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Regional Policy Reform and the Environment:A Case Study on the Institutionalizationof an EU Structural Funding Programme inGa¨vleborg, SwedenHelena Valve & Mikaela Gro¨nqvistPublished online: 21 Jul 2010.

To cite this article: Helena Valve & Mikaela Gro¨nqvist (2003) Regional Policy Reform and the Environment:A Case Study on the Institutionalization of an EU Structural Funding Programme in Ga¨vleborg, Sweden,Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning, 5:1, 23-38, DOI: 10.1080/15239080305606

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Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning,Vol. 5, No. 1, March 2003, 23–38

Regional Policy Reform and theEnvironment: A Case Study on theInstitutionalization of an EU StructuralFunding Programme in Gavleborg,SwedenHELENA VALVE & MIKAELA GRONQVIST

ABSTRACT In this paper we study how an EU structural funding programme became institu-tionalized in the county of Gavleborg, Sweden and how the outcomes affected the capability tointegrate regional development activities with environmental concerns. The environmentalassessment of the programme institutionalization has two parts. First, we ask whether there werebarriers to the implementation of the intended means of environmental integration and, if so,what those barriers were. Second, we identify possible obstacles of social learning. Potential forsocial learning is essential for the achievement of environmental goals, since it allows new,context-specific innovations and options to emerge. The results show that in the case studied theintegration of regional and environmental policies was restricted by the manner in which theprogramme implementation became supply-driven. This decreased the effectiveness of the environ-mental integration mechanisms. Since participation in the implementation process tended todemand specific resources and established positions, the Objective 5b programme widened the gapbetween outsiders and insiders in regional development and so decreased the social learningpotential. However, evidence of an opposite tendency could be discerned in some municipalitiesin which the programme politicized economic development.

Introduction

EU regional policy and the operation of structural funds should promote the achieve-ment of environmental policy goals (Council Regulation (EC) 1260/1999, OJ no. L161, 26June 1999, pp. 1–42; Council Regulation (EEC) 2081/93, OJ no. L193, 31 July 1993, pp.5–19). The environment is viewed as “a major factor for regional development” and “animportant area of new employment”. The EU Commission also states that economicdevelopment gives “the least favoured regions better opportunities to improve environ-mental standards and quality”. On the other hand, the potentially harmful environmen-tal impacts of structural funding also have to be assessed (CEC, 1995). In order topromote effective achievement of environmental goals, the Commission has issued ahandbook on the environmental assessment of structural funding programmes (EC/DGXI, 1998).

Helena Valve, Finnish Environment Institute, PO Box 140, 00251 Helsinki, Finland. Email: [email protected] Gronqvist. Email: [email protected]

1464-9357 Print/1470-000X On-line/03/010023-16 2003 Taylor & Francis Ltd

DOI: 10.1080/1523908032000088993

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24 H. Valve & M. Gronqvist

The methodology of the EC handbook focuses on physical outcomes of structuralfunding. This outline contradicts the large body of academic literature, which stressesthe importance of the institutional changes brought about by the funding schemes (e.g.Hooghe, 1996; John, 2000). By institutions we refer to forms of structured coherence thathave a selective function: they reward actions that are compatible with them (Jessop,2001). This structured coherence may be either organizational or conventional in origin;the latter here also including discursive structures.

Within a region that has received a structural funding designation, the new policyscheme appears as an outside input introduced into an existing system. At the beginningof the first funding period the change is likely to cause confusion, but it is equally likelythat the situation will calm down relatively soon. After that, activities tend to take placewithin particular networks and according to more or less stabilized practices andunderstandings. This is a process of policy institutionalization.

In this paper we study and assess the institutionalization of a so-called Objective 5bprogramme in the county of Gavleborg, Sweden. When analysing the structures andpractices that the institutionalization process produced or reproduced we focus on thefactors that came to construct participation and project generation in the implementationof the Objective 5b programme. In the implementation of a structural funding pro-gramme, an actor may participate in the identification of development needs or oppor-tunities, but also become involved in the generation or realization of a particular project.

The focus of the analysis stems from our normative interest. We wished to find outwhat kind of conditions the programme institutionalization created for environmentalintegration. In answering this question we applied two assessment criteria. First, weenquired if barriers impeding the implementation of the intended means of environmen-tal integration existed and, if so, what those barriers were. Second, we examined if theprogramme institutionalization provided potential for social learning to take place.Social learning potential describes how well the institutional conditions support theproduction of collective innovations. The next chapter introduces the assessment frame-work in more detail.

This study is part of a wider research project that will compare the institutionalizationof three Objective 5b programmes during the 1994–1999 programming period. The focuswill be on the assessment of the social learning potentials provided by the programmes.

Framework for the Environmental Assessment of Institutionalization

Programme institutionalization may hinder environmental integration in two ways.First, the routines that become institutionalized may be unfavourable for the applicationof environmental policy instruments. In other words, the intervention logic of the policyinstruments assumed to ensure that environmental integration takes place does notnecessarily correspond with the realm of regional development. For example, in orderfor environmental screening criteria to make a difference, project initiatives need to besystematically evaluated at some stage.

Second, environmental considerations can only have an impact if there is freedom ofaction, i.e. alternative ways to proceed. Glasbergen (1997) expresses this by stating thateffective environmental integration requires that ‘social learning’ is possible. Indeed, “itis not only environmental interests that are central, but also those interests which, in thelight of environmental objectives, have been forced to adopt and reorient themselves”(Glasbergen, 1997, p. 190).

Social learning occurs when “actors can learn from each other during responsivecommunication and, as a result, are able to reframe their action conditions and construct-

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Regional Policy Reform and the Environment in Sweden 25

new policy horizons” (Valve, 2003). This means that the communicative process enlargessocial space; it produces novel opportunities and alternatives. As a result, social learningboth imposes demands on the institutional conditions and provides an additionalopportunity for changing them.

In the pre-definition of the factors that make social learning improbable we rely onempirical results that have been obtained elsewhere (Valve, 2001, 2002, 2003). Accordingto these, the implementation of a structural funding programme may decrease sociallearning potential in two ways. First, the programme and the manner in which it isimplemented may allow or support the participation of only such actors who havealready earlier had an established position in regional development. Participation mayrequire qualities or resources that are available only or mainly for a privileged set ofactors. If participation becomes limited in this manner, the probability that fresh ideaswill emerge decreases.

Second, the implementation of a structural funding programme may standardizeinteraction that is related to regional development. Regulatory appliances institutesocially guaranteed identities (Bourdieu, 1994). The social classifications and categoriesthat they impose structure our self-understandings and the ways we are perceived byothers. Interaction may become standardized when a participant is encouraged to haveonly one single, one-dimensional identity at a time.

Alternatively, when multidimensionality exists, an actor is likely to participate incommon problem solving without identifying herself with only one single group orcategory. Multidimensionality favours social learning: the more room there is forchanging positions and alliances, the more potential for such learning exists. Forinstance, farmers do not necessarily participate only as representatives of their pro-fession, but may be ready to identify themselves also with non-farmers such as otherparents or other users of the river basin. Novel coalitions which develop may allowtotally new perspectives and alternatives to emerge (Dyke & Dyke, 2002)

Since the time-scale our study is narrow—one programming period only—we cannotsay much about whether the Objective 5b programme promoted social learning inGavleborg or, if so, how. Therefore, we focus on the possible impediments to andpotentials of social learning.

Background of the Case Study

Regional Policy in Sweden

In Sweden both population and welfare have tended to concentrate in the southern partsof the country. Regional policy has its origin in general welfare policies and in equalityconsiderations, but has, from the 1990s onward, focused more on promoting economicgrowth (Aalbu et al., 1999; Hallin & Lindstrom, 2000). The policy is very intensive interms of national spending: the budget allocation per capita in 1999 was by far thehighest in the Nordic countries (Aalbu et al., 1999, p. 47).

Sweden is divided into 21 counties. In each of them the Swedish government isrepresented by a County Administrative Board (CAB). The CABs draft regional develop-ment strategies and distribute related measures to the various actors. Other key admin-istrators are the County Councils, who look after health care and cultural services. TheCouncils are run by elected councillors.

The structural funding programmes were introduced in Sweden at a time whenregional administration was in a state of flux. At the beginning of the 1990s, discussions

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took place about discontinuing County Councils (Sandberg & Stahlberg, 2000, pp. 1,102). The introduction of structural funds raised a contest between the CABs, the CountyCouncils and the municipalities—all of them were eager to take the lead in theadministration of the funding programmes (Aalbu et al., 1999, p. 73; Gronqvist, 2002;SOU, 1999). Finally, the task was given to the CABs, who also administrate the nationaldevelopment funds. Therefore, the division of labour that followed has been character-ized as a “victory of the CABs which are accustomed to power” (Groning & Hjern, 2000,p. 12).

Responsibility for regional policy is shared between the state and the municipalities,the latter having the executive role. The municipalities are relatively independent unitsof local administration and have the right to levy taxes. Since the end of the 1970s, eventhe smallest municipalities have tended to carry out their own economic developmentpolicies (Hallin & Lindstrom, 2000).

In Sweden the administrators of regional policy started the reforms of the policysystem only after the national referendum had opted for EU membership. Since thereforms took a considerable time, the actual programming work started late.

Designated Region

The region we studied covers six municipalities, all situated in the county of Gavleborgand covered by the Objective 5b programme of Vasterbotten/Gavle/Dala (see Figure 1).As the name of the programme suggests, the overall designated region comprises threeareas, all belonging to different counties.

The six municipalities vary considerably in size and wealth. While the smallest ofthem, Ockelbo, has only some 6200 inhabitants, the biggest municipality, Hudiksvall, has38 000. In 1999 the total number of inhabitants in the region studied was around 122 000.Five of the municipalities are in the historical province of Halsingland and one, Ockelbo,in Gastrikland.

In Gavleborg forests cover 80 per cent of the county area: the figure is the largest ofall the Swedish counties. Wood processing and the pulp and paper industry areimportant employers. Agriculture is dominated by animal husbandry and, particularly,by dairy farming. Agricultural subsidies in Sweden were abolished in the early 1990s,except for those which favoured environmental protection (Eckerberg & Wide, 2001). EUmembership, by re-introducing subsidies, therefore appeared beneficial to Swedishfarmers.

Intensive agriculture and forestry have affected the state of the environment in twoways. The level of biodiversity has decreased and the watersheds in many places sufferfrom eutrophication. The decrease in agricultural production has meant that the land-scape has significantly lost its open character. (Lansstyrelsen Gavleborg, 1995). Changesin rural habitation also constitute a potential threat to the rich cultural milieu of theregion.

The Objective 5b Programme in Gavleborg

During the 1994–1999 programming period, EU structural funding concentrated on sixpriority Objectives, each supporting specifically designated regions. Objective 5btargeted the development of rural regions.

In a region that has received a structural funding designation, the various govern-

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Figure 1. The municipalities in focus. Source: http://www.regionfakta.com/gavleborg/020328.

mental organizations, local administrative bodies, private actors and voluntary organiza-tions are expected to initiate projects and act as co-financing partners. In order to obtainfunding, the projects must comply with the national and EU regulations. Nominatednational authorities co-ordinate and control the implementation process.

In the designated regions structural funding is allocated with the help of program-ming documents. The document introduces policy priorities and measures. The descrip-tion of each measure indicates for which activity types the measure provides funding.The Vasterbotten/Gavle/Dala programming document was drafted hastily, only threepeople doing the actual writing. They each represented one of the counties involved. TheObjective 5b programme channelled about €24 million from the EU to Gavelborg.However, to be able to receive EU funding, a potential applicant had to find nationalmatching funding to cover 35–65 per cent of the total costs of a project, depending onthe measure (IM-Gruppen, 1997).

The programming document included three priorities and ten measures. Some of themeasures explicitly aimed at the integration of environmental goals into other policy

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sectors. Those which did so most explicitly promoted increased utilization of forests anddiversification of farming, forestry and fisheries. Many other measures referred toenvironmental goals as well. For example, the development of small and medium-sizedfirms was expected to result in environmental improvements in 50 firms (Samlatplaneringsdokument, 1996, p. 35).

The programming document also introduced horizontal criteria and defined theprocedures by which the correspondence of the project initiatives with the criteriawas to be ensured. Among other things, the projects were required to increase responsi-bility for the environment and cultural heritage (Samlat planeringsdokument, 1996,p. 35).

The official evaluation of the Objective 5b programme reports that out of the over 450project managers who were contacted, almost 75 per cent said that they had paidattention, at least to some extent, to environmental issues during project generation(Glesbygdsverket, 2001, p. 33). The evaluation also found evidence that environmentalconcerns had affected the implementation of some projects (Glesbygdsverket, 2001,p. 49). However, the report does not reveal the actual role of the environmental criteriain these considerations.

The Research Process

In this paper we study the interplay between a policy scheme that was imposed fromabove and the political context to adopt it. Studying institutionalization in this mannerrequires a case study approach. We chose the Gavleborg municipalities as a case for twobasic reasons. First, the six municipalities form a fairly coherent whole and are governedby the same administrative institutions. Second, they all are covered by an Objective 5bprogramme: this particular objective will also be in the focus of a forthcoming compar-ative study.

The data consist of 19 interviews (with 20 interviewees) carried out by MikaelaGronqvist, while Helena Valve participated in only four of these. The interviews werecarried out mainly in January–February 2001 with the exception of the four last ones,which took place in October 2001.

The interviewees were selected to represent parties with varying roles and responsibil-ities. They had all given, or could have given, a significant input to the process. Membersof the Secretariat were contacted, who then named actors they considered influential.The snowball process went on but, at the same time, organizations and persons werepicked from lists that included information about financed projects. The obvious lack inthe primary data is the scarcity of non-contributors’ stories. Some of the individualscontacted were totally ignorant of the Objective 5b programme.

Not all institutional features are equally relevant for the achievement of environmentalpolicy goals. The focus in this study is both on the constitution of extensive implemen-tation structures and on the development of the conditions in which the deliberation ofenvironmental management issues took or could have taken place. These two criteriaaffected both the selection of interviewees and the content of the analysis.

The interviewees, even when describing the same implementation process, recountedstories that naturally varied depending, for example, on the position a person had, orhad previously had, in the process. However, the narratives were seldom actuallycontradictory. Helena Valve analyzed how the interviewees prescribed practices, posi-tions and the evolvement of the implementation process. The focus was on the catego-rizations the interviewees applied.

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The Structures (re)Produced

Region-wide Implementation Structures

The following three quotations capture the region-wide structures that conditionedenvironmental integration and the development of interaction conditions in Gavleborg:

EU money means that it is possible to make it bigger and effective (memberof the Secretariat).

… since there is more money than projects there is also political pressure thatyou must set projects going and get rid of the money … in other words, therewas this outcry that nothing happens, we are not getting any money, no-onetakes money home, reclaims no money and … (member of the Secretariat).

… one needs to have money to invest. That is the main thing. That is whymunicipalities have been forced to go in. Who else … no-one else can go in.The employment service doesn’t want to manage projects [have projects oftheir own]. They have said that we may generate projects, they follow andco-finance. There are not actually many alternatives (municipal co-ordinator).

At the beginning of the programming period in Gavleborg, interpretation of structuralfunding regulations and setting up of the required administrative arrangements provedto be a laborious and confusing task. This was the case, although in the CAB the EUfunds were closely integrated with the distribution of the existing systems of financialaid. However, the programming document also included measures that had not beforebeen so extensively a part of the regional policy tool-kit. Some respondents referred tothese as “those tailored for voluntary organisations”. By these measures they meant thespecific local services and rural development measures.

As in other Swedish regions, a particular group was established to make decisions onEU funding. The group consisted mainly of municipal politicians and was chaired by aCAB official. Before a project application reached this body, the initiatives were screenedby civil servants who formed a so-called programme Secretariat.

For the members of the Secretariat their mission appeared twofold: they needed tomake sure that all relevant regulations were followed, but also to facilitate the use of thefunds. In the awareness-raising work the Secretariat focused mostly on the municipali-ties, which were viewed as the key units for programme implementation. According tosome interviewees, the Objective 5b programme strengthened the role of the municipal-ities in the field of regional development compared to what it had been before.

All of the municipalities concerned realized—some sooner and some later—that theyrequired a new type of competence and new workforce to be able to take advantage ofthe Objective 5b programme. They all employed people to co-ordinate project gener-ation. These co-ordinators represented expertise on structural funding in municipalities.As one of them put it: “if it says ‘EU’ in a document they [the municipality administra-tion] want to turn to an expert”.

The Objective 5b programme also gave the municipalities a strategic role as aco-financier. Often their contribution determined whether a project was realized or not.The paradox of the system was that for impecunious municipalities the novel fundingopportunity was of strategic importance, but simultaneously they were poorly equippedto provide the necessary matching funding.

While the politicians came together in the meetings of the decision-making group, thecivil servants working with the implementation of the Objective 5b programme had a

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network of their own. In the regular gatherings of this network, the members of theSecretariat could inform the municipality representatives of the grounds for theirdeliberation and the various participants could exchange views and experiences gener-ally.

In the assessment of the eligibility of project proposals the Secretariat adopted asupportive role. The primary aim was to promote the generation of projects and the useof funds within the limited time frame. The officials could suggest alterations to theinitiatives—even to the wordings only—but seldom turned any down. However, theregulations had a significant anticipatory impact on the generation of project initiatives.The content of the programming document was particularly significant in this respect:the applications were to be adopted to the measures from which funding was available.Particularly towards the end the project generators had to check in which measures therewas money left and tailor their proposals accordingly.

A member of the Secretariat noted that environmental issues were obviously takeninto account in the judgements he and his colleagues made, but that it was impossibleto estimate whether a project would fully achieve the environmental objectives. Theprogramme managers considered specific procedures unnecessary, since market forces,the existing legislation and the ‘back-bone’ eliminate environmentally harmful activities.The members of the decision-making group shared these opinions, although some ofthem frankly said that the criteria only had a symbolic meaning. One of the representa-tives admitted that if there had been stronger competition for the funds, the horizontalaims would also have been given more weight. According to her, the positive environ-mental role of the projects could always be increased.

The actors who had been involved in the generation of projects frequently mentionedthe requirement for public matching funding as a problem in project generation. Theamount of matching funding required was high and the financing practices in variouspublic bodies desynchronized. Some organizations might decrease their contributionduring the realization of a project from the sum they had initially promised, therebysimultaneously decreasing the size of the EU contribution available.1

Municipalities as Constructers of Implementation Conditions

[T]hen we have had dialogue locally and we knew approximately whatopportunities we had, and if you now look at the evaluations which havebeen made … so we received quite many projects and quite big projects. Andquite valuable projects … that is, we saw approximately which branches wereabout to expand and in which branches we could receive growth…(municipal representative).

[T]here are some municipalities … where they have integration between thetraditional economic development and rural development, but you could saythat that is unique. Since otherwise rural development … it is not perceived aseconomic development but as something wishy-washy (project co-ordinator).

In different municipalities the Objective 5b programme encountered very variablecircumstances. The municipal councillors and authorities in Soderhamn viewed theprogramme as an antidote for the acute unemployment problems. In that municipalityseveral large factories had recently closed down. The government had established a‘Soderhamn Commission’ to deal with the problems of the municipality. Therefore, it isno wonder that in Soderhamn the Objective 5b programme was closely integrated into

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existing business development practices: it was described as “an additional pot ofmoney”.

In Soderhamn, in co-operation with business interests, the administrators identifiedthe sectors with growth potential. In this the municipal co-ordinator badly neededcompetent private consultants who, however, were scarce. The aim was to generatelong-lasting and large projects that could provide employment for many. The extent towhich the programming document allocated money to small-scale activities raisedirritation in some respondents.

In many other municipalities the identification of development needs and potentialstook place in a centralized manner, too. Particularly at the beginning of the program-ming period, various meetings were held between the representatives of the munici-pality, the employment service, the county administrative board and private firms. Thescale of deliberation was seen as appropriate since “the municipality has a comprehen-sive view”. Neither was the centralized approach viewed as non-democratic: after all, itwas the elected councillors who made decisions on the municipal co-funding.

One of the municipal co-ordinators described himself as a provider of financingservices. He viewed firms as the customers of the municipality: his task was to match upthe support options of the public organizations and the needs of the firms.

The rural municipality of Ockelbo chose a very specific kind of strategy in theidentification of development potentials. Since this small municipality had been suffer-ing from considerable emigration, promotion of local activity was identified as importanteven before the Objective 5b programme was launched. An earlier project had organizedlocal study circles for the identification of development problems and needs. Thenew programme was integrated into this existing activity and the project managercontinued to work as a facilitator. The Objective 5b programme appeared to him as a“fantastic opportunity”. He generated a new project that provided lay groups with easyaccess to the funds. The co-ordinator also had a political agenda: he worked, in relationto specific issues such as rural transportation, against standardizing policies that, as heargued, did not leave room for locality specific solutions.

In Bollnas an agricultural extension project evolved into a county-wide scheme aimedat increasing the involvement of local communities in regional and municipal develop-ment. The project resulted, among other things, in a system of ‘village banks’ from whichthe local inhabitants could obtain loans for shared purposes. The project also broughttogether a group of actors representing what they called a ‘social economy’ perspective.One of their common aims was to question the dominant thinking within the municipaleconomic development policies: they wished to change the way the needs of the policywere identified and to strengthen the role of villages in the making of the policy.However, the representative of the lobby noted that the division between the‘conventional’ economic development and the social economy approach was hard toovercome. Despite the invitations the municipal officials coming from this sectordid not participate in the meetings organized by the movement. On the other hand,the group received both attention and funding from some municipalities and from theCAB.

As the project manager expressed it, he and his associates were interested in workingon ‘how’ questions. As achievements he mentioned the manner the project had broughtpeople together and how the network so formed had succeeded in getting a LEADER � 2

designation for the region. Being inside the bureaucratic structural funding discourse,the lobby could take part in the related discussion. It criticized the Swedish interpret-ations of the structural funding regulations for causing “home-made problems”

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local participation (Sinclair & Lager, 1999, p. 18). The lobby proposed that privatecontributions also be counted as valid matching funding.

Some of the civil servants interviewed took a critical attitude towards the bottom-upemphasis. They argued that only institutionalized organizations—such as the municipalunits and companies—could guarantee the continuity of the projects. Moreover, amunicipal representative claimed that projects that only promoted the bottom-up ap-proach easily failed, since in their enthusiasm the managers only ended up mappinglocal needs without really thinking to what kind of municipal activity the messageshould be transmitted.

Despite the dichotomy in approaches, many municipal representatives—as well as themunicipality administration they represented—perceived centralized business pro-motion and localized village development as complementary. For example, in Ovanakera specific village development scheme accompanied traditional business promotion. Theexception here was the municipality of Hudiksvall which, in general, did little facilita-tion work.

Project Generation Outside Municipal Structures

Because of the red tape and bureaucracy involved in the applications etc. etc.it appears as it does. One needs special skills to be able to produce aproject … it is not something a Mr Svensson [Mr Smith] can do (employee ofa private organization).

No, I think that the idea may be as brilliant as ever, but if you don’t have theeconomic resources or contacts to the respective administrators in order toactualise it … then it collapses (employee of a private organization).

The implementation of the agriculture and forestry related measures proved to beproblematic in Gavleborg. Environmental certification of forests was a preferred activity,but the private firms operating in the certification business expressed no interest in thisfunding source. The interviewees evinced various explanations for this. Some of themsuggested that the forest owners were passive since they were already doing so well. Therequest for public co-funding was also seen as an obstacle to the participation of privateactors. A forestry administrator, in turn, claimed that “certification is something thefirms do by themselves and they do not want to involve the authorities”.

The forestry measure was “saved”—according to one interviewee—by two largeschemes. First, the Forest Council initiated an environmental project called the ‘GreenHouse’. This project, however, had little to do with forestry or forest owners. Instead itgathered environmental information and delivered it to administrators and residents.Second, some municipalities and their new alliances initiated projects to promote theutilization of wood as an energy source and the development of sawmills. Therefore, inthe end, the measure was also described in positive terms: it had forced some changesto come about.

The measure aiming at diversification of agriculture, forestry and fisheries did notachieve this positive development path and was, therefore, integrated into a tourismmeasure (Glesbygdsverket, 2001, p. 11). Even within this new measure, spendingremained slow. In its implementation a private organization called the Rural Economyand Agricultural Society gained a central position. The Society had close contacts to theCAB, where one of its former employees had worked on the drafting of the programm-

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ing document. For the Society the Objective 5b programme appeared a potential newfunding source for their normal activities.

Some of the projects initiated by the Rural Economy and Agricultural Society,concentrating on the promotion of ecological farming and local food-systems, offeredvarious actors a chance to form novel networks. However, some of the extension projectsleft little freedom of action for the beneficiaries, who either had to accept the proposedscheme or be excluded.

Objective 5b funding was also utilized for the realization of such projects thatstemmed from local and regional environmental concerns in an ad hoc manner. The bestexample comes from Hudiksvall, where a local group, concerned about the state of anearby lake, initiated and realized a restoration project.

The participation of a village group, a voluntary organization or a potential newentrepreneur, however, required that many difficulties be overcome. Success necessi-tated that a local enthusiast came in contact with a municipal co-ordinator and, afterlaunching the idea to his or her reference group, was ready to start working with thecomplicated project management bureaucracy. Moreover, the local team had to beprepared to do voluntary work and to apply for a loan, since the Objective 5b fundingwas available only retrospectively.

The village development schemes launched by some municipalities were a means bywhich local action could be supported without causing the participants overwhelmingbureaucratic burdens. These schemes were utilized a great deal for the realization oflocal cultural events and for restoring buildings for communal use.

Whether an actor became involved with the generation of a project via municipalities,other organizations or alternatively heard about the opportunity directly from the CAB,the person or organization tended to have good opportunities to participate in thefuture, too. Often projects led to further projects. Moreover, learning the funding systemprovided an actor with capital that was worth utilizing again.

Environmental Assessment of Programme Institutionalization

Practicability of the Means of Environmental Integration

In Gavleborg, the driving force behind the implementation of the Objective 5b pro-gramme was the aim of ensuring that the allocated funds would be fully used during thefew years that were left of the programming period. The results support the view thatstructural funding is not just about institutions that are looking for funding. Instead, itis very much “a funding system looking for a set of institutions” (Marks, 1996, p. 391).In Gavleborg this was particularly true in the case of measures that for one reason oranother became unpopular. The environmental criteria easily lost their significance. Onlythe most obviously harmful proposals were screened out. It is difficult to estimate theadditional value of the criteria in contrast to environmental legislation.

The programming document promoted environmentally beneficial changes by estab-lishing particular measures, e.g. for forestry. However, only part of the assumedimplementers took part in the common endeavour. One obvious reason for this was themanner in which the environmental and other goals were imposed from above. More-over, application of funding demanded earlier expertise or, alternatively, ample dedi-cation. Thus, the applicants needed time and money to invest in the process. If theproject initiators represented private organizations, they had to find a considerable shareof matching funding from public sources, while the public sector applicants could use

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their own resources for this purpose. Finally, it is possible that some potential applicantswere not interested because they simply did not need extra funding, particularly as itwas laborious to access.

It seems that environmental measures promote environmental integration only if oneof the following three conditions is met. First, success is likely if the existing practicesand problem formations in the policy sector or in a locality support such an endeavour.Second, some of the potential applicants may be particularly motivated to grasp funding.If the other measures do not satisfy their needs, and if the programme managers are notwilling to change the preconditions of financing, such applicants may produce initiativeswhich differ from their normal activities in order to benefit from the programme. Third,the implementation of the measures may result in the advent of new actors with newideas for the rural development arena. They might be either introduced to do that ormay recognize the new financing option themselves.

Regarding the last point, the Objective 5b programme did indeed offer voluntarygroups an opportunity to address local environmental problems and propose solutions.The programming document encouraged spontaneous, non-professional activism, butthe funding instrument was not suitable for the promotion of such purposes. Fortu-nately, the direct funding which some municipalities provided for ad hoc and communitygroups could compensate for the problems caused by the bureaucratic funding source.However, such funding was not available for the environmentally orientated measures.

The Objective 5b Programme as a Generator of Social Learning Potential?

All the factors restricting participation in the implementation process also decreased thepotential for social learning. Many of the restrictions stemmed, as noted above, from thelogic of the funding instrument. The goal of maximum spending, the limited time frameand the quality criteria set for projects encouraged the programme administrators to leanon already familiar actors and practices.

As a result, the Objective 5b programme was integrated into the existing regionaldevelopment practices. This is in line with other Swedish experiences (SOU, 1999, p. 42).Co-operation between public actors increased, but their roles and positions remainedvery much the same. Governmental and local authorities were best equipped toparticipate: they had easy access to information and the structures necessary for projectmanagement and they could, to varying extents, provide the necessary matchingfunding (see also Hallin & Lindstrom, 2000, p. 95). The programme also favoured theparticipation of experts who already had an insider position or otherwise close contactsto key authorities.

At the county level, and in many municipalities, the allocation of public funds wasperceived as an issue requiring political control, but the definition of development needsreceived a technical status. This easily happens since the complex funding system andthe status of implementation function as neutralizers, focusing much attention oncorrectness and eligibility issues and creating a distinguishing discourse and a demandfor very specific expertise (Valve, 2003). A bureaucratic perspective also restricts sociallearning by giving actors with official expert status a dominating and potentiallyrepressing position or by treating the issues at stake as de-political and not worth publicdeliberation at all (Bourdieu, 1994).

Moreover, economic development policies in municipalities have traditionally aimedat creating favourable conditions for private enterprises and, in this manner, safeguard-ing high employment rates. In Swedish municipalities, the making of economic develop-

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ment policies has followed pragmatic intentions, but has been only loosely anchored indemocratic control systems. The identification of municipal interest with the interests ofthe firms operating in the municipality has also made the policy sector an elitist one(Hanberger, 1997, pp. 154–157; see also Pierre, 1996).3 In Gavleborg the variations in theintensity of structural funding facilitation between municipalities also put actors andfirms in unequal positions.

The antagonism between centralized, comprehensive schemes on the one hand andde-centralized, small-scale and ‘rural’ ones on the other also became politicized. Theprogramme generated political interest in municipal economic development activities(see also Glesbygdsverket, 2001, p. 47). The non-uniform social economy lobby openedthe discussion on a topic that, prior to the EU programme, had been a closed world,occupied by specific experts and concerned beneficiaries. In addition to that, thenewcomers had specific demands for further pluralization of the making of economicpolicies in municipalities.

The Objective 5b programme generated potential for social learning and facilitated theachievement of environmental policy goals not only by politicizing economic develop-ment but also by generating or strengthening problem-orientated interaction in localcommunities. These arenas could offer room for the emergence of multi-dimensionalidentities, if they are not overly insular. The independence of the interaction frombureaucratic categories may liberate the participants from one-dimensional identities.Moreover, when actors can participate directly, without representatives, there is lessneed for fixed identities or clear-cut barriers and segments (Dyke & Dyke, 2002).

On the other hand, since the Objective 5b programme created a bureaucratic, one-di-mensional category of programme implementation, the risk is that in communities inwhich interactive plurality has been possible, one-dimensional rationales, e.g. spendingwithin the set limits, start to narrow the imagination (see Ray, 1999). If this happensagency is conditioned by the concepts and goals of programmatic development—not bythe plurality of rural people and their problems. Such a risk seemed apparent inGavleborg: the (former) non-professionals interviewed thought and acted according tothe terms provided by the funding system.

Conclusions

In Gavleborg the integration of regional and environmental policies was restricted by themanner in which the programme implementation became supply-driven. This decreasedthe effectiveness of the environmental screening criteria. Moreover, the environmentallyorientated measures attracted only some of the intended actors. Many private actors, inparticular, did not view applying for the Objective 5b funding worthwhile. Such actorswere, indeed, in a worse position than the public applicants since their own contribu-tions did not count as necessary matching funding.

On the other hand, even if the institutionalization process had created favourableconditions for the application of the suggested integration mechanisms, and if weassume that the instruments were fully applied, we would still know nothing about theeffectiveness of the environmental integration occurring. The consideration of environ-mental impacts may have been only cosmetic. Therefore, the extent to which programmeimplementation can promote the emergence of new innovations and solutions is crucial.However, in Gavleborg the Objective 5b programme succeeded in generating sociallearning potential only to a limited extent. On the contrary, since participation in theimplementation process tended to demand specific resources and established positions,

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the Objective 5b programme was likely to increase the gap between outsiders andinsiders in regional development and so to decrease the social learning potential.

At the same time, however, the Objective 5b programme politicized economic develop-ment in some municipalities. The implementation process also brought actors togetherin new ways. Although in the novel policy arenas interaction was often structured by theconcepts and categories of the funding system, actors sometimes met in order to discussconcrete development problems.

The discourse and actor positions constructed on the county-wide arenas also affectedthe constitution of interaction conditions in more specific settings. However, the connec-tion between the region-wide interpretations and the conditions emerging was notextensive. The Objective 5b programme was re-interpreted in a non-linear manner. Thedifferences between the various municipalities show how much the impact of structuralfunding programmes depends on the historical and political conditions in which they areintroduced. They do not determine policy outcomes, but a tendency towards self-rein-forcing processes exists.

It seems that, in Sweden, municipalities are in key roles in the integration ofenvironmental policy concerns and development activities. Municipalities are wellequipped to act as mediators between local needs and the complex EU bureaucracy.Moreover, economic development is indeed an environmentally relevant topic: it is acontext in which the integration of environmental concerns and human subsistence couldtake place. What needs to be kept in mind is the heterogeneity of a municipality: itincludes various social realms, in which environmental goals are given meaning inrelation, for example, to differing historical backgrounds, economic activities and waysof life.

In addition, it appears to us that programming documents could support environmen-tal integration more than occurred in Gavleborg. Instead of addressing only contentualrequests in a top-down manner, they could, to an increasing extent, yield suggestions onthe organization of the implementation process. They could propose contexts where thedefinition of needs and the innovation of projects could take place. In the proposals theprerequisites of social learning should naturally be taken into account. This also holdsfor the drafting of the document: this process can in itself promote learning and mutualcommitment.

A potential problem in the opening up of policy making may, of course, be thescarceness or passivity of those who could participate. There are no easy solutions to this,but it seems clear that the spaces of contemplation and deliberation should make roomfor the experiences of individuals in order to make participation meaningful. This issomething a purely bureaucratic endeavour is unlikely to do.

Acknowledgements

The paper is an outcome of a project financed by the Academy of Finland (Project 49576),Nordregio and the Finnish Environment Institute. Dr Tuija Hilding-Rydevik of Nordre-gio provided us with insights and encouragement. Professor Yrjo Haila and programmedirector Mikael Hilden gave valuable comments to an earlier draft of the paper. We alsothank the interviewees who all gave generously of their time and effort.

Notes

1. After the publication of the interim evaluation the required amount of matching funding was lowered.

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This alleviated the problem somewhat. Since the applicants also became familiar with new funding

sources, the governmental account states that in the latter part of the programming period, matching

funding did not significantly restrict project generation (SOU, 1999, p. 51).

2. LEADER programme is a Community initiative for local rural development. 2000–2006: LEADER � ,

“Links between Actions for the Development of the Rural Economy”.

3. On the other hand, Hanberger (1997, p. 161) argues that the increased emphasis on project development

is an attempt to build new bridges between specific local demands and economic development practices.

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