regulation of externalities. market efficiency & market failure efficiency –all goods worth...

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Regulation of Externalities

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Page 1: Regulation of Externalities. Market Efficiency & Market Failure Efficiency –All goods worth more than they cost to produce get produced (No DWL) –No goods

Regulation of Externalities

Page 2: Regulation of Externalities. Market Efficiency & Market Failure Efficiency –All goods worth more than they cost to produce get produced (No DWL) –No goods

Market Efficiency & Market Failure

• Efficiency– All goods worth more than they cost to produce get

produced (No DWL)– No goods worth less than they cost to produce get

produced (No DWL)– Aggregate well-being is maximized

• Why do we like free markets?– In general, free markets produce efficient outcomes– Interventions such as price controls, quantity limits,

minimum wages, cause DWL

• But – Under some circumstances, unfettered markets fail to produce “best” outcomes– Market Failures

Page 3: Regulation of Externalities. Market Efficiency & Market Failure Efficiency –All goods worth more than they cost to produce get produced (No DWL) –No goods

Externalities

• Negative: Production or consumption of a product harms others– Pollution– Loud Noise– Blocked view

• Positive: Production or consumption of a product benefit others– Planting flowers– Painting house

• Analytical Representation– Why do externalities create DWL?

Page 4: Regulation of Externalities. Market Efficiency & Market Failure Efficiency –All goods worth more than they cost to produce get produced (No DWL) –No goods

What’s the Inefficiency?

• With Negative Externalities, market quantity is higher than social optimum and price is too low

$

S=MC

S’=SMC

Q (Gallons of Gasoline)

Demand

QMarketQEfficient

PMarket

PEfficient

Negative Externalities

DWL

Page 5: Regulation of Externalities. Market Efficiency & Market Failure Efficiency –All goods worth more than they cost to produce get produced (No DWL) –No goods

Solutions to Externality ProblemTraditional Economics Approach

• Negative externalities should be taxed

• Positive externalities should be subsidized

• Goal -Make market demand & supply match “real” demand & supply

• Examples: Oil refinery, House Painting

Page 6: Regulation of Externalities. Market Efficiency & Market Failure Efficiency –All goods worth more than they cost to produce get produced (No DWL) –No goods

Solutions to Externality ProblemsTraditional Approach

• Taxes shift the supply curve. A per-unit tax equal to the negative externality will align the market and social marginal cost curves.

• Why is it hard to “correct” externalities with taxes?• How can we measure the effect of externalities?

– Planting Trees, Oil Refinery, Logging?

$

STax = S’

Q (Gallons of Gasoline)

Demand

QTax

PTax

Negative Externalities with Taxes

S

Page 7: Regulation of Externalities. Market Efficiency & Market Failure Efficiency –All goods worth more than they cost to produce get produced (No DWL) –No goods

New View of ExternalitiesReciprocity & the Coase Theorem

• Ronald Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost”, Journal of Law & Economics, 1960

• Suppose a candy maker works next to a doctor– Candy maker produces a negative externality (noise)– Noise harms doctors business

• Old view: Noise is bad, factory must be restrained with rules or taxes

• Coase view: Allowing noise harms doctor, but stopping noise harms factory

• Key insight -- may be more efficient to stop doctor than to stop noise

Page 8: Regulation of Externalities. Market Efficiency & Market Failure Efficiency –All goods worth more than they cost to produce get produced (No DWL) –No goods

Examples

• Case 1: – Candy maker earns $40/hr from operating– Doctor loses $60/hr when candy maker operates

• Case 2: – Candy maker earns $60/hr from operating– Doctor loses $40/hr when candy maker operates

• What is the efficient outcome in each case?• What outcomes do markets produce?

– Liability for Noise Damage– No Liability for Noise Damage

Page 9: Regulation of Externalities. Market Efficiency & Market Failure Efficiency –All goods worth more than they cost to produce get produced (No DWL) –No goods

Examples, Continued

• Now suppose that the candy maker can install soundproofing at a cost of $20.00– What is the efficient outcome?– What does the market produce in each case?

• Liability for Noise Damage• No Liability for Noise Damage

Page 10: Regulation of Externalities. Market Efficiency & Market Failure Efficiency –All goods worth more than they cost to produce get produced (No DWL) –No goods

The Coase Theorem

• When parties affected by externalities can negotiate costlessly with each other and property rights are clear, the efficient outcome occurs regardless of who has property rights.

Page 11: Regulation of Externalities. Market Efficiency & Market Failure Efficiency –All goods worth more than they cost to produce get produced (No DWL) –No goods

New Solutions to Externality Problems• When does the free market work best?

– Clear Property Rights– Easy Bargaining

• How should we assign property rights?– Cost of Compliance: Eg: Soundproofing– Zoning

• Examples:– Airspace Rights – CO2 Emissions– Second-Hand Smoke– Chernobyl Reactors

• When are taxes & subsidies still the best option?

Page 12: Regulation of Externalities. Market Efficiency & Market Failure Efficiency –All goods worth more than they cost to produce get produced (No DWL) –No goods

Transferable Air Rights• Japan

– Construction boom in 1960’s caused disputes between builders & homeowners

– Local law assigned rights specifying minimum sunlight a builder had to provide to neighbors

– To construct a building that would block sunlight, builder needed unanimous consent from neighbors.

– Sunshine rights were exclusive and divestible

• New York– Early 1900’s skyscraper boom affects neighboring property– Building Codes: 1916 -- setbacks, 1962 -- FAR’s– NYC proposes transferable air rights in 1980’s– Incentive for historic preservation (Trump Tower & Tiffany & Co.)

• Questions– How does assignment of rights differ in NY & Japan?– How do outcomes differ?– LA & DC have height limits. How do outcomes compare?