Flying instructors may be employed in the following roles:

a. Flying instructor. Certification as a flying instructor allows Defence employment in flying instruction and assessment.

b. FISO. Certification as a FISO permits a flying instructor to undertake assessments of flying instructors, for the purpose of recommending category renewal to COs, on behalf of CO CFS.

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10. Appointment of FISO external to CFS. The need to appoint non-CFS staff as FISOs may be determined by the OAA. CO CFS is responsible for the assessment of all FISOs. The senior FISOs for Navy and Army, who are agents for CFS, should be assessed annually by a CFS FISO, and may, under delegation from CO CFS, assess subordinate FISOs.

Flying instructor certification13

11. Awarding Authority. Normally, the CO of the operating or training unit is the issuing Authority for flying instructor qualifications. Senior officers within the COs chain of command may also award these qualifications.

12. Certification recommendation. Formal recommendation of flying instructor qualifications is made by the assessing officer to the applicable Awarding Authority on the appropriate single Service documentation.

13. Validity. Unless the OAA directs otherwise, flying instructor certification should be valid for 12 months, .

a. Extensions. Extensions to flying instructor qualification validity periods may be authorised by the OAA.

b. Flight Simulators. FS that are used for flying instruction should be subject to the same training management processes as for the relevant aircraft being supported.

Assessments9

14. Conduct of assessments. The assessments of flying instructors may be conducted as follows:

a. Flying instructor. All flying instructors are to be assessed in airborne instructional technique in accordance with a CO CFS endorsed assessment guide.

b. FISO. The assessment and certification of FISOs may be as per flying instructor assessment; however, the focus should be on the specific FISO responsibility.

15. Assessment results. A flying instructor who has successfully completed an assessment normally should not exercise the privileges related to the assessment until formal certification from the Awarding Authority.

16. Accreditation. Unless the OAA determines otherwise, Recognition of Current Competency (RCC) procedures may be applied to graduates of recognised military instructor training courses.

Training standardisation visits23

17. Purpose of visits. Training standardisation visits should be conducted as an external validation of all Defence flying training organisations.

18. Frequency of visits. Training standardisation visits should be conducted on an annual basis, but not less than once every two years.

19. External validation of CFS. CDR AFTG may coordinate a system of benchmarking with allied agencies to facilitate a biennial external validation of CFS standardisation and instructional activities.

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AVIATION MEDICINE


OAREG 2.3.5—Aviation medicine

OAREG 2.3.5.a

The OAA/FTAA must ensure aircrew are trained in aviation medicine awareness prior to conducting flight operations in a military Configuration Role or Environment with a training currency not exceeding 5 years.

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that aircrew are aware and appropriately trained in aviation medicine before commencing flying activity in the unique Defence aviation environment.

2. Where an aircraft used by or on behalf of Defence is operating in a military configuration, role and environment (CRE) the aircraft must be Defence registered. Civil type certification requirements do not consider the complexities of military operation and are inadequate to form the full basis of certification of a military specific aircraft type. Examples of military roles include, tactical air combat, strike and reconnaissance, tactical airlift, maritime patrol, close air support, helicopter anti-submarine warfare etc.

3. Accordingly, it is this unique military CRE that drives the requirement for Defence aircrew to be appropriately trained and competent across the spectrum of operations. Prior awareness of the hazards that are present when humans operate high performance and complex military aircraft, combined with training in the knowledge and application of aviation medicine will result in the enhancement of human performance and contribute effective controls in ensuring aircrew safety and suitability for flight.

4. Applicability. OAREG 2.3.5.a does not apply to passengers, who are managed separately under OAREG 2.2.9. Aircraft controllers, remote pilots and air vehicle operators (AVO) are normally employed in ground roles1; however, there may be a requirement for limited aviation medicine training. The amount of this training, if any, may be determined by the OAA/FTAA.

AMC 1 to OAREG 2.3.5.a – Flexibility provision

5. Aircrew who are not performing military CRE flying related duties, for example flying under the ACFS, are exempt from aviation medicine training currency requirements; however, compliance is required prior to returning to a military CRE flying related position.

AMC 2 to OAREG 2.3.5.a – Aviation Medicine Awareness training

6. The Single Service Aviation Medicine Advisor (SSAMA) is the OAA FMS Key Appointment for aviation medicine advice. The SSAMA is responsible for ensuring aviation medicine awareness training meets OAA requirements. Aviation medicine awareness training should:

a. Address the common hazards that are present when aircrew operate Defence registered aircraft in the military CRE.

b. Be tailored to target specific aircraft hazards associated within the OAA’s delegation of responsibility.

c. Regardless of Service, assure that Defence aircrew are equipped with an appropriate level of aviation medicine awareness training for their specific aircraft type.

7. Recognition of aviation medicine training Air and Space Interoperability Council (ASIC) Air Standards details the requirements for aviation medicine training of each ASIC member nation. Aviation medicine training that meets the ASIC requirements is considered acceptable to other ASIC member nations for the purpose of allowing aircrew to perform flying related duties with any ASIC member nation. Aviation medicine training conducted by non-ASIC member nations may be referred to the relevant SSAMA for advice regarding OAA recognition of prior learning (RPL).

8. Currency. A five year period is made available to the OAA/FTAA to set appropriate compliance periods and is harmonised to the ASIC Air Standard. Although the OAA/FTAA may impose more stringent currency requirements, exemption requests for an aviation medicine training currency lapse greater than five years may not be considered.

9. Documentation. All aviation medicine training courses should be documented and recorded. An acceptable means includes certificates, PMKeyS reporting, annotation in flying logbooks.

1 Some ACO(ABM) are also employed as aircrew. In such cases, normal aviation medicine training requirements apply.

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AMC 3 to OAREG 2.3.5.a – Aviation Medicine Awareness training

10. Aviation Medicine Awareness training should include:

a. lectures in aviation medicine appropriate to CRE of aircraft type to be operated

b. where appropriate, practical hypoxia awareness training that may include:

(1) exposure to a rapid decompression

(2) exposure to pressure breathing

(3) demonstration of the effect of hypoxia on night vision.

c. where appropriate:

(1) demonstrations of spatial disorientation, including simulator-based demonstrations of spatial disorientation in fixed or rotary-wing aircraft

(2) centrifuge training including exposure to the high-G environment and instruction in the correct application of the anti-G straining manoeuvre

(3) training in parachute descent and landing fall

(4) demonstration of physiology limitations with use of Night Vision Devices (NVD)

(5) demonstration of the ejection seat

(6) other training related to fast jet, fixed wing or rotary wing aircraft peculiarities.

d. Other specific aircrew needs. For example, instructional duties may require training detailing the aviation medical aspects of the instructional flight environment.

AMC 4 to OAREG 2.3.5.a – Unit Aviation Physiology Training Officer (APTO)

11. A unit APTO may fulfil an aviation medicine support role2 within the unit as first point of contact for aviation medicine issues specific to the unit operational requirements and may conduct informal unit-level aviation medicine training, oversighted by the relevant AVMO as required. APTO training may include:

a. lectures in aviation anatomy, physiology, pathology and human factors

b. introductory lectures to clinical aspects of aircrew health

c. other aspects of aviation medicine training as approved by the SSAMA.

AMC 5 to OAREG 2.3.5.a – Supplemental aviation medicine training

12. The maximum refresher currency period of five years is set to afford maximum flexibility in resource management. If periods longer than three years will be utilised, as an effective aircrew safety control the OAA should consider provision of supplemental aviation medicine training as part of a unit’s training programme3.4

13. Supplementary aviation medicine training may include:

a. Topics appropriate to the CRE of aircraft type being operated and/or current operations. For example, highlight aviation medicine related safety reports raised by the unit in previous 12–36 month period.

b. Related topics such as decompression illness (DCI) and effects of hypoxia.

c. Ensuring aircrew knowledge of aviation medicine factors is assessed as part of aircrew general knowledge training.

d. Aviation medicine aspects of recent aviation accidents or incidents relevant to the type of aircraft being flown.

2 An APTO is not likely to be a medical professional; rather, the APTO is intended to assist with general information only. 3 For example, during an Annual Safety Day. 4 Supplemental aviation medicine training is considered informal in nature, therefore there is no requirement for this training be formally recorded.

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OAREG 2.3.5.b

The OAA/FTAA must ensure aircrew, aircraft controllers and remote pilots have a current aviation medical certificate that is:

(1) For aircrew: valid for a period not greater than 12 months.

(2) For aircraft controllers and remote pilots: valid for a period not greater than 24 months.5

14. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to:

a. Ensure an entry standard is established for a person to conduct flying related duties so that aircrew, aircraft controllers and remote pilots will not compromise suitability for flight due to deficiencies in Defence-prescribed physiological and psychological medical fitness standards.

b. Support civil recognition of Defence aviation medical standards by facilitating an option to harmonise Defence aviation medical currency with CASA regulatory requirements.

c. Provide a framework that allows the aviation command authority to direct aviation medical support requirements to the Defence health service provider.

15. Applicability – Air vehicle operators (AVO). Unless the OAA/FTAA determines otherwise, AVO are not regulated under this regulation due to the category of the unmanned aircraft they may operate. For example, the medical requirements for an AVO who is operating a CAT 4 UAS are unlikely to exceed normal Defence periodic health exam (PHE) requirements; however, a CAT 3 UAS by definition has an increased risk of harm to other airspace users, people and property than a CAT 4 UAS. As such, the OAA/FTAA may consider the need for certain CAT 3 UAS AVO to comply with the remote pilot medical standard or an extended remote pilot currency period.

16. Foreign aircrew operation of Defence registered aircraft. Circumstances may exist where a foreign aircrew member is expected/required to operate a Defence registered aircraft. In such cases, the OAA/FTAA should ascertain if the foreign aircrew medical requirements are reasonably comparable and acceptable to Defence medical requirements. If found acceptable, the OAA/FTAA may authorise foreign aircrew to operate the Defence registered aircraft. Advice may be sought from the relevant SSAMA regarding foreign aircrew medical requirements.

17. CASA medical certificates. Defence use of an appropriate CASA issued medical certificate is recognised as acceptable for Defence civilians who may provide Air Traffic Control services or civil pilots contracted to operate Defence aircraft, such as training flights, on condition that the CASA medical certificate supports only those duties directly related to the flying related duties the certificate was issued for.

18. CASA medical certificates issued to Reserve members may not be used to support any deployed operations, either within or outside of Australia. In such cases, a Defence medical is required as Defence has special needs that are not covered under CASA requirements. Detailed advice may be sought from the relevant SSAMA. Reserve JBAC performing flying related duties at an airbase are not deemed as deployed.

19. CASA medical currency standard harmonisation may afford Defence development of CASA recognition of Defence aviation medical assessments, thereby removing the need for Defence pilots to obtain a CASA medical when operating civil registered aircraft not deemed a State aircraft.

AMC 1 to OAREG 2.3.5.b – Flexibility provisions

20. Flexibility provision 1 – employment in non-flying related duties. Aircrew, aircraft controllers and remote pilots not posted to flying related positions may maintain an aviation medical certificate currency period aligned to the normal Defence PHE currency. Medical certificate compliance is required prior to returning to flying related duties. Pilots participating in the ADF Currency flying Scheme (ACFS) must maintain a current CASA medical certificate in addition to their normal Defence PHE requirement.

21. Flexibility provision 2 – extensions. Circumstances may arise beyond a member’s control to maintain medical currency that may impact operational requirements. Should a member’s medical currency period expire, the OAA/FTAA may issue a waiver; or authorise a command authority to issue a waiver, to extend the expiration date. The command authority should seek SSAMA advice before issuing a waiver past 60 days.

22. Flexibility provision 3 – non–pilot aircrew. The OAA/FTAA may determine if it is more appropriate for non-pilot aircrew to maintain 24 month medical currency requirements.

23. Flexibility provision 4 – aircraft controllers. Other than personnel who provide an Air Traffic Control (ATC) service, the OAA/FTAA may determine what aircraft controller category/specialisations should comply with 24 month medical currency requirements. 5 OAR DB of 26 Apr 15 (AB21783374)

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24. Flexibility provision 5 – medical certificate waiver. The OAA may approve waivers to specific medical requirements for the issue of an aviation medical certificate. The OAA should consult the SSAMA when using this provision to ensure understanding of risk before making a decision to approve a waiver.

AMC 2 to OAREG 2.3.5.b – Medical certificate management

25. Issuing authority. An ADF aviation medical certificate is issued by an Aviation Medical Officer (AVMO).

26. Certificate Types. Medical certificates demonstrate 2.3.5.b regulatory compliance. Medical certificates should be issued on appropriate forms using medical standards approved by the SSAMA once endorsed by the Surgeon General ADF and the OAA. Certificates may follow a class system, Specialist Employment Stream/Specialist Employment Classification (SPEC), occupation name or similar. The method of recording may vary from electronic means to a hard copy log book entry.6

27. Initial currency date. The date the first aviation medical examination is completed. For example, a member who has never held a medical certificate has an examination for the issue of a medical certificate on 11 January 2015. The appropriate day for the certificate issue is 11 January 2015.

28. Currency. A medical certificate is considered current (valid) from the date of examination for a period not greater than the applicable 12/24 months duration, or the period directed by the OAA if a relevant flexibility provision is used. Currency will vary depending on the currency management system used by the individual Service.

AMC 3 to OAREG 2.3.5.b – Ongoing currency management compliance: civil harmonised system

29. A renewed certificate will remain current if a medical examination is completed within 28 days or less before the certificate’s expiry date, allowing another 12/24 months currency from the original expiry date. A certificate that is renewed more than 28 days before the certificate’s original expiry date, or after the original expiry date, is current from the date of issue and resets the expiry date. The following currency examples would apply:

a. If an aircrew medical examination was performed on 11 January 2015, the medical remains valid until the 11 January 2016.

b. An aircrew member who holds a medical certificate that is due to expire on 11 January 2016 has an examination for a new certificate on 1 November 2015 (more than 28 days). The appropriate day for the new certificate is 1 November 2015, with an expiry date of 1 November 2016.

c. An aircrew member who holds a medical certificate that is due to expire on 11 January 2016 has an examination for a new certificate on 20 December 2015 (28 days or less). The appropriate day for the new certificate is 20 December 2015, with an expiry date of 11 January 2017.

d. An aircraft controller or remote pilot who held a medical certificate that expired on 11 January 2016 has an examination for a new certificate on 20 January 2016 (expired). The appropriate day for the new certificate is 20 January 2016, with an expiry date of 20 January 2018.

AMC 4 to OAREG 2.3.5.b – Ongoing currency management compliance: Service specific

30. An OAA/FTAA may decide harmonisation with the civil system is less important than the Service requirements and adopt a different method to allow flexibility in completing aircrew medical examinations. A renewed certificate will remain current if completed no later than the end of the month in which the certificate was issued the previous year. A certificate that is renewed in a different month to the certificate’s expiry date is current from the date of issue with an expiry date to the end of the same month in the following year. The following currency examples would apply:

a. If an aircrew medical examination was performed on 11 January 2015, the medical remains valid until the 31 January 2016.

b. An aircraft controller or remote pilot who holds a medical certificate that is due to expire on 31 January 2016 has an examination for a new certificate on 20 December 2015 (different month). The appropriate day for the new certificate is 20 December 2015, with an expiry date of 31 December 2017.

c. An aircrew member who holds a medical certificate that is due to expire on 31 January 2016 has an examination for a new certificate on 20 January 2016 (same month). The appropriate day for the new certificate is 20 January 2016, with an expiry date of 31 January 2017.

6 The Defence Medical Certificate should not be confused with a CASA Medical Certificate, which is issued under CASA provisions.

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d. An aircrew member who held a medical certificate that expired on 31 January 2016 has an examination for a new certificate on 5 February 2016 (expired). The appropriate day for the new certificate is 5 February 2016, with an expiry date of 28 February 2017.

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AIRCREW LOGBOOKS


OAREG 2.3.10—Aircrew and Aviation Support System operator logbooks

INTRODUCTION

1. The flying logbook or an approved electronic equivalent provides a detailed record of an aircrew member’s flying experience. As the only record of its type, it is an important document, which is to be maintained accurately by all individual Defence aircrew members. A Defence Flying Log Book is an official document and is the property of the Commonwealth of Australia.

PURPOSE

2. This chapter provides guidance on the management and maintenance of aircrew logbooks.

APPLICABILITY

3. This guidance applies to all military personnel employed as Defence aircrew.

POLICY

4. Every qualified aircrew member, and every member undergoing flying training, is required to keep in an approved flying logbook:

a. a complete record of all Defence flights undertaken by the member as crew in a Defence registered or non-Defence registered aircraft; and

b. all practice in any FSTDs qualified in accordance with OAREG 8— Flight Simulation Training Devices.

5. Defence aircrew are required to maintain flying logbooks or an approved electronic equivalent in accordance with OIP issued by the member’s applicable single-Service.

LOGBOOK ENTRIES

6. When an aircrew member completes a conversion or an aircrew training course, the CO of the unit is required to annotate the appropriate section of the flying logbook.

7. When an aircrew member completes an approved aviation medicine training course, the medical officer conducting the course or delegate, is required to record the details in the appropriate section of the flying logbook.

8. Where Defence-approved electronic means have replaced paper flying logbooks and the electronic logbook employs a system to ensure that logbook entries are certified by an authorised person, there is no requirement for monthly certifications of logbooks nor completion of annual flying hour returns unless dictated by single-Service instructions.

Monthly logbook certification

9. At the beginning of each month, an aircrew member is to summarise the total flying time for the previous month and record the hours by aircraft type in each column of the logbook.

10. All FSTD time should be totalled separately, in accordance with the applicable flying organisation’s Standing Instructions. The CO of a flying unit, nominated flight commander or, in the case of the CO the officer’s Deputy, is required to view and certify entries in aircrew flying logbooks as an accurate record of each aircrew member’s flying experience (this may include non-unit aircrew who have flown in unit aircraft).

End of tour and annual aircrew reporting

11. Aircrew are required to complete annual returns of flying hours, annual proficiency reporting and end of tour reports of flying hours and proficiency in accordance with single-Service instructions.

PROTECTION OF LOGBOOKS

12. To protect the record of a member’s flying experience, the aircrew flying logbook shall not be carried in an aircraft in which the aircrew member is flying as a crew member. In circumstances where an aircrew member is killed

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on active operations, is missing in action, is taken prisoner of war, or is involved in a flying accident resulting in fatalities, the CO of the unit involved is to arrange to secure and protect the member’s logbook in accordance with single-Service instructions and to have a representative attend the applicable Inquiry, Board of Inquiry (BOI) or Coronial Inquest to produce, if required, all relevant flying logbooks.

DISPOSAL OF LOGBOOKS

13. When a member is discharged or appointed to non-flying duties, the member’s logbook normally becomes the member’s personal property.

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MEDICAL FITNESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM


OAREG 2.1.3—Aircrew competency system

OAREG 2.3.5—Aviation medicine

OAREG 2.3.5.c

The OAA/FTAA must establish a medical fitness management system that ensures aircrew, aircraft controllers and remote pilots maintain medical fitness standards for flying related duties.

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure personnel engaged in flying related duties, noting they will already have a current medical certificate, remain medically fit to do so through effective health management. Factors such as injury or disease can adversely affect medical fitness, both in the short and long-term, but may not require assessment of the person’s medical certificate as issued under 2.3.5.b. Apart from serious pathological conditions, fitness may be compromised as a result of various extraneous factors that may require a member to be deemed temporarily medically unfit for flying related duties (TMUFF).

2. TMUFF may be recommended by:

a. any health care provider

b. commanders and supervisors

c. the individual concerned (self-imposed TMUFF).

3. TMUFF Authority. The OAA/FTAA, or a delegated command authority, has final authority regarding authorisation of personnel to perform flying related duties, including TMUFF reversal.

AMC 1 to OAREG 2.3.5.c – TMUFF management

4. Flying related duties should not be performed when a medical or dental condition exists that may compromise suitability for flight. Table 1 – TMUFF Rules provides minimum self-cancelling TMUFF periods for many conditions. The individual may extend the minimum periods where there is excessive pain, limitation of movement following a procedure or other complications without seeking AVMO advice; however, if the issue persists longer than 7 days beyond the minimum periods provided an AVMO consult is required.

5. Documentation. A TMUFF recommendation, including all restrictions, should be documented in writing.

6. Medical certificate. TMUFF does not affect medical certificate validity unless the condition persists into the next medical certificate currency period. In such cases, a flexibility provision under 2.3.5.b may be used if the OAA or deems this suitable and required.

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Table 1–TMUFF Rules

Activity, condition or factor Minimum TMUFF periods

Medical / Dental procedures

Where local anaesthetic (including eye drops) is used:

• 8 hours.

For general, spinal, epidural anaesthesia or IV sedation:

• 48 hours.

Where Ketamine is used:

• 3 weeks.

Eye examinations • 24 hours following use of dilating eye drops.

Administration of medication • The period specified by the prescribing AVMO or dental officer.

Ingestion of alcohol • Blood alcohol content level (BAL) of zero and appropriate recovery time that ensures any after effects of alcohol consumption, such as hang over symptoms, are eliminated.

Immunisation procedures • 12 hours or as directed by an AVMO.

Blood donation • 72 hours for aircrew.

• 24 hours for aircraft controllers and remote pilots.

Flying after use of a flight simulator training device

• TMUFF IAW unit policy.

Self Imposed TMUFF, includes fatigue issues

• Limited to 48 hour period

• Notified to Flight Authorising Officer / Supervisor

• Return to duty must be approved by Flight Authorising Officer / Supervisor

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Activity, condition or factor Minimum TMUFF Periods

Psychosocial conditions • TMUFF pending AVMO consultation.

Critical Incident Mental Health Support (CMS)

• TMUFF pending AVMO consultation.

Diving (aircrew only). There is no restriction placed on flying following snorkelling, breathhold diving or diving on pure oxygen.

Flying at or below 8 000 ft Cabin Altitude (CA):

• 12 hours after a dive of less than 10 metres, with no decompression stops.

• 48 hours after a Heliox decompression dive of greater than 2 hours, or a Saturation dive.

• 24 hours after a dive of greater than 10 metres, and/or decompression stops.

• 9 hours after use of compressed air device, during Emergency Breathing System (EBS) training. This may be reduced to two hours if cabin altitude remains at or below 3 280 ft AMSL.

Flying above 8 000 ft CA:

• 48 hours after a dive to any depth.

• Seven days after a Heliox decompression dive of greater than 2 hours, or a Saturation dive.

• 9 hours after use of compressed air device, during Emergency Breathing System (EBS) training.

Aircraft Pressurisation Check / Aircraft Wash

Individual exposure to be limited to a maximum of four aircraft pressurisation checks, lasting no longer than 30 minutes, to a maximum of 0.5 atmospheres above ambient pressure in any 24-hour period.

Flying at or below 8 000 ft Cabin Altitude (CA):

• 24 hours

Flying above 8 000 ft CA:

• 48 hours

For aircraft pressurisation associated with washing the aircraft:

• Nil TMUFF period required

Fluid/meal not consumed within the previous six hours

• TMUFF pending fluid/meal consumption.

Following a physiological aviation safety occurrence, whether symptomatic or asymptomatic


Unplanned exposure above 25 000 ft CA (aircrew only)


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AMC 2 to OAREG 2.3.5.c – TMUFF considerations

7. Administration of medication. There is potential for almost any medication to generate unwanted side effects. Caution should be exercised and understanding obtained regarding the risks in taking any drug, including over-the-counter and herbal preparations. The effects of these drugs vary from person to person and may not be detected by the individual member concerned. In addition, adverse effects may be exacerbated when two or more drugs are taken together and interact. Herbal preparations are widely available in the community and are seen by many as a ‘natural’ alternative to conventional medicine. Unfortunately, such agents are not always subject to the same stringent regulations that apply to registered medicinal compounds. In addition, many of these preparations contain agents that can interact with other drugs, and have the potential to cause side effects that are incompatible with flight safety. The use of agents to aid in sleep/wake cycle regulation have been advocated in some operational circumstances and is conducted in accordance with Health Directive policy. While not all specialist occupations are specifically addressed, an AVMO may prescribe sleep regulating medication to members of all aviation related occupations.

8. Prescribed medicine is administered as per AVMO instruction. Over the counter, herbal and other ‘alternative’ medications may only be taken as permitted in relevant Health policy.

9. Alcohol use. Alcohol is a well-recognised cause of impaired performance. Evidence suggests that psychomotor skills can be degraded even at very low blood alcohol levels (BAL). The effects of alcohol are insidious; the person may be unaware of the extent of performance degradation. Prior experience and acquired skills do not protect against the effects of alcohol, as both newly acquired and older skills are affected. Similarly, the effects of hangover, even after BAL has returned to zero, can result in marked impairment of performance due to dehydration, hypoglycaemia, gastrointestinal upset and disturbances in vestibular function. Recovery time periods from alcohol ingestion will also vary amongst different people.

10. The histotoxic effects of alcohol are similar to those of hypoxia, and are magnified with increasing altitude such that a BAL that would have minor effects at sea level can cause significant performance decrement at 10 000 ft. The detrimental performance effects of alcohol can also be potentiated and worsened by coexisting factors such as medication use or toxic gas exposure, such as carbon monoxide from cigarette smoke.

11. Performance impairments may include:

a. impairment of motor function and slowed reaction times

b. impairment of function of the vestibular system

c. reduction in situational awareness and response to visual stimuli

d. reduction of cognitive functions such as memory, judgment and problem-solving.

12. BAL will vary with the amount, timing and rate of consumption of alcohol. The presence of food in the stomach, the person’s build and rate of elimination by the liver will also contribute to determining BAL. With such large individual variations, the following tools for the calculation of BAL provide guidance that should assist management of BAL:

a. a standard drink contains 10 grams of alcohol. This is equivalent to 285 ml of full strength beer, 100 ml of table wine, 60 ml of fortified wine or 30 ml of distilled proof spirit

b. the average rate of elimination is 10 grams per hour. This equates to one standard drink, or 0.01% per hour. There is wide variability between individuals in this rate of elimination

c. peak BAL occurs between 30 minutes and two hours after the last drink is consumed. This reflects the finite period between drinking alcohol and its absorption into the bloodstream.

13. A BAL of zero and free from the physical or physiological effects of alcohol consumption is the requirement to perform flying related duties. The recovery time to achieve a zero blood alcohol level is different for each person. Although not definitive, personnel should not enter a ‘safety critical area’ for a minimum of eight hours following their last drink. In the case of heavy alcohol consumption, the time period to recover from the physical or physiological effects of alcohol consumption may well exceed 24 hours from the time of the last drink. For example, the physiological effects of a hangover may continue many hours after reaching BAL zero. Therefore, self–assessment is required to ensure a person is free from the physical or physiological effects of alcohol consumption that may still exist even after achieving a BAL of zero.

14. A person with a suspected BAL greater than zero or with the presence of any after-effects of alcohol consumption may not perform any flying related duties, nor may they perform any functions preparatory to commencing flying related duties. TMUFF should either be self-imposed or directed by medical staff or flight supervisors until such time as BAL has returned to zero and all symptoms of hangover have resolved.

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15. Not withstanding the alcohol consumption guidance provided, AMC for abstinence from flying related duties after consumption of alcohol is outlined in table 2.

Table 2 – Minimum abstinence period prior to flying according to drinks consumed

Number of standard drinks consumed Minimum period of abstinence from the last drink to commencement of flying related duties

(hours)

1 – 4 8

5 – 6 12

7 – 10 18

16. Immunisation Procedures. Localised or general reactions following immunisations or desensitisation therapy may present within minutes to hours, or even days following administration. TMUFF is imposed as directed by the relevant Health policy related to the immunisation. Personnel who have had prior reactions or allergic reactions require an AVMO consultation before receiving immunisations.

17. Blood Donation. Following blood donation, the circulating blood volume is depleted and will require time to return to normal. TMUFF is used as a precautionary measure to reduce the likelihood of temporary loss of consciousness, lethargy or other symptoms following acute reduction in blood volume. Post blood donation a person is increasingly vulnerable to hypoxia and G-induced loss of consciousness (GLOC) and will have decreased exercise tolerance. AVMO review post blood donation is not required unless the member has other health concerns.

18. Recovery time limits vary depending on whether a person performs flying related duties in the air or ground environment and are advised in regulation guidance material. For operational reasons, a desire to donate blood should consider TMUFF restrictions and plan accordingly.

19. Psychosocial conditions. Psychological health is as important as physical wellbeing in determining the aviation medicine fitness to undertake flying related duties. There are many environmental and personal factors that can adversely affect mental health and lead to increased risk of disorientation, loss of situational awareness, and training failures. Subjective expressions of ‘stress’, fatigue, mood liability, and decrease in work performance, along with non-specific physical symptoms such as loss of appetite or headache, are ways that poor psychological fitness can manifest. It is vital that personnel, their commanders, and medical staff are vigilant in ensuring that expression of symptoms indicative of psychosocial pressure are carefully assessed and appropriate specialist management is provided. If there is a significant risk to aviation safety, a psychologist, counsellor or AVMO may recommend TMUFF, notify the person’s CO and arrange an AVMO review. Although management of psychosocial conditions may be undertaken by a variety of support staff the procedures outlined in this guidance material should be used to return a person to flying related duties.

20. Critical Incident Mental Health Support (CMS). CMS has been developed as a technique to assist coping with a ‘crisis’—an event that is often traumatic, personally confronting and out of the person’s normal range of experiences. The psychological response to a crisis, regardless of aetiology, should be correctly managed in order to ensure quick return to normal activities, including the work environment. After undergoing CMS debriefing, an AVMO recommendation as medically fit to return to flying related duties should be obtained.

21. Fatigue. Fatigue causes deterioration of individual performance levels, manifesting initially as irritability and progressing to loss of judgment, difficulty with complex or multiple tasks, load shedding, mental apathy and tiredness. Fatigue may exacerbate the effects of coexisting operational stresses such as noise and heat, and may be worsened by numerous other factors such as illness, domestic stress, alcohol and ingestion of medications. Individual self-assessment of fatigue levels is notoriously poor, and for this reason it is vital that the relevant policy on crew-rest and duty limitations be followed; however, maintenance of appropriate ‘by the book’ crew rest hours does not guarantee absence of fatigue. Commanders, supervisors and health personnel should be watchful for symptoms, particularly where irregular duty/rest hours are undertaken.

22. Fatigue may be classified several ways:

a. Acute fatigue. Strenuous physical or mental activity may cause acute fatigue, especially if recent workload has been high. Engaging in physical exercise programs will assist fatigue management, but heavy exercise is likely to worsen fatigue and disrupt sleep if undertaken directly before or during allocated rest periods.

b. Circadian dysrhythmia. The term ‘circadian dysrhythmia’ indicates a disturbance to the normal human diurnal cycle of wake and sleep. Without adequate conditioning and rest, these natural rhythms

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can be upset by rapid or prolonged travel across time zones, or by activities that rapidly alter normal periods of wakefulness and sleep. These difficulties are worsened by continually shifting duty patterns such that a new circadian rhythm can never be ‘set’. In general terms, recovery to a normal circadian rhythm occurs at about one hour per day towards the new time or duty period. On prolonged flights across time zones, or where duty rapidly cycles through periods of night and day, personal fatigue should be expected, regardless of the number of hours allocated to rest.

c. Chronic fatigue. Chronic fatigue is largely a result of cumulative periods of poor or insufficient sleep. Sleep is a physiological need, and the average number of hours required is between seven and eight hours per 24-hour period. Sleep quality is best if it is uninterrupted and falls over an individual’s circadian low point, which is around 0300 by the body’s internal clock. Repeatedly interrupted sleep or disturbed circadian rhythms will result in the accumulation of a ‘sleep debt’.

23. Crew rest, crew duty and rostering limitations should be designed to avoid the performance deficit associated with fatigue. Where fatigue is still suspected despite appropriate provision of crew-rest, TMUFF should be imposed until a cause and solution to the fatigue can be identified.

24. Diet and meals. Failure to eat an adequate nutritionally balanced meal prior to performing flight duties, or not being properly hydrated, may reduce tolerance to flight stresses. Meal and/or fluid consumption immediately prior to flying should avoid food and drink known to produce intestinal gas as this can result in abdominal discomfort and even incapacitation during flight, especially at high altitude.

25. Consumption of foods with high caloric values and high glycaemic index as a substitute for planned meals may result in inappropriate levels of blood sugar, and in the longer term may contribute to nutritional disorders such as obesity.

26. Consumption of contaminated food can lead to gastrointestinal upsets, and subsequent sudden incapacitation. This is of particular concern for flight crew who may be required to consume in-flight rations. The type and severity of food poisoning is influenced by the following factors:

a. the hygiene standards of the food handlers

b. cooking procedures and activities

c. types of foodstuffs

d. storage, hygiene and reconstitution procedures

e. susceptibility of the consumer.

27. To avoid food poisoning be cautious and selective when eating, especially when in remote areas or overseas. In-flight meals should be handled hygienically at all times, and transit times between cold storage and aircraft refrigeration should be minimised. After frozen meals are heated, they should be eaten immediately and not refrozen for future use. Where two pilots are part of one flight crew, they should eat different meals at least one hour apart. In-flight rations provided for consumption in aircraft without a refrigerator should be supplied in an insulated bag with a cooling block, or be supplied in a collective cooling facility such as an esky. All perishable foodstuffs should be removed from the aircraft at the end of each flight and either consumed or destroyed in keeping with local quarantine rules. Perishable foodstuffs should not to be reused for subsequent flights.

28. In the event of actual or suspected food poisoning, samples of suspect food or water should be retained for investigation and arrangements made for investigation of the possible source of contamination to be investigated as soon as possible.

29. Return to flying related duties following a physiological aviation safety occurrence, whether symptomatic or asymptomatic. Command consideration of TMUFF duration after involvement in a physiological aviation safety incident requiring AVMO consultation1 will vary according to the extent of physical and/or psychological injury sustained. To ensure command duty of care, incidents that require AVMO assessment prior to returning to flying related duties may include:

a. proven or suspected hypoxia

b. decompression illness (DCI) due to cabin pressurisation issues

c. unintentional explosive or rapid cabin decompression

d. evolved gas or severe reaction to trapped gas resulting in incapacitation or flight modification

e. hyperventilation

1 AVMO consultation is not required to be conducted face to face.

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f. spatial disorientation resulting in an unusual attitude

g. loss of consciousness for any cause, including GLOC

h. toxicological exposures such as carbon monoxide poisoning or smoke/fumes/gases in the cockpit

i. physiological, pathological, physical, psychological or psychiatric conditions, including simulated flight

j. aircraft accident, aircraft incident or related critical incident.

30. Flight simulation training device (FSTD). Use of FSTD carries the risk of ‘simulator sickness’, a form of motion sickness relating to the disparities between the visual and motor components of the trainer. Simulator sickness risk is enhanced if training is conducted with visual displays, but no comparative motion. The small, but significant differences between simulator and ‘real time’ flying is sufficient to warrant consideration for a period of TMUFF in circumstances directly related to the person’s well being vice any other safety effects that might occur when flying.

31. Diving. Diving using self contained underwater breathing apparatus (SCUBA) using compressed air carries a significant DCI risk. This risk relates to the length and depth of the dive, the timing of subsequent dives and individual variables such as physical fitness, concurrent illness or injury, age, and fatigue. The risk of DCI is increased by exposure to altitude soon after diving.

32. Aircraft Pressurisation Checks. Aircraft pressurisation checks involve post maintenance checks of an aircraft’s pressurisation system, where personnel working within the pressurised section of an aircraft are exposed to atmospheric pressures greater than ambient.

AMC 3 to OAREG 2.3.5.c – TMUFF reversal

33. TMUFF reversal is dependant on a combination of risk assessment, mission essential requirements and AVMO advice.

34. TMUFF reversal. The OAA/FTAA, or a delegated command authority, has final authority regarding authorisation of personnel to perform flying related duties including TMUFF reversal. The decision should be based on AVMO advice or the periods specified in Table 1 – TMUFF Rules. Some TMUFF issues may be managed administratively rather than seeking or returning for additional AVMO consultation. In such situations, the person may be TMUFF for a specified period and return to duty without seeing a health care provider. Such circumstances may include the following:

a. defined time limits prescribed in Table 1 – TMUFF Rules

b. where the AVMO has set a defined time limit or conditions–based return to flying related duties for uncomplicated, self-limiting conditions (eg gastric problems, cold, flu or similar) not prescribed in Table 1 – TMUFF Rules.

35. Remote AVMO consultation. Direct consultation with an AVMO may not always be possible. Where the AVMO is located or by whom the AVMO contact is established is not important, only that an AVMO is consulted. For example, AVMO telephone contact may be available. The RAAF Institute of Aviation Medicine also provides a duty AVMO service. AVMO consultation is not intended to stop command decision making regarding personnel who cannot achieve medical advice to support an operational need to return to flying related duties. For example, a crew member, who might be unable to fly to home base from an isolated location, would be better supported to fly home under Aircraft Captain authority if the member feels well enough to do so and there is no chance of gaining AVMO advice in the current location.

36. Use of a Designated Aviation Medical Examiner (DAME). For Defence personnel who operate under oversight of a CASA medical

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SECTION 5

CHAPTER 6

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE AVIATION CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Applicable Regulations OAREG 2.3.6—Crew resource management training

APPLICABLE DEFENCE INSTRUCTIONS 1. AAP 6734.001 Defence Aviation Safety Manual prescribes the policy for aviation crew resource management in Defence.

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SECTION 5

CHAPTER 7



OAREG 5—Operation of Non-Defence Registered Aircraft

INTRODUCTION1

1. This chapter provides guidance for use of civilian registered aircraft by Defence employees for Defence duty, including policy with respect to Australian Cadet flying in such aircraft. Further policy and guidance on Australian Cadet flying can be found in AAFC 400.001 AAFC Flying Operations Manual.

2. Non-Defence qualified pilots who hold a civilian pilot’s licence may use civilian registered aircraft to conduct staff travel, provided that they meet the eligibility requirements as listed in OAREG 5. Approved participants of the ACFS may use civilian registered aircraft which are under the regulatory control of CASA in accordance with the requirements of OAREG 5.

PURPOSE

3. Defence has a duty of care to ensure that a suitable framework exists for the use of civilian registered aircraft by Defence personnel for duty. Airworthiness and safety oversight is a key aspect that requires consideration, as well as regulatory governance and control of such events.

APPLICABILITY

4. This guidance applies to all Defence personnel operating Non-Defence registered aircraft for Defence duty such as but not limited to Australian Cadets Flying Operations, ACFS, Parachuting Operations and Heritage Aircraft Operations.

QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

5. Pilots who conduct flights under OAREG 5 shall ensure that they meet all qualification and currency requirements that apply to the planned activity or operation. Defence has a duty of care to ensure that personnel travelling on duty are afforded the appropriate safety mechanisms as established in the Work Health and Safety Act 2012. The following restrictions apply to the use of light aircraft for duty travel:

a. Defence personnel may use light aircraft for duty travel without passengers, provided that:

(1) they hold a minimum of a civilian Private Pilots Licence; and

(2) the aircraft is operated under a valid Air Operators Certificate (AOC);

b. Defence personnel may use light aircraft for duty travel whilst carrying Defence passengers provided that they:

(1) hold a minimum of a current civilian Commercial Pilots Licence;

(2) hold a current Command Instrument Rating (CIR); and

(3) operate a twin piston engine aircraft, or single or twin engine turbine powered aircraft, that is operated under a valid AOC.

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GUIDANCE

• Current CIR refers to the 12-month CIR validity. The member shall also be current for the planned instrument approaches in concert with the forecast weather conditions, and meet the instrument recency requirements as specified in Civil Aviation Orders (CAO), part 40—Pilot Licenses and Ratings.

APPROPRIATE AIRCRAFT TYPES

6. Aircraft on the civil register, both fixed and rotary wing, are considered appropriate for use. The use of aircraft including ultra-lights, gliders, hang-gliders, balloons, experimental, restricted, limited and similar aircraft is prohibited for duty travel. Aircraft type requirements for all pilots may only be waivered by the Defence AA.

Aircraft hire

7. Members are required to source hired aircraft through commercial organisations that operate under a CASA endorsed AOC. AOC details for all commercial flying organisations in Australia can be found at the CASA website (www.casa.gov.au). Members are required to confirm that the commercial organisation that they intend to use holds a valid AOC.

8. Aircraft hire agreements. Aircraft hire agreements set out the terms and conditions on which aircraft are hired, including the liability of the parties of the agreement, for loss, damage, personal injury or death arising out of an accident involving the aircraft under hire. The terms of such agreements are usually set out as a standard form hiring agreement, the terms of which are generally reasonable. In some circumstances, the contract of hire may not always represent the entirety of the agreement between the parties. Defence personnel shall ensure that they fully read and understand all terms and conditions governing the hire of an aircraft, particularly those appearing in the hire agreement, before agreeing to the hire contract and conducting any flights. Where doubt exists as to the appropriateness of the terms and conditions of hire, participants should seek advice from the Defence Legal Division, Directorate of Advisings, by telephone on (02) 6266 2745 or via email: [email protected].

9. Indemnity. Pilots should pay particular attention to all indemnity clauses that appear in aircraft hire agreements. Pilots using the scheme shall not sign hire agreements that require the Commonwealth to indemnify the hirer or release the hirer from liability. Where doubt exists, legal advice should be sought from Defence Legal Division.

10. Insurance. Pilots should ensure that aircraft hire agreements also include insurance policies for personal injury and property damage, including damage to the aircraft, personal injury or death for the pilot and passengers and third party personal injury and property damage. Under arrangements with COMCOVER, the Commonwealth’s self managed insurance fund, it is a mandatory requirement for the aircraft hirer to ensure that a primary policy is in place when hiring the aircraft. A primary policy shall be in effect in order for COMCOVER to cover contingency liability above the primary policy up to Defence’s limit of cover for contingent liability. Where property damage occurs and there is a policy excess under the primary policy then the hirer should seek advice from Defence Legal Division as to the liability of the Commonwealth to pay the excess and/or to seek recovery of the excess from the party responsible for the damage. Pilots shall determine whether insurance is included in the aircraft hire cost, or whether additional insurance needs to be purchased from the hire company.

Aircraft ownership

11. Members may also use and operate an aircraft under this regulation which they own or part own, or that they source from a commercial organisation in which they or their next of kin hold an interest, provided that it has a valid Certificate of Airworthiness and the flight is operated without passengers. The aircraft does not have to operate under an AOC in these instances. Members shall seek written permission in advance from DGCP–AF (through Airlift and Training 1 Air Force Headquarters (AT1 AFHQ)) prior to operating such an aircraft.

12. Importantly, privately owned aircraft may not be utilised if the pilot of the duty travel flight is not the owner (or part owner) in accordance with OAREG 5.1.5.

INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBILITY

13. Duty. Members shall comply with crew duty limits specified by CASA through the appropriate CAO and CAR. Calculation of duty times shall take into consideration time spent in their primary work place as well as those periods they are involved in flying and associated duties, eg flight planning, refuelling.

14. Alcohol and drug use. Defence personnel shall meet CASA requirements for minimum time between alcohol intake and commencing flying duties. Members undertaking activities in accordance with this Instruction may

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be subject to random drug and alcohol testing pursuant to part 99 of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations. Illegal drug use is prohibited at all times in accordance with normal Defence policy.

15. Aviation Security Identification Card (ASIC) requirements. The ASIC is normally required to be displayed prior to entry onto a security controlled aerodrome within Australia. The Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005, paragraph 3.06 allows Defence personnel flying civilian aircraft whilst on duty to utilise their military ID instead of a civilian ASIC. Furthermore, Defence personnel may wear civilian clothes when conducting operations with military ID in accordance with this Instruction. Any questions on this topic should be directed to AFHQ in the first instance, or otherwise to the Section Head of Identity Security, Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government.

16. Captain’s authority. Whilst operating a flight for duty travel, the designated pilot-in-command has sole responsibility for the safety of the aircraft. In this capacity, they have authority over all passengers, regardless of rank, to ensure the safe operation of the aircraft. The ACFS Desk Officer shall be consulted as soon as possible after landing should pressure be placed on the pilot-in-command by a senior ranking passenger to continue on, despite weather or safety concerns.

17. Search and rescue requirements. All flights operated by Defence personnel under this Instruction shall be conducted with a minimum of a Visual Flight Rules (VFR) SARTIME for arrival at the planned destination (except for local flights operating within the circuit area or local training areas). A VFR flight note does not meet this requirement. For travel with passengers, flights should be operated under the Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) where possible, regardless of the prevailing weather conditions.

18. Funding. Defence personnel who are operating as pilot-in-command of the aircraft are not to be paid in any way for duty travel. All operating costs should be initially paid from unit Travel and Subsistence (T&S) funds, and then supplemented if required by ACFS funds if the pilot-in-command is using the scheme. If multiple Defence personnel from different units are travelling on the same aircraft, the T&S requirements for each member should be divided amongst the personnel onboard (including the pilot).

AVIATION SAFETY

Flying Safety, occurrences and accidents27 19. The safety of all Defence personnel while travelling in light aircraft is paramount. While flying in a Defence unit brings the benefits of supervision and constant contact with peers, this is not possible while operating in the GA environment.

20. Defence personnel shall ensure that their flying activities comply at all times with the relevant civilian regulations and are conducted in a manner that minimises the risk of a safety occurrence. Should any incident occur, members are required to report the occurrence in accordance with the following guidance. The same ‘open, honest and just’ culture that applies to occurrence reporting in Defence operations will apply when operating GA aircraft. Under no circumstances are pilots involved in an occurrence or accident to admit liability personally or as a Defence employee.

21. Pilots should be aware that the professional reputation of Defence could be adversely affected by any breach of CARs. Furthermore, any air safety occurrence involving Defence personnel has significant negative public relations potential. Members subject to administrative action by CASA for breeches of CARs should advise AFHQ immediately.

Aviation Safety Occurrence Reporting (ASOR)

22. An ASOR shall be submitted for any aviation safety occurrence (as defined in the DASM) involving Defence personnel operating under this Instruction. To report an occurrence to Directorate of Defence Aviation and Air Force Safety (DDAAFS), download the form ‘ASOR Template (doc)’ from the DASM website, taking note of the reporting time frames (http://defweb.cbr.defence.gov.au/home/documents /departmental/manuals/dasm.htm follow the ASOR link). The completed form can be sent to DDAAFS who will forward the form to the relevant Command for investigation, Supervisor and CO comment. Personnel should also advise AFHQ of the incident.

23. Personnel shall also be aware of the requirement for Form AC 563—Defence OHS Incident Report entries in accordance with Defence Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) policy, if applicable. In the case of a serious incident or accident the DDAAFS Duty Officer is to be notified as soon as possible after the occurrence on 0410 626 357.

24. Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) reporting. CASA requires that aviation safety occurrences are reported to the ATSB within 72 hours. The ATSB website (www.atsb.gov.au) provides guidance on when an ATSB report is required, as well as links to online reporting tools. Accidents or serious incidents should in the first instance be notified to the ATSB by telephone on 1800 011 034.

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Incidents resulting in damage, personal injury or death

25. Occurrences which result in, or which may result in loss, damage, personal injury or death being suffered by the Commonwealth, to pilot or third parties should be reported to the ACFS Manager, the Defence Insurance Office and the Defence Legal Division as soon as possible, but within five working days. The Defence Insurance Office can be contacted by telephone on 1800 990 900 or at [email protected]. Form AC 563 shall be completed and sent to COMCARE also, if applicable.

26. When the sponsor is advised of occurrences that may give rise to claims against the Commonwealth as defined in Chief Executive Instructions (CEIs) 8.1—‘Managing Claims Against the Commonwealth’, Defence personnel should comply with those instructions.

AUSTRALIAN CADETS – FLYING OPERATIONS

27. Australian Cadet flying operations are conducted in Non-Defence registered aircraft for the purposes of air familiarisation, skills challenges and to enhance morale. Cadet flying operations are conducted by the following Defence organisations :

a. Australian Air Force Cadets,

b. Australian Army Cadets, and

c. Australian Naval Cadets (‘Cadets’) flying operations.

28. The following is guidance from the AAFC 400.001 AAFC Flying Operations Manual:

a. Air Familiarisation (AIRFAM). AIRFAM shall be conducted by the holder of a Commercial Pilot Licence or higher. The operation shall be conducted through organisation(s) which hold an Air Operator's Certificate issued by CASA which authorises charter operations. The pilot(s) shall be approved to conduct the AAFC operation by the company's Chief Pilot. The aircraft used shall be in the charter category with the appropriate level of insurance to cover the "Carrier's Legal Liability Act". The flight shall be conducted as a charter operation;

b. Air Experience (AIREXP) and Training Flights. AIREXP shall be conducted by a Qualified Flying Instructor (QFI) holding a CASA Grade 3, 2 or 1 Instructor Rating. The operation shall be conducted through organisation(s) which hold an Air Operator's Certificate issued by CASA which authorises flying training operations. The QFI(s) shall be approved to conduct the AAFC operation by the company's Chief Flying Instructor. The aircraft used shall be in the aerial work category with the appropriate levels of insurance to cover flying training, pilot/passenger, hull and third party liability; and

c. Holders of a Private Pilot Licence, or Student Pilot Licence with a Passenger Carrying Permit, are not permitted to carry cadets as passengers on any AAFC approved activity. Cadets are not permitted to be carried on board a flight operating in the private category.

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PROVISION AND USE OF OXYGEN IN AIRCRAFT

OAREG 2.2.16 – ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE AND GUIDANCE MATERIAL

2.2.16.a

The OAA/FTAA must establish an oxygen management system that ensures appropriate provision and use of oxygen systems on Defence aircraft.

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure suitability for flight is not comprised due to lack of supplemental oxygen for use when required by crew or passengers on Defence aircraft.

2. An FTAA may use an OAA established system to comply with this regulation, supplemented by specific flight test requirements where required.

3. For Defence aircraft that are not Defence registered, unless agreement exists with CASA that assigns oversight responsibility of the aircraft operation to Defence, or the aircraft is not deemed a State aircraft, the OAA/FTAA may rely upon the oxygen management provisions required by CASA.

4. The regulatory outcome required is not intended to replace formal aviation medicine training requirements. For example, detailed DCI knowledge and treatments. In developing the oxygen management system, DCI references should be balanced by limiting oxygen management system to general prevention measures, leaving the more detailed awareness and procedures to be prescribed by aviation medicine regulation outcomes.

AMC 1 to 2.2.16.a – Oxygen Management System

5. The oxygen management system controls should include:

a. Direction on determination of appropriate supplemental oxygen supply duration periods and system design as relates to flight crew, other crew and passengers.

b. Ejection seat aircraft occupants are provided a correctly fitted oxygen mask and that maximum use of the oxygen mask is achieved to the extent practical during flight.

c. A suitable supplemental oxygen dispensing system within easy reach of the personnel carried onboard the aircraft. Pressurised aircraft may have different oxygen systems than unpressurised aircraft.

d. Methods for calculating supplementary oxygen requirements. Calculations may consider aircraft performance characteristics WRT to emergency requirements as a balance to total quantities of oxygen carried.

e. Oxygen training requirements, unless covered under other OIP.

f. Pre-flight briefing requirements by a suitably qualified person that may include appropriate briefings and demonstrations in the use of the oxygen system.

g. For pressurised aircraft, direction that ensures enhanced emergency response for the pre–fitment of oxygen masks. Examples include:

(1) Above 35 000 ft AMSL: At least one pilot is seated at the flight controls using an oxygen mask, unless the aircraft is fitted with a quick donning mask system.

(2) Above 41 000 ft AMSL: If one pilot has to leave a pilot control position, the remaining pilot uses an oxygen mask until the other pilot has returned to the pilot control position.

(3) Above 45,000 ft AMSL: At least one pilot will use an oxygen mask at all times.

(4) Pre-flight briefs for passengers on use of the passenger supplemental oxygen systems that can ensure compliance with OAREG 2.2.16.c.

h. Other mitigating considerations as may relate to aircraft type design aspects that may also achieve desired outcomes.

i. Advice relating to high altitude management procedures for levels above 21 000 ft CA that reduces the risk of decompression illness (DCI). AMC 2 provides examples.

j. Direction that should loss of cabin pressure occur above 25 000 ft AMSL, and the aircraft oxygen system capability can support all crew and passengers (if carried) if the aircraft will remain at this level, that the time spent above that 25 000 ft CA should be kept to a minimum.

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AMC 2 to 2.2.16.a – High Altitude Exposure Management

6. In the absence of other DCI risk factors, such as underwater diving within 48 hours of flight time, including use of self contained underwater breathing apparatus (SCUBA), and noting that DCI actually can occur at a lower altitude, the risk of DCI is considered very low at or below 21 000 ft CA without the need for 100% oxygen or flight restrictions.

7. Flight above 21 000 ft CA or rapid changes in cabin altitude can lead to an increased risk of DCI, which is influenced by a variety of individual and environmental factors. Above 21 000 ft CA controls that may reduce the risk of DCI include:

a. Pre–oxygenation. Medical evidence suggests that the DCI risk is significant enough to require 20 minutes of pre-oxygenation with 100 %1 oxygen completed before ascending above 21 000 ft CA. Pre-oxygenation may commence on the ground prior to take off and continued during the climb. Where pre-oxygenation has not been possible, emergency ascents above 21 000 ft CA without pre-oxygenation may only occur if deemed an operational imperative. Time should be limited, 100% oxygen should be applied, and the maximum time above 21 000 ft CA should not exceed the time limits specified in Table 8–12.

b. 100% oxygen. Use of 100% oxygen during flight when practicable Aircraft equipped with irregular oxygen systems that prevent the use of 100% oxygen for pre-oxygenation, or other aspects of exposure to high altitude requirements, should have alternative RAAF Institute of Aviation Medicine endorsed DCI risk reduction procedures published in type specific OIP that provide an equivalent level of DCI protection.

c. Time at altitude. After pre-oxygenation, time limits above 21 000 ft CA are applied as specified in Table 8–1. The time above 21 000 ft CA is based on the highest cabin altitude reached during the sortie. Pilots should descend to or below 10 000 ft CA before the Table 8–1 time limit is reached. Any breach of Table 8–1 limits requires an AVMO assessment before conducting further flight and appropriate safety reporting.

d. Time between re–exposures within a sortie. Time spent at or below 10 000 ft CA resets the allowable duration above 21 000 ft CA at a one-for-one rate. For example, when aircrew spend 60 minutes at 23 000 CA and descend to 10 000 ft CA or below for 60 minutes, they regain 60 minutes of exposure time and may climb above 21 000 ft CA and operate at 23 000 ft CA for a further 120 minutes (allowable at Table 8–1) before having to descend again. To ensure reduced DCI risk, use of 100% oxygen when resetting for exposure within a sortie, including below 10 000 ft CA, is required.

e. Subsequent sorties. Risk of DCI is significantly higher for re-exposure because post-flight time not spent on 100 % oxygen reintroduces nitrogen into the oxygen system due to the high nitrogen content of ambient air. Following flight above 21 000 ft CA, within the Table 8–1 time limits, crew or passengers may only conduct further sorties unrestricted providing CA exposure does not exceed 21 000 ft CA again within the next 24 hour period.

Table 8–1 – Above 21 000 ft CA time limits

TIME IN MINUTES CABIN ALTITUDE (FT)

45 24 001 – 25 000

70 23 001 – 24 000

120 22 001 – 23 000

200 21 001 – 22 000

1 Aircraft utilising on board oxygen generation systems (OBOGS) are unlikely to achieve 100% oxygen output. When OBOGS is used, the maximum oxygen concentration output achieved is sufficient when the AMC refers to 100% oxygen. 2 Table 8–1 limits primarily refers to TMUFF limitations, but also afford DCI protection by not exceeding the limits at all.

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AMC 3 to 2.2.16.a – Very High Altitude Exposure Management Procedures

8. Flight at altitudes above 25 000 ft CA may not be conducted without OAA approval as this incurs a significantly increased risk of DCI.

9. The OAA may not approve Sustained flight above 25 000 ft CA unless special operational reasons exist. Approval considerations should consider SSAMA advice.

10. Operations at altitudes above 50 000 ft AMSL may require provision of appropriate counter pressure garments to assist positive pressure breathing.

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2.2.16.b

The OAA/FTAA must ensure that flight crew who are occupants of flight crew seats on flight crew compartment duty use supplemental oxygen above 10 000 ft cabin altitude.

11. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that reduced levels of oxygen do not introduce physiologically based flight crew deficiencies that could compromise suitability for flight. The regulation does not consider mission capability beyond airworthiness aspects and specifically addresses only the flight crew who are holding primary control of aircraft flight systems. If deemed necessary, the OAA may expand those flight crew members who are deemed to be actively conducting essential flight crew duties In this manner, the regulator does not impose potentially unneeded aircraft design features.

12. The regulation does not discriminate between pressurised or non-pressurised aircraft as a cabin altitude above 10 000 ft CA presents the same hazard to the flight crew of both aircraft types and therefore requires the same controls. For example, military operations in a pressurised aircraft may require the Aircraft Captain to authorise depressurisation of the aircraft environment at altitudes above 10 000 ft CA in order to achieve a mission requirement, such as parachute operations. This is equivalent to a non-pressurised aircraft being operated above 10 000 ft CA or a cabin pressurisation failure above 10 000 ft AMSL.

13. Exemption. The OAA/FTAA may issue a waiver allowing flight crew to comply with OAREG 2.2.16.c when flight above 10 000 ft CA is required due operational reasons, but the aircraft is not equipped with an adequate supplemental oxygen system.

AMC 1 to 2.2.16.b Oxygen management system

14. Oxygen management system controls should include:

a. The supplemental oxygen supply is sufficient to ensure availability for the entire time cabin altitude is above 10 000 ft CA if a planned operation, or 15 minutes as a minimum period to allow descent to 10 000 ft CA in an emergency

b. Pre-flight calculation should include the anticipated flight profiles above 10 000 ft CA, planned depressurisation aspects, and potential emergency descent profiles required to descend the aircraft to 10 000 ft CA.

c. To ensure flight crew are able to achieve access to supplemental oxygen when required the oxygen system should include:

(1) Individual oxygen dispensing units that are connected to the oxygen supply terminal, can be readily and visually checked for the flow and quantity of available oxygen and are available for immediate use.

(2) A quick donning mask that can be placed on the face with one hand from the ready position within five seconds3, properly secured, sealed and supplying oxygen.

(3) The mask should be a pressure demand type mask .Use of a diluter demand pressure breathing regulator design is not mandatory.

(4) An ability to access the aircraft communications system simultaneously with the use of oxygen.

(5) A portable oxygen system, sufficient supply hose, or spare oxygen outlets and masks to ensure immediate availability of oxygen for flight crew members who are required to move around in the aircraft to perform essential flight crew duties. For example, a loadmaster who must oversight a parachute extraction mission and the aircraft is depressurised above 10 000 ft AMSL.

3 Excludes the time period required to remove protective helmets that may interfere with donning the mask. In such cases, AVMED advice should be sought to ascertain if anticipated time limits will not exceed safe limits.

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2.2.16.c

The OAA/FTAA must ensure passengers and crew not regulated under 2.2.16.b use supplemental oxygen whenever:

a. flight above 10 000 ft cabin altitude but not above 13 000 ft cabin altitude exceeds 30 minutes, or

b. flight is above 13 000 ft cabin altitude.

15. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that reduced levels of oxygen do not introduce physiologically harm to passengers and crew.

16. The regulation does not discriminate between pressurised or non-pressurised aircraft as flight above 10 000 ft CA presents the same hazard to the passengers and crew of both aircraft types and therefore requires the same controls.

17. This regulation does not consider safety procedures and equipment for mission essential passengers who are intending to egress an aircraft above 10 000 ft CA, such as parachute operations. Should mission essential personnel be equipped with mission commander authorised self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) for use upon egress of the aircraft, the SCBA may also be used as the onboard aircraft support system for those personnel.

AMC 1 to 2.2.16.c

18. Oxygen supply durations, means of supply and other considerations may be provided under OAREG 2.2.16.a outcomes. Defence aircraft are not always constructed to civil design standards; however, use of any recognised NAA standard for the provision of oxygen, or a hybrid of more than one such standard, which may achieve the required outcome may be used if TAA consultation supports the design determinations.

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OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT


OAREG 3.2—New aircraft and Major changes to Type Design

INTRODUCTION

1. For all new aircraft types acquired by Defence, an airworthy basis of operations must be established prior to the introduction into service of the capability. This basis ensures the safe operation of the aircraft in the intended roles and environment with an acceptable level of risk of loss of life or injury and damage to assets. Similarly, major modifications to an existing Defence registered aircraft type configuration or changes to the type’s operating role or environment require assurance that the certification basis and airworthiness management arrangements supporting operations with the modified aircraft have not been compromised. This level of assurance, from both a technical and operational airworthiness perspective, is achieved through the Type Certification and SR process.

PURPOSE

2. The detailed processes to achieve Type Certification and SR of Defence aircraft type are documented in AAP 7001.048—Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual. This chapter describes in further detail the operational airworthiness requirements and inputs to Type Certification and SR.

APPLICABILITY

3. This chapter is applicable to the acquisition of new Defence aircraft types and existing aircraft that are undergoing a change to the Type Design classified as ‘Major’ in accordance with the TAREGs in AAP 7001.053—electronic technical airworthiness management manual (eTAMM).

OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT

THE CAPABILITY ‘LIFE CYCLE’

4. The Defence Capability Development Manual, which provides authoritative guidance on the process and business rules applying to developing capability by the Defence, explains that the capability ‘life cycle’ begins with the identification of the need to address a current or prospective capability gap. This need is progressively translated into a functioning ‘capability system’ that is operated and supported until it is ultimately withdrawn from service, and the associated physical and resource related assets are disposed of or redeployed.

5. All Defence Capabilities are managed throughout their life in five key phases:

a. Needs Phase. During the Needs Phase capability gaps, derived from consideration of strategic guidance, current and future operational concepts, future technology and the current and emerging force structure, are identified by Defence and approved by government.

b. Requirements Phase. During the Requirements Phase each approved capability need is transformed progressively into a set of requirements, with an associated costed and defined solution, and approved by government with a schedule for acquisition leading to operational release.

c. Acquisition Phase. During the Acquisition Phase an approved capability solution is acquired or established and, in the case of aviation platforms, weapons systems and other materiel, entered into service.

d. In–Service Phase. During the In-Service Phase the individual components that make up the capability system are operated, supported, modified as necessary and managed by the relevant authority in Defence (who are referred to generically in Defence as a ‘Capability Manager’).

e. Disposal Phase. During the Disposal Phase the capability system as a whole is withdrawn from service (in what is usually a process rather than an event) and disposed of or redeployed, depending on the nature of the individual capability elements.

OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS INPUTS TO THE NEEDS PHASE AND THE REQUIREMENTS PHASE

6. The Type Certification and SR process begins during the Needs Phase and the Requirements Phase and continues until all elements of the capability subject to Type Certification and SR have entered service. Whilst the focus of this chapter remains the Type Certification and SR processes associated with the Acquisition Phase of the

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capability development life, operational airworthiness inputs to the earlier ‘need’ and ‘requirements’ phases must be understood, as these set the scene for operational airworthiness decisions during later phases. During these pre-acquisition stages there are two key elements that require operational airworthiness input:

a. establishment of the Configuration, Role and Environment (CRE); and

b. the SOR.

7. An aircraft is certified within a Design Flight Envelope and associated design limitations. Such certification, whether made by the Defence or another recognised airworthiness authority, is based on the application of an airworthiness code to a specific design. Dependent on the proposed role and operating environment, additional airworthiness requirements may also be considered during Type Certification.

8. An example is the Lockheed 382J, which is the civil variant of the RAAF C–130J–30. The Lockheed 382J was certified by the FAA primarily against the requirements of FAR 25. However, the FAA certification was limited in two major respects: the certification was limited to aircraft operations within the contiguous USA; and the certification was for carriage of cargo only (ie no passengers). Clearly, the RAAF SOI for C–130J–30 involved operations outside the contiguous USA and with carriage of personnel. The RAAF SOI became the key element in the independent RAAF assessment of the C–130J–30 airworthiness.

The Statement of Operating Intent

NOTE

• Further detail on SOI is in annex A. ACPA website contains an example SOI.

9. Establishing the Configuration, Role and Environment. Airworthiness is managed in the context of the operational role, environment and planned usage. These aspects are documented in the SOI and provide a basis of operations against which Type Certification and SR are judged. The SOI is the document which provides the context for airworthiness certification and is a key element through which operational input is provided during the Needs Phase and the Requirements Phase. The SOI describes all intended aircraft roles, tasks, flight profiles and the operating environments and parameters within which the aircraft type must safely operate. The SOI is initially developed from the operational framework described in the Operational Concept Document (OCD), and is further defined to take into consideration the selected aircraft design during acquisition. The SOI is necessary as a starting point for determining Type Certification requirements because it defines:

a. the aircraft roles, which, in conjunction with aircraft and mission subsystem equipment, are used to determine the applicable airworthiness requirements to include in the Certification Basis Description (CBD)

b. the role and environmental parameters against which compliance with the airworthiness requirements documented in the CBD must be achieved

c. the expected usage spectrum to determine the aircraft and engine structural certification requirements

d. the likely stores, life support and role equipment necessary to meet the designated roles.

10. Review of the SOI. The OAA is responsible for ensuring the SOI continues to be developed as part of acquisition activities. During development, the OAA should obtain input on the SOI from applicable stakeholders. These include organisation and appointments such as:

a. Director General Technical Airworthiness (the TAA/TAR)

b. Capability Development Executive

c. the relevant single-Service Capability Manager

d. representatives of end-user and operating organisations

e. operational support network members with a stake in the SOI content.

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11. Approval of the SOI. OAREG 3.2 b requires the SOI to be endorsed by the TAA and approved by the OAA under whose management the aircraft will operate following SR. The OAA will base approval on the recommendations of the reviewing organisations and maturity of the SOI given the state of the system within the capability life cycle. The SOI will inform a significant component of the SOR so shall therefore be sufficiently mature to enable OAA and TAA endorsement of the SOR prior to contract signature.

12. Airworthiness Board Review. The Airworthiness Board will review aspects of the Type Design of the aircraft against the context provided by the SOI to provide a recommendation to the Defence AA for Type Certification and SR.

13. The SOI and the Certification Basis Description. The Certification Basis Description (CBD) is the checklist or matrix of airworthiness requirements applicable to the aircraft design, role and environment. The CBD provides the link between the SOI and the Type Design and is a list of airworthiness requirements against which compliance must be achieved, in conjunction with a system safety assessment, to assure the safety of the aircraft type.

14. The SOI and the Statement of Requirement. The SOR is the foundation upon which a formal contract with the OEM is established to develop and deliver an aircraft type or modification to meet Defence capability requirements. As such, the SOR forms the basis for the acquisition, or modification, of an aircraft, including the means by which airworthiness of a new or modified aircraft will be demonstrated (through the CBD). In acquisition terminology, the SOR comprises the Functional Performance Specification (FPS) and the acquisition Statement of Work (SOW). Of particular importance from an operational airworthiness perspective, the FPS should detail or provide reference to the intended roles, capability requirements and environmental parameters within which the system is expected to perform. Supporting these functional aspects are the detailed design requirements including all the airworthiness standards which form the CBD. Accordingly, the FPS must be consistent with both the SOI and the CBD, and should contain an acceptable verification method for each CBD requirement.

15. OAA endorsement of the SOR. In conjunction with endorsement by the TAA, the OAA’s endorsement of the SOR should confirm that the:

a. CRE established in the SOI is consistent with the airworthiness basis included in the CBD

b. aircraft roles and environmental parameters are adequately captured in the FPS

c. Design Flight Envelope captured in the FPS encompasses the required service flight usage defined in the SOI

d. SOW requires the contractor to provide adequate evidence to verify the operational airworthiness aspects of the design as they relate to the operation of the aircraft by Defence aircrew in the intended roles (eg human factors, aircrew publications, performance and handling characteristics, etc.).

OPERATIONAL RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN NATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITIES AND MILITARY AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITIES

16. A NAA is the organisation of a sovereign state responsible for specifying minimum standards for the safety of aviation operations in the state’s airspace and its territory and for the Type Certification of aircraft types registered by that state. For example the CASA is the NAA for Australia’s airspace and territory and for Australian aircraft (ie civil aircraft registered in Australia) including type certification of those aircraft. Military Airworthiness Authorities (MAAs) similarly exercise airworthiness authority for Defence registered aircraft. For example the United States Navy (USN) and the UK Military Aviation Authority are MAAs. NAAs and MAAs can therefore be recognised to provide oversight of the Type Certification of an aircraft type on behalf of Defence where it is mutually agreeable and cost effective to do so. From an operational perspective, this oversight may only extend to the operational airworthiness aspects of the aircraft’s Type Certification where the NAA or MAA is specifically recognised by the Defence AA or OAR and assessed as having an operational AMS which has been implemented with a similar philosophy to Defence system. Additionally, flight test operators under the auspices of the foreign NAA or MAA shall be able to intrinsically understand Defence operational context to provide wholly valid conclusions and recommendations for Defence aircraft.

17. Conversely to the technical airworthiness domain, this assessment may be highly subjective and permeates the continuum of operations from ab-initio training through to complex operational roles performed under the jurisdiction of the NAA or MAA. Recognition of foreign NAAs and MAAs may therefore be impractical in some circumstances unless the operational system proposed for a particular aircraft type can be accepted in total. Such a mechanism might involve initial aircrew training of Defence crews within the foreign NAA or MAA operational system to provide a basis for organic training in substantially similar operational roles and the environments within Defence.

Annex

A. Statement of Operating Intent.

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AAP 8000.010(AM1) Annex A to Sect 6 Chap 1

1A–1

STATEMENT OF OPERATING INTENT PURPOSE

1. The SOI for aircraft operated by Defence should clearly describe the intended service usage spectrum for the aircraft (ie roles, tasks, flight profiles and operating environment).

DESCRIPTION

2. Design Flight Envelope. The design flight envelope is defined by the design authority or aircraft OEM, is accepted through certification, and is the outermost boundary of flight conditions to which an aircraft may be flown and remain airworthy.

3. Operational Flight Envelope. The operational flight envelope is the outermost boundary to which Defence intends to operate a specific aircraft type in service. This envelope may be more restrictive than the design flight envelope. An example of when Defence could operate an aircraft to an operational flight envelope that is considerably more restrictive than the design flight envelope may occur with fleet addition aircraft. The OAA may decide, in the interests of risk management, to operate a fleet addition aircraft, which has certain increased design limits, to the same (lower) design limits of the in-service aircraft. In such cases the OAA would require that flight publications and cockpit instrumentation be modified to be consistent with Defence operational flight envelope.

4. Service Flight Usage Spectrum. The SOI defines the service flight usage spectrum, consisting of defined operational flight profiles for each task, and encompasses the flight conditions over which the aircraft can be operated in service without exceeding the design flight envelope. In the instance of an SOI being prepared for an aircraft type for which a design flight envelope has not yet been defined, the SOI would be based on the Commonwealth design requirement, and may be subject to change following advice from the OEM and/or applicable Authorised Engineering Organisation.

SOI DEVELOPMENT

5. The SOI will only contain approved tasks, in support of authorised roles, and should be developed using operational flight envelopes specified in the SOR used to define a required capability. The SOI will change through the life cycle of the capability/platform/Aviation system. Specific ways in which the SOI may be tailored are as follows:

a. Pre–acquisition. Where a capability requirement is identified, but an aircraft platform has not been specified, the SOI will be somewhat more generic. Nevertheless, an SOI may be raised in such circumstances to define the intended operating roles and operating environment. The initial SOI could be developed as a derivative of the Major Capability Submission (MCS).

b. During acquisition. Where a platform is identified, the aircraft specification should include a desired design flight envelope that encompasses the required service flight usage spectrum defined in the SOI.

c. Type Certification. The design flight envelope must be validated against the SOI with necessary adjustments to ensure that the risk of exceeding the design flight envelope is acceptable in normal service operations.

d. In–service. The SOI should be kept current for the authorised roles and tasks of the affected aircraft type and operating organisation. While the SOI should reflect actual operations, there is provision to identify intended developments in the SOI via OAREG 2.1.2, OAREG 3.1 and OAREG 3.5.

Structure And Content

6. The following provides guidance on the minimum required structure and content of an SOI:

a. Introduction. The introduction should refer to the operating organisations, the aircraft type and models operated, and the total fleet size.

b. Role. Identify the authorised roles for the aircraft including training requirements.

c. Tasks. List all authorised tasks within the authorised unit roles. Where different models are assigned different tasks then identify which models do which tasks.

d. Flight profiles. Define typical flight profiles for each task. Each profile is to include at least the details in appendix 1. Whilst a flight profile for every variation of the parameters in appendix 1 is not required, sufficient profiles are to be provided to define the usage spectrum. DGTA staff can provide guidance on the discrimination between flight profiles that is required to define the usage spectrum.

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Profiles may be provided graphically or in text and should be compiled into logical groups such as ‘Common Profiles’, ‘Ground Attack’, ‘Air-to-Air’, ‘Conversion Training’, etc. Each profile should be given a numerical code (often called a ‘Mission Code’ or ‘Sortie Pattern Code’).

e. OAA defined operational limitations or requirements. Reference any relevant ‘Operational Requirement’ documents to avoid duplication of information. Consideration should be given to citing any specific operational requirements for aircraft stores capabilities. Define any specific operational airworthiness limitations or requirements that directly impact the modus operandi for the aircraft. Such requirements may include:

(1) fuel reserve requirements;

(2) altitude limits associated with carriage of passengers;

(3) minimum margins in respect of stall or minimum control speeds; or

(4) operation in airspace requiring specific communication, navigation or identification equipment such as Reduced Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM) or Required Navigation Performance (RNP) airspace.

f. Operating environment. The operating environment needs to be clearly defined in terms of:

(1) areas of operation;

(2) airspace limitations (specifically applicable to UASs);

(3) runway conditions;

(4) ship board operations (eg maximum sea states, availability of Recovery Assist Secure and Traverse (RAST));

(5) expected meteorological extremes (eg temperature, humidity);

(6) hazardous environments (eg dust, salt);

(7) maintenance system;

(8) basing;

(9) reliance on remote systems for safe operation (eg command and control systems for UAVs, remote sensors);

(10) ground environment;

(11) possible threats; and

(12) known special operations.

g. Aircraft configuration. Each representative flight profile should have an accompanying table showing the aircraft configuration for the task. A sample configuration list is provided in appendix 2.

h. General information. Any additional information that may enhance the understanding of the usage spectrum for the type or model should be included.

i. Rate of effort and planned life. An indication of the annual rate of effort should be provided, and the expected or required life for the aircraft type and, if applicable, models.

j. Future changes. Any planned tasks of the aircraft, for the authorised unit roles, that have not been validated against the design flight envelope and design standards should be recorded in this section.

Appendix(es):

1. SOI flight profile details 2. Aircraft configuration details

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AAP 8000.010(AM1) Appendix 1 to Annex A to Sect 6 Chap 1

1A1–1

SOI FLIGHT PROFILE DETAILS 1. The representative flight profiles should include the following details:

a. Description of sortie, and sortie pattern code;

b. Duration of sortie:

(1) Total;

(2) At full throttle (afterburner, reverse thrust or other engine condition as appropriate); and

(3) Taxi time;

c. Climb speed (IAS) and time to altitude;

d. Cruise speed (IAS or Mach No) and height (above ground level) or altitude for each leg; and

e. Descent speed (IAS or Mach No) and time to descend.

NOTE

• The information in sub-paragraphs c, d and e should be repeated as necessary for high-low-high and similar sorties.

f. Delivery, attack and training manoeuvres:

(1) Type of manoeuvre;

(2) Speed (IAS or Mach No);

(3) Height or altitude (maximum and minimum);

(4) Manoeuvre ‘g’ envelope (ie maximum and minimum value of positive and, where applicable, negative ‘g’ applied during the manoeuvre);

(5) Duration of manoeuvre;

(6) Number during sortie; and

(7) Stores released.

g. Percentage of sortie over land and over sea;

h. Number of landings:

(1) Touch and go; and

(2) Full stop.

i. Circuit speed, circuit altitude and time (typical);

j. Number of pressurisation cycles;

k. Theatre of operation;

l. Percentage of rough or smooth landing surface;

m. STOL performance, if applicable; and

n. Percentage of fleet rate of effort dedicated to this profile.

2. Where aircraft are operated in a role which results in a high usage of engine or structural life (eg flying displays, circuit training, or repeated heavy lifting), attention should be made to describing flight profiles as accurately as possible.

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AAP 8000.010(AM1) Appendix 2 to Annex A to Sect 6 Chap 1

1A2–1

AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION DETAILS 1. Sample list of aircraft configuration details is as follows:

a. Configuration, including:

(1) Stores (eg weapons, external pods, external fuel tanks) including possible configurations of stores following stores release, and mixed configurations.

(2) Loads (eg underslung or internal loads).

(3) Mission or role equipment (eg aeromedical equipment, ferry tanks).

(4) Life Support Equipment (eg active noise reduction, personnel survival packs).

(5) All up weight at take-off and associated centre of gravity.

b. Average all up weight during sortie and associated centre of gravity (CoG) movement and tolerances.

c. Fuel weight at take-off.

d. Distribution of fuel at take-off.

e. Fuel use schedule.

f. Weight and CoG movement during employment or jettison of stores or equipment during sortie.

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OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT DURING ACQUISITION

Applicable Regulations OAREG 3.1—Changes to aircraft configuration, role and environments

OAREG 3.2—New aircraft and Major changes to Type Design

OAREG 3.3—Operation of new aircraft or Major change prior to Service Release

OAREG 3.4—Service Release for new aircraft or Major changes to Type Design

INTRODUCTION 1. For all new aircraft types acquired by Defence, an airworthy basis of operations must be established prior to the introduction into service of the capability. This basis ensures the safe operation of the aircraft in the intended roles and environment with an acceptable level of risk of loss of life or injury and damage to assets. Similarly, major modifications to an existing Defence registered aircraft type configuration or changes to the type’s operating role or environment require assurance that the certification basis and airworthiness management arrangements supporting operations with the modified aircraft have not been compromised. This level of assurance, from both a technical and operational airworthiness perspective, is achieved through the Type Certification and SR process.

PURPOSE 2. The detailed processes to achieve Type Certification and SR of Defence aircraft type are documented in AAP 7001.048—Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual. This chapter identifies in further detail the operational airworthiness requirements and inputs to Type Certification and SR. Flow charts summarising the acquisition processes described in this chapter are included in annex A.

APPLICABILITY 3. This chapter is applicable to the acquisition of new Defence aircraft types, or those which are undergoing a change to the Type Design classified as ‘Major’ in accordance with AAP 7001.053—electronic technical airworthiness management manual (eTAMM).

NEW AIRCRAFT AND THE ACQUISITION PROCESS 4. Early in the acquisition process, the following elements need to be established:

a. OAA may delegate operational airworthiness authority by appointing an OAAR(Acq).

b. Operational personnel and organisations to conduct and manage operational airworthiness within the project environment are appointed, such as:

(1) Operational Requirements/Airworthiness Manager

(2) Qualified Test Pilot

(3) Qualified Flying Instructors

(4) Operational Support Networks.

c. Develop strategy for operational airworthiness management of acquisition flying activities (documented through the OAMP).

d. Develop strategy for achievement of Type Certification and SR.

OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS APPOINTMENTS FOR THE ACQUISITION PHASE 5. Prior to Type Certification and SR, the acquisition phase requires the management of certification activities and flying operations of the aircraft. Flying activities may involve Defence aircrew operating a non-Defence registered aircraft, as well as operations to support Defence activities under a temporary airworthiness instrument. An operational airworthiness (OA) management framework must be instituted for the acquisition phase to ensure the preservation of safety for flying operations and that certification of the capability is appropriately conducted and meets expected airworthiness outcomes. The OA management framework is comprised of individual airworthiness appointments responsible to the OAA for the different aspects of acquisition airworthiness, and the establishment of an Operational Support Network (OSN) to advice and assist with type certification and SR activities.

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6. Operational airworthiness delegation. OAREG 1.2 paragraph 1.2.2—Delegation of Operational Airworthiness Authority allows an OAA to appoint, through a written delegation, an Operational Airworthiness Authority Representative – Acquisition (OAAR(Acq)) who may exercise airworthiness authority on behalf of the OAA for a specified scope of acquisition activities. For a new aircraft type or major change to the type design of an existing aircraft, OAREG 3.2—New aircraft and Major changes to Type Design describes the responsibilities typically delegated to an OAAR(Acq).

7. Flight Test Approval Authority (FTAA). The FTAA is responsible for defining requirements for the operational airworthiness management of flight test activities. The FTAA usually provides advice on the conduct of flight test activities performed in support of the certification and introduction to service of the acquired capability.

8. Qualified Test Pilot (QTP). Acquisition activity to introduce a new aircraft type will normally include an extensive program of ground and flight testing to verify that the specification requirements have been met. In such cases, the OAAR(Acq) may appoint a QTP who is endorsed by an FTAA as having the necessary competencies and experience to perform this role. The QTP must have the necessary role background and flight test experience to represent the Commonwealth on matters relating to the safety of flight test activity, and the adequacy of test activity to demonstrate that airworthiness requirements have been met. The OAAR(Acq) may appoint other specialist operational representatives (such as test specialists or mission specialist) to support the QTP in the conduct of their responsibilities with respect to the Type Certification and SR of new or modified aircraft. The QTP is normally responsible for:

a. providing recommendations to the OAAR(Acq) and FTAA regarding the equivalence of contractor FMSs to that required by Defence, when assessing the suitability of Defence aircrew to participate in contractor flight activities

b. representing Defence during any contractor Flight Test Readiness Review (FTRR) and agreeing the risk assessment and conduct of flight testing involving Defence personnel

c. operational qualification and verification activities during acquisition

d. providing recommendations to the OAAR(Acq) on the operational acceptability of the aircraft type to perform the roles within the environment specified in the SOI.

9. Aviation Safety Officer (ASO). The ASO is the specialist advisor to the OAAR(Acq) responsible for ensuring that aviation safety practices are applied to any Defence flying activity or external flying activities involving Defence personnel during the Acquisition phase and prior to SR. The ASO should monitor and coordinate operational preventive or corrective action for aviation safety incidents resulting during the acquisition flying program. The ASO appointment is normally responsible for:

a. reviewing reported incidents during Developmental T&E, Acceptance T&E and Initial Operational T&E

b. coordinating Commonwealth of Australia involvement in any required investigation and reporting of aircraft operational hazards and incidents during contractor flying-operations

c. ensuring that identified deficiencies are tracked to resolution

d. potential hazards are identified and averted.

Operational Support Networks 10. Formation of an acquisition project team with all the necessary skills and experience to certify the operational airworthiness elements of the type design and prepare the capability for introduction into service might be impractical. In such cases, additional personnel and agencies external to the project should be identified to support compliance finding activity, in what is known as an Operational Support Network (OSN). These external organisations can provide data, advice or additional resources towards the type certification and SR processes. Below are some of the activities OSN members can be involved in:

a. assistance with issue resolution

b. assistance with development and amendments to the SOI, SOR, OAMP and other documents

c. establishment of a FMS for Defence flying operations conducted during acquisition and post SR

d. assistance with operational compliance findings and flight test activities

e. planning and preparation for airworthiness submission and subsequent board

f. assistance with Development of OIP

g. general sounding boards for ‘What-If’ scenarios.

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11. The OSN should be documented in, or reference by, the OAMP. Examples of OSN members can be found below:

a. Aerospace Operational Support Group (AOSG). AOSG is the flight test Centre of Expertise (CoE) for the conduct of flight test activities of Defence registered aircraft in support of certification, design changes, stores compatibility clearance and developmental or investigative tasks. AOSG may provide support in the following areas:

(1) Test and Evaluation planning and conduct

(2) performance and handling assessments

(3) human factors assessments

(4) electronic warfare self protection advice and assessment

(5) operational compliance findings.

b. Force Element Group (FEG) and Operational Units. The end user may provide broad operational support to the T&E program via OT&E and provision of operational assets and personnel.

c. Transition teams. Transition teams are normally set up to coordinate the operational transition of the capability from the project acquisition environment into Defence Service. The scope of support provided by Transition Teams includes assessment of the impact of qualification and certification outcomes on the FMS, operational procedures, and training and qualification requirements.

d. Air Movements Training and Development Unit (AMTDU). AMTDU is a CoE with particular expertise in air loads and aerial delivery and can provide airworthiness advice in these areas.

e. Foreign military services. Foreign military services which operate a similar version of the aircraft design being acquired may assist in a wide variety of areas, including flight testing and training.

f. Foreign National Airworthiness Authority (NAA), Military Airworthiness Authority (MAA) or Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). An NAA, MAA and OEM retain responsibility for the operational airworthiness management of flying activities for non-Defence registered aircraft during the Acquisition phase. In such cases the acquisition strategy may include a collaborative approach to Type Certification for those aspects of the design that share the same configuration, and where the role and environment are substantially similar to that intended by Defence.

g. Airworthiness Coordination and Policy Agency (ACPA). ACPA is the principle representative of the Defence OAR. In conjunction with the OAA and/or FTAA, ACPA may be consulted where interpretation or clarification of OAREGs is required.

h. Directorate of Defence Aviation and Air Force Safety (DDAAFS). DDAAFS provides advice and assistance on the development and conduct of Defence Aviation Safety Management Systems and is responsible for the conduct of investigations into all Defence aviation accidents and significant incidents. DDAAFS may provide advice regarding flying safety practices and the investigation and resolution of incidents which occur during the acquisition and introduction into service of the aircraft type.

i. Directorate of Aerospace Simulator and Special Purpose Aircraft (DASSPA). DASSPA is responsible for the management of aerospace simulators and Special Purpose Aircraft. DASSPA may provide airworthiness advice on Synthetic Training Device accreditation and management.

j. Directorate of Trials (DTRIALS). DTRIALS is responsible for the development of T&E policy and may assist with management and conduct of OT&E activities and trials.

k. Directorate of Ordnance Safety (DOS). DOS can provide advice on safety verification and design acceptance of ordnance.

l. Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO). GWEO may provide advice on and evaluation of safety, suitability for service and effectiveness of ordnance.

m. Aerospace Materiel Systems Program Office (AMSPO). AMSPO provides advice and support to OAARs in the creation, management, promulgation and compliance of Defence aviation and Australian Air Publications.

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OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS STRATEGY 12. Operational Airworthiness Management Plan (OAMP). The use of an OAMP for in-service purposes was discussed in section 1, chapter 1. OAREG 3.2 paragraph 3.2.1 requires an operational airworthiness management strategy, meeting the regulations within AAP 8000.010, to be documented for the operational airworthiness management of Type Certification and SR acquisition activities. This should describe the strategy and scope of operational airworthiness activities and responsibilities identified to achieve and maintain operational airworthiness prior to and following SR, including identifying the organisational arrangements, personnel, processes and supporting networks that have been implemented to achieve the required operational airworthiness outcomes. The OAMP is also required to identify the approved SOI, operational input to the development of the SOR, and a strategy to assess critical operational aspects of the design in support of compliance finding and Design Acceptance by the aircraft DAR.

OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS INPUTS TO TYPE CERTIFICATION 13. Type Certification is the process through which compliance with the airworthiness design requirements contained in the Certification Basis Description (CBD) is established through the development of the Type Design to meet the operating roles and environment contained in the SOI. Compliance finding is the process of formally documenting that applicable verification data or evidence has been examined in relation to an airworthiness requirement contained in the CBD and that the data has shown that the requirement has been satisfied.

Management of operational assessments 14. Operational airworthiness matters regarding the acceptability of the aircraft type to operate in the SOI roles and environment that arise during the acquisition of a capability, and which require assessment by a Project Operational Appointment or member of the OSN, should be recorded and managed by the acquisition agency as the generated assessments will normally be used to support design acceptance activities, compliance findings, contract deliverables, Issue Papers, Contract Change Proposals (CCP), Technical Information (TI), reports, or other activities. A set of project level processes and procedure should be established to manage the documentation, tracking and resolution of operational assessments. The sources of an operational query or assessment can be varied, such as an operational concern arising out of compliance findings, test activities, compliance assurance, design acceptance process, technical inquiries, etc. An operational query may also be raised as a result of the design acceptance or other process to communicate the requirement for operational airworthiness action outside the control of project offices.

15. An operational assessment should be referred to an OA appointment or OSN member by the OAAR(Acq). Pending on the item under review, some assessments are limited to appointments with particular qualifications and experience. Common assessment categories impacting on operational airworthiness may include:

a. Performance and handling qualities. Performance and handling qualities refers to the flight performance and flying characteristics of the aircraft in all aspects of the flight envelope.

b. Human factors. Human factors refers to the aspects of the aircraft system which impact the human-machine-interface, affecting both the safe workload and control of the aircraft and any navigation or mission system required to be operated either in the cockpit or by the cockpit flight crew during any phase of aircraft operation.

c. Aviation safety. Aviation safety is the preventative or corrective measures taken to address an aviation safety issue or trend.

d. Test and evaluation. Test and evaluation is any activity:

(1) where the results will impact the operational airworthiness of the aircraft type

(2) involving flight test conducted to provide compliance evidence for Commonwealth acceptance purposes, or

(3) involving flight test with Defence personnel.

e. Aircrew Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP). Aircrew OIP refers to any aircrew operating instructions issued or delivered by the OEM and approved or issued by Defence which are necessary to safely operate the aircraft in the intended roles.

f. Training. Training refers to the training and assessments related to qualification and competency criteria for operational personnel (aircrew, etc).

g. Synthetic Training Device qualification. Synthetic Training Device qualification is those activities required to confirm the correct functionality and fidelity of a training device on which aircrew will achieve competency and currency for safety-critical tasks.

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h. Other Platform Interface. Other platform interface relates to an interface with another aircraft or platform where the operational airworthiness of either aircraft may be affected.

16. Assessments considered to have no substantial impact upon operational airworthiness may be actioned by the OA appointments identified through the operational assessment process. The OAAR(Acq) is responsible for providing further determination and approval for those operational assessments determined to require input due to their classification or operational airworthiness impact. On the basis of the recommendations documented with the associated assessment, the OAAR(Acq) may consult further with the FTAA, OAA, or other OAARs as necessary. Where the OAAR(Acq) is satisfied that the issue may be addressed without elevation as an Airworthiness Issue, action is to be taken by the relevant OA appointments (and engineering staff if required) to close the assessment. Where elevation as an Airworthiness Issue is required, this must be managed in accordance with the established Defence Airworthiness Issue Paper process.

17. Where the substance of an operational assessment is addressed through the technical airworthiness means, operational assessment may be closed following acceptance action by the relevant DAR or Senior Design Engineer (SDE). Where there are any follow-on actions which impact SR or an operational airworthiness aspect of the aircraft, the assessments are to be transferred to the relevant organisation for action prior to closure. Where an operational assessment is not adequately resolved at the Project level and has a significant impact upon operational airworthiness, then the matter should be progressed through the Defence Airworthiness Issue Paper process.

18. Operational assessments and specification compliance. Operational airworthiness assessments should not address contractual issues, issues of specification compliance, or program issues. The authorised Project Engineering Team remains responsible for assessing and advising specification compliance through the design acceptance process. Although responsibility for specification compliance remains with the DAR, operational staff can contribute where there are operational factors to be assessed.

OPERATIONAL COMPLIANCE FINDINGS 19. Defence airworthiness compliance findings are managed by the DAR in accordance with the TAREGs in AAP 7001.053. The key mechanism for providing operational airworthiness compliance findings is through the conduct of a flight test clearance program. While foreign services (eg USAF, USN and RAF) may conduct dedicated programs prior to release for Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E), Defence typically accomplishes the same outcomes through contractor DT&E and a limited AT&E program, conducted prior to aircraft acceptance.

20. Compliance finding process. Many elements will require both a technical and operational person to agree to the findings. Operational compliance finding is a structured process that involves the review of evidence obtained during acquisition, by persons or organisations nominated by the OAA, to establish a level of conformance for each of the CBD’s operational airworthiness elements. When that level of conformance is deemed satisfactory to meet the certification basis, the findings should be presented to the OAAR(Acq) for endorsement. Ultimately, the DAR is responsible, as the CBD manager, for acceptance of the compliance finding and, in the case of operational findings, this will be based on the recommendations and endorsement provided by the OAAR(Acq).

21. The compliance finder. During acquisition airworthiness planning, the OAAR(Acq) should identify positions within the project team with the necessary pre-requisite operational or engineering experience and qualifications to make and review operational compliance findings for components of the acquisition activity. Many certification basis elements will require both a technical and operational person to agree the finding. Certification basis requirements which impacts operational airworthiness may be assessed by a person or organisation (OSN member) authorised by the OAAR(Acq). These may include, for example, any aspect of the design which impacts cockpit layout, avionics symbology, warnings and cautions, engine performance, stores jettison envelopes, etc. Where the compliance finding relates to aircraft handling qualities or crew workload, a QTP or relevant flight test systems specialist is to agree the finding in accordance with OAREG 3.2 paragraph 3.2.6—Human factors. All persons and agencies authorised to make compliance findings should be documented in the OAMP.

22. Compliance finding evidence. Compliance findings are made on the basis of data obtained through different means, including Defence involvement in the OEM developmental and type acceptance activities, dedicated Defence inspection and test of the aircraft and data obtained from Foreign Military Services or other OSN members. Evidence used as a basis for compliance findings are usually contained in formal document deliveries required under the SOW. Similarly, Defence involvement in OEM ground and flight test activities, and the requirement for the OEM to make sufficient demonstrations to Defence to enable compliance finding activity, can also be included in the SOW. However, informal involvement or witnessing by the acquisition project team of test or developmental activities may also provide a basis to make a compliance finding, combined with reference to formal data or documentation.

23. Compliance finding documentation. Recording of operational compliance findings will depend on the arrangements established within each project for documentation of compliance findings. Operational compliance findings should be endorsed by the OAAR(Acq) where applicable and are ultimately accepted by the applicable DAR.

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All evidence gathered to support the operational compliance finding must be included or clearly referred to within the finding record.

24. A summary of the compliance finding activity, which demonstrates the elements of the certification basis are acceptable and the system is operationally suitable for the approved roles and environments, forms part of the documented submission provided to the OAA and the Airworthiness Board for recommendations to the Defence AA.

TEST AND EVALUATION 25. Test and evaluation (T&E) provides the opportunity for the acquisition agency to make operational airworthiness compliance findings associated with the use of the aircraft in the intended roles and environment. Acquisition flight testing has the following characteristics:

a. Test data forms part of the type design.

b. Test data and involvement of Defence personnel for compliance findings and design acceptance.

c. Mechanism for assessing design aspects that impact operational airworthiness (ie Performance and Handling Qualities and Human Factors).

d. Gather data to support design development.

e. Gather data to assess design performance.

f. Verify particular aspects of the design specification have been met.

g. Demonstrate that the aircraft or modification satisfies those parts of the FPS which require verification by flight test.

h. Demonstrate capability requirements which are not part of the CBD.

i. Validate the capability.

26. The appointment of QTPs or a T&E team consisting of QTPs and other test and mission specialist by the OAAR(Acq) is necessary to ensure T&E conducted during acquisition sufficiently complements compliance findings against operational airworthiness requirements. Types of acquisition T&E include:

a. Developmental Test & Evaluation (DT&E).

b. Acceptance Test & Evaluation (AT&E).

c. Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E).

27. Relationship between DT&E and operational airworthiness. Whilst DT&E is the domain of the contractor, Defence personal may participate in DT&E activities. Through this participation and review of developmental records, Defence may obtain initial insights into aspects of the design that impact upon operational airworthiness and data to support operational compliance findings.

28. Relationship between AT&E and operational airworthiness. The act of verifying FPS requirements includes both airworthiness requirements documented in the CBD and other FPS requirements related to performance and capability. Acceptance testing therefore provides the opportunity for the acquisition agency to make operational airworthiness compliance findings associated with the use of the aircraft in the intended roles and environment.

29. Relationship between OT&E and operational airworthiness. OT&E relates more to the validation of the capability through assessing the operational effectiveness and suitability to perform the SOI roles in the intended environment and rate of effort. Even though the focus is more on the capability rather than airworthiness (since airworthiness would have been established as a result of Type Certification and SR), valuable operational airworthiness outcomes may be obtained through the validation process to ensure the implemented systems are appropriate and opportunities for changes identified. Prior to SR, IOT&E assists with the development and validation of OIPs, employment tactics, training and other processes which support operational airworthiness.

AVIATION SAFETY 30. Operational airworthiness is achieved in part through the mitigation of operational hazards. Aviation safety occurrences prior to SR may have occurred either during contractor flight trials or during Commonwealth flight operations. The management of aviation safety during acquisition should be included OAMP.

31. Appointment of an Aviation Safety Officer (ASO) is advised in order to manage safety occurrences and hazards identified during flying operations (both contractor and Defence activities) prior to SR. DDAAFS should be a member of the OSN, and can assist with the investigation of accidents and serious incidents to ensure the factors contributing to the occurrence are discovered and appropriately rectified. While aviation safety is the concern of the

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contractor prior to delivery to Defence, Defence is interested in the closure of any actions arising from aviation safety occurrences that may have occurred during contractor flight operations. All occurrences should be closely monitored by the ASO. For Defence operations, SAFETYMAN vol 3 part 1—Defence Aviation Safety Manual (DASM) provides guidance on the process that the OAAR(Acq), ASO, flying supervisors, operators and safety personnel should apply to secure the highest standard in health and safety for all aviation activities.

32. The Defence Aviation Hazard Reporting and Tracking System (DAHRTS) is the tool employed by Defence to record, investigate, action, track, review and analyse Defence aviation safety occurrences and operational hazards in order to prevent, as much as possible, hazards leading to aviation safety occurrences or repetitive unsafe conditions or practices. Project Offices should make full use of this tool during acquisition, by organising set up and sufficient access to the system with DDAAFS.

33. A summary of the aviation safety occurrences, demonstrating that each occurrence has been adequately addressed, forms part of the documented submission provided to the OAA and the Airworthiness Board for recommendations to the Defence AA.

Human factors 34. Human factors involves gathering information about human abilities, limitations, and other characteristics and applying it to tools, machines, systems, tasks, jobs, and environments to produce safe, comfortable, and effective human use. In aviation, human factors is dedicated to understanding how humans can most safely and efficiently be integrated with the technology. That understanding is then translated into the design of equipment (by OEM or Contractor) or training, policies, or procedures in order to help humans perform better.

35. Human factors are a significant aspect of the type certification of a new design, or a variation to an existing role, environment or configuration. While human factors affect all aspects of system operation and maintenance, the focus in regard to operational airworthiness is concerned with safety of flight while the aircraft is being operated in the SOI environment and roles. A QTP or human factors specialist should be nominated to make operational human factors findings and assess related issues. Areas of interest in human factors may include:

a. cognitive and physiological workload

b. human–machine-interface (including):

(1) control design

(2) display design

(3) audible cue design

(4) cockpit or crew-station layout

(5) internal and external visibility.

c. freedom of movement, reach capability and anthropometric limitations

d. ergonomics

e. fatigue

f. internal and external communication

g. situational awareness

h. useability

i. emergency lighting and egress

j. crew interaction

k. environmental effects on the individual (heat, cold, dust, etc)

l. crew resource management.

36. A summary of the human factor assessments which demonstrate that the system can be safely operated in the intended roles and environment by Defence aircrew forms part of the documented submission provided to the OAA and the Airworthiness Board for recommendations to the Defence AA.

AIRCREW OIP 37. Management of aircrew OIP is the responsibility of the OAA. As part of the Type Certification process, the acquisition agency shall ensure that a suitable set of OIP are developed to safely operate the aircraft type. Aircrew

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documentation must be reviewed by technical and operational staff, ensuring accuracy of the content against operational and technical data. Where appropriate, limitations and restrictions placed upon flying operations and highlighted during the developmental and acceptance process should be documented in aircrew publications.

38. A summary of assessment of the aircrew OIP, which demonstrates that all limitations and procedures necessary to safely operate the system have been documented, forms part of the documented submission provided to the OAA and the Airworthiness Board for recommendations to the Defence AA.

OPERATIONAL INPUTS TO AIRWORTHINESS ISSUE PAPERS 39. Defence Airworthiness Issue Papers are raised to identify design or certification issues encountered during aviation system development and test that require consideration by operational and technical airworthiness authorities. For example, a manufacturer may offer a throttle control with or without certain electronic protection, requiring the OAA and TAA to consider specialist advice regarding the airworthiness (safety of flight) impact upon the role and environment of each configuration, before making a decision.

40. Airworthiness Issue Papers may be raised for technical or operational reasons. Airworthiness Issue Papers raised as a result of non-compliant technical matters should be reviewed by operational staff to assess the impact of the issue upon operational airworthiness. Operational concerns should, in the first instance, be referred to the DAR who may determine that an Issue Paper is warranted on technical grounds. Those operational matters that are not technically significant, but may be operationally substantial should be reviewed by the OAAR(Acq) who may direct elevation of the operational issue to an Issue Paper if necessary. Such action would only be required where the endorsement of the OAA is considered appropriate to manage the issue. Regardless of an Airworthiness Issue Paper’s origin, the risk management and mitigation approach documented in an Issue Paper requires the endorsement of both the OAA and the TAA.

41. When compiling or conducting operational review of an Airworthiness Issue Paper the following factors should be covered:

a. a technical assessment has been provided where appropriate

b. analysis of the issue against the different operational airworthiness elements

c. assessment of the issue’s implications upon aircrew operations

d. determination of mitigating operational measures that can be employed to reduce risk to an acceptable level

e. appropriateness of the referral of the issue to SR, including capture of all associated SR limitations in OIPs under which the aircraft type will be operated.

42. A list of current issue papers which are being managed to resolve outstanding airworthiness issues forms part of the documented submission provided to the OAA and the Airworthiness Board for recommendations to the Defence AA.

OAA recommendation for AMTC or STC 43. The OAA shall make a recommendation to the Defence AA that the aircraft type has been certified as operationally airworthy. The documents and evidence to achieve an OAA recommendation for Type Certification are a subset of those required for submission to the Airworthiness Board prior to Defence issue of an AMTC/STC. The full requirements for a submission to the Airworthiness Board are contained in AAP 7001.048.

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OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS INPUTS TO SERVICE RELEASE 44. The SR is a declaration that sufficient supporting arrangements are in place to sustain the airworthiness of the aircraft type when operated as described in the SOI, and represents the transition from the Acquisition phase into the In-Service phase. As such, OAREG 3.4—Service Release for new aircraft or Major changes to Type Design focuses on ensuring that all airworthiness transition aspects have been adequately implemented prior to SR and commencement of operations by the flying organisation.

45. From an operational airworthiness perspective, the transitional aspects revolve around the establishment of a suitable FMS to govern the management and conduct of flying activities. The OAA recommendation for SR will be based on:

a. establishing a FMS to safely manage flight operations following introduction into service

b. establishing and assessing the acceptability of operational procedures to support operational airworthiness following introduction into service

c. implementing and assessing the training and competency system

d. ensuring there are sufficient trained aircrew to manage and operate the aviation system at the expected rate of effort.

Annex: A. Process flowcharts – New aircraft and changes to aircraft configuration, role and environment

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PROCESS FLOWCHARTS – NEW AIRCRAFT AND CHANGES TO AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION, ROLE AND ENVIRONMENT

Figure 2–A–1 Operational change determination process

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Figure 2–A–2 Type Certification Process

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Figure 2–A–3 Operations prior to Service Release process

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Figure 2–A–4 Service Release process

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Figure 2–A–5 Supplemental Role Approval process Sup

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CHANGES TO AN AIRCRAFT’S OPERATING ROLE OR ENVIRONMENT


OAREG 3.1—Changes to aircraft configuration, role and environments

OAREG 3.5—New or modified configuration, role or environment

INTRODUCTION

1. Changes to the role and environment of an aircraft are often required during the in-service life of the aircraft type. Changes may result from configuration upgrades, technical initiations, test and evaluation (T&E), expansion of operational requirement, or through the evolution of tactics. Role and environment changes can substantially impact the way in which an aircraft is operated, or provide an additional workload on aircrew. In these cases, the change shall be supported by measures that address the impact of the change on operational airworthiness. Accordingly, changes to an aircraft system, whether initiated through technical or operational needs, shall be assessed for the impact of the change on the approved Configuration, Role and Environment (CRE). Such assessment will ensure that an appropriate level of airworthiness oversight is afforded to any required changes and that the airworthiness bestowed by those systems supporting operation in the modified aircraft CRE (ie the FMS, operational rules and limitations, human-machine-interface, training sequences, etc) are not compromised.

PURPOSE

2. This chapter describes operational airworthiness management of changes to CRE of Defence registered aircraft.

APPLICABILITY

3. This chapter is applicable to changes which impact upon the CRE of Defence registered aircraft types and for which a Major change to the Type Design is not required.

INITIATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF OPERATIONAL CHANGES

INITIATION

4. Changes to the role and environment of an aircraft may be initiated for operational or technical reasons. A change may be required to meet a new operational capability requirement, to enhance an existing capability, or to enable performance of an existing role with alternate mission equipment or stores. Changes may also result from a technical requirement to correct a defect to maintain the established airworthiness Certification Basis or as a result of changes to sub-system components from a third party.

Technical Initiated Changes

5. The decision of whether a design change is either Major or Minor affects the degree of airworthiness oversight applied to the design change. Whilst the Design Acceptance Representative (DAR) and the Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO) for an aircraft type operate predominantly within the technical airworthiness framework, technical staffs are obliged to be cognisant of the impact of changes to the Type Design on operational airworthiness. Changes which are initiated by the DAR on a technical basis will be classified as either a Major or Minor change in accordance with AAP 7001.053—electronic technical airworthiness management manual.

6. Changes to the Type Design considered to be Major by the DAR, usually involve a significant operational change to the aircraft CRE. Major changes require a higher level of airworthiness oversight including review and recommendations from the TAA and OAA and approval by the Defence AA. Consequently assessment of the operational aspects associated with a Major change is inherent within the Type Certification and SR processes governed by OAREG 3. Therefore, issue of an STC and SR, including modification and approval of the SOI, negate the requirement for a separate process to address the operational airworthiness requirements associated with a Major change to the Type Design.

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7. Through Type Certification and SR, the SOI should be amended to incorporate any new roles, environmental parameters or usage introduced by a modification. In such cases the existing Certification Basis shall be examined in conjunction with the SOI amendment and the new aircraft and mission subsystem equipment to determine:

a. any new airworthiness certification basis requirements which need to be added to the CBD

b. those existing certification basis requirements affected by the change to which compliance shall be re-established.

8. Minor design changes to in-service aircraft types are technically managed at the SPO/FEG level through established design acceptance, incorporation approval and SR processes adhering to the TAREGs. Changes classified as Minor, however, shall be assessed for operational airworthiness impact by the OAA to determine the level of operational oversight required. Operational determination of Minor changes is normally facilitated through the participation of operational delegates in Configuration Control Boards (CCB) or the formalisation of consultation processes between technical and operational airworthiness organisations or representatives.

9. Participation in Configuration Control Boards (CCB). The CCB is a mechanism through which the operational aspects of a minor technical change may be considered. Each stakeholder in the change management process is usually represented at the CCB including technical, logistics and financial management staff. The OAA (or OAAR where delegated) should nominate a competent operational member to participate in CCBs for each aircraft type. Proposed design changes will be raised at the CCB where the operational representative should consider what further operational airworthiness action may be required to support the change. Where a technical change is deemed to impact operational airworthiness, the change should be referred to the OAAR or appointed representative for operational airworthiness classification IAW OAREG 3.

10. Aircrew Appointment to the CCB. A Defence member appointed to participate in Configuration Control Boards by the OAA (or OAAR where delegated) is required to:

a. be an aircrew member with a broad and extensive level of experience in Defence aviation operations for the applicable aircraft type

b. be familiar with the Operational Airworthiness Regulatory framework

c. be conversant with the design acceptance and SR processes of technical modifications

d. possess an adequate level of experience with operational flight testing

e. be familiar with the implemented FMS to support operational airworthiness

f. be experienced with training operations.

Operational Initiated Changes

11. Changes initiated by Capability Managers or operational units relating to operation of an aircraft type shall undergo an assessment by technical personnel to determine whether a resulting design change will be required. Operationally based changes are normally managed through amendment of the SOI. Where a proposed operational change is sought, the applicable Force Element Group (FEG) Headquarters shall confirm that the change can be technically supported. OAREG 2 requires that the aircraft DAR is notified of any proposed change to the SOI. The DAR will assess the impact of the change on the existing Certification Basis of the aircraft and will determine whether a technical change is required, potentially resulting in a Major or Minor modification. Where no design change is necessary, technical airworthiness consideration of the change is required to ensure the impact of the change on ongoing airworthiness management is appropriately accounted for, including aircraft or engine structural integrity management, maintenance management, logistics planning etc. Regardless of whether a Minor change or no design change is required, the OAAR should classify the impact of operational changes upon an aircraft role and environment IAW OAREG 3. Operational changes assessed by the DAR to require a Major change to the Type Design, due to the significant scope of such changes, will be progressed through the Type Certification and SR processes discussed earlier.

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CLASSIFICATION OF OPERATIONAL CHANGES

12. New roles or changes to the existing operational roles or environment that do not result in a Major change to the Type Design shall be assessed as either ‘Substantial’ or ‘Non-Substantial’ in accordance with OAREG 3. This determination will affect the degree of operational airworthiness oversight applied to the change; ensuring appropriate measures are implemented to safely accommodate the change whilst maintaining operational airworthiness. The OAA may assume that all role and environment changes are Non-Substantial unless there will be an appreciable affect on the operational airworthiness of the system. This appreciable affect may result from an individual factor, or an accumulation of factors which impact operational airworthiness and may include such matters as:

a. introduction of a new intended role or operating environment for an aircraft type

b. significant alteration to aircrew training and qualification requirements

c. significant additions or changes to the competency management system utilised for the aircraft type

d. an increase in aircrew cockpit workload

e. significant alteration to the human-machine-interface

f. additional or unusual considerations for flight authorisation

g. any other operational impact where the extent is difficult to determine.

13. In the circumstance where the OAA considers that an appreciable affect may exist, the full extent of the operational change shall be examined to assess the level of complexity required in its implementation. This level of operational impact and complexity, based on the extent of flight testing and mitigating activities required to support the change, is the determining factor for classifying an operational change as ‘Substantial’. However, the OAA cannot perform this assessment in isolation. The classification should be referred to an FTAA with flight test expertise with the aircraft type. The FTAA’s experience in test and evaluation activities aids in assessing the nature of the operational change and the likely test requirements, to fully determine the scope of changes required of the relevant FMS, or any new operational limitations. The FTAA should make the determination in consultation with the OAA to ensure that the appropriate scope of operations resulting from the operational change is being considered. Determination of an operational change as Substantial is therefore a collaborative effort between the OAA and the FTAA. Role or environment changes equivalent to a Substantial operational change may undergo acceptance testing by operational aircrew only where the FTAA or FTAA’s representative is satisfied that the operational airworthiness characteristics of the change have been adequately considered and the participating aircrew are suitably qualified and competent.

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Example Operational Change Classification

14. Suppose a decision has been made to introduce Night Vision Device (NVD) equipment to an aircraft type to enhance the capability and safety during night operations. In the first instance, the proposed change should be referred to the DAR for assessment of the technical impact of the proposed modification. However, in respect of the operational airworthiness assessment only, since the operating intent remains the same and the aircraft could previously be operated in night conditions the change is not introducing a new role or environment. However, the overall impact upon operational airworthiness shall be examined and the introduction of NVDs will likely have the following implications:

a. The FMS needs to be expanded to accommodate conduct of operations under NVD by:

(1) new aircrew competency and currency criteria shall be established for NVD operations

(2) flight authorisation officers shall be appointed to authorise task and missions where NVDs are being employed

(3) applying the aviation risk management (AVRM) process to NVD-operations, resulting in additional Mission Risk Profiles (MRP)

(4) amending OIPs to capture the above FMS elements.

b. Flying rules and limitations are identified and captured in OIP; which include:

(1) low flying restrictions with NVDs

(2) formation flying restriction with NVDs

(3) procedural controls as a result of the altered human-machine-interface with NVDs, etc.

c. Training curriculums shall be expanded to include specific training for NVD operations, sufficient to ensure aircrew meet the competency and initial qualification requirements.

15. Based on these implications, the OAA or OAAR determines that consultation with the FTAA is required to assess the extent of flying activities necessary to clear the NVD for fleet use. Due to the extent of testing required, the FTAA and OAAR agree that the operational change shall be classified as Substantial. Assuming that the modification has been assessed as Minor by the DAR, the change would then be progressed through the Supplemental Role Approval process.

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MANAGEMENT OF A SUBSTANTIAL OPERATIONAL CHANGE

16. An operational change that has been determined as Substantial shall undergo ‘Supplemental Role Approval’ by the relevant OAA in accordance with OAREG 3.

Objective of Supplemental Role Approval

17. Supplemental Role Approval is an airworthiness process to ensure the operational airworthiness aspects of a role change have been appropriately considered. Whilst the broader aim of the supplemental role will include capability objectives or a required operational outcome, Supplemental Role Approval is only concerned with aspects, or supporting aspects, of the role change that impact airworthiness. These aspects include:

a. conduct of any flight testing in support of the supplemental role

b. confirmation that the supplemental role will not negatively impact operational airworthiness

c. confirmation that airworthiness management arrangements support the ongoing operation of the aircraft type in the supplemental role.

18. As such, Supplemental Role Approval is not dissimilar to Supplemental Type Certification and SR, albeit without the need for the additional technical airworthiness oversight required for a Major design change.

Referral of Flying Activities to an FTAA

19. OAREG 3 requires that flying activity in support of supplemental role approval be referred to an FTAA. This may be because the flying operations are required to be conducted prior to SR of a Minor design change, or because the activity involves operation of the aircraft outside approved limitations. In these cases, the flight test activity shall be conducted under either a SFP or under the authority of an FTAA in accordance with OAREG 4. Where the scope of activity is within the FTAA’s authority, the FTAA may allow an external organisation to conduct the activity under the provisions of OAREG 4.

20. Where the supplemental role does not or no longer involves operations prior to SR or outside existing limitations, the role approval process may be achieved through a program of Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E). OAREG 3 also requires such activity to be referred to an FTAA. For Substantial changes to the aircraft roles and environment, FTAA involvement is necessary to ensure that:

a. the proposed testing is safely conducted by appropriately qualified and competent personnel

b. the proposed testing is sufficient to fully evaluate the impact of the change on operational airworthiness.

21. Depending on the scope of flying required and the limit of authority of the FTAA, the FTAA may refer the authority to conduct the required OT&E to the Defence AA for conduct under an SFP. Where OT&E may be conducted within the scope of the FTAA’s authority, the FTAA may either conduct the OT&E activity on behalf of the OAA or, where the FTAA is satisfied that the testing may be safely conducted by the identified flying organisation, may alternatively endorse a test plan detailing the conduct of the activity by the operating organisation. Ultimately, the OAA and Capability Managers are responsible for defining the objectives of any test activity in support of Supplemental Role Approval. Involvement of the FTAA in authorising or endorsing the T&E activity ensures that airworthiness is maintained during the test operations.

22. In summary, the airworthiness instrument used to operate an aircraft for T&E purposes in support of Supplemental Role Approval is dependant on the risk associated with the necessary flying activities. Activities that require complex, unique or high risk dedicated T&E outside the scope of an FTAA’s authority or for which the FMS is not mature or is insufficient, should normally be performed under an SFP (issued by the Defence AA). The SFP process will ensure thorough consideration of the operational and technical measures and that limitations to mitigate risk are applied to the activities. T&E activities which are of a lower risk to safety, but where the FTAA deems that specialist flight test expertise is necessary, would normally be conducted by a Centre of Expertise (such as ARDU or AMAFTU) through approval of a test plan or under FTP (issued by the FTAA). T&E activities orientated towards operational assessment and requiring operational pilots to perform, may be conducted by an organisation assessed as competent by the FTAA through the auspices of an OT&E plan endorsed by the FTAA and approved by the OAA. The following areas should be considered by the OAA and FTAA when determining the appropriate mechanism for conducting flying activities in support of a Supplemental Role Approval:

a. The level of risk associated with the intended flying activities

b. The maturity of the FMS to support operations under the new or modified role or environment

c. Qualification and competencies required by aircrew conducting flight test activities

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d. The extent of training required to support activities.

Criteria for Supplemental Role Approval

23. Following completion of the necessary activities to assure the airworthiness of operations prior to, and after introduction, supplemental roles may be approved by the OAA without recourse to the Defence AA or the Airworthiness Board. The considerations for approving the supplemental role are listed in OAREG 3. In summary, the approval considerations for operation in the new or modified role include:

a. confirmation from the aircraft DAR that the impact of the change on technical airworthiness has been appropriately considered

b. the capacity of the relevant FMS to manage ongoing operations

c. promulgation of all necessary rules, limitations and procedures

d. implementation of any necessary training and qualification criteria

e. availability of sufficiently trained aircrew to support the anticipated operations.

24. As these elements form the basis for OAA approval, sufficient evidence demonstrating the completion of all required activities along with recommendations provided by the responsible appointments shall be documented and presented to the OAA for adequate consideration of the supplemental role. A revised SOI incorporating the new or modified role or environment and the amended Type Certification Data Sheet (TCDS), if appropriate, should also be provided.

25. Prior to formally approving the supplemental role, the OAA shall ensure that the SOI has been amended to reflect any new role or environment, changes to existing roles and all associated limitations. Flight Profiles should be amended or included as necessary, as well as approved aircraft configurations in the new or modified roles. The expected annual Rate of Effort should be amended taking into account all new additions and modifications to the CRE. The TCDS should be reviewed and amended if necessary. Once satisfied that the necessary changes and mitigating measures to assure continuing operational airworthiness have been appropriately implemented, in accordance with OAREG 2, the SOI should be provided to the TAA for endorsement. Once TAA endorsement of the SOI has been received, the OAA should approve the revised SOI thus formally authorising the supplemental role.

Review Process

26. All supplemental roles shall be reviewed at the next scheduled in-service Airworthiness Board for the aircraft type. The relevant Airworthiness Board submission and presentation shall include a summary of each approved supplemental role and the changes in the operational airworthiness management of the aircraft type to accommodate the role.

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MANAGEMENT OF NON-SUBSTANTIAL OPERATIONAL CHANGES

27. Changes classified as Non-Substantial do not have a significant impact upon the approved role and environment. By their nature, Non-Substantial operational changes do not require the extensive oversight of the Supplemental Role Approval process, but are instead managed within the FMS of the relevant aircraft type in accordance with OAREG 3. Accommodation of the operational change may be made through operational evaluation and amendment to procedures, OIP, or adjustments to training curriculums.

28. Where a Non-Substantial operational change is associated with a Minor change to the Type Design, CCBs are normally held to approve incorporation of the design change. As a pre-requisite for CCB incorporation approval and SR, Minor design changes are subject to satisfaction that operational airworthiness considerations have been appropriately assessed, namely:

a. changes to the FMS OIPs

b. addition or changes to operational rules and limitations within aircrew publications and OIPs

c. changes to training and qualifications

d. confirmation that sufficient trained aircrew exist to operate the modified aircraft during operations.

29. OAA endorsement for Incorporation Approval of Minor modifications may be effected through the operational representative at the CCB or written communication of the endorsement to the DAR and CCB. Evidence used to support the endorsement shall be documented and maintained.

Test and Evaluation of Non-Substantial Changes

30. A Minor change to the Type Design may require testing prior to SR to verify the suitability of the design. In such instances, the DAR may seek FTAA advice to determine whether the scope of testing requires specialist T&E expertise under authority of the FTAA (ie ARDU or AMAFTU), or can be conducted by a competent organisation under the authority of an OAA or OAAR.

31. Where OT&E is required to validate Non-Substantial operational changes, this may be done under the authority of an OAA or OAAR following endorsement from the FTAA and subject to the requirements of OAREG 4.

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FLIGHT TEST


OAREG 4 —Flight Test

OAREG 4.a

The OAA/FTAA must issue a Flight Test Permit that will authorise the conduct of Defence flight test in a manner that will not compromise suitability for flight.

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that Defence flight test is not conducted until the approving authority has completed appropriate oversight and is satisfied that the activity will not compromise suitability for flight.

2. Defence flight test is only conducted on Defence registered aircraft. Flight test on non-Defence registered aircraft is conducted under OAREG 4.c.

3. A FTP may be issued by the FTAA or OAA. The OAA/FTAA may delegate approval of specific FTP category to an appropriate Flight Test Representative who meets the FTAA standards IAW AMC 2 to OAREG 4.b.

4. Flight test is conducted to varying degrees of complexity and risk and is authorised by the issue of a Flight Test Permit (FTP). To ensure FTP approval and oversight is relevant to the associated flight test risk, FTP are broken into four categories, each aligned to EASA Part 21 Appendix XII1 and linked to the most appropriate FTP approval authority.

5. Maintenance Test Flight (MTF) and Maintenance Check Flight (MCF). MTF and MCF are part of routine operation post maintenance and are not flight test.

AMC 1 to 4.a – FTP Category Determination2

FLIGHT TEST CATEGORY APPROVAL AUTHORITY

Category 1 FTAA

Category 2 FTAA or OAA



Table 1 – Flight Test Category and Approval

6. Flight Test Category 1:

a. Initial flight(s) of a new type of aircraft or of an aircraft of which flight or handling characteristics may have been significantly3 modified.

b. Flights during which it can be envisaged to potentially encounter flight characteristics significantly different from those already known.

c. Flights to investigate novel or unusual aircraft design features or techniques.

d. Flights to determine or expand the flight envelope.

e. Flights to determine the regulatory performances, flight characteristics and handling qualities when flight envelope limits are approached.

f. Flight test training for Category 1 flight tests.

1 Commission regulation (EU) 2015/1039 of 30 June 2015 amending regulation (EU) No 748/2012, flight testing. 2 Categories of flight test are specified in EASA Part 21 Appendix XII. 3 Significant has a specific definition in the context of flight test category (different to that in OAREG 3) - A change to the type-certificate significant to the extent that it changes at the product level one or more of the following: general configuration, principles of construction, or the assumptions used for certification, but not to the extent that to be considered a Substantial change under EASA Part 21.

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7. Flight Test Category 2:

a. Flights not classified as Category 1 on an aircraft whose type is not yet certified.

b. Flights not classified as Category 1 on an aircraft of an already certified type, after embodiment of a trial modification and which:

(1) Require an assessment of the general behaviour of the aircraft.

(2) Require an assessment of the basic crew procedures, when a new or modified system is operating or is needed.

(3) Are required to intentionally fly outside of the limitations of the currently approved operational envelope, but within the investigated flight envelope.

c. Flight test training for Category 2 flight tests.

8. FTAA consultation is required before OAA authorisation of any Category 2.a or Category 2.b(3) flight test.

9. Flight Test Category 3. Flights performed for the issuance of statement of conformity for new-built aircraft which do not require flying outside of the limitations of the type certification or the aircraft flight manual.

10. Flight Test Category 4. Flights not categorised as Category 1 or 2 on an aircraft of an already certified type, in the case of an embodiment of a trial modification.

11. Flight test complexity. Flight test under Category 2 or Category 4 may still be complex or involve a high level of risk. Similarly, flight test for advanced Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) may be within Type Design and Statement of Operating Intent (SOI) but involve a high level of risk. Where there is doubt the OAA should seek FTAA advice regarding the flight test plan assurances before issuing an FTP.

12. Occasionally, it may be difficult to determine a flight test category without first flying the aircraft. The FTAA may authorise a FTP to conduct flight testing required to determine the flight test category. Subsequent flight test may then be completed under the appropriate flight test category.

13. Test and Evaluation. Test and evaluation (T&E) classifications include Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E), Acceptance Test and Evaluation (AT&E), and Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E); and occur at different phases of the capability life cycle. Flight test Categories 1 to 4 are not directly related to the classification of T&E being conducted.

AMC 2 to 4.a – Flight Test for Change to Role or Environment

14. Change to aircraft Role or Environment which has an appreciable effect on aircrew training curriculum, competency management, cockpit workload, human machine interface, flight authorisation or other factors which affect operational airworthiness should be classified as Category 1 flight test. Changes which may generate an appreciable effect on operational airworthiness requiring flight test Category 1 include:

a. introduction of a new role or alteration to an existing role

b. alteration to operating environment

c. alteration to interoperability with other aircraft / ships

d. new and unique flight crew training requirements.

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AMC 3 to 4.a – FTP Contents

15. A FTP is an authorisation by the approving authority to conduct the flight test activity and is not intended to be a complex document. The FTP complexity may vary with the degree of test complexity and risk control.

16. A FTP should include:

a. A statement of the fight test category.

b. Flight test scope.

c. Identification of a suitable, qualified organisation to conduct the flight test.

d. If applicable, a reference to the design acceptance certification of any new or modified configurations required for the test.

e. Reference to the approved flight test plan.

f. Residual airworthiness risk and/or residual operational risk held.

g. Any additional imposed restriction or limitation not identified in the flight test plan.

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OAREG 4.b

The OAA/FTAA must ensure that flight test plans are established to support the safe and effective conduct of Defence flight test.

17. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure appropriate oversight of the planning of Defence flight test and to ensure conduct of the test activity will not compromise suitability for flight.

AMC 1 to 4.b – Flight Test Plan controls

18. The flight test plan should include:

a. Test scope and objectives.

b. Location of flight test activity.

c. Pre-cursor airworthiness instruments or clearances required prior to testing.

d. Required qualification, training and experience of the flight test personnel.

e. Flight test procedures to be conducted.

f. Data collection requirements.

g. Configuration and environmental limitations imposed on the flight test.

h. Operational limitations for each test configuration.

i. Operations, maintenance and support arrangements.

j. An aircraft stores clearance or aerial delivery clearance, if required.

k. Results of previous tests, if applicable.

l. SAR requirements.

m. Reference to documented risk assessment and treatment, including any residual risk posed by the flight test.

AMC 2 to 4.b – Recognition of Flight Test Organisation

19. The FTAA may recognise, as appropriate for the flight test category, an organisation as being an approved Flight Test Organisation (FTO) to design and implement Flight Test Plan requirements.

20. The FTAA may establish standards, as appropriate for the flight test category, for personnel deemed competent and authorised to design and implement Flight Test Plan requirements.

21. OAA conduct of flight test should employ personnel and/or organisations, as appropriate for the flight test category/complexity, that meet the FTAA competency standards.

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OAREG 4.c

The Defence Organisation Head engaging Defence personnel in non-Defence flight test must ensure that risk to participating Defence personnel arising from flight test activity has been eliminated, or otherwise reduced, so far as is reasonably practicable.

22. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to prescribe appropriate oversight of non-Defence flight test to ensure an acceptable level of safety for Defence members involved in the flight test.

23. The Defence Organisation Head seeking to engage Defence personnel in non-Defence flight test4 activity may not proceed until FTAA endorsement of the planned activity has been obtained. An FTAA has the subject matter expertise to assess the competency and risk to Defence personnel of a non-Defence Flight Test Organisation (FTO).

24. Outcomes of incident or accident investigations that occur during the aircraft acquisition phase should be obtained by the Defence Organisation Head, usually through the test representative, to ensure considerations are included in future activities, thereby enhancing the safety of Defence personnel.

AMC 1 to 4.c – Non-Defence FTO Assessment

25. FTO assessment criteria should include:

a. Any operating certificates or exemptions issued by a NAA/MAA.

b. The operational history of the FTO.

c. The FTO’s qualification, training and currency requirements.

d. The FTO’s experience on the relevant aircraft type.

e. The difference between the FTO’s processes and procedures and those typically used by Defence.

f. Any cultural or language differences between the FTO and Defence.

g. Whether the FTO maintains an acceptable ASMS.

4 Conducted on non Defence registered aircraft.

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OAREG 4.d

Error! Reference source not found.

26. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that flight test activity is reviewed and considered as part of the overall aviation platform review activity.

AMC 1 to 4.d

27. The OAA/ FTAA should formally address those deficiencies related to aviation safety identified through test and evaluation since the previous AwB.

28. FTAA review of OAA flight test activities should occur when an AwB is not scheduled within a twelve month review cycle; however, the FTAA may apply a risk based approach to waive this requirement for review.

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NON DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT AND FOREIGN MILITARY AIRCRAFT

Applicable Regulations OAREG 5—Non-Defence Registered Aircraft

OAREG 5.1.a The Sponsor that purchases, wet leases, dry leases, charters or authorises operation of a non-Defence registered aircraft by or on behalf of Defence must ensure the aircraft’s operation is subject to the regulatory requirements of a Defence AA recognised NAA/MAA. 1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that operation of non-Defence registered aircraft (NDRA) by or on behalf of Defence is conducted under the airworthiness oversight of Defence AA recognised airworthiness authorities to ensure that NDRA are operated in a manner no less safe than Defence registered aircraft.

2. While most aircraft acquired for use by Defence are listed on the Defence Register, circumstances exist where Defence registration may be impractical, inappropriate or even undesirable. Defence activities may involve the use of Australian civil registered aircraft or foreign registered aircraft. In such cases, the flexibility to operate a NDRA enhances Defence capability; however, the operation of a NDRA does not remove the requirement to ensure that acceptable aviation safety management is in place prior to NDRA use.

3. DACPA should advise CASA of the intention to operate a Defence owned or dry leased NDRA prior to the commencement of operations.

Applicability 4. Conditions where a NDRA may be operated by or on behalf of Defence include:

a. Aircraft performing in a configuration, role and environment substantially similar to an equivalent civilian aircraft type.

b. Aircraft undergoing flying activity prior to issue of a Defence airworthiness instrument.

c. Foreign military aircraft operated by Defence personnel.

d. Aircraft temporarily chartered in support of Defence operations.

e. Aircraft temporarily operated by Defence personnel in the course of their duties.

f. Aircraft in which Defence personnel are deemed crew for Defence purposes.

g. Aircraft in which Defence personnel are passengers for Defence purposes.

h. Temporary operation of an aircraft for the purpose of capability trials or demonstrations.

i. Aircraft conducting approved sports aviation activities for Defence purposes.

j. Defence Flying Club activity from Defence Aerodromes.

k. The following sports aviation activities:

(1) Gliders.

(2) Parachuting.

(3) Recreational ballooning.

(4) Warbirds Historic and Replica aircraft (WHRA).

5. This regulation does not apply to:

a. Defence Personnel or External Service Providers travelling as passengers on Australian or foreign public air transport.

b. Defence Personnel or External Service Providers acting as crew or travelling as passengers on foreign military flights which are not exclusively for Defence use.

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c. Defence Personnel or External Service Providers participating in recreational flying not identified under para 4.

d. The following sports aviation activities:

(1) Amateur built and experimental aircraft.

(2) Gyroplanes.

(3) Hang gliders, paragliders and powered parachutes.

(4) Light recreational and microlight aircraft.

(5) Model aircraft, unless conducted as a Defence Flying Club activity.

AMC 1 to OAREG 5.1.a –– Evidence of NAA or MAA oversight 6. Defence AA recognised NAA/MAA are advised on the DASP website.

7. An NDRA under the oversight of an approved NAA/MAA will have documents supporting the aircraft’s airworthiness status that include:

a. A current Type Certificate, or equivalent document; for the aircraft type/class

b. A Certificate of Airworthiness (CofA), or equivalent document, for each aircraft.

c. Any additional NAA/MAA directives, limitations or restrictions that apply to the relevant aircraft.

d. An Air Operator’s Certificate (AOC), or equivalent certificate, applicable for the operation to be conducted.

e. System of maintenance approval, or equivalent document.

8. Where a NDRA is oversighted by a NAA/MAA not recognised by Defence, advice should be sought from DACPA or DGTA regarding flexibility provisions.

9. A Sponsor considering use of a non-Defence Registered Unmanned Aircraft (NDRUA) should seek ACPA advice regardless of NAA/MAA recognition.

AMC 2 to OAREG 5.1.a – CASA Aviation Administration Organisations Sports Aviation oversight 10. This AMC provides oversight supporting sports aviation activities.

11. CASA established an extended sports aviation oversight system of approved Recreational Aviation Administration Organisations (RAAO).1 The system allows CASA to set the regulations and then work in close cooperation with an established RAAO to make sure the regulations are applied and enforced.

12. A RAAO provides CASA with specialist knowledge and insight into the relevant sport aviation industry.2 A RAAO will oversight members’ activities and continually assess how the required performance standards are being achieved in accordance with RAAO operational regulations.

13. CASA needs to be fully confident that each RAAO has the capacity to provide the safety outcomes required and therefore aspires to monitor RAAO conformance through six-monthly reporting, annual auditing and ongoing engagement. If an RAAO cannot assure CASA confidence, then CASA will not allow the organisation to continue to administer its activities under the exemption.

14. The CASA sponsored Sport Aviation Self-Administration Handbook 2010 (or subsequent) provides additional information on sports aviation management.

1http://www.casa.gov.au/scripts/nc.dll?WCMS:STANDARD::pc=PC_93439 2 CASA website: http://www.casa.gov.au/scripts/nc.dll?WCMS:STANDARD::pc=PC_93439

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http://www.casa.gov.au/wcmswr/_assets/main/pilots/download/sport.pdf




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15. CASA approved RAAO include:

a. Australian Parachute Federation (APF).3 The APF is the organisation which controls skydiving and parachuting at nearly all the civilian operations in Australia. With the approval of CASA the APF sets operational standards, issues licences and instructor ratings, conducts exams and publishes information to keep its members informed of safety standards.

b. Gliding Federation of Australia (GFA). The GFA is the recreational aviation administration organisation responsible for gliding and has accepted full responsibility for glider airworthiness through CASA authorised exemptions and delegations.

c. The Australian Warbirds Associated Limited (AWAL). The AWAL RAAO is the industry body that undertakes self-administration of the Special (limited category) CoA4, which includes ex-military aircraft. AWAL is also recommended in AC 21.5(0) as the RAAO best suited to advise those people or organisation who desire to restore ex-military heritage aircraft. AWAL services include:

(1) Administration of Limited Category Warbirds Historic and Replica aircraft (WHRA) on behalf of CASA.

(2) Provision of a maintenance systems for various warbird types.

(3) The conduct seminars and training days for engineers, owners, and pilots of limited category aircraft.

(4) Assistance for enthusiasts to get close to real WHRA and their operators.

d. Australian Ballooning Federation (ABF). The ABF administers recreational ballooning, to standards accepted by CASA. Recreational ballooning refers to those pilots who hold a private ABF issued balloon certificate and who don’t carry fare-paying passengers. In addition to regulatory requirements, the ABF publishes information to keep its members informed of safety standards.

AMC 3 to OAREG 5.1.a – ADF Currency Flying Scheme 16. Short-term lease includes operation of NDRA for the purposes of the Australian Defence Force Currency Flying Scheme (ACFS).

17. Aircraft hired for operations under the ACFS are subject to the requirements of a CASA issued AOC or Part 141 certificate.

18. OAREG 5 takes precedence over other operational regulation that may exist in ACFS administrative instructions and conflicts with OAREG 5.

AMC 4 to OAREG 5.1.a – Defence Flying Clubs 19. OAREG 5.1.a requirements pertain only to those Defence Flying Clubs that will operate from a Defence aerodrome with NDRA.

20. Flying is recognised as an approved Defence recreational activity. The management of RAAF flying clubs is facilitated under the auspices of the Air Force Sports Council (AFSC).

21. The Sponsor should appoint an OIC Flying Club to ensure that the Defence Flying Club will operate under a valid AOC applicable to the activities being conducted. The AOC need not be directly held by the Flying Club.

3 CASA Instrument 14/11 dated 20 Jan 11 expires end Jan 2014 4 CASA Instrument No. 161/07 dated 11 May 2007

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http://www.australianwarbirds.com.au/

http://www.abf.net.au/

http://www.casa.gov.au/WCMSWR/_assets/main/lib100060/casa014.pdf

http://www.casa.gov.au/WCMSWR/_assets/main/rules/miscinst/2007/casa161.pdf


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OAREG 5.1.b The Sponsor that purchases, wet leases, dry leases, charters or authorises operation of a non-Defence registered aircraft by or on behalf of Defence must implement safety controls to the operation of non-Defence registered aircraft such that it is reasonably expected that suitability for flight will not be compromised. 22. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that operations of non-Defence registered aircraft (NDRA) by or on behalf of Defence are conducted at an equivalent level of safety to that of Defence registered aircraft.

23. Whilst restricting utilisation of NDRA to aircraft that are operated under the regulatory control of a Defence AA recognised NAA or MAA is an effective safety control, this control in isolation may not deliver Defence the required aviation safety outcomes. Imposing additional safety controls (as required) on the operation of NDRA will assist in mitigating the associated hazards.

24. When deciding the NDRA acquisition, contracting or approval strategy, the Sponsor should consider Defence registration when:

a. operations are expected to occur for a period in excess of 12 months, and

b. the aircraft contains a military-like modification or role equipment, or

c. the aircraft operates in a military-like role and/or environment.

25. Should DACPA assistance be requested, the following NDRA information may be required:

a. Identification of the:

(1) proposed operator

(2) aircraft make, model and tail number(s)

(3) aircraft owner

(4) aircraft operator

(5) country of registration/regulator and country of maintenance/regulator.

b. Number of sorties and duration.

c. Total number of Defence personnel to be transported, or special cargo requirements.

d. A description of the operational imperative or practical necessity that requires the lease.

e. Details of any current or recent AOC, or equivalent such as a Non-Scheduled Flight Approval.

f. Advice of what military options are available and what lower risk civilian assets are available.

g. Any relevant notes or comments from the tasking authority.

h. The aviation activities the aircraft operator is endorsed to undertake and the organisation that provides the endorsement.

i. Any relevant findings regarding oversight activities already conducted by the NAA/MAA.

AMC 1 to OAREG 5.1.b – Approval to Operate an NDRA 26. The Sponsor approving the acquisition or operation of a NDRA is responsible for the associated safe aviation outcomes. Once satisfied, the Sponsor can issue an Approval to Operate (ATO) once satisfied suitability for flight will not be compromised. Where the Sponsor is not a Defence AA appointed authority, advice should be sought from DACPA.

27. The level of rigour applied to an ATO decision is dependent on the aircraft lease or ownership. In some cases, such as a one off charter/short term lease, the ATO may be issued verbally. In other cases, such as a dry lease, a Defence AA independent review may be necessary. If required, advice may be sought from DACPA to assist with ATO determinations. Supers

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28. The controls for an NDRA Approval to Operate may include:

a. Suitability for flight determination.

b. Determination of the most recent NAA/MAA oversight activity.

c. Appropriate contractual controls.

d. Additional operational controls for identified and untreated hazards.

e. Periodicity of Aviation Safety review (as required).

f. Approval to operate has been issued.

29. The NDRA sponsor may defer or be directed to defer the approval to operate decision to the Defence AA.

AMC 2 to OAREG 5.1.b – Suitability for Flight of NDRA 30. Understanding the Hazards associated with NDRA is critical to identifying required controls and delivering acceptable safety outcomes. The Sponsor should consider all elements of suitability for flight. For example, whether the aircraft will carry Defence personnel as passengers or the loss of the NDRA over a populated area.5

31. A NDRA is deemed suitable for flight when it is operated:

a. In approved roles appropriate to the certification basis of the aircraft as described in the applicable Type Certificate or authorised exemption.

b. Within the limitations and conditions established by the certifying authority in the applicable aircraft operating instructions, Type Certificate and/or authorised exemption.

c. In accordance with an applicable Defence AA recognised NAA/MAA aviation safety regulations appropriate to the aircraft operating role and environment.

d. By flight crew and maintenance personnel who are deemed qualified and capable by a Defence AA recognised regulatory framework.

e. Within Defence approved levels of risk to first, second and thirty party persons or property.

f. In accordance with any directives or requirements issued by the regulator.

g. In accordance with orders and instructions issued by the relevant Sponsor.

h. In accordance with any directives issued by the NAA or MAA, where applicable.

32. Where there is doubt surrounding the suitability of flight of a particular NDRA activity, the Sponsor that is responsible for authorising operation of an NDRA and therefore the associated aviation outcomes should seek specific aviation safety advice from ACPA6 prior to authorising the activity.

33. Factors such as type of charter, length of charter and the operational circumstances will influence the level of assurance and compliance required in each case. ACPA may recommend additional levels of mitigation for use of the NDRA by endorsing the contractual terms of the lease intended for use, or specifying any additional terms/limitations that may be necessary.

5 While not a Defence capability issue, such an incident will become a Defence management issue regarding the potential recovery operations, potential for harm to people and property and Defence’s public image as a result of a mishap 6 Airworthiness Board review may assist in suitability for flight determinations.

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AMC 3 to OAREG 5.1.b – Contractual Controls 34. A Sponsor desiring to utilise a NDRA will do so under the terms of an enforceable legally binding instrument that requires the NDRA operator to comply with any lease requirements.7. The legally binding instrument should include aviation safety controls:

a. The aircraft captain, crew, aircraft owners, and operators will abide by ICAO and relevant NAA or MAA requirements.

b. Implementation of an accident and incident reporting system that, in addition to the NAA/MAA requirements, includes an equivalent notification period to DDAAFS. This ensures Defence awareness of safety issues, and thereby allows for improved control over flight authorisation under the contract, particularly outside Australia. In addition to country of occurrence incident reporting, the contract should identify the 1800 notification number for both ATSB (or equivalent) and DDAAFS, desired reporting formats, and email notification addresses.

c. Upon request, make all documentation supporting the continuing airworthiness of the aircraft available to Defence. Records may include any contracts, inspections, documents, accident reporting or incident reporting requirements used to establish and maintain the continuing airworthiness of the aircraft operation. Documentation may include but not limited to, documents provided to the recognised NAA, operations manuals, maintenance records, individual licenses (aircrew and maintenance), flight records, safety occurrence reports and investigation reports.

d. Compliance with the Australian Work Health and Safety (WHS) Act 2011 as appropriate.

e. Any exemption from IATA dangerous cargo requirements will comply with Defence Air Cargo Delivery regulations.

f. Any sub-contracts to be subject to the requirements of this regulation. This ensures Defence has the ability to conduct regulatory oversight across the complete operation if required.

g. Allowance for Defence to make any safety inspections prior to task or at anytime during the charter. This ensures Defence has the ability to conduct regulatory oversight across the complete operation if required.

h. Any additional aviation safety controls/limitations to ensure the aircrafts operation will not compromise suitability for flight.

i. Appropriate insurance policies are in place to cover the legal liabilities of both Defence and the registered operator for the lease activity. The registered operator may already have appropriate insurance coverage, but may not provide the required cover for a Defence person operating the aircraft.

AMC 4 to OAREG 5.1.b – Ramp Inspections 35. Purpose. The purpose of a Ramp Inspection of NDRA is to provide the Sponsor a higher degree of confidence that the operator, flight crew and aircraft intended for use by or on behalf of Defence is suitable for flight by ensuring that the aircraft and crew do not have significant defects or obvious aviation safety issues.

36. A Ramp Inspection is an acknowledged means of providing additional confidence in the fitness for purpose of a NDRA intended for use by or on behalf of Defence. Ramp Inspections may also be suitable for services provided to Defence personnel under sport aviation activities who may be conducting non–Defence required activities, but require approval in order to participate in such an activity such as, a civilian parachuting club. A Ramp Inspection does not provide a means to gain an exemption for a relevant regulation; rather, it provides an improved understanding of suspected or known facts.8

37. The inspection regime should allow the approval authority to access applicable resources relevant to inspecting the leased aircraft shortly prior to flight regarding readily apparent technical issues and the overall operational readiness of the aircraft. Control of the inspection process should be delegated to aviation safety personnel to ensure appropriate risk management and resource management. Personnel who conduct ramp inspections should have relevant experience and deemed competent to conduct them. Inspections teams should comprise at least one operational representative, one maintenance representative and other relevant personnel as required. Such personnel may be identified by a DASP Agency or an OAA/OAAR headquarters.

7 Aircraft lease types vary and are defined in the glossary. The use of charter or wet lease aircraft may represent higher risk to Defence because of the ad-hoc nature of the charter requirements and the short timescales that are often involved. 8 NDRA Ramp Inspection Checklist is located on the ACPA Website

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38. A NDRA used by or on behalf of Defence, that is not dry leased, should be considered for a Ramp Inspection if the lease will be 12 months or longer. Additional considerations should be the amount of sorties the aircraft will conduct. For example, a WHRA sortie rate of more than three flights in a three month period may be sufficient activity to consider a Ramp Inspection. Consideration does not mean an inspection must occur.

39. Ramp Inspection reports should be provided to the Sponsor. Any adverse inspections reports should also be provided to DACPA.

AMC 5 to OAREG 5.1.b –Sports Aviation Controls 40. General controls for assessing the sports aviation activity risk include:

a. The aircraft will operate under a CASA approved instrument.

b. The aircraft will operate under the oversight of a CASA recognised RAAO.

c. Any Defence personnel or organisation identified to undertake the activity will be a full member of the relevant RAAO prior to conducting the activity. Full membership assures Defence personnel are able to obtain all required compliance information from the RAAO, as well as other benefits supporting safe conduct of the activity.

d. A periodic safety audit has been conducted. An appropriate audit includes any CASA approved audit process or an OAA recognised audit process.

AMC 6 to OAREG 5.1.b –ADF Cadets Flying Operations Controls 41. ADF Cadets is a collective reference to any of:

a. Australian Navy Cadets.

b. Australian Army Cadets.

c. Australian Air Force Cadets (AAFC).

42. Due to the limited opportunity and exposure to flying operations of the Army and Navy Cadet organisations, the AAFC is the authority for control and management of ADF Cadet flying operations.

43. For ADF Cadets flying related operations the Sponsor is DGCADETS.

44. The Sponsor has established (and is the authority for) the AAFC Manual of Aviation Operations9 to support ADF Cadets flying operations. Unless OIP stipulate otherwise, the AAFC Manual of Aviation Operations will apply.

AMC 7 to OAREG 5.1.b –Gliding Operations Controls 45. Glider activity may only be conducted under oversight of the Glider RAAO, supplemented by any additional Sponsor requirements.

46. For ADF Cadets gliding activities the Sponsor is DGCADETS.

47. A glider need not be operated under an AOC.

AMC 8 to OAREG 5.1.b –Parachute Operations Controls 48. The Sponsor considerations for parachute operations conducted from NDRA by Defence members on duty may include:

a. If parachute operations are likely to exceed either 70 events per year or 10 events per month that the non-Defence registered aircraft will meet full NDRA requirements.

b. The commercial or private entity is an Australian Parachute Federation (APF) member organisation.

c. Parachute operations are conducted in accordance with APF Operational Regulations or the Defence Parachute Training School Standing Instructions as appropriate.

d. The aircraft operator is compliant with the APF regulations, as confirmed through review of an APF Safety Audit (Aircraft Operations Supplementary Safety Audit) conducted on the operator within the previous 12 months.

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e. Where parachute operations exceed 3 events per annum or the number of Defence personnel involved in any one event is greater than 10, a Ramp Inspection is conducted prior to first operations with the aircraft.

f. The aircraft pilot holds a CASA issued Commercial Pilots License (Aeroplane) (CPL(A)) or an Air Transport Pilots Licence (Aeroplane) (ATPL(A)).

g. If the operation is not conducted under oversight of the Defence Parachute Training School the activity is under APF oversight.

h. Need not be operated under an AOC, but is desirable.

49. For ADF Cadets parachute activities the Sponsor is DGCADETS.

50. For Defence parachute activities the Sponsor is CO Parachute Training School.

AMC 9 to OAREG 5.1.b –Recreational Ballooning Controls 51. Ballooning may only be conducted under oversight of the Australian Ballooning Federation (ABF) RAAO, supplemented by any additional Sponsor requirements.

52. RAAF Balloons may also be subject to increased DASP oversight as directed by the Defence AA.

AMC 10 to OAREG 5.1.b –Warbirds Historic and Replica Aircraft Controls 53. Defence operates a small and diverse fleet of Defence owned Warbirds Historic and Replica aircraft (WHRA) that are civil registered for the purpose of maintaining Australian military heritage and promoting Defence within the wider community. In general, WHRA are designed and manufactured to historical standards and for various reasons are no longer eligible for the issue of a Type Certificate, and by extension a Standard Certificate of Airworthiness (CoA). In such cases, CASA may approve a special purpose operation where an aircraft issued with a Special (limited category) CoA under CASR 21.189 for the purposes that are set out in CASR 21.189(3) and as prescribed in Civil Aviation Regulation (CAR) 262.

54. CASA does not require limited category ex-military aircraft to comply with any specific civil airworthiness standards or design codes. The basic eligibility requirement for certification of a limited category aircraft is that it is one of a type that at some stage has undergone some form of formal airworthiness acceptance process. If the aircraft type is of military origin, then it must have been produced in accordance with the requirements of, and accepted by, an armed force of any nation. The applicant must also demonstrate a safe history of operation of the type. If the aircraft is of civil origin, then an authorised person or CASA must be satisfied that the aircraft meets the airworthiness requirements (present or past) applicable to an aircraft for which a Standard CoA has been issued, except for any requirements that are inappropriate for the special purpose(s) for which the aircraft is to be used. 10

55. The short term lease of WHR aircraft by Defence may represent an increased airworthiness risk due to the operation of an aircraft designed to a reduced or unknown original airworthiness standard, and the operation of an aircraft that is not part of an organisation covered by an AOC.

56. WHR aircraft that do not qualify for a special (limited category) CoA may operate in accordance with an experimental certificate issued by CASA under CASR 21.191. CASA currently maintains administrative responsibility for aircraft issued with an experimental certificate.11 Under OAREG 5.1, the Defence AA has reserved the decision for approving the operation of WHRA issued with an experimental certificate due to the associated airworthiness exceptions.

57. Controls that may assist the Sponsor in ensuring that WHRA operation will not compromise suitability for flight include:

a. For an aircraft with a Special CoA, the registered operator is approved for special purpose operations under the administration of a CASA recognised RAAO.

b. The aircraft is maintained in accordance with a Defence recognised or approved maintenance system, and the aircraft has a current maintenance release.

c. The aircraft is maintained in accordance with the approved AWAL maintenance system.

d. Defence Personnel may not fly as passengers aboard the WHRA, regardless of CoA status, unless deemed mission essential and approved by the Sponsor.

10 10 Refer to CASA AC 21.5 (0) dated Nov 1998 for more detailed information on a special (limited category) CoA. 11 Refer to CASA AC 21-10(2) dated Jul 2011 Experimental Certificates.

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e. If leased for more than 3 flights (start-ups and shutdowns) but less than 12 flights in a 12-month period, a Ramp Inspection should be conducted prior to first WHRA use and then on an annual basis thereafter.

58. Additional controls for WHRA leased from a private or commercial entity include:

a. Need not be operated under an AOC, but is desirable.

b. Operation under an experimental certificate complies with OAREG 5.1.d.

c. Prior to first flight ensuring that the registered operator is approved for special purpose operations under the administration of a CASA recognised RAAO and CAR 262AM.

59. In addition to contractual controls under AMC 3 to OAREG 5.1.b, additional lease controls may be applied that limit WHRA operations to the following activities:

a. Training of Defence personnel to qualify for an aircraft flying endorsement for an aircraft type or category in which the aircraft is included and that flying instructors are appropriately qualified and licensed.

b. Practice by Defence personnel in flying the aircraft in, or training for, a special purpose operation for which the aircraft is certified.

c. An operation necessary to maintain aircrew currency of Defence personnel on the aircraft type.

d. Flying the aircraft to or from a place where the above flights are to occur.

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OAREG 5.1.c The Sponsor that purchases, wet leases, dry leases, charters or authorises operation of a non–Defence registered aircraft by, or on behalf of Defence must suspend flight operations when suitability for flight is believed to be compromised. 60. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure there is a mechanism to suspend NDRA operations by or on behalf of Defence, when suitability for flight of the activity is believed to be compromised.

61. Suspension of flight will treat a Defence aviation risk, noting that a contracted flying organisation operating the aircraft may still use it for another non-Defence purpose. As such, any suspension of flight regarding a non–Defence registered aircraft should be advised to the relevant NAA/MAA and the Defence AA via DACPA.

AMC 1 to OAREG 5.1.c – When to Suspend 62. Suspension of NDRA flight operations should occur when:

a. there is clear evidence that an NAA/MAA is not applying the regulations and level of oversight that its policy requires to the relevant aircraft; or

b. the aircrew and/or passengers flying in the aircraft are of a fundamentally different category to that envisaged by the NAA/MAA in deciding what regulations and oversight to apply; or

c. the aircraft operations generate a risk that is significantly increased from the risk considered by the NAA/MAA in deciding what regulations and oversight should apply.

AMC 2 to OAREG 5.1.c – Cancelling Suspension 63. Procedures to reinstate flight operations should follow the general guidance and procedures provided for Defence Registered aircraft, noting that engagement with the NAA/MAA may be required.

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OAREG 5.1.d The Defence AA must approve any Defence operation of a non–Defence registered aircraft to be operated under an Experimental Certificate of Airworthiness. 64. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that an additional level of control and oversight of non–Defence registered aircraft (NDRA) that are experimental is provided though involvement of DACPA and DGTA in the experimental aircraft use.

65. CASA or an authorised person can issue experimental certificates to allow specific operations of aircraft that are not by their nature type certificated or have certain unapproved modifications embodied.12 Defence has a duty of care to ensure Defence personnel operating such aircraft are provided oversight. This is assured as any requests to the Defence AA will undergo rigorous assessment by the operational and technical agencies who support the Defence AA decision making process.

AMC 1 to OAREG 5.1.d – Approval to Operate an NDRA (Experimental CoA) 66. Defence AA approval may be obtained though consultation with DACPA. Depending on the conditions of intended use and other factors, the rigour applied will be variable.

12 Refer to CASA AC 21-10(2) dated Jul 2011 Experimental Certificates.

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OAREG 5.2.a Defence personnel that operate a non-Defence registered aircraft on behalf of Defence must comply with the Defence AA recognised NAA or MAA regulatory requirements and any further controls imposed by the relevant Sponsor. 67. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to provide clarity as to the jurisdiction of the recognised NAA/MAA regulator with respect to licensing and training requirements of Defence personnel who operate non–Defence registered aircraft (NDRA).

68. There are circumstances where Defence personnel temporarily operate NDRA in the course of their normal duties. These circumstances may include flying as part of the ADF Currency Flying Scheme (ACFS) and type conversion flying. Unless an agreement is in place between Defence and the relevant NAA/MAA, compliance is required with the NAA/MAA operating requirements.

69. The Sponsor responsible for the OAREG 5.2.a outcome may impose additional limitations on operating personnel where it is deemed warranted to assure suitability for flight.

70. Flexibility provision. Defence personnel that operate a chartered, dry or short term leased NDRA as a ‘State Aircraft’ may comply with Defence regulatory requirements, providing that the applicable aircraft is not flown outside of the approved CRE without the relevant NAA/MAA approval. This exemption affords flexibility for Defence personnel to utilise their existing qualifications without having to undertake additional training and recognises that some rules of the air, as published by the NDRA regulator, may not be complied with due operational requirements.

AMC 1 to OAREG 5.2.a – Sponsor Controls 71. The Sponsor controls to ensure that Defence members who intend to hire, lease or operate an NDRA within the scope of this regulation may include:

a. Compliance with OAREG 5.1.a and 5.1.b as appropriate.

b. Restrict carriage of passengers to mission essential personnel that are:

(1) Required to travel on the aircraft for duty.

(2) Civilian instructional staff required to perform supervision and assessment for the attainment of a requisite civil license and/or appropriate endorsements.

c. Only carry passengers in NDRA that are:

(1) If a single engine piston aircraft, being fitted with an approved parachute system is desired.

(2) A two or more piston engine aircraft.

(3) A turbine powered aircraft.

d. The aircraft is maintained in accordance with a Defence recognised maintenance system, and the aircraft has a current maintenance release.

e. Implement other FMS controls as appropriate.

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AMC 2 to OAREG 5.2.a – Pilot Controls for NDRA Under CASA Oversight 72. Controls that ensure Defence personnel who, in the course of their duties, safely operate an NDRA oversighted by CASA include:

a. Hold a current and appropriate civil aviation licence, endorsements and ratings relevant to the aircraft type and operations to be conducted:

(1) without Passengers – current and appropriate civil aviation license

(2) with Passengers – current civilian Commercial Pilots Licence (CPL) and have a current Command Instrument Rating (CIR). Navy and Army pilots who qualify for entry into the ACFS, are not required to hold a civilian Command Instrument Rating for rotary aircraft if they have previously held an instrument rating on a military helicopter.13

b. Operate within the scope of a valid Air Operator’s Certificate (AOC) or Part 141 Certificate.

c. Log flying times in accordance with CASA requirements in the member’s Defence flying logbook.

d. Operate solely under the relevant Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR) or equivalent for the type of aircraft and operation.

e. For travel with passengers, where the pilot is required to hold a Command Instrument Rating, IAW OAREG 5.2.a, the flight should be operated under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) regardless of the prevailing weather conditions. For travel with passengers when not operating IFR, pilots should operate with a SARTIME for arrival.

f. For travel without passengers a pilot may operate under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) with a SARTIME for arrival at the planned destination for operations.

g. Fatigue management limitations.

AMC 3 to OAREG 5.2.a –Controls for Aircraft Owned by Defence Personnel Used Whilst on Duty 73. The Sponsor may approve Defence personnel to operate an aircraft whilst on duty which they own, part own or source from a commercial organisation in which they or their next of kin hold an interest.

74. The owned aircraft need not operate under an AOC; however, it is to have the following requirements:

a. a valid CASA Standard Certificate of Airworthiness

b. civil registration

c. other CASA requirements that may apply

d. not included in the list sports aviation activities that are not regulated under OAREG 5.1.a.

75. The Aircraft Captain requirements include:

a. hold a current and appropriate civil aviation license

b. hold appropriate civil endorsements and ratings relevant to the aircraft type and operations to be conducted

c. hold other CASA requirements that may apply

d. not carry passengers unless appropriate command authority is provided to do so.

13 OAR Decision Brief of 09 May 16 (AB27366561)

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OAREG 5.3.a The Sponsor who approves a foreign military aircraft to operate within Australian airspace as part of Defence exercises, capability trials or under other sustained operations must ensure that the foreign aircraft operation will not compromise suitability for flight. 76. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure the Sponsor responsible for approving foreign military aircraft operations in Australian airspace is also responsible to ensure that the approved operation will not compromise suitability for flight.

Applicability 77. This regulation applies to foreign military aircraft that:

a. Use Australian airspace for military activity extending to 12 nm offshore from surface level and above.

b. Operate as part of an exercise, including transient aircraft that will not land within Australian airspace, but will conduct a military activity. For example, a foreign aircraft that will launch and recover outside of Australian airspace, but will conduct military activity within Australian airspace. Such activity may include weapons release or simulated weapons release activity at an air weapons range or air combat manoeuvres.

c. Conduct sustained operations within Australian airspace. An example of sustained operations is a foreign military that has established a permanent military flying training program within Australian airspace utilising foreign registered aircraft, or civil registered aircraft operated by foreign aircrew. For example, a foreign military flying training school based within Australia.

78. This regulation does not apply to foreign military aircraft that:

d. Operate as a passenger transport or air cargo flight, transiting through Australian airspace – including stopovers – without conducting a military activity.

e. Are used as a static display for commercial interests and will not conduct military operations as part of their time within Australian airspace. For example, the aircraft used by a visiting State dignitary that will remain parked until the State visit is completed, or a foreign military aircraft used only as a display aircraft at an air show. If the aircraft was to conduct an air demonstration, then the regulation would apply.

79. Suitability for flight considerations. The sponsor should consider all elements of suitability for flight. For example, whether the foreign aircraft will carry Defence personnel as passengers; or the loss of a foreign military aircraft with respect to other parties. While not a Defence capability issue, such an incident will become a Defence management issue regarding the associated recovery operations, potential for harm to people and property and Defence’s public image as a result of a mishap.

AMC 1 to OAREG 5.3.a – Managing Approvals 80. Foreign militaries seeking to operate aircraft in Australian airspace may require additional clearances that are separate to this regulation, such as a diplomatic clearance. Agencies involved in such clearances include HQJOC and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

81. Coordination. Foreign military flight operations within Australian airspace should be planned with an Australian Defence aviation command, or HQJOC, or directly with an aviation safety authority.14 Advice from DACPA may help ensure this outcome is achieved.

82. Assessment requirements. This regulation requires that an assessment of the operational and technical airworthiness systems be completed to provide the Defence AA confidence that foreign military aircraft are operated safely within Australian airspace. If the MAA is not Defence AA recognised, advice should be sought from DACPA.

83. Operational restrictions. Implementing operational restrictions is an acceptable control. For example, foreign fast jets might be based at RAAF Base Tindal and required to transit to/from the designated training area via routes constrained over sparsely populated areas where possible.

84. If the MAA is not Defence AA recognised, the Sponsor should request a Defence AA recommendation (from DACPA/DGTA) that would consider evidence that the MAA has a system in place for type certification and

14 The OAA is placed at the FORCOMD, COMAUSFLT and ACAUST positions, which interact with HQJOC on a routine basis, therefore the command and airworthiness roles align so that oversight may be achieved with certainty.

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continuing airworthiness management of the foreign military aircraft and whether the system might provide the required assurances for the intended operations.

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OAREG 5.3.b The Sponsor who approves a foreign military aircraft to operate within Australian airspace must suspend the foreign military aircraft flight operation when there is concern that suitability for flight may be compromised. 85. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that foreign military aircraft are operated safely within Australian airspace.

86. The authority suspending flight operations should advise the relevant OAA and DACPA as soon as practicable.

AMC 1 to OAREG 5.3.b – When to Suspend 87. Suspension of flight operations should occur when the aircraft operations generate a risk exposure that is increased from the risk levels considered by the Sponsor during the approval process and the Sponsor believes suitability for flight may be compromised.

AMC 2 to OAREG 5.3.b – Cancelling Suspension 88. Procedures to reinstate flight operations should follow the general guidance and procedures provided for Defence Registered aircraft, noting that engagement with the MAA may be required.

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OAREG 6 - AVIATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS (AvSS)


1. This chapter provides guidance for the following regulations:

a. OAREG 6.1 – AvSS.

b. OAREG 6.1.1 – Personnel competency management.

c. OAREG 6.1.2 – Aerodromes.

d. OAREG 6.1.3 – Aerodrome rescue and fire fighting (ARFF).

e. OAREG 6.1.4 – Aeronautical information.

f. OAREG 6.1.5 – Air battle management (ABM).

g. OAREG 6.1.6 – Air cargo delivery (ACD).

h. OAREG 6.1.7 – Air traffic management (ATM).

i. OAREG 6.1.8 – Air weapons ranges (AWR).

j. OAREG 6.1.9 – Meteorology (MET).

k. OAREG 6.1.10 – Ship aviation facilities (SAF).

l. OAREG 6.1.11 – Terminal attack control (TAC).

m. OAREG 6.1.12 – Joint personnel recovery (JPR).

n. OAREG 6.1.13 – Medical.

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OAREG 6.1– AvSS (back to top)

OAREG 6.1.a The OAA must ensure AvSS compliance activities comply with OAREG 1.3.

2. Purpose. Refer to OAREG 1.3 and relevant guidance.

3. The OAA may extend the OAREG 1.3 audit activities period from one year to two years.

4. The OAR need not be advised of compliance activity outcomes unless the OAA feels such notification is required, or the OAR states a requirement.

OAREG 6.1.b.(1) The OAA must ensure an operational document established as required under OAREG 6 complies with OAREG 2.1.7 – OIP.

5. Purpose. Refer to OAREG 2.1.7.

OAREG 6.1.b.(2) The OAA must ensure an operational document established as required under OAREG 6 includes a reference to any ICAO Annex used as an acceptable means of compliance, and the established means for communicating future ICAO amendments to the document sponsor.

6. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to prevent a loss of control regarding relevant ICAO requirements and to ensure awareness to readers. The communication means may be email distribution lists, established Australian government ICAO committee members who may provide advice on upcoming changes, or similar means.

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OAREG 6.1.1 – PERSONNEL COMPETENCY MANAGEMENT (back to top)

OAREG 6.1.1.a The OAA must ensure AvSS service providers establish a personnel competency management system that trains and authorises operational staff to provide the service.

7. Purpose. AvSS involves a wide array of systems and sub-systems. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that a minimum AvSS operational standard is maintained that ensures suitability for flight will not be compromised.

8. To assist in resource management, training should recognise prior learning in other areas to reduce training requirements.

9. The personnel competency management system is intended to ensure the safe output of a system or service. The management document should include or reference the following:

a. Recognition of the authorised training facility. The training facility should meet nationally accredited training standards.

b. Ab–initio training requirements. If it exists, reference to the occupation specialisation documents should be included.

c. Ab–initio training competency standards. Competency standards include both written and practicable examinations, or may be based upon the ability to demonstrate an understanding by doing.

d. Post graduate training requirements. Time periods allocated to achieve desired outcomes should be identified.

e. Post graduate competency proficiency standards. Proficiency is the assessed level of ability to carry out the functions of a competency measured against the minimum prescribed standard in a formal performance assessment.

f. Regular training needs analysis to ensure operational outcomes are met. The scheme should undergo a training needs analysis every three years, or as determined by those persons who have relevant expertise regarding this area.

g. Categorisation of skills or competencies. Categorisation of skills benefits both capability management and the ability to audit proficiency.

h. Currency requirements. Currency is the authorised period over which a person may perform in a designated role consistent with the relevant categorisation. Currency requirements may vary depending on the category scheme used.

i. Recency requirements. Recency is the on-going practical application of a function for a required minimum period within the time frame specified. Recency supports currency requirements, and may involve minimum time periods in a designated role and/or missions.

j. Method of recording competency and currency. Methods may be logbooks, IT based solutions, or any other format that is determined to be enduring. The competency management document should not be contained within operational documents.

k. Personnel fatigue management strategy. Fatigue management strategy may include crew duty limitations, maximum allowable hours worked over specified periods, or minimum rest time between control duty periods. Additional information should be sought from subject matter experts.

AMC 10. AAP 2002.001 – Manual of Training - Policy and procedures.

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OAREG 6.1.2 – AERODROMES (back to top) 11. Suitability for flight assessment. Aerodrome can compromise suitability for flight in the event that aerodrome lighting or visual aid failure, affects the landing and take off flight profiles or and the ability of an aircraft to safely operate on the movement areas, by introducing aircraft damage due to irregular movement areas or unreliable supply of power to other AvSS that rely on the aerodrome to produce the required service outputs.

OAREG 6.1.2.a The OAA must approve any classification of an aerodrome as a heliport and ensure the classification is recorded in the relevant aerodrome manual and on the AvSSC.

12. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to remove ambiguity in design.

13. For aerodrome regulations, the terms airport, airfield or airbase are all considered to mean an aerodrome.

14. The terms aerodrome and heliport are interchangeable except where design criteria requires otherwise.

15. Differences in design standards apply to aerodromes and heliports. Classifying an aerodrome as a heliport can assure the relevant design standards are considered, as well as other operational requirements more relevant to rotary wing operations.

16. Heliport classification would not necessarily restrict all fixed wing movements; however, should a fixed wing aircraft operate at the heliport; clear advice for public use should be published detailing any prior permissions required (PPR), if any, for fixed wing operations at a heliport.

17. All aerodrome regulations are constrained to the aerodrome’s aircraft movement areas1 and associated aspects including lighting, movement area guidance signs (MAGS), visual NAVAIDS and other relevant procedures and standards associated with the movement areas. Other systems that could compromise suitability for flight on an aerodrome, such as replenishment systems for gases and fuels, may be regulated under technical regulation by the TAR if deemed a requirement in accordance with MILAVREG 1.6 determinations.2 Capability requirements such as security, passenger facilities, etc, which are deemed the responsibility of the command and management structure of the relevant airport/airfield/airbase supporting the aerodrome are not regulated.3

AMC

18. Heliport and aerodrome design standards are advised within AAP 7001.054 – electronic Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (eADRM).

1ICAO Annex 14 Vol. I – Definitions, page 1–6. 2Bulk fuel installation and fuel quality are regulated under the Defence Manual of Infrastructure Engineering Bulk Fuel Installation – Design Section 1.5. 3Not all aerodromes are located on an airbase. For example Gin Gin aerodrome and Jervis Bay aerodrome are remote aerodromes managed by a geographically separated airbase.

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http://intranet.defence.gov.au/im/policy/technical/fuel_farm_design/Fuel%20Farm%20Design%20Policy.pdf


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OAREG 6.1.2.b The OAA must categorise Defence aerodromes as either Defence certified, Defence registered, or Defence unregistered.

19. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to align Defence terminology with ICAO4 and CASA for certified and registered aerodromes.

20. A comparison with CASA certified and registered aerodrome requirements indicates the Defence aerodrome management system as provided under OAREG 6.1.2 assures interoperability with the civil system.

21. The term ‘unregistered’ is a CASA MOS 139 term used to refer to those aerodromes that are not registered or certified. AvSS Certificate (AvSSC) requirements do not apply to unregistered aerodromes.

22. OAREG 6 does not regulate unregistered aerodromes; rather, the responsibility for use of such facilities rests with the operational commander. For example, there may be HLS or airstrips in remote localities that are not registered due to sporadic use or less than ideal infrastructure support, yet may be approved by an authorising officer after a suitable risk determination, or aerodromes in remote locations sporadically used.

23. Aerodrome design standards are equally applicable to certified and registered aerodromes, and may include:

a. physical characteristics of the movement area

b. obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS)

c. aerodrome markings

d. lighting

e. wind direction indicators

f. any other standards deemed required based upon risk determination.

AMC

24. Heliport and aerodrome design standards are advised within AAP 7001.054 – electronic Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (eADRM).

25. To ascertain Defence compliance with the eADRM, a design certification baseline determination (CBD) should be conducted via an audit against the eADRM. Should a registered or certified aerodrome be found non-compliant with eADRM design requirements, the deficiency should be recorded in the aerodrome manual, clearly articulating perceived risk to aerodrome users. Modification of an existing non-compliant aerodrome facility to comply with eADRM requirements is not required until the facility is replaced or upgraded.

26. The difference between a certified Defence aerodrome and a registered Defence aerodrome is one of operational capability as provided for within the overall scope of MILAVREG 6.3. The OAA responsibility to categorise an aerodrome as certified, registered or unregistered affords control of resource allocations.

27. Two independent reasons a Defence aerodrome should be considered for certified status include:

a. Characteristics exist that include:

(1) Defence aircraft are permanently based at the aerodrome; or

(2) civil regular public transport (RPT) aircraft with a capacity of more than 30 seats or carrying capacity that exceeds 3 400 kilograms are permitted use of the aerodrome5; and

(3) the aerodrome is likely to be used by Defence aircraft at least 70 days per calendar year. The selection of 70 days is:

(a) based on the aerodrome being considered ‘active’ for a quarter of the year; and

(b) the OAA may have confidence that aircraft operations can continue in an environment where risk is reduced to an ALoS by virtue of requiring elevated levels of maintenance and surveillance by the relevant aerodrome service provider.

4 ICAO Annex 14 Vol 1 Aerodromes – Chap 1 General – definitions and MOS 139. 5 Consideration does not mean certification is an assured outcome, as aircraft movements (even if RPT) may not justify the resource expenditure.

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b. The OAA determines certification is required to meet relevant Australian Government policy.

28. Defence may approve RPT aircraft to operate at the aerodrome that have a capacity of more than 30 seats.6 The Airports Act 1996 section 7B states Darwin and Townsville are joint–user airports (JUA), which includes the aerodrome subsystem as regulated under MILAVREG 6. This constitutes an approved agreement. As such Darwin and Townsville should be categorised as certified aerodromes. For other Defence aerodromes, where deemed appropriate, civil access may be afforded by use of agreements between Defence and the civil operator. In such cases, the formal contract (agreement, lease or other instrument) between Defence and the civil entity may afford the civil entity use of the Defence aerodrome for the conduct of civil aircraft operations, which may include RPT, and other non-aerodrome considerations that comprise airport services. The agreement may include land lease for the establishment of civil air terminals, shared security provisions, limitations upon civil aircraft movement rates of effort, cost-sharing arrangements for maintenance requirements, or contract driven aerodrome improvements required to meet CASR 139 regulations, and other specified services.7 For example, in addition to Williamtown being a Defence base with permanently based Defence aircraft, it also has a lease that permits RPT access and is used by aircraft with a seating capacity that exceeds 30 seats. As such, Williamtown (Newcastle) should be categorised as a certified aerodrome.

29. While CASR 139 does not regulate Defence, Defence may have agreements that allow Defence aerodrome use by civil operators, who under CASR 139 may have need for aerodrome certification due to the CASA requirement that civil aerodromes be certified if a runway exists that is suitable for use by aircraft having:

a. a maximum passenger seating capacity of more than 30 seats; or

b. a maximum carrying capacity of more than 3 400 kilograms; and

c. is available for use in RPT operations or charter operations by such aircraft.8

30. Such an event could occur at remote aerodrome locations, such as ‘bare bases’ as well as at Defence certified aerodromes. Unless the OAA deems it in the interest of Defence to certify the aerodrome, and chooses to expend the resources, agreements allowing civil aircraft to operate from Defence aerodromes should ensure CASA imposed requirements are resourced by the civil operator, vice Defence. As most of the decisions CASA makes involve the exercise of discretion,9 the civil operator may obtain CASA permissions thereby conserving Defence resources, yet allow the civil operator to provide the service local communities may require.

31. CASA requires that aerodromes available for public use with non–precision approach runways be certified or registered.10 As Defence aerodromes may also be used by civil registered aircraft, Defence instrument approach runways should only be approved for certified or registered aerodromes. If approved for unregistered aerodromes, instrument procedures should be restricted and explicitly advised to be ‘for military use only’. With the prevalence of GPS approaches, there is potential that a civil operator may self-authorise a company GPS approach for an unregistered aerodrome. Should this be the case at an unregistered Defence aerodrome and known to Defence, the matter should be referred to CASA for any potential oversight requirements, vice Defence assigning resources to increase aerodrome compliance.

OAREG 6.1.2.c The OAA must ensure each certified or registered aerodrome holds an individual AvSSC that reflects the aerodrome category.

32. Purpose. The purpose of the AvSSC is to afford the OAA the means to document the aerodrome category and the conditions for its use, including any operational restriction/s or limitation/s.

33. Each certified or registered aerodrome requires an individual AvSSC because each aerodrome configuration will be different in capability aspects, layout and other relevant areas, which are not advantageous to use of Certificates of Conformance.

34. An individual AvSSC also allows an aerodrome to be afforded less or more restrictions than another similar aerodrome, for example civil use of the aerodrome.

6 As per general information provided regarding Defence agreements that allow civil access to Defence aerodromes, the contract/agreement should stipulate what support Defence can or cannot provide to attain certified status. Also note CASA exemptions/waivers that may be available to civil operators. 7 AVM Treloar/AIRCDRE Devine Sep 2010 report on civil access to AF airfields. 8CASR 139 Subpart 139.B para 139.040 – When an aerodrome certificate is required. 9CASA aerodrome certificates, aerodrome registration, and approval of persons manual Version 1.1: November 2010 – Introduction–Regulatory Decision Making. 10CASR 139 Subpart 139.A para 139.030 – Aerodromes with non-precision approach runways to be certified or registered.

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http://www.casa.gov.au/wcmswr/_assets/main/manuals/regulate/acr_ap/007rfull.pdf

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OAREG 6.1.2.d The OAA must provide DACPA with a copy of each aerodrome AvSSC.

35. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure the provision of a key document required by the regulator for compliance activities.

36. The AvSSC provides the aerodrome category, as determined by the OAA, for the purpose of recording in the Defence aerodrome database.

37. The OAA must provide DACPA with each certified or registered aerodrome’s AvSSC so that the aerodrome may be recorded in the Defence aerodrome database.

38. The Defence aerodrome database is maintained by DACPA and may be accessed via the ACPA website. The Defence aerodrome database is intended to provide stakeholders awareness about which aerodromes have been categorised to what status. In addition, it provides an inclusive listing of aerodrome capability across Defence that can also provide awareness of compliance status, who is the responsible airworthiness authority and electronic access to relevant aerodrome information, such as AvSSC and AUTHOP dates. DACPA may tailor the Defence aerodrome database to assist other OAA data requirements where possible.

39. The OAA may request an unregistered aerodrome be recorded on the Defence aerodrome database by providing DACPA a minute that provides the name, the geographical location including an aerodrome reference point and a reference to a document that describes its dimensions and /or expected capability support (this could be a unit SI, or an annex to the minute). This listing would be as a convenience only, as unregistered aerodromes are not regulated under OAREG 6.

40. The aerodrome manual for a registered aerodrome should contain fewer requirements than those of a certified aerodrome.

41. Where practicable, in the interests of interoperability with the civil aerodrome management system, the Defence aerodrome procedures and training requirements may align operational procedures with the CASA MOS 139 – Aerodromes.

OAREG 6.1.2.e(1) The OAA must ensure an aerodrome manual11 is established for each certified or registered aerodrome that details operational procedures, plans and essential information used to maintain and operate the aerodrome including public information required for flight planning or other operational needs; the ARFF level of protection required in support of aerodrome operation; and the obstacle data Coverage Area information.

42. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to provide a ‘one stop shop’12 for all relevant information and procedures that underpin the safe and effective use of an aerodrome. The aerodrome manual also affords a means of data integrity compliance with other products that would draw form the manual’s information, such as that published in other products used by flight crew for planning purposes.

43. For legacy aerodromes, the aerodrome manual replaces the SOI and AvSSMP as supporting documentation for the AvSS Certificate (AvSSC) as required under MILAVREG 6. For an aerodrome yet to be built it is likely an AvSSMP will be required to determine relevant AvSSMP criteria, therefore for new aerodromes the aerodrome manual may only replace the SOI unless the OAA approves differently.

44. The aerodrome manual is the authoritative source for aerodrome information published for public use.

45. An aerodrome manual template is available from the ACPA website. Conformance with the template will ensure compliance with OAREG 6.1.2.

46. Depending on OAA determinations, a registered aerodrome manual may require less detail than a certified aerodrome manual, but should follow the same format as provided in the template.

11 ICAO Annex 14, Vol 1, Ch 1, para 1.4 (Note), page 1-10. 12 Airworthiness Board Report – Aerodromes of 28 Feb 11 (R8072986)

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47. Aerodrome manual procedures, plans and essential information include those items listed in Table 1-1.

Table 1-1 – Aerodrome manual requirements

Procedures, plans and information requirements Certified Registered Aerodrome lighting configuration X X Aerodrome maintenance agreements that may exist. X X Airside access control X X Airside vehicle requirements and radio procedures X X An aerodrome master contact list of relevant aerodrome

management positions X X

Description of aerodrome areas, which may include: o bird baths o apron management o taxiway restrictions o engine run up positions o compass swing area etc o parking restrictions

X X

Information provided for public use X X Low visibility procedures X X NAVAID information required for use X X Organisation and management structure that applies to the

aerodrome, including any civil use agreements X X

Prior approval requirements for non-locally based aircraft use X X Procedures for documenting subterranean data such as

underground cable, sewage pipes, etc X X

Non-compliance with aerodrome design standards X X Aerodrome power supply requirements X OAA decision ARFF requirements X OAA decision Aerodrome reporting requirements X OAA decision Aerodrome works management X OAA decision Aircraft arrestor systems and management X OAA decision Aerodrome emergency plan (AEP) X OAA decision Any exemptions, waivers or special conditions that apply to the

aerodrome X X

Explosive ordnance loading areas and procedures X OAA decision Foreign Object Debris (FOD) prevention program X OAA decision Hazardous material handling information X OAA decision Movement area inspection regime X OAA decision Obstacle data Coverage Area information X OAA decision Wildlife Hazard Management Plan (WHMP) X OAA decision Other requirements as may be deemed necessary OAA decision OAA decision

48. Should a civil entity have a formal agreement that allows access to the Defence aerodrome for the conduct of civil aviation operations, such as a Joint User Airport or a different lease agreement, a shared civil/military aerodrome manual may be published.

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OAREG 6.1.2.e(2) The OAA must ensure an aerodrome manual is established for each certified or registered aerodrome is established that details the personnel authorised to provide aerodrome information intended for public use to the Defence AISP.

49. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure adequate controls over approval to change aerodrome information.

50. Changes to Defence AIP information requires careful consideration as Defence AIP is utilised to make flight planning determinations. Appointments that should be identified in the aerodrome manual as authorised to submit Defence AIP changes include:

a. The Senior Air Traffic Control Officer (SATCO).13

b. Aerodrome Executive / Operations Officer.

c. Senior Airfield Engineer Officer.

d. Base Aviation Safety Officer (BASO)

e. If a civil access agreement exists:

(1) The civil airport’s Operations Manager.

(2) The civil airport operator’s Senior Safety Officer.

OAREG 6.1.2.e(3) The OAA must ensure an aerodrome manual is established for each certified or registered aerodrome that is approved in accordance with the command and management design for the Defence Base supporting the aerodrome.

51. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure compliance to aerodrome manual procedures and other listed requirements.

52. The approval process mimics the approval process for Base Standing Instructions, as an aerodrome manual is essentially a Base Standing Instruction (SI). As such, extending the SI approval structure to the aerodrome manual assures compliance to the aerodrome manual requirements.

53. The aerodrome manual provides the OAA assurance that the aerodrome has met the AvSS Certificate requirements as required under MILAVREG 6.2.

OAREG 6.1.2.e(4) The OAA must ensure an aerodrome manual is established for each certified or registered aerodrome that is reviewed annually.

54. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure information and procedures remain valid. The annual review requirement also aligns with civilian aerodrome requirements.

55. The aerodrome manual should be reviewed annually as it provides essential day to day aerodrome operations information. Should a review initiate changes to the aerodrome manual, unless a Substantial Change occurs, there is no need to request an AvSSC review due to the change. An example of a Substantial Change would be increased civil access to the aerodrome, introduction of a new NAVAID, removal of an existing NAVAID or a change to the aerodrome hours of operation. Should such a change occur, the AvSSC review process provides assurance that the OAA is involved in the process and will endorse (or not) the aerodrome manual change via the AvSSC. In this manner, the AvSSC provides the required oversight so that Defence aviation is receiving the expected aerodrome service.

13 See DASP Master Glossary

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OAREG 6.1.2.f The OAA must ensure public information for each certified or registered aerodrome (1) required for flight planning or other operational needs is documented in the aerodrome manual, and (2) is provided to the Defence AISP for publishing in the Defence AIP.

56. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure information published in the relevant aerodrome manual is afforded data integrity via audit against the means used to publish the information for public use, and the source data from which the information is sourced – the aerodrome manual.

57. Aerodrome information that should be provided to the Defence AISP for publishing in Defence AIP for public use includes:

a. General information that may include:

(1) Aerodrome name.

(2) Aerodrome category, specified as Defence Certified, Defence Registered, or only Defence Unregistered.14

(3) ICAO identifier code.

(4) Categorisation.

(5) Location.

(6) Aerodrome reference point.

(7) Elevation (based on the Australian Height Datum).

(8) Operations and contact information.

b. Runway and taxiway information, including pavement classification number (PCN) data and runway distance supplement (RDS).

c. Magnetic bearing, number, dimensions, capability information, obstacle chart information.

d. Visual aid systems information, such as type of runway lighting, standby power aspects, visual slope indicator system, and visual docking system used for apron management.

e. Aerodrome hours of operation.

f. ATS hours of operation.

g. ARFF category – level of protection (as required under OAREG 6.1.3).

h. Prior permission requirements (PPR).

i. Available support services, such as refuelling, dangerous good handling, noise abatement procedures, aircraft engine run locations and procedures.

j. Radio system information, such as CTAF, PAL and AFRU.

k. Flying procedures provided for public use that are not suitable to hold within non-Defence AIP data sources, such as a relevant SI(OPS) 3 standing instruction. For example, general aviation access procedures to Defence administered airspace.

58. The Defence AISP ensures advice to the public is provided via the NOTAM15 system and process a Defence AIP amendment for the next available change date, normally IAW the international 28 day Aeronautical Information Regulation and Control (AIRAC) cycle.

59. NOTAM that amend Defence AIP information should be staffed via the Defence AISP because if this does not occur, it may result in a missed Defence AIP amendment.

60. AMC. Determining information required for public use is in ICAO Annex 15 – Aeronautical Information Services, Appendix 1 Part 3 – Aerodromes.

14 The publishing document used for providing the information may also use other means to indicate an aerodrome is unregistered, such as a shaded background. 15 Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) are created and transmitted by government agencies and airport operators under guidelines specified by ICAO Annex 15: Aeronautical Information Services.

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OAREG 6.1.2.g The OAA must ensure that Defence AIP aerodrome information is current and consistent with the aerodrome manual.

61. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure the aerodrome manual authority will conduct integrity checks against known sources making aerodrome manual information available for public use.

62. The authoritative source for aerodrome information that will be published for public use in the Defence AIP is the aerodrome manual. The aerodrome manual will take precedence over Defence AIP.

OAREG 6.1.2.h The OAA must ensure a system is established that ensures the ongoing integrity and validity of unregistered aerodrome data published for public use.

63. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that should the OAA choose to provide unregistered aerodrome information for public use, ongoing data verification will be possible.

64. Outdated data could become stale and could compromise suitability for flight. Therefore, should the OAA decide to publish unregistered aerodrome information for public use, via the Defence AIP or other means, a system to ensure validation of the data is required. A solution might be to use an aerodrome manual as a standalone document, or the aerodrome database to hold the information. Regardless of the manner chosen, the data should be controlled as to amendment authority and review periods. Ideally, the system established should be comparable to that used by a regulated aerodrome.

OAREG 6.1.2.i The OAA must ensure a LVP are established for each certified aerodrome that ensures safe surface movements.

65. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that during periods of low visibility aircraft are afforded safe and effective use of the movement areas.

66. Low visibility procedures (LVP) are required when the visual meteorological condition (VMC) has degraded to a distance that aerodrome surface movement safety may be compromised. The extent of degradation may vary by aerodrome; however, if runway visual range (RVR) is 800 metres or less, or cloud ceiling is 200 feet or less, or visibility on any part of the aerodrome is unsuitable to afford safe aircraft movements then LVP of a suitable movement rate should be implemented.

67. Depending on how severe the meteorological VMC restricts visibility, the low visibility procedures may require restricting surface movement to one aircraft at a time from taxi to take off or landing to parking, with no concurrent vehicle movement.

68. Surface movement surveillance systems, such as RADAR or ADS-B, if available, significantly improves aerodrome safety and can reduce LVP restrictions.

69. At aerodromes with ATS in operation, the SATCO will normally implement LVP. At other times, the aerodrome operator may also implement LVP.

70. The Defence ATS manual may also reference LVP. If the ATS manual conflicts with the aerodrome manual, the aerodrome manual will have precedence between the two documents. Should differences be unable to be resolved, the OAA should be requested to make a determination.

OAREG 6.1.2.j The OAA must determine the LVP requirements for each registered aerodrome.

71. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to afford the OAA an ability to control resources using risk determinations.

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OAREG 6.1.2.k The OAA must ensure personnel who conduct movement area inspections are appropriately trained.

72. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure personnel who conduct movement area inspections are able to identify safety hazards that may compromise suitability for flight.

73. AMC. Aerodrome MOS 139 – Aerodromes and guidance contained in OAREG 6.1.1. The OAA may also determine that OAREG 6.1.1 is a suitable means to achieve the desired outcome.

OAREG 6.1.2.l The OAA must ensure movement areas for certified aerodromes are inspected daily (prior to flight activity occurring); immediately before last light (when night flying is planned); and monthly.

74. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to align Defence aerodrome practices with the civilian requirements.

75. A daily inspection is primarily intended to ensure movement areas are free of FOD and that essential support equipment, such as lighting, is serviceable. Short notice inspections may also be required due to FOD concerns or equipment inspections. Ideally, an inspection report will be utilised for daily checks. A daily inspection check list is available in the aerodrome manual template.

76. Monthly aerodrome inspections should review all aerodrome support structure for integrity issues, visibility status of markings, etc. A monthly inspection check list is available in the aerodrome manual template.

77. Other periods when aerodrome inspections may be required include:

a. Every six months by TAR endorsed technical representatives TAR endorsed staff are normally engineers qualified in aerodrome design matters, or equivalent. The aerodrome operations staff should also be present during the inspection.

b. At other times to ensure that the aerodrome manual provides the correct information for aviation purposes. For example, a runway extension will impact obstacle data requirements. A review six months after the work is completed could ensure correct data has been obtained and incorporated into the aerodrome manual, which ensure any national database system or aeronautical information product will be updated.

OAREG 6.1.2.m The OAA must determine the movement area inspection requirements for each registered aerodrome.

78. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to afford the OAA an ability to control resources using risk determinations.

79. Registered aerodrome inspections depend upon the expected use of the aerodrome and ease of access to the aerodrome location.

OAREG 6.1.2.n The OAA must ensure a foreign object debris (FOD) prevention program is established for each certified aerodrome.

80. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to avoid aircraft bring damaged by FOD.

81. Sweeper systems should have collected debris reviewed to assess if any aircraft parts have been collected.

82. Personnel operating on movement areas of any aerodrome who find any FOD that could potentially be aircraft parts should report the FOD to the Base Aviation Safety Officer (BASO) or equivalent safety representative.

OAREG 6.1.2.o The OAA must determine the FOD prevention program requirements for each registered aerodrome.

83. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to afford the OAA an ability to control resources using risk determination.

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OAREG 6.1.2.p(1) The DEPSEC E&IG must ensure required obstacle data for an aerodrome is acquired.

84. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that aerodrome obstacle data can be provided to support safe aviation activities at Defence aerodromes and within the relevant airspace associated with a particular Defence aerodrome.

85. DEPSEC E&IG, as the estate manager for all Defence aerodromes, is best able to provide obstacle management requirements and therefore the relevant service provider who is best placed to achieve safety outcomes required by obstacle data regulation and OAA determinations.

86. An obstacle is defined as all fixed (whether temporary or permanent) and mobile objects, or parts thereof, that:

a. are located on an area intended for the surface movement of aircraft, or

b. extend above a defined surface intended to protect aircraft in flight, or

c. stand outside those defined surfaces and that have been assessed as being a hazard to air navigation.16

87. Aerodrome obstacle data may support estate management by:

a. use in ground proximity warning systems with forward looking terrain avoidance function and minimum safe altitude warning system

b. determination of contingency procedures for use in the event of an emergency during a missed approach or take-off

c. other applications such as flight simulator and synthetic vision systems

d. aircraft operating limitations analysis

e. determination of en-route “drift-down” procedure and en-route emergency landing location

f. advanced surface movement guidance and control system

g. assisting in determining the height restriction or removal of obstacles that pose a hazard to air navigation17.

h. AISP developed aeronautical product.

i. estate planning to ensure existing aeronautical information product is not compromised.

OAREG 6.1.2.p(2) The DEPSEC E&IG must ensure a master database for aerodrome obstacle data is retained for the aerodrome.

88. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that aerodrome obstacle data can be maintained to support safe aviation activities at Defence aerodromes and within the relevant airspace associated with a particular Defence aerodrome. the ability to conduct compliance validation of the dataset used by the AISP.

89. Where a Defence aerodrome is subject to an agreement that affords civil use of the aerodrome, a shared civil/military obstacle data system should be used. This will ensure there is only one database for the aerodrome, which should improve data accuracy. This requirement does not restrict a national database being provided data for the individual aerodromes if that is desired. The functionality of a national database should be such that data for individual aerodromes is able to be ‘filtered’ or grouped by aerodrome to support safety assurance activities to verify compliance.

16 ICAO Annex 14 Vol 1 – definitions. 17 ICAO Annex 15 Chapter 10 – note.

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OAREG 6.1.2.p(3) The DEPSEC E&IG must ensure the obstacle data, including all changes, is provided to the Defence AISP.

90. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure obstacle data is pushed the AISP to ensure use of most recent data.

91. The Defence AISP requires the aerodrome’s obstacle data to design aeronautical products that support flight activities. Such products may include:

a. standard instrument departure (SID) procedures

b. instrument procedure design (including circling procedures)

c. Radar Terrain Clearance Charts (RTCC), normally provided to 40 nautical miles (nm) (or 74 km)

d. Minimum Safe Altitude (MSA) areas, normally provided to 25 nm (or 46.3 km)

e. aeronautical chart publications

f. data that may be provided for use by aircraft systems.

OAREG 6.1.2.p(4) The DEPSEC E&IG must ensure the obstacle data is validated annually or less often if the OAA agrees.

92. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that aerodrome obstacle data remains accurate.

93. As obstacle data is used to determine safety tolerances for aeronautical products, one year is deemed suitable for review periods; however, as aerodromes are very static in nature, the obstacle data supplier (E&IG) may propose to the OAA that a longer review period for certain aerodromes is more suitable.

94. Resource impact is recognised within the regulation by affording the OAA the ability to determine risk acceptance levels based upon E&IG advice. If E&IG advice indicates a period longer than one year between reviews is acceptable, and the OAA agrees with this advice, then the OAA may authorise an extended review period.

95. Exemption. The OAA may agree to a longer review period. Such might be the case for remote aerodromes that are unlikely to have estate developments imposed upon them in surrounding areas. The agreed review period should be advised in the aerodrome manual.

OAREG 6.1.2.p(5) The DEPSEC E&IG must ensure consultation with the relevant aerodrome manual approval authority for known land use proposals that may result in new aerodrome obstacle hazards.

96. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that consultation occurs regarding aerodrome obstacles to ensure safety is not compromised at Defence aerodromes and within the relevant airspace associated with a particular Defence aerodrome.

97. E&IG applies the Defence Areas Control Regulations (DACR) to 13 Defence aerodromes18 around Australia. The DACR limit the height of new structures, or additions to existing structures, to ground level (ie no structures permitted) or to heights of 7.5, 15, 45 or 90 metres. The DACR are used as a means whereby local authorities are required to consult Defence on development applications or land use proposals that may impact on the safe operation of aircraft at a Defence aerodrome. The DACR confer powers in association with the height restrictions, such as a right of entry on land and authority to order removal of a building or structure19.

98. It is essential the aerodrome manual approval authority is consulted in order to ensure current and known future operations are not compromised.

18 HMAS Albatross (Nowra), Army Aviation Centre (AAC) Oakey and RAAF bases: East Sale, Amberley, Scherger, Townsville, Darwin, Tindal, Edinburgh, Gin Gin, Pearce, Learmonth; plus the RAAF Pearce remote TACAN/ILS training site. 19 Defence Estate Quality Management System (DEQMS) webpage: See <http://intranet.defence.gov.au/estatemanagement/lifecycle/DocumentDirectory/DACR/Default.asp>

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OAREG 6.1.2.q(1)(a) The DEPSEC E&IG must ensure obstacle data is acquired for each Defence aerodrome as follows: certified aerodromes or certified heliports: the primary runway(s).

99. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that aerodrome obstacle data is provided to support safe aviation activities at Defence aerodromes and within the relevant airspace associated with a particular Defence aerodrome.

100. Obstacle data should not be limited to line of sight from the aerodrome, as other obstacles may be significant beyond the line of sight.

101. AMC. Acceptable means of compliance includes:

a. ICAO Annex 4 – Aeronautical Charts.

b. ICAO Annex 15 – Aeronautical Information Services.

c. AAP 7001.054 – electronic Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (eADRM).20

102. ICAO Annex 15, Chapter 10 defines coverage areas for the collection of terrain and obstacle data. Annex 15 Appendix 8 further defines the collection height by subdivided areas 2a – 2d.

103. Within these Defence regulations, usage of the term 'Coverage area 2c' is inclusive of the lesser coverage areas that precede it. For example, where the guidance material states: 'Coverage Area 2c', this includes Coverage Area 2a, plus 2b, plus 2c. The four ICAO Annex 15 areas and the ICAO Annex 4 Type Chart equivalency are presented in Table–1 alongside the Defence regulation term.

Table–1 Coverage Area in ICAO Annex 15 mapped to Type Charts in ICAO Annex 4 and OAREG term usage

AAP 8000.010 (Defence regulation term)

Equivalent Coverage Area (ICAO Annex 15)

Type Charts (ICAO Annex 4)

Coverage Area 2b Coverage Areas 2a and 2b Type A

Coverage Area 2c Coverage Areas 2a, 2b and 2c Type B

Coverage Area 2d Coverage Areas 2a, 2b, 2c and 2d Type C21

Aerodrome Terrain and Obstacle Chart

— ICAO (Electronic)

104. ICAO Coverage Area 2b provides obstacle information on all significant obstacles within the approach/take-off flight path areas of an aerodrome up to 10 km from the end of the runway, or a larger distance if required. For example, eADRM22 requires an instrument approach runway, or a Code 3 or Code 4 runway for take off, to be surveyed up to 15 km from the end of the runway. Obstacle data for Coverage Area 2b is not required for a particular runway if it has been determined that no significant obstacles exist within the runway’s take-off flight path.

105. Should the primary runway determination not be readily known, the aerodrome command and management staff should ask the OAA for a determination to ensure aircraft capability aspects are properly captured.

OAREG 6.1.2.q(1)(b) The DEPSEC E&IG must ensure obstacle data is acquired for each Defence aerodrome as follows: certified aerodromes or certified heliports: as determined by the OAA, any secondary runway(s).

106. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure non-primary runways do not unnecessarily impose resource requirements upon the service provider.

20 Defence Aerodrome Design Requirements are contained in Section 5, Chapter 8. CASA implements Australia’s obligations under the ICAO framework via MOS 139 – Aerodromes, which contains the design requirements to be met. Defence uses MOS 139 as the benchmark for new aerodromes and for works on existing aerodromes. The intent is for the gradual convergence of Defence aerodromes to MOS 139 requirements. 21 Note: No longer defined by ICAO Annex 4. Replaced by the ‘Aerodrome Terrain and Obstacle Chart — ICAO (Electronic)’ 22 By derogation, MOS139 Table 7.1-2 for the take-off runway & Table 7.1-1 for the approach runway, noting that where two obstacle limitation surfaces (OLS) overlap, the lower surface must be used as the controlling OLS (MOS 139, clause 7.1.3.6).

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OAREG 6.1.2.q(1)(c) The DEPSEC E&IG must ensure obstacle data is acquired for each Defence aerodrome as follows: certified aerodromes or certified heliports: a minimum of 10 km circumference from the aerodrome reference point, unless the OAA determines a larger distance is required.

107. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that required aerodrome obstacle data is provided to support safe aviation activities at Defence aerodromes and within the relevant airspace associated with a particular Defence aerodrome.

108. The OAA is afforded discretion to determine if increased coverage areas are required as geographical terrain and infrastructure is not the same for all aerodromes.

109. ICAO Coverage Area 2c provides obstacle information on all significant obstacles within 10 km of the aerodrome reference point. Should the radius required for circling approach procedures exceed 10 km then the OAA should increase the radius as necessary. If a larger radius is required, ICAO Coverage Area 2d provides obstacle information on all significant obstacles up to 45 km from the aerodrome reference point. Notwithstanding the ICAO AMC provides set distances, this does not preclude the OAA from making other radius determinations that achieve the required safety outcome, such as 30 km.

110. Noting the minimum 10 km requirement, additional obstacle data capture is defined by the OAA to ensure safety of flight. For example, an OAA may require obstacle data at RAAF Townsville, in certain quadrants, out to 15 km for various instrument procedures (their operational requirement). The ICAO Coverage Area 2d between 10 km and 15 km could be surveyed using ICAO Annex 15 or ICAO Annex 4, Chapter 5, Aerodrome Terrain and Obstacle Chart–ICAO (Electronic)—noting this chapter is for a chart that covers 'Area 2', which includes areas 2a–2d, and thus is 'up to 45 km' from the aerodrome reference point.

111. The Defence AISP produces charts that require data in excess of 10 km. For example, RTCC used by ATC to conduct ATC services may extend to 40 nm (74 km) and MSA out to 25 nm (46.3 km) as provided on terminal approach plates. These products require obstacle and terrain data supported by relevant Coverage Area information. Such data may be obtained from other government agencies (eg Geoscience Australia) who maintain topographical data. The Defence AISP should be consulted regarding the integrity of non-Defence sourced obstacle data that may support AIP.

112. Use of electronic charting should be strongly considered in consultation with the Defence AISP. There is no specific design imposed for electronic charts, in fact any suitable model can achieve the outcome as long as the Defence AISP is able to use the data, it is accurate and can be maintained. In determining operational requirements the OAA should consult the Defence AISP to ensure aerodrome products have verified and auditable data before advising E&IG of their obstacle data requirements.

113. An example obstacle data requirement for a Defence aerodrome is available from the ACPA website.

OAREG 6.1.2.q(2) The DEPSEC E&IG must ensure obstacle data is acquired for each Defence aerodrome as follows: as determined by the OAA for each registered aerodrome.

114. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure resource management control so that registered aerodromes that do not require instrument runway procedures do not unnecessarily consume Defence resources. As the aircraft operator, the OAA is uniquely positioned as the authority who may accept reduced validation period based upon E&IG advice.

OAREG 6.1.2.r Reserved.

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OAREG 6.1.2.s The OAA must ensure all personnel who require airside access are qualified and authorised.

115. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure personnel do not present a safety hazard to themselves or other personnel and equipment.

116. Airside is the movement area and other facilities or zones on the aerodrome vital to the safe operation of aircraft and the personnel working with those aircraft. OAREG 6 is primarily concerned with the access requirements to the manoeuvring areas.

117. Airside access training requirements that meet the requirements include:

a. Radio telephony procedures.

b. Aerodrome layout.

c. Vehicle requirements.

d. Driving requirements.

e. ATC Tower signal light system codes.

f. Aerodrome operations in general.

118. Personnel who are pilots, ACO, JBAC or another OAA recommended category are exempted from some or all elements of airside access training by recognising prior learning (RPL) associated with aerodrome operations. For example, an aerodrome familiarisation drive by an airside qualified person is deemed to be sufficient, unless existing local awareness is judged acceptable based upon time in location.

119. A limited airside access authorisation may be issued to personnel (primarily civil contractors) who only require access to aprons and have received an appropriate apron safety briefing.

120. Personnel who require access to the manoeuvring area, but have not completed airside access training, may be accompanied and supervised by a person who is airside access qualified.


a. ICAO Annex 14 Aerodromes – Volume 1 – Aerodrome Design and Operations.

b. ICAO Document 9870 – Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions.

c. MOS 139 – Aerodromes.

OAREG 6.1.2.t The OAA must ensure aerodrome works/maintenance activities conducted on the manoeuvring areas are supervised by qualified and authorised personnel.

122. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure personnel are not exposed to safety hazards.

123. Aerodrome maintenance/works supervisor training should include:

a. Airside access training.

b. Application of displaced threshold application.

c. NOTAM procedures and requirements.

d. Aerodrome standards for restricting taxiway access.

e. Method of Works Plan (MOWP) implementation.

f. Safety reporting requirements, such as ASOR information requirements. If a contracted service, this requirement should be part of the contract stipulations.

g. Other required aerodrome knowledge.


a. ICAO Annex 14 Aerodromes – Volume 1 – Aerodrome Design and Operations.

b. ICAO Document 9870 – Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions.

c. MOS 139 – Aerodromes.

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OAREG 6.1.2.u The OAA must ensure vehicle operations on the manoeuvring area are equipped with an appropriate radio; establish radio communication before entering a manoeuvring area; are in receipt of an ATC clearance when an ATS is provided at the aerodrome, or comply with Common Traffic Advisory Frequency (CTAF) procedures if the aerodrome is uncontrolled; maintain a continuous listening watch on the ATS assigned or CTAF required frequency; give way to aircraft unless ATC directs otherwise, or the pilot of the aircraft has agreed to give way; and are compliant with any other local aerodrome vehicle requirements.

125. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure personnel do not present a safety hazard to themselves or other personnel and equipment.

126. VHF FM radio is normally used for SMC(V) communications during ATS provision when vehicle access to the manoeuvring area is required. Vehicles that have a requirement to communicate on aircraft frequencies during ATS provision will require SATCO approval. Non-radio communication techniques, such as a mobile phone use, will require SATCO approval. During CTAF, vehicles will require an ability to broadcast on the published CTAF frequency to access the runway.

127. Such procedures should be included in airside access training. Known communication black spots that inhibit radio communications should be advised in the aerodrome manual.

OAREG 6.1.2.v The OAA must ensure vehicles used to access movement areas are equipped with safety lighting to indicate the presence of vehicles or mobile plant on the movement area.

128. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure vehicles do not present a safety hazard to personnel and equipment due lack of visibility.

129. Suitable equipment may be a rotating beacon (preferred), use of four way vehicle emergency flashers or vehicle indicators.

130. Vehicles not suitably equipped and that require access to the manoeuvring area may obtain a temporary waiver from the SATCO or if the aerodrome executive/operations officer if access is required to the apron only.

131. Private vehicles, including contractor vehicles that are not compliant with regulation requirements may be escorted by a suitably equipped vehicle. Use of a ‘one plus one/two’ for aerodrome access can allow a suitably equipped vehicle to escort non-equipped vehicles to required areas on an aerodrome. Such access may be required to conduct maintenance activities, or to access parts of the aerodrome not readily available by other means.

OAREG 6.1.2.w The OAA must ensure the following maximum movement area vehicle speed limits are not exceeded: Runways and taxiways: 70 km/h, unless a higher speed is operationally required; all aprons: 40 km/h; within 10 metres of any aircraft: 10 km/h; within 5 metres of any aircraft: 5 km/h.

132. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure vehicle speeds are appropriate for the work intended but will not become a safety hazard to personnel and equipment.

133. The aerodrome speed limits have been determined by aerodrome operations staff knowledge and experience of what achieves a balanced approach between safety and aerodrome operational requirements.

134. Aerodrome taxiways and runways are often several kilometres long. Speed requirements are balanced to account for driver safety and efficient work practice. For example, runway FOD checks may be required a long distance from the runway entrance point, yet extended time on the runway could compromise an aircraft’s intended landing or departure time. As such, a higher speed may be required. A higher speed may also be required to obtain operational objectives, such as an ATC instruction for a driver to expedite clearance of a runway or emergency response services.

135. 40 km/h is equivalent to school zone speeds, which affords safety of personnel.

136. Regardless of the vehicle’s location on the aerodrome, the intent is to slow vehicle speed in proportion to the vehicle’s distance from an aircraft, wherever the aircraft is located vice a specific area such as the apron. 5Km/h is considered a normal walking speed.

137. Vehicle speed indications are normally marked in increments of five, therefore the 10 metres/10 km/h and 5 metres/5 km/h should be easily remembered and visible to the driver regardless of the vehicle’s instrument display design.

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OAREG 6.1.2.x

The OAA must ensure aircraft limitations pertaining to the aircraft type’s ability to trample raised or partially raised aircraft arrestor cables is advised to the aerodrome’s ATS provider.

138. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure ATS personnel are aware of aircraft limitations when seeking to achieve maximum runway efficiency.

139. Aerodrome based aircraft arrestor systems (AAS) include:

a. arrestor cables placed across runways

b. barrier nets placed at the end of a runway

c. control interfaces.

140. Operational efficiency reduces cost. Some arrestor cable systems (BAK–12) are not able to be remotely raised or lowered by ATC, whereas others can be remotely raised and lowered (BAK–14). A raised or partially raised arrestor cable, intended or otherwise, may not present a runway obstruction hazard to all aircraft. Such requirements should include advice on which aircraft may trample a raised or partially raised arrestor cable, including whether this is approach end on landing or departure end on take off, or anytime at taxi speed. Also of note, the setup of a BAK–14 should also be considered as trampling may dislodge cable positioning/restraint hardware.

141. Non–Defence aircraft that operate at Defence aerodromes equipped with arrestor cables may or may not be able to trample a raised or partially raised arrestor cable. In such cases, should such action be foreseen, liaison with the company Chief Pilot should occur to ascertain aircraft capability.

142. Should any doubt exist as to whether an aircraft may or may not trample a raised or partially raised arrestor cable that cannot be lowered, the ATS provider should advise the pilot of the cable status and distance from the approach or departure end of the runway as appropriate, and request from the pilot a determination of the aircraft’s ability to trample the cable or not, vice the ATS provider imposing a determination.

143. OAA policy determinations relating to arrestor systems should be made available in Defence AIP to assure awareness and compliance.

OAREG 6.1.2.y The OAA must ensure a Wildlife Hazard Management Plan (WHMP) is established for each certified aerodrome.

144. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure the presence of wildlife (birds and animals) on and in the aerodrome vicinity will not pose a serious threat to aircraft operational safety.

145. A WHMP minimises the likelihood of collisions between aircraft and wildlife. The intent of the regulation is not to force high resource allocation upon the service provider; but to ensure at least basic protection is provided that meets the OAA requirements. The level of detail in the WHPM may vary between aerodromes. For example, it may be that grass cutting and fencing will suffice in some cases. In other cases, a higher degree of protection may be required, such as only planting certain types of grass, or using advanced wildlife scaring techniques. As such, close coordination by the service provider with the OAA is required to ensure aircraft safety is assured in a manner that meets OAA ALARP principles. Certified aerodromes are also likely to be shared with a civil aerodrome operator, who is required by CASA to develop an appropriate WHMP. As such, Defence will benefit from close WHMP coordination with these entities.

OAREG 6.1.2.z The OAA must determine the WHMP requirements for each registered aerodrome.

146. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure the OAA an ability to control resources using risk determinations.

147. The OAA may also consider the need for an unregistered aerodrome’s requirement to have a WHMP should an increase in operational tempo be planned for the aerodrome. In such cases, a simple risk determination and minimal defence strategies may prove beneficial to flight safety. Sup

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OAREG 6.1.2.aa The OAA must ensure an AEP is established for each certified aerodrome.


149. An AEP is a critical document that supports the safe management of aircraft emergencies and/or accidents.

150. AMC. Acceptable means of compliance includes the AAP 6734.001 – Defence Aviation Safety Manual.

OAREG 6.1.2.bb The OAA must determine the AEP requirements for each registered aerodrome.


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OAREG 6.1.3 – AERODROME RESCUE AND FIRE FIGHTING (ARFF) (back to top) 152. Suitability for flight assessment. ARFF can compromise suitability for flight if unable to create and maintain survivable conditions after an aircraft accident or serious incident by providing egress routes for aircraft occupants and initiating the rescue of those occupants unable to make their escape without direct aid. ARFF also contributes support for maintenance activities, such as hot refuelling, to ensure safety of both personnel and aircraft.

OAREG 6.1.3.a(1) The OAA must ensure an operational document is established that details ARFF procedures.

153. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that Aerodrome Rescue And Fire Fighting (ARFF) services are provided in a manner that preservation of life and materiel in the event of an aircraft accident or incident occurring at, or in the immediate vicinity of, an aerodrome is can be achieved.

154. ARFF service is a critical aerodrome subsystem that is regulated separately from aerodromes due to its specialised nature. Defence ARFF may be provided by Service elements or contracted civilian agencies.

155. In interests of interoperability, the OAA may authorise a shared ARFF document with the civil ARFF service provider.

156. ARFF vehicles are regulated under the Technical Regulation of ADF Materiel Manual - Land (TRAMM–L) as published by the Director of Technical Regulation – Army. ARFF provided as part of RAN Ship Aviation Facilities (SAF) are regulated under Navy Australian Books of Reference.

AMC 157. ARFF operational controls include:

a. ICAO Annex 14 – Volume I – Aerodromes.

b. MOS 139 Subpart H – Standards Applicable to the Provision of Aerodrome Rescue and Fire Fighting Services.

OAREG 6.1.3.a(2) The OAA must ensure the constraints for ARFF to operate elsewhere other than on the supported aerodrome are established and published in the aerodrome manual.

158. The principle ARFF objective should not prevent the aerodrome’s ARFF service provider from providing fire control services or rescue services off the aerodrome, but the ARFF service provider must give priority to the principle ARFF objectives that support the aerodrome.

159. The distance ARFF is permitted to operate off the aerodrome should be specified as a time interval vice a specified distance, as a short distance over difficult terrain could require a large time period for return to base. A suggested time period is a 10 minute transit time from the ARFF base station. The time period should be advised via the aerodrome manual.

OAREG 6.1.3.a(3) The OAA must ensure aerodrome emergency access roads are provided that facilitate ARFF achieving a response time not exceeding three minutes to any point of each operational runway, in optimum visibility and surface conditions from the ARFF base station.

160. Response time is considered the time between the initial call to ARFF, and the time when the first responding vehicle(s) can be positioned to provide assistance.

161. Optimum visibility and surface conditions are defined as daytime, good visibility, no precipitation with normal response route free of surface contamination.

162. The ARFF base should be pre-positioned in a location that provides direct and clear access to the relevant runways.

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OAREG 6.1.3.a(4) The OAA must ensure the ARFF level of protection required in support of aerodrome operations is established and published in the aerodrome manual.

163. ARFF requirements vary by aircraft type. The level of protection normally available at an aerodrome should be expressed in terms of an ARFF category, which determines the types and amounts of extinguishing agents normally available at the aerodrome.

164. The ARFF category protection level should be published in Defence AIP (via the aerodrome manual) to ensure it is available for public use.

OAREG 6.1.3.a(5) The OAA must ensure a reliable communication system is established that allows direct communications between the ARFF base station, ATC tower, the ARFF vehicles and other required emergency response services.

165. The communication system may consist of a combination of radio, land line and other mobile systems.

OAREG 6.1.3.a(6) The OAA must ensure that personnel who provide an ARFF service comply with OAREG 6.1.1.

166. An aircraft rescue fire fighter is a Defence member or employee, including those civilian personnel under contract to Defence, who is recognised as appropriately trained and authorised to provide an ARFF service.

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OAREG 6.1.4 – AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION (back to top) 167. Suitability for flight assessment. Aeronautical information can compromise suitability for flight if product relied upon to manoeuvre an aircraft is inaccurate, resulting in the aircraft being placed within an unsafe proximity to terrain, obstacles or another aircraft.

OAREG 6.1.4.a The OAA must approve use of aeronautical information or data obtained from entities other than the Defence AISP.

168. The purpose of this regulation is acknowledge that operational constraints may not allow for formal Defence AISP review or provision of the intended product under OAREG 6.1.4.b. The regulation is not intended to provide a means to conveniently bypass the Defence AISP. In such cases, the OAA will make a risk determination as to the aeronautical information or data integrity.

169. The OAA referred to in this regulation is the OAA accountable for the aviation system using the aeronautical information or data, not the OAA who holds the Defence AA AISP (AIS–AF) delegation. For example, if an aircraft is specified under the Army OAA appointment, the Army OAA may approve the non-Defence AISP sourced aeronautical information or data. In such cases, the AISP should be made aware if the information or data is an ongoing requirement so the AISP can apply resources to achieve an AISP sourced supply.

OAREG 6.1.4.b The OAA must ensure the published Defence AIP includes:

(1) Publications that advise those flight procedures and airspace requirements used to conduct flight nationally and internationally.

(2) Aeronautical data in support of mission planning products.

(3) Enroute charts, both national and international as required.

(4) Visual charts used for navigation and planning purposes.

(5) Terminal charts containing information on departure and approach procedures for:

(a) each certified aerodrome

(b) each registered aerodrome (as determined by the OAA)

(c) each operationally relevant overseas aerodrome (as determined by the OAA).

(6) Any other matter of lasting relevance relating to the facilitation of air traffic.

170. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that required AIP is available for Defence use.

171. Air Force has historically acted as the Aeronautical Information Service provider (AISP) on behalf of all Defence aviation.

172. Only the registered aerodromes and operationally relevant overseas aerodromes that the OAA has determined to require Terminal charts should be included in the published Defence AIP.

173. The Defence AIP constitutes the basic information source for permanent information and long duration temporary changes. The Defence AIP is intended to satisfy Defence requirements for the exchange of aeronautical information of a lasting character essential to air navigation, both nationally and internationally.

174. The Defence AIP should be constrained to essential Defence requirements in a manner that suits operational requirements, and supplemented where required by reference to the civil AIP Australia for more general matters. Where practicable, the form of presentation should be designed to facilitate use in flight.

175. Aeronautical information may be hard copy, electronic copy or digital data format.

176. Digital data products are supplied to support mission and flight planning systems, and for avionic systems in certain Defence aviation systems.

177. Defence aerodrome information provided for public use should utilise the aerodrome categorisation terminology as provided in OAREG 6.1.2–Aerodrome (Public information).

178. The Defence AISP should coordinate alignment wherever practicable regarding rules of the air between civil and military aviation practise.

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a. ICAO Annex 2 – Rules of the Air.

b. ICAO Annex 4 – Aeronautical Charts.

c. ICAO Annex 11 – Air Traffic Services.

d. The Airspace Act 2007.

e. ICAO Annex 15 – Aeronautical Information Services.

f. Air Services Australia Act.

180. Conflicts that may exist between Defence AIP, AIP Australia and the Defence ATS document are addressed under OAREG 6.1.7 – ATM. Coordination is required between the Defence AISP and the Defence ANSP to ensure document conflicts are resolved should any exist.

181. The Defence AISP may substitute external aeronautical information it deems suitable for Defence use where efficiencies can be gained. For example, AIP Australia as published under Airservices Regulation 4.12.

OAREG 6.1.4.c The OAA must ensure the Defence AIP states the Defence AA as the publishing authority.

182. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that Defence AIP are provided authority for application.

183. Defence AIP is intended for use by all Services under the auspices of the DASP. This requires Defence AA to be identified as the Defence AIP publishing authority.

OAREG 6.1.4.d The OAA must approve authorisations for specialised flight procedures that form part of the Defence AIP or civil AIP that may be used by Defence aviation, including obtaining TAA recommendations when required.

184. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that flight procedures published for general use are afforded appropriate oversight before publication.

185. Similar civil requirements as provided in AIP Australia direct such authorisations to CASA. As Defence may also use the AIP Australia, clarification in the Defence AIP ensures clear direction for Defence users regardless of which information is used, that is, the OAA is always the approval authority for military aviation.

OAREG 6.1.4.e The OAA must ensure personnel who design aeronautical instrument procedures used for conduct of flight comply with OAREG 6.1.1.

186. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that personnel who design instrument procedures do not compromise suitability for flight.

187. An instrument procedures designer is a Defence member or employee who is recognised as appropriately trained and authorised to design instrument procedures used for air navigation.

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OAREG 6.1.5 – AIR BATTLE MANAGEMENT (ABM) (back to top) 188. Suitability for flight assessment. ABM can compromise suitability for flight if tactical control or advisory information provided to and acted upon by the pilot subsequently places the aircraft in close proximity to other aircraft, objects or terrain.

OAREG 6.1.5.a The OAA must ensure an operational document is established that details Air Battle Management procedures.

189. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that Air Battle Management (ABM) services will not compromise suitability for flight.

190. ABM provides a wider range of services than those regulated under MILAVREG 6. For the purpose of MILAVREG 6, ABM is constrained to those aspects that provide tactical control or advisory information that the pilot may base flight decisions upon. Tactical control does not include positive separation assurance as provided under an ATC service.

191. Where ABM services are provided from an aircraft or ship, the aircraft or ship systems utilised to provide the service may be regulated as part of the aircraft’s or the ship’s equivalent document vice AvSS requirements.

AMC 192. ABM operational controls include accepted Australian Defence doctrine, which includes foreign Service doctrine accepted for use by Australia.

193. ABM is provided by more than one Service, therefore ABM practises should utilise joint publications where possible.

OAREG 6.1.5.b The OAA must ensure personnel who provide an ABM service comply with OAREG 6.1.1.

194. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that personnel who provide ABM services will not compromise suitability for flight.

195. An Air Combat Officer (ACO) Air Battle Manager (ABM) is an Air Force Defence member recognised as appropriately trained and authorised to provide an ABM service.

196. A Fighter Controller (FC) is a Navy Defence member recognised as appropriately trained and authorised to provide an ABM service.23

23 http://intranet.defence.gov.au/navyweb/sites/HWaCu/ComWeb.asp?page=111623.

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OAREG 6.1.6 – AIR CARGO DELIVERY (ACD) (back to top) 197. Suitability for flight assessment. ACD can compromise suitability for flight by affecting the aircraft’s flight profile or physical integrity should the cargo be incorrectly loaded into the aircraft in a manner that does not ensure correct configuration, placement, and restraint.

OAREG 6.1.6.a The OAA must ensure an operational document is established that details ACD procedures.

198. Aircraft movement services provide a multitude of services, one of which is Air Cargo Delivery (ACD). The regulation only applies to ACD aspects that involve the loading of air cargo, whatever it may be,24 and the unloading of the air cargo, either on the ground or while in the air.

199. ACD may include:

a. payload composition

b. configuration, which includes weight and balance

c. placement

d. restraint within, or attached to, aircraft platforms.

AMC 200. ACD operational controls include:

a. ICAO Annex 18 – Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air.

b. International Air Transport Association (IATA) Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR) Manual.

c. CASR Part 92 – Consignment & carriage of dangerous goods by air

d. eDEOP 101 – Safety principles for the handling of explosives ordnance.

e. Accepted Australian Defence doctrine, which includes foreign Service doctrine accepted for use by Australia.

201. Where ACD is provided by more than one service, ACD service providers should utilise joint publications where possible.

OAREG 6.1.6.b The OAA must approve any waiver for IATA identified dangerous goods (DG) that are not configured and handled in accordance with IATA regulations unless the Defence ACD document has authorised a different procedure.

202. While IATA is a comprehensive document, it may not always accommodate the needs of Defence activity. In such cases, specialised Defence requirements should be contained within the Defence ACD document. For those non-documented requirements, the waiver process provides an acceptable risk determination ability.

203. OIP in relation to dangerous goods issued under this regulation should include:

a. Assurances that exemptions for carriage of dangerous goods issued to meet an operational requirement will not compromise suitability for flight.

b. Dangerous goods training requirements, including currency/refresher training for dangerous goods qualifications.

c. Identification of requirements for the carriage of:

(1) approved munitions, including riot control agents

(2) individual weapons by aircrew in hostile or remote areas

(3) dangerous/restricted articles by passengers, including private firearms, animals, plants and fruit

(4) Military Police / Force Protection working dogs.

27 Including, but not limited to passengers, freight, paratroopers, animals and EO materials.

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OAREG 6.1.6.c The OAA must ensure that personnel who configure, load and unload air cargo comply with OAREG 6.1.1.

204. An air movement specialist is a Defence member or employee recognised as appropriately trained and authorised to conduct aircraft loading/unloading, including aerial delivery.

205. An Aircraft Loadmaster is a Defence member operating in the airborne environment, who among other duties is also recognised as appropriately trained and authorised to conduct aircraft loading/unloading, including aerial delivery.

206. An Air Dispatcher (AD) is a Defence member who among other duties is also recognised as appropriately trained and authorised, to build loads for air drop, air land and helicopter external lift

207. A Parachute Rigger (RIG PCHT) is a Defence member who inspects, packs/reservices and repairs Aerial Delivery Equipment (ADE)

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OAREG 6.1.7 – AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT (ATM) (back to top) 208. Suitability for flight assessment. ATM can compromise suitability for flight by:

a. affecting the manner in which aircraft are operated, positioned or exposed to other aircraft, other airborne objects such as artillery fire, terrain, obstacles or aerodrome surface movement traffic;

b. inadvertently changing the service provision due to incorrect airspace classification determinations, by allocating insufficient airspace volumes to conduct an aircraft activity, or by use of inappropriate airspace deconfliction procedures impacting the ability to safely provide an airspace dependant service; and

c. providing navigation information, that if inaccurate or unavailable, could result in an aircraft impacting terrain, obstacles, other aircraft, an increased fuel burn leading to an inability to reach the required landing position, or an aircraft’s ability to land during inclement weather conditions.

OAREG 6.1.7.a The OAA must ensure an operational document is established that details ATS procedures and air traffic control (ATC) separation standards; is harmonised with ICAO and national civil practice.

209. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure formal Defence commitments provided to CASA in July 2000 that Defence ATS will apply CASA/ICAO ATC standards to civil aircraft are regulated in an enduring manner that ensures continued compliance and visibility to CASA, or any other non-Defence agency.25

210. Defence is an Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) in its own right, and is recognised as such by the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 1988 Part 1 Interpretation, Civil Airspace Regulations 2007 Part 2 para 13(3)(b), and the Australian Airspace Policy Statements of 2007 para 5.10.

211. Air Force has provided Defence ATC on behalf of Navy since 1993 and on behalf of Army since 1998. Defence also provides ATC to civil aircraft; as such Defence and civil ATC procedures require harmonisation in order to ensure interoperability in a safe and effective manner.

212. Defence has also provided, and will likely continue to provide, ATS to other countries in time of crisis, where such ATS must comply with ICAO standards and recommended practices (SARPS). It is essential that ATC service is harmonised between civil and military to ensure safe application of the ATS. Equally, this regulation ensures separation assurance or lesser requirements are provided to Defence aircraft in an acceptable manner.

213. Maritime considerations.26 Defence ATS categories that apply to maritime operations are referred to as Maritime Control Services (MCS). The Helicopter Operations from Ships other than Aircraft Carriers (HOSTAC) Program provides a forum for standardising procedures and hardware for helicopter and ship cross operations among different nations. Once national ship, helicopter, and procedural data is gathered and compiled, the HOSTAC Program makes it available to nations through the multinational HOSTAC publications. HOSTAC Volume I is the international naval standard providing maritime based MCS operational procedures.27 Recognition is provided that MCS harmonisation with ICAO and national practice may not be achievable concurrently with HOSTAC expectations; therefore HOSTAC may take precedence as required to ensure that a ship’s ability to operate in the combined naval environment is not compromised.

214. Separation standards. Air traffic separation standards are designed to prevent collision between aircraft. HOSTAC provides surveillance based separation standards; however, ICAO Annex 11 provides both surveillance based separation standards, non-surveillance based separation standards and wake turbulence separation standards. As ICAO Annex 11 is the predominant document, applied internationally under the Chicago convention, and provides the widest range of standards, compliance with Annex 11 best ensures Australian air traffic separation standards will achieve the purpose of collision avoidance with the best overall operational flexibility. Reductions in ICAO standards are managed under OAREG 6.1.7.c.

AMC 215. ATS operational controls include:

a. ICAO Annex 11 – Air Traffic Services.

b. Australian Airspace Regulations 2007.

c. CASR Part 172 – Air Traffic Services. 25 CAF minute 2000 9743 Pt 1 (25) / CAF 634 100 of 31 Jul 2000 (R9693328) 26 OAR DB Introduction of Maritime Control Service of 09 Nov 15 (AB24978978) 27 HOSTAC use of the term ATC includes advisory services Defence groups under the term MCS.

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d. NATO Standard MPP-02 Helicopter Operations from Ships other than Aircraft Carriers (HOSTAC) Vol 1 Chap 2 of 2013.

e. Maritime doctrine.

216. In interests of harmonisation, a shared civil–military document with the civil ATS provider may be published, noting this may not be suitable for the maritime based ATS document.

OAREG 6.1.7.b The OAA must ensure Defence ATS providers within Australian airspace resolve differences between AIP Australia, Defence AIP and the Defence ATS documents in accordance with the following document hierarchy: AIP Australia and Defence AIP take precedence over the Defence ATS document, and for military aircraft Defence AIP has precedence over AIP Australia and the Defence ATS document.

217. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure conflicts between operational documents do not lead to confusion between the flight crew and service provider.

218. The Defence air navigation service provider (ANSP) is required to follow the ATS document in order to provide the intended service, whereas rules of the air provided in Defence AIP and AIP Australia are utilised by pilots to navigate aircraft. Ideally, the two information sources would be aligned to ensure conflicts do not exist. The intent of this regulation is to ensure that where conflicts may exist, the ANSP is responsive to the customer requirements. Any unresolved conflicts should be directed to the OAA for determination.

219. When the Defence ATS document conflicts with either AIP Australia or Defence AIP, the person who has noted the issue should take action to address such conflicts by informing the Defence AISP and the relevant ATS provider.

OAREG 6.1.7.c Any reduction of air traffic separation standards prescribed in the Defence ATS document must be approved by the OAA for the affected aircraft type.

220. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that application of a reduced air traffic separation standard is only approved by the authority responsible for the aircraft to which the reduced standard will be applied vice another OAA who may hold a delegation for the supporting AvSS, but may not be the aircraft specific OAA. For example, an Army aircraft would require Army OAA approval, vice the OAA responsible for the ATS being provided.

221. Operational considerations may require a reduction of ICAO separation standards. For example, a wake turbulence standard reduction to gain an operational efficiency; or maritime operations may necessitate a reduction in surveillance standards.

222. Reductions from ICAO specified separation standards should be published in the Defence AIP, which will then support changes to the Defence ATS document.

223. There is no restriction on who may propose a change to separation standards, but in any case the initial research should closely involve the Defence ANSP to ensure any such change will not compromise safety of other flight operations.

OAREG 6.1.7.d The OAA must ensure personnel providing an ATC service possess an ATC license that complies with ICAO Annex 1 – Personnel Licensing.

224. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that past Chief of Air Force commitments to CASA regarding the application of Defence ATS as a national ANSP are made enduring.28

225. ATC is the only ATS that is responsible for collision avoidance for civil and military aircraft by issuing pilots ATC instructions and clearances that ensure separation assurance is maintained.

226. Unless the Navy OAA deems otherwise, this regulation does not apply to personnel who provide MCS positive safety control as the service is applied to military aircraft only.

28 CAF minute 2000 9743 Pt 1 (25) / CAF 634 100 of 31 Jul 2000 (R9693328).

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OAREG 6.1.7.e The OAA must ensure the ATC license clearly indicates ICAO compliance has been achieved, specifies the OAR as the licensing authority, and is issued by the OAA.

227. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to formalise ATC qualification to ICAO. The license can be a standalone document, or an entry appropriately placed within the ATC service provider’s personnel logbook.

228. In the interests of harmonisation, implementation of agreements with CASA should be considered that affords the use of CASR Part 65 – ATS Licensing.

OAREG 6.1.7.f The OAA must ensure an operational document is established that details Battlefield Airspace Control (BAC) procedures.

AMC 229. Operational controls include accepted Australian Defence doctrine, which includes foreign Service doctrine accepted for use by Australia.

230. The BAC document should align with the Defence ATS document, the Terminal Attack Control (TAC) document and the airspace management document in order to gain efficiencies.

OAREG 6.1.7.g The OAA must ensure that personnel providing an ATS comply with OAREG 6.1.1.

231. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that personnel who provide an ATS service will not compromise suitability for flight.

232. Personnel who provide various ATS include:

a. Joint Battlefield Airspace Controller (JBAC), who is a Defence member recognised as appropriately trained and authorised to provide ATC, MCS and/or BAC.

b. Defence Air Traffic Controller (Defence ATC), who is a Defence employee recognised as appropriately trained and authorised to provide ATC.

c. Helicopter Control Officer (HCO), who is a Defence member who, amongst other duties, recognised as appropriately trained and authorised to provide a ship–based (heliport) MCS (advisory).

d. Procedural Aircraft Controller (PAC), who is a Defence member who, amongst other duties, is recognised as appropriately trained and authorised to provide a ship based MCS.

e. Anti-Submarine/Anti-Surface Aircraft Controller (ASAC), who is a Defence member who, amongst other tactical services, is recognised as appropriately trained and authorised to provide an MCS, SSRA and ELVA (refer to OAREG 6.1.10 – SAF).

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OAREG 6.1.7.h The OAA must ensure an operational document is established that details airspace management procedures to ensure safe, orderly and efficient use of Defence administered airspace.

233. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that Defence administered airspace management procedures are harmonised with civil requirements and to ensure efficiencies for Defence use.

234. Within Australia, the Airspace Act 2007 is the legislation directing the national airspace administration and regulation as follows:

a. Part 2 section 8 directs the Minister for Transport to make an Australian Airspace Policy Statement, which is reviewed at least every three years.

b. Part 3 section 11 directs CASA to administer and regulate Australian airspace, and to perform its powers and functions in a manner consistent with the Minister’s Airspace Policy statement.

c. Part 3 section 12(2)(b) requires that CASA take into account national security interests when performing its airspace regulator role.

235. Within CASA, the Office of Airspace Regulation has sole responsibility for regulating Australian airspace.

236. The Airspace Policy Statement 2007 section 5.10 recognises Defence airspace requirements and notes the Defence powers that can affect airspace at section 4.2. To operate an integrated civilian/military airspace management service at the national level that meets the needs of both civilian and Defence airspace users, the Airspace Policy Statement 2007 facilitates Defence agreements with CASA that allow embedding of Defence members within the CASA Office of Airspace Regulation to represent Defence’s airspace interests.

237. Defence administration of allocated airspace affords the ability to vary airspace classes and services provided in order to assure Defence raise, train and sustain (RTS) requirements can be achieved. Civil aircraft who desire to operate in Defence airspace should be advised of any existing deviations to the airspace classification determined services normally provided under the Airspace Regulations 2007 so the operator may choose to comply or not enter the airspace.

AMC 238. Operational controls include:

a. Australian Airspace Regulations 2007.

b. Defence AIP.

c. Government policy direction.

d. Australian Defence doctrine.

239. Airspace change proposals are managed IAW the CASA Office of Airspace Regulation Operations Manual.

OAREG 6.1.7.i The OAA must ensure airspace requirements for Defence administered Prohibited, Restricted and Danger (PRD) areas are established and include vertical airspace requirements; lateral airspace boundary requirements; the hours of airspace activation required for the training area; the Restricted Area (RA) civil access status; identification and contact information for the coordinating authority for each airspace; the level of ATS, if active, that will be provided to civil aircraft should access to the RA be approved.

240. This regulation also includes airspace that supports ground fire activities that require public notice of airspace requirements to ensure aviation safety.

241. CASA airspace policy provides various RA civil aircraft access levels for consideration by Defence.

OAREG 6.1.7.j The OAA must ensure Defence PRD requirements are provided to the CASA Office of Airspace Regulation.

242. The Australian Designated Airspace Handbook is managed by CASA via the civil ANSP and provides required airspace information used to manage listed airspace.

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http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2007A00038/Html/Text#param8




http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2011C00282

http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2007L01835


http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/aip/aip.asp?pg=10


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OAREG 6.1.7.k The OAA must ensure the Defence (Special Undertakings) Act 1952 is not used for the relatively routine activities of declaring airspace for military raise, train, sustain (RTS) requirements.

243. The Airspace Policy Statement 2007 section 5.10 recognises Defence airspace requirements and notes the Defence powers that can affect airspace at section 4.2.

Air navigation aids (NAVAIDS) 244. As an ANSP, Defence is responsible for the reliability, availability and accuracy of Defence NAVAIDS, which may include:

a. Instrument landing system (ILS).

b. Global navigation satellite system (GNSS).

c. VHF omni–directional radio range (VOR).

d. Non-directional radio beacon (NDB).

e. Distance measuring equipment (DME).

f. Tactical air navigation aid (TACAN).

g. Precision approach path indicator (PAPI).

h. Surveillance systems (RADAR, ADS–B).

245. NAVAID management is provided for under MILAVREG 6 and technical regulations.

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OAREG 6.1.8 – AIR WEAPONS RANGE (AWR) (back to top) 246. Suitability for flight assessment. An AWR can compromise suitability for flight by affecting safe aircraft access to and use of AWR related airspace to conduct activities or the safety of those ground based personnel supporting the AWR during ordnance delivery.

OAREG 6.1.8.a The OAA must ensure an operational document is established that details Air Weapons Range airspace safety procedures.

247. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that Defence administered airspace management procedures at Air Weapons Ranges are documented to assure suitability for flight.

248. An Air Weapons Range (AWR) consists of:

a. infrastructure

b. an airspace safety system.

249. MILAVREG 6 and OAREG 6 do not regulate AWR infrastructure and related support services, as existing regulations, policies and practices are deemed sufficient.

250. Defence Force Regulations Part XI – Defence Practice Areas Regulation 49 authorises the Minister for Defence to declare a Defence Practice Area (DPA) for air, land or sea areas.

251. The Woomera Prohibited Area (WPA) policy is prescribed within DI(G) ADMIN 38–1 – Policy and Procedures for the use of the WPA and Woomera Test Facility. The WPA policy is deemed to be sufficient for the management of Woomera Test Range infrastructure. Additionally, T&E of flight activities are outside the normal airworthiness construct, by the fact they are T&E, vice normal operating procedures.

252. The Directorate of Training Areas, Regulations and Policy (DTARP) within Estate and Infrastructure Group (E&IG) is responsible for maintaining Defence policy on the regulation and management of training areas throughout Australia and delivery and maintenance of the Defence Training Area Management Manual (DTAMM).

253. The DTAMM describes the responsibilities and framework for corporate planning and management of Defence training areas and ranges. The DTAMM is authorised by DI(G) ADMIN 59–1 – Management of Defence Training Areas. Training area management policy is designed to deliver a safe and sustainable training environment.29

254. The Directorate of Operations and Training Area Management (DOTAM) is the directorate that is responsible for the planning and operations of approximately 50 Defence Training Areas and Ranges in Australia.

255. The Training Area Management Authority (TAMA) is responsible for authorising and controlling all non-Defence use and access to Defence training areas and ranges.30

AMC 256. Operational control sources include:

a. Defence ATS and airspace management documents.

b. Accepted Australian Defence doctrine, which includes foreign Service doctrine accepted for use by Australia.

OAREG 6.1.8.b The OAA must ensure AWR activities involving delivery of ordnance employ an AWR airspace safety officer.

257. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure airspace safety at an AWR is sufficiently resourced so that suitability for flight is not compromised when any ordnance is planned for deployment, be it live or inert.

16 DTARP website viewed 23 Oct 12. 17As advised on the DTARP FAQ website viewed 23 Oct 12.

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http://intranet.defence.gov.au/dsg/sites/DOTAM/ComWeb.asp?page=4897

http://intranet.defence.gov.au/home/documents/data/ADFPUBS/DIG/ga59_01.pdf

http://intranet.defence.gov.au/dsg/sites/DTARP/ComWeb.asp?page=6449

http://intranet.defence.gov.au/dsg/sites/DTARP/ComWeb.asp?page=68512


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OAREG 6.1.8.c The OAA must ensure that personnel who provide an AWR airspace safety service comply with OAREG 6.1.1.

258. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that personnel who assure airspace safety at an AWR will not compromise suitability for flight.

259. A Range Safety Officer (RSO) is a Defence member who is recognised as appropriately trained and authorised to provide an AWR airspace safety service.

OAREG 6.1.9 – METEOROLOGY (MET) (back to top) 260. Suitability for flight assessment. MET service can compromise suitability for flight where pre-flight planning or enroute flight decisions have been based upon MET product that may be inaccurate.

OAREG 6.1.9.a The OAA must ensure an operational document is established that details Defence generated MET product development and MET product delivery procedures.

261. Under The Meteorology Act 1955,31 the Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) is the National Meteorological Authority for Australia and complies with ICAO Annex 3 – Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation. The BOM provides MET services to Defence under contract, except where a Service maintains inherent capability (such as Navy).

262. MET regulation only applies to Defence produced MET product.

AMC 263. MET operational controls include ICAO Annex 3 – Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation.

OAREG 6.1.9.b The OAA must ensure Defence personnel who provide a MET service comply with OAREG 6.1.1.

264. A Defence meteorologist is a Defence member or employee who is recognised as appropriately trained and authorised to provide a MET service. BOM MET staff are deemed to be compliant with OAREG 6.1.1.

AMC 265. Defence MET staff may be trained using BOM resources.

18 http://www.bom.gov.au/inside/eiab/reports/ar02-03/PDF/Appendix.pdf.

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OAREG 6.1.10 – SHIP AVIATION FACILITIES (SAF) (back to top) 266. Suitability for flight assessment. SAF can compromise suitability for flight in the same manner as ABM, ATM or aerodromes.

267. Heliport. SAF Heliport facilities include:

a. The flight deck area, which includes aircraft landing/take off areas, for either rotary wing or fixed wing as per ship design and capability.

b. Assisted landing systems, such as recover, assist, secure and traverse (RAST).

c. Other landing aids, such as MAGS, visual NAVAIDS, surface lighting, etc.

268. The term heliport is used vice the term flight deck to provide a broader scope of awareness concerning all AvSS capabilities associated with SAF flight operations, such as ARFF service, lighting requirements, tie down points, arrestor equipment, etc. The term flight deck is comparable to the term movement area as described under Aerodromes.

269. SAF heliport facilities are not regulated in the same manner as aerodromes. The ship aviation facilities on RAN vessels are also regulated under Australian Books of Reference (ABR).

OAREG 6.1.10.a The OAA must ensure SAF based personnel providing an ABM service comply with OAREG 6.1.5 – ABM.

270. OAREG 6 does not regulate tactical services directed towards surface or sub surface activities. Tactical control also does not include separation assurance as provided under an ATC or MCS/positive control. See OAREG 6.1.5.

OAREG 6.1.10.b The OAA must ensure SAF based personnel providing a maritime control service comply with OAREG 6.1.7 – ATM.

271. An air capable ship may also provide a wide array of AvSS over a number of different platforms that must be integrated into the overall ship design.

OAREG 6.1.10.c The OAA must ensure personnel who provide air capable ship based ARFF comply with OAREG 6.1.1.

272. Refer to ABM, ATM and ARFF regulation guidance for service provider descriptions.

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OAREG 6.11 – TERMINAL ATTACK CONTROL (TAC) (back to top) 273. Suitability for flight assessment. TAC can compromise suitability for flight if tactical control or advisory information provided to and acted upon by the pilot subsequently places the aircraft in close proximity to other aircraft, objects or terrain, or cause an attack profile to target unintended people or property.

OAREG 6.1.11.a The OAA must ensure an operational document is established that details TAC procedures.

274. TAC provides tactical control or advisory information, from a forward position, that supports the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air support and other offensive air support activities. When conducted from an airborne position, TAC may also be referred to as Forward Air Control–Airborne (FAC–A); however the functional outcome is the same.

275. MILAVREG 6 only regulates those TAC aspects that provide tactical control or advisory information that the pilot may base flight decisions upon. Tactical control does not include positive separation assurance as provided under an ATC service.

AMC 276. Regulation only applies to those TAC aspects that provide tactical control or advisory information that the pilot may base flight decisions upon. Tactical control does not include positive separation assurance as provided under an ATC service.

277. TAC operational controls include accepted Australian Defence doctrine, which includes foreign Service doctrine accepted for use by Australia.

OAREG 6.1.11.b The OAA must ensure personnel who provide a TAC service comply with OAREG 6.1.1.

278. A Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) is a Defence member who is recognised as appropriately trained and authorised to provide TAC.

279. A Forward Air Controller–Airborne (FAC–A) is a Defence member operating in the airborne environment, who among other duties is also recognised as appropriately trained and authorised to provide TAC service.

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OAREG 6.1.12 – Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR) (back to top) 280. Suitability for flight assessment. Joint personnel recovery (JPR) can compromise suitability for flight should the ability to recover personnel transported aboard the aircraft who are in need of JPR be ineffective. Just as airworthiness commences with pre-flight preparations, such as flight planning, so does suitability for flight extend to the post flight phase.

281. Exemption. JPR is not regulated as the CJOPS extant policy and product is deemed adequate for achieving AvSS compliance.

282. JPR provides a mechanism to reduce, wherever possible, the risk to the lives and welfare of personnel as a result of Defence aviation activity.

283. The Australian National Search and Rescue (NATSAR) http://natsar.amsa.gov.au/index.asp, comprising representatives from the Commonwealth, States and Department of Defence,20 sponsors the NATSAR Manual (NATSARM). The ADF is responsible for providing SAR coverage for military assets and within the Australian Search and Rescue Region (SRR), including visiting military foreign forces.

284. The ADF recognises JPR as the mechanism for recovering all isolated personnel from all environments at all levels of hostility. As part of JPR, SAR operations are those operations executed in a permissive environment, while JPR operations are executed in an uncertain or hostile environment.

285. CJOPS has established a policy21 that while the NATSARM is accepted as the Australian standard procedural guide for coordinating peacetime SAR activities within the Australian SRR, the NATSARM is not to be used as the authority for recovery operations. Under this policy, CJOPS has published a comprehensive JPR Manual that is intended to achieve Defence JPR requirements.

20 Inter-Governmental Agreement on National Search and Rescue Response Arrangements dated 29 June 2012 – para 6. 21 CJOPS HQJOC (AM169740) dated 15 Dec 10 333.

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http://natsar.amsa.gov.au/Manuals/Search_and_Rescue_Manual/documents/NATSARMAN2011.pdf

http://natsar.amsa.gov.au/SAR_Issues/documents/IGAdated29June2012.pdf


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OAREG 6.1.13 – Medical (back to top) 286. Suitability for flight assessment. Medical can compromise suitability for flight if aircrew or designated specialist staff are operating without the ability to obtain medical clearance for a physiological or psychological condition that might induce error and impact safety, or by limiting the ability to conduct effective aerodrome emergency response due to lack of medical staff.

287. Flexibility Provision.. MILAVREG 6 does not regulate Medical as the extant medical policy and product is deemed adequate for achieving AvSS compliance. Medical training is a nationally documented training system that may not be well complemented by additional aviation regulations.

288. Medical provides specialist medical services to nominated specialist personnel as part of daily flying activity, and emergency response capabilities in support of the Aerodrome Emergency Plan (AEP).

289. Medical should not be confused with Aviation Medicine aspects such as hyperbaric training equipment, which are not considered; rather they form part of the overall aircrew training system.

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UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS


MILAVREG 7 – Unmanned Aircraft System

OAREG 7 – Unmanned Aircraft Systems

INTRODUCTION

1. The outcome of OAREG 7 is to regulate UAS to ensure UAS operations are conducted at an acceptable level of safety to personnel, other aircraft and property, without undue compromise to operational flexibility that achieves ALARP. Management of a UAS begins at the commencement of the acquisition process and continues throughout the lifecycle of the system. The degree of regulatory oversight applied to the operation of a UAS requires tailoring, as deemed appropriate, to suit the CRE of the system and associated risk.

2. MILAVREG 7 addresses the Airworthiness management of UAS along the following fundamental principles:

a. A particular UAS type will be chosen for acquisition on the basis that it will satisfy the operational capability requirement when performing designated roles in a defined operating environment.

b. The level of airworthiness management applied to a particular UAS1 will be determined by the level of risk that the system poses to personnel, other aircraft and property given the characteristics of the system and its intended operating environment.

c. A UAS Categorisation system based on required operational capability and associated risk forms the basis for application of the DASP Regulatory framework, as follows:

(1) For Category 1 UAS established manned aircraft airworthiness standards are to be used as the basis to assess the capacity of the design to safely perform the designated roles.

(2) For Category 2 UAS the technical airworthiness assessment and operational constraints should ensure that the overall risk posed by the UAS, when operated in its intended CRE, is acceptable to the Defence AA.

(3) For Category 3 UAS the operating environment should ensure that the overall risk posed by the UAS is unlikely to cause a ground fatality, significant damage to property or pose an unacceptable risk to other airspace users.

(4) For Category 4 UAS the physical size and resultant low KE characteristics and constrained operating environment ensure the overall risk posed by the UAS is negligible.

3. OAREG 7 applies operational regulation that supports the framework of MILAVREG 7.

PURPOSE

4. The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance supporting the Operational Airworthiness management of UAS.

APPLICABILITY

5. OAREG 7 is applicable to all UAS operated by or on behalf of Defence and foreign UAS operating within Australian airspace.

OAREG 7 GUIDANCE

6. Operational airworthiness management of acquisition activities to bring a UAS into Service is intended to ensure that the system can perform designated roles safely and that sufficient arrangements are in place to manage the continuing airworthiness of the system. Airworthiness management of the introduction of UAS assures safety through the examination of the design and operating basis and assessment of the risks posed by the system to personnel on the ground, other airspace users and property. Early consideration of airworthiness factors assures the safe introduction into service of UAS without undue impedance of operational flexibility or prohibitive costs. The airworthiness of a particular UAS should be established for the intended CRE during the acquisition process, by following the regulation and guidance in MILAVREG 7.

1 Airworthiness management will be applied to the whole UAS, not just the unmanned aircraft (UA) component.

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OAREG 7.1.1 – UAS MANAGEMENT

OAREG 7.1.1.a – The OAA must ensure UAS compliance activities comply with OAREG 1.3.

7. Section 1 Chapter 3 provides guidance on operational airworthiness compliance assurance.

OAREG 7.1.1.b – The OAA must ensure that UAS operational documents comply with OAREG 2.1.7 – OIP.

8. OIP essential to the operation of UAS should be included in the OIP management system required by OAREG 2.1.7—Management of Orders, Instructions and Publications. Guidance on the production and management of OIP is contained in section 3, chapter 9.

OAREG 7.1.1.c – The OAA must periodically review a UASOP where an AwB under MILAVREG 4 is not required.

9. The OAA will determine an appropriate interval for airworthiness review of a UASOP under their control that is not subject to Defence AA AwB.

10. The maximum period of review should not be greater than 24months.

OAREG 7.1.1.d – The OAA must periodically review a Category 4 UAS management system.

11. The OAA should determine an appropriate interval for airworthiness review of a Category 4 UAS management system under their control.

OAREG 7.1.2.a – The OAA must ensure an SOI for Category 1 and 2 UAS is issued.

12. An SOI should be developed for all Category 1 and 2 UAS. The SOI should describe the intended configuration, role and environment (CRE) applicable to the UAS operation as per OAREG 2.1.2. However, in describing the operational roles, a UAS SOI should document additional factors which may be taken for granted for manned systems. These factors include:

a. UA specifications (including relevant masses, speeds, dimensions and payloads),

b. flight profiles proposed for the UA,

c. the extent to which the UAS is required to operate over people and property including the duration and expected population density, amplifying;

(1) population distributions of Mission Essential Personnel to whom the UA may present a hazard,

(2) population distributions of the general public to whom the UA may present a hazard,

d. airspace environments in which the UA may operate, including the extent to which the UAS will operate in shared airspace, and

e. extent to which the UA is required to operate in the vicinity of high value or high risk assets such as aerodromes, ships, fuel and explosives storage areas, or civil infrastructure.

13. At the acquisition phase an initial UAS SOI should be produced in conjunction with the development of operational requirements, which may evolve to remain applicable to the UAS selected to meet those requirements. The UAS SOI provides the required context and inputs to assess the risks posed by the system.

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OAREG 7.1.2.b – The OAA must ensure OIP that defines the CRE for Category 3 and 4 UAS is issued.

14. OIP should be developed for all Category 3 and 4 UAS to define the CRE of the respective UAS operations. The OAA may use OAREG 2.1.2 in developing an SOI for Category 3 and 4 UAS if desired.

15. For Category 3 UAS, CRE OIP should include:

a. UA specifications (including relevant masses, speeds, dimensions and payloads),

b. flight profiles proposed for the UA,

c. the extent to which the UAS will operate over sparsely populated areas and property, including the duration and expected population density, amplifying;

(1) population distributions of Mission Essential Personnel to whom the UA may present a hazard.

d. specific details of the segregated airspace environments in which the UA may operate, and

e. extent to which the UA is required to operate in the vicinity of high value or high risk assets such as aerodromes, ships, fuel and explosives storage areas, or civil infrastructure.

16. The OAA may choose to issue generic OIP that details the CRE of all Category 4 UAS under their control, due to the constrained operating environment and physical size restrictions inherent with Category 4 UAS (MILAVREG 7 Annex A).

OAREG 7.1.3.a – The OAA must ensure a risk analysis is conducted in support of an event requiring UAS Categorisation under OAREG 7.2.1.

17. The process used to identify and manage operational risks should be consistent with approved Defence aviation risk management (AVRM) processes, or otherwise as prescribed by the responsible OAA. The risk assessment areas for each phase of flight that should be addressed include:

a. Mission Essential Personnel,

b. the general public,

c. property, and

d. other aircraft.

18. For ease of analysis, the risks may be broken down into phases of flight:

a. launch;

b. transit;

c. operating area;

d. transit; and

e. recovery.

19. Risk analysis of a Category 1,2 or 3 UAS supports the case for categorisation, therefore the risk analysis will require updating as the SOI CRE changes. MILAVREG 7 provides further guidance.

OAREG 7.1.4.a – The OAA must ensure an ATMP management system is established that assures UAS Category 1, 2 or 3 airspace use is appropriate for the authorised activity.

20. The Air Traffic Management Plan (ATMP) should outline the systems, Airspace Control Measures (ACM) and procedures to be used to ensure that UAS operations are safely carried out in conjunction with other air traffic. The ATMP should cover all phases of operation from launch to recovery, including abnormal operations and recovery at unplanned destinations. Additional factors may also include specific air traffic management processes required in support of the flight and how these will be identified to the Air traffic service provider.

21. An ATMP details the airspace management procedures for where the UA is to be operated and how the UA is to be operated in conjunction with other military and/or civilian aircraft. The ATMP supports the SOI and associated Risk Analysis through implementation of air traffic management measures to specifically address the risk of collision with other airspace users for UAS. While it may be initially used to set the specific operational requirements / restrictions to be adhered to supporting a case for UAS Categorisation, the document will form part of the ongoing airworthiness management process post UASOP approval.

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22. An ATMP should be developed as part of the Risk Analysis process (MILAVREG 7 guidance, OAREG 7.1.3) by considering a number of factors, including:

a. where the Unmanned Aircraft (UA) is required or likely to operate;

b. the nature and density of the air traffic in the required area of operations, noting such specifications are likely to change as mission objectives change post UASOP approval;

c. the size and velocity of the UA, and unique characteristics of the UAS according to Categorisation;

d. the accuracy, integrity and reliability of fitted systems such as positional information, collision avoidance, flight control, communication and other relevant UAS systems;

e. the strategy or method for the safe interaction or de-confliction with all other airspace users;

f. the requirements for notification to other airspace users of intended operations with the UA;

g. the requirements for notification to other airspace users of any segregated airspace required for the intended operations;

h. the anticipated segregated airspace volumes required to support operations, including airspace boundary buffers; and

i. any utilisation of unique ACMs strategies such as Flexible Use Airspace (FUA), User Preferred Trajectories (UPTs) or UAS Transit Corridors.

23. Changes in the area of operations may require amendment to the ATMP. The OAA endorsed ATMP management system should ensure appropriate review mechanisms are in place that can accommodate such changes in a manner that affords oversight but affords some operational flexibility while not invalidating the any UASOP operational limitations.

24. The Headquarters Joint Operations Command Air & Space Operations Centre (ASOC) Joint Airspace Control Cell (JACC) provides support for the development or amendment of UAS ATMPs and should be used to gain SME advice before an ATMP is recommended for endorsement by the appropriate authority.

25. Noting that Category 1 UAS may have a certified Detect and Avoid capability, an ATMP for Category 1 UAS should focus on degraded mode operations. An airworthiness deficiency, such as the lack of a certified ‘detect and avoid’ capability, will require a degree of operational limitation or risk mitigation to ensure the system poses an acceptable risk to other airspace users. These conditions and limitations should be detailed in the SRLMs for a Category 1 UAS and in the UASOP for a Category 2 UAS.

26. Take off, landing and transit over populated areas by Category 1 and 2 UAS may be approved by the relevant OAA, subject to appropriate risk mitigation and acceptance. Category 2 UAS transit through non-segregated airspace may be conducted where UAS transit routes have been designated and activated by the appropriate airspace management agency, which includes Airservices Australia, a Defence Air Traffic Services SQN or HQJOC JACC. Any desire for permanent transit routes should be processed via the JACC in all cases.

OAREG 7.1.5.a – The OAA must ensure an FMS is maintained for Category 1 and 2 UAS in accordance with OAREG 2.1.

27. A flying management system (FMS) ensures that the organisational structure provides the required operational capability with acceptable levels of risk. The organisation conducting operations does so within a framework that ensures that qualified personnel, who are competent to perform the required roles, are authorised to fly specified operations within approved limitations and instructions.

28. UAS Remote Pilots (RP) are considered flight crew for FMS requirements.

29. Category 1 and 2 UAS should meet the requirements of OAREG 2.1—Flying Management System, except that:

a. the UAS crew competency system should be based upon the requirements for aircrew competency systems specified in OAREG 2.1.3—Aircrew competency system and should be appropriate to the UAS operating roles documented in the SOI; and

b. the Flight Authorisation process for a UAS should be based upon the requirements of OAREG 2.1.4—Flight authorisation and should involve all UAS crew required for safe and successful conduct of each UAS flight.

30. OAREG 2.1 guidance is available at Section 3. Should further guidance be required regarding the aspects of the FMS – UAS relationship, advice may be sought from ACPA.

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OAREG 7.1.5.b – The OAA must ensure a flying management system is established for Category 3 and 4 UAS.

31. Appropriate controls that assure an acceptable Category 3 or 4 UAS FMS include:

a. key Staff are identified and appointed;

b. OIP are applicable, approved, available and relevant to the scope of operations;

c. crew competency is defined, assessed and maintained;

d. authorisation process for conduct of operations;

e. AVRM is applied relevant to the impact of operations on other airspace users, people and property;

f. any necessary ground safety or exclusion templates are implemented and controlled;

g. use of ground and air collision avoidance, flight termination and emergency recovery systems is defined and controlled;

h. OIP issued to manage UAS flying operations take account the CRE and any unique operating characteristics of the UAS; and

i. the UAS is only operated when serviceable and suitable for the proposed operations.

OAREG 7.1.6.a (1&2) – In complying with MILAVREG 7.1 and MILAVREG 3.7, the OAA must initiate a UASOP change or reissue when a technical change to the Category 2 or 3 UAS has been made which is equivalent to a Major change to the Type Design; or an operational change to the Category 2 or 3 UAS has been made which is equivalent to a Substantial change to CRE.

32. MILAVREG 3.7 and associated guidance specifies the requirements for issue of a UASOP.

33. The OAA should notify the Defence AA (through DACPA) of the initial issue, or any change of a Category 2 or 3 UASOP.

34. Prior to initiating a UASOP change or reissue, the OAA should ensure the following has occurred:

a. a recommendation from the TAA in respect of any change to the technical configuration or operation of the Category 2 or 3 UAS in the intended CRE has been obtained;

b. that any activities required under OAREG 7.1 to support a change have been completed to the extent necessary to support the UAS operation in the intended CRE and can be sustained at the expected rate of effort; and

c. any operating limitations resulting from the change due to the immaturity of supporting arrangements, technical issues, or T&E activities have been appropriately identified and mitigated.

OAREG 7.1.7.a – The OAA must ensure that operation of a non-Defence registered UAS by or on behalf of Defence, or by a foreign military within Australian airspace, are conducted in accordance with the appropriate requirements of MILAVREG 7, OAREG 7, MILAVREG 5 and OAREG 5.

35. The acceptability to Defence of operations involving non-Defence registered UAS is predicated on the demonstration that an appropriate level of airworthiness oversight and management has been achieved in each case.. Non-Defence registered UAS will normally hold an extant type certification or permit issued by a foreign national or military airworthiness authority, which may be used as provenance that equivalent standards to those expected by Defence have been applied. Because international airworthiness standards for UAS can vary widely, the countries whose regulatory frameworks are recognised as providing an acceptable level of safety are restricted to those the Defence AA might recognise for UAS airworthiness vice manned aircraft, as the two require different airworthiness management.

36. A foreign military/civilian UAS operated by a Defence member or operating in Joint exercises in Australian Airspace will also be required to comply with relevant MILAVREG and OAREG. Further guidance should be sought from ACPA as required.

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OAREG 7.2.1.a(1) – In complying with MILAVREG 7.1, an OAA must make UAS Category 1 or 2 categorisation recommendations to the Defence AA prior to introduction into Service of a UAS, or when a planned change to the CRE is likely to result in a change to the approved Category of an in-service UAS.

37. UAS airworthiness categorisation is used to determine the level of application of the Defence AMS and the level of airworthiness oversight applied to the design, construction, maintenance and operation of the UAS. The airworthiness category of a particular UAS is based on the SOI CRE and on the mitigated consequence of catastrophic failure of the system in relation to the capacity for any part of the failed system to cause death or serious injury to personnel, or significant damage to property, when operating in the intended CRE.

38. Categorisation determination underpins UAS airworthiness and therefore should be established prior to introduction to service.

OAREG 7.2.1.a(2) – In complying with MILAVREG 7.1, an OAA must make categorisation determinations for Category 3 and 4 UAS prior to commencement of operations.

39. Where a change in the SOI CRE or associated risk of operation increases to an in-service categorised UAS, the OAA should re-evaluate the categorisation prior to conducting operations under the revised SOI CRE.

OAREG 7.2.2.a – The OAA must ensure Category 1 UAS are operated in accordance with the requirements of OAREG 2.2—Operations.

40. Approval to operate a Category 1 UAS may be granted following the Defence AA issue of a Special Flight Permit, or Australian Military Type Certificate (AMTC) and Service Release (SR) IAW MILAVREG 2.4 and MILAVREG 7.1.

41. Application of OAREG to Category 1 UAS should be as for manned aircraft; however, as the OAREG were first drafted for regulation of manned aircraft some tailoring for UAS may be required. In such cases advice may be sought from ACPA. The intent is that Category 1 UAS will comply with OAREG 2.2 as per manned aircraft. Unless the Defence AA approval has been achieved to carry UAS passengers, UAS need not comply with OAREG 2.2.9—Carriage of personnel in Defence aircraft.

42. A Category 1 UAS Crew member should be designated the UA Captain for each air vehicle participating in a UAS mission and should be subject to the requirements of OAREG 2.2.3—Aircraft captaincy tailored to suit the operational role and any unique operating characteristics of the system as listed in the SOI and as required by the relevant OAA. In applying OAREG 2.2.2—Aircraft crewing, Category 1 UAS operations should be conducted by crews appropriate to the UAS operational role and any unique operating characteristics of the system as listed in the SOI and as required by the relevant OAA.

OAREG 7.2.2.b – The OAA must ensure Category 1 UAS are operated in accordance with the approved airworthiness instrument and supporting documents.

43. In addition to those documents that would support AMTC, conformance to the ATMP and UAS type flight information manuals is also required.

OAREG 7.2.2.c – The OAA must ensure a Category 1 UAS Remote Pilot (RP) is trained and qualified in accordance with OAREG 2.3—Qualifications and training, or an equivalent training and qualification system.

44. The core knowledge, skills and attitude to operate UAS remain the same as for manned aircraft. All UAS crew should have an understanding of the airborne environment and the relevant rules of the air. Any reduction in training requirements of UAS RP may increase the risk burden of other airspace users or the risk to people and property on the ground. As such, the documented training system in place for Category 1 UAS should parallel that of manned aircraft and comply with the full requirements of OAREG 2.3.

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OAREG 7.2.2.d – A Category 1 UAS RP must be a qualified military Pilot, or hold equivalent civilian IFR Pilot qualifications.

45. A Category 1 UAS is able to conduct unrestricted flight operations. Employment of a military pilot assures ALARP is achieved. A qualified military pilot is someone who has completed an OAR recognised and approved military pilots course, and holds or has held a Military Instrument Rating on a current in-service military aircraft. An equivalent civilian IFR Pilot qualification is considered to be a command instrument rating.

46. An OAA may develop a Military UAS Remote Pilot (RP) Qualification and Training course and seek approval from the OAR to meet the intent of this regulation. In so doing the OAA will show how an RP trained under such a course meets the equivalent standard and competency required of OAREG 2.3. The In Flight Emergency Management (IFER) training and other similar manned aircraft Pilot skill sets must also be considered in addition to core flying achievements when applying for such recognition.

OAREG 7.2.3.a – The OAA must ensure Category 2 UAS are operated in accordance with the requirements of OAREG 2.2—Operations.

47. Application of OAREG 2.2 – Operations for Category 2 UAS is as detailed for Category 1 UAS at OAREG 7.2.2.

OAREG 7.2.3.b – The OAA must ensure Category 2 UAS operations present a lower risk than Category 1 UAS to other airspace users, people and property when operated in the approved CRE.

48. The OAA should have OIP that details the implementation of any operational restriction imposed when recommending categorisation for a Category 2 UAS. Restrictions on airspace access and limitations on flight over populated areas are broad risk mitigations that can achieve the desired outcome. RP training standards are also excellent mitigation. Use of AMTC required rigour for the UASOP supporting documents may also decrease risk.

OAREG 7.2.3.c – The OAA must ensure Category 2 UAS are operated in accordance with the approved UASOP and supporting documents.

49. Operation of a Category 2 UAS may occur after a Defence AA categorisation and issue of a Category 2 UASOP.

50. All Category 2 UAS operations must be in accordance with OAA issued OIP. In all cases the UASOP will provide any significant operating limitations and restrictions. The ATMP forms the basis for how the risk of collision with other airspace users is mitigated and will supplement the UASOP requirements.

OAREG 7.2.3.d – The OAA must ensure a Category 2 UAS Remote Pilot (RP) is trained and qualified in accordance with OAREG 2.3 – Qualifications and training, or an equivalent training and qualification system.

51. The same reasoning applies for Category 2 RP training as for Category 1 as detailed in OAREG 7.2.2 due to the risk of operation posed by the Category 2 UAS to other airspace users, people and property.

OAREG 7.2.3.e – A Category 2 UAS RP must be a qualified military Pilot, or hold equivalent civilian IFR Pilot qualifications, unless the UAS flight will be constrained to Category 3 UAS airspace, people and property limitations.

52. The same reasoning applies for Category 2 RP training as for Category 1 as detailed in OAREG 7.2.2 due to the risk of operation posed by the Category 2 UAS to other airspace users, people and property.

53. Operations of a Category 2 UAS within Category 3 airspace and population constraints may offer increased operational flexibility. For example, a military Pilot might transit the UAS to a segregated airspace over a sparsely populated area for an extended mission, where a lesser qualified AVO might be used to support a mission. At end of mission, a military Pilot can then remotely pilot the UAS from the segregated airspace to the intended landing location.

54. An OAA may develop a Military UAS Remote Pilot (RP) Qualification and Training course and seek approval from the OAR to meet the intent of this regulation. In so doing the OAA will show how an RP trained under such a course meets the equivalent standard and competency required of OAREG 2.3. The In Flight Emergency Management (IFER) training and other similar manned aircraft Pilot skill sets must also be considered in addition to core flying achievements when applying for such recognition.

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OAREG 7.2.4.a – The OAA must ensure Category 3 UAS operations present a lower risk than Category 2 UAS to other airspace users, people and property when operated in the approved CRE.

55. Approval to operate a Category 3 UAS will be granted following the OAA categorisation and the issue of a UASOP.

56. A Category 3 UAS should not commence operations before being categorised.

57. The OAA should have OIP that details the implementation of any operational restriction imposed when recommending categorisation for a Category 3 UAS. Restrictions on segregated airspace access and limitations on flight over MEP are broad risk mitigations that can achieve the desired outcome. Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) training standards are also excellent mitigation.

OAREG 7.2.4.b – The OAA must ensure Category 3 UAS are operated in accordance with the requirements of the approved UASOP and supporting documents.

58. Operation of a Category 3 UAS may occur after OAA categorisation and issue of a Category 3 UASOP.

59. All Category 3 UAS operations must be in accordance with OAA issued OIP and MILAVREG 7 UAS Category 3 constraints. In all cases the UASOP will provide any significant operating limitations and restrictions. The ATMP forms the basis for how the risk of collision with other airspace users is mitigated and will supplement the UASOP requirements.

OAREG 7.2.4.c – The OAA must ensure a Category 3 UAS register is maintained.

60. A UAS register requirement is not intended to be a complicated matter and is intended to supplement the UAS management system. For example, the use of a UAS register can afford an OAA the ability to collocate reference to all supporting UAS documents. The register can be a simple as a spread sheet held at an OAA delegated unit.

61. If desired, application may be made to DACPA to hold the UAS registration on the Defence Register. Such a request might be approved if the UAS in question required significant resources and funds to maintain.

OAREG 7.2.4.d – The OAA must ensure a Category 3 UAS AVO is trained and qualified in accordance with OAREG 2.3—Qualifications and training, or an equivalent training and qualification system.

62. Whilst segregating a UAS from other users of the airspace may reduce the risks associated with their operation, the core knowledge, skills and attitude to operate remain the same. All UAS crew should have an understanding of the airborne environment and the rules that pertain to them. Reducing the training requirements of UAS crew serves to increase the risk burden of other concurrent airspace users. To further help reduce the risk imposed on other airborne users of airspace, restrictions should be applied dependant on the level of training received.

63. Category 3 UAS based on the SOI CRE and intrinsic categorisation of operations solely in segregated airspace are not required to be operated in accordance with the rules of the air as advised in the Defence Aeronautical Information Package. As such the documented AVO training system in place for Category 3 UAS may parallel that of manned aircraft and comply with OAREG 2.3, or the OAA may develop an equivalent training and qualification system that meets the specific Category 3 UAS requirements.

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OAREG 7.2.5.a – The OAA must ensure Category 4 UAS operations present a negligible risk to other airspace users, people and property.

64. Approval to operate a Category 4 UAS will be granted by the OAA, or an OAA approved UAS Manager.

65. A Category 4 UAS should not commence operations before being categorised.

66. Category 4 UAS pose an insignificant risk to other aircraft, people and property. Although the design integrity of the system cannot be assured through certification, when the UA has an energy assessment of 42 Joules2 or less, the risk of serious injury or damage caused by the UA is low.

67. The calculation of collision energy contribution maybe calculated using the Kinetic Energy equation - ½ x Mass x Velocity2. For example, a calculation to determine the maximum velocity a 1kg UA can operate at to be appropriately categorised at a Category 4 UAS is as follows:

a. 42 Joules= 0.5 x 1kg x Velocity2

b. Therefore:- Velocity = 9.17m/s or 33km/hr

68. In this example, 1 kg UAS cannot have the ability to travel faster than 33km/hr to be appropriately categorised as a Category 4 UAS.

69. The consequence of catastrophic failure for Category 4 UAS is the expected outcome when operating a UA with a physical size constraint (<42J) and operationally restricting the UA away from other airspace users (as per CASA rules for model aircraft flying).

70. The Category 4 UAS Manager should document the categorisation determination, particularly if an alternate method is used to determine the collision energy transfer, to the Kinetic Energy method.

71. The OAA should have OIP that details the implementation of any operational restriction imposed when categorising a Category 4 UAS under MILAVREG 7 Annex A. OIP should include vertical airspace limitations and lateral displacement from aerodromes.

OAREG 7.2.5.b – The OAA must ensure Category 4 UAS are operated by approved and competent personnel.

72. The OAA should have OIP that details the level of training and competency required of Category 4 UAS operators.

OAREG 7.2.5.c – The OAA must ensure a Category 4 UAS register is maintained.

73. As with Category 3 UAS, registration requirement are intended to assist management process and need not be complicated. Registering of Category 4 UAS by type only is sufficient.

OAREG 7.2.5.d – The OAA must ensure a Risk Management Plan is maintained for the operation of Category 4 UAS.

74. The Risk Management Plan should be completed inline with the requirements of accepted Defence risk management doctrine.

OAREG 7.2.6.a – The OAA must comply with OAREG 2.1.1 if appointing a Category 4 UAS Manager.

75. The intent of this regulation is that Category 4 UAS operations under an OAA appointed UAS manager will maintain the same level of airworthiness and safety oversight, equivalent to the level of oversight an OAA would provide.

2 Clothier, Reece A. and Walker, Rodney A. and Palmer, Jennifer L. and Fulton, Neale L. (2010) ‘Definition of airworthiness categories for civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems

(UAS)’. In: 27th International Congress of the Aeronautical Sciences, 19-24 September 2010, Acropolis Conference Centre, Nice.

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OAREG 7.2.6.b – An OAA appointed Category 4 UAS Manager must ensure that UAS are operated in accordance with the categorisation requirements, by approved and competent personnel, under a Risk Management Plan, and in accordance with any additional requirements of the OAA.

76. A Category 4 UAS Manager should have experience in the following areas:

a. UAS operations,

b. Aviation Airworthiness Management, and

c. WH&S Management.

77. The OAA letter of appointment should be in writing and should include the scope and limitations of the delegation.

78. Applying the operational restrictions to Category 4 UAS is akin to CASA’s model aircraft flying requirements and ensures the risk to other aircraft remains low.

79. The intent of this regulation is that Category 4 UAS operations under an OAA appointed UAS manager will maintain the same level of airworthiness and safety oversight, equivalent to the level of oversight an OAA would provide.

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AL 7 1

FLIGHT SIMULATION TRAINING DEVICES

Applicable Regulations OAREG 8—Flight Simulation Training Devices

OAREG 8.a

The OAA must approve a Flight Simulation Training Device Installation Operating Permit prior to use of the Flight Simulation Training Device in support of flight crew training, qualification or currency. 1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure aviation operations augmented by a Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) will be adequately controlled and managed such that the inherent airworthiness of the parent platform is preserved.

2. Non-FSTD application. The regulation is focused on training that directly impacts the control of the aircraft in flight. Specifically, the FSTD used to train personnel who interact with aircraft flight controls or power plant controls to manoeuvre the aircraft in flight. The OAA may determine if FTSD regulation should apply to Mission Simulators or Weapon Tactical Trainers. In this manner, regulation is prescribed at the minimum level of safety and no more, leaving the Command Authority freedom of action to apply further prescription.

3. A FSTD IOP is a control that authorises FSTD use supported by the overall FSTD management system outcomes.

4. A FSTD IOP is not an airworthiness instrument as the FSTD does not actually fly. This prevents excessive rigor being applied to the overall technical aspects of the FSTD management system.

5. The issue of a FSTD IOP is the end result of the process that formally examines and documents compliance of a product against predefined FSTD management system requirements to the satisfaction of the issuing authority.

6. The IOP assures that the FSTD:

a. design and construction meets the required specifications

b. can be maintained and operated for its intended purpose

c. fidelity meets the required FSTD Qualification, as applicable

d. negative training is eliminated or mitigated

e. restrictions / limitations, if required, are identified.

7. A FSTD Installation Operating Permit (IOP) is required for:

a. Defence owned FSTD.

b. Non-Defence-owned FSTD operated by or on behalf of Defence.

8. A FSTD system includes:

a. hardware components

b. software

c. operating personnel, excluding the trainee and training instructor using the FSTD for training purposes.

d. maintenance personnel.

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AMC 1 to OAREG 8.a – FSTD IOP 9. The FSTD IOP is not intended to be a complex document; rather the IOP should identify minimal content as required to underpin the authority to use the FSTD for training. IOP details should include:

a. Name and location of the FSTD.

b. Parent aircraft platform.

c. FSTD category.

d. FSTD Qualification standard, as applicable.

e. FSTD Qualification renewal interval, as applicable.

f. Reference to relevant Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP) management framework.

g. Limitations or restrictions, if applicable.

h. IOP review period.

10. IOP template. A FSTD IOP template is available on the ACPA Website.

11. Non-Defence FSTD. Where the FSTD is operated not solely for the use by Defence, the OAA may seek appropriate documentation from the training provider, who should have equivalent documents that may show evidence of compliance, or be equivalent documents from an approved NAA/MAA, that can support issue of an IOP.

12. Equivalent documents. It is not the intention of this regulation to re-certify and re-document FSTD criteria where such oversight has already been achieved by a Defence AA recognised NAA/MAA.

13. Where the FSTD is not operated solely for Defence use, the OAA may seek an FSTD Certificate or equivalent documentation from the training provider vice cconducting a Defence assessment of fidelity.

14. Legacy systems. Existing FSTD IOP may meet the requirements of OAREG 8.

AMC 2 to OAREG 8.a –IOP application process 15. Application for an IOP may consist of an accomplishment summary that provides assurances to the approval authority that all required FSTD outcomes have been achieved and that use of the IOP will not compromise suitability for flight.

16. IOP approval considerations, as supported by the FSTD management system outcmes may include:

a. Design, engineering and maintenance outcomes, including limitations or adverse findings.

b. Assessment of the status of technical, logistics and infrastructure support availability.

c. Support staff training has been achieved and can be maintained.

d. Qualification results.

e. Other relevant information.

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OAREG 8b The OAA must ensure a Flight Simulation Training Device Management System is established that details the implementation and ongoing in service management of the Flight Simulation Training Device. 17. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that the overall implementation and ongoing management of the FSTD is appropriately established before FSTD use and that the required training outcomes are achieved and can be maintained.

18. The FSTD management system should minimise negative training of flight crew and thus not compromise safe operation of the parent platform.

19. This regulation does not provide management controls regarding the potential to use/swap parts between the FSTD and parent platform. In such cases, compliance with the parent platform processes is required and advice should be sought from the parent platform technical authority.

AMC 1 to OAREG 8.b – FSTD Management Plan 20. Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) Management Plan (MP) explains the strategy and scope of activities that will achieve the desired outcomes prior to use and during life of type. By establishing baselines and clearly identifying expectations, the MP will support IOP determinations in a flexible and resource minded manner.

21. The FSTD MP controls should include:

a. A description of the FSTD purpose, including the expected qualification category.

b. The Parent Platform(s) and reference to the Parent Platform(s) SOI. There maybe cases where the FSTD does not have a Parent Platform, the FSTD is more generic in nature and the tasks trained are across multiple platforms. In this case, state the multiple platforms that it is intended for. This ensures that the OAA maintains the FSTD relevance across those platforms in case of CRE changes across the nominated platforms.

c. The technical and/or operational regulations that apply to the FSTD. The degree of regulatory oversight of the design, construction, maintenance and operation of a FSTD requires tailoring to specific systems to suit the FSTD CRE capabilities. The OAA should seek technical advice as necessary and determine the system rigour required to ensure an FSTD can achieve the intended output.

d. The system safety requirements that apply to the FSTD. System safety requirements should consider what the FSTD will be used for and from this activity invoke appropriate limitations on resources in order to assure that the FSTD is neither over nor under designed. For example, a full flight deck simulator would require a higher degree of complexity than a basic flight trainer.

e. Technical training requirements. Reference to a training plan for the maintenance and functional operation of the FSTD.

f. Flight crew operational training requirements. Reference to a detailed curriculum/ training management plan. (Refer AMC 4)

g. A reference to any design acceptance and operational certification requirements such as the FSTD Evaluation Program. Test and Evaluation (T&E) planning details should be broadly provided or a reference provided for the location of the T&E plan to be utilised. The T&E information should also advise the funding provided as part of the contract to develop the system.

h. Logistics, technical and operational activities undertaken in support of the FSTD.

i. A schedule of the milestones for providing the key documentation and plans.

j. The FSTD organisational responsibilities and any delegations. For example a FSTD Manager if deemed necessary.

k. The responsible organisations for compliance with technical regulatory oversight of the FSTD.

l. The responsible organisations for compliance with operational regulatory oversight of the FSTD.

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22. The FSTD MP controls may include:

a. An outline of the scope of the acquisition activity to introduce an FSTD, or to make a Substantial Change to an existing FSTD. The outline is intended to provide basic awareness of the overall process to be followed. It should only make reference to any complex documents or processes, vice including any substantial detail in the MP.

b. A system to ensure that changes in the Parent Platform are evaluated with respect to the relevance to the FSTD. Use of a register noting CRE changes/modification and the details of any necessary changes to the FSTD may assist this outcome.

AMC 2 to OAREG 8.b – FSTD Categorisation 23. FSTD are categorised according to their level of simulated realism and whether training time accrued in the FSTD may be credited toward flight crew qualification or currency. The OAA should categorise FSTD IAW Table 1. Categorisation is required to determine the requirement for FSTD Qualification and the NAA standard that may apply.

FSTD Category

(FAA uses the term STD)

Control layout/systems interconnectivity

Aircraft aerodynamic behaviour model

Aircrew qualification/ currency validity

Full Flight Simulator (FFS)

or

Full Flight Mission Simulator (FFMS)1

Full replica of specific aircraft type

Fully modeled Yes – may be up to zero flight time aircrew qualification

Flight Training Device (FTD) Partial or full replica of specific aircraft type

Generic aircraft modeling Partial – procedural training only

Basic Flight Trainer (BFT) Generic aircraft layout Basic, generic pitch, roll, yaw No

Basic Instrument Flight Trainer (BIFT)

Generic aircraft layout Basic, generic pitch, roll, yaw No

Table 1 – FSTD Categorisation

1 These are the know descriptors applied to FSTD of this nature. FFMS is sometimes used by civil to describe military FFS of this category.

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AMC 3 to OAREG 8.b – FSTD Qualification 24. FSTD are qualified against recognised NAA standards, by an approved Qualification organisation. FSTD Qualification comprises an Initial Evaluation, which produces a Master Qualification Test Guide (MQTG) that documents the results of all the qualification tests. All NAA Qualification standards contain mandatory FSTD reassessment periods against its MQTG.

25. Full Flight Simulators (FFS) Qualification. The OAA should ensure that all FFS are Qualified so that FFS initial and continuing fidelities are quantified. The NAA standard and level of FSTD Qualification should be such that the fidelity of the simulation meets the training requirements of the flight crew. FSTD Qualification ensures that:

a. FSTD fidelity is maintained through mandatory, periodic reassessment against the MQTG.

b. The fidelity of the simulated aerodynamic flight model, visuals and motion cues is documented and can be compared against the actual aircraft to identify discrepancies and potential negative training.

FSTD Qualification standards applicable for FSTD procured after 2010

Full Flight Simulator (FSS)

or

Full Flight Mission Simulator (FFMS)2

CASR 1998 Part 60.

CASA MOS-603

FAA 14 CFR Part 604

FAA AFS-205. Guidance Bulletin 03-02



ICAO 9625 MCQFS5 2nd Edition (2003)

ICAO 9625 MCQFS 3rd Edition (2009)

ICAO 9625 MCQFS 4th Edition

EASA CS-FSTD(A), Aeroplanes

EASA CS-FSTD(H), Helicopters

Level A – D.

Appendix A (FFS) Level A – D

Head Up Display (HUD)

Enhanced Flight Vision Systems (EFVS)

Night Vision Goggles (NVG)

Specifies a single level only. Equivalent to level D

Level I – VII

(to be issued 2015)

Flight Training Device (FTD)

FAA 14 CFR Part 606

CASA Aviation Circular AC 60-4 (FTD)

Appendix B. (FTD) Level 4- 6

FSTD Qualification standards applicable for FSTD procured prior to 2010

Full Flight Simulator (FFS)

All FSS standards listed above plus

CASA CAO 45.0. FSD-1

Flight Training Device (FTD)

All FTD standards listed above plus

CASA CAO 45.0. FSD-2

Table 2 – FSTD Qualification

2 These are the know descriptors applied to FSTD of this nature. FFMS is sometimes used by civil to describe military FSS of this category. 3 CASR Part 60, based on ICAO 9625 MCQFS 2nd Edition (2003) 4 FAA CFR Part 60, based on ICAO 9625 MCQFS 2nd Edition (2003) 5 ICAO Manual of Criterion for Qualification of Flight Simulators (MCQFS) 6 Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 60, United States of America.

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26. Qualification Standard Equivalency. Only Defense AA recognized NAA/MAA qualification standards may be used in support of qualification determinations. ICAO, EASA, FAA and CASA Qualification Standards are based on similar levels of fidelity, but are not interchangeable. Qualification under one standard does not automatically meet the fidelity requirements of another. To ensure the simulation fidelity can achieve the intended level of training and that the FSTD meets that standard is a determination requirement at the earliest stage of the qualification process.

27. Where the FSTD is not operated solely for Defence use, the authority may seek appropriate documentation from the training provider to support the FSTD and /or conduct an independent assessment of the FSTD.

AMC 4 to OAREG 8.b – Operational Training Curriculum 28. The FSTD management system controls that may provide detailed oversight of the operational aircrew training conducted within the FSTD include:

a. Prevention SFARP of negative training that teaches or reinforces technique that is different to operation of the actual aircraft. Full flight simulator (FFS) training should be a realistic replication of the parent platform and conducted in a manner that copies operation of the aircraft type.

b. Negative training identification and mitigation. For example, mitigation may include remedial training in the actual parent aircraft platform.

c. An approved curriculum that states all training conducted in the FSTD. The curriculum contained within a learning management package (LMP) / training management package (TMP) should contain the learning modules, learning outcomes and assessment criteria.

d. An auditing program to ensure that training sequences are conducted IAW an approved curriculum and that FSTD personnel are appropriately trained. In the event that the FSTD is run by a civilian organisation, potentially overseas, the OAA should obtain a copy of the organisation’s certification of training.

e. A process for maintaining alignment of the FSTD to the parent platform SOI/CRE.

f. The impact on overall aircrew training if the FSTD is unavailable / unserviceable.

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AAP 8000.010 Glossary

GLOSSARY

AL 6 1

1. All authorised Defence Aviation terms are defined in the DASP Master Glossary (MG) that is contained within AAP 7001.048 – Defence Aviation Safety Program.

2. The Australian Defence Glossary (ADG) synchronises to the DASP MG via authority of the AAP 7001.048.

3. As the AAP 7001.048 and the ADG are available via the DRN as well as the AAP 701.048 is available via the internet, this publication no longer includes the DASP MG as a matter of publication efficiency.

Supers

eded

by A

AP 8000

.011 –

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nce A

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http://intranet.dpo.mil.au/avpubs/aaplib/7001_048/AAP7001_048.pdf

http://adg.eas.defence.mil.au/results.asp

AAP 8000.010 List of Abbreviations

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AL 6 1

1. The Defence Aviation list of abbreviations is contained within AAP 7001.048 – Defence Aviation Safety Program List of Abbreviations.

2. As the AAP 7001.048 is available via the DRN, this publication no longer includes the DASP List of Abbreviations as a matter of publication efficiency.

Supers

eded

by A

AP 8000

.011 –

Defe

nce A

viatio

n Safe

ty Reg

ulatio

ns

http://intranet.dpo.mil.au/avpubs/aaplib/7001_048/AAP7001_048.pdf