1

Reducing Overhead and Improving Business Operations

Initial Observations

July 22, 2010

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Terms of ReferenceThe Secretary of Defense is concerned over the ability of the Department of Defense to sustain

current force structure levels and to continue critical modernization of military capabilities given

the current and projected fiscal climate. It is imperative that the Department identify and pursue

every opportunity to economize and increase the efficiency of its business operations.

DeliverablesProvide recommendations on options to materially reduce overhead and increase the efficiency of

the Department's business operations. This effort should identify both short- and long-term

opportunities to achieve budget savings as well as make process or organizational changes that

will yield long-term operational efficiencies.

Task GroupMr. Arnold Punaro (Chair)

Mr. Fernando Amandi

Mr. Pierre Chao

Mr. Patrick Gross

Mr. Joseph Wright

Military AssistantCaptain Michael Bohn, USN

Task Group Overview

“The Defense Department must take a

hard look at every aspect of how it is

organized, staffed and operated”

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, May 8, 2010

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INTRODUCTION

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Background

Since its inception in 2001, the DBB has been recommending ways

for the department to improve its effectiveness and service delivery

Most importantly, during the Transition of the current administration

in 2009, the DBB articulated three existential challenges facing the

Department that needed fixing. Those were

– Acquisition

– Overhead

– Health care costs

This effort is an expansion of the issues we raised in that transition

report on the threat presented to the department by the escalating

costs and burden of overhead

Without this fixed, the Department will be unable to provide

adequate resources to its warfighters

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Presentation Purpose

The purpose of this briefing is to

– Outline the challenge

– Describe near term opportunities for the Department to pursue

– Outline longer term systemic fixes necessary to meet the Secretary’s challenging end state

goals

We see four major themes

– There has been an explosion of overhead work because the Department has failed to

establish adequate controls to keep it in line relative to the size of the warfight

– In order to accomplish that work, the Department has applied ever more personnel to those

tasks which has added immensely to costs

– The majority of this new work is being done by contractors, the cost of which is nearly

invisible to the Department as it is buried within O&M accounts rather than in the more visible

personnel accounts

– There is a sizeable portion of the active military who are performing what would otherwise

be not inherently government work or work that should be more appropriately assigned to

DoD civilians. The military are compensated at rates substantially greater than their civilian

counterparts but, more importantly, are needed at the tip of the spear

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Some Initial Observations

The Nation cannot sustain a strong defense on a weak economy

– The Country’s current fiscal posture is a national security threat

Congress and DoD have a poor track record in addressing overhead

expenses

Whether it’s improving the tooth-to-tail ratio; increasing the “bang for

the buck”, or converting overhead to combat, Congress and DoD must

significantly change their approach

Must think “smarter” … not “richer”

Must focus on “outputs” … not “inputs”

Must use the numerous world-class business practices and proven

business operations that are applicable to DoD’s overhead

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What This is Not

It is not a criticism of DoD leadership in current or previous

administrations

– Many of these problems have been in the “too hard” box for years

because the solutions are not easy

It is not a suggestion that no improvements have occurred

– The measure is not how far we’ve come … but how far we have to go

It is not ignoring the past 10 years of fighting two wars and

more including increasing homeland security

It is not a suggestion that anyone knows precisely what DoD’s

overhead costs are, the best way to define them, that

changing the adverse trend lines can occur quickly or without

significant opposition

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History of DoD Characteristics by Presidential Administration

Source: National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2011, April 2010

End of

Carter

End of

Reagan

End of

Bush

End of

Clinton

End of

GW Bush Obama

1980 1988 1992 2000 2008 2011

Total Budget Authority ($B - Constant $) $383 $518 $451 $381 $694 $553 44% 7%Total Budget Authority ($B - Current $) $142 $288 $285 $287 $672 $553 289% 92%Supplementals ($B) $0 $0 $4 $0 $190 $159Active Duty Personnel (K) 2,101 2,209 1,886 1,449 1,406 1,484 -29% -33%Reserve and Guard Personnel (K) 851 1,158 1,135 865 843 845 -1% -27%DoD Civilian Personnel (K) 1,019 1,090 1,006 698 671 785 -23% -28%Active in Commission Ships 521 573 471 341 282 284 -45% -50%Army Divisions (active) 19 20 20 10 10 10 -47% -50%AF Fighter/Attack (Total Active Inventory) 2,789 3,027 2,000 1,666 1,460 1,280 -54% -58%

Change

1980-2010Category

Change

1988-2010

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Significant “More for Less” Trends

Paying more for smaller numbers

– Military personnel, force structure, equipment

Paying more for more of the same

– Overhead, HQs + staffs + agencies + layers + commands

Adding costs and inefficiencies due to the

cumulative weight of laws, rules, and regulations

– most Congressionally driven

Paying for much of this with operations and

maintenance funds which have evolved to a

catch-all

– $184.5B for FY10 (approximately 3% CAGR)

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Significant Unsustainable Trends

Paying the military and their families for 60 years to serve for

only 20 years

– Military “entitlements”, which have expanded rapidly, have become

part of the nation’s mandatory spending problems

Allowing 340,000 military personnel to serve in commercial

activities (not inherently governmental)

Allowing military personnel to serve in inherently

governmental activities billets that otherwise should be

occupied by DoD government civilians

Increasing the number of contractors in all activities without

proper planning, adequate visibility, or careful oversight

Creating new organizations and large staffs without sufficient

controls to ensure their efficiencies

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Significant Opportunity Areas

Ignoring proven business processes in areas like

logistics and supply chain, knowledge based

services, IT expenses, and contracted services

– Driving costs much higher than required in these enormous

expenditure areas

Total for contracted services $197B

Total for supplies and equipment $179B

Logistics and Supply Chain $190B

Knowledge Based Services $ 52B

Information Technology Expenses $ 37B

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FEDERAL AND DOD SPENDING

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Federal Deficits as a Percent of GDP

Source: Peterson Foundation State of the Union’s Finances – A Citizen’s Guide April 2010

Mandatory

spending and

interest on

debt crowding

out

discretionary

Interest

will

exceed

defense

budget in

2017

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Discretionary and Mandatory TrendsPercent of Total in Constant 2009 Dollars

Source: Peterson Foundation State of the Union’s Finances – A Citizen’s Guide April 2010

42%

20%

7%

31%

Social Security, Medicare, and MedicaidNet InterestOtherDefense

20%

40%6%

34%

11%

52%

30%

7%

DoD’s budget has an ever

increased percentage of fixed

obligations for personnel

entitlements

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FY 2010 Base Budget(Enacted)

(Dollars in Billions)

Military Personnel: $135.0

Operation &

Maintenance: $184.5

Procurement: $104.8

RDT&E: $80.1

Military Construction: $21.0

Family Housing: $2.3

Revolving Funds: $3.1

$660.7Bwith OCO

Numbers may not add due to rounding

At least $200 billion ($1

trillion across the FYDP)

is “overhead”

$530.7B

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If DoD overhead was a

separate country, it would

rank 49th in GDP But it is run, not through market

forces, but through bureaucratic

processes:

Planning, Programming,

Budgeting, and Execution System

and Future Year Defense Plan

Acquisition Boards and Teams

DoD Instructions and Directives

Audits/Investigations/

Congressional Oversight

*Sources: Year 2009 Country GDP PPP Statistics (CIA Factbook);

Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 2011, Analytical Perspectives, Table

32-1 (Base budget of $513B, not including $130B in OCO funding);

FY09 Defense Manpower Requirements Report, Chapter 2, Tables 2-

1a through 2-1d, Infrastructure (40% of total).

RANK COUNTRY GDP ($B)*

45 Chile 244

46 Bangladesh 242

47 Singapore 235

48 Portugal 232

49 DoD Overhead 212

50 Israel 205

51 UAE 200

Putting DoD Overhead in Perspective

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Organizational Totals

No Reliable Contractor Data Available

Joint Funding (2000-2015)

0

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

120,000

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

FY

$ (

Millio

ns

)

Joint Staff COCOM OSD Defense Agencies/Activities

Joint Manpower (2000-2015)

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

300,000

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

FY

Joint Staff Military Joint Staff Civilian COCOM Military COCOM Civilian

OSD Military OSD Civilian Defense Agencies Military Defense Agencies Civilian

Dollars: $113B People: 240,000

OSD, Joint Staff, COCOMs, and Defense Agencies

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PEOPLE

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DoD LayersA Long Trip To The Top

AO

OSDSecretary

Deputy Secretary

Under Secretary

Principal Deputy Under Secretary

Assistant Secretary

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary

Deputy Assistant Secretary

Office Director

Action Officer

AO

Joint StaffChairman

Vice Chairman

Director, Joint Staff

Vice Director

Director, J-#

Vice Director

Deputy Director

Regional/Subject Officer

AO

Start with AO

Service Military StaffChief of Staff

Vice Chief of Staff

Assistant Vice Chief of Staff

Director of Service Staff

Deputy Chief of Staff

Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff

Division Chief

Office Chief

Action Officer

Service

SecretariatSecretary

Under Secretary

Assistant Secretary

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary

Deputy Assistant Secretary

Director

Action Officer

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26362708

21702174

1765

2106

2258

1627

1974

1500

1700

1900

2100

2300

2500

2700

2900

FY80 FY85 FY90 FY95 FY00 FY05 FY10

Full-time Authorized Manpower

Trends in OSD Staff SizeProjection a/o June 2010

9-11

impact

beginsFY98 NDAA

baseline for

25% MHA

reductions

Defense

Reform

Initiative

reductions

Reagan

Administration

build-up

Projection:

In-sourcing,

WSARA,

DOEPP, CLO,

functional

transfers etc.

Note: Chart does not include active duty reservists, detailees, contractor manpower, or temporary overstrengths

In-sourcing

WSARA

OUSD(C)

FY11 in-sourcing

growth not yet

Included in projected

FY11 total

Source: Carol Walker at ODAM June 2010

$5.5B spent

by OSD in

FY10

We think the

number of

contractors

adds + 2,000

people

All in

estimate is

±5,100

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PERSONNEL ISSUES

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Where is Pvt. Waldo?

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Is the Department overdeployed and undermanned, orjust performing too many “non-military” functions?

DoD Total for Active Duty

11.4%

40.0%18.3%

30.3%

Never Deployed Deployed Once Deployed Twice Deployed Three or More Times

Never deployed: 560K

Deployed once: 424K

Deployed twice: 256K

Deployed three times or more: 160K

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Where is Private Waldo?

1.4M Total Active Duty

340K Deployed as of May 2010

1.1M

340K

• What are the other 1.1M

doing?

• More active duty would be available for deployment if non-military functions converted to civilians or eliminated

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Cost of Military doing not Inherently Governmental Commercial Activities

339,142 active duty military performing commercial

activities (per FY2009 FAIR inventory)

– Using an average cost of $160K/yr (CRS Milpers/troop index), this

costs over $54B/yr!

– 8% of the FY10 base budget!

Eliminating 10% of commercial activities positions could

save $5.4B

Poor use of our most expensive personnel – active duty

military

$54 BILLION ANNUALLY!!!

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Cost of Military in DoD Civilian Roles

Another group of personnel are most likely to be

found within the non-deployable portions of each

of the Services that have never deployed

This number is not known

Poor use of our most expensive personnel –

active duty military

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ORGANIZATIONS

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Defense Agencies are Big Businesses

Defense Agencies Compared with Top Defense Contractors

Rank Contractors (Rank)/Defense

Agencies

DoD Contracts/Agency

Budget ($,M)

1 Defense Logistics Agency 38,890

2 Lockheed Martin Corp. (1) 30,052

3 Defense Health* 29,001

4 Northrop Grumman Corp. (2) 23,494

5 Boeing Co. (3) 23,338

6 BAE Systems (4) 16,280

7 General Dynamics Corp. (5) 14,438

8 Raytheon Co. (6) 14,219

9 Missile Defense Agency 11,584

10 United Technologies Corp (7) 8,300

11 Defense Commissary Agency 7,618

12 Defense Information Systems Agency 7,026

Five of the 12 Top Defense Contractors Are Defense AgenciesFY2009 Contracts Data from govexec.com;

FY2009 Agency Budgets Include Defense

Working Capital Revenues

*Defense Health Programmed Portion Only;

Includes “Tricare for life” accruals; Excludes Service

Medical Funding that is Outside Defense Health Program

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Defense Agencies and Field Activities

Have continued to grow and spend

– The number and scope have outstripped current management and

oversight mechanisms

Fundamental problem: DAs/FAs are not being managed as cost-

effective businesses or recognized as a major element of overhead

– They spend over 20% of DoD’s entire budget

– There is limited application of best business practices – military leadership

– for most part – of largely business activities

– Few meaningful performance management systems

– Continued operation of non-core functions

– Passive supervision but strong advocacy by over-worked OSD officials

– Services believe they are being overcharged – and they are

In spite of assertions to the contrary, there are substantial gains yet to

be made by making them more cost-effective thru: business

processes, consolidations of overhead functions, elimination,

privatization, devolving, and merging

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Combatant Commands

Note: Contractor data was self-reported by COCOMs. All data is as of July 2009.

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

CENTCOM EUCOM AFRICOM JFCOM NORTHCOM PACOM SOCOM SOUTHCOM STRATCOM TRANSCOM

MIL & CIV

CTR

Source: BGEN Walters J8 June 2010

“Many Combatant Commands are staff

and contractor heavy and very expensive”

Are some of the Combatant

Commands becoming

“Contractor” Commands??

10,800 estimated contractors based on chart

For FY10, in the 10

Combatant Commands,

there are an approximate

total of 98,000 military,

civilian, and contractors

with a total budget of

$16.5B

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Joint Forces Command’s own Joint Commands and Activities

Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA)

Joint Irregular Warfare Center (JIWC)

Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC)

Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC)

Joint Communication Support Element (JCSE)

Joint Systems Integration Center (JSIC)

Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC)

Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Center of Excellence (JUAS COE)

Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE)

Joint Deployment Training Center (JDTC)

Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability Center (JFIIT)

Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA)

Joint National Training Capability (JNTC)

Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability (JKDDC)

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Most Infrastructure (73%) is in the Military Departments

An effective infrastructure reduction effort must include the military departments.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

(FY1

0$

Bill

ion

s, T

OA

)

Military Departments

Defense Agencies

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BENEFITS,

ENTITLEMENTS,

& DEFERRED COMPENSATION

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Outlays for Military Personnel and Retirees Fiscal Year 2007

Source: DTM 09-007, January 29,2010

GAO:

“The military compensation

system has had the same

basic structure since the end

of World War II. … It is

unlikely that DoD’s current

approach to compensation is

reasonable, appropriate,

affordable, and sustainable

over the long-tem”,

July 2005; April 2010

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Changes in Military Pay and Benefits per Active Duty TroopFY1998-FY2009

Source: STATEMENT OF STEPHEN DAGGETT SPECIALIST IN DEFENSE POLICY AND BUDGETS CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE BEFORE THE HOUSE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HEARING ON RESOURCING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY: IMPLICATIONS OF LONG-TERM DEFENSE BUDGET

TRENDS NOVEMBER 18, 2009

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Congressional Actions Shape the Compensation Bill

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10

TRICARE for Life Healthcare for Non-Activated Reservists

Increased Family Separation Allowance Survivor Benefit Enhancements

Redux Repeal Concurrent Receipt

$22.8B

$17.4B

$12.7B

$21.3B$20.0B

$18.9B

$16.0B

$8.9B

$0.3B

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The “Military Retirement” sacred cow is increasingly unaffordable

# of military retired for:

– 1980 1,264,525

– 1990 1,472,129

– 2000 1,701,218

– 2010 1,905,074 projected

– 2020 1,935,840 projected

Amount treasury pays in military retirement pay each year from 1990 projected to 2020

Percentage of people that join the military that earn retirement

– Based on current decrement rates, 17 percent of a typical group of new entrants attains 20 years of active duty service and becomes eligible for non-disability retirement from active duty. Specifically, 47 percent of new officers and 15 percent of new enlistees attain 20 years of active duty service. It should be noted that some military personnel who begin their careers on active duty move to the reserves and retire from there. The stated percentages also reflect the effect of reentrants.

1990 $21,645,293 2000 $32,857,908 2010 $46,710,544 2020 $59,325,445

1991 $23,221,989 2001 $34,154,145 2011 $47,051,038

1992 $24,573,765 2002 $35,137,252 2012 $47,329,394

1993 $25,812,350 2003 $35,443,953 2013 $48,423,020

1994 $26,799,869 2004 $36,895,426 2014 $49,763,256

1995 $27,896,463 2005 $38,790,217 2015 $50,987,103

1996 $28,974,224 2006 $41,130,056 2016 $52,248,515

1997 $30,240,029 2007 $43,573,120 2017 $53,597,259

1998 $31,206,731 2008 $45,656,789 2018 $55,362,008

1999 $31,912,636 2009 $46,250,532 2019 $57,307,992

Does not include

retiree health care

All recent serious studies

have recommended

changing the 20 year

retirement, including the

10th QRMC

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Number of Military Retirees receiving retired pay by years of service

0

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

500,000

600,000

700,000

800,000

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43

# o

f M

ilita

ry R

etir

ees

Rec

eivi

ng

Ret

ired

Pa

y

Years of Service

39

CONCLUSION

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Best Business Practices for Immediate Consideration

1. Initiate hiring freeze and headcount control process

– Start with OSD, JCS, and COCOMs

– Establish a high-level process to track and control military, civilian, and

contractor head counts and costs denominated by full-time equivalents

– Direct Military Department and Defense Agencies to do same

– Direct civilian reductions back to FY 2003 levels or 15% whichever is greater

– Find out how many contractors work for DoD

Freeze “contractor” spending at current levels until this headcount is known

Once known, reduce to FY 2003 levels in all activities

2. Eliminate organizational duplication and overlap

– Focus first in areas such as OSD/JCS in Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs,

Legal Affairs, Personnel Oversight, Cables, J-8/CAPE and JROC and AT&L

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Best Business Practices for Immediate Consideration

3. Downsize Combatant Commands beginning with elimination of JFCOM

and do the same for OSD organizations as NII

4. Curtail indirect spending now

– Reduce the frequency of duty station moves

– Reduce travel

– Reduce conferences

– Modify end of year “use it or lose it” policy

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Finding the $100B

While DoD’s near term goal is to achieve $7B in savings, the harder task

is to find the gains sufficient to reach the $100B goal set by the

Secretary of Defense

Much of the initiatives just briefed will take years to develop and years

more to begin to harvest the benefits and savings

This requires managing in parallel the harvesting of near term

efficiencies and cost savings along with the initiation of these just

discussed major reforms to control work and redefine the compensation

of uniformed and contract personnel

Without immediate action and long term discipline, the Department will

not have sufficient active duty military, or be able to properly train and

equip them to defeat the nation’s enemies

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Questions?

DEFENSE BUSINESS BOARD

Business Excellence In Defense of the Nation