f there has been a consistent theme linkingCanadian foreign and defence policies in the thir-teen decades since Confederation it is that succes-sive governments have, always with reservations,chosen to assure national security primarily

through alliances with the world’s most powerfulnations, initially Great Britain and later the UnitedStates of America. Despite that element of consistencythese policies have never been static; both have under-gone continual, sometimes significant change inemphasis and direction in keeping with Canada’sevolving stature and the country’s willingness andcapacity to be involved in international affairs. Most ofthis time there was a high degree of congruencebetween foreign and defence policies, with defencepolicy appropriately being derived from the securitycomponent of foreign policy. In recent years, however,a disturbing inconsistency — in concept and in appli-cation — appears to have developed.

This article will review the main elements ofCanada’s current foreign and defence policies with aview to identifying the linkages and the inconsisten-cies between these policies, and it will discuss someinitiatives that could help to bring them into greaterharmony.

A POST-WAR PERSPECTIVE

uring the Second World War Canada made a mili-tary contribution well out of proportion to its

small population and economic base, but Canadianstatecraft in the immediate post-war era was both prac-tical and modest. Out of their wartime experienceCanadians developed a passionate interest in promotinga global environment in which peace and security couldbe assured to the extent possible, and attention wasfocused on the United Nations. Lacking the military andeconomic capabilities of the larger powers, Canada was,however, “…content to be the industrious tailor of theinternational system, stitching together workable com-promises out of rather patternless and (often) threadbarematerial.”1 Within this somewhat confining regime, thenation’s leaders placed great stock on selectivity, andwhat might be termed ‘functionalism’ served as the coreorganizing principle for this internationalist phase ofCanadian foreign policy. The value of consultation andcollaboration was thoroughly assimilated, and Canadiandiplomats became highly adept at building coalitions tosupport initiatives related to the promotion of a peacefulworld. The founding of NATO to deter another European

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by Lieutenant-Colonel David L. Bashow

RECONCILING THE IRRECONCILABLE?

CANADA’S FOREIGN AND

DEFENCE POLICY LINKAGE

Lieutenant-Colonel David L. Bashow teaches history at RoyalMilitary College of Canada.

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war was one such initiative where Canadians played amajor role, and over many years Canada was able toexert influence beyond its real power through theAlliance’s political and military consultative process,and at relatively modest cost in terms of actual militarycommitments. Peacekeeping, mainly under UnitedNations auspices, also brought to the fore the process ofdiplomatic dialogue together with the employment ofsmall military forces to control minor conflicts beforethey could draw in superpower involvement. Between1948 and 1999 Canada participated in 90 peacekeepingor peace restoration operations, the highest number ofany nation. It needs to be mentioned, however, that thiscommendable form of contribution to a more stableworld has probably always been driven more by nation-al self-interest in maintaining the international statusquo and fostering trade, rather than “…over any motiva-tion for community involvement centered on claims ofjustice.”2 Indeed, the self-interest motivation, thoughoften couched in lofty terms such as global stability, hasnever been far from the surface in contemporaryCanadian foreign policy.

Canada’s foreign and defence policies were both fun-damentally revised by the Trudeau government in 1968.

An ardent nationalist, Pierre Elliott Trudeau believedthat the nation’s foreign policy had first to serve nation-al interests. He considered “… that Canada had an‘inverted’ policy: ‘We should be protecting our internalsecurity, defending our three seas, and then consideringother possible commitments. It was not logical orrational to not protect that which was ours.’ For PierreTrudeau, the proper policy was Canada first.”3 He alsothought that Canada had become obsessed with bothEurope and the Soviet-American Cold War struggle, sohe ordered concurrent reviews of both policies.

The outcome was a foreign policy that verged on non-alignment. And, in what proved to be a ‘long, dark nightof the spirit’ for the Canadian Forces, extensive troopreductions and fiscal neglect characterised the followingseven years, and the Canadian military struggled to under-stand “…a government that treated them as an inescapablenuisance.”4 It would not be until a major philosophicalturnabout by Trudeau in 1975 on the utility of NATO,spurred largely by economic factors, that the CanadianForces began to receive some overdue attention.

The Mulroney government took a very different viewof close political links with the United States and tradi-tional allies in Europe, and especially of collectivedefence arrangements in NATO and of Canada’s armedforces. Indeed, the 1987 Defence White Paper empha-sised that “…the first objective of Canadian security was‘…the promotion of a stronger and more stable interna-tional environment in which our values and interests canflourish.’ Canada would pursue this objective ‘within theframework of collective security.’”5 The optimisticspending proposals articulated in this White Paper were,however, never implemented since many of the provi-sions became irrelevant after the collapse of the SovietUnion and the fragmentation of the Warsaw Pact.

CURRENT CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

he most recent codification of Canadian foreignpolicy is found in the 1995 Chretien government

statement entitled Canada in the World, although it hasbeen significantly augmented by later departmental pol-icy statements. While the White Paper suggests that thenation’s position in the world order is “... to influencechange and to benefit from opportunities,”6 it furtherstates that the government “...will exercise that influ-ence responsibly to protect and promote Canada’s val-ues and interests in the world.”7 These confident andforthright proclamations appear to constitute a soundbeginning in the articulation of Canadian foreign policy.But, while Canadian values are covered in some detail,the document never identifies or defines the nature ofthe national interests. Instead, the document is con-structed around three broad, if vague key objectives: the

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promotion of prosperity and employment; the protectionof our security within a stable global framework; andthe projection of Canadian values and culture.8

The White Paper touts Canada’s promotion of globalpeace as the key element in protecting national security,emphasizing that Canadian security is increasinglydependent on that of other nations, and highlighting“...our fundamental interdependence with the rest of theworld.”9 It further suggests that international affairs willbe “...rooted increasingly in economic and traderelations between countries and regions.”10

While acknowledging that new and dangerousglobal threats exist from a wide array of chal-lenges11, only minimal attention is given to theuse of military resources in the resolution ofthreat-based issues. The following quote is anexample of the low priority accorded the use ofthe armed forces in international security prob-lems: “More and more, the concept of security isfocusing on the economic, social and politicalneeds of the individual. In tackling these issues,we will require clarity in our thinking about thesources of each threat and problem, and aboutwhich combination of interests, including devel-opment cooperation, trade liberalization and, ifneeds be, preventive diplomacy and peacemak-ing, is best able to address them.”12

In its focus on the first key objective, the pro-motion of prosperity and employment, the WhitePaper discusses the economic implications ofCanadian foreign policy at great length, andCanada’s economic relationship with respect tothe United States is given special attention.

It then moves to the second key objective, theprotection of national security within a stableglobal framework. Significant emphasis is givento meeting security challenges in a shared man-ner, through multilateral and bilateral alliances.The pre-eminent nature of the cooperative rela-tionship between Canada and the United Statesis acknowledged. Both NATO and NORAD arehailed as important guarantors of national mili-tary security, but the United Nations, particular-ly through regional alliances, “... continues tobe the key vehicle for pursuing Canada’s globalsecurity objectives,”13 and its long-term success isdeemed essential to Canada’s future security. Regionalsecurity arrangements are also emphasized, in line withthe government’s desire to shift away from an overly-Eurocentric position. The Arctic, Latin America and theCaribbean are singled out as special interest areas with-in the Western Hemisphere, while Europe and the Asia-Pacific region are both cited as areas of additional spe-

cial interest. Having missed some parts of the globe, theMiddle East and Africa are also noted as being worthyof special attention, as well as participation in LaFrancophonie and Commonwealth forums.14

Finally, as to the third key objective, the projection ofCanadian values and culture, the White Paper states thatCanadian interests within the international milieu areadvanced as the Department of Foreign Affairs “…pro-motes these values in our relations with individual

countries and as a member of such individual organiza-tions as the United Nations, the Commonwealth, LaFrancophonie, the G-8 and the Organization ofAmerican States.”15

While this catalogue of declared objectives no doubtconstitutes noble and desirable goals, it would seemunlikely that every aspect is equally important. One of

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the shortcomings of the White Paper, as mentioned ear-lier, is its failure to articulate what are the nationalinterests that must be protected and promoted. This is inmarked contrast to statements of foreign and nationalsecurity policy by the United States. American policydocuments clearly and specifically define their nationalinterests, they set them in priority by relative degree ofimportance, and then provide considerable guidance onimplementation methodologies.16 Thus, when Americansdeclare a policy on an issue to be in the national interest,

it is generally possible to verify and, if necessary, to chal-lenge or debate the issue. Such is not the case in Canada,where the contrasting, perhaps contrived vagueness andlack of structured priority in foreign policy documents,most notably Canada in the World, makes cogent appli-cation through defence policy rather difficult.

The most recent refinement of the government’s for-eign policy, Foreign Minister Axworthy’s HumanSecurity initiative, emphasizes the interdependence ofnations within the global village. He argues that thisentails ensuring the safety of people from both non-vio-lent and violent threats, and that national security andhuman security are mutually supportive. In fairness, thisinitiative does state that “…when conditions warrant,vigorous action in defence of human security objectiveswill be necessary. Ensuring human security can involvethe use of coercive measures, including sanctions andmilitary force, as in Bosnia and Kosovo.”17 However,this document also plays down the use of the military inthe achievement of these goals, concentrating instead on“…the strengthening of legal norms and building thecapacity to enforce them, …improving democratic gov-ernance within states, and …strengthening the capacityof international organizations, in particular, the UnitedNations, to deliver on their agreed mandates.”18 PaulHeinbecker, Assistant Deputy Minister, Global andSecurity Policy in the Department of Foreign Affairsand International Trade (who has an article on the topic

elsewhere in this issue), recently argued that the humansecurity concept is highly relevant to Canadians as“…sooner or later, directly or indirectly, the security ofothers becomes our problem.” Heinbecker has empha-sized that individual human beings, not states, are thepoint of reference, that threats come from both militaryand non-military sources, and that human security is “acomplement to, not a substitute for, national security.”19

This well-intentioned if still somewhat vague initiative,however, denies long-established principles of state sov-ereignty, and may well encourage unwarranted interfer-ence in the internal affairs of other states, issuing “ablank cheque for virtually limitless UN intervention-ism.”20 In fact, the potential for greater human insecuri-ty may be fostered, “…as governments fortify against apossible intervention by repressing their populations intoservility.”21 Despite Mr. Heinbecker’s assurances, itwould appear that this initiative has very little directapplication to Canadian national security, which is whata cogent, appropriate defence policy must serve. And itwould also seem to open the possibility of even greaterCanadian Forces involvement in external commitmentsthat have little to do with Canadian interests.

Certain characteristics inherent in the Canadian sys-tem of Cabinet-centred government further muddy thenation’s foreign and defence policy waters. ProfessorAlbert Legault of Laval University, in his March 1997Report to the Prime Minister on the state of theCanadian Armed Forces, states that the notion of politi-cal accountability is more transparent in the UnitedStates than in the Canadian system. He argues that whileCanadians believe they possess a democratic systemwithin which Parliament is all-powerful, “... in realityCanada has virtually a presidential system with a strongconcentration of powers in the hands of the PrimeMinister and his Privy Council. In the United States, onthe other hand, the system provides a better balancebetween Congress and the Executive. ...[In Canada] it isthe executive of the Cabinet that is the major designerof policy, whether in defence or foreign policy.”22

In the absence of clear policy commitments, it thusappears that the Prime Minister and his Cabinet have thepower to designate anything they please as a nationalvital interest, and to commit whatever national elementsor forces they see fit in its pursuit. Parliament has a lim-ited role in approving the placing of military personnelon active service, and “...its most important role is inreviewing the government’s decision concerningCanadian participation in international conflicts.”23

McMaster University political scientist Kim Nossalbelieves that fusion of the executive branch and the leg-islature as embodied in the Cabinet prevents Parliamenthaving any real say in foreign and defence policy.Parliament can “discuss but they cannot make foreign

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policy.”24 Many have seen this as a weakness in theprocess of formulating coherent and linked foreign anddefence policies, and a number of high-level recommen-dations have been made over time to rectify this per-ceived deficiency. In February 1995, for example, theSpecial Joint Parliamentary Committee ReviewingCanadian Foreign Policy recommended “...the establish-ment of a high-level government mechanism, such as aCabinet committee, and ... a restructuring of the rele-vant Standing Committees of Parliament, in order toensure that the various elements of security areaddressed in an integrated manner.”25 Other pertinentrecommendations will be discussed later in this paper.

THE 1994 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER

n an Air Command summary of the 1994 DefenceWhite Paper, it is noted that the fundamental goal of

the policy is “…to reflect the Government’s program ofnational fiscal constraint, while continuing to provideCanadians with the defence forces necessary to upholdessential Canadian values and security interests, both athome and abroad.”26 The emphasis on fiscal restraint istelling, for it reflects acknowledgement that Canada willget whatever national defence it can purchase for afinite sum, rather than what might be necessary to pro-tect values and interests now and in the future.27 It isalso interesting to note that this subordinate governmentdocument actually gives a definition of Canadiannational values and interests. Situated in the context of“…an active participant in multilateral efforts to pro-mote collective security,”28 they are: first, Canadiansbelieve that the rule of law must govern relationsbetween states; second, Canadians have deemed theirown security indivisible from that of their allies; andthird, Canadians have a strong sense of responsibility toalleviate suffering and respond, where their efforts canmake a difference.29 The missions of the CanadianForces, as stated in the White Paper and confirmed inthe 1999 Departmental Outlook, are, in priority:

• The defence of Canada and the protection of Canadiansovereignty;

• The bilateral defence of the North American continent,in cooperation with the United States; and

• Contributions to international security.30

As in the Foreign Policy White Paper, the DefenceWhite Paper reaffirms that the nation’s interests are bestserved by helping to ensure global peace and security. Itstresses the need for operationally ready forces andreaffirms continued commitment to collective defenceand cooperative security institutions such as NATO,NORAD and the United Nations. It also “…calls for a

leaner but better managed, multipurpose combat-capa-ble force to protect Canada’s security at home, whilerecognizing our multilateral peace and security interestsand responsibilities abroad.”31

The document then discusses the nature of globalthreats at some length, suggesting that the focus on thepeace dividend is premature and that it would be a gravemistake to dismantle the capacity to defend the nation.After addressing the first two missions, the defence ofCanada and the bilateral defence of the North Americancontinent, the focus of the White Paper turns toCanada’s most demanding and in many ways its mostcontroversial military mission, that of contributing tointernational security. Emphasizing that Canadians areinternationalist and not isolationist by nature,32 thePaper argues that “...multilateral security cooperation isnot merely a Canadian tradition, it is the expression ofCanadian values in the international sphere.”33 It articu-lates a Canadian perspective on multilateral operations,which, it argues, must “address genuine threats to inter-national peace and security (as was, for example, thecase in the Persian Gulf or the former Yugoslavia) oremerging humanitarian tragedies…”34, such as the situ-ations in Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo and East Timor.Several key principles are then outlined for the designof all such missions.

The White Paper expresses strong support for bothNATO and the UN, even while acknowledging that bothorganizations require extensive structural reform.However, it then argues the need to be selective aboutthe wide range of multilateral operations to whichCanada might be asked to contribute, but states that thenation is willing to commit forces to a full range of oper-ations, including the preventive deployment of forces,peacekeeping and observer missions, peace enforcementand the defence of allied nations, post-conflict peace-building, and measures to enhance stability and buildconfidence.35 In keeping with the desire to balanceexpanding global interests, the White Paper suggests amore active security role in the Asia-Pacific region aswell as in Latin America, the Middle East and Africa.36

Finally, guidance is given to the three services onforce levels, along with promises for equipment updatesand modernization. It gives a revised overall force struc-ture of approximately 60,000 personnel in the RegularForces, and 23,000 personnel in the Primary Reserve by1999.37 The document concludes with an affirmation of“… the need to maintain multipurpose, combat-capablesea, land and air forces that will protect Canadians andproject their interests and values abroad.”38

At this juncture one could well argue that there is lit-tle wrong with the 1994 Defence White Paper, even

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though a demonstration of financial resolve by the gov-ernment to implement and sustain the Paper’s maintenets has thus far been lacking.39 Joseph Jockel, arespected American commentator on Canadian defenceissues at St. Lawrence University, in a recent book enti-tled The Canadian Forces: Hard Choices, Soft Power,warns that Canada’s military will be unfit for combatwithin five years unless the government makes a majorincrease in defence spending. Jockel believes that whilethe personnel demands are severe, obsolescent equip-ment is the main concern. He points out that the AuditorGeneral has said that $11 billion in new equipment isneeded, but that only $5 billion dollars has been bud-geted. Professor Jockel notes that all the services are indire need of a cash infusion for equipment, but that thearmy is especially vulnerable, particularly with respectto armour. He believes that the shift from being pre-pared to field a brigade group, a sustainable combatgrouping, toward smaller and less expensive ‘battlegroups’, which are unable to remain in the field forlengthy periods, will relegate Canada to constabularypeacekeeping duties by default. “Canada must nowdecide whether to put money back into the military orsee its stature as a military power diminished. Canadacould begin reducing its military contributions, but atthe risk of losing global influence.”40

THE DEFENCE POLICY/FOREIGN POLICY LINKAGE

he Canadian public should be able to expect rea-sonable consistency between foreign policy and

defence policy, both in content and in application.Unfortunately, Canadian defence policy sometimesappears to have been generated in a vacuum because of alack of agreement between external and domestic priori-ties, and its implementation is usually hostage to federalbudgets and regional economics, with little regard forlong-term fiscal planning and spending stability. It mayalso be of interest to note that the 1994 Defence WhitePaper was published several months prior to its foreignpolicy counterpart.41 Small wonder that there are someinconsistencies between the two documents, given thatForeign Affairs is meant to be the lead agency for thenation’s security policy. Security policy is usually under-stood to be an overarching concept that should serve as abridge between foreign and defence policy, identifyingthreats and risks to national interests. In reality, securitypolicy in Canada, when it has existed at all, has beenmore ad hoc than codified in a structured manner.

One significant inconsistency in the application offoreign and defence policies has been the extraordinarynumber of commitments generated for the CanadianForces by the executive branch of the government. Itfrequently appears that the Prime Minister and the

Cabinet are unable to differentiate in a global sensebetween what constitutes a security threat and what is, ineffect, a humanitarian tragedy. The government simplydoes not have the military wherewithal to react to everyglobal tragedy, media frenzies and Realpolitik notwith-standing. The resources of the Canadian Forces are lim-ited, and recently there has been a large a gap betweendesirable and undoubtedly well-intentioned commit-ments and practical operational capabilities. WhileCanada may tout a global approach in its foreign policy,it does so with an increasingly questionable global capa-bility. This commitment-capability gap has not been loston the national’s allies, and there is increasing evidenceof an erosion in the credibility of the Canadian Forces inthe international arena. In fairness, this may have beensomewhat mitigated by the recent performance ofCanadian air and land forces in Bosnia and Kosovo.Nonetheless, Joseph Jockel recently revealed that “…theUnited States has said quietly to Canada that in any com-bat formation that the United States leads, it really does-n’t want a contribution smaller than a brigade.”42 Itshould be noted that Strategy 2020, the officialDepartment of National Defence guidance on futureplanning, places significant emphasis upon Canada’sability to work with its principal allies, calling it “…avital distinctive competency.”43 The same documentspecifies that Canada’s most important ally now and forthe future is the United States of America.

Of all the missions assigned to the Canadian Forces,none has generated more controversy or focused moreattention on Canada’s military deficiencies than that ofcontributing to international security, whether in supportof NATO-led operations as in Bosnia and Kosovo or withUnited Nations forces. One of the problems associatedwith the rapid diversification and expansion of peace-making, peace enforcement and peacekeeping missionrequirements is that it has too often resulted in inade-quately equipped and doctrinally-limited soldiers beingsent under the guise of humanitarian assistance into sit-uations which have been highly unstable and extremelydangerous, where intrastate or “failed state” scenarioshave dominated. There has also been a significant over-commitment of land force combat units. Occasionallythe pristine Canadian image abroad has been tarnishedby unsavoury disciplinary incidents in Somalia and theformer Yugoslavia. Government leaders were often tooquick to use democratization and humanitarian issues asa rationale for supposedly-neutral intervention, in theabsence of a security threat to national interests. Theproblem here is that humanitarian intervention is seldomperceived, or executed for that matter, as a neutral act,particularly in high-intensity peacemaking or peace-enforcement scenarios. It is instead frequently a tool offoreign policy that amounts to taking sides for a myriadof reasons, with concomitant repercussions. The opera-

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tional loss of inadequately equipped and occasionallyneedlessly-endangered Canadian service personnel onrelatively recent deployments has once again testedCanada’s threshold for sacrifice.

Canadian Forces staff reports lend credence to thesense that Canadian troops have, in the recent past, beencommitted to UN deployments without due care andconsideration being given to all the ramifications ofsuch deployments. Specifically, “... a Canadian Forcesassessment of its mission to Rwanda paints a scathingpicture of haste and confusion that could have cost sol-diers their lives.”44 These setbacks and embarrassmentsfor some time resulted in the significant downsizing ofCanadian peacekeeping commitments. The Chretiengovernment, again with the exceptions of the Kosovocrisis and the recent deployment to East Timor, has gen-erally proven to be somewhat hesitant in committingCanadian troops to subsequent UN missions, and thenonly when linked to a restrictive set of conditions gov-erning their limited use. One notable inconsistency inthis pattern was the December 1996 planning for a mis-sion to Zaire, where not only a prudent deploymentpace, but overriding national interests seemed to beabsent from deliberations.

In the words of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, thegovernment views Canada as “...a middle power withlimited military might, well-placed to wield soft power,based on the idea that knowledge and information con-fer international influence.”45 This insinuation of a lackof a robust Canadian commitment to a multi-purpose,broad spectrum com-bat-capable force,together with increas-ing restrictions onterms of employment,would seem to under-mine the credibility ofthe foreign policyobjective, “...the pro-tection of our securitywithin a stable globalframework.”45 Thistentativeness “... lim-its Canadian forces tosmaller, less salientroles in multilateraloperations.”46

A policy whichwould limit Canadian troops only to ‘support’ opera-tions, contingent upon a myriad of preconditions, isunrealistic in today’s world. Political scientists LouisNastro and Kim Nossal argue that the recommendationof the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian

Foreign Policy, which would require the consent of alladversarial parties prior to entering a country is “ ...merely nostalgic yearning for an earlier (and safer) gen-eration of peacekeeping; the only signal it sends to oth-ers is that Canada has little willingness to engage in thekind of military operations abroad that have come withthe post-Cold War environment.”47 In terms of the needfor an even broader capability, this writer argues thatthe Canadian Armed Forces need to be prepared for theworst possible contingency, since, if history teachesanything, it is that the Canadian Forces will probably berequired at some future date in high-intensity combatoperations that are clearly in the nation’s vital interests.Given the lengthy time now needed to acquire newequipment and capabilities, the nation does not have theluxury of waiting until a crisis is upon it to rebuild realoperational, war-fighting capabilities.

A LARGE PROBLEM LARGELY UNRESOLVED

he Government of Canada has not yet fully cometo grips with a highly significant problem now fac-

ing the Canadian military. As was clearly articulated inthe 1994 Defence White Paper “... Canada can and mustbe selective [in terms of deployments] if it is going toremain in a position to play a meaningful role. Canadacannot and need not, participate in every multilateraloperation. Our resources are finite. We may not agreewith the purpose or organization of a given mission. Wemay not be convinced of its prospects for success. Wemay be otherwise engaged. Moreover, Canada is not

obliged to take on amajor portion of everyoperation or to con-tribute forces forlonger than seems rea-sonable.”48 This clear,unambiguous policystatement has, howev-er, been routinely vio-lated. As of December1999, approximately4300 Canadian Forcespersonnel were de-ployed worldwide on23 international oper-ations, including over500 dedicated to thenew UN mission inEast Timor, 1362 in

Bosnia and 1556 in Kosovo. This was the highest num-ber of overseas-deployed forces since the KoreanConflict of 1950-53, and as many as when the serviceswere dangerously over-tasked during the Mulroney andCampbell administrations. At that time (1992-93), 4300

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service personnel were serving in Bosnia, Cambodia,Somalia and other locations, but the Regular Forceestablishment was 85,000 members, as opposed to thecurrent 60,000 level.49

The East Timor deployment was undoubtedly consid-ered in the national interest as an intervention onhumanitarian grounds, and a logical embodiment ofDefence White Paper thoughts on greater engagementfor the Canadian Forces in the Pacific area. But perhapsthere were other factors at play. A recent Ottawa Citizenarticle underscored an extremely lucrative Canada-Indonesia trade relationship that dates back to 1975.“Cumulative Canadian direct investment in Indonesia isestimated by the Foreign Affairs Department to total

$8 billion now.”50 And, apart from a temporary excep-tion by the Mulroney administration in 1991, “…thethree Canadian governments that have been in placesince East Timor’s annexation, Pierre Trudeau’sLiberals, Mulroney’s Conservatives and Chretien’sLiberals, have always put trade and investment inIndonesia ahead of the plight of the East Timorese.”51

University of Ottawa human rights specialist Errol Mendeshas suggested that there appears to be “…a lot of guiltswirling around” Canada’s involvement in East Timor. 52

In recent years a number of means have been proposedto provide checks and balances on the powers of thePrime Minister and Cabinet in matters related to nation-al foreign and defence policies. In addition to oversightroles, most of these initiatives have incorporated sug-gestions to educate, advise and broaden the awarenessof the most senior members of government about mili-tary and security issues and how they relate to nationalinterests. Perhaps the government needs help in deter-mining, on a case by case basis, which possible peace-keeping deployments are legitimately in the nationalinterest, and not merely a reaction on humanitarian

grounds to an ever-increasing number of globaltragedies. Humanitarian intervention is, of course, partand parcel of being a good international citizen, but itcannot be the predominant reason for the employment ofmilitary force. The government must also be prepared tocommit the Canadian Forces to a full range of opera-tions, including high intensity combat, but only when itis considered in the national interest to do so.

In 1994, the Special Joint Committee on Canada’sDefence Policy argued “...that there is a need tostrengthen the role of Parliament in the scrutiny anddevelopment of defence policy.”53 They considered thattheir Committee, which consisted of both House ofCommons and Senate representatives, had been particu-larly productive and therefore recommended the cre-ation of a new Standing Joint Committee of the Senateand House of Commons on Defence to institutionalize aregular public review of defence policy and majordefence budgetary and procurement issues. The SpecialJoint Committee also recommended full Parliamentarydebate before any deployment of Canadian Forcesabroad, and Parliamentary scrutiny before any futuredefence policy review or White Paper.

A May 1996 Report by the Auditor General on bothForeign Affairs and DND involvement in peacekeepingnoted that costs associated with peacekeeping operationshad quadrupled between 1991 and 1996, and also remarkedon “...serious problems in the Land Forces’ ability to gen-erate multipurpose forces.”54 The report also took theDepartment of Foreign Affairs to task for not establishinga method to evaluate or conduct ‘lessons learned’ exercis-es pertaining to peacekeeping issues as seen from a foreignpolicy perspective, arguing that the full benefits from pre-vious experience were thus not gained. It also argued thatinformed decisions on matters related to peacekeepingwould in general be ameliorated by greater governmentalaccountability and transparency.55

The House of Commons Standing Committee onNational Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA)performs vital service, but it is limited in both its scopeand authority. In his March 1997 Report to the PrimeMinister, Dr. D. J. Bercuson made very specific recom-mendations about broadening the authority of thisCommittee. Further, ‘Defence Community’ representa-tives from the university-based Strategic and DefenceForum, in their report, concluded that initiatives need tobe taken which would contribute to a greater under-standing of defence in Canada, and they also felt thisshould include giving more authority to SCONDVA.

Albert Legault, in his concurrent March 1997 Reportto the Prime Minister, specifically homed in on peace-keeping problems. Citing the Somalia experience, he

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noted that Foreign Affairs was often uninvolved duringthis crisis, that the Rules of Engagement (ROEs) hadbeen determined hastily and then were not updated whenthe mandate of the Force was substantially changed. Herecommended “...that each major peacekeeping opera-tion in which Canada is a participant be equipped withan interdepartmental coordination structure comprisedof the Chief of the Defence Staff and the two DeputyMinisters for National Defence and External Affairs,with representatives of the Privy Council, the CanadianInternational Development Agency, the Chief ElectoralOfficer of Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Policeand other departments if they are concerned with anoperation under-way.”56 Legault believes that this pro-cedure would be in keeping with Canadian constitution-al reality, that it would ensure that every military view-point would be taken into account for each peacekeep-ing operation, and that it would facilitate formal inte-gration of the ministerial responsibility of the Ministerof External Affairs, “... since that Department is the leadDepartment for peacekeeping.”57

Other opinions have been voiced, and agree on theneed for reform. Defence analyst Peter Haydon, forexample, argues that “... there is a continuing need totake political factors into account in developing andimplementing [Departmental] policy, and there shouldbe some form of arbitration process to resolve signifi-cant differences between political aims and militaryadvice on the implications of attaining those aims.”58

Haydon suggests that a return to a formal standingCabinet Defence Committee, attended by the CDS andperhaps the three service Chiefs of Staff, would makesense. He also feels the need “...to make greater use ofthe Parliamentary committee process, especially inhelping to determine the ‘national interest,’ but also toprovide an enhanced oversight capability for defencepolicy as a whole. This would entail the authority tohold independent hearings and to call witnesses.”59

It has also been suggested that it might be appropriateto create some form of a National Security Council orinterdepartmental coordination vehicle that couldbecome the Prime Minister’s learned body for decision-making in times of international crisis. Albert Legaulthas, however, argued against these well-intentioned pro-posals on the grounds that such an initiative would ren-der the foreign policy process even less transparent, thatit would shift ministerial responsibility to the Office ofthe Prime Minister, thus transforming the Canadian par-liamentary system into a quasi-presidential system, andthat such a structure would add nothing to the Cabinetcommittees set up on an ad hoc basis.”60

Not surprisingly, the Somalia Commission made sever-al specific recommendations to the government with

respect to the conduct and oversight of future peace sup-port operations. These were, however, rejected, on thegrounds that appropriate oversight procedures and mech-anisms already existed. In October 1997, for example,the Minister of National Defence clarified Departmentalpolicy with respect to the acceptance of a proposed mis-sion. Comprehensive mission guidelines are now provid-ed. Furthermore, “…If possible, the CF carries out adetailed reconnaissance for every new mission. Canadianparticipation in United Nations peace support operationsis contingent upon a mission analysis based on severalmilitary requirements. The Government of Canada advo-cates reform of United Nations operational proceduresand planning. The CDS and DND in general maintainestablished guidelines relating to defining missions andmatching force requirements to those missions andobjectives before committing to them.”61

Notwithstanding the DND policies, it is still ultimatelythe prerogative of the government to accept or to rejectspecific missions, regardless of the level or extent ofexisting Canadian Forces commitments, and also irre-spective of DND advice on the matter.

The outcome of these well-intentioned criticisms andrecommendations for improvement has been far greatertransparency within the Department of NationalDefence. As of spring 1998, the Minister provides anannual report, prepared by the CDS, to SCONDVA.Since the autumn of 1998 a new DepartmentalPerformance Report is submitted to Parliament provid-ing a clear indication of Canadian Forces and DNDaccomplishments over the previous fiscal year, includ-ing insights into how resources have been utilized. And,since the spring of 1998, DND submits to Parliament aDepartmental Plans and Priorities Report, whichincludes an outline of the Department’s overall strategyand specific plans to accomplish assigned missions andobjectives.62 These Departmental actions, howeverworthwhile in themselves, really only serve to betterinform Parliament and SCONDVA, not increase theirauthority. For the most part, however, initiatives whichwould curtail the virtually unchallengeable authority ofthe Prime Minister and his Cabinet have been adroitlysidestepped, summarily dismissed or, perhaps worst ofall, not even tabled for serious consideration by a gov-ernment apparently intent upon preserving what hasbecome a jealously guarded monopoly on the interpreta-tion of the national interests. This state of affairs canonly be remedied by broader and more balanced govern-mental oversight. As has been demonstrated, a host ofoptions are available as possible solutions to these fun-damental problems. The government needs to assign atleast as high a priority to solving these overarchingissues as it, hopefully, will give to the reformation ofthe military itself.

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26 Canadian Military Journal ● Spring 2000

1. Andrew F. Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy -Old Habits and New Directions, (Scarborough:Prentice Hall, Allyn and Bacon, 1997), p. 362. ibid, p. 1773. J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell,Pirouette - Pierre Trudeau and Canadian ForeignPolicy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,1990), p. 244. ibid, p. 2345. Danford W. Middlemiss and Joel J. Sokolsky,Canadian Defence - Decisions and Determinants,(Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch, 1989), p. 496. Canada in the World, (Hull: CanadaCommunications Group, 1995), p. i7. ibid8. ibid9. ibid, p. ii10. ibid, p. 211. Most recently, a Health Canada ProtectionBranch report, tabled on the 24th of August, 1999,stated that “…Canada could become the target offoreign terrorists because of the country’s ‘closealignment’ with U.S. policies. Moreover, Canadahas its own ‘disgruntled factions and disturbedfringe groups who could resort to biological ter-rorism to advance their causes.’” Anthrax bacteriais considered the greatest threat, since it is consid-erably easier to obtain than other dangerous bio-logical agents. Jeff Sallot, “Bioterrorism ThreatReal, Scientists Warn”, in The Globe and Mail, 19October 1999. Further, a recent Canadian SecurityIntelligence Service (CSIS) report on Chemical,Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Terrorismunderscores that terrorists armed with weapons ofmass destruction pose an increasing threat toCanadians. The report says that the threat is “bothconsiderable and growing”, given the recenttrends of weapons technology and proliferation,the increased tempo of high-casualty, indiscrimi-nate attacks and the marked increase in religiousand inter-ethnic violence. Jim Bronskill, “CSISFears Bioterrorism, Nuclear Attacks”, in TheOttawa Citizen, 27 October 199912. Canada in the World, (Hull: CanadaCommunications Group, 1995), p. 313. ibid, p. 2714. Canada in the World, Summary and Excerpts,p.715. http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/dfait/10001-e.asp,p. 316. By way of example, the National SecurityStrategy of the United States, published in May1997, defines national interests clearly, and inthree categories. The first includes vital interests,“those of broad, overriding importance to the sur-vival, safety and vitality of our nation.” (i.e., thephysical security of national and allied territory,the safety of citizens and economic well being).“We will do whatever it takes to defend theseinterests, including-when necessary-using ourmilitary might unilaterally and decisively.” Thesecond category includes important interests,which “do not affect national survival, but they doaffect our national well being, and the character ofthe world in which we live. In such cases, we will

use our resources to advance these interests inso-far as the costs and the risks are commensuratewith the interests at stake. (i.e., NATO operationsin Bosnia). The third category consists of human-itarian interests. “In the event of natural or man-made disasters or gross violations of humanrights, our nation may act because our valuesdemand it. Moreover, in such cases, the force ofour example bolsters support for our leadership inthe world.” A National Security Strategy for aNew Century, (Washington: The White House,May 1997), p. 917. Lloyd Axworthy, Human Security-Safety for Peoplein a Changing World, April 1999, at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/HumanSecurity/secur-e.htm, p. 218. ibid, p. 619. Paul Heinbecker, “Human Security”, inHeadlines, Vol.56, No.2, February 1999, pp. 4-720. “Human Security”, in The National Post, 27October 199921. ibid22. Albert Legault., “Bringing the CanadianArmed Forces into the Twenty-First Century”, inReport to the Prime Minister, 25 March 1997, p. 523. International Conflicts: Parliament, the NationalDefence Act, and the Decision to Participate,Canada, The Library of Parliament, p. 2124. Kim Nossal, The Politics of Canadian ForeignPolicy, Third Edition, (Scarborough: PrenticeHall, 1997), p. 26525. Government Response to the Recommendationsof the Special Joint Parliamentary CommitteeReviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, February1995, p. 826. White Paper ’94-Canada’s Defence Policy, athttp://www.achq.dnd.ca/aftoday/white94.htm, p. 127. Although somewhat dated, the followingcomment by political scientist Evan H. Potter isstill relevant. “In recent years, while attempting toreposition the Canadian military so that it isequally capable of fighting a ‘hot’ war andresponding to ‘global’ and so-called emergingsecurity challenges to Canadian sovereignty (ille-gal or harmful over-fishing, drug trafficking, ille-gal immigration and the international release ofpollutants off Canadian coasts), it has faced thebiggest cuts of all. Its budget is expected to fall to$9.2 billion by 1988-9 from a 1994 level of over$12 billion (a reduction of 23 percent).Consequently, hard political choices will have tobe made if Canada’s international efforts are toremain creditable.” Evan H. Potter, “NicheDiplomacy as Canadian Foreign Policy”, inInternational Journal, Vol. LII, No.1, Winter1996-1997, p. 2928. 1994 Defence White Paper, (Ottawa: CanadaCommunication Group, 1994), p. 1229. ibid30. ibid, pp. 15, 21 and 2731. White Paper ’94, p. 232. At least, as has been demonstrated, in the postSecond World War era of Canadian foreign policy.33. 1994 Defence White Paper, p. 2734. ibid, p. 2835. ibid, pp. 32-33

36. ibid, pp. 36-3837. ibid, pp. 46-4838. ibid, p. 4939. The Honourable Douglas Young, formerMND, and Dr. D.J. Bercuson, among a host oflearned defence and foreign policy watchers andanalysts agree, and have said so in their respectiveReports to the Prime Minister on the status of theCanadian Forces. Bercuson calls it “…one of themost comprehensive and realistic White Papers onDefence that Canada has seen since the early daysof the Cold War.” D.J. Bercuson, Report to thePrime Minister, 25 March 1997, p. 440. Stewart Bell, “Military May Soon Be Unfitfor Combat”, in The National Post, 18 October199941. In fact, the Foreign Policy White Paper actu-ally makes reference to the 1994 Defence WhitePaper in its coverage of directions for Canadiansecurity policy.42. Bell, p. 243. DND Strategy 2020, p. 244. “Canada Lucky Soldiers Weren’t Killed inRwanda”, in The Toronto Star, 19 November 199745. DFAIT Policy Statement 96/53, December199646. Ibid47. Louis Nastro and Kim Richard Nossal, “TheCommitment-Capability Gap: Implication forCanadian Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era”,Canadian Defence Quarterly, Fall 1997, p. 20.48. 1994 Defence White Paper, p. 3149. David Pugliese, “Troops Abroad Set NewRecord”, in The Ottawa Citizen, 25 October 199950. Juliet O’Neill, “Canada’s ‘Shameful’ Recordin Indonesia”, in The Ottawa Citizen, 13September 199951. ibid52. ibid53. Security in a Changing World. Report of theSpecial Joint Committee on Canada’s DefencePolicy, (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group,1994), p. 5754. Report of the Auditor General of Canada tothe House of Commons, (Ottawa: Minister ofPublic Works and Government Service, 1996),Chapter. 6, p. 555. ibid56. Albert Legault, p. 957. ibid58. Peter T. Haydon, “The Somalia Inquiry: Can ItSolve Anything?”, in Canadian Defence Quarterly,April 1997, p. 2359. ibid60. Legault, p. 861. Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Changein the Department of National Defence-InterimReport 1999, p. 8062. Report on the Recommendations of theSomalia Commission-Part 2, p. 7

NOTES