regional issues · 2016-07-01 · airfield at fiery cross reef 4 figure 3. airfield at subi reef 6....

Journal of Strategic Intelligence Summer 20164

Surprise! What Caused China’s Recent and Massive Land Reclamation in the South China Sea? By Wayne R. Hugar

Regional Issues

About the Author: Mr. Wayne Hugar (CDR USN, Ret.) designs, develops, and delivers graduate-level intelligence education courses covering key strategic drivers and characteristics of the global security environment, and China and East Asia intelligence issues. He manages NIU’s regional intel-ligence education Program of Study for China and East Asia and the China Certificate in Intelligence Studies Program.

AbstractThis research article identifies causal factors for China’s initiation of large-scale land reclamation and infrastructure construction on its occupied Spratly Island reefs in the South China Sea in 2014. The purpose of this research was to identify likely causes and determine whether there was evi-dence from official Chinese government sources that were publicly available before China began the land reclamation. The internal causal variables identified were: 1) linkages between China’s maritime claims and Communist Party legitimacy; 2) economic reliance on the South China Sea by domestic actors; 3) Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power and focus on maritime sovereignty; and 4) the strategic security significance of the South China Sea. External causal variables were: 1) U.S. military activities and the 2011 U.S. Rebalance to Asia policy; and 2) prior land reclamation by Vietnam and Taiwan, among others, in the South China Sea.

Introduction and Background

This article presents preliminary research findings identifying po-tential causal factors for China’s sudden initiation in early 2014 of large-scale land reclamation and infrastructure construction on its occupied Spratly Island reefs in the South China Sea. By January 2014, apparently without previous indications or announcement, China began

Regional Issues

5Journal of Strategic Intelligence Summer 2016

1Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Develop-ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, 2015, 72, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf.2Author’s calculations based on reported data from Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative website, which lists 12,822,000 square meters of reclaimed land, or 3,168 acres. See http://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/. 3Ben Doven et al., Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea: Implications and Policy Options, Congressional Research Service, 2015, 3, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44072.pdf.

conducting near-simultaneous, extensive, and seemingly well-planned and organized infrastructure construction projects on five of its seven occupied reefs and shoals in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. From 1988 to 2013, before its 2014 initiation of land reclamation on its Spratly Island reef outposts, China had reclaimed a total of roughly five acres of land on the seven reefs and built a half-dozen semi-permanent building and structures on raised platforms made from concrete, metal, and wood. By the end of 2014, China had reclaimed about 500 acres of land at five of its occupied reefs.1 A mere six months later, by July 2015, China had reclaimed a total of about 3,200 acres (or nearly 13 million square meters of land) on seven Spratly outposts,2 as identified in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Chinese Land Reclamation on Spratly Island Reefs3

Regional Issues

6 Journal of Strategic Intelligence Summer 2016

China’s land reclamation efforts on its occupied features in the Spratly Islands are new and unprecedented not only for the speed of infrastructure development, but for their size, scale, and scope. This activity has created a significant change in the amount of land China now occupies compared to rival claimants on Spratly Island features in the South China Sea. China’s

infrastructure construction on these new land forms includes at least two 9,000 foot airfields, one on Fiery Cross (Yongshu) Reef as depicted in Fig-ure 2, another on Subi (Zhubi) Reef as depicted in Figure 3, and probably a third airfield of 6,000 feet being constructed on Mischief (Meiji) Reef.5

4See http://www.janes.com/article/54814/china-completes-runway-on-fiery-cross-reef5Gregory Poling, “Potential New Runway Presents New Headaches,” Asia Maritime Trans-parency Initiative, 2015, http://amti.csis.org/new-imagery-release/.6See http://www.andrewerickson.com/2015/09/south-china-sea-satellite-imagery-makes-clear-chinas-runway-work-at-subi-reef/.

Figure 2. Airfield at Fiery Cross Reef 4

Figure 3. Airfield at Subi Reef 6

Regional Issues


These three locations, as well as four additional new Chinese land forms on reefs in the Spratly Islands at Cuarteron (Huayang), Hughes (Dong-men), Johnson South (Chigua), and Gaven (Nanxun and Xinan) Reefs, also have multiple helicopter landing pads and port facilities, large multistory buildings, construction and maintenance facilities, radar and communica-tion nodes, housing, and power-generation plants7, 8 (as depicted on Johnson Reef in Figure 4). As a result, Beijing will soon have an increasing range of potential options across the political, economic, security, informational, and military domains for enforcing China’s maritime sovereignty claims, as well as other future defensive or offensive purposes in the region.9

There appears to have been no obvious or specific prior indications that Beijing would decide to initiate a bold change in the loose status quo be-tween the Spratlys’ competing claimants. The goal of this research was to determine if this was actually the case by identifying the most likely in-ternal and external causal variables with evidence that was available be-fore China began Spratly Island land reclamation in early 2014. Evidence

7 Doven, Chinese Land Reclamation, 9. 8Derek Watkins, “What China Has Been Building in the South China Sea,” New York Times, September 23, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-has-been-building-in-the-south-china-sea.html?_r=0.9Doven, Chinese Land Reclamation, 7–13.10Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “Dredging Up the Issues:S & ED Analysis Plus New Spratly Imagery, July 1, 2015, http://amti.csis.org/sedscs.

Figure 4. Facilities on Johnson South Reef, June 10, 201510

Regional Issues


and judgment used to support the findings were derived from both official Chinese sources and recent research from scholars and experts on the top-ic. The internal causal variables identified and examined are: 1) the link-age between China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea and Chinese Communist Party legitimacy; 2) China’s actual and perpetuated economic reliance on the maritime environment; 3) Xi Jinping’s consolidation of pow-er and his focus on maritime sovereignty; and 4) the strategic security sig-nificance of the South China Sea. External causal variables are: 1) U.S. mili-tary activities associated with the 2011 U.S. Rebalance to Asia policy; and 2) land reclamation and associated activities by Vietnam and Taiwan, among others, in the South China Sea. Ascertaining the likely internal and external variables and drivers leading to Beijing’s decision to choose this particular period to develop large new land forms in the Spratly Islands, hundreds of miles from China’s mainland, may provide insight into factors influencing this and other aspects of the Chinese leadership’s decisionmaking.

Except where relevant, this article avoids covering additional aspects of South China Sea sovereignty issues and actions by the competing claimants because the issues are covered extensively in a plethora of current literature published by multiple sources. Also not covered is China’s extensive land reclamation on Woody (Yongxing) Island and Duncan (Chenhang) Island in the Paracel (Xisha) Islands in the South China Sea. These islands are just south of Hainan Island, as indicated in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Map of Woody Island and Duncan Island in the Paracel Islands11

11Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publica-tions/the-world-factbook/geos/pf.html.

Regional Issues


Although China has been conducting land reclamation and infrastruc-ture upgrades in the Paracels since 2012, reclamation has been ongoing on Woody Island since 1990 when China began building a 1,200 foot runway.12 Subsequently, China has expanded the runway numerous times to roughly 8,000 feet, with four large aircraft hangars adjacent to it (as in Figure 6).

Also during this period, three small harbors with port facilities and break-waters have been added (as depicted in Figure 7).

12James Borton, “The South China Sea: Challenges and Promises,” Xlibris, 2015.13Victor Robert Lee, “South China Sea: China Is Building on the Paracels As Well” The Diplomat, April 14, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/south-china-sea-china-is-build-ing-on-the-paracels-as-well.14The China Daily, “Sansha City to be One Year Old,” May 23, 2015, http://www.china-daily.com.cn/slides/2013-05/23/content_16525741_4.htm./.

Figure 6. Woody Island Airfield and Hangar Upgrades in the Paracel Islands13

Figure 7. Woody Island Harbor in the Paracel Islands, 201314

Regional Issues


China’s recent land reclamation and harbor construction on Duncan Island is depicted in Figure 8.

Since this activity has continued for more than 25 years and is well-doc-umented in numerous sources, this article focuses on China’s new construc-tion on reefs in the Spratly Islands, which coincidentally is very similar to what China had constructed in the Paracel Islands.

Internal Drivers

Previous Official Chinese References Prior to Land Reclamation in 2014

Four official Chinese government documents released by Beijing between 1998 and 2012 contain direct and indirect references portending China’s

15Ibid.

Figure 8. Duncan Island Land Reclamation in the Paracel Islands, 201515

Regional Issues


initiation of massive land reclamation in the South China Sea’s Spratly Is-lands in 2014.16 First, in 1998 Beijing formally announced its right to create artificial islands in its Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Exclu-sive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf. Article 8 of the law states, “The People’s Republic of China shall have the exclusive right to construct and to authorize and regulate the construction, operation and use of artifi-cial islands, installations and structures in its exclusive economic zone and on its continental shelf….”17 Articles 3, 4, and 8 of the law refer to “artifi-cial islands, installations and structures” in six places. Beijing’s official an-nouncement of its right to construct, operate, and use “artificial islands” in 1998 was specified to be within China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf. Although China claims the Spratly Islands as its sov-ereign territory, China has not adequately defined its EEZ or whether it claims the Spratly Island features it is reclaiming land on have the same legal rights, protections, and stipulations as provided for EEZs under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982.18 Despite this and several other ambiguous aspects to its claims in the South China Sea, in hindsight China’s 1998 reference to artificial islands in the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf Law could also be construed as a potential indicator.

Second, over a decade later on December 26, 2009, Beijing issued, through Presidential Decree No. 22, China’s Island Protection Law, which went into effect on March 1, 2010. The law states that there should be an “island protection planning system,” and called for the establishment of a “national island protection plan.” Portions of the Island Protection

16This paper uses the term “official” which can also be considered “authoritative,” and is best described by Michael D. Swaine: “Several types of PRC sources are considered au-thoritative in the sense of explicitly ‘speaking for the regime.’ They generally include MFA and MND statements and briefings and remarks by senior civilian and military officials appearing in the leading Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (or CCP CC) and military (People’s Liberation Army or PLA) newspapers: People’s Daily (人民日报) and Liberation Army Daily (解放军报). Authoritative statements include, in descending order of authority, PRC government and CCP statements, MFA statements, MFA spokesperson statements, and MFA daily press briefings.” See Footnote 4, p. 18 in Michael D Swaine, “Chinese Views Regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 41, June 6, 2013. http://www.hoover.org/research/chinese-views-regarding-senkakudiaoyu-islands-dispute. 17PRC State Council, Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, 1998. http://library.uoregon.edu/ec/e-asia/read/ecozone.pdf. 18See http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm.

Regional Issues


Law state, “The state shall apply special protection to the islands where the territorial sea base points are located, islands for the purpose of na-tional defense, islands within the marine natural reserves and other islands for special purposes or with special conservation value.”19 Third, in 2011 China’s State Council published China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) for comprehensive overall socio-economic development, in which Chapter 14: Promote the Development of Marine Economy, Section 2: Strengthen-ing Integrated Marine Management stated: “…promote the protection and utilization of sea islands, and support the development of remote seas is-lands…Strengthen sea area and island management,…strengthen reclama-tion management.”20 Fourth, in 2012, China’s State Council promulgated a major planning and policy implementation document entitled Island Protec-tion and Exploration for the Period 2012-2020 and Vision to 2030.21, 22 In April 2012, China’s State Oceanic Administration issued a nearly identical official document referred to as the PRC National Island Protection Plan 2011-2020.23 The 2012 Island Protection Plan is likely an important and detailed official source indicating that China’s State Council had authorized relevant Chinese government agencies to begin or finalize preparation of implementation plans for the near-term construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea.

In addition to these four documents, China’s 12th Five-Year Plan for National Marine Development is worth considering. Although it was not publicly available in Chinese or English before September 2014, Chi-na most likely would have completed and authorized the distribution of it within the Chinese government between 2011 and 2012. The National Marine Development Plan provides implementation guidance on maritime-related economic development, administration, and security for all relevant Chinese central and local government agencies. The Marine Development

19PRC State Council, PRC Island Protection Law, 2009, http://faolex.fao.org/cgi-bin/faolex.exe?rec_id=136787&database=faolex&search_type=link&table=result&lang=eng&format_name=@ERALL. 20PRC State Council, 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015), March 2011, 17, http://cbi.typepad.com/china_direct/2011/05/chinas-twelfth-five-new-plan-the-full-english-version.html.21Timothy R. Heath, China’s New Governing Party Paradigm (Burlington: Ashgate Pub-lishing, 2014), 167. 22Vietnamplus, “China Must Cancel Islands Plan: FM Spokesman,” April 24, 2012, http://www.vietmaz.com/2012/04/china-must-cancel-islands-plan-fm-spokesman/.23Xinhua, “National Plan on Island Protection Enters Effect,” April 20, 2012, http://www.china.org.cn/environment/2012-04/20/content_25192256.htm.

Regional Issues


Plan follows the guidance and directly supports “The Guideline of National Marine Development” that was approved and implemented by the State Council in 2008.24 On September 2, 2014, China’s State Council posted the National Marine Development Plan on its website under the heading “National Marine Project Development in the 12th Five-Year Program.”25 Remarkably, this official guidance for implementation did not become pub-licly available until nine months after China began land reclamation in the Spratly Islands.

The Marine Development Plan provides implementation guidance to accelerate comprehensive economic development of natural resources, pro-tection of sovereignty, administration and management, diplomacy, science and technology, environmental protection, and education related to China’s maritime claims. A review of the Marine Development Plan’s chapter titles indicates China’s intent to conduct land reclamation and major construction projects in China’s maritime regions, as well as the need to increase island protection. For example, “Chapter Four: Sea Area Intensive Use” has a sec-tion entitled “Intensifying Administration of Sea Area Use for Reclamation and Major Construction Projects,” while “Chapter Five: Protecting and De-veloping Islands” has a section entitled “Strengthening the Management of Special Purpose Islands.”26

A review of these five official sources, four of which were publicly avail-able before China’s initiation of land reclamation in the Spratly Islands, reveals that there have been numerous direct and indirect references por-tending China’s 2014 initiation of land reclamation in the South China Sea from official Chinese documents that were publicly available between 1998 and 2013. The earliest clues from official sources include the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf Law (1998), in which China first announced its right to the “construction, operation and use of artificial is-lands, installations and structures in its exclusive economic zone and on its continental shelf;” the Island Protection Law (2009), which stipulated that China would “apply special protection to the islands where the territorial sea base points are located, islands for the purpose of national defense;” and China’s release in 2011 of the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015), which

24PRC State Council, “PRC National Marine Project Development in the 12th Five-Year Program,” September 2, 2014, State Council Information Office http://www.scio.gov.cn 25Ibid. 26Ibid.

Regional Issues


stated China’s intent to: “…promote the protection and utilization of sea islands, and support the development of remote seas islands…Strengthen sea area and island management,…strengthen reclamation management.”27 Four of these five official references linking land reclamation, island protec-tion, and developing and constructing remote islands to China’s maritime rights, national security, and territorial sea base points were important in-dicators available before the commencement of land reclamation in early 2014.

China’s Maritime Economy: Both Real and Perpetuated

China’s pressing economic development needs are also likely key caus-al factors influencing China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea. China’s future use of the artificial islands for state and private-sector eco-nomic uses will enable it to commercially exploit the South China Sea’s natural resources, thus contributing to China’s economic development and sustaining employment for several million Chinese citizens. China’s new land reclamation also absorbs some of the excess capacity of Chinese agencies, companies, and workers engaged in infrastructure construction because many of these entities have been idle or underutilized due to the ongoing global recession. In 2011, China released its 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) for socio-economic development, which included Chapter 14: Promote the Development of Marine Economy.28 This chapter contained two sections, the first, Section 1: Optimizing the Marine Industry Structure, called for the development and implementation of a comprehensive marine development strategy to:

…exploit and utilize marine resources rationally, develop ma-rine oil and gas, marine transport, marine fishing and coastal travel industries greatly, and expand marine biopharmaceutical, integrated seawater utilization, marine engineering equipment manufacturing and other rising industries. Strengthen the R&D of basic, proactive and critical marine technologies, improve marine technology level, and improve marine development and utilization capabilities.29

27PRC State Council, 12th Five-Year Plan, 17. 28Ibid.29Ibid.

Regional Issues


China’s national and provincial party and government institutions rely on and promote the marine environment as a key source of economic growth and employment for Chinese companies and citizens. China’s national and provincial industrial enterprises involved in infrastructure include concrete, steel, and materials production; fabrication, construction, and finishing; transport and shipping; electricity and telecommunications; fossil fuel and green energy generation; food, water, and sanitation; and road, runway, and port construction. Each year Chinese government entities such as the Min-istry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Land and Resources, the State Oceanic Administration, China National Petroleum Corporation, and the China National Offshore Oil Cor-poration are involved in the planning, organizing, and sponsoring of large-scale expositions to advance several aspects of maritime-related economic development by linking domestic and foreign companies.30 Examples in-clude the China Marine Economy Exhibition,31 the China Maritime-Inter-national Offshore Engineering Technology & Equipment Exhibition,32 the All-China Maritime Conference and Exhibition,33 the China International Marine Exhibition,34 the Oceanology International China: Marine Technol-ogy and Ocean Science Exhibition and Conference,35 and the China Interna-tional Offshore Oil & Gas Exhibition.36

China’s State Oceanic Administration and its subordinate organizations, such as the Chinese Society of Oceanography, The National Ocean Technol-ogy Center, and China Ocean Mineral Resources R&D Association, are key proponents, as well as being Chinese state administrative managing entities involved in economic development of the maritime environment.37 Over the past five years, the State Oceanic Administration has published an annual report entitled “China’s Maritime Development,” which details a wealth of

30See http://www.marintecchina.com/en-us/About-The-Fair/Industry-Support.31See http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2014-02/12/content_17277918.htm and http://www.dongguantoday.com/news/guangdong/201408/t20140821_4325493.shtml.32See http://www.chinamaritime.com.cn/2015/en/AboutUs/GeneralInfo/#.33 See http://www.marintecchina.com/en-us/About-The-Fair/Overview.34See http://www.maritimeshows.com/china/.35See http://www.oichina.com.cn/en/Home/.36See http://www.ciooe.com.cn/2016/en/.37See http://www.oichina.com.cn/en/Event-Info/Supporters-and-Endorsement/ and http://apps.ubmasia.com/files/mediaobjects/Files/9/Marintec%202015/MT15%20sales%20fly-er_Final_25Mar%20%28split%29.pdf.

Regional Issues


statistics attributable to several categories of economic sectors related to the maritime environment. The 2015 report highlights that China’s GDP growth attributable to the maritime domain accounted for 9.4 percent of total GDP in 2014. Further, the report states that China’s maritime-related economic output in 2014 totaled $962.4 billion, a 7.7-percent increase over 2013.38

In support of China’s overall national socio-economic development and its 12th Five-Year Plan (2012-2016), China’s State Council issued an ac-companying 12th Five-Year National Oceanic Economic Development Plan listing several industries and sectors that benefit economically from the maritime domain.39 In 2013 President Xi made an official speech em-phasizing a number of technological and industrial economic sectors as im-portant to developing the maritime economy. Xi stressed the “importance of developing the marine economy, protecting the marine environment and strengthening marine science and technology research.” He added: “A developed marine economy is an important part of building maritime power.”40 Shen Dingli, a prominent Chinese academic, has appeared in and published articles in public forums recently to justify China’s Spratly Island land reclamation by linking it to China’s goals for developing its maritime economy and EEZ. Shen argues that China’s EEZ is insufficient compared to China’s large population and that it needs to expand its EEZ into South China Sea because it depends on it for fishing, oil extraction, and other natural resources.41, 42

In 2013 China’s Shandong Provincial government, together with the Qingdao municipal government and China’s state-run media and propagan-da institution, Xinhua, created the Xinhua (Qingdao) International Ocean Information Center to publish a marine-related economic report with data

38See http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-06/23/c_134349386.htm.39Xinhua (Qingdao) International Ocean Information Center and State Financial Informa-tion Center Index Research Institute, 2013 Xinhua Ocean Development Index Report, No-vember 2013, 15, http://upload.xinhua08.com/2013/1106/1383705135387.pdf.40Wang Qian and Zhang Yunbi, “Xi Vows to Protect Maritime Interests,” China Daily, Au-gust 1, 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/maritime-economy.htm.41Sui Noi Goh, “South China Sea Reclamation an Economic Move” Straits Times, May 30, 2015, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/south-china-sea-reclamation-an-econom-ic-move-chinese-scholar.42Shen Dingli, “Why China Has the Right to ‘Build Sovereignty’ in the South China Sea,” Huffington Post, June 3, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shen-dingli/china-sover-eignty-south-china-sea_b_7499186.html.

Regional Issues


provided by the Chinese government’s State Ocean Administration Devel-opment Research Center, a major institution directly reporting to China’s State Council.43 This government-sponsored annual report publicizes and outlines the economic significance of marine-related industries by various sectors in its China Marine Economic Development Index.44 Major sectors highlighted include fishing, shipping, offshore oil and gas, mineral and chemical resource extraction, bio pharmaceutical, marine engineering and infrastructure development (e.g. land reclamation), science and technology innovation, and marine tourism industries (as depicted below in Figure 9).45

The economic importance and job creation opportunities resulting from China’s land reclamation in the Spratlys is illustrated by the stated purposes

43Xie Chuanjiao, “China’s First Ocean Development Index Released in Qingdao,” China Daily, November 7, 2013, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-11/07/con-tent_17089292.htm.44China Daily, “Ocean Development Index to Boost Marine Economy,” November 7, 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/shandong/e/2013-11/07/content_17097468.htm. 45PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Communiqué on Land and Resources of China 2007, http://www.mlr.gov.cn/mlrenglish/communique/2007/.462013 Xinhua Ocean Development Index Report, 22.

Figure 9. China’s 2013 Marine Economic Development Index46

Marine Economic Development Index

Economic Growth

GOP (Gross Ocean Product)

GOP Accounts for theProportion of GDP

GOP’s Annual Growth RateMarine Fishery

Ocean Shipping

Marine Chemical and Salt

Marine BioPharmaceutical

Marine Power andSeawater Utilization

Marine Tourism

Offshore Oil and Gas

Marine EngineeringConstruction

Marine High-techIndustry Structure

Industrial Development

Regional Issues


and functions that China intends for these new facilities. For example, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s highest-level state organization responsible for economic reform and moderniza-tion, recently announced the civilian functions and activities that China in-tends for its new artificial islands in the South China Sea.47 Equating these activities with the requisite numbers and types of persons that would be needed to be employed directly on the islands (and those indirectly on the mainland) suggests that tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of Chinese citizens, as well as affiliated state and private companies, will benefit financially.

Announced NDRC civilian facilities construction plans include com-munication, navigation, environment observation, disaster prevention and mitigation, transportation, delivery support, production and daily life support facilities. These new facilities include: lighthouses; radio naviga-tion assistance facilities (including a ship automatic identification system base); maritime security communication facilities (including a ground-to-air communication base); maritime medical and emergency rescue facilities equipped with navigation support, and oil spill emergency handling; dock-ing, replenishing, and repair services for commercial, law enforcement, and military ships; maritime and meteorological observation stations for tsunami alert, earthquake monitoring, and maritime environment monitor-ing; maritime scientific research and ecological protection facilities; fossil fuel and green energy generation facilities; food and entertainment services; and sanitation treatment facilities.48

China has also used hundreds of vessels in its land reclamation and con-struction of infrastructure on the reclaimed land. These include vessels for transporting raw bulk materials and finished machinery equipment or semi-finished or prefabricated materials. The vessels range in size and sophistica-tion from small barges and medium-size bulk freighters to military amphib-ious transport dock landing ships and commercial roll-on/roll-off vessels.49 China’s relatively recent acquisition of new industrial technology and land reclamation proficiency, particularly in dredging, has been a catalyst aiding

47PRC State Oceanic Administration, “China to Build Maritime Scientific Research Center, Ground Meteorological Observation Station, and Maritime Observation Center,” China Ocean Daily, June 23, 2015, http://www.oceanol.com/48Ibid. 49Author’s conclusions based on visual analysis and review of publicly available Digital Globe satellite imagery from multiple Internet websites from June 2014 to October 2015.

Regional Issues


China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea. A review of publicly avail-able imagery released by dozens of news outlets, journals, governments, and think tanks around the world during the past 20 months reveals that hundreds of water-borne machines and craft associated with dredging have been and continue to be involved in China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea. For example, the Tianjin Dredging Company, a subsidiary of the national-level China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), and one of China’s largest national state-owned infrastructure construction companies, has reportedly been operating several modern and sophisticated cutter suction dredgers. These include the 2,400-ton Tian Jing Hao, which at 416 feet in length was the largest dredger in Asia and third-largest in the world when it was built in 2010.50, 51, 52, 53, 54 The company also operates other dredging equipment in the Spratlys, including trailing-suction dredgers, grab and bucket dredgers, and split hopper barges associated with land rec-lamation.55 CCCC reported revenues of $4.5 billion in 2014 that represented a 15 percent decrease from 2013, but reported that new dredging contracts increased by 7.6 percent in 2015.56

There are significant financial benefits for several Chinese state and pri-vate sector companies engaged in ship construction, outfitting, supply of peripheral equipment and maintenance services for the People’s Libera-tion Army (PLA) Navy and Chinese Coast Guard related to China’s South China Sea land reclamation and maritime sovereignty enforcement. For ex-ample, one recent source estimated that China has spent $1.74 billion annu-ally from 2011 to 2015 on construction and operations of the China Coast Guard, which currently has 205 vessels (a significant number of which were built recently).57 One indicator of this activity emerged in 2012 with the

50Charles Clover, “South China Sea Island-maker Seeks Foreign Flotation,” Financial Times, June 11, 2015, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2bd0b16a-0f51-11e5-897e-00144feabdc0.html.51See https://www.dredgepoint.org/dredging-database/equipment/tian-jing-hao.52See http://www.marinetraffic.com/ais/details/ships/shipid:480815/mmsi:412018470/imo: 9549073/vessel: TIAN_JING_HAO. 53See http://www.cmhicom.com/en/ShowNews.asp?NewsID=333. 54Clover, “South China Sea Foreign Flotation.” This self-propelled dredger, designed by Vosta of Germany, was built by China Merchants Heavy Industries Co. in Shenzhen at a cost of $130 million; it can extract nearly 6,000 cubic yards of sand and rock per hour. 55See http://en.tjhdj.com/index.php?mod=product&act=list#hxzb3.56 Ibid.57David Tweed, “No Guns as China’s Coast Guard Chases Boats in South China Sea,” Bloom-berg Business, October 25, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-25/no-guns-as-china-s-coast-guard-chases-boats-in-south-china-sea.

Regional Issues


release of China’s 12th Five-Year Plan for National Marine Development Chapter Nine: Marine Public Services, Section 5 Strengthening the Service for Marine Transportation Safety, which stated:

Intensify marine shipping supervision, administration, and services, optimize the layout of the vessel traffic control sys-tem,… and extend the channel of safety patrols to the exclusive economic zone and other sea areas under China’s jurisdiction. Purchase helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, build patrol ships, beacon ships, and survey ships, and push forward the construc-tion of shipping support bases.58

China may have already spent an estimated $11.3 billion on construc-tion on Fiery Cross Reef alone, thus significantly increasing the budgets for Chinese national and provincial state agencies,59 as well as Chinese state and private sector companies and employees participating in land recla-mation. It is likely that China has also spent additional billions of dollars for construction on the other six Spratly features.60 China’s future use of reclaimed land facilities for naval, air, maritime law enforcement, and intel-ligence and surveillance of the South China Sea will assist Beijing’s desire to ensure sovereignty in the region thus allowing for further maritime-relat-ed economic exploitation for China’s national and provincial state-owned and private businesses. Finally, evidence emerged in 2011 that identified another contributing factor driving China’s rapid pace of land reclamation in the South China Sea. The 2011-2015 Five-Year Plan said it should be completed by the end of 2015. The plan stated:

The “12th Five-Year Plan” period is a critical time to speed up, expand, and enhance the adjustment of China’s marine indus-try. Actively adapt to the changes in domestic and international situations, keep a foothold on the foundation for development, seize opportunities for future development, innovate develop-ment ideas,…61

58PRC State Council, “PRC National Marine Project Development,” 19. 59Linda Jakobson, China’s Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors, Lowy Institute, December 11, 2014, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/chinas-unpredictable-mar-itime-security-actors. 60Want China Times, “US$11.5bn Spent by China to Expand Disputed Fiery Cross Reef,” April 15, 2015, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1101&MainCatID=11&id=20150415000103.61PRC State Council, “PRC National Marine Project Development,” 5.

Regional Issues


Xi Jinping’s Consolidation of Power and Focus on Maritime Sovereignty

China’s initiation of land reclamation in the Spratly Islands in January 2014 occurred about nine months after Xi Jinping assumed the last of the three highest-level leadership positions in the Chinese party-state system—that being the title of President of the Chinese State following his “election” during the 12th National People’s Congress in March 2013. Five months earlier, in November 2012, Xi had been named the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission.62 Since 2007 Xi had been steadily assuming key and increasingly higher-level leadership positions throughout the CPC.63 As early as December 2012, Western media sources reported that Xi had also assumed leadership of the relatively new Leading Small Group for the Pro-tection of Maritime Interests.64 This Group is administratively part of the Maritime Rights Office, also created in 2012. The Maritime Rights Office falls within the purview of the CPC’s National Security Leading Group and the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group, both of which Xi Jinping had as-sumed leadership of in December 2012. 65, 66, 67

62Xinhua, “Xi Jinping Elected General Secretary of the CPC,” November 15, 2012, http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/15/content_27121146.htm; Xi assumed the title of President of the PRC in March 2013 at the 12th National People’s Congress. 63Other positions and dates include: 2007–2008, member, Standing Committee, Politi-cal Bureau; and member, Secretariat, CPC Central Committee; president, Central Party School; 2008–2010, member, Standing Committee, Political Bureau; and member, Sec-retariat, CPC Central Committee; vice president, PRC; president, Central Party School; 2010–2012, member, Standing Committee, Political Bureau; member, Secretariat, CPC Central Committee; vice president, PRC; vice chairman, CPC and PRC Central Military Commission; president, Central Party School; 2012, general secretary, CPC Central Com-mittee; chairman, CPC Central Military Commission; vice president, PRC; vice chairman, PRC Central Military Commission; president, Central Party School. See Xinhua, “Xi Jin-ping—PRC President, CMC Chairman,” March 14, 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013npc/2013-03/14/content_16308383_2.htm.64Jane Perlez, “Dispute Flares Over Energy in South China Sea,” New York Times, Decem-ber 4, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/05/world/asia/china-vietnam-and-india-fight-over-energy-exploration-in-south-china-sea.html?ref=world&_r=0.65Ibid.66Scott Bentley, “Keeping an Eye on the South (China Sea): Implications of Recent Inci-dents for China’s Claims and Strategic Intent,” Center for International Maritime Security, December 3, 2013, http://cimsec.org/keeping-eye-south-china-sea-implications-recent-incidents-chinas-claims-strategic-intent/8873. 67Jakobson, China’s Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors, 12.

Regional Issues


The group’s purpose is to make policy recommendations for CPC lead-ership and coordinate the work and implementation among several of China’s party-state organizations involved in bolstering China’s maritime sovereignty, particularly in the South China Sea.68, 69 In July 2013 Xi led a high-level CPC study session to address how to “Build China Into a Mari-time Power” with members of the CPC Political Bureau. In the session, he reportedly called for “efforts to learn more about and further manage mari-time development.”70 Most likely, the Maritime Rights Protection Leading Group, as the collective leadership directly under Xi Jinping, is the lead CPC entity that since 2012 has been in charge of policy and guidance for land reclamation. This entity would have approved and directed the land reclamation, at least as early as 2012.

The Group would have included Liu Cigui, who was director of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) from 2011 to 2014. Xi Jinping appears to be a patron of Liu; the relationship likely began while both served in vari-ous CPC leadership positions in Fujian Province from 1985 to 2002.71 Liu has become a leading and increasingly powerful official in developing and protecting China’s maritime interests in the East China Sea and South China Sea. In January 2015 Liu was promoted from his position as SOA Director to be the governor and deputy party secretary of Hainan Province, whose territorial administration includes the Nansha (Spratly Islands).

In March 2013 while Liu was the SOA Director, Xi Jinping was well-positioned to give Liu authority to implement and administer China’s na-tional re-organization of the SOA, which folded several agencies under the jurisdiction of the “New SOA” in an effort to streamline and improve China’s maritime affairs.72 This re-organization was designed to enhance the planning and coordination of numerous Chinese entities at the national, pro-vincial, and local levels for maritime-related development, protection, and

68Bonnie S. Glaser, “China’s Maritime Rights Protection Leading Small Group—Shrouded in Secrecy,” Center for International and Strategic Studies, September 11, 2015, http://amti.csis.org/chinas-maritime-rights-protection-leading-small-group-shrouded-in-secrecy/. 69Scott Bentley, “Implications of Recent Incidents for China’s Claims and Strategic Intent in the South China Sea (part 2),” South China Sea, November 30, 2013, https://southeasta-siansea.wordpress.com/2013/11/30/implications-of-recent-incidents-for-chinas-claims-and-strategic-intent-in-the-south-china-sea-part-2/yards of sand and rock per hour. 70Xinhua, “Xi advocates efforts to boost China’s maritime power,” July 31, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-07/31/c_132591246.htm.71See http://chinavitae.com/biography/Liu_Cigui/career.72PRC State Oceanic Administration, “Normalized Patrol,” April 1, 2013.

Regional Issues


sovereignty enforcement. The China Coast Guard was also re-designated to report administratively to the SOA, but operationally to the Ministry of State Security.73 It appears that the SOA is responsible for implementing China’s plans for land reclamation as well as subsequent facilities construction and maintenance, management and services, and logistics and re-supply.

Strategic Maritime Geography for Defense and Offense

Most accounts characterize Beijing’s views of the South China Sea as part of China’s “near seas” (as depicted in Figure 10) and as a historical and current avenue of invasion or intimidation by foreign military powers.74 It is a strategic area that provides a buffer for China’s defense as well as a “bastion” for its naval forces charged with defensive and offensive mis-sions.75 Interestingly, China’s rapid land reclamation and new construction of military-related facilities during 2014-2015 coincides with the expected operational deployment in late 2015-early 201676 of China’s new sea-based nuclear deterrent, the JIN nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). China has a total of four JIN SSBNs, with three currently based at the Chinese Navy’s Yalong naval base on Hainan Island.77, 78, 79 From a PLA

73Ibid. According to the SOA website: “The new State Oceanic Administration was estab-lished on the basis of merging the contingents and functions of the China Marine Surveil-lance under the original State Oceanic Administration, the China Coast Guard under the Ministry of Public Security, the China Fishery Administration under the Ministry of Agri-culture, and the Maritime Anti-smuggling Police Force under the General Administration of Customs. It is now subordinate to the Ministry of Land and Resources. At the same time, the State Oceanic Commission was established at the high level as a work planning and coordination organ, responsible for studying and formulating the state’s maritime develop-ment strategy and coordinating the handling of major maritime affairs.”74Peter Dutton, “Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on China’s Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas,” January 14, 2014, 2–3, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS28/20140114/101612/HHRG-113-AS28-Wstate-DuttonP-20140114.pdf. 75Jia Yu and Zhang Xiaoyi, “China’s Construction on the Islands and Reefs of the Nansha Islands [Spratly Islands] Is Reasonable and Has Legal Basis,” Renmin Ribao (Peoples Daily), June 5, 2015, 3, http://paper.people.com.cn 76Department of Defense, Annual Report 2015, 9.77Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Navy and Air Force: Advancing Capabilities and Mis-sions,” National Bureau of Asian Research, September 27, 2012, http://www.nbr.org/re-search/activity.aspx?id=276. 78Hans M. Kristensen, “China SSBN Fleet Getting Ready—But For What?” Fed-eration of American Scientists, April 25, 2014, http://blogs.fas.org/security/2014/04/chinassbnfleet/#more-6261. 79Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century, February 2015, 19, http://www.oni.navy.mil/Intelligence_Community/china_me-dia/2015_PLA_NAVY_PUB_Print.pdf.

Regional Issues


naval base on Hainan Island, the JINs can be expected to conduct opera-tional nuclear deterrent deployments in or through the deep waters of the South China Sea and into in the western Pacific Ocean.80

When complete, the port and airfield facilities on China’s reclaimed reefs could also sustain surface ships, additional submarines, and antisubmarine warfare and intelligence collection aircraft to conduct routine air and mari-time surveillance and protection duties throughout the South China Sea and western Pacific areas. In addition, the airfields on Fiery Cross and Subi Reef and potentially Mischief Reef would serve as alternate divert landing fields for aircraft from China’s current and future aircraft carriers. However, the main operational purpose of the new facilities on the reclaimed reefs appears to be for stationing and sustaining a myriad of PLA Navy surface combatants, intelligence and surveillance ships and aircraft, logistics and resupply platforms, and Chinese Coast Guard ships and aircraft to enforce China’s sovereignty claims throughout the South China Sea.81, 82

Figure 10. China’s “Near Seas” and the South China Sea83

80Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “China’s Nuclear Forces 2015,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 71, no. 4 (July 2015): 77–84, http://thebulletin.org/2015/july/chinese-nuclear-forces-20158459.81Doven, Chinese Land Reclamation, 8–9. 82Department of Defense, Annual Report 2015, 72. 83Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, “Near Seas ‘Anti-Navy’ Capabilities, not Nascent Blue Water Fleet, Constitute China’s Core Challenge to U.S. and Regional Militaries,” China SignPost, March 7, 2012, http://www.chinasignpost.com/2012/03/07/near-seas-anti-navy-capabilities-not-nascent-blue-water-fleet-constitute-chinas-core-challenge-to-u-s-and-regional-militaries/.

Regional Issues


China’s South China Sea Sovereignty Claim and Communist Party Legitimacy

A key domestic internal driver for China’s recent land reclamation is the linkage between China’s overall sovereignty claim to the South China Sea and Chinese Communist Party legitimacy. Since 1958, when China (PRC) officially declared that the South China Sea is the “…territory of the People’s Republic of China [and] includes the Nansha (Spratly) Islands,” Beijing has consistently and vigorously espoused this narrative through many official forums to both domestic and international audiences.84 This causal variable is thoroughly documented and explained in numerous ar-ticles.85 Therefore, this section will only describe in a cursory manner the connection between China’s land reclamation and its sovereignty claims to water, land, and other features in the South China Sea.

China’s claim of sovereignty in the South China Sea is officially ex-pressed in the often referred to Nine-Dash Line (as depicted in Figure 11). Beijing has never actually formally claimed or announced the specific lati-tude and longitude coordinates of a territorial sea baseline that would com-prise a formal legal claim to maritime sovereignty for the South China Sea under international law.86 China’s extensive land reclamation on seven reefs that it occupies in the Spratly Islands and its future use of these new artifi-cial islands are directly linked to ensuring China’s sovereignty claims to the South China Sea. In 2009 Beijing officially submitted two Notes Verbales to the UN that contained a version of the Nine-Dash Line map along with justification for China’s claims to sovereignty in the South China Sea.87

84PRC State Council, Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, December 7, 2014, http://english.gov.cn/archive/press_briefing/2014/12/07/content_281475020441708.htm; This document states, “The Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea of 1958 declared that the territory of the People’s Republic of China includes, inter alia, the Nansha Islands.”85See for example U.S. Department of State, “Limits in the Seas No. 143: China Maritime Claims in the South China Sea,” December 5, 2014, http://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/c16065.htm; Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, China Versus Vietnam: An Analysis of the Competing Claims in the South China Sea, Center for Naval Analyses, August 2014, 5–36, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IOP-2014-U-009109.pdf.86Jia Yu and Zhang Xiaoyi, “China’s Construction on the Islands and Reefs of the Nansha Islands [Spratly Islands] Is Reasonable and Has Legal Basis,” Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), June 5, 2015, 3, http://paper.people.com.cn. 87U.S. Department of State, “Limits in the Seas,” 1–4.

Regional Issues


External DriversThe U.S. Rebalance and U.S. Military Activities

The enhanced U.S. military posture near the South China Sea as a result of the U.S. Rebalance, announced by President Obama in 2011, was pos-sibly another significant new development that influenced Beijing to em-bark on extensive land reclamation in the South China Sea.89 For example, since 2011 the United States has officially specified or implied that China

88U.S. Department of State, “Limits in the Seas,” 6.89Chu Shulong, “China’s View on U.S. Policy in the South China Sea,” in Murray Hiebert et al., Perspectives on the South China Sea, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2014, 13–19, http://csis.org/files/publication/140930_Hiebert_Perspectives-SouthChinaSea_Web.pdf.

Figure 11. China’s Nine-Dash Line of Sovereignty Claims in the South China Sea88

Regional Issues


is a potential threat to U.S. interests in East Asia and as a consequence an-nounced several military and security initiatives to improve and increase U.S. military forces in the region.90 On January 5, 2012, President Obama released the U.S. DoD’s Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, which stated that the United States will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region. It noted:

Our planning envisages forces that are able to fully deny a ca-pable state’s aggressive objectives in one region by conduct-ing a combined arms campaign across all domains – land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace. This includes being able to secure territory and populations and facilitate a transition to stable governance on a small scale for a limited period using standing forces and, if necessary, for an extended period with mobilized forces. Even when U.S. forces are committed to a large-scale operation in one region, they will be capable of de-nying the objectives of – or imposing unacceptable costs on – an opportunistic aggressor in a second region.91

More specifically, U.S. leaders’ references to tensions in the South China Sea have increased since 2010.92 In 2012 then Secretary of De-fense Leon Panetta announced several U.S. military initiatives to increase U.S. combat power in East Asia, including regular rotational deployments of U.S. Marine Corps personnel to Australia, a shift of U.S. naval power from a roughly even 50 percent of naval combatants stationed on the U.S. west and east coasts to 60 percent on the U.S. west coast, hence quicker access and deployment capability to Asia.93 Secretary Panetta also mentioned other enabling U.S. defense initiatives, such as the Air-Sea Battle and Joint Operational Access Concepts aimed at countering anti-access/area denial

90Mark E. Manyin et al., Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward Asia, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL42448, March 28, 2012, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf.91Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 5, 2012, http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf. 92Robert Gates, “Remarks at the ASEAN Meeting of Asian Defense Ministers Meeting,” October 12, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/world/secretary-gates-remarks-asean-defense- ministers-meeting-october-2010/p23126.93Leon Panetta, “Remarks at the Shangri-La Security Dialogue in Singapore,” June 2, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/panettas-speech-shangri-la-security-dialogue-june-2012/p28435.

Regional Issues


capabilities of potential adversaries such as China. As a result, Beijing likely perceived that the U.S. Rebalance would result in an increased U.S. military threat to China’s claims in the South China Sea in the near term, as well as that other competing claimant nations would be emboldened to take actions to enforce their claims. Beijing also likely concluded that time was not on China’s side, thus leading to Beijing’s decision to either speed up the execution or refinement of existing plans—or create and quickly imple-ment detailed land reclamation and infrastructure construction plans for the South China Sea.

Land Reclamation and Related Actions of Other Claimants

Small-scale land reclamation and development of reefs, shoals, and is-lands in the South China Sea by Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Taiwan during the past 50 years are also key drivers for Beijing’s initiation of large-scale land reclamation in the Spratly Islands in 2014. However, it is likely that the more recent infrastructure upgrades by Vietnam, Taiwan, and Malaysia from 2003 to 2012 in the South China Sea, that preceded China’s recent land reclamation activities, were the most relevant developments in-fluencing Beijing to act in early 2014.94 Historically, Chinese government officials of both the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC, mainland China) have cited the intrusion or illegal occupation of Chinese-claimed features in the South China Sea by France, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia since the 19th century. An official Chinese (PRC) CPC media organ recently referred to other coun-tries’ land reclamation in the South China Sea by stating:

Since the 1970s, the Philippines, Vietnam, and other countries have illegally occupied some of China’s islands and reefs of the Nansha Islands and have for a long time carried out large-scale reclamation activity on the relevant islands and reefs. Vietnam has carried out large-scale reclamation on more than 20 islands and reefs of China’s Nansha Islands and has simultaneously built harbor basins, runways, missile sites, office buildings, barracks, hotels, lighthouses, and a large number of other fixed facilities.95

94Doven, Chinese Land Reclamation, 2, 17, 20, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44072.pdf and http://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/.95Jia Yu and Zhang Xiaoyi, “China’s Construction on the Islands,” 3.

Regional Issues


The Philippines and Malaysia

During the 1970s and 1980s, the Philippines constructed a 3,000-foot unpaved airstrip on Thitu (Pagasa) Island in the Spratlys after reclaim-ing 14 acres of new land (as depicted in Figure 12).96 Since the 1980s, the Philippines has made only marginal improvements to Thitu Island’s infra-structure. However, despite a lack of significant land reclamation or other improvements by the Philippines on its Spratly Island holdings, two re-cent key developments leading to an increase in tensions between Beijing and Manila are worth noting as factors influencing Beijing to act in 2014. During 2012, following the arrest by the Philippines of Chinese fishermen in Scarborough Reef, a standoff over the occupation of the reef ensued with China prevailing after overwhelming the Filipinos with larger numbers of China Coast Guard ships and armed fishing boats. Second, as a consequence of the 2012 Scarborough and several other related incidents, on January 22, 2013, the Philippines formally initiated arbitration proceedings versus China with The Hague’s international Permanent Court of Arbitration to determine “maritime entitlements and the lawfulness of Chinese activities in the South China Sea,” as provided for in Part XV of the United Nations

96Department of Defense, The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, August 14, 2015, 15, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_Secu-ritY_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF.97See http://amti.csis.org/airstrips-scs/October 29, 2015, 1–2.

Figure 12. Thitu Island Airport Runway and Facilities, the Philippines97

Regional Issues


Convention on the Law of the Sea.98 Beijing certainly would have viewed this legal challenge, and the court’s future rulings that would likely be un-favorable toward China, as a legitimate threat undermining Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea.

For decades, occupation and development of islands, reefs, and shoals in the South China Sea have caused tension between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia. More recently, significant developments in-clude the 2003 completion of extensive land reclamation to accommodate the expansion of Malaysia’s airfield on Swallow Reef, which resulted in the lengthening of the runway from 3,500 feet to 4,500 feet. This follows Malaysia’s land reclamation and original construction of the airfield from 1991 to 1995, which included building aircraft hangars and a tactical air navigation tower (as depicted in Figure 13).99

98Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague, “Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility: PCA Case Number 2013-19, in the Matter of an Arbitration—before—an Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea—between—The Republic Of The Philippines and The People’s Republic Of China.”99Conflict and Military, “History of Station Lima at Swallow Reef (Terumbu Layang-Lay-ang),” September 8, 2014, http://konflikdanmiliter.blogspot.sg/2014/09/history-of-station-lima-at-swallow-reef.html.100See http://amti.csis.org/airstrips-scs/.

Figure 13. Malaysia’s Airport Runway and Facilities on Swallow Reef 100

Regional Issues


Vietnam

Another key development that caught Beijing’s attention occured in 2004 when Vietnam refurbished and modernized its 2,000 foot airstrip on Spratly Island (as depicted in Figure 14). Constructed by the Vietnamese in the 1970s, the airstrip had only been marginally maintained before 2004.101 Bei-jing’s awareness likely reached a heightened sense of urgency during 2011 and 2012, when both Vietnam and Taiwan began a series of small-scale land reclamation projects, runway, port, and facility upgrades, weapons em-placement, and high-profile political leader visits on two of Vietnam’s reefs and one Taiwanese island and reef in the Spratlys.

In August 2011 Vietnam initiated a land reclamation project on Sand Cay in the Tizard Bank Reef of the Spratly Islands.103 By early 2015, Vietnam’s new land reclamation efforts on Sand Cay totaled five acres (as depicted in Figure 15).104 Sand Cay lies about 17 miles southwest of Gaven Reef and 40 miles southeast of Subi Reef, where China began land recla-

101British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC),“Vietnam Re-builds Spratly Airport,” May 14, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3714627.stm.102See http://amti.csis.org/airstrips-scs/.103See http://amti.csis.org/vietnam-island-building/.104Ibid.

Figure 14. Vietnamese Land Reclamation and Runway Extension on Spratly Island 102

Regional Issues


mation in 2014. A year later in August 2012, Vietnam initiated two slightly larger, albeit small-scale, land reclamation projects totaling 16 acres on West London Reef, which lies about 35 nautical miles west of Cuarter-on Reef and 60 miles south of Fiery Cross Reef (where China also began land reclamation in 2014).105 In total, from 2009 to 2015, Vietnam has re-claimed nearly 60 acres and built small-scale infrastructures on 7 of over 20 occupied features.106 Improvements include the following:

• Radar and communications equipment at 15 outposts.• Quality of life improvements at 19 outposts.• Point defense improvements at 18 outposts.• Civilian infrastructure improvements at 5 outposts.107

Beijing has been aware that since 1975 the Vietnamese have con-structed and expanded small-scale military and civilian facilities on both Sand Cay and West London Reef, which has a small boat harbor, a lighthouse, and a helicopter pad.109 A deeper understanding of Beijing’s current behavior in the South China Sea can also be enhanced by examining Sino-Vietnamese tensions, actions, and counteractions involving territorial control and sovereignty over the Paracel Islands (Xi Sha) and the Sprat-ly (Nansha) Islands just before 1975. In September 1973, South Vietnam (RVN) officially annexed 10 Spratly islands and reefs and began placing

105Ibid.106Department of Defense, Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, 15. 107Ibid. 108See http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-has-been-building-in-the-south-china-sea.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module= photo-spot-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=1.109See http://www.iiss.org/en/regions/china/china-s-land-reclamation-in-the-south-china-sea-e557.

Figure 15. Vietnamese Land Reclamation and Construction, Sand Cay108

2011 2015

Regional Issues


hundreds of troops at small outposts on several of those features.110 In Janu-ary 1974 China reacted to what it considered to be illegal occupation of three of the Crescent Group islands in the Paracel Islands and forcibly evicted the South Vietnamese forces. Losing three islands in the Parcels and the desire to prevent the Chinese from occupying other islands in the South China Sea led to North Vietnam (DRV), just before the collapse of South Vietnam, occupying 6 of the 10 Spratly Island features in April 1975 that previously had been occupied by the South.111

Vietnam (SRV) continued to occupy and build small facilities on several more reefs in the Spratlys during the 1970s and 1980s. Vietnam’s gradual occupation of over 20 islands and features in the Spratly Islands to a large degree influenced Beijing to establish a permanent presence in the Sprat-lys in early 1988. As a result, Sino-Vietnamese hostilities over the Spratlys accelerated in January 1988, when China first occupied a Spratly Island feature—Fiery Cross Reef. Reportedly, within nine days of four Chinese ships arriving with materials and personnel, China reclaimed just under two acres of land by blasting and dredging the coral reef.112 In response, Vietnam quickly occupied a few additional nearby reefs. At Johnson Reef, both sides clashed in March 1988, resulting in 64 Vietnamese killed and three Vietnamese boats sunk.113

Taiwan

China’s first official occupation of a Spratly Island was made by gov-ernment officials from the Republic of China (ROC) at Taiping Island (Itu Aba) on December 12, 1946. This was subsequent to Japan’s occupation of Taiping Island from 1939 to 1945. ROC military forces occupied Taiping Island until May 5, 1950, when they were withdrawn due to the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949. In 1956 the ROC (Taiwan) re-occupied Taiping Island and maintains possession of it to the present. During this period, Tai-wan built a small, crude airstrip and a boat wharf.114 A significant develop-ment occurred in mid-2006, when Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and Coast Guard Administration began significantly upgrading its 3,800-foot

110Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014): 71.111Ibid., 79.112 Ibid., 82.113Ibid., 83.114Ibid., 95.

Regional Issues


runway on Taiping (Itu Aba), a project it completed in 2008.115, 116, 117 In Sep-tember 2013 Taiwan announced that it would invest $112 million over three years to lengthen its airstrip and upgrade its port facilities on Taiping Island to increase its Coast Guard and naval presence in the South China Sea.118, 119 Construction progress on the new wharf enabled Taiwan in April 2014 to begin additional land reclamation of five acres, which boosted the total amount of land reclaimed since 2013 to eight acres.120 The land was used to lengthen the runway from 3,800 feet to 5,000 feet to accommodate larger and more aircraft.122, 123 Figure 16 depicts these new facilities on Itu Aba. Figure 17 is a map identifying the islands mentioned above.

115Michael J. Cole, “Taiwan’s South China Sea Plan,” The Diplomat, July 19, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2012/07/taiwans-south-china-sea-plan/.116China Post, “Taiwan Needs Clear EEZ Rights Declaration,” May 19, 2009, http://www.chinapost.com.tw.117Taipei Times, “MND Admits Strategic Value of Spratly Airstrip,” January 6, 2006, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/01/06/2003287638.118Michael J. Cole, “Taiwan’s Power Grab in the South China Sea,” The Diplomat, Septem-ber 4, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/09/taiwans-power-grab-in-the-south-china-sea/.119Ralph Jennings, “Taiwan Plans New Infrastructure for Disputed South China Sea Claim,” Voice of America, September 2, 2013, http://www.voanews.com/content/taiwan-plans-new-infrastructure-for-disputed-south-china-sea-claim/1741463.html.120Department of Defense, Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, 15. 121See http://amti.csis.org/airstrips-scs/.122Department of Defense, Annual Report 2015, 72.123Jennings, “Taiwan Plans New Infrastructure.”

Figure 16. Extended Runway and New Port on Taiwan’s Itu Aba (Taiping Island)121

Regional Issues


124http://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/.

Figure 17. Spratly Islands and Features Overview Map124

Conclusion

The evidence from Chinese official sources suggests that Beijing had been analyzing and planning for land reclamation and infrastructure con-struction in the Spratly Islands at least since 2007, and perhaps as far back as 1998. A combination of internal and external developments during the past five years probably led China’s leadership to decide to initiate the large-scale land reclamation in the South China Sea in early 2014 (as illustrated by Figure 18).

Regional Issues


125Author compiled matrix derived from sources and analysis used throughout this paper.

Beijing’s Decision to Begin Spratly Island Land Reclamation in

January 2014

Internal Causal Actors

External Causal Actors

Key Developments Prior to Land Reclamation Beginning

Linking China’s Maritime Claims to CPC Legitimacy

CPC MFA PLA Propaganda Department

(Taiwan maintains a similar SCS Sovereignty claim)

1947: ROC 9-Dash/11-Dash Line SCS Map 1958: PRC Territorial Sea Declaration 1992: PRC Law on the Territorial Sea 1998: PRC EEZ and Continental Shelf Law 2009: PRC National Island Protection Law

Economic Reliance on the South China Sea by Domestic Actors

CPC, NDRC SOA, SOE’s Provinces (Energy,Fishing, Shipbuilding, etc.)

2009: National Island Protection Law 2011: 12th Five-Year Plan: (2011-2015) 2011: 12th Five-Year Plan for National Marine Development 2012: National Island Protection Plan (2011-2020)

Xi Jinping’s Consolidation of Power

Xi Jinping Liu Cigui

2012-2013: Xi becomes CPC General Secretary, Chairman, Central Military Commission, PRC President 2012: Maritime Rights Protection Leading Group established

Strategic Security Significance of the South China Sea

CPC PLA

1958 to Present 2012: National Island Protection Plan 2015/2016: Impending PLAN JIN SSBN Operational Deployments

2011 U.S. Rebalance to Asia policy and U.S. Military Activities

U.S. and Key U.S. allies

2011 to Present Increased U.S. Military operations, exercises, and surveillance in SCS Enhancements of U.S.-Japan and U.S. Philippines Defense Security Treaties U.S. Key U.S. officials’ statements

Land Reclamation and Infrastructure by Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, Philippines

Vietnam Taiwan Philippines Malaysia

1970s-1980s: Philippines builds runway, Thitu 1991-1995: Malaysia builds airfield, Swallow Reef 2003: Malaysia upgrades airfield, Swallow Reef 2004: Vietnam upgrades airfield, Spratly Island 2006-2008: Taiwan upgrades airfield, Itu Aba 2011: Vietnam reclaims land on Sand Cay Reef 2012: Vietnam reclaims land on West London Reef 2013: Taiwan lengthens runway, Itu Aba

Figure 18. Matrix of Internal and External Factors Influencing Beijing125