red army swords and free market ploughshares

RED ARMY SWORDS AND FREE MARKET PLOUGHSHARES

Brian Murray

This article reviews the record of military reform, demobilization, and conversion in the Chinese and Soviet militaries. As the Chi- nese experience has been relatively successful and the two states have similar military systems, lessons are drawn from the Chinese experience and applied to the current debate on the progress of military reform in the Soviet Union. The Chinese military reform model is offered as an alternative that could satisfy the demands of Soviet liberals, predisposed to an American model, as well as Soviet centralists, predisposed to a praetorian model.

In implementing the provisions of the INF Treaty signed in December 1987 and the unilateral arms reductions announced by Mikhail Gorbachev in his December 1988 United Nations speech, the Soviet Red Army has started to demobilize a substantial portion of its military manpower. As part of this process and in an effort to advance economic restruc- turing (perestroika), the Soviet Union is converting a large part of its military resources to the production of civilian goods. The current debate on military reform in the Soviet Union centers on the problems associated with this demobilization and conversion of the Soviet military machine.

Communist China also went through a demobilization and conversion process during the "decade of reform" from 1979 to 1989. China's Red Army, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), unlike its Soviet counterpart to date, has been relatively successful in its demobilization, conversion, and reform efforts. As will be shown, both the positive and negative aspects of the Chinese experience demonstrates the need to keep political reform in step with economic reform and to simultaneously reform the military along with society a s

a whole. While China should be an attractive model for reform of the Soviet mili-

tary, civilian and military experts in Moscow have been looking West rather than East for a reform model. 1 The American military establishment is frequently cited as a model for reform of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Defense Committee of the Soviet Parliament, for example, was expressly designed to function as an equivalent of the Armed Services Committee of the United States Congress, presently chaired by Representative Les Aspin. In fact, the Soviets sought and received American advice in setting up this legislative

Brian Murray is a Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science Department and East Asian Institute at Columbia University.

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organ: Aspin traveled to Moscow and hosted Soviet delegations involved in the establishment of the Soviet committee. The two committees foresee future cooperation in overseeing the two superpower defense establishments through regular exchanges and a joint office established in Vienna. 2 The Soviets are also considering the appointment of a civilian as minister of defense, a significant innovation which is based, in part at least, on the American experience.3 Radical reformers who have called for the adoption of an all-volunteer, professional military frequently refer to and cite statistics from American experience. 4 Soviet military officers are even taking crash courses at the John E Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. 5

American analysis of the reform process, because of frequent Soviet- American exchanges, has contributed to the Soviet use of an American model for the military reform. American analysts have equated the reformed Soviet Defense Council with the American National Security Council; a new arms control and national security planning body within the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been equated with the State Department's Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA); the involvement of civilian experts from the various institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (institutichki) in military affairs has been compared to the role of the Rand Corporation in the United States; and the ensuing resentment by military officials toward these civilian experts has been compared to the treatment afforded Robert McNa- mara's "whiz kids" when they arrived in the Pentagon in 1961.6

While it might be a natural process to study and even imitate the military of a recently victorious opponent--consider, for example, the Soviet imitation of the Nazi Wehrmacht's blitzkrieg--the wholesale application of the Amer- ican model to the Soviet reform process is largely inappropriate, despite the recent American "victory" in the Cold War, given the two superpowers' vastly different political, economic, and military systems. For example, while McNamara's "whiz kids" had an institutional role in the Pentagon, the civilian experts in the Soviet Union, are involved in military affairs exclusively because of their connections ("guanxi" in Chinese) with the senior leadership. Soviet military reformers, therefore, are more similar to their Chinese rather than their American counterparts. Furthermore, China's political, economic, and military structures are modeled on those of the Soviet Union. China is, therefore, the more relevant model for reform of the Soviet military.

TWO RED ARMIES: SAME BUT DIFFERENT

Before discussing the particular aspects of the demobilization and conversion process in China and the Soviet Union, the similarities and differences that exist between the two Red Armies should be addressed.

The Soviet and Chinese armies are both communist military organizations that, because of a similar imperial historical record, include a wide range of

28 JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES / SUMMER 1991

diverse ethnic and national groups. While Ukrainians, Baits, Caucasians, and Central Asians, as well as ethnic Russians serve together in the Soviet Armed Forces, Tibetans, Mongols, and Uighurs serve in the PLA along with Han Chinese. A key difference between the two Red Armies, however, is that while ethnic Russians constitute slightly less that 50 percent of the Soviet population, and therefore, a similar proportion of Soviet military manpower, Han Chinese represent almost 95 percent of China's military and civilian population. 7 Therefore, the Soviet military is both more affected by ethnic divisions and more dependent on ethnic recruitment for manpower than is its Chinese counterpart.

In Tibet, for example, the Chinese crushed a separatist uprising in 1959 and imposed martial law in 1989 in order to maintain control over a province strategically located on China's border. In the Baltic states, the Soviet military has had an additional motive in trying to prevent the Baits from leaving the Union: the Baltic states' defection from the Union and the Soviet Armed Forces, while affecting only 2 percent of conscripts, would create a domino effect that could lead to similar moves by larger, more important Republics, most notably the Ukraine, which provides 16 percent of Soviet conscripts and the bulk of Soviet NCOs (noncommissioned officers.) 8 Nationalities in the Soviet Union inhabit strategic border areas, as they do in China, but they also represent a substantial percentage of the military manpower of the Soviet Armed Forces.

While it is possible that Deng's reform unleashed some of the separatist activity in Tibet, it is unquestionable that the separatist moves of the Soviet Republics are a direct result of Gorbachev's reform. Thus, whereas the nationalities question has remained relatively insignificant in China and especially within the PLA, it may well be the issue that drives the Soviet military into taking action against the reformers. The Soviet military, unlike its Chi- nese counterparts, cannot afford to lose its ethnic conscripts.

In terms of economics, both the Soviet and Chinese defense industries operate separately from the civilian economy. The defense industries in both communist states are the most privileged sectors within the centrally planned economic structure. They enjoyed, until recently, almost unlimited budgets and benefits. During the Chinese Cultural Revolution, for example, when the political slogan of the day was "smash everything," workers and intellectuals involved in nuclear weapons development were insulated from the political and economic chaos of the period. 9 The Soviet defense industry, likewise, has never been plagued with the supply problems endemic to the Soviet civilian economy, lo

One important economic difference, however, is that while Soviet defense industries are concentrated near the major cities, primarily Moscow and Len- ingrad, defense factories in China are found in the hinterland, that is in Mao's "third line" defense areas. Thus, the defense industries in China are removed

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from the more economically advanced and politically progressive coastal areas. Chinese defense facilities are also more integrated and self-sufficient than their Soviet counterparts. In the Soviet defense industry, research and design institutes are usually under a different roof than production facilities. 11 So while Soviet defense enterprises have the advantage of being located near major urban areas where they could potentially market consumer goods produced from converted production lines, they do not always have the independent capability to produce such goods. They depend on cooperation, planned or otherwise, from other enterprises.

Politically, both the Soviet and Chinese Red Armies have historically placed commissars throughout the ranks so as to ensure that the "party controls the gun." The Military Political Directorate (MPD) of the Soviet Armed Forces and the PLA's General Political Directorate (GDP), along with the Central Military Commission (CMC), in China are the organs that enforce party control over the army. Commissars are present at every level of both military organizations to ensure the military's loyalty to the Communist party. 12

The need to control the army in both the Soviet Union and China is motivated by a fear of over-politicization of the military and the threat of a military coup. The declaration of martial law in Poland in 1981 made this an even more salient issue for both Soviet and Chinese leaders. Discontent over reform within military ranks has brought the issue closer to home. Rumors of a military coup have been circulating in Moscow since 1990 and in Beijing since the June 4, 1989 massacre. 13 The August 19, 1991 putsch in Moscow demonstrated the disunion and discontent within the Soviet Armed Forces, In spite of the apparent success of the liberals' counter-coup, the problem of the military's loyalty has yet to be resolved. In both the Soviet Union and China, military rebellion continues to be a real possibility and military reform could aggravate rather than ameliorate the situation.

A key political difference between the Chinese and Soviet experiences is that the PLA has been more active politically than the Soviet military: there is a significant difference in the nature and consistency of politicization in the two Red Armies. Both militaries stress the need to be both "red" (politically reliable) and "expert" (technically competent). In China, however, the for- mula may favor the "red," depending on the political environment, whereas in the Soviet Union, "expert" has always been dominant. Now, for example, in China, "red" is dominant whereas "expert" was more important during the period from 1979 to 1989.14

At the leadership level, for example, control of the CMC by Deng Xiaoping from 1979 to 1989 was seen as crucial to his position as China's preeminent leader. The military was actively engaged in politics during the latter stages of the Cultural Revolution culminating in Lin Biao's attempted coup. In Soviet politics, however, such military involvement (to date at least) has occurred much less frequently. Moreover, the present leadership in China


came to power by military means. By contrast, in the Soviet Union, the leadership rose through the party ranks by winning political, not military, battles. Hence it is natural that the PLA should have a more active political role than the Soviet military despite the similar organizational structures of the two Red Armies.

Generally speaking, reform in the two communist giants has been aimed at invigorating economic growth with market incentives and liberalizing the strictures of the central planning system. In the Soviet Union, political reform (glasnost and demokratizatsia) has taken precedence over economic reform (perestroika). In China, economic reform (the Four Modernizations) has flour- ished while political reform is virtually nonexistent. The difference is evident on the streets of Moscow and Beijing. In Moscow, the food shops are empty but the press is full of active debate; in Beijing, open political debate is nonexistent while food and consumer goods are widely available.

In terms of military reform in China and the Soviet Union, the two states have less in common. In China, the military sector was not exempt from initial reform efforts, defense being the fourth of the Four Modernizations. Deng Xiaoping has been actively involved in promoting demobilization of the PLA and conversion of military industries. In the Soviet Union, however, military reform has only recently begun in earnest; perestroika has been slow in coming to the Soviet economy and even slower to the Soviet military. Military reform is only now being debated in the Soviet Union whereas it has been state policy in China for the past ten years.

Economically speaking, the reform of the Chinese defense industry proceeded in tandem with the civilian sectors of the economy, thus leading to a relatively smooth conversion from military to civilian production. In China, for example, when defense enterprises were forced to market consumer goods to replace canceled Ministry of Defense (MOD) orders, the civilian reforms had already created private markets and provided consumers with disposable income. Conversion, therefore, was profitable because it was coordinated with reform throughout the economy. By contrast, in the Soviet Union, even if defense enterprises could make and market converted consumer goods, private markets do not exist for such output. Thus, when Soviet defense enterprises have their orders from the MOD canceled, they lose money as they have no alternative outlet in which to market their output.

Politically speaking, dissent in the Chinese military is not tolerated whereas it is spreading rapidly in the Soviet Union. In China, centralism continues unabated while it is rapidly disintegrating in the Soviet Union. While Chinese officers have formed private organizations to support the PLA's professionalization drive, Soviet officers and servicemen have formed their own "trade union" known as Shield (Shchit) as a direct challenge to centralism in the Soviet military. Shield has picketed the MOD several times; has attempted to institute criminal proceedings against the MOD for "war crimes"; and is

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bringing a case against the MOD to the International Court of Justice in the Hague. Shield has nominated military officers to stand for the Supreme Soviet and may evolve into a political party. 15

In the Soviet Union, political reform has destroyed the centralism that once existed in the Soviet Armed Forces. Shield challenges the MOD in the Hague while liberal reformers challenge the army in the Supreme Soviet. The Soviet military itself is divided and its future direction is being debated in all quar- ters. By contrast, in China, the military remains under strict centralist control even though a fight for political control of the PLA is presently underway. 16

In short, Soviet political reform has destroyed the centralism that once ruled over the military, and economic reform has left soldiers homeless and hungry. In China, economic reform has created the "entrepreneurial" or "moonlighting" army which as been an economic boon for the PLA, and the lack of political reform has left discipline and centralism intact. 17

THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE: DEMOBILIZATION

In June of 1985, Deng Xiaoping announced a 25 percent reduction in Chinese military manpower levels, which amounts to over one million men being cut from PLA ranks, is This reduction is complete and further cuts of up to half a million men are being considered. 19 To a certain extent, these cuts represent a correction of the excesses created by the rapid expansion of the PLA when its ranks increased from 3 million in 1974 to 4.2 million in 1978. 20 Nonetheless, the reductions represent a substantial demobilization. Moreover, the fact that further reductions are being planned suggests that the demobilization effort has been successful to date. China Daily reports that the demobilization of 30,000 officers in 1989 went "smoothly" although resettlement problems did occur because of "present economic difficulties, ''21 In fact, reports of resettlement problems caused by the recent economic downturn in China have been answered by propagandistic calls from People's Daily and the head of the GPD, Yang Baibing, to increase vigilance in the demobilization effort. 22 These recent problems are related to the general economic slowdown and do not detract from the fact that demobilization has become an institutionalized part of military reform. The PLA has even inaugurated a new journal, Demobilized Army Officers, devoted to this aspect of the reform process. 23

The demobilization has not, however, proceeded smoothly on such a large scale for so long simply on account of the PLA issuing a new journal; feath- erbedding, golden parachutes, and free markets have played a crucial role in making the demobilization process successful. If a suitable position cannot be found for a demobilized military cadre, then he can receive the same level of remuneration as a city or county level cadre. 24 Regulations stipulate that


demobilized officers are entitled to wages slightly higher than civilians of equivalent rank. And 60 percent of demobilized officers are placed in large- and medium-sized cities, a priceless benefit in China. 25 A substantial number of demobilized cadres have become entrepreneurs, taking advantage no doubt of their former positions and functioning as intermediaries between the planned and market economy. 26

Obviously not all the demobilized soldiers were bought off. A large number were simply transferred to civilian ministries, notably the People's Armed Police and the Railway Engineer Corps, or given civilian jobs within the PLA itself. 27 The PLA did not, however, abandon its veterans. Demobilized servicemen continue to enjoy the perks and privileges of military life in their civilian posts.

Despite the positive signs, there have been reports of violence by demobilized soldiers. In Yanan, a group of PLA veterans reportedly burned party flags and clashed with police. In Guizhou, a group of demobilized soldiers prostrated themselves in front of party headquarters for over fifty-six hours. Protests have also been reported in Anhui, Hebei, and Shanxi provinces. Protesters are allegedly demanding food instead of "isms. ''2s Many young officers say they are unhappy with Yang Baibing's political campaigns, i.e., the calls to emulate Lei Feng and oppose bourgeois liberalization. 29 This perhaps explains why one of the main points in Yang's speech to students at the National Defense University was to "persist in saying less. "3~

Demobilization was obviously not as "smooth" a process as the PLA would have liked or would have us all believe. 31 However, it is significant that reports of discontent within the PLA occurred only after 1989, i.e., after the economic downturn and the Tiananmen massacre. In Yanan, for example, the masses joined in the veterans' antiparty protests, indicating that the protests were not so much about the PLA demobilization as about the economy. Thus, the economic downturn in China, rather than the demobilization effort, is the most likely cause of the recent protests by veterans.

The purges in the military and the transition from "expert" to "red" following the June 4th incident is an obvious cause of concern for military officers and professionals. Thousands of PLA servicemen were investigated and purged following Tiananmen to ensure the army's loyalty, which was called into question by the refusal of some PLA units to march on the square. 32 The purges and renewed political campaigns have caused a great deal of resentment among the PLA's professional officers. Hong Xuezhi, a leading PLA general, was reportedly removed from the CMC because he wanted to cease the campaigns and thereby alleviate the concerns of the off icers . 33

While PLA officers oppose the move away from "expert" toward "red," they support the demobilization drive as it is a move toward a "leaner and meaner" army.

MURRAY 33

THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE: CONVERSION

As noted, one of the main reasons for the successful demobilization of approximately one million men in China has been the PLA's ability to "buy them off." It is significant, however, that government defense expenditures actually decreased in China during the demobilization. 34 The PLA supplemented its coffers and thereby subsidized the demobilization effort by making money--a lot of money--by producing goods and services for the civilian economy. Civilian goods accounted for 80 percent of China's defense industry output in 1990, or approximately 20 billion yuan, which amounts to more than two-thirds of the PLA's state budget. 35 The PLA reportedly spends 30 percent of its business earnings on "troop costs," 30 percent on maintaining barracks, and 11 percent on training. 36 In other words, the profits from conversion in effect subsidized demobilization and were able to offset military spending cuts.

The PLA directly transferred some military assets, such as air transport planes, airfields, oil depots, etc. to the civilian economy. 37 While this was profitable, producing consumer goods not only generated continuous profits for the military but also satisfied rising demand for consumer goods. Two- thirds of all defense enterprises are now involved in the production of consumer goods. And those enterprises that are not making a profit, which usually implies they are not actively engaged in the civilian economy, are liable to be taken over by civilian enterprises. 38

Defense enterprises are producing a wide range of civilian goods. The Shenyang Aircraft Factory, which produces fighter jets, now makes rowing machines and trash compactors. The Shanghai Broadcast Equipment Com- pany, which makes missile monitoring and satellite parts, has made substantial profits producing television sets. And the PLA has plunged headlong into the hotel business: the Red Army reportedly owns one-third of the hotel bed space in Shanghai. 39

The Chinese military also earns foreign currency by exporting arms. China sold $8.7 billion worth of armaments from 1980 to 1987 and now ranks as the fifth largest arms exporter behind only the Soviet Union, United States, France, and Britain. 4~ While the sale of Silkworm and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles to the Middle East has created diplomatic problems, China is not likely to give up its profitable arms trade. A commentary in a Chinese international economic journal noted that the international arms market, with its high profit margin, is one area where China has a definite comparative advantage. The article concludes that China should increase both the qualitative and quantitative nature of its arms exports. 41

Conversion, thus, has been a profitable experience for the Chinese military- industrial complex and the central government. But as a commentary on the experience on one enterprise notes:


The conversion has not been plain sailing. People in the factory were used to being assigned fixed quotas, supplied with all necessary funds and raw materials by the state. Production and marketing were all done according to a unified state plan. With civilian goods, the factory must face all kinds of competition, collect its market data, find its own funds and raw materials and then market the products itself. 42

In short, the defense industry has been forced to abandon its privileged place in the centrally planned economy and adapt to the demands of a free market. The Chinese experience demonstrates that successful conversion of the defense industry requires abandoning privileges and adapting to free market practices.

THE SOVIET EXPERIMENT: CONVERSION

Before discussing Soviet and Chinese prescriptions for reform of the Soviet military, Moscow's experience in conversion and demobilization efforts to date will be reviewed.

To a certain extent, the Soviets are following a Chinese model: they are just not doing it very wholeheartedly. In November of 1989, the MOD held an "exhibition cum sale" of "Military Hardware for Peaceful Purposes" in Moscow. A "substantial proportion" of the proceeds from the sale was used to support demobilized servicemen. 43 But this represents a one-time sale of hardware with rather limited applications in the civilian economy. Conversion for all intents and purposes is a myth, "eyewash," in the words of Soviet People's Deputy Major Vladimir Lopatin, in that of the R63 billion (R = Soviet rubles) that was earmarked for conversion, only R13 billion has been spent thus far.44

There are three main points that can be deduced from the statistics quoted by Lopatin. First, conversion is envisioned as a centrally planned exercise. Second, conversion is planned as a loss-making rather than revenue- generating activity. Finally, the first point is not proceeding according to plan while the second point most surely is. In other words, conversion is not fulfilling the plan and it is costing money.

The plan does, however, look good on paper. The civilian output of defense enterprises is supposed to increase from 40 percent today, representing 7.8 percent of all consumer goods, to 60 percent in 1995. 45 By the end of 1990, all defense enterprises should be fully implementing the principles of "khoz- raschet," or full economic accounting and self-financing. 46 This requires firms to strive for profitability while continuing to operate, nonetheless, within the plan.

Military enterprises in the Soviet Union have always produced for the civilian economy, especially "high-tech" consumer goods. Defense factories presently produce 100 percent of Soviet televisions, VCRs, and sewing ma-

MURRAY 35

chines; 95 percent of refrigerators; 77 percent of vacuum cleaners; 74 percent of mini-tractors; and 66 percent of washing machines. 47 Planning changes have yet to increase the availability and/or profitability of these products and even Soviet shoppers are dissatisfied with their quality. 48 In 1989, the plan called for defense industries to introduce 120 new products for the civilian economy. Of these, only 23 were actually produced and only 5 met international standards of quality. 49

It should not be surprising to Soviet economists and consumers that the "magic" associated with the high-tech defense industry does not apply when the same factories produce consumer goods since the output of defense enterprises was never really perfect or "magical." The Tu-144, a supersonic airliner, is but one example of a military-produced civilian product that failed to perform adequately. 5~ Past attempts to produce automotive vehicles by planned conversion have also been less than successful. According to one Soviet commentator, "You cannot obtain good products without excellent machine tools, but the experience of VAZ and KAMAZ, which have mainly imported equipment, shows that we have learned quite well how to produce poor products with excellent equipment. ''51

Soviet defense industries produced high-quality military products because of the privilege of "end results at any cost" under the planning system. In short, money was no object when producing for the MOD. Under the conversion plan, the military-industrial complex would, more or less, remain intact which means that defense industries will retain their privileges. Con- version will be pursued "at any cost" as will military endeavors in general. The quality of consumer products will be no better in the future as defense industries will continue to give priority to the production of military goods and produce small quantities of low-quality consumer goods. And their monopoly in the production of most "high-tech" consumer goods will insulate them from competition and demands for improved quality. 52 In short, planned conversion will not produce the goods that the Soviet public demands.

Planned conversion will also be an expensive experiment. As a result of Gorbachev's UN speech, military spending has dropped by 14.2 percent which has led to a sudden decrease of 19.5 percent in arms procurement. Defense industries have had a large part of their orders from the MOD can- celled and they have no alternative customers. Production lines have not been altered and new product lines do not exist. The Ministry of Radio Industry alone lost millions of rubles and thousands of jobs within only six months due to the cancellation of MOD orders. 53 In addition to financial losses and the usual waste inherent in Soviet economic planning, there is a long list of "expensive absurdities" created by the conversion process. One such absur- dity is that as nuclear weapons factories are being converted to food process- ing, new dairy equipment is supposedly being made out of titanium. 54


THE SOVIET EXPERIMENT: DEMOBILIZATION

While conversion in the Soviet Union is fast becoming a planning failure, demobilization has already proven to be a complete failure to plan. While Gorbachev may be known abroad as a Nobel Peace Laureate, he is derided at home with such appellations as "the bald bastard who has let the country collapse. ''55 Moreover, the same unilateral troop reductions that earned him the Nobel Prize caused a great deal of hardship and discontent within the Soviet military; demobilized soldiers are not only neglected financially, they are often not even provided with housing.

There are presently anywhere from 173,000 to 280,000 homeless families of servicemen in the Soviet Union; 10,300 families in Moscow alone. An additional 123,000 servicemen are expected to join the ranks of the Soviet military homeless as they return from Czechoslovakia and Hungary in 1991.56 Local soviets charged with the responsibility of housing the demobilized soldiers already have long lines of civilians waiting for apartments. The military complains that the local soviets discriminate against soldiers while civilians assert the opposite, i.e., that the soldiers are given priority over those already on the waiting lists. 57

Needless to say, Soviet servicemen are not anxious to give up their hard currency salaries in Germany and return to housing queues back home. Sol- diers are deserting and seeking asylum in Germany rather than returning home. s8 The wives of Soviet servicemen in Germany have publicly protested their orders to return home. 59 Discipline is breaking down. Soldiers have started to sell their weapons on the open market for hard currency and some of their wives have started to sell themselves. 6~

Protest and discontent in the military are not limited to the Soviet Forces in Germany. In 1989, over 6,000 men deserted from the Soviet Armed Forces, five times more than in 1988. A reported 8,000 soldiers die in peacetime every year in the Soviet Armed Forces; 50 percent of these deaths are classified as suicides, 20 percent are the result of "inflicted injuries." The servicemen's union, Shield, claims a good portion of the suicides should be classified as murders. 61 In general, crime has become widespread within the military and the breakdown of order has led to numerous protests within the military. Wives and children of air force officers in Karelia and the Ukraine blocked civilian and military runways to protest transfer orders. 62 A Strategic Rocket Forces unit in the Urals went on strike and threatened to leave their posts if the MOD did not meet their demand for food. 63 A lieutenant colonel in Kaliningrad staged a hunger strike to protest the party's involvement in military affairs. 64

An argument could be made that discontent has always existed in the Soviet military but was previously a closely held secret. While valid in some respects, this argument is flawed for at least two reasons. First, glasnost has

MURRAY 37

been around for over five years but military dissent has only recently taken on such large proportions. Second, these problems are being reported now even in the conservative and military press in addition to the liberal magazines that have gained such popularity under glasnost.

The ultimate expression of dissent in the ranks, a military coup d'etat, was expected in the Soviet Union long before August 19, 1991 and may yet re-occur. The servicemen's union, Shield, has long claimed that the MOD and the KGB have been planning for martial law. 65 There were persistent rumors and denials of a coup attempt on February 25, 1990. 66 A Soviet Army Air Force major, Mikhail Pustabayev, appeared on a Moscow television program and claimed that a military exercise in mid-September 1990 outside Moscow was an attempted coup. The major later retracted his statement and was investigated by the MOD for releasing state secrets. 67

The military officially denied any suggestions that it was planning or would participate in a coup attempt. Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, who resigned as chief of staff following Gorbachev's UN speech, claimed that the coup rumors are an attempt to discredit the Soviet Armed Forces. He compared these rumors and allegations to Stalin's false accusations against the military made during the purge of the officer corps back in 1937.68 Unlike former Defense Minister Dmitrii Yazov who also denied the possibility of a military coup and then went on to lead the August 19th coup, 69 Marshal Akhromeyev should not be seen as a hypocrite as he was not known to be involved in the coup. Akhromeyev was the most public spokesman for the military before the coup and had consistently denied that the army would address its grievances by extraconstitutional means. Akhromeyev's apparent suicide could be explained by the difficulty he faced in defending the military's loyalty in the wake of the failed coup. 7~

One unofficial indicator of the possibility of a military coup was a speech given in the Kremlin at the Russian Communist party conference in June 1990 by Col. General Albert Makashov, who ran for president of the Russian Republic against Boris Yeltsin in March 1991. In addition to comparing the Communist party to King Lear by giving away the state, he made the following remarks in his speech:

We are being driven without a fight from the countries that our fathers liberated.

And in spite of everything, we army Communists cannot conceive (sic) the Union without Russia or Russia without the Union. And for this we are prepared to fight. 71

Makashov's call to arms prompted Izvestiya (which read his speech as a "transparent hint" at a coup) to call for the general's resignation. 72 Makashov responded that journalists are not empowered to oust generals. 73 The MOD daily newspaper reported that Makashov's speech was "hotly debated" in


military circles, with soldiers both defending and criticizing the general's comments. 74 The military debate on Makashov's transparent hint at a coup was most probably replayed with a greater intensity during the real coup on August 19, 1991. The debate is not yet concluded and the prospect of another coup is still real.

SOVIET PRESCRIPTIONS FOR SOVIET MILITARY REFORM

Military reform and the problems of demobilization and conversion have become contentious issues within the military. Just as Mikhail Gorbachev can no longer speak for the entire Soviet people, no one military leader can be taken as representative of the entire Soviet military. Centralism and unity in the armed forces are dead. 75

Aleksandr Prokhanov, a well-known civilian defender of the Soviet Armed Forces, has written that the military is the only centralist structure left in the Soviet Union. He claims that the Soviet Communist party (CPSU) has given up its centralist orientation and broken up into three main groups: bourgeois liberal social democrats (liberals); centralist communists (centralists); and corrupt cadres. 76 His claim that the Soviet military is the "last repository of people's rule" represents, however, wishful thinking. Prokhanov's descrip- tion of the party's dissolution could also be applied to the army. There are three groups of military men in the Soviet Union: liberals; centralists; and corrupt cadres.

Major Vladimir Lopatin of the Supreme Soviet and the membership of Shield are notable examples of liberals in the military who may represent a minority view in the army in much the same way that Prokhanov's centralist view is considered a minority view among his civilian academic colleagues. The liberal and the centralist (both military and civilian) prescriptions for military reform will be discussed below, followed by alternative prescriptions for military reform based on the PLA's experience.

THE CENTRALIST PRESCRIPTION: THE PRAETORIAN MODEL

On at least one point, the liberals and centralists, military and civilian, are in agreement. According to a field officer from a remote garrison, " I f reform does not occur in the near future, we will lose the Army. There will be no one in command and also no one to c o m m a n d . ''77 This fairly nonpartisan assessment of the urgent need for reform appears to be shared by both liberals and centralists. The two sides agree that corruption and inefficiency have gotten out of hand. Major Lopatin describes nepotism in the MOD with the following riddle: "Why can't a General's son become a Marshal? Well, because the Marshal has his own son. ''7s The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, a

MURRAY 39

centralist, agrees that nepotism has become problematic. 79 But while the centralists and liberals agree there is a problem, they differ on the solution.

The most centralist of the centralists' prescriptions is obviously the official MOD reform plan. Stage I of this plan (from 1990 to 1994), includes the repatriation of troops from abroad, the resettlement of these troops, and the demobilization of railway and construction troops. Stage II (1994 to 1995) includes further, unspecified reductions and an unspecified increase in the army's professionalization. Stage III (from 1995 to 2000) envisions the im- plementation of a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons and a reorganization of the armed forces. The plan foresees a 12 percent reduction in ground forces; an 18-20 percent reduction in air defense troops; a 6 percent drop in their air force; no changes in the navy; and a 30 percent drop in administrative units. Military education will be changed such that all military cadres will be enrolled in five-year scientific-technical degree programs. The military draft will be retained but "service contracts" will be offered for NCO slots and alternative, nonmilitary, service will be an option. And all of this is going to cost, rather than make money. Increasing military training and reducing forces is seen as an expensive proposition. 8~

This official plan basically implements the reductions that Gorbachev has agreed to internationally as a result of the INF Treaty, his UN speech, the Vienna CFE negotiations, and the Geneva START talks. The MOD acknowl- edges the need to "eliminate the stereotypes of paper-pushing and administrative leadership" but rejects allegations of privileges among military officers. Rumors to this effect are seen as being spread by groups trying to "isolate the Army" and "sow mistrust of the Armed Forces. ''81

Before the coup and countercoup in August of 1991, the MOD rejected any talk of change in the political role of the CPSU in the Army. According to the senior MOD leadership, "In any society, the army is an instrument of state power and a vehicle for state policy, therefore the very term depoliticization is out of place in this context. ''82 Lt. General Shlyaga, chief of the MPD, says that depoliticization of the army is "simply amoral" and "a fig leaf to cover the perfectly defined intentions of forces fighting for power in the country to over-politicize the Armed Forces and to incline them to their side. ''83 In April 1991, Shlyaga declared that the party's operations in the military would in the future be separated from state functions but the party would nonetheless remain active in the military. 84 In August 1991, CPSU political activity was banned in the aftermath of the failed coup. The implications of this ban and the future role of political commissars in the military remains uncertain at the time of this writing.

More conservative centralists advocate that the army should enter politics to defend itself and/or the "state" from constant violent attacks on the military by civilians. 85 These attacks include being reportedly "under siege" in Lithuania and the threat by the president of Latvia to cut off food deliveries


to Soviet military bases. 86 Violent attacks on the periphery coincide with verbal attacks at the center. The writings of liberal critics of the army, according to several prominent marshals and generals, "are aimed primarily at seriously weakening the moral, political potential and ultimately the might of the Soviet Armed Forces." According to these military leaders, "a blow is being struck at the headquarters. ''87

The generals have consistently claimed that they would not launch a coup. And while the military was far from united during the events of mid-August 1991, it was apparently willing to take action against the liberals and follow orders from an extraconstitutional committee. A year before the August coup, Marshal Akhromeyev declared that "the Army stands in need of protection. ''ss After the coup and Akhromeyev's apparent suicide, the military is likely to feel even more threatened.

As the "most stable institution in society," the army is the only organization capable of providing protection for itself or, for that matter, anyone else. Marshal Akhromeyev has said that the army represents "one of those forces which stabilizes the situation and guarantees the integrity of our state,"s9 and according to the political scientist Prokhanov, "At present, the struggle to save the Army is the last struggle for statehood and the idea of the people. ''9~

Based on the perception that the military is under attack and craves stability, it is easy to see how the MOD centralist line could lead to a fulfillment of General Makashov's promise that "the Army and the navy will yet stand the Union and Russia in good stead. ''9~ The centralists oppose depoliticization, an all-volunteer military, the break up of the Union, and further reductions in the manpower of the Soviet Armed Forces. If reform continues to move toward these objectives, the centralists' calls for a coup and the stability associated with a praetorian society might increase. At some point, actions will start to speak louder than words. As shown by the events of August 1991, the centralists want stability and may again use force in an attempt to achieve it.

THE LIBERAL PRESCRIPTION: THE A M E R I C A N MODEL

Opposing liberal views can be found in the military. While centralist officers write that the military has an important, internal function, liberals contend that if the army leaves the barracks, it is not doing its job; the army should be used only in defending the state from external enemies. 92

Depoliticization of the army is only one liberal demand in the military reform debate. The liberals also want civilian oversight; legislative approval of budgets; a professional, all-volunteer force; less defense spending; and more conversion of military production. Some liberals are even willing to accept limited dissolution of the Union with each Republic deploying its own militia force. In essence, the liberals want to adopt the American model for

MURRAY 41

the army with civilians in control as opposed to the centralist call for a praetorian society led by the military. They cite the American transition in the early 1970s to a volunteer force as an attractive model because of the resultant higher professional standards among both officers and recruits.

The liberals are so taken with the American model that one suspects the centralists see their opponents as something of a "fifth column" within Soviet society. A military-industrialist has referred to the civilian military specialists as "dilettantes. ''93 And former Minister of Defense Dmitrii Yazov derided the servicemen's union, Shield, as being guilty of "extremism and irresponsibil- ity. ''94 The centralists point out that using an American model and seeking Western assistance in reforming the Soviet military is akin to looking for "free cheese" which, of course, can be found only in NATO mousetraps. 95

The "American fifth column" is led by academicians Aleksei and Georgii Arbatov, Andrei Kokoshin, and the other Academy of Science "whiz kids." As noted, they are attempting to have a civilian appointed as minister of defense and to establish legislative oversight of the military. They aim to reduce the military's political influence as well as its share of the budget. 96 The "whiz kids" want their positions institutionalized and the liberal military reforms implemented.

People's Deputy Major Vladimir Lopatin fears that the army will disinte- grate before the MOD reform plan can be implemented. He cites official figures from the MPD that show a dramatic decrease in willingness to serve among officers and sergeants in the Soviet Armed Forces: In 1975, 78 percent of these soldiers demonstrated a "great interest in service"; whereas in 1986, this figure was 63 percent; and in 1990, only 12 percent. Lopatin contrasts these figures with a 1990 poll, which indicates that 87 percent of officers support the idea of a professional volunteer army and over 50 percent of enlisted personnel would serve in such an army. Lopatin cites the massive post-Civil War demobilization and professionalization of the Red Army ex- ecuted by Mikhail Frunze as a model for making today's Soviet military both "leaner and meaner. ''97

The reform package that Lopatin put before the Supreme Parliament in 1990 as an alternative to the MOD's program included plans for a volunteer force; sharp reductions in manpower; increased spending on personnel; and an overall decrease in defense expenditures. Lopatin argues that the United States spends over 50 percent of its defense budget on personnel-related costs whereas the Soviet Union spends only 26 percent on such costs. According to Lopatin, switching to a volunteer army and increasing personnel spending would solve the problems caused by demobilization as soldiers would be both trained and paid better. Lopatin notes that the MOD has revised its estimates of the cost of a transition to a volunteer army at least three times, which proves, in his view, that the MOD has not fully studied the issue. 98

In addition to increased personnel spending, another key part of Lopatin's


reform program is depoliticization, which would obviously include having the CPSU's commissars relieved of their duty in the Soviet Armed Forces. He notes that no Western armies have these political officers and sees them as reducing the qualitative effectiveness of the military. 99 In other words, Lo- patin wants the army to be exclusively "expert" and not the least bit "red."

The debate on the military reform plan was officially declared concluded and the Lopatin plan labeled "worthless" by chief of staff, General Moiseyev, in June 1991.1~176 In the aftermath of the events of August 1991, however, Moiseyev's postmortem on the reform debate and Lopatin's plan was obviously premature. The post-coup changes in the military leadership and the changing relationship between Moscow and the Republics will revive the military reform debate. Lopatin's plan, which calls for the creation of a depoliticized, all-volunteer force and Republican militias, therefore, remains an attractive alternative to the centralist program.

The Soviet public appears to support the liberals' prescription for reform. Polls suggest that the Soviet people no longer trust the army and want to see it reformed and have its role in society reduced. In reporting the results of an All-Union Centre for the Study of Public Opinion poll on the military, Mos-

cow News commented that "Of the three whales supporting totalitarian rule in the country--the party apparat, the secret police, and the army--the latter has always been the largest. ''~~ And the army is seen as incapable of reforming itself. According to Komsomolskaya Pravda, the only military officer in history ever known to "pull himself out of a swamp with his own hair" was the ridiculous Baron Munchhausen and the idea of the Soviet military reforming itself is equally ridiculous. Military reform, the paper concluded, should be decided by Parliament, "not journalists or generals. ''~~

CHINESE PRESCRIPTIONS FOR SOVIET MILITARY REFORM

Aleksandr Yakovlev, a former Gorbachev aide, has said that the present destabilization of Soviet society is a result of "a dangerous gap between the pace of the political and economic reform." 1o3 In the Soviet Union, this gap occurred as a result of political reform outpacing economic reform. A "dangerous gap" also emerged in Chinese society in the months leading up to the Tiananmen massacre, In contrast to the Soviet case, however, Chinese instability resulted from economic reform outpacing political reform. If both the positive and negative aspects of the Chinese military reform experience are taken into account in the Soviet debate, then perhaps incidents along the lines of August 19, 1991 and further instability could be avoided.

The Chinese model offers something for both Soviet centralists and liberals. For centralists, the Chinese model, 1979 to 1989, offers discipline, stability, and the continuation of the professional development of the military. During the reform years, the Chinese defense budget was supplemented by

MURRAY 43

profits generated from conversion such that overall expenditures were not drastically reduced.

Liberals should also be satisfied with the economic benefits gained from conversion and the political stability that this would bring: in China, the sales of rowing and sewing machines paid for the demobilization of one million men and continues to subsidize the PLA's spending. Moreover, in spite of the cuts in military ranks and spending, the PLA was content with the military reform because of the professionalization that accompanied demobilization and the profit-making opportunities that resulted from conversion. Thus while the PLA was content in its barracks and was only reluctantly drawn into the political fray in June 1989, the Soviet military has been agitating for political stability. The army acted independently in the crackdown in the Baltics in January 1991 and its loyalty during the August 1991 coup in Moscow was dubious at best. lO4

To a limited extent, the Soviets have started to imitate the Chinese in the economic arena by setting up joint ventures with Western companies to fa- cilitate the conversion process. 1~ Sukhoi and Gulfstream have signed an agreement, for example, to market a supersonic business jet. lo6 As in China, these joint venture agreements can improve the quality of indigenous factories but they do not generate substantial profits, certainly not in the short term. And despite the fact that the Soviet military enterprises "can offer cheap, experienced brain power to a world market," Western firms are not beating down the doors of the Soviet MOD looking for contracts, lo7 Even if Western firms were interested and the MOD allowed the military enterprises to sign joint venture agreements, profits would not be sufficient to finance the conversion and demobilization expenses. As in the Chinese case, the bulk of the money has to be made at home.

In China, economic reform was implemented at most defense factories concurrently with reform in the rest of the economy. So when Chinese defense factories started to market their consumer goods, markets existed with cash-rich consumers ready to put their money down. Moreover, the PLA used its privileged position within the planned economy to make profits in the free market economy. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, free markets for all intents and purposes do not exist. A free market (the black market) is slowly emerging alongside the planned economy as a result of perestroika but Soviet defense industries cannot legally enter, let alone profit from, this or any other free market. 1o8

The relatively successful Chinese model demonstrates that the Soviet Union's "internal COCOM," that is the impenetrable barrier between the military and civilian economy, is preventing conversion from being profitable, lO9 Soviet defense enterprises will never make any money if they cannot enter the civilian economy and the MOD remains their sole customer. Soviet managers estimate that the profit margin for consumer goods is more than 20 percent,


which is considerably higher than what the MOD can offer, n~ If planning mechanisms were removed, then enterprises would be forced to produce and market civilian goods independent of state interference. While this is radical reform for a planned economy, it worked extremely well in Deng's China, which is politically much more dogmatic about communism than either Gor- bachev's or Yeltsin's Russia.

Defense factories could produce civilian goods for the market economy and military goods for the planned economy. Profits and losses would determine output for the former and MOD orders and national security requirements, as in the past, would control the latter. In a nutshell, the objective would be to use free market profits from the production of ploughshares to subsidize the costs of Red Army swords.

When the PLA Air Force converted some air transports and demobilized their crews, for example, these economic assets immediately started to com- pete with the state monopoly. The demobilized airmen were gainfully em- ployed and the converted assets generated profits. Like the PLA, the Soviet military could, by converting military assets, employ demobilized soldiers, generate profits, provide needed goods and services, and challenge state monopolies such as the state airline and foreign tourist monopolies, Aeroflot and Intourist. The military would benefit by generating profits in hard currency as well as rubles.

If conversion could be made profitable, the military could develop the professional military that both centralists and liberals desire. Demobilized soldiers and officers would be offered golden parachutes and featherbeds and the military could concentrate its resources on training a "leaner, meaner" force. The military's main complaint is economic: soldiers are hungry and homeless. If the economic problems could be solved, then the political threat of a praetorian coup, a more violent replay of August 19, 1991, might be lessened.

It should not be that difficult to convince the Soviet Armed Forces to stay in their barracks. Traditionally, the Soviet military has been less politicized than the PLA. During the reform years in China, the military moved quickly from "red" to "expert." The Soviet military has only to be convinced to remain "expert," a task that could be simplified by offering them the profits from the conversion process. Just as Leonid Brezhnev bought off the military with a healthy share of funds from the state plan, Gorbachev and/or Yeltsin could buy them off with healthy profits generated by the conversion process.

F U T U R E P R O S P E C T S

The successes and failures of the PLA reform suggest two reasons why military reform in the Soviet Union needs to, in the words of Chairman Mao, "walk on two legs." First, because the military cannot be divorced from

MURRAY 45

society as a whole, reform in the military must occur simultaneously with civilian reform efforts. To the extent that the PLA demobilization and conversion efforts were successful, it was because of the concurrent success of the Four Modernizations. Demobilized soldiers and converted factories were able to move smoothly from the military to the civilian sector because the latter had already been reconstructed.

Second, reform has to "walk on two legs" in terms of both economics and politics. If a gap between economic and political reform emerges, Aleksandr Yakovlev noted, instability will result. While Chinese reform failed to walk on its political leg, i.e., glasnost did not have a Chinese equivalent, the Chinese are presently attempting to narrow the gap between political and economic reform by slowing the latter rather than accelerating the former. By narrowing this gap, the CCP will be less likely to need to use PLA interven- tion for stability in the future.

While the Chinese failed on the second count, the Soviets have failed to "walk on two legs" in both respects. First, the military has not been reformed along with society. Perestroika in the military sector has been hampered by a persistent lack of reform in the civilian economy. The result: demobilized soldiers and converted military output have nowhere to go in Soviet society. Second, economic reform has not kept pace with political reform, which has led to a destabilization of Soviet society reaching dangerous proportions. As a result of this double failure to "walk on two legs," instability continues unabated in the Soviet Union while the dangerous gap between political and economic reform widens.

A more important criterion for evaluating the Chinese and Soviet reform efforts is the military's loyalty to civilian rule. The PLA remained loyal to the CCP leadership that had initiated the reforms, despite obvious hesitations during Tiananmen. Had the PLA not been reformed, and more importantly, not profited from the reforms, it would have been much less likely to uphold Deng's leadership on June 4, 1989. Thus, when instability resulted from the gap between the pace of political and economic reform, the CCP could continue to rely on the PLA to reassert its authority.

The Soviet military, on the other hand, is more likely to challenge civilian rule precisely because the military has not been reformed or benefited from the current reforms. The military has not only failed to profit from perestroika, but has been the "whipping boy" of glasnost. Thus, the Soviet military has no vested interest in remaining loyal to a reform leadership that has brought it nothing but trouble. The double Soviet failure to "walk on two legs," i.e., to institute simultaneous military/societal and political/economic reform, makes prospects for peace and stability in the Soviet Union much more bleak than in China.

In a future succession crisis, the PLA will undoubtedly have a role to play. But the PLA, because it has profited from the CCP reforms, is not likely to


challenge party rule. Rather, the control of centralist organs by Deng's hand- picked successors will be challenged by the Yang brothers or other hardliners. And the PLA may well throw its weight behind one faction or the other. Factional infighting in Zhongnanhai (the Chinese "Kremlin"), however, is certainly not as dangerous as street fighting in Vilnius or Moscow.

In the Soviet Union, the "dangerous gap" between political and economic reform is unlikely to be remedied in the short term. Consequently, the "dangerous gap" will continue to cause instability. The gap between military and societal reform is even more dangerous. A Stalinist military cannot peacefully coexist for long with a democratizing, multiparty society. As instability in- creases, in both the military and society, the army will be increasingly tempted to intervene so as to bring stability to the country.

The military, however, cannot be assured of its own cohesion or effectiveness in the event of an internal crackdown. In its efforts to stabilize Soviet society, the Soviet military might trigger a civil war. Resistance on the part of liberals and Republic loyalists could be formidable. Rather than take the risk of using military assets in a crackdown (thereby endangering the army's cohesion), the Soviets could imitate the Chinese experience, which demonstrates that Red Armies can make money as efficiently (if not moreso) as they make war. The Soviet Army, like the PLA, could employ its economic assets to solve the problems within its own ranks and throughout Soviet society. By converting a substantial portion of its output to civilian production, the Soviet military would not only be making money for selfish purposes but would also dramatically improve its image among the Soviet populace by providing desperately needed consumer goods. By initiating its own perestroika effort, the Soviet military leadership could close the "dangerous gap" between political and economic reform and, thus, the "whipping boy" of glasnost could become the real hero of perestroika.

During the reform years in China, 1979-1989, propagandists touted the slogans "making money is good" and "get rich." After the Tiananmen massacre, Yang Balbing admonished Chinese soldiers to "persist in saying less." By taking all three of these Chinese messages to heart and letting its actions speak louder than words, the Soviet military could successfully generate free market profits. By abandoning the bankrupt political and economic strategies of the past, concluding the reform debate, and getting down to the business of making money so as to house its soldiers and offset the upcoming cuts in its state budget, the Soviet military could bring true domestic stability to the Soviet Union.

N O T E S

The author would like to acknowledge Professor Huan Guocang for his assistance. This article was originally written for Professor Huan's Chinese Politics Seminar at Columbia University.

MURRAY 47

1. Notable exceptions are the following discussions on the record of Chinese military reform in the Soviet press: Major V. Kladov, "The Way It's Going in China," Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star, Soviet MOD daily newspaper), April 18, 1990, p. 3 in Joint Publications Research Service (hereafter JPRS), UMA-90-O14, pp. 98-99, June 14, 1990; A Morozov, "Munitions Industry: Change of Accent," Far Eastern Affairs, 1 (Moscow, 1989), pp. 56--65; Lt. Col. Prikhodchenko, "Military Construction in China," Krasnaya Zvezda, July 19, 1988, p. 3; and especially Lt. Col. Aleksandr Savinkin, "What Kind of Armed Forces Do We Need?" Moscow News, November 6, 1988, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, Soviet Union, hereafter FBIS-USSR, December 2, 1988, pp. 90-91. All of these articles as well as the annual PLA Day (August lst) reviews of the PLA in Krasnaya Zvezda are rather specialized, low-level commentaries and are not at the forefront of Soviet military reform debate.

2. C. G. Jacobsen, "Dramatic Changes in Soviet Defense Decisionmaking," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol. 21, no. 2 (June 1990), pp. 115-119.

3. Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Is Soviet Defense Policy Becoming Civilianized?" Rand Research Report #R-3939-USDP, August 1990, p. 65. Former Defense Minister Yazov said a civilian could very well succeed him.

4. See for example the interview with People's Deputy, Major Vladimir Lopatin iv Nedelya, No. 22, May 28, 1990, in JPRS-UMA-90-015, June 26, 1990, p. 17 and General Gelyy Batenin, "How to Avoid the 1941 Syndrome," New Times, no. 8, February 26, 1991, pp. 12-14 in FBIS-USSR, March 12, 1991, p. 67.

5. New York Times, September 10, 1991, p. A13. 6. Jacobsen, op tit. and Lambeth, op. cit., p. 51. It is interesting to note that Andrei Kokoshin

is cited as a possible future minister of defense. This of course would further the McNamara analogy as Kokoshin as the leader of the Soviet "whiz kids."

7. See Alexander Alexiev and S. Enders Wimbush, "The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces," in Alexander Alexiev, editor, Ethnic Minorities in the Red Army (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988); and William R. Heaton, "The Minorities and the Military in China," Armed Forces and Society (February 1977), pp. 325-341.

8. At present, Russians account for slightly more than half of the Soviet draft cohort but this is expected to decrease over the next few years while the ethnic composition, especially of Muslim and Turkic peoples, is expected to increase. See Edmund Brunner, "Soviet De- mographic Trends and the Ethnic Composition of Draft-Age Males, 1980-1995," in Al- exander Alexiev, ed., op. cit., pp. 197-232.

9. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, Stanford University Press, 1988, passim.

10. Arthur Alexander, "Perestroika and Change in Soviet Weapons Acquisition," Rand Re- search Report #R-3821, June 1990, pp. 10-15.

11. Ibid, pp. 26-27. 12. After the coup and countercoup in August 1991, the CPSU was banned from any political

activity. At the time of this writing, the fate of the military's political commissars is still uncertain. They may be decommissioned, depoliticized, or remain at their posts with new functions and/or titles. In April 1991, General Shlyaga, the head of the MPD, had announced that party and state functions would in the future be separate in the Soviet Armed Forces; see "lass, April 3, 1991, in FBIS-USSR, same date, p. 46.

13. Eleven senior PLA leaders, including such prominent figures as Yang Dezhi, Hong Xuezhi, and Zhang Alping, sent a letter to Deng Xiaoping in June 1990 citing fears that a "careerist" was attempting to usurp power. The letter did not name the careerist but strongman Yang Shangkun is the most likely candidate. See Cheng Ming (Hung Kong), June 1, 1990, in FBIS-China, same date, pp. 9-13. Rumors, accusations, and threats of military coup have appeared throughout 1990 in the Soviet press. The most dramatic incident was a report that a paratroop exercise outside Moscow was actually a coup attempt. The incident was investigated by a committee of the Supreme Soviet. See, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Novem- ber 11, 1990, p. 2 in FBIS-USSR, November 28, 1990, pp. 75-77.

14. Presently, training in the PLA is now 70% political ("red") and only 30% ("expert"). Hsin Pao (Hong Kong), February 24, 1990; p. 7 in FBIS-China, February 26, 1990, pp, 23-24; and Far Eastern Economic Review, (FEER hereafter) February 1, 1990, p. 22.


15. Interview with Shield chairman, Vitaly Urazhtsev in New Times, 1990, No. 32, pp. 18-21. The conservative paper Sovetskaya Rossiya (February 6, 1991, p. 2 in JPRS-UMA-91-006, p. 12) writes that in seeking to join Euromil, a West European union of military servicemen, Shield is taking the free cheese offered in a mousetrap. The paper also says that Shield's secret membership implies that the union also has a secret agenda.

16. Party General Secretary Jiang Zcmin, with the backing of Deng Xiaoping, is attempting to wrest control of the CIVIC, and thereby the PLA from Yang Baibing, backed by Yang Shangkun. FEER, January 17, 1991, pp. 16-17.

17. The Economist (London), "China Invents the Entrepreneurial Army," May 14, 1988, pp. 67-68 and "Tinker, Tailor, Soldier: Defence Cuts Create a Moonlighting Army, FEER, August 18, 1988, pp. 28-29.

18. FEER, July 4, 1985, pp. 40--42. 19. FEER, December 13, 1990, p. 25 20. John Frankenstein, "Military Cuts in China," Problems of Communism, July-August 1985,

p. 59. 21. China Daily, July 2, 1990, p. 1 in FBIS-China, July 9, 1990, p. 38. Renmin Ribao, October

15, 1990 reports that the 1990 demobilization of 32,000 officers has been 99% successful, in FBIS-China, October 22, 1990, p. 28.

22. Yang Baibing, "Do a Better Job in Making Arrangements in the New Situation for the Placement of Military Cadres Transferred to Civilian Work," Jiefangjun Bao, April 12, 1990, p. 1 in JPRS-CAR-904)44, June 11, 1990, pp. 86-87 and Renmin Ribao, "Bring the Role of Demobilized Soldiers into Full Play," August 12, 1990, p. 3 in FBIS-China, August 20, 1990, pp. 26-27. In addition to being head of the GDP and General Secretary of the CMC, Yang Baibing is the brother of Chinese President and strongman Yang Shanglam.

23. In Chinese the journal is called Jundui Zhuanye Ganbu, reported by Xinhua, May 17, 1990, in FBIS-China, May 21, 1990, p. 43.

24. Zhejiang Ribao, May 25, 1990, p. 1 in FBIS-China, June 6, 1990, p. 55. 25. China Daily, July 2, 1990, p. 1 in FBIS-China, July 9, 1990, p. 38. Over 1,900 of the

demobilized cadres were placed in Beijing alone, see Renmin Ribao, January 9, 1990, p. 3 in FBIS-China, January 20, 1990, p. 37.

26. Renmin Ribao, "Bring the Role of Demobilized Soldiers into Full Play," August 12, 1990, p. 3 in FBIS-China, August 20, 1990, pp. 26-27.

27. Frankenstein, op. cit., p. 58 and Beifing Review, May 16, 1988. 28. Cheng Ming (Hong Kong), August 1, 1990 in FBIS-China, August 9, 1990, pp. 32-34. 29. Chi Ta, "Young Officers Boycott Yang Baibing," Tang Tai (Hong Kong), October 20,

1990, p. 14 in FBIS-China, October 25, 1990, pp. 30-32. 30. The speech was carried by Xinhua, May 18, 1990 in FBIS-China, May 21, 1990, p. 40. 31. June Treufel Dreyer notes that initial demobilization efforts, from 1975 to 1985, met with

considerable military and civilian resistance but that the subsequent demobilization has proceeded much more successfully. See her article, "The Demobilization of PLA Service- men and Their Reintegration into Civilian Live," in the book she edited, Chinese Defense and Foreign Policy (New York: Professors' World Peace Academy, 1989), pp. 297-330.

32. Michael T. Byrnes, "The Death of a People's Army," in George Hicks, editor, The Broken Mirror: China After Tiananmen (London: St. James Press, 1990), pp. 132-151 and Hsin Pao (Hong Kong), February 24, 1990 in FBIS-China, February 26, 1990, pp. 23-24.

33. Lo Ping, "Deng Xiaoping Confers Military Power on Yang Balbing," Cheng Ming (Hong Kong), June 1, 1990, in FBIS-China, same date, pp. 9-13.

34. See Worm Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 1988, p. 38. Defense spending is set to increase in 1990 according to China Daily, January 23, 1990, in FBIS-China, January 26, 1990, p. 29. The increase after several years of declining military expenditures can be seen as a reward for the military's crackdown on the student movement in 1989.

35. In 1979, consumer goods represented only 10% of all defense industry output. FEER, April 5, 1990, p. 28 and China Daily, July 31, 1990, p. 1 in FBIS-China, August 2, 1990, p. 24. The latter report notes that the civilian production of military enterprises in Guizhou represents 25% of the province's total output.

36. The Economist, May 14, 1988, pp. 67-68.

MURRAY 49

37. FEER, August 22, 1985, pp. 43--44. It is interesting to note that the PLA transferred the air transports, with their crews, to a half dozen competitive regional airlines rather than to the state monopoly. This free market transaction obviously contributes to a further privatization of the economy.

38. The Economist, May 14, 1988, pp. 67--68, reports that China's largest civilian conglom- erate, China International Trade and Investmen~ Corporation (CITIC) took over a loss- making defense factory in Shanxi and that such takeovers are to become the model for the defense industry.

39. The Economist, May 14, 1988, pp. 87-88; Beijing Review, August 13, 1987, pp. 14-16; and Lonnie Henley, "China's Military Modernization: A Ten Year Assessment," in Larry Wortzel, China's Milita~ Modernization (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), p. 109.

40. Eden Y. Woon, "Chinese Arms Sales and U.S.-China Military Relations," Asian Survey, June 1989, p. 603. China also imports arms from the United States and NATO countries but its export earnings far outweigh its import costs. See ACDA, 1988, p. 80.

41. Chen Hun, "Preliminary Analysis of Export of Chinese Military Goods," Guoji Maoyi Wenti, January 30, 1989, pp. 9-12 in JPRS-CAR-89-056, May 31, 1989, pp. 38--41.

42. Beijing Review, August 13, 1987, pp. 14-16. 43. Pravda, November 10, 1989 in FBIS-USSR, November 16, 1989, pp. 106-107, quoted in

William Kincade and T. Keith Thomson, "Economic Conversion in the USSR: Its Role in Perestroyka," Problems of Communism, January/February 1990, p. 90.

44. Nedelya, No. 22, May 28, 1990, in JPRS-UMA-90-015, June 26, 1990, p. 17. 45. I. S. Belousov, chairman of Soviet Military Industrial Commission, in Kommunist Vooruzhen-

nykh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces), September 1989, no. 19, in JPRS-UMA-90- 004, February 2, 1990, pp. 61--64; Krasnaya Zvezda, December 3, 1989, in JPRS-UMA- 90-007, March 23, 1990, pp. 89-90; and Leonid Vid, Gosplan Deputy Chairman, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January/February 1990, pp. 17-19.

46. Alexander, op. cit., p. 52. 47. Yevgeny Nikitin, "Conversion: The Long and Winding Road," Kommersant (Soviet busi-

ness weekly), August 20, 1990, p. 3 and Alexander, op. cit., p. 31. 48. Literaturnaya Gazeta, July 12, 1989, in FBIS-USSR, July 25, 1989, quoted in Kincade and

Thomson, op. cit., p. 92. 49. Yevgeny Nikitin, "Conversion: The Long and Winding Road," Kommersant, August 20,

1990, p. 3. 50. Alexander, op. cit., pp. 70-74. 51. S. Yelekoyev, "The Last Trump," Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya, January 28, 1989, p. 2 in

FBIS-USSR, February 2, 1989, p. 80 quoted in Alexander, op. cit., p. 41. 52. Yevgeny Nikitin, "Conversion: The Long and Winding Road," Kommersant, August 20,

1990, p. 3. 53. Alexander, op. cit., pp. 22-30. 54. The Economist, December 15, 1990, p. 21. 55. Serge Schmemann quoting an army major at a Soviet officers' club in Germany, New York

Times, December 17, 1989, p. A1. A more eloquent rebuke of Gorbachev came from People's Deputy, Sazhi Z. Umalatova, "Having disrupted the country and divided the people, he goes to the world with outstretched hands. Perhaps you favor this kind of charity, but I am deeply insulted by it. In all the applause from the West, Mikhail Sergeyevich has forgotten whose President he is." Quoted in New York Times, December 18, 1989, p. A1.

56. The lower estimate is from interview with Col. Gen. D. Grinkevich, Kommunist Vooruzhen- nykh Sil, May 1990, in JPRS-UMA-90-018, August 6, 1990, pp. 2-3 and the higher figure from Major Lopatin, Nedelya, No. 22, May 28, 1990, in JPRS-UMA-90-015, June 26, 1990, p. 17. The figure for Moscow is from Krasnaya Zvezda, February 10, 1990, p. 3, in UMA-09-O06, March 20, 1990, pp. 54-56. See also Krasnaya Zvezda, July 18, 1990, p. I in FBIS-USSR, July 19, 1990, p. 76.

57. Krasnaya Zvezda, January 31, 1990 in UMA-90-006, March 20, 1990, pp. 54-56 and interview with Col. Gen. D. Grinkevich, Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, May 1990, in JPRS-UMA-90-018, August 6, 1990, p. 2-3.

58. Pravda of August 3, 1990, p. 5 in FBIS-USSR, August 7, 1990, p. 20 and New York Times, December 17, 1990, p. AI. From October 1990 through June 1991, there were 172 Soviet


servicemen who officially requested political asylum from the German government. Others are reported to be hiding in Germany from KGB and army agents pursuing them, Berlin ADN, June 14, 1991 in FBIS-USSR, June 17, 1991, p. 66.

59. Paris AFP wire from Berlin, August 31, 1990 in FBIS-USSR, same date, p. 14. 60. Moscow News, September 28, 1990, p. 15; Sovetskaya Rossiya, October 9, 1990, in

FBIS-USSR, October 10, 1990, p. 89; and New York Times, December 17, 1990, p. AI. 61. Major Lopatin, Nedelya, No. 22, May 28, 1990, in JPRS-UMA-09-015, June 26, 1990, p.

17; IAN press release, undated from Moscow, in FBIS-USSR, April 25, 1991, p. 47. According to Shield leader, Vitaly Urazhtsev, "From year to year, one division perishes, one deserts, and one goes to jail." New Times, 1990, No. 32, pp. 18-21. And Moscow Russian Television reports that even in peacetime, "every hour a soldier dies" in the Soviet Armed Forces, June 18, 1991 in FBIS-USSR, June 24th, pp. 81-82.

62. Paris AFP of November 12, 1990 quoting Interfax, Moscow in FBIS-USSR, November 13, 1990, p. 61.

63. Komsomolskaya Pravda, October 27, 1990, p. 1 in FBIS-USSR, October 30, 1990, p. 49. The paper reports that a plane immediately left Moscow to deal with the strike. The MOD delegation did not bring any food with them hut did leave with the strike's ringleaders.

64. Moscow Television, September 12, 1990 in FBIS-USSR, September 13, 1990, p. 67. The colonel said his hunger strike was aimed at "reactionary generals who are the brake of military reform."

65. Urazhtsez, Moscow World Service, October 5, 1990 in FBIS-USSR, October 12, 1990, p. 89.

66. Marshal Kulikov interview on Moscow World Service, May 30, 1990, in FBIS-USSR, May 31, 1990, p. 64 and Aleksandr Yakovlev interview with Tass, May 4, 1990 in FBIS- USSR, same date, p. 39.

67. Pustabayev claimed that the paratroopers flew in with combat gear and live ammunition. He claimed that this practice deviated from standard exercise and only occurred, in his experience, under real combat conditions, i.e., during the Afghan war and the ethnic riots in Baku. The Supreme Soviet investigated the coup reports and concluded that nothing was awry. Liberal press reports made their own conclusions. Pustabayev on "Vzglyad" television program, Moscow "IV, October 12, 1990 in FBIS-USSR, October 15, 1990, p. 59 and his letter in Komsomolskaya Pravda, October 12, 1990, p. 1 in FBIS-USSR, same date, p. 88. Pustabayev's retraction, Sovetskaya Rossiya, October 16, 1990, p. 2 in FBIS-USSR, same date, p. 55. Critique of the Supreme Soviet report in Komsomolskaya Pravda, November 28, 1990, p. 2 in FBIS-USSR, same date, pp. 75-77.

68. Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev's letter to Ogonek, December 1989, No. 50 in JPRS-UMA- 90-006, March 20, 1990, pp. 1-8. The liberal journai's editor, Vitalii Korotich, replied that the Marshal had written in his letter that the "army cannot stand aside from politics." Korotich notes that this viewpoint offers little reassurance that the army will not interfere in the future development of Soviet politics.

69. Yazov interview with the Italian newspaper ll Giorno, reported in Krasnaya Zvezda, May 16, 1991, p. 3 in FBIS-USSR, same date, p. 42.

70. Akhromeyev reportedly left a suicide note indicating that everything he had worked for was collapsing around him. Reuters wire in New York Times, September 4, 1991, p. A16. In an exchange with liberal critics of the military published in Novoye Vremye, no. 15, April 1991, pp. 12-17, Akhromeyev vehemently denied the possibility of any extraconstitutionai political interference on the part of the military: "The Armed Forces will not interfere with anything if the process in society proceeds within the framework of the Constitution of the USSR. But when the political struggle goes beyond the framework of the Constitution, the Army and Navy will stand in defense of the Constitution in accordance with the decisions of the highest state organs" (i.e., the President of the USSR, the Supreme Soviet, and the Congress of People's Deputies.) In FBIS-USSR, May 10, 1991, p. 41.

71. Moscow TV, June 19, 1990, in FBIS-USSR, June 21, 1990, p. 92. 72. Specifically, V. Nadein, "The Target of General Makashov's Allegations," lzvestiya, June

21, 1990, in FBIS-USSR, same date, p. 93, interpreted Makashov's discussion of Zhukov's saving Khrushcbev from Beria as a hint that the military might intervene to save the Party yet again.

MURRAY 51

73. He also denied rumors that the MOD was considering sending him to the Near East as a military attach6 to get him out of the country. See his letter in Krasnaya Zvezda, July 12th, in FBIS-USSR, July 13, 1990, p. 61.

74. Krasnaya Zvezda, June 23rd, in FBIS-USSR, June 26, 1990, p. 68. 75. It is for this reason that Western analysis of the Soviet Union that assumes a centralist

military is already dated. See Nelson and Peter Schweizer, "The Next Generation," both in Orbis, Spring 1989.

76. Aleksandr Prokhanov, "Sufficient Defense," Literaturnaya Rossiya, April 6, 1990, No. 14, in JPRS-UMA-90-018, August 6, 1990, pp. 15-19.

77. Quoted by Maj. General V. Dudnik in Krasnaya Zvezda, January 23, 1990, in JPRS-UMA- 90-010, April 25, 1990, pp. 1-3.

78. In Ogonek, February 1990, No. 9, pp. 28-30, in JPRS-UMA-90-0!3, June 4, 1990, pp. 1-11.

79. Col. General Ye. Shaposhnikov, in Krasnaya Zvezda, September 15th, p. 2 in FBIS-USSR, September 20, 1990, p. 55.

80. Chief of Staff Moiseyev, in Krasnaya Zvezda, November 20th, p. 2 in FBIS-USSR, November 21, 1990, pp. 49-54. See also I. Iudin, "Economic Aspects of Reducing the Armed Forces and Conversion of Military Production," Problems of Economics, March 1990, pp. 6--14 for a planner's prescription.

81. Krasnaya Zvezda, July 29th, p. 1 in FBIS-USSR, August 7, 1990, pp. 48-50. 82. Moiseyev, Shlyaga and others in Krasnaya Zvezda, July 29th, p. 1 in FBIS-USSR, August

7, 1990, pp. 48-50. 83. Tass of November 18th, in FBIS-USSR, November 19, 1990, p. 75. 84. While this change was significant, CPSU commissars remain in the ranks of the military as

agents of the Soviet state's sole ruling party, according to General Shlyaga, Tass, April 3, 1991, in FBIS-USSR, same date, p. 46. Eighty percent of Army officers are Party members and there are still reports that officers leaving the Party are relieved of their duties, see Pravda, April 4, 1991, p. 2 in FBIS-USSR, April 9th, p. 38 and lzvestiya, March 13, 1991, p. 16 in FBIS-USSR, March 14th, p. 63.

85. See for example, New York Times, December 4, 1990; five soldiers were killed by civilians in Uzbekistan.

86. New York Times, editorial, December 10, 1990, p. A18. 87. Letter to Komsomolskaya Pravda, August 4, 1990, p. 2 in FBIS-USSR, August 14, 1990,

pp. 48-51, signed by Marshals Akhromeyev, Ogarkov, and other leading military leaders. 88. Krasnaya Zvezda, June 28th, in FBIS-USSR, July 13, 1990, pp. 60-61. 89. On "Serving the Fatherland," Moscow TV, July 21st, in FBIS-USSR, July 27, 1990, pp.

63-65. 90. Literaturnaya Rossiya, April 6, 1990, No. 14, in JPRS-UMA-90-018, August 6, 1990, pp.

15-19. Prokhanov concludes his article with the prediction that "the future of Russia is not a barracks, not a concentration camp, not a concession, not an appendage of the oligarchic empires of the word, but rather an integral, stable society." As the only stable institution in society, the army is the only organization that can fulfill Prokhanov's prescription.

91. Moscow TV, June 19, 1990, in FBIS-USSR, June 21, 1990, p. 92. 92. See the debate in Kommunist Vooruzhenykh Sil, No. 18 and No. 19, September and

October, 1989, in JPRS-UMA-90-003, January 24, 1990, pp. 6-13 especially the centralist argument by Col. Skorodenko and the liberal arguments of Lt. Col. Voytenko and Col. Belkov.

93. Lambeth, see note 3, p. 13 quoting Vladimir Lapygin. 94. Belgrade Tanjug, November 13th, quoting Inteffax, Moscow in FBIS-USSR, November

14, 1990, p. 50. 95. Sovetskaya Rossiya, February 6, 1991, p. 2 in JPRS-UMA-006, March 4, 1991, p. 12. 96. Lambeth, op. cit., passim. 97. From 1920 to 1924, the Red Army was reduced from 5 million to 562,000 men. This

demobilization not only reduced military expenditures but also increased professional standards within the Army. See "Military Reform: Radicals and Generals," Komsomolskaya Pravda, November 13th, pp. 2-3 in FBIS-USSR, November 16, 1990, pp. 51-54.


98. According to Lopatin, in the spring of 1989 the MOD said a professional military would cost 8 times the existing, unspecified defense budget. In December of 1988, the MOD said it would cost 5 times more and in January of 1990, the figure was 3.3 times existing levels. See "Military Reform: Radicals and Generals," Komsomolskaya Pravda, November 13th, pp. 2-3 in FBIS-USSR, November 16, 1990, pp. 51-54.

99. Nedelya, No. 22, May 28, 1990, in JPRS-UMA-90-O15, June 26, 1990, p. 17. 100. Interview in Krasnaya Zvezda, June 12, 1991, p. 12 in FBIS-USSR, June 14th, pp. 35--40.

After the August coup, Moiseyev served for a short time as minister of defense but was quickly replaced due to his suspect loyalties.

101. See poll results and commentary in Moscow News, September 16-23, No. 36, pp. 8-9 in FBIS-USSR, September 17, 1990, pp. 72-74.

102. Editorial response to letter from military leaders (see note 87), Komsomolskaya Pravda, August 4, 1990, p. 2 in FBIS-USSR, August 14, 1990, pp. 48-51.

103. "Pass interview, May 4, 1990 in FBIS-USSR, same date, p. 39. 104. Not only did officers and men refuse to march on Tiananmen Square but several leading and

retired Chinese military leaders including Marshal Nie Rongzhen, Xu Xiangqian, former Chief of Staff Yang Dezhi, and former minister of Defense Zhang Aiping, all opposed the Beijing deployments. See, Michael T. Byrnes (note 32), pp. 132-151.

105. The Vietnamese military has also started to implement the Chinese model of converting Red Army swords into free market profits. See Murray Hiebert, "Soldiers of Fortune," FEER, June 13, 1991, pp. 26-27.

106. The Economist, December 15, 1990, p. 21; other examples are listed in Kommersant, August 29, 1990, p. 3. The KGB also offered its services to Western firms interested in "market research." The Economist, December 8, 1990, p. 70.

107. G. I. Zaigonov, head of Central Aero-dynamic Research Institute, quoted in Alexander (see note 10). p. 25.

108. The preferred currency of the free (black) market in the USSR is the U.S. dollar. This is another example the Soviets could learn from the Chinese. Through the creation of a Foreign Exchange Certificate (FEC), basically a hard yuan, and other measures, the Chi- nese have been able to curb the black market and eventually subject it to government control by means of fiscal and monetary policy.

109. The Economist, December 15, 1990, p. 19. 110. Alexander, op. cit., p. 52.

red army swords and free market ploughshares

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