reconstitution and recovery capability of the light infantry company

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Reconstitution and recovery capability of the

light infantry company.

Fujio, Hirome.

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DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARYNAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOLMONTEREY. CALIFORNIA 93943

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California

THESISRECONSTITUTION AND RECOVERY CAPABILITY

OF THE

LIGHT INFANTRY COMPANY

by

Hirome Fujio

September 198 5

Thesis Advisor: Alan W. McMasters

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

T222847

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Reconstitution and Recovery Capability ofthe Light Infantry Company

Master's ThesisSeptember, 19856. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER

7. AUTHORfsJ

Hirome Fu j io

8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERf*)

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS

Naval Postgraduate SchoolMonterey, California 93943-5100

10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASKAREA 4 WORK UNIT NUMBERS

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19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side It necessary and Identity by block number)

AMORE, Reconstitution, Recoverability , Resiliency, Combat Capa-bility, Substitutability, Mission Essential Team, Probabilityof Degradation, Light Infantry Company

I

20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side If necessary and Identify by block number)

This thesis is a study of the resiliency and recoverability ofthe light infantry company utilizing the Analysis of MilitaryOrganizational Effectiveness (AMORE) methodology. The efficiencyof the current organizational structure of the company is deter-mined by measuring its capability against its remaining resourcelevel after the application of degradation. A discussion of theAMORE methodology and the light infantry concept is followed by

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20. the extensive input requirements of the model. A sensitivity-analysis is conducted to examine the effects of changes ininput parameters on the company reconstitution capabilities.The methodology is also used to determine those personneland materiel that contributed to low rates and levels ofunit recover ability . Based on the criterion established byScience Applications, Incorporated, this study concludedthat the light infantry company, as it is currently designed,exhibits adequate resiliency and recoverability at degrada-tion levels between 10 and 50 percent.

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Reconstitution and Recovery Capability of theLight Infantry Company

by

Hirome FujioMajor, United States Army

B.B.A., University of Hawaii, 1974

Submitted in partial fulfillment of therequirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOLSeptember 1985

1 1,

ABSTRACT

This thesis is a study of the resiliency and recover-

ability of the light infantry company utilizing the Analysis

of Military Organizational Effectiveness (AMORE) method-

ology. The efficiency of the current organizational struc-

ture of the company is determined by measuring its

capability against its remaining resource level after the

application of degradation. A discussion of the AMORE meth-

odology and the light infantry concept is followed by the

extensive input requirements of the model. A sensitivity

analysis is conducted to examine the effects of changes in

input parameters on the company reconstitution capabilities.

The methodology is also used to determine those personnel

and materiel that contributed to low rates and levels of

unit recoverability . Based on the criterion established by

Science Applications, Incorporated, this study concluded

that the light infantry company, as it is currently

designed, exhibits adequate resiliency and recoverability at

degradation levels between 10 and 50 percent.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 10

A. AMORE METHODOLOGY 10

B. LIGHT INFANTRY CONCEPT 14

1. Organization of the Light Infantry

Company 18

2. Missions of the Light Infantry Company . . 18

C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 22

D. PREVIEW 22

II

.

INPUT DATA 24

A. GENERAL 24

B. UNIT MISSION 24

C. INITIAL STRENGTH 25

D. TRANSFER MATRIX 25

1. Personnel 25

2. Materiel 28

E. MATERIEL REPAIR TIME 28

F. PROBABILITY OF DEGRADATION SET 35

1. Personnel PD 36

2. Materiel PD 36

3. Commander's Decision Time 36

G. MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAM (MET) 39

1. Personnel 39

2. Materiel 39

H. NUMBER OF ITERATIONS 40

III. ANALYSES OF UNIT CAPABILITY 45

A. GENERAL 45

B. UNIT CAPABILITY 46

1. Mean Fraction of Capability 46

2. Integral of Unit Capability with

Respect to Time 50

C. CHOKE ANALYSIS 51

1. Personnel Requirements and Shortages ... 53

2. Materiel Requirements and Shortages ... 54

D. CONCLUSIONS 55

IV. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 56

A. GENERAL 5 6

B. PROBABILITY OF DEGRADATION 5 6

1. Small Variations in Personnel PD 56

2. Broad Variations of Personnel and

Materiel PD Levels 59

C. MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAMS 62

D. CONCLUSIONS 66

V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS .... 69

A. SUMMARY 69

B. CONCLUSIONS 70

C. RECOMMENDATIONS 70

APPENDIX A: CHOKE ANALYSIS NEEDS AND SURPLUS 7 3

APPENDIX B: MEAN CAPABILITY FOR VARIOUS LEVELS OF

PROBABILITY OF DEGRADATION 79

LIST OF REFERENCES 84

BIBLIOGRAPHY 85

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 87

LIST OF TABLES

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

VIII

IX

X

XI

XII

XIII

XIV

XV

XVI

XVII

XVIII

XIX

XX

XXI

LISTING OF PERSONNEL INITIAL STRENGTHS 26

LISTING OF MATERIEL INITIAL STRENGTHS 27

TRANSFER MATRIX FOR PERSONNEL 29

TRANSFER MATRIX FOR MATERIEL . . . .• 32

MATERIEL REPAIR TIME • .... 35

PROBABILITY OF PERSONNEL DEGRADATION SET .... 37

PROBABILITY OF MATERIEL DEGRADATION SET 38

MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAMS - PERSONNEL 41

MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAMS - MATERIEL 43

UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME (BASE CASE) 48

INTEGRAL OF UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME (BASE

CASE) 50

PROBABILITY OF PERSONNEL DEGRADATION

SET (ALTERNATIVE CASE I) 57

UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME (ALTERNATIVE CASE I) . . 58

COMPARISON OF MAXIMUM UNIT CAPABILITY FOR' THE

BASE CASE AND ALTERNATIVE CASE I 59

LEVELS OF PROBABILITY OF DEGRADATION 61

MAXIMUM UNIT CAPABILITY 61

MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAMS -

PERSONNEL (ALTERNATIVE CASE II) 64

MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAMS -

MATERIEL (ALTERNATIVE CASE II) 65

UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME (ALTERNATIVE CASE

II) 66

COMPARISON OF MAXIMUM UNIT CAPABILITY FOR THE

BASE CASE AND ALTERNATIVE CASE II 67

CHOKE ANALYSIS DATA - PERSONNEL (TEAM 18) .... 73

XXII CHOKE ANALYSIS DATA - PERSONNEL (AFTER LAST

TEAM) 74

XXIII CHOKE ANALYSIS DATA - MATERIEL (TEAM 15) .... 75

XXIV CHOKE ANALYSIS DATA - MATERIEL (TEAM 16) .... 76

XXV CHOKE ANALYSIS DATA - MATERIEL (TEAM 17) .... 77

XXVI CHOKE ANALYSIS DATA - MATERIEL (TEAM 18) .... 78

XXVII UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME (LEVEL 1) 79

XXVIII UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME (LEVEL 2) 80

XXIX UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME (LEVEL 3) 81

XXX UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME (LEVEL 4) 82

XXXI UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME (LEVEL 5) 83

LIST OF FIGURES

1.1 AMORE Methodology 12

1.2 Acceptable and Unacceptable Recovery Capability

Regions 13

1.3 Combat Power of Heavy and Light Infantry Versus

Terrain 16

1.4 Organization of the Light Infantry Company .... 19

3.1 Resilience Curve (Base Case) 49

3.2 Effective Unit Hours (Base Case) 52

4.1 Comparison of Resiliency Curves for the Base

Case and Alternative Case I 60

4.2 Recoverability from Combat Degradation 63

4.3 Comparison of Resiliency Curves for the Base

Case and Alternative Case II 68

I. INTRODUCTION

A. AMORE METHODOLOGY

The Analysis of Military Organizational Effectiveness

(AMORE) methodology is an analytical approach for deter-

mining unit resiliency and recoverability under combat

conditions. This is accomplished by analyzing the correla-

tion between the unit's mission requirements and its capa-

bility through its available personnel and equipment

resources after applying combat degradation. The unit is

said to be resilient if it is able to reconstitute over the

time period of a mission to a given capability level. The

following factors make a unit resilient on the battlefield

[Ref. 1: p. 1-4]:

1. High substitutability of personnel and materiel.

2. Minimum number of essential skills or materiel items

per function.

3. Reduced probability of kill for both personnel and

materiel

.

4. Self-sufficient organizational elements.

5. Appropriate levels of cohesiveness

.

6. Good standard operating procedures for training and

implementation of reconstitution concepts.

The AMORE methodology is outlined graphically in Figure

1.1 and considers the following [Ref. 1: p. B-5]

:

1. Combinations of personnel and materiel damage.

2. Degradation of personnel and materiel and their

interaction as they merge together to form functional

teams required for combat capability.

3. The state of training and cross- training of indi-

vidual members of the organizations to include skill

substitutability

.

10

4. Substitutability and repairability of equipment.

5. The organization's ability to reconstitute its func-

tions and regenerate combat capability as a function

of time.

Initially Figure 1.1 defines the unit mission and posture,

which is needed to determine the structure of essential

teams. Then the functional analysis first specifies the

initial strengths (assets) of personnel and materiel

required by the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE).

These assets are then divided into essential teams such that

each will contribute equally to mission accomplishment.

Simultaneously with the functional analysis, the probabili-

ties of degradation for personnel and materiel are deter-

mined. These are often established by the use of Joint

Munitions Effectiveness Manual (JMEM) methodologies. Next

the AMORE model simulates the degradation of the unit by

using a Monte Carlo technique and the input probabilities.

Following degradation, the unit undergoes reconstitution by

using a transportation/assignment algorithm and the substi-

tutability data. Finally the model computes the expected

value of the best reconstituted unit capability for the

defined mission and the simulated degradation. This forms

the basis for the output analyses (Chapter III).

According to [Ref. 1: p. 1-7], Science Applications,

Incorporated (SAI) has suggested that, as a minimum, a resi-

lient unit should eventually attain a unit recovery capa-

bility which is linear with respect to damage level. This

defines a reconstituted capability value of 1-PD as the

resiliency threshold where PD is the probability of degrada-

tion for personnel and at least light damage for materiel.

Therefore, a unit is said to be resilient if its reconsti-

tuted capability level meets or exceeds this criterion

value. Figure 1.2 depicts the acceptable and unacceptable

regions

.

11

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B. LIGHT INFANTRY CONCEPT

The light infantry was organized out of a necessity to

have a highly-trained unit that could be deployed rapidly in

response to a contingency mission anywhere in the world.

The spectrum of conflict consists of the following scenarios

ranging from low- intensity to high- intensity

:

1.. Terrorism

2. Unconventional warfare

3. Minor conventional warfare

4. Major conventional warfare

5. Theater nuclear warfare

6. Strategic nuclear warfare

The current heavy forces are designed and structured for

the major conventional warfare scenario. Due to increased

occurrences of crises in the low- to mid- intensity scenarios

such as

1. Korea

2. Venezuela

3. Lebanon

4. Berlin

5

.

Cuba

6

.

Vietnam

7. Laos/Thailand

8

.

Panama

9. Dominican Republic

10. Israel

11. Grenada

it was determined that light forces were better suited to

meet these kinds of crises. The light infantry is charac-

terized by a capability to maneuver either offensively or

defensively through terrain impassable by vehicles and to

adapt quickly to various modes of ground, air, or water

transport available to the force. It possesses a

14

substantial number of automatic weapons to enhance its close

combat capability. Figure 1.3 [Ref. 2: p. iii] shows that a

heavy infantry force such as a mechanized infantry unit in a

deliberate attack on open terrain (desert, plains, valleys)

generates high combat power in terms of firepower, mobility,

and protection. However, this force loses considerable

combat power when it is assigned missions in restrictive

terrain (dry creek beds, urban or built-up areas, dense

forests, mountains, jungles). The light infantry is better

suited to fight in a low- intensity environment in all types

of terrain and climatic conditions or in a mid- to high-

intensity environment (Europe) in close terrain.

A limitation of the light infantry company is that it is

completely foot-mobile, making it vulnerable to enemy

artillery, mortar, and nuclear, biological, and chemical

(NBC) attacks. Its survivability depends greatly on the use

of cover and concealment. The light infantry soldier is the

most versatile, advanced, and effective combat "system" on

the battlefield and will never be duplicated in mechanical

or electrical form [Ref. 3: pp. 28-29]:

1. In one package, the light infantry soldier provides

an optical and aura sensor system (eyes and ears)

tied into a central processor (the brain) with an

incredible range of operating programs and almost

infinite recoverable memory.

2. The system can be rapidly programmed (through

training) and loaded through a voice-recognition

system. It is, thereafter, adaptive and

self -reprogrammable

.

3. It can accept and apply mission-type instructions to

infinitely variable terrain, conditions of visi-

bility, size and composition of enemy force, and

enemy movements and actions.

15

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4. It can assess and select covered and concealed routes

of advance into the enemy rear and onto his flanks.

5. All this is mounted on a multi-flex chassis capable

of negotiating every kind of terrain, including water

obstacles, by self -propulsion.

6. Super robotic arms, hands, and fingers with infinite

degrees of freedom couple the control processor to

weapons and communications devices.

7. This remarkable fighting system includes automatic

and continuous position location, plus situation

analysis and reporting, with a large, flexible (even

entertaining) vocabulary.

8. The "system" performs target detection, identifica-

tion, acquisition, munition and weapon selection,

engagement, damage assessment, and reengagement as

indicated by target condition.

For this unique "system", emphasis is placed on cross-

training and the attainment of individual proficiency on

multiple weapon systems to enhance unit flexibility. Every

effort is placed on commonality in weapons and equipment to

significantly reduce logistical requirements, streamline

maintenance operations, and simplify repair parts manage-

ment. Equipment commonality also reduces operator training

requirements and facilitates cross- training . In other words,

soldiers trained on one system have the basic knowledge to

operate, maintain, and diagnose problems on common equipment

items that are used with other systems [Ref. 4: pp. 5-6].

According to General John A. Wickham, Jr. [Ref. 5: ],

"The smallest Active Army in 34 years requires an Army of

Excellence which optimizes combat power. If we seize this

(light infantry) concept with conviction, innovativeness

,

and vision, the Army's land power will increase and, as a

result, play a more significant role in future U.S.

national security."

17

1. Organization of the Light Infantry Company

The light infantry company is organized as shown in

Figure 1.4 [Ref. 2: p. 2]. It consists of a company head-

quarters platoon, composed of a headquarters section, an

antiarmor (AA) section, and a mortar section, and three

rifle platoons, each composed of a headquarters section and

three rifle squads. A rifle squad operates in two fire

teams, each consisting of four men. The company has no

organic vehicles but it can use the support platoon's motor-

cycles if necessary.

The medium antiarmor weapons (Dragon) are consoli-

dated at company level to preclude encumbering the rifle

platoons with a bulky weapon system that may impede their

rate of movement in a low- intensity environment where armor

targets are scarce. This also enables the company commander

to provide rapid response based on the situation. The

antiarmor section can be used as an additional rifle unit if

the company is not faced with an enemy armor threat . The

M-60 machineguns (two per platoon) are placed, controlled,

and displaced by the platoon leader.

With the availability of night vision goggles and

night vision sights, the light infantry company is capable

of conducting operations under all visibility conditions.

2

.

Missions of the Light Infantry Company

a. Offense

The primary purpose of offensive operations is

to destroy the capability of the enemy and/or his will to

fight. This is accomplished by:

1. Attacking the enemy from the least expected area.

2. Concentrating effort in one direction while forcing

the enemy to fight in two or more directions.

18

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3. Destroying or wearing down enemy troops.

4. Penetrating the enemy's defenses to attack key combat

service, combat service support, and command,

control, and communications elements.

5. Seizing key terrain to enable maximum capability on

favorable ground.

The light infantry company can achieve maximum

success by employing sound principles of fire and movement

and attacking in restrictive terrain such as towns, swamps,

forests, and mountains. It can also maximize surprise by

attacking the flanks and rear of the enemy at night or

during limited visibility.

The light infantry company is capable of

conducting the following offensive operations [Ref. 4: pp.

B-9 - B-12]

:

1. Movement to contact

2. Hasty attack

3. Deliberate attack

4. Pursuit and exploitation when opposed by light enemy

forces

Movement to contact - conducted to locate the

enemy, develop the situation, and maintain the initiative.

Decentralized control, rapid execution, and responsive fire

support are critical to defeating the enemy.

Hasty attack - conducted to defeat an ill-

prepared enemy force quickly or to take advantage of an

enemy weakness. The effective use of indirect and supporting

weapon systems, suppression of enemy fire support and air

defense, and efficient application of combat support assets

increase the devastating effect of the swift, violent

maneuver against an ill-prepared enemy.

Deliberate attack - conducted to defeat a strong

enemy force in well-prepared positions that cannot be over-

come by a hasty attack. The main effort is directed toward

the enemy's weakest point.

20

Exploitation and pursuit - conducted to cut off

enemy dismounted infantry forces and defeat remaining

forces, conduct military operations on urban terrain (MOUT),

and destroy pockets of resistance.

b. Defense


defending against enemy light forces. However, as was

depicted in Figure 1.3, it can also defend against tank and

motorized units in close terrain. Defensive operations are

conducted in order to:

1. Cause an enemy attack to fail by destroying him or

forcing him to withdraw.

2. Control essential terrain or secure a key area to

deny enemy entry.

3. Gain time to prepare for a subsequent offense.

4. Economize forces in one area to allow concentration

elsewhere

.

5. Reduce the enemy capability for offensive action.


conducting the following defensive operations:

1. Defend in sector

2. Defend from a battle position

3. Defend a strongpoint

Defend in sector - This is the most frequent

defensive mission. The company defends in an area character-

ized by positions in depth and coordination with adjacent

units. Defending in depth entails drawing the enemy into the

sector and conducting multiple and repeated surprise attacks

throughout the depths of its formation.

Defend from a battle position - This mission is

assigned when key terrain must be held or when the position

is located in a favorable engagement area. It is character-

ized by obstacles to slow the enemy and stop it in the

21

engagement area such that the battle position can engage

targets from the flanks and rear.

Defend a strongpoint - This mission prevents the

enemy from bypassing or reducing the strongpoint without

expending excessive amounts of resources and time. A strong-

point is usually located in restrictive terrain such as

thick forests, mountains, swamps, urban areas, etc., that

cannot be easily bypassed.

C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

Because of the importance of the light infantry concept

to the United States Army, this thesis investigated the

composition and mechanics of a light infantry company to

identify, from a set of alternatives, the force structure

that maximizes unit resiliency on the battlefield for a

night defensive mission in a nuclear, biological, and chem-

ical (NBC) environment. The AMORE methodology was used to

evaluate the alternatives.

Although the United States Army Infantry School (USAIS)

conducted an AMORE analysis of the light infantry company as

input to the AMORE Analysis of the Light Infantry Division

prepared by Science Applications, Incorporated, it was

constrained by time and resident experience on the AMORE

model, resulting in an analysis that was not performed at

the level of detail and depth as this study. Additionally,

the USAIS analysis considered the organization of the light

infantry company before a mortar section was included in the

TOE. This thesis analyzed the company subsequent to that

change

.

D. PREVIEW

Chapter II discusses the input information that must be

determined before the AMORE methodology can be exercised.

22

The development of these input data required an extensive

analysis of the unit and its mission in conjunction with

subject matter experts. Chapter III provides the output

analyses based on the transformation of the input informa-

tion into measures of organizational capability. The anal-

yses focus on the recovery potential of the unit and include

developing capability as a function of time and identifying

critical resources. A sensitivity analysis is conducted in

Chapter IV. It examines the effects of changes in degrada-

tion probabilities and the definition of a mission essential

team on unit reconstitution capabilities. Chapter V summa-

rizes the analyses, and presents conclusions and recommenda-

tions based on the results of these analyses.

23

II. INPUT DATA

A. GENERAL

The AMORE methodology requires a significant amount of

input data based on an evaluation of a unit's capabilities,

organizational and operational concepts, and resources

provided in the Table of Organization and Equipment. The

following data elements are required to run the base case

using the AMORE methodology:

1. Unit mission.

2. TOE or starting strength of personnel and materiel.

3. Personnel and materiel transfer matrices.

4. Repair time for materiel.

5. Probability of degradation for personnel and

materiel

.

6. Commander's decision time.

7. Essential team requirements for personnel and

materiel

.

8. Number of simulation iterations.

B. UNIT MISSION

Although the unit mission is not input directly, it

determines the requirements for essential teams. For this

analysis, the light infantry company is in a six-hour night

defensive posture in a nuclear, biological, and chemical

(NBC) environment. This presents a stressful situation

which requires most of the skill groups and equipment types,

thereby providing the most information about the company

performing its combat function.

24

C. INITIAL STRENGTH

The initial strength pertains to the number of personnel

by grade and military occupational specialty (MOS) and the

number of significant items of equipment specified in the

TOE. These listings are depicted in Table I and Table II.

Although the fire support team chief, the fire support team

sergeant, the fire support team radio telephone operator

(RATELO), the medic, the forward observer, and the forward

observer RATELO are not included in the TOE, they are

usually attached to the light infantry company during opera-

tions and are therefore included in Table I.

D. TRANSFER MATRIX

A transfer matrix identifies the personnel and materiel

that are substitutable for other personnel and materiel and

the amount of time it takes to complete the substitution.

The matrix consists of row and column headings corresponding

to the row or line numbers of the personnel or materiel. An

entry indicates the time, in minutes, it takes for a row

skill or materiel item to substitute for a column skill or

materiel item. Zero entries indicate that substitutions

take place immediately while dots denote substitutions that

would not normally occur or would be infeasible. The diag-

onal entries represent the intersections of the rows and

columns with equal numbers. The transfer times used for

this analysis were developed from discussions with subject

matter experts from the Light Division Certification Board

of the US Army Combat Developments Experimentation Center

(CDEC) at Fort Ord.

1 . Personnel

The transfer matrix for personnel displays the

substitutability of one personnel for another in terms of

25

TABLE I

LISTING OF PERSONNEL INITIAL STRENGTHS

Personnel Skill Groups Grade MOS Qty

123456789

1011

12131415

16171819

2021222324252627

2829303132

Company Headquarters:

Company CommanderExecutive OfficerFirst SergeantSupply SergeantCommunications ChiefNBC NCOArmorerCompany RATELOFire Support Team ChiefFire Support Team SergeantFire Support Team RATELO

Antiarmor Section:

0-30-2E-8

Antiarmor Section LeaderAntiarmor Team leaderAntiarmor GunnerAsst Antiarmor Gunner

Mortar Section:

Mortar Section LeaderMortar Squad LeaderMortar GunnerAmmunition Bearer

Platoon Headquarters:

Platoon LeaderPlatoon SergeantPlatoon RATELOMachinegun GunnerAsst Machinegun GunnerMedicForward ObserverForward Observer RATELO

Rifle Squad:

Squad LeaderTeam LeaderAutomatic RiflemanGrenadierRifleman

6654

E-30-2E-6E-4

E-6E-5E-4E-3

E-6E-5E-4E-3

0-2E-7E-3E-4E-3E-4E-5E-3

E-6E-5E-4E-4E-3

11B00 111B00 111B5M 176Y30 131V30 154E20 176Y10 111B10 213A00 113F30 113F10 1

11B30 111B20 311B10 611B10 3

11C30 111C20 111C10 211C10 2

11B00 311B4G 311B10 311B10 611B10 691A10 313F20 313F10 3

11B30 911B20 1811B10 1811B10 1811B10 18

Total 142

26

TABLE II

LISTING OF MATERIEL INITIAL !STRENGTHS

1

Materiel Quantity

Binocular 132 Chemical Alarm 13 Compass, Magnetic 24 Dragon 65 Grenade Launcher 40mm M-203 186 Infrared Viewer AN/ PAS -7

Machinegun 7.62mm M-604

7 68 Mortar bOmm 29 Night Vision Goggles AN/P^

Night Vision Sight AN/PVS/S-5 36

10 -4 1811 Night Vision Sight AN/TVS -5 612 Pistol Caliber .45 713 Platoon Early Warning System 314 Radiac Detector Charger 115 Radiac Set AN7PDR-27

Radiacmeter IM-174/PD1

16 317 Radiacmeter IM-185/UD

Radio Set AN/PRC-7712

18 619 Rifle 5.56mm M- 16A2 8420 Small Unit Transceiver 1221 Speech Security Equipment 422 Squad Automatic Weapon 1823 Tape Reader

Telephone Set TA-l/PTTelephone Set TA-312/PT

124 1425 1

the average time required to reach an acceptable operational

capability. Table III presents the 32 x 32 matrix of

personnel transfer times, in minutes, for the light infantry

company. It can be seen that there is significant potential

for substitution between infantry MOS codes (llxxx; see

Table I) but only limited potential for headquarters

elements and attached personnel (fire support team, forward

observer teams, and medics).

Personnel skill substitutions during reorganization

and reconstitution following degradation were limited to

those substitutions that would normally occur instead of

considering every possibility. For example, although the

company commander has the skill and training to substitute

for a rifleman, he would not assume that role.

27

Transfer times ranged from 1 to 45 minutes (with the

exception of diagonal elements). For the most part, the

increased transfer times resulted from substitutions

involving greater differences in proficiency levels and from

the distance that had to be travelled during limited visi-

bility between positions of one personnel to the other. In,

the case of the light infantry company in the defense

mission, that distance could be as much as 750 meters,

depending on the terrain. The time penalty assessed for

travel varied from 5 to 15 minutes.

2 . Materiel

A similar matrix for materiel substitution times is

presented in Table IV. Due to the nature and organization

of the light infantry company, the unit possesses relatively

few essential materiel items. This provides very little

potential for these items to substitute for one another.

The most significant elements of materiel transfer times are

adjustment and repositioning times.

E. MATERIEL REPAIR TIME

The times to repair light (operator level or first

echelon maintenance) and moderate (organizational level or

second echelon maintenance) materiel damage are shown in

Table V. According to [Ref. 6: p. 6], doctrine dictates 18

minutes as the time limit for light repair and four hours as

the time limit for moderate repair. Any equipment exceeding

four hours of repair time is assumed to be not repairable by

the organizational level and therefore is considered lost to

the unit

.

28

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TABLE V

MATERIEL REPAIR TIME

Repair Time (Minutes

)

Light Moderate

1

Materiel Damage Damage

240Binocular 182 Chemical Alarm 18 2403 Compass, Magnetic 18 2404 Dragon 18 2405 Grenade Launcher 40mm M-203 18 2406 Infrared Viewer AN/PAS-

7

Machinegun 7.62mm M-6018 240

7 18 2408 Mortar 60mm 18 2409 Night Vision Goggles AN/PVS-5

Night Vision Sight AN/PVS-418 240

10 18 24011 Night Vision Sight AN/TVS-5 18 24012 Pistol Caliber .45 18 24013 Platoon Early Warning System

Radiac Detector Charger18 240

14 18 24015 Radiac Set AN/PDR-27

Radiacmeter IM-174/PD18 240

16 18 24017 Radiacmeter IM-185/UD

Radio Set AN/PRC-7718 240

18 18 24019 Rifle 5.56mm M-16A2 18 24020 Small Unit Transceiver 18 24021 Speech Security Equipment 18 24022 Squad Automatic Weapon 18 24023 Tape Reader

Telephone Set TA-l/PTTelephone Set TA-312/PT

. 18 24024 18 24025 18 240

F. PROBABILITY OF DEGRADATION SET

A probability of degradation set (PD set) consists of

both the degradation probabilities and the commander's deci-

sion times for personnel and materiel. This set is

presented in Tables VI and VII. The degradation probabili-

ties for personnel and materiel are determined by the unit

posture and the threat being simulated.

35

1. Personnel PD

Personnel probabilities of degradation can be

derived from the Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual based

on the light infantry company in a defensive posture against

conventional weapon systems. The recommended degradation

probability is 0.10 by the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at

Fort Leavenworth.

2. Materiel PD

Materiel probabilities of degradation are required

for light and moderate damage (repairable in the unit) and

for severe damage (lost to the unit). The Combined Arms

Center recommended that the corresponding degradation prob-

abilities should be 0.10, 0.05, and 0.02. In Table VII, the

cumulative "at least light" column is the sum of the indi-

vidual light, moderate, and severe PD ' s , the "at least

moderate" column is the sum of the moderate and severe PD ' s

,

and the "severe" column is only the severe PD. These cumu-

lative PD's are required by the AMORE model.

3

.

Commander' s Decision Time

In any given situation following degradation, a

commander needs time to assess the condition of the unit and

decide how to reorganize. This decision time is in addition

to any transfer times (personnel and materiel) except for

diagonal elements. It takes into consideration the time

lost due to the initial impact following an attack, which

may result in a brief period of confusion, demoralization,

and immediate aid to casualties. After the initial reaction

period, the commander's decision time will involve time

elements for damage assessment, communication of damage and

casualty reports, the commander's evaluation and decision

process, and communication of decisions for employment of

36

surviving assets to reconstitute the unit [Ref. 7: page 20].

A time of five minutes, concurred by subject matter experts

at the Light Division Certification Board at CDEC, for all

levels of degradation was used for this analysis.

TABLE VI

PROBABILITY OF PERSONNEL DEGRADATION

Commander'

s

SET

Decision Degradation

1

Personnel Time (min) Probability

Company Commander 5 0. 102 Executive Officer 5 0. 103 First Sergeant 5 0. 104 Supply Sergeant 5 0. 105 Communications Chief 5 106 NBC NCO 5 107 Armorer 5 0. 108 Company RATELO 5 0. 109 Fire Support Team Chief 5 0. 10

10 Fire Support Team Sergeant 5 1011 Fire Support Team RATELO 5 0. 1012 Antiarmor Section Leader 5 1013 Antiarmor Team leader 5 1014 Antiarmor Gunner 5 1015 Asst Antiarmor Gunner 5 1016 Mortar Section Leader 5 1017 Mortar Squad Leader 5 1018 Mortar Gunner 5 1019 Ammunition Bearer 5 1020 Platoon Leader 5 1021 Platoon Sergeant 5 1022 Platoon RATELO 5 1023 Machinegun Gunner 5 1024 Asst Machinegun Gunner 5 1025 Medic 5 1026 Forward Observer 5 1027 Forward Observer RATELO 5 1028 Squad Leader 5 1029 Team Leader 5 1030 Automatic Rifleman 5 1031 Grenadier 5 1032 Rifleman 5 10

37

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38

G. MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAM (MET)

The AMORE capability analysis requires the breakdown of

the unit into essential teams, consisting of only those

personnel and materiel elements which are necessary to

accomplish a mission. In the case of the light infantry

company, the smallest combat force is the fire team

consisting of the following elements: team leader, automatic

rifleman, grenadier, and rifleman. If an element is missing

for any given essential team, that team then has no mission

capability [Ref. 8: p. 2-10]. Using the fire team as the

basic increment of capability, eighteen teams were

constructed to produce the increment of mission performance.

An effort was made to distribute basic skills and equipment

as evenly as possible across the various increments of

capability

.

1

.

Personnel

Table VIII shows the personnel mission essential

teams for the light infantry company. It can be noted that

the teams contain a command element along with a full

complement of infantry, antiarmor, and mortar personnel

required for night defensive operations. The executive

officer, supply sergeant, armorer, fire support team,

medics, and the forward observer teams were not considered

essential to this particular mission.

2

.

Materiel

The composition of the materiel mission essential

teams of the light infantry company is presented in Table

IX. These elements represent the equipment associated with

the proper personnel. Only major items of equipment are

listed and each item is considered to include all of its

component parts. Some items which are issued on the basis

39

of one per individual (protective masks, bayonets) are not

included.

H. NUMBER OF ITERATIONS

An iteration includes application of damage to personnel

and materiel, assessment of surviving resources, reconstitu-

tion of the maximum number of mission essential teams, and

evaluation of an expected value of unit capability at speci-

fied time periods. The number of iterations must be greater

than or equal to two for proper program execution.

According to the User's Manual [Ref. 9: p. 2-32], fifty

iterations are generally sufficient to provide statistically

significant convergence of results. Thus, fifty iterations

were used in the analysis of the light infantry company.

40

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44

III. ANALYSES OF UNIT CAPABILITY

A. GENERAL

This chapter looks at those personnel and materiel

factors which influence the light infantry company's ability

to reconstitute its combat capability following an attack.

Some of the factors which affect its recoverability are

[Ref. 1: p. 5-1]:

1. The number of personnel and materiel items which are

authorized by the TOE and the number that survive

after an attack.

2. The transferability of personnel and materiel to

other skills or functions.

3. The time required to accomplish the transfer

(including delay and repair times).

4. The demand of the essential teams for specific types

and numbers of personnel and materiel items

.

The AMORE methodology considers the above factors in

producing the output for the base case from the available

data.

The following assumptions apply in the analyses:

1. Personnel and materiel systems for the base case

light infantry company are from the TOE developed by

the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

2. The light infantry company is at 100% strength (as

defined by the TOE) at the beginning of the mission.

3. Personnel are fully trained and qualified in their

Military Occupational Specialty (MOS).

4. Materiel systems are operationally combat ready at

the beginning of the mission.

45

5. Available weapon systems have an adequate supply of

ammunition for the entire mission.

6. Stress, fatigue, morale, etc. are not explicitly

considered.

The two most important outputs used as the basis for the

analyses of this chapter are:

1. Unit capability - the average recovery capability the

total unit (both personnel and materiel) has attained

by a given time.

2. Available surpluses and shortages - those elements

(either personnel or materiel) that prevented the

unit from having additional capability (shortages)

and those which are not being utilized (surpluses).

B. UNIT CAPABILITY

1. Mean Fraction of Capability

The rate of reconstitution is a function of the

times required for transfer and/or repair of assets. The

AMORE methodology allows the user to use average times or

random exponential simulated times based on the input mean

or expected times. The exponential distribution is known as

a frequently observed waiting time distribution. For this

analysis, the "mean time only" option was considered suffi-

cient for determining capability.

Table X presents the mean fraction of pre-

degradation capability for personnel and materiel as a func-

tion of time after degradation. These capabilities are

evaluated at the specified time periods, and at minimum and

infinite times. The minimum time capability is evaluated

immediately after the start of the reconstitution. All

transfers are in progress, but only those with a total time

(transfer + commander's decision + equipment repair) of zero

have been completed. Infinite time or maximum capability is

46

evaluated when all possible transfers and all possible

equipment repairs have been made. The "Unit" column gives

the unit capability which is the minimum of the personnel

and materiel capabilities derived from the average for all

iterations [Ref. 9: p. 2-50]. Additionally, the confidence

limit based on the t-test of significance for a 90 percent

confidence level (two-sided) is given for each of the mean

capabilities. The basic equation is [Ref. 10: p. 3-84]:

90% CI = +t VX Z - (YX )2

/ N (eqn 3.1)n-. / i i

V n"(n"-"I)

where X = capability for iteration i;i

N = number of simulation iterations (2-=N<CO);

t = table value of t for N-l degrees of freedom,n

An example of how to read the table is as follows:

after 0.5 hours, personnel regained a mean capability of

96.2 percent, materiel reached 69.9 percent, and the minimum

or unit mean capability was 69.9 percent. Maximum recovery

is accomplished between 4.0 and 4.25 hours. This can be

identified by the first point in time where the value of

unit capability reaches its maximum. The 90 percent confi-

dence interval for the unit capability can be calculated

using eqn. 3 . 1 at that time and the range is from 0.913 to

0.933.

Figure 3.1 depicts the graphical representation of

the mean data presented in Table X. It does not indicate

any significant divergence between the personnel and

materiel capability over time. It does show that materiel

is always the limiting or minimum factor at any time after

0.25 hours. At 0.25 hours the materiel capability and unit

capability become and continue to be equal. Prior to that

47

TABLE X

UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME(BASE CASE)

Time(Hours

)

Minimum

Personnel

394 0.033

Materiel

0.589 0.034

Unit

376 0270.250 747 0.043 0.618 0.032 596 0350.500 962 0.011 0.699 0.035 699 0350.750 974 0.007 0.797 0.025 797 0251.000 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0251.250 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0251.500 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0251.750 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0252.000 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0252.250 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0252.500 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0252.750 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0253.000 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0253.250 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0253.500 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0253.750 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0254.000 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0254.250 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0104.500 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0104.750 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0105.000 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0105.250 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0105.500 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0105.750 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0106.000 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010

Infinity 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010

time, the personnel capability was lower than the materiel

capability

.

Based on the resiliency threshold (1-PD) discussed

in Chapter I, it can be seen that the light infantry company

is resilient at a 10 percent degradation level (degradation

probability, PD, of 10 percent for personnel and 10 percent

at least light damage for materiel). The maximum capabili-

ties are 97.4 percent and 92.3 percent for personnel and

materiel, respectively. The value of Figure 3.1 to the Army

is that it portrays the light infantry company as being

self-sufficient and effective on the battlefield at a light

level of degradation.

48

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49

2.,Integral of Unit Capability with Respect to Time

Table XI provides the output of the cumulative area

under the capability curve. This area provides a measure of

the accumulated effective unit hours over the six-hour time

period.

TABLE XI

INTEGRAL OF UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME(BASE CASE)

-Time Unit Unit Team(Hours

)

Capability Hours Hours

Minimum 0.376 0.000 0.0000.250 0.596 0.121 2.1850.500 0.699 0.283 5.0970.750 0.797 0.470 8.4621.000 0.798 0.669 12.0501.250 0.798 0.869 15.6401.500 0.798 1.068 19.2301.750 0.798 1.268 2-2.8202.000 0.798 1.467 26.4102.250 0.798 1.667 30.0002.500 0.798 1.866 33.5902.750 0.798 2.066 37.1803.000 0.798 2.265 40.7703.250 0.798 2.464 44.3603.500 0.798 2.664 47.9503.750 0.798 2.863 51.5404.000 0.798 3.063 55.1304.250 0.923 3.278 59.0024.500 0.923 3.509 63.1574.750 0.923 3.740 67.1575.000 0.923 3.970 71.4675.250 0.923 4.201 75.6225.500 0.923 4.432 79.7775.750 0.923 4.663 83.9326.000 0.923 4.894 88.087

50

The unit capability (Unit column from Table X), as

mentioned earlier, is the minimum of the personnel and

materiel capabilities derived from the average for all iter-

ations. The unit hours available to the light infantry

company define the maximum potential output of the company

in time. This means that a full-up unit at 100 percent

capability would have one unit hour available in one hour.

Unit output is expressed in terms of team hours where one

team hour is defined as the amount of work one team can do

in one hour. The maximum value for the light infantry

company would be 18 team hours of output work every hour.

The average cumulative area is given in terms of the unit

hours and team hours that are available from the beginning

of reorganization to the desired time. Table XI shows that

0.669 unit hours were available in the first hour or 12.050

team hours from an eighteen- team unit. The light infantry

company has recovered to 79.8 percent capability at the end

of the first hour. However, the potential work the company

could have produced in that hour is only 66.9 percent of a

full-up unit. Figure 3.2 graphically shows the effective

unit hours compared to a reference line representing a unit

at 100 percent capability over the entire time.

C. CHOKE ANALYSIS

The choke analysis output (Appendix A) provides the

information on why the light infantry company was unable to

reconstitute to full capability by infinite time. The

output includes those items needed (Needs), on the average,

to complete the designated team and those items excess

(Surplus), on the average, to the requirements of that team.

The standard deviation for these averages is also given.

51

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52

Those personnel and materiel items critical to additional

capability in the unit are identified as need items while

the surplus items show where possible changes in transfer

capability could be used to increase unit recovered capa-

bility. The number of teams attempted (one beyond the

optimal solution team) is provided along with the number of

iterations for which this "next" team was attempted [Ref. 9:

p. 2-53].

1. Personnel Requirements and Shortages

As expected, the richness of total personnel due to

substitutability is apparent in the light infantry company

as evidenced by Tables XXI and XXII in Appendix A. For

example, in the results listed in Table XXI labelled "(Team

18)", seventeen teams were built and the eighteenth team was

attempted to be built. The model failed to complete the

eighteenth team twenty-three times out of the fifty itera-

tions (The other twenty-seven attempts will be shown on

additional printouts at ' the appropriate team level of

attempted completion) . The attempted construction of the

eighteenth team failed (choked) due to the personnel needs

in column one by the amounts specified by the values as

listed. These values were derived by the following

expression:

n

( Y (total number of shortages by skill) )/ni

i=l

where n = number of failures (iterations).

53

The major items contributing to the choke on the eighteenth

team were as follows:

1. Communication Chief (skill number 5)

2. Antiarmor Gunner (skill number 14)

3. Mortar Gunner (skill number 18)

4. Squad Leader (skill number 28)

5. Team Leader (skill number 29)

6. Automatic Rifleman (skill number 30)

7. Grenadier (skill number 31)

Table XXII is denoted by "After Last Team" and indicates

that the "next" team increment solution is not required

since all eighteen teams can be built. Therefore, the

average needs are not necessary, resulting in only a listing

of average surplus and standard deviation of surplus. The

fifty iterations of the simulation are accounted for as

follows: seventeen teams were built in the twenty-three

iterations of Table XXI, and eighteen teams were built in

the twenty-seven iterations (23 + 27 = 50) of Table XXII.

2. Materiel Requirements and Shortages

Tables XXIII through XXVI in Appendix A display the

choke analysis output for materiel. An examination of Table

XXIV shows that the sixteenth team was attempted five times,

resulting in a maximum capability of fifteen teams. This

was caused by a lack of materiel items 18 and 20. On the

average, team sixteen required 0.80 of item 18, an AN/PRC-77

radio set, and 0.20 of item 20, a small unit transceiver.

In other words, in four of the five iterations an AN/PRC-77

radio set was needed to build the sixteenth team while the

remaining iteration required a small unit transceiver.

Analyzing the remainder of the choke data for materiel in a

similar method results in a Dragon (item number 4) being

needed to build the fifteenth team in one iteration, a

54

binocular (item number 1) being needed to build the seven-

teenth team in one of the six iterations, and a Dragon being

needed in the other five iterations. Thirty-eight itera-

tions choked on team eighteen in Table XXVI due to a lack of

most of the materiel items. To account for all fifty itera-

tions of the materiel run, the following summary of results

is provided:

Number of Teams Built Number of Iterations

14

15

16

17

1

5

6

38

50

D. CONCLUSIONS

Based on the results from the analyses of the two

outputs, the following observations are made:

1. The recovery capability of the light infantry company

at the end of its assigned mission indicates that it

is resilient at the 10 percent level of degradation.

2. Resiliency is limited by some items of equipment,

particularly the Dragon which is a low-density equip-

ment. Improving survivability for the Dragon would

increase reconstitution capability.

3. Although all eighteen personnel essential teams were

built in 54 percent of the iterations, improved capa-

bility could be accomplished by increasing theft

substitutability for squad leaders and team leaders.

55

IV. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

A

.

GENERAL

This chapter investigates how sensitive the AMORE simu-

lation output measure of effectiveness of the light infantry-

company is to changes in the input parameters. A review of

existing AMORE literature indicates that the model provides

sensitivity analyses to changes in practically every input

factor. This analysis examined the sensitivity to changes

in the following input parameters, which are considered by

the author to be of primary importance to the light infantry

company analysis:

1. Probability of degradation

2. Mission essential teams

These will be referred to as Alternative Cases I and II.

B. PROBABILITY OF DEGRADATION

1. Small Variations in Personnel PD

The base case in Chapter III assumed a 10 percent

probability of degradation for all personnel in the light

infantry company. This section will allow the degradation

probabilities to vary with the relative location of each of

the personnel in the defensive position. It should be

expected that vulnerability levels would vary depending on

the degree of exposure. Table XII illustrates such a

possible situation. As an example, squad members (PD =

0.12) are more exposed to direct fire weapons than those

personnel in the company headquarters position (PD = 0.08).

These probability of degradation values were developed from

discussions with subject matter experts at the Light

56

Division Certification Board at CDEC. It was determined

that values between 0.06 and 0.14 would be considered

reasonable to classify as a light level of damage.

TABLE XII

PROBABILITY OF PERSONNEL DEGRADATION SET(ALTERNATIVE CASE I)

Commander'

s

Decision Degradation

1

Personnel Time (min) Probability

Company Commander 5 0.122 Executive Officer 5 0.083 First Sergeant 5 0.084 Supply Sergeant 5 0.085 Communications Chief 5 0.086 NBC NCO 5 0.087 Armorer 5 0.088 Company RATELO 5 0.089 Fire Support Team Chief 5 0.08

10 Fire Support Team Sergeant 5 0.0811 Fire Support Team RATELO 5 0.0812 Antiarmor Section Leader 5 0.1213 Antiarmor Team leader 5 0.1214 Antiarmor Gunner 5 0.1215 Asst Antiarmor Gunner 5 0.1216 Mortar Section Leader. 5 0.0817 Mortar Squad Leader 5 0.0818 Mortar Gunner 5 0.0819 Ammunition Bearer 5 0.0820 Platoon Leader 5 0.1221 Platoon Sergeant 5 0.1222 Platoon RATELO 5 0.1023 Machinegun Gunner 5 0.1224 Asst Machinegun Gunner 5 0.1225 Medic 5 0.1026 Forward Observer 5 0.1027 Forward Observer RATELO 5 0.1028 Squad Leader 5 0.1229 Team Leader 5 0.1230 Automatic Rifleman 5 0.1231 Grenadier 5 0.1232 Rifleman 5 0.12

The AMORE model was then run with all other input

parameters kept constant. Table XIII displays the mean

fraction of capability for personnel, materiel, and the

unit

.

57

TABLE XIII

UNI T CAPABILITY OVER TIME(ALTERNATIVE CASE I)

Time(Hours)

Minimum

Personnel Materiel Unit

432 0.037 0.580 0.028 399 032 .

0.250 702 0.047 0.604 0.029 547 0360.500 949 0.014 0.710 0.034 708 0330.750 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0261.000 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0261.250 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0261.500 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0261.750 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0262.000 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0262.250 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0262.500 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0262.750 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0263.000 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0263.250 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0263.500 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0263.750 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0264.000 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 0264.250 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil4.500 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil4.750 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil5.000 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil5.250 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil5.500 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil5.750 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil6.000 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil

Infinity 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil

A comparison with the base case is presented in

Table XIV and shows that this set of PD values resulted in a

slightly increased unit capability due to an improvement in

materiel capability. It seems logical that they should have

been identical since the probabilities of degradation for

materiel do not change. The reason for the difference is

due to the stochastic process and the "sort" routine used in

the AMORE model. The first iteration change will throw all

subsequent results out of sequence from the original run,

thus yielding different results. The graphical comparison

58

of the resiliency curves of both cases over all time periods

in Figure 4.1 suggests that the differences are

insignificant

.

TABLE XIV

COMPARISON OF MAXIMUM UNIT CAPABILITYFOR THE BASE CASE AND ALTERNATIVE CASE I

Base CaseAlternative Case I

Personnel Materiel

0.9230.928

Unit

0.9740.963

0.9230.927

In this case, although the changing of the prob-

ability of degradation for personnel based on their degree

of exposure to enemy direct fire weapons increased the capa-

bility of the light infantry company, the difference was not

deemed significant enough to draw any viable conclusions.

2. Broad Variations of Personnel and Materiel PD Levels

The effect of widely varying levels of degradation

probabilities for personnel along with a corresponding

change to materiel probabilities of degradation was analyzed

next. The degradation levels used include the base case as

level 1 and are listed in Table XV. The results of running

the AMORE model for each level are provided in Appendix B.

Figure XVI presents the capability of the light infantry

company at infinite time at each level.

59

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60

TABLE XV

LEVELS OF PROBABILITY OF DEGRADATION

Materiel PD (Cumulative)

Personnel At Least At LeastLevel

1

PD Light Moderate

.10 .05

Severe

.02.102 .20 .20 .10 .043 .30 .30 .15 .064 .40 .40 .20 .085 .50 .50 .25 .10

TABLE XVI

MAXIMUM UNIT CAPABILITY

Level Personnel Materiel Unit

1 0.974 0.9232 0.858 0.8823 0.749 0.8194 0.649 0.7815 0.518 0.771

9238397 32640518

The recovery capability of the light infantry

company based on Table XVI is displayed in Figure 4.2.

According to the resilience threshold (1-PD), it can be seen

that the company is resilient between the 10 percent and 50

61

percent levels of degradation. Its capability to reconsti-

tute after degradation is primarily limited by the number of

survivors and not by the shortage of any particular skill or

materiel items.

C. MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAMS

Although doctrine states that the rifle fire team is the

smallest combat fighting force, its size (four members)

under the light infantry concept may preclude it from under-

taking very many missions. Therefore, in this section the

squad will be considered as the basic increment of capa-

bility in determining mission essential teams. This results

in nine mission essential teams for both personnel and

materiel (Tables XVII and XVIII) versus eighteen for the

rifle fire teams. The same total number of personnel and

materiel was used in constructing these new mission essen-

tial teams.

The AMORE model was again run with all other input

parameters kept constant. Table XIX displays the mean frac-

tion of capability for personnel and materiel.

This trial resulted in a significant decrease in unit

capability compared to the base case as shown in Table XX.

Both personnel and materiel capabilities are lower at infi-

nite time. Although personnel capability exceeds the

criterion value of 1-PD as the resiliency threshold, the

unit as well as the materiel does not, resulting in the

company being not resilient. Figure 4.3 presents a graph-

ical comparison of the resiliency curves of both cases over

all time periods.

62

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65

TABLE XIX

•

UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME(ALTERNATIVE CASE ID

Time(Hours

)

Minimum

Personnel

0.424 0.037

Materiel Unit

0.651 0.018 413 0340.250 0.649 0.038 0.671 0.015 593 0260.500 0.871 0.030 0.747 0.029 718 0290.750 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0221.000 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0221.250 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0221.500 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0221.750 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0222.000 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0222.250 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0222.500 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0222.750 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0223.000 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0223.250 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0223.500 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0223.750 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0224.000 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 0224.250 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 0134.500 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 0134.750 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 0135.000 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 0135.250 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 0135.500 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 0135.750 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 0136.000 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 013

Infinity 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 013

D. CONCLUSIONS

The following summarizes the sensitivity of unit

recovery rates to changes in the input parameters:

1. Small variations in personnel probability of degrada-

tion which modeled more realistic probabilities of

exposure for various unit members resulted in insig-

nificant differences in the capability levels.

66

TABLE XX

COMPARISON OF MAXIMUM UNIT CAPABILITYFOR THE BASE CASE AND ALTERNATIVE CASE II


Base Case 0.974 0.923 0.923Alternative Case II 0.938 0.880 0.876

Broad variations of personnel and materiel probabili-

ties of degradation levels identified the light

infantry company as still being resilient to at least

the 50 percent level of degradation.

Restructuring the number of mission essential teams

from eighteen to nine revealed that the capability

level decreased significantly to the point that the

company was no longer resilient.

67

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68

V. SUMMARY , CONCLUSIONS , AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A . SUMMARY

The importance of the light infantry concept is to

provide a capability of rapidly deploying a highly-trained

unit in response to a contingency mission anywhere in the

world. This light force would be particularly effective in

meeting a crisis in a low-intensity scenario such as Grenada

and Lebanon.

This thesis investigated the light infantry company for

a night defensive mission in a nuclear, biological, and

chemical (NBC) environment to identify, from a set of alter-

natives, the force structure that maximizes unit resiliency/

recoverability on the battlefield. The Analysis of Military

Organizational Effectiveness (AMORE) methodology, developed

by Science Applications, Incorporated (SAI), was used to

evaluate the alternatives.

Chapter I discussed the AMORE methodology, the light

infantry concept, and the purpose of this thesis. Chapter

II presented the extensive input data that was developed for

the AMORE model. This data assumed the light infantry

company was performing only the defense mission. The anal-

yses of unit capability are presented in Chapter III. Some

of the areas examined include capability as a function of

time, potential productivity, and available surpluses and

shortages. A sensitivity analysis was conducted in Chapter

IV to investigate the effects of changes in degradation

probabilities and the definition of a mission essential team

on unit reconstitution capabilities.

69

B. CONCLUSIONS

Based on the results of this analysis, the following

conclusions are provided:

1. The light infantry company, as currently designed for

employment in low- intensity conflicts and as analyzed

in this study, possesses resiliency/recoverability

,

as defined by SAI , if it is structured with eighteen

mission essential teams. It is not resilient when

only nine teams are constructed.

2. At a low level of degradation corresponding to the

defense mission (probability of degradation = .10),

the light infantry company is materiel- limited.

However, at higher levels, personnel constraints

become the limiting factors.

3. The choke analysis identified the squad leader and

the team leader as the primary personnel shortfalls

at a 10 percent probability of degradation.

4. Materiel recovery was affected by some low-density

items such as the Dragon and the AN/PRC-77 radio set.

Losses of these key items were found to be extremely

degrading to the company's combat resiliency.

5. The relatively low rate of substitutability is

attributable in part to the large number of technical

jobs requiring specialized training.

C

.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are given:

1. Subsequent analyses of the light infantry company

should establish the fire team as the increment of

capability for determining mission essential teams.

2. Further specific areas of study that could complement

this thesis include random exponential simulated

times and increased probabilities of degradation.

70

The analyses of the capability of the light infantry

company based on eighteen mission essential teams and

on nine teams raised questions about the definition

of resiliency and what an essential team is believed

to do. This issue should be resolved.

At higher intensity conflicts, augmentation in

personnel and materiel is likely to result in

improved capability. AMORE analyses of the light

infantry company for each type of attack and defense

mission in every scenario of the strategic spectrum

of conflict is needed to provide a complete picture

of the resiliency of the company.

The procedures for determining the probability of

degradation for infantry equipment should be investi-

gated since many of the choke points uncovered by

AMORE may be due to an artificially high degradation

level for materiel.

Increasing the quantities of the critical low-density

items may be appropriate and should be evaluated.

In the sensitivity analysis, an attempt was made to

have various personnel elements of the company have

different risks of being degraded. This concept

suggests that some type of weighting factors, based

upon external analysis such as combat simulations or

Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual (JMEM) methodol-

ogies, could be developed and assigned to each

element to reflect the varying risks.

The value of substitutability is so significant that

every effort should be made by Table of Organization

and Equipment (TOE) builders to insure that all

possible substitutions are recognized and considered

in structuring the organization of a unit.

Cross-training and on-the-job training should be

increased to improve the light infantry company's

71

reconstitution ability as a result of greater substi-

tutability. Lower skill level personnel should be

trained to work and plan as effectively as possible

with minimum supervision. Emphasis should be placed

at unit level to train for reconstitution.

10. The application of high technology to reduce materiel

losses or repair times can reap great benefits. Due

to the limited mobility of the light infantry,

continued emphasis must be placed on equipment design

oriented toward reduced size and weight. Some design

criteria would be high reliability and maintain-

ability, man-portability, survivability, and longer

range. This would significantly increase the ability

of the light infantry company to reconstitute.

11. Although the AMORE methodology has value in providing

insights into existing organizations and into indi-

vidual training objectives, it should be used in

conjunction with, not to replace, the present US Army

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) TOE develop-

ment methodology.

72

APPENDIX A

CHOKE ANALYSIS NEEDS AND SURPLUS

TABLE XXI

CHOKE ANALYSIS DATA - PERSONNEL (TEAM 18)

Skill

1

Need:5 Suirplus

Average !

0.00

5td. Dev. Average

0.00

Std. Dev.

0.00 0.002 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.213 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.005 0.22 0.42 0.00 0.006 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.007 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.008 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.009 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.29

10 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.2111 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.2112 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.0013 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.0014 0.17 0.49 0.00 0.0015 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.0016 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0017 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.0018 0.17 0.39 0.00 0.0019 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.0020 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.0021 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0022 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0023 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0024 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0025 0.00 0.00 2.70 0.5626 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0027 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.2128 0.39 0.58 0.00 0.0029 1.04 . 1.19 0.00 0.0030 0.13 0.46 0.00 0.0031 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.0032 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Number of Iterations = 23.

73

TABLE XXII

CHOKE ANALYSIS DATA PERSONNEL (AFTER LAST TEAM)

Skill

1

Surplus

Average

0.00

Std. Dev.

0.002 0.04 0.193 0.00 0.004 0.00 0.005 0.00 0.006 0.00 0.007 0.07 0.278 0.11 0.329 0.15 0.36

10 0.44 0.5111 0.56 0.5112 0.00 0.0013 0.00 0.0014 1.00 0.0015 0.00 0.0016 0.00 0.0017 0.00 0.0018 0.00 0.0019 0.00 0.0020 0.00 0.0021 0.00 0.0022 0.00 0.0023 0.00 0.0024 0.00 0.0025 2.67 0.5526 0.37 0.7427 0.81 0.8328 0.00 0.0029 0.00 0.0030 0.00 0.0031 0.00 0.0032 0.00 0.00


74

TABLE XXIII

CHOKE ANALYSIS DATA - MATERIEL (TEAM 15)

Item

1

Needs Surplus

Average Std. Dev

0.00 0.00

Average

0.00

Std. Dev.

0.002 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.003 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.004 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.005 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.006 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.007 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.008 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.009 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

10 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.0011 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0012 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.0013 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0014 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.0015 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0016 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0017 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.0018 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0019 0.00 0.00 5.00 0.0020 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.0021 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.0022 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.0023 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.0024 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.0025 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00


75

TABLE XXIV


Item

1

Needs Su:rplus

Average S

0.00

td. Dev. Average

0.20

Std. Dev.

0.00 0.452 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.003 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.004 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.555 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.006 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.007 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.008 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.009 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.45

10 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.8411 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0012 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0013 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0014 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.0015 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.5516 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0017 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.5518 0.80 0.45 0.00 0.0019 0.00 0.00 0.60 1.3420 0.20 0.45 0.00 0.0021 0.00 0.00 3.00 1.0022 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.4523 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.0024 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.4525 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.45

Number iDf Iterations = 5.

76

TABLE XXV


Item

1

Needs Suirplus

Average Std. Dev. Average

0.00

Std. Dev.

0.17 0.41 0.002 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.413 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.004 0.83 0.41 0.00 0.005 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.006 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.007 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.008 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.009 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0011 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0012 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0013 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0014 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.5215 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.4116 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0017 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.5218 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0019 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0020 0.00 0.00 2.50 0.5521 0.00 0.00 3.50 0.5522 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0023 0.00 0.00 1.00 . 0.0024 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.5225 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.52

Number <}f Iterations = 6.

77

TABLE XXVI


Item

Needs Surplus

Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev.

1 0.26 0.55 0.00 0.002 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.003 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.005 0.29 0.46 0.00 0.006 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.007 0.05 0.23 0.00 0.008 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.009 0.47 0.65 0.00 0.00

10 0.45 0.65 0.00 0.0011 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0012 0.11 0.39 0.00 0.0013 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.0014 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.0015 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0016 0.05 0.23 0.00 0.0017 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.0018 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.0019 1.89 1.35 0.00 0.0020 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.0021 0.00 0.00 3.55 0.6922 0.37 0.71 0.00 0.0023 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.2724 0.24 0.49 O'.OO 0.0025 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00

Number Df Iterations = 38.

78

APPENDIX B

MEAN CAPABILITY FOR VARIOUS LEVELS OF PROBABILITY OF

DEGRADATION

TABLE XXVII

UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME(LEVEL 1)

Time(Hours

)

Minimum


394 0.033 0.589 0.034 376 0270.250 747 0.043 0.618 0.032 596 0350.500 962 0.011 0.699 0.035 699 0350.750 974 0.007 0.797 0.025 797 0251.000 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0251.250 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0251.500 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0251.750 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0252.000 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0252.250 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0252.500 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0252.750 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0253.000 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0253.250 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0253.500 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0253.750 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0254.000 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 0254.250 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0104.500 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0104.750 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0105.000 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0105.250 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0105.500 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0105.750 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 0106.000 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010

Infinity 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010

79

TABLE XXVIII


Time(Hours

)

Minimum


330 0.028 0.482 0.029 316 0230.250 564 0.047 0.522 0.028 458 0340.500 837 0.020 0.658 0.024 648 0250.750 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0211.000 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0211.250 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0211.500 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0211.750 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0212.000 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0212.250 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0212.500 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0212.750 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0213.000 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0213.250 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0213.500 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0213.750 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0214.000 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 0214.250 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 0144.500 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 0144.750 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 0145.000 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 0145.250 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 0145.500 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 0145.750 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 0146.000 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 014

Infinity 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 014

80

TABLE XXIX


Time(Hours

)

Minimum


0.290 0.027 0.347 0.027 254 0240.250 • 0.452 0.047 0.379 0.023 323 0280.500 0.614 0.057 0.589 0.029 500 0470.750 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0231.000 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0231.250 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0231.500 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0231.750 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0232.000 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0232.250 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0232.500 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0232.750 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0233.000 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0233.250 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0233.500 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0233.750 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0234.000 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 0234.250 0.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 0124.500 0.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 0124.750 0.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 0125.000 0.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 0125.250 0.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 0125.500 0.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 0125.750 0.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 0126.000 0.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 012

Infinity 0T.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 012

81

TABLE XXX


Time(Hours

)

Minimum


239 0.024 0.261 0.028 206 024- 0.250 394 0.035 0.287 0.025 256 0240.500 568 0.043 0.512 0.036 454 0430.750 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0241.000 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0241.250 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0241.500 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0241.750 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0242.000 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0242.250 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0242.500 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0242.750 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0243.000 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0243.250 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0243.500 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0243.750 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0244.000 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 0244.250 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 640 0154.500 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 ,640 .0154.750 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 640 .0155.000 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 .640 0155.250 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 640 .0155.500 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 .640 0155.750 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 .640 0156.000 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 640 .015

Infinity 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 .640 .015

82

TABLE XXXI


Time(Hours

)

Minimum


.197 0.023 0.197 0.025 144 0190.250 320 0.032 0.229 0.023 199 0210.500 446 0.036 0.430 0.033 358 0350.750 518 0.021 0.521 0.025 471 0221.000 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0221.250 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0221.500 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0221.750 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0222.000 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0222.250 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0222.500 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0222.750 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0223.000 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0223.250 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0223.500 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0223.750 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0224.000 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 0224.250 518 0.021 0.770 0.019 518 0214.500 518 0.021 0.770 0.019 518 0214.750 518 0.021 0.771 0.019 518 0215.000 518 0.021 0.771 0.019 518 0215.250 518 0.021 0.771 0.019 518 0215.500 518 0.021 0.771 0.019 518 0215.750 518 0.021 0.771 0.019 518 0216.000 518 0.021 0.771 0.019 518 021

Infinity 518 0.021 0.771 0.019*

518 021

83

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86

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Reconstitution andrecovery capability of

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reconstitution and recovery capability of the light infantry company

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