recognizing mutual self-interests in the galapagos

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RECOGNIZING MUTUAL SELF-INTERESTS IN THE GALAPAGOS A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of California State Polytechnic University, Pomona In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Masters In Landscape Architecture By Milena P. Frieden 2005

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Page 1: Recognizing Mutual Self-interests in the Galapagos

RECOGNIZING MUTUAL SELF-INTERESTS IN THE GALAPAGOS

A ThesisPresented to the

Faculty ofCalifornia State Polytechnic University, Pomona

In Partial Fulfillmentof the Requirements for the Degree

MastersIn

Landscape Architecture

ByMilena P. Frieden

2005

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SIGNATURE PAGE

THESIS: RECOGNIZING MUTUAL SELF-INTERESTS INTHE GALAPAGOS

AUTHOR: Milena P. Frieden

DATE SUBMITTED: August 18, 2005

Department of Landscape Architecture

Kyle D. Brown, Ph.D. __________________________________________Thesis Committee ChairLandscape Architecture

Gerald O. Taylor, A.S.L.A. __________________________________________Landscape Architecture

Laszlo J. Szijj, Ph.D. __________________________________________Biological Sciences

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people contributed in different ways to the completion of this thesis.

First, I would like to thank Kyle Brown, my thesis committee chair, for his

unwavering support, constructive ideas and suggestions, and our many

stimulating conversations. I would also like to thank committee member

Jerry Taylor for his ongoing support and advice during the writing of my

thesis. I am deeply grateful to committee member Dr. Szijj for introducing

me to the Galapagos, his continuous enthusiasm throughout my project,

and our many inspiring discussions.

My sincere thanks to Pam Chapman, my friend and first landscape

architecture professor, for introducing me to the idea of combining

landscape architecture with conservation and community development

in third world countries. Many thanks to a number of friends and

colleagues especially, Jeanna Menze and Jill Karkazis, for the countless

hours of insightful discussions. I am extremely grateful to Sergio Larrea,

director of the Galapagos Participatory Management Board, and Carlos

Zapata, president of FUNDAR – Galápagos, for giving me the opportunity

to volunteer with their organizations and for the many hours of interesting

conversation.

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I am profoundly thankful to my parents, Roger and Lia Frieden, and my

sisters, Vanessa Frieden and Claudia Frieden, for their unconditional

support and encouragement in everything that I do.

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ABSTRACT

RECOGNIZING MUTUAL SELF-INTERESTS IN THE GALAPAGOS

This qualitative case study looks at how the Galapagos conservation,

Park, and fishing sectors’ destinies are inextricably linked and how

recognizing their common goals will bring them one step closer to

achieving a sustainable Galapagos Marine Reserve. One of the reasons

for choosing the Galapagos as a case study is that despite the long

history of conservation on the islands, the challenges in saving this fragile

place from ecological destruction continue to increase. In this thesis, I

examine the importance of mutual-self interests between the Galapagos

National Park (GNP), conservation, and fishing sectors and how identifying

and pursuing common objectives can lead to a stronger foundation for

achieving long-term goals. Interviews were conducted in the Galapagos

with individuals from the GNP, conservation, and fishing sectors.

A Galapagos participatory management system is currently in place.

However, there is a lack of confidence among stakeholders due largely to

the absence of recognizing mutual self-interest between the conservation

and fishing sectors. Increasing restrictions on fisheries have left fishermen

with few economic alternatives. Assurances of skill-building projects and

job opportunities in other fields from the conservation organizations for

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fishermen continue to go unrealized and have resulted in disappointment

and frustration in the local population. This has contributed to the current

distrust and instability of the Galapagos Marine Reserve (GMR)

management system.

Improving communication skills, successfully addressing conflict, and

integrating participatory fisheries management with conservation and a

growing human population continues to challenge a number of regions in

the world. Proactive and innovative efforts based on mutual self-interests

could encourage stability and credibility in participatory management

systems. The Galapagos Islands have the potential to be a positive and

inspiring example of successful integration of conservation and human

needs.

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ACRONYMS

BATNA Best alternative to negotiated agreement

CBO Community-based organization

CDF Charles Darwin Foundation

CSR Corporate Social Responsibility

ECFMA European Commission for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

FUNDAR Fundación para el Desarollo Alternativo Responsible para

Galápagos

GMR Galapagos Marine Reserve

GMRMP Galapagos and Marine Reserve Management Plan

GNP Galapagos National Park

IMA Inter-institutional Management Authority

ICDP Integrated conservation and development programs

ICT Information and Communication Technologies

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IRB Institutional Review Board

IATTC Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC)

MPA Marine protected area

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NOAA U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

PM Participatory management

PMB Participatory Management Board

SFF Sustainable Fisheries Fund

SIFAR Support unit for International Fisheries and Aquatic Research

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organization

WWF World Wildlife Fund

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FIGURES

Figure 1.1 Flowchart of Galapagos stakeholderdecision making process withhypothetical examples 12

Figure 2.1 Ladder of participation 31

Figure 2.2 Overlapping interests 44

Figure 4.1 Surface longlining diagram 95

Figure 4.2 Galapagos thermocline diagram 96

Figure 4.3 Bycatch pie char for one fishing trip 99

Figure 4.4 Combined bycatch pie chart for sevenfishing trips 99

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MAPS

1.1 Galapagos and mainland Ecuador 2

1.2 Galapagos and South America 2

1.3 Galapagos and the world 2

1.4 Galapagos Islands detail 4

1.5 Galapagos Marine Reserve 8

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CONTENTS

SIGNATURE PAGE ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii

ABSTRACT v

ACRONYMS vii

FIGURES ix

MAPS x

1. INTRODUCTION 1

2. LITERATURE REVIEW 182.1. Conservation efforts often conflict with

economic activities of locals 182.2. Participatory management 252.3. Why participatory management is not

working in the Galapagos 282.4. What are the characteristics of effective

cooperative endeavors? 432.4.1. Common goals 442.4.2. What constitutes positive deviation? 452.4.3. Mutual interdependence 482.4.4. Mutual gains approach 50

2.5. Summary of the Literature Review 50

3. RESEARCH METHODS 523.1. Why interviewing? 523.2. Interviewee selection and interview process 563.3. Interview questions 60

3.3.1. General questions 603.3.2. Management plan questions 613.3.3. Specific issues 623.3.4. Conclusive question 62

3.4. Summary 633.5. Limitations of the study 64

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4. FINDINGS 664.1. Mutual self-interests of the conservation, park

and fishing sectors 664.2. Participatory management and why it is not

working 714.2.1. Insufficient economic activity 734.2.2. Insincerity and lack of trust 774.2.3. Non-participatory and token participation 824.2.4. Special Law is not implemented and

migration continues 864.2.5. Poor communication among sectors 894.2.6. Selective interpretation of data 934.2.7. Disorganization and weakness of the sectors 104

5. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 107

APPENDIX A: Interview Guide 115

BIBLIOGRAPHY 117

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1. Introduction

This thesis looks at how the conservation and fishing sectors’ destinies are

inextricably linked and how recognizing their common goals will bring

them one step closer to achieving a sustainable Galapagos Marine

Reserve (GMR). Three objectives of this paper are to verify the importance

of mutual-self interests, to establish that the Galapagos stakeholders are

not recognizing their mutual-self interests, and finally, to suggest the

potential for collaboration once these mutual self-interests have been

recognized. More involvement in policymaking and local community

dynamics from landscape architects and planners could help bridge the

gap between the social sciences and the biological sciences and assist in

the coordination and integration of vital components of complicated

conservation projects.

Ever since a trip to Costa Rica in 2001, I have been interested in the

integration of conservation with community development in Latin

America. Both are integral parts of a sustainable environment. I see

landscape architecture as the bridge connecting these fields and began

the Cal Poly Pomona program in 2002 with this in mind. Most people in

conservation are biologists or are in some way strongly connected to the

sciences. It was obvious that to gain a clearer understanding of the

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conservation sector’s interests I would need to work on a project with

people in this field. So, in the fall of 2002, I contacted the biology

department and was able to design two independent studies based on

the trip I would take to the Galapagos with the biology department in the

summer of 2003. This trip and the well-publicized conflicts between the

fishing and conservation sectors prompted me to take a closer look at

what is keeping the Galapagos stakeholders from achieving their goal of

establishing a more sustainable Galapagos Marine Reserve.

Source: www.footprint-adventures.co Source: www.footprint-adventures.co Source: www.nationmaster.com

Map 1.1 Galapagos and mainland Map 1.2 Galapagos Map1.3 Galapagos and Ecuador and South the world

America

The Galapagos Islands are an Ecuadorian province situated

approximately 620 miles off the coast of Ecuador (Map 1.1). The

archipelago is made up of 13 major islands, the smallest being 8.7 square

miles and the largest 2,844.5 square miles, as well as over 115 islets and

rocks, most of which have vegetation. The total terrestrial area is 4,960

square miles and the coastline is 930 miles (Guerrero, Velásquez, and Cruz

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2003). Generally, people think of the Galapagos as a pristine place with

exotic plants and animals. Though much of the islands remain relatively

undisturbed, there are also thriving communities with more people than

one might expect. As of 2005, there is an estimated 27,000 people living

on the islands (Boersma, Vargas, and Merlen 2005). Four islands are

inhabited. Santa Cruz, the most populated island, is where most tour boats

begin their excursions. The capital of the Galapagos is Puerto Baquerizo

Moreno on San Cristobal, the second most populated island. Isabela has

approximately 2000 people and Santa Maria, more commonly called

Floreana, has 80 people. Ninety-eight percent of the population is from

mainland Ecuador and 2 percent is from other countries. The majority of

the Ecuadorians come from the provinces of Guayas (from the city of

Guayaquil), Tungurahua (from the city of Ambato), and Pichincha (from

the Ecuadorian capital of Quito) (Kerr, Cardenas, and Hendy 2004).

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= interview locations

www.galapaguide.com/galapagos_map.htmGalapagos Map: Galapaguide.com

Map 1.4 Galapagos Islands detail

Another reason for choosing the Galapagos as a case study is that

despite the long history of conservation on the islands, the challenges in

saving this fragile place from ecological destruction continue to increase.

I wonder if conservation is not successful there, where can it be

successful? Ever since 1959, the majority of the islands have been part of

the Ecuadorian National Park system and the Charles Darwin Foundation

(CDF) has had a strong presence there. Over the years a number of local

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and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have

financially supported conservation efforts in the Galapagos and continue

to promote international awareness of the islands’ attempt to balance

conservation with the needs of a growing population.

One of the unique characteristics of the Galapagos is that it has an

established community despite the short history of people living on the

islands. For many years it was simply a stopover for seafarers, who would

often keep goats on the islands as a readily available food source for the

next time they passed through. These introduced species continue to

wreak havoc on the ecosystem by stripping the islands of their vegetation,

leaving little for its native inhabitants. During this time the famous

Galapagos tortoises were also considered an ideal food source. The

tortoises could be stacked alive for months at a time, ensuring a fresh

food supply as long as they stayed alive. In fact, galapago means saddle

in Spanish and the islands get their name from the shape of the shell of

the Saddleback tortoise. The Galapagos Islands’ inhospitable climate and

terrain kept people from settling there until the early 1900s when several

Europeans decided to make the islands their home.

People have been fishing in the Galapagos for over forty years, enough

time for this occupation to become a satisfactory lifestyle for the locals.

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Fishing thusly provides a viable employment opportunity for a small

number of people in the Galapagos community. In 1998 the Special Law

of the Galapagos banned industrial fishing and allowed only artisanal

fishermen to harvest the resources in the Galapagos Marine Reserve.

Www.fishbase.com defines artisanal fisheries as “Fisheries involving skilled

but non-industrialized operators; typically a small-scale, decentralized

operation; normally subsistence fisheries although sometimes the catch

may be sold. Usually fishing trips are short and inshore and fishing vessels

are small but in developed countries may apply to trawlers, seiners or

longliners. Also called small-scale fisheries.” Though there are relatively few

fishermen, approximately 1000 out of an estimated 27,000 people, there

continues to be a tremendous impact on the Marine Reserve as a result of

overexploitation of the fisheries.

Overfishing in the Galapagos is not a recent development. One of the

interviewees explains, “dried salt ‘bacalao’ [cod], fished artisanally,

catches and fish size, were already in decline in the 1960s due to

overexploitation of the resource. Frozen lobster tails, fished by larger boats

each with a number of divers to collect lobsters, were in decline in the

‘70s also due to overexploitation.” Two periods of significant increases in

the fishing sector came from 1982 to 1984 with the lobster fishery, and in

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the 1990s with the popularization of the sea cucumber fisheries (Kerr,

Cardenas, and Hendy 2004).

The number of registered artisanal fishermen has increased from

approximately 100 in the early 1940s to 1950s to around 956 in 2002 (ibid.).

The number of fishermen monitored by the Participatory Research and

Monitoring Program of the Fisheries indicates there are many more active

fishermen than are registered with the Galapagos National Park (GNP)

(ibid.). For example, in 2000 there were approximately 80 percent more

people fishing for sea cucumbers than were registered with the National

Park (ibid.). Many of the fishermen are temporary and have other

occupations throughout the year. They often only fish during certain

fishing seasons, such as the lucrative sea cucumber season from May to

July. Inadequate enforcement and the ongoing poaching by local and

mainland based fishing enterprises also contribute to overfishing (Ben-

Yami 2001).

Tourism has also contributed to increased migration to the islands. In 1970

the first 1500 tourists arrived when the Ecuadorian airline TAME began

regular flights to Baltra, the small island where most tourists still land today.

(Machuca 2004). The population continued to grow and increased

rapidly from 1974 through 1997, where the average population growth

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was approximately 6 percent per year (Kerr, Cardenas, and Hendy 2004).

Many people migrated from mainland Ecuador to find work in the

growing Galapagos tourism industry.

Source: effetivempa.noaa.gov/

Map 1.5 Galapagos Marine Reserve

In the mid-90s, the Galapagos community came together to set the

groundwork for the Special Law of the Galapagos and the Galapagos

Marine Reserve Management Plan (GMRMP). This resulted in the extension

of the Marine Reserve from 15 nautical miles from the baseline to 40 miles.

The Reserve is the second largest protected marine reserve in the world at

83,700 square miles. Australia’s Great Barrier Reef is the first. The teamwork

among Galapagos stakeholders paid off and a legal framework (1998)

and management plan (1999) were approved. The rules and regulations

established were a result of teamwork. The intention was to move ahead

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together in the implementation stage of the Special Law and

Management Plan. Unfortunately, since 1998 the participatory

management system has deteriorated and resulted in ongoing conflicts

primarily between the conservation and fishing sectors. The fish stocks are

severely depleted and there are no signs of concerted efforts being

made to reconcile differences amongst the sectors and move ahead to

achieve everyone’s goal of a more sustainable Galapagos.

One of the benefits of the Special Law of the Galapagos is that it

declared industrial fishing illegal within the Galapagos Marine Reserve

(GMR). Technically, this has given the artisanal fishermen their own

exclusive fishing grounds. However, the fishermen’s inability to process and

sell their own fish on an economically acceptable level has made the

Galapagos fishermen dependent on local middlemen and the industrial

boats waiting on the periphery of the Reserve to buy their fish (Buckley

2003). Also, ongoing illegal fishing of beyond quota quantities of species

and protected species by artisanal and industrial fishermen affects the

amount of stock available to legitimate Galapagos artisanal fishermen.

The conservation sector has encouraged fishermen to pursue other job

opportunities. However, for those seeking to change careers, there are

few economically viable alternatives. Tourism is often suggested as an

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alternative to fishing. However, fishermen have training that may not

prepare them for a position in tourism. Fishing is a solitary occupation,

where there is not much interaction with people on a daily basis. Tourism

requires people who enjoy interacting with tourists, a job requirement

fishermen may be unprepared for, because of their previous job

experience.

To complicate the fishermen’s plight, the tourist fleet is supposed to

employ people from the Galapagos, when in fact most of its employees

are hired from the mainland (Ben-Yami 2001). Many of the skills needed to

work in tourism are difficult to find among locals due to the unsatisfactory

educational system. In 1998, twenty-three percent of residents (temporary

and permanent) over the age of 24 had completed college and very few

speak a second language (Kerr, Cardenas, and Hendy 2004).

When the Special Law was created, it established the Participatory

Management Board (PMB) as the decision making entity at the local

level. The PMB represents the Galapagos National Park (GNP), the Charles

Darwin Foundation (CDF), tourism, guide, and fishing sectors. Most issues

are first discussed and decided by consensus in the PMB. If a consensus is

not reached, the PMB passes the undecided issue to the Inter-institutional

Management Authority (IMA) at the national level. The IMA represents the

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Ministries of Environment, Defense, Trade and Fisheries, Tourism, and the

Presidents of the Ecuadorian Committee for the Defense of Nature and

Environment, Galapagos Fishing Cooperatives, and the Chamber of

Tourism. Another example is a consensus may be reached on agreeing to

monitor a certain species, however once this species has been monitored,

there may not be a consensus as to how it should be regulated, so it is

then passed on to the IMA (see flow chart on p. 12). The GNP is

responsible for the implementation of the management plan and also has

the authority to make a decision in emergency situations. Decisions made

by the GNP later must be approved by the IMA.

In the spring of 2004, the fishermen decided not to attend PMB meetings

and went directly to the IMA with their requests because the fishermen

thought the IMA would be more likely to make decisions in their favor.

Fishermen decided to follow the example of the large tourism companies,

which circumvented the PMB in January 2004, in order to amend the

regulatory framework for Galapagos tourism (MPA News 2004). As one

person from an international NGO says, “ The fishing sector started

planning to eliminate the fishing regulation and impose the adoption of

longlines after witnessing how the tourism sector got what it wanted

without playing by the rules.” (MPA News 2004, 6). This furthered

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resentment among the sectors. In March 2005, the fishing sector began

attending the PMB meetings again.

DECISION MAKING PROCESS

Source: M. Frieden

Figure 1.1 Flowchart of Galapagos stakeholder decision making process with hypothetical examples

Currently, meetings are held when controversial issues arise shortly before

or during the fishing season. The majority of the issues revolve around

restrictions on the fishing sector. Sea cucumber and lobster fishing are

increasingly restricted due to the species’ declining numbers, leaving

fishermen with few economic alternatives. Assurances of skill-building

projects and job opportunities in other fields from the conservation

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organizations for fishermen continue to go unrealized and have resulted in

disappointment and frustration in the local population. In the interviews

several people from the fishing and conservation sectors mentioned the

short notice of meetings. This results in stakeholders attending meetings

without enough time to review reports or complete absenteeism due to

inadequate time to make travel arrangements. A number of the

fishermen must travel from other islands for the meetings, which are held

on the island of Santa Cruz, where the Park, conservation, and tourism

sectors are based. The fishermen see the PMB as singling them out and

favoring the tourism and conservation sectors.

Violations in the tourism industry often go unpunished. The money

generated by the fishermen per year (~6 million USD) is not nearly as

significant as the income Galapagos tourism brings in each year (~150

million USD). Ecuador’s fourth largest industry is tourism and, in 2001, it

earned more than $430 million dollars (Valdivieso et al. 2003). The 630,000

foreign tourists that year brought in nearly 9 percent of Ecuador’s income

from exported goods and services and 4.2 percent of the nation’s Gross

Domestic Product (ibid.). The Galapagos Islands are Ecuador’s most

popular tourist destination with approximately 70,000 tourists visiting the

islands every year (ibid.). However, the majority of the profits earned from

tourism returns to mainland Ecuador. In 1991, 15 percent of the tourism

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income made its way back into the local economy (Honey 1999). A

survey in 1995 estimated only 7.6 percent of money spent by tourists

entered the islands’ economy. The Galapagos people experience

relatively few benefits from the tourism industry. Though the Special Law

requires that the tour operators employ locals, many of the tourism

workers are hired from the mainland. The tour operators generally pay the

workers less, since the cost of living on the mainland is much lower than on

the Galapagos.

Frequent changes in Galapagos National Park (GNP) leadership due to

ongoing political tensions among stakeholders, lack of funds, and

personnel cutbacks contribute to GNP instability and the Park’s ability to

maintain technical programs for monitoring species and law

enforcement. This has contributed to the controversy regarding methods

used for evaluating fish stocks. The methods determine the total allowable

catch and where fishing is permitted. People are losing confidence in the

PMB and the Participatory Management System.

The challenges of combining conservation with development are issues

facing most regions throughout the world. Those in a variety of fields are

recognizing the importance of acknowledging the connection between

the two. William Rees, a bioecologist and planner who developed the

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“ecological footprint” concept, emphasizes the significance of

ecologically connecting communities to their geographical locations and

that no place can be sustainable on its own (Steiner 2002). He describes

the “ecological footprint” concept as “. . . the area of land and water

ecosytems required, on a continuous basis, to produce the resources that

the population consumes, and to assimilate the wastes that the

population produces, wherever on Earth the relevant land/water is

located” (Steiner 2002, 73). In Steiner’s Human Ecology, he points out that

the “ecological footprint” concept can assist planners and designers to

create new communities and adapt existing ones (ibid.). Planners, Beatley

and Manning emphasize that, “questions of ecological sustainability are

fundamentally and inextricably tied to patterns of human settlement.”

(Steiner 2002, 170). The idea of incorporating ecology with human

development is not unique to the field of planning and landscape

architecture. Architect Peter Calthorpe talks about using, “a broader,

more philosophic “ecology” which teaches diversity, interdependence,

and [that] whole systems are fundamental to health.” (Steiner 2002, 73).

Frederick Steiner discusses the importance of establishing community

goals in order to shape planning decisions (Steiner 2000). He also points

out how, “ People are commonly regarded as existing outside of nature,

or, alternatively, ecology is studied in “pristine” wilderness areas, far away

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from human settlements” (Steiner 2002, 16). Many stakeholders in the

Galapagos are refusing to acknowledge the importance of involving the

growing local population in shaping the future of the Galapagos. Most

people in the world are not even aware that human communities exist on

the Galapagos. People have been living on the Galapagos for over fifty

years and the degradation of the aquatic and terrestrial landscape has

continued ever since. Perhaps, now it is time for an integrative long-term

strategy to address this growth, rather than maintaining the hope that it

will stop or reverse itself. If stakeholders continue to dream that people will

leave or stop coming, they will miss out on the opportunity to create a

solid plan that in the long-term could prevent the collapse of these fragile

islands.

Clearly the conflicts in the Galapagos are multi-faceted and have unique

characteristics. However, if more efforts were made to identify mutual self-

interests amongst the conservation and fishing sectors, more collaboration

would take place, increasing confidence in the participatory

management system. This thesis looks at how the conservation and fishing

sectors’ fates are closely linked and how recognizing their common goals

will bring them one step closer to achieving a sustainable Galapagos

Marine Reserve (GMR). Three objectives of this paper are to verify the

importance of mutual-self interests, to establish that neither side is

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recognizing their mutual-self interests, and finally, to suggest the potential

for collaboration once these mutual self-interests have been recognized.

To fulfill these objectives, I have conducted extensive literature reviews,

interviewed numerous individuals in the Galapagos conservation and

fishing sectors, and analyzed the data. The following compilation will

review information found in the literature on current conservation

practices, why participatory management practices are often ineffective,

characteristics of successful alliances, and the relevance to landscape

architecture. A description of the research methods and process will be

articulated, followed by results of the data analysis. In conclusion,

potential opportunities for the sectors and prospective research

possibilities will be discussed.

It is important to recognize that although the Galapagos is a unique

place, there are many other regions in the world facing the challenges of

integrating conservation with human development. Identifying mutual

self-interests among conservation groups and local communities could be

the first step in bringing people together to create more effective long-

term plans for sustainable environments and human communities.

2. Literature Review

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Most publications concerning the Galapagos are written from a

conservation perspective and published by conservation organizations as

such, it is difficult to find detailed information expressing the views of the

islands’ locals. In general, economically challenged people throughout

the world find it difficult to have their voices heard by decision makers.

Often they lack the writing skills, the media savvy, or financial resources to

market, promote, or express their views. In the following pages, I will

examine the literature related to conservation efforts clashing with local

economic needs and methods used to address the disparity between

conservation and local economic needs, such as participatory

management. Subsequent literature reviews will describe why

participatory management is not working in many regions and examine

the traits of effective cooperative practices.

2.1. Conservation efforts often conflict with economic activities of locals

In determining the success of marine reserve management, most analyses

have been based on environmental factors. The social dynamics are

generally of greater concern to direct users of the marine reserve

resources and are often the source of conflict in the design and

management of a reserve (Sobel and Dahlgren 2004). For example, the

data suggests small-scale fishermen may have increased costs and

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become fully or partially displaced when a marine reserve is established

(ibid.). Unfortunately, the lack of social scientific research on social and

economic performance of marine reserves makes it difficult to discuss

policies regarding these issues (ibid.).

Sobel and Dahlgren point out that “Research also suggests that the

presence of economically congruent resource use rights—where the

resource users who benefit most from reserve establishment bear the

greatest cost of sustaining reserve benefits, while those who derive the

fewest benefits incur the least cost—foster marine reserve performance.”

(Sobel and Dahlgren 2004, 180). This would suggest that those benefiting

from tourism would be responsible for paying substantially more for the

management infrastructure of the reserve, since the income generated

from tourism by far exceeds the income generated from fishing.

In Ngugi’s study of the economic impact of the no-take Mombasa Marine

Park in Kenya on local fishermen (Ngugi 2002), the point is made that

“government policies in the marine realm, both for conservation and the

promotion of tourism, have resulted in conflict and resentment from

affected users of the areas placed under protection, mostly local fishing

communities.” (Ngugi 2002, 3). Though the economic effects of the

establishment of no-take reserves on fishermen are more dramatic, many

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of the issues encountered are similar to those of any marine protected

area. Sobel and Dahlgren define marine protected areas (MPAs) as

including “a broad spectrum of protective management regimes with

variable levels of protection for ocean waters,” and no-take marine

reserves as areas where “all extractive uses, including fishing, are

effectively prohibited and other human interference is minimized to the

extent practicable.” (Sobel and Dahlgren 2004, 21-22). The Galapagos

Marine Reserve prohibits industrial fishing, but permits artisanal fishing.

Ngugi explains out that, “The delicate balance of people and nature

within marine areas has not been given the attention it deserves (Ngugi

2002, 9).

In the article, Marine Protected Areas: an Ecosystem-based Management

Tool, Pomeroy discusses the benefits of MPAs and how they act as

insurance against great population variations and the depletion of fish

outside the protected area as a result of mismanagement or natural

changes (Pomeroy 2005). On the other hand, some concerns are the

displacement of the fishing efforts elsewhere, causing depletion outside

the MPA (ibid.). Pomeroy also states that, “Closed areas can result in lower

catches, especially in the short-term, and associated social and

economic impacts on fishermen and fishing communities.” (Pomeroy

2005, 2).

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In “Biodiversity Conservation and Human Population impacts in the

Galapagos Islands, Ecuador,” MacFarland and Cifuentes articulate the

need for qualitative research regarding the relationship of humans to

natural systems in the Galapagos. They suggest that models developed

should address the involvement of local populations in determining the

future of the Galapagos (MacFarland and Cifuentes 1996).

As noted in the 2004 United Nations Environment Programme’s Exploring

the Links, “One of the main reasons the poor sell their resources, or are not

able to convert the resources into economic goods, is the lack of financial

resources or access to the resources needed to undertake economic

activity.” (Kumar 2004, 24). Though the Galapagos fishermen are

considered significantly better off than the fishermen from mainland

Ecuador, hence the growing Galapagos fishing sector, they are still

unable to efficiently process and market their fish. Most sectors in the

Galapagos acknowledge the need for skill-building, however no

substantial efforts have been made by stakeholders to enable the

fishermen in processing and marketing their fish.

Mac Chapin’s 2004 November/December World Watch article “A

Challenge to Conservationists” discusses certain conservation

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organizations’ history of interactions with indigenous people and the

current conservation trends. Locals, in general, and indigenous people

experience similar interactions with conservation organizations. A series of

discussions held by conservation groups and the Ford Foundation

reviewed global approaches to conservation that raised questions and

concerns from “local communities, national NGOs and human rights

activists.” (Chapin 2004, 17). Initially, conservationists and indigenous

people were viewed as suitable partners. However, now the indigenous

people are seen more as being difficult to work with, tending to revolt

when they are not satisfied with the way conservation organizations

interact with their communities (ibid.). Chapin states that there have been

warnings from the conservation sector that “indigenous peoples are

not—contrary to what many of them have been advertising—suitable

allies because they, like most other people, are not even good

conservationists, sometimes choosing their economic wellbeing over

preservation and natural resources.” (Chapin 2004, 18).

In the 1980s and 1990s, conservation groups designed plans to work with

communities based on the concept of sustainable development (Chapin

2004). Marginalizing local people from protected areas without providing

alternative livelihoods was recognized as unjust and not politically realistic

(Wells et al. 2004). Many terms were used to describe these more inclusive

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plans, including “community-based resource management,”

“participatory management,” and “integrated conservation and

development programs” (ICDPs) (Chapin 2004). In actuality ICDPs are

generally “lacking in expertise, and one-sided—driven largely by the

agendas of conservationists, with little indigenous input.” (ibid., 20).

Chapin points out, “The fact that conservation organizations were

perhaps not suited to work in the social and economic realms was missed

in all the excitement.” (ibid., 20).

In the introduction to Getting Biodiversity Projects to Work, Wells and

McShane state, “A backlash against the ICDP approach has begun to

gain momentum among the organizations actually carrying out

conservation activities in developing countries, as well as among

agencies providing funding. The staff of some conservation organizations

have begun questioning whether projects that emphasize sustainable

development—a term that remains frustratingly elusive to define—can in

practice be compatible with biodiversity conservation.”(Wells et al. 2004,

4). The authors acknowledge the ongoing challenge of integrating

protected areas with local communities, and that it is necessary to learn

from mistakes and apply lessons from successful projects to future efforts

(ibid.).

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In recent years, talk of working with communities to create “natural”

alliances has been replaced by focus on larger-scale conservation

strategies and an emphasis on science (Chapin 2004). McShane and

Wells also suggest that, “ The predominant paradigm of most of the

international conservation organizations has shifted from ICDPs to

conservation at larger scales . . . Most of these efforts have focused on

defining large-scale conservation priorities and conservation-friendly

policies across diverse sectors.” (Wells et al. 2004, 7).

Social and economic conflicts between direct users of marine reserves

and the conservation groups are common. As the literature suggests,

there is a shortage of research examining the dynamics between marine

reserve resource users and conservation efforts. Turning to examples

outside of the Galapagos and other disciplines more experienced in

addressing conflict management could benefit the participatory

management efforts in the Galapagos.

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2.2. Participatory management

The depletion of the world’s fisheries has prompted many countries and

organizations to take a closer look at implementing more effective

management plans for their fisheries. More traditional reserves are based

on centralized decision making situations, where the decisions are

generally made by one organization or government branch (Sobel and

Dahlgren 2004). As the term “participatory management” implies, it

involves a variety of stakeholders. In this scenario decisions depend on

larger, diverse amounts of information, increasing the chances that

policies will be based on accurate models of human and environmental

interactions (ibid.). Participatory management can also give the system

more legitimacy, since a broader perspective is represented. Ultimately,

procedural rules as to how stakeholders make decisions dictate the results

of marine reserve decision making process and voting rules form the

balance of power between majority and minority members (ibid.).

In 1999, after 15 months of meetings and discussions among the

stakeholders, the Management Plan for Conservation and Sustainable Use

of the Galapagos Marine Reserve was officially adopted (Charles Darwin

Foundation 1999). The management plan process description states “The

whole process has involved a mix of education, training, human relations

and technical decision making. It has also included intense discussions

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and understanding of how to obtain a form of management, which

caters to the requirements of users as well as the requirements of

conservation and protection of the Reserve in such a way that includes

the fulfillment and aid of the regulations.” (Galapagos National Park 1998,

7). In the Charles Darwin Foundation’s paper “Galapagos Marine Reserve:

A Protected Area for Biodiversity Conservation, Science, Education,

Tourism and Artisanal Fishing, the authors explain, “With an innovative,

community-based approach to conserving one of the world’s greatest

marine protected areas, Ecuador will once again be a world leader in the

immensely complex challenge of marine conservation, at which too

many countries, developed and developing, have failed miserably.”

(Charles Darwin Foundation 1999, 5).

In 2001, the Charles Darwin Foundation hired renowned fisheries

consultant Menakhem Ben-Yami to evaluate the Galapagos fisheries

management. When describing his philosophy Ben-Yami comments that,

“Even the best intended and well-based fishing laws and regulations, are

usually doomed to remain on paper, or even worse, to be

counterproductive, if they are perceived by the fishing people to be

against what they consider their best interests, and/or against their fishing

logic and life experience.” (Ben-Yami 2001). In his evaluation Ben-Yami

had a number of recommendations and emphasized the importance of

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involving the fishermen in the design and implementation of the

Galapagos fisheries management system (ibid.). He suggests co-

management as option, which fishermen trust and take part in (ibid.).

In McConney, Pomeroy, and Mahon’s summary of guidelines for

successful Caribbean Coastal Co-management plans they point out, that

“There is evidence that involving resource users in management has

assisted in conservation when compared to other areas” when referring to

Santa Lucia’s Soufriere Marine Management Area (McConney, Pomeroy,

and Mahon 2004). Santa Lucia’s Soufriere Marine Management Area is

one of the few that is considered to be in the post-implementation stage

(ibid.).

A number of reasons given by stakeholders for implementing a successful

and sustainable coastal resource co-management plan in the Caribbean

are increasing conflicts among coastal and marine resource users,

coastal resources are being overexploited, the trend towards

empowering NGOs and civil society, as well as citizens’ demands for

greater legitimacy and transparency (ibid.).

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2.3. Why participatory management is not working in the Galapagos

In 2000, disagreements over acceptable lobster fishery levels resulted in

protests by the fishermen on the Galapagos island of Isabela (see map on

p. 2) (Charles Darwin Foundation 2000). This prompted a variety of studies

and evaluations of the Galapagos fisheries management system. In

Borrini-Feyerabend and Farvar’s 2001 Participatory Evaluation of the

Participatory Management of the Galapagos Marine Reserve (Ecuador),

they examined the “limiting characteristics/weaknesses” of the

Participatory Management (PM) process of the Galapagos Marine

Reserve (GMR) (Borrini-Feyerabend and Farvar 2001). Among a number of

observations were that, “The PM system still works within an unclear frame

of reference regarding the key policy directions for sustainable

development in the archipelago . . . the grassroots [organizations] of all

sectors represented in the Participatory Management Board (PMB) are still

only limitedly aware of the PM system and limitedly engaged in it . . . the

Galapagos National Park is rather tepid in appreciating the PM approach

and could go beyond a passive form of compliance towards a more

active, proponent role.” (ibid., 6-7).

In the Caribbean the term “co-management” is increasingly used to

describe conservation efforts regarding exploited small coastal fisheries

(McConney, Pomeroy, and Mahon 2004). Co-management and

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29

participatory management are terminologies often used

interchangeably. For example, the Caribbean Natural Resources Institute

uses the term “participatory management.” (ibid.). The authors of Coastal

resources co-management in the Caribbean comment that, “The term

[co-management] is used often and liberally by government fisheries

management authorities, and also non-governmental organizations such

as fishing associations, cooperatives, community-based environmental

groups and other key stakeholders.” (ibid., 1). Seldom do all stakeholders

have the same ideas on the categories and phases of co-management

(ibid.).

The McConney et al. paper takes a look at the guidelines for successful

co-management plans in the Caribbean (ibid.). They examine three types

of co-management: consultative co-management (where the

government interacts with the stakeholders, but makes all the decisions),

collaborative co-management (government and stakeholders work

together and share decision making), and delegated co-management

(government lets formally organized stakeholders make decisions) (ibid.).

The Galapagos stakeholders like to think of their management system as

collaborative co-management, implying a stronger partnership than the

other forms of co-management. The authors explain that, “establishing

successful co-management is seldom immediate, and progression

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through several categories of co-management is often apparent as

institutional relationships are developed and mature.” (ibid., 4). The three

stages of progression are categorized as: pre-implementation,

implementation, and post-implementation (ibid.).

In Sherry Arnstein’s A Ladder of Participation, she describes the first two

rungs of participation as non-participatory where the objective is not to

truly have the participants have a say, but where those with the power try

to “educate” or “cure” the other stakeholders (Arnstein 1969). The next

three rungs are associated with tokenism, where those in power allow the

others to voice their opinion, with the knowledge that the powerholders

will be the ones who ultimately decide the outcome (ibid.). Arnstein points

out, “When participation is restricted to these levels, there is no follow-

through, no “muscle,” hence no assurance to changing the status quo.”

(ibid., 4). The top three rungs give stakeholders increasing degrees of

decision making input, allowing them to negotiate compromises with the

traditional powerholders (ibid.). The Galapagos participatory

management system falls between non-participatory and tokenism.

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Source: Arnstein 1969

Figure 2.1 Ladder of participation

Claiming to be a participatory management system, when in practice it is

not, will continue to perpetuate mistrust in consensus efforts attempted by

Galapagos stakeholders. In Science, Society and Power, Fairhead and

Leach describe a national park planning ‘community’ process in Guinea

where ‘traditional’ hunters and herbalists are included, but not charcoal-

makers and bush-meat sellers (Fairhead and Leach 2003). The authors

observe that, “Interested and knowledgeable parties find themselves

excluded or silenced in expressing certain aspects of their identities and

the knowledge, political and material interests associated with them.

Apparent consensus in such circumstances can conceal much conflict.”

(ibid., 234). When the stakeholders are asked to participate, it is often

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“with pre-set environment and development objectives—and within

frames of debate which obscure their own perspectives and interactions

with ecology.” (ibid., 234). Concerted efforts and collaboration could

result in a fishing community doctrine compatible with other Galapagos

interests. However, currently, the Galapagos fishermen do not nicely fit

into the desired vision of a pristine, natural ‘living laboratory’ available for

tourists worldwide to discover and appreciate in perpetuity.

In The Deliberative Practitioner, John Forester gives examples of

straightforward approaches planners and architects use in participatory

processes and negotiation. He discusses the importance of political

deliberation and how this not only involves evaluating and assessing

efficient options and strategies, but just as importantly, “a careful

exploration to learn about the ends (including goals, mandates,

obligations, hopes, and what these mean in a given case) and a subtle

but real recognition of other parties—even as they might propose to build

where you want to preserve (vice versa), even as they bring histories of

distrust and feelings of being “done-to” to the table.” (Forester 2001, 86).

Taking a comprehensive look at the Galapagos stakeholders’ goals and

what each sector is really trying achieve, while making a sincere effort to

truly understand each other, could greatly benefit the participatory

process.

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In Forester’s book, Norwegian planner Rolf Jensen describes the value of

using a humble approach, “And how do we get that judgment from the

outside? Again, by dialogue, and I would say not by downgrading your

own profession, but by downgrading the image of your own profession,

having more professional humility—reflecting first of all upon what you’re

doing and being more open for more negotiated approaches.” (ibid.,

94). Architect-planner David Best points out that often people have

difficulty expressing their ideas, but not to assume that they do not have

any or that they are not good. He stresses, “You’ve got to give people a

hell of a lot of credit at the beginning, and you’ve got to try to find out,

from them, really what they want. You mustn’t come, saying ‘Oh, no—it’s

not what you want. This is what you need.’ ” (ibid., 102).

On this same topic planner Ann Forsyth observes how some environmental

planners wanting to take a responsible stance towards the environment

may include articulating public opinion while also promoting good public

policy using values based on their “clearest and most considered views.”

(Forsyth 1999). As David Best says, just because people find it challenging

to express themselves does not mean they do not know what they want. It

is up to all the interested parties to elicit these opinions in a constructive

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fashion if there is to be a viable long-term plan requiring the stakeholders’

support (Forester 2001).

In The Deliberative Practitioner, transportation planner Baruch Hirschberg

emphasizes the importance of diplomatic recognition. He gives an

account of where environmentalists he has worked with describe one of

his very competent colleagues, “When you sit with him, you just see it in his

eyes that we’re an obstacle, we’re just something to be overcome. We

just see it in his eyes.” (Forester 2001, 107). Hirschberg observes that the

environmentalists will not make compromises because they know his

colleague is also unwilling to do so (ibid.). This is a fairly accurate

description of the situation the fishermen are experiencing with the

Galapagos conservationists. The fishermen are quite aware that the

conservation stakeholders are unprepared to make compromises. The

fishing sector also views the conservation sector as an obstacle. However,

the conservation sector is in a more powerful position, due to its

monumental international backing. Most of the conservation

organizations are based in foreign countries and are really just guests in

Ecuador. In reality, if the Ecuadorian conservation groups strongly

suggested that fishermen find alternative occupations in ecologically

threatened areas of the United States, the foreign conservation groups

would probably not be well-received by Americans.

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It is important to recognize that without the presence of the conservation

organizations, the Galapagos ecosystem may have already collapsed.

Conservation efforts have resulted in preserving a truly unique research

and tourist destination. However, the fishermen will remain an integral part

of the Galapagos human ecosystem and community fabric and attempts

by other stakeholders to marginalize them will continue to be ineffective.

Valiant efforts to integrate rather than impose conservation agendas and

goals could prove beneficial to all stakeholders. This will take time,

patience, and more complex, purposeful planning than is presently taking

place. Identifying common goals could be the beginning of formulating a

comprehensive plan for a sustainable Galapagos.

In Marine Reserves, Mascia discusses the lack of integration of the social

sciences in marine reserve design and that much of the designs are

based on anecdotal indicators and individual experiences (Sobel and

Dahlgren 2004). Examining what it is necessary to simultaneously

implement effective strategies for capacity building, develop

occupational opportunities, monitor, and uphold the law is crucial to

resolving the Galapagos conflicts. McConney et al. emphasize that

“Critical to the success of co-management is the extent to which

community-based organizations (CBOs) engage in poverty eradication

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36

and alleviation.” (McConney, Pomeroy and Mahon 2004, 12). They also

point out that most Caribbean management authorities do not factor in

local economic needs in the management of marine areas (ibid.). It is

important to create incentives and benefits for all the stakeholders in

order to sustain motivation to believe and participate in the system (ibid.).

This is especially important in the early stages when costs tend to be high

and short-term benefits unapparent (ibid.). The authors emphasize “A

good incentive operates at the individual level without compromising the

integrity of the group process.” (ibid., 14).

Ben-Yami points out in his 2001 Consultancy Report for the Charles Darwin

Foundation, “There is no true conflict between rational conservation and

a sustainable fishery.” (Ben-Yami 2001, 3). Often conflicts are a result of

extreme views from the conservative sector, financial opportunism or

ignorance on behalf of the fishing sector, and communication problems

between the two (ibid.). The Caribbean co-managers in the McConney

et al. article stress “the need for considerable improvement in

communication, cooperation and coordination.” (McConney Pomeroy

and Mahon 2004, 21). Formal communication is critical to the success of

co-management. Sometimes informal avenues may appear more

efficient, but in the end “transparency and institutional memory are

weakened by the absence of recorded decisions.” (ibid., 21). Effective

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37

co-management is based on teamwork and “Working together towards

common goals requires collective action. Trust and mutual respect are

essential for this to happen without undue conflict.” (ibid., 16).

Monitoring systems are important aspects of participatory management

systems, but are often contributors to skepticism and mistrust in the system.

In his 2001 Consultancy Report for the Charles Darwin Foundation, Ben-

Yami explains that, “Much more data and information on the local fishery

resources and their exploitation are needed to constitute the science on

which reliable and rational fishery management can be based.” (Ben-

Yami 2001, 21). Without scientific data it is difficult to apply the

precautionary principle (ibid.). As Eugene Lapointe mentions in Embracing

the Earth’s Wild Resources, the problem associated with the

precautionary principle is that “The approach demands that resource use

be stopped until all certainty is assured.” (Lapointe 2003, 7). In his report

Ben-Yami mentions, “I was shown some doomsday predictions from the

early 1990s, which had not materialized. In fact, while landings keep

fluctuating, perhaps mainly due to environmental changes, and some

areas have been over-exploited, there is no evidence of any looming

disaster, apart from the ever-increasing fishing effort.” (Ben-Yami 2001, 22).

Greater involvement from the fishing sector and unbiased outside

consultants could help rebuild the credibility of the monitoring system in

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the Galapagos. Lapointe emphasizes that “ . . . conservation of fisheries

will never be achieved without total involvement of fishermen . . .”

(Lapointe 2003, 20).

Funding is frequently considered an obstacle in achieving capacity

building goals. Finances are provided, structures are built, but the

fishermen continue to be challenged with creating viable processing

plants to effectively sell their fish. Buildings remain empty and operational

capacity is nonexistent. In a recent Economist article there is a description

of the complexity of distributing mosquito bednets impregnated with

insecticide to prevent the spread of malaria in Africa. After hearing a

speech describing the fight to prevent malaria at a recent meeting at the

World Economic Forum in Davos, a Hollywood actress donated $10,000

for bednets (The Economist 2005). The article continues to explain the

challenges in simply purchasing and distributing bednets. Nigeria places

tariffs of up to 40% on imported nets to protect their own bednet

producers, who do not use the insecticide necessary in preventing

malaria (ibid.). A recent Ugandan newspaper warned women not to turn

bednets into wedding gowns (ibid.). The basic infrastructure necessary for

safe, efficient distribution is frequently absent in developing countries. The

article points out, “Donors muster resources, but they fail to align the

incentives of the people providing them or benefiting them. The grand

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macro-solutions often neglect the nagging micro-foundations.” (The

Economist 2005, 26).

In “Assessing Aid”, the authors identify, “One painful lesson of experience

is that government and community ownership is crucial. . . There is no

alternative to patience.” (Dollar and Pritchett 1998, 79, 82). If projects are

to be truly helpful and effective in the long-term, there is no avoiding the

interaction and collaboration with local communities. The authors

continue to emphasize the necessity of introducing technology and

delivering assistance by working closely with the people who will be using

it, “This is not knowledge that exists somewhere and can be packed in a

suitcase and carried to developing countries. To be effective, this is

knowledge that must be created locally and internalized. Existing

principles must always be adapted to new or local circumstances (or

both), and developing country government and citizens must take the

lead in creating this new knowledge.” (ibid., 83-84).

Some of the confusion in participatory management is derived from

language, which is not agreed upon by all the stakeholders from the

beginning. The term sustainable development has many different

meanings depending on with whom you are speaking. In Keith Pezzoli’s

book Human Settlements and Planning for Ecological Sustainability he

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suggests that, “Despite all of its ambiguities (probably because of them)

the term sustainable development has become a widely invoked

trademark of local, regional, national, and especially international

organizations dedicated to promoting environmentally sound

approaches to economic development.” (Pezzoli 1998, 78). In the fishing

community, sustainability signifies the future availability of an

economically viable fishery for fishermen to pass down to their children

(Parravano, Thomas, and Grader 2003). A non-profitable fishery, or

unbearable fishing conditions are characteristics of an unsustainable

fishery (ibid.). The lack of a unifying definition of sustainability agreed upon

by all sectors is part of where the confusion lies. As Margoluis and Salafsky

mention in Measures of Success, “. . .if you can’t agree on what you

generally want to accomplish, then it will be very difficult for your group to

function efficiently and effectively.” (Margoluis and Salafsky 1998, 18).

In Jared Diamond’s Collapse, he discusses why some societies and

ecosystems have survived and others haven’t. What is it that makes

people not take the appropriate corrective actions in the face of

impending systematic failure? He suggests that in certain situations the

status quo is acceptable because it favors the well-being of a certain

group of people. He also explains the concept of irrational behavior,

which is behavior that is harmful to everyone, and is probably more

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41

applicable to the Galapagos situation (Diamond 2005). He continues,

“Such irrational behavior often arises when each of us individually is torn

by clashes of values: we may ignore a bad status quo because it is

favored by some deeply held value to which we cling.” (Diamond 2005,

432). In psychology this phenomenon is often referred to as the “sunk-cost

effect,” where so much time and effort has been invested in something

that one becomes increasingly hesitant to abandon it (ibid.).

Changing course will not always guarantee the desired results. However,

sometimes chances must be taken. In McDonough and Braungart’s

Cradle to Cradle, they discuss the five guiding principles of eco-

effectiveness: signal your intention, restore, be ready to innovate further,

understand and prepare for the learning curve, and exert

intergenerational responsibility (McDonough Braungart 2002). While they

are emphasizing the importance of an ecological perspective in the

business world, the tips they recommend are equally beneficial to those in

the ecological sector seeking to become more socially equitable. They

talk about taking the step “to commit to a new paradigm, rather than an

incremental improvement of the old.” (ibid., 182).

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Occasionally, whether at a company or non-governmental organization

(NGO), people directly interacting at the local level have identified the

issues and necessary changes, but find it difficult to convince the

decision-makers at the top to make strategic modifications essential for

implementation. An article in The Economist describes the problems

arising when “companies have chosen to root their [“Corporate Social

Responsibility”] CSR functions too narrowly within their public- or

corporate-affairs departments. Though playing an important tactical role,

such departments are often geared towards rebutting criticism, and tend

to operate at a distance from strategic decision making within the

company.” (Davis 2005, 70). The article discusses the importance of

balancing “Corporate Social Responsibility” and the “business of business

is business” priorities. The article continues, “Businesses need to introduce

explicit processes to make sure that social issues and emerging social

forces are discussed at the highest levels as part of overall strategic

planning. This means executive managers must educate and engage

their board of directors.” (ibid., 70).

The dynamics and interests of stakeholders are complex. Understanding

the context in which groups of people and institutions operate and what

motivates people to work together or not are key factors in moving

forward (FAO 1995). Institutional and policy analysis are necessary in order

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43

to see what the goals and objectives are of each of the stakeholders and

how these goals and objectives overlap. Common grounds must be

found to implement a comprehensive plan (FAO 1995). As Michael

Mascia comments in Marine Reserves, “Social factors—not biological or

physical variables—may be the primary determinants of marine reserve

design and performance.” (Mascia 2004, 164).

The participatory management system is not truly participatory. True

incentives to participate are absent, a lack of respect among

stakeholders prevails, and input is not honored and taken seriously. In 2000

the Borrini-Feyerabend and Farvar evaluations observed inadequate

participation and, five years later, the situation has continued to degrade.

Perhaps the fact that these issues have not been addressed needs to be

closely examined. Being open-minded, treating stakeholders with respect,

and conveying sincere intentions are prerequisites in moving forward and

identifying mutual self-interests.

2.4. What are the characteristics of effective cooperative endeavors?

The literature discusses a variety of ways to use mutual gains as a method

for achieving stakeholders’ goals. Finding common ground in

conservation and stakeholder project management, discovering what

people are doing to rise above the odds, and exploring how successful

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44

corporations build partnerships, all demonstrate the benefits of

recognizing mutual self-interests.

2.4.1. Common goals

In Measures of Success Margoluis and Salafsky discuss the importance of

finding common ground in conservation project collaborations. It is

important to recognize the similarities and differences of various

stakeholders’ mission statements (Margoluis and Salafsky 1998). The

following diagram (Figure 2.2) illustrates where the overlap exists (dark

shaded area) and where there are differences (lightly-shaded area)

(ibid.).

Source: Margoluis and Salafsky 1998

Figure 2.2 Overlapping interests

Each of the stakeholders needs to be clear about what they hope to

achieve. It is fine to have areas of disagreement, to agree to disagree, or

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45

negotiate mutually accepted trade-offs (Margoluis and Salafsky 1998). In

Getting to Yes, Fisher, Urey, and Patton, emphasize that finding mutual

interests are not always obvious. Often you need to discover common

ground and create opportunities (Fisher, Urey, and Patton 1991).

Emphasizing shared interests can facilitate negotiations and make the

process more pleasant (ibid.).

Dovetailing differences can also lead to mutual gain. In Getting to Yes the

authors give the example of dividing an orange between two children.

“After they finally agree to divide the orange in half, the first child took

one half, ate the fruit and threw away the peel, while the other threw

away the fruit and used the peel from the second half in baking a cake.”

(Fisher, Urey, and Patton 1991, 73). They both need the orange, but for

different purposes. Too often negotiations end up with half an orange for

each side rather than the whole fruit for one and the whole peel for the

other (ibid.).

2.4.2. What constitutes positive deviation?

The traditional approach to change is to analyze what is not working, take

control and impose top-down modifications (Pascale and Sternin 2005). In

Pascale and Sternin’s “Your Company’s Secret Change Agents,” they

describe the positive deviance approach to change as bottom-up, inside

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out, and asset based (ibid.). “It powers change from within by identifying

and leveraging innovators. This method diminishes the social distance that

often blocks acceptance.” (ibid., 75). The business world is often more

motivated than other fields to find long-term solutions to problems. They

have a vested interest in efficiency and productivity because it inevitably

affects their bottom line. In their determination to find a solution they are

often more open to interdisciplinary solutions, stepping outside of the

proverbial box, looking at the bigger picture and incorporating ideas from

other fields into their changes. In their Harvard Business Review article on

the positive deviance approach, Pascale and Sternin turn to a variety of

disciplines for examples. They point out that “. . . we have derived our

conclusions from some of the largest, messiest, most intractable change

problems on the planet: malnutrition in Mali and Vietnam, catastrophic

dropout rates within rural schools in Argentina, the trafficking of girls in East

Java, the spread of HIV/AIDS in Myanmar, and the widespread practice

of female circumcision in Egypt.” (ibid., 74). The purpose of these

examples is to make connections to business problems in corporations.

Finding solutions to environment and development problems requires not

only looking at the interactions between the environmental sciences and

development, but social interactions in general.

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Positive deviation is the idea of focusing on people who achieve success

against all odds. What is the fundamental nature of these people’s

techniques that make things work? In the Argentinian case, the World

Bank was being implicated for underfunding the rural schools, so decided

to hold a workshop on positive deviance for teachers and principals

(ibid.). Although 86% of children in Argentina completed elementary

school only 56% from the more rural area of Misiones did the same (ibid.).

The workshop participants became curious when they were told ten

schools in the Misiones province with the same resources had over a 90%

retention rate (ibid.). After visiting the successful schools, the workshop

participants were surprised to learn the teachers in the successful schools

were negotiating “learning contracts,” where “as the children learned to

read, add, and subtract, they could help their parents take advantage of

government subsidies and compute the amount earned from crops or

owed at the village store.” (ibid., 77). The partnership with parents and

the children was incentive for all involved to work towards the goal of

having the children complete elementary school. Shortly thereafter the

workshop participants started to negotiate similar contracts (ibid.).

Discovering what the parents, children and teachers could gain from

working together is what made the Argentinian case a success.

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2.4.3. Mutual interdependence

The awareness of mutual interdependence can lead group members to

make decisions that are consistent with the welfare of the community

(Ryan 1995). This can be accentuated in a variety of ways. Allison and

Messick found that when individuals were educated about the impact of

their behavior on the availability of resources, they acted in more socially

responsible ways (ibid.).

In 2003, Planning Perspective, a research-based company, conducted

studies for a benchmark survey on the manufacturer-supplier relations in

the U.S. automobile industry (Liker and Choi 2004). Toyota and Honda

were rated as the companies with whom suppliers most preferred to work

(ibid.). What was it that made suppliers prefer to deal with the Japanese

automobile manufacturers over the big three American companies,

Chrysler, Ford and GM? The Japanese automakers made a conscious

effort to assure that both they and their suppliers were benefiting from

their relationships with one another.

A tremendous amount of time and effort is allocated to building the

foundation for productive partnerships. When the Japanese first began

producing their cars in the United States in the 1980s they asked that their

Japanese suppliers engage in the partnerships with local American

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suppliers (ibid.). Once a rapport was established between the supplier

and Japanese manufacturer, executives were sent in to work with the

suppliers and assist them in streamlining the part development process.

The Japanese were then able to set the price they believed the market

could bear ensuring that the supplier would also make a profit (ibid.). In

Liker and Choi’s article, a senior executive for a braking supply company

points out, “Whenever I ask [executives in the Big Three] how they

develop a target price, the answer is: silence. They base the target price

on nothing. The finance manager just divvies up the available money:

‘Here’s what we normally spend on braking systems, here’s what you’ll get

this year.’ They have no idea how we’ll get those cost reductions. They just

want them.” (ibid., 108). The response this brake supplier executive

received from the American car company is similar to the expectations

the conservation organizations have of the Galapagos fishing sector.

Changes are necessary and are requested however the technology and

know how for achieving these goals are unavailable. In describing the

process of setting up the relationships between the Japanese auto

manufacturers and their suppliers, Liker and Choi state, “The process can

take a while, but it usually proves to be valuable for both the suppliers and

the manufacturers.” (ibid., 108).

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2.4.4. Mutual gains approach

The mutual gains approach is the philosophy that well-structured and

thoughtful negotiations can result in gains for regulators and regulatees

and for the community as a whole (Susskind, Levy, and Thomas-Larmer

2000). An effective agreement can assist in making the regulatee more

willing to comply and more comfortable with approaching the regulating

agency to work together. The mutual gains approach is founded on the

concept of BATNA, which is the “best alternative to negotiated

agreement.” It is each party’s best estimate of what he or she will do if an

agreement isn’t reached (ibid.). The agreement should turn out better

than either party’s alternative if no agreement is reached. Susskind et al.

state the goals of the mutual gains approach should be “clarifying

interests, inventing options (the purpose of inventing options is to expand

the pie), objective criteria, and relationships.” (Susskind, Levy, and

Thomas-Larmer 2000, 24).

2.5. Summary of the Literature Review

It is evident from the literature that conservation efforts commonly clash

with the economic needs of local communities, creating bitterness and

resentment on both sides. Co-management or participatory

management is repeatedly recommended as the most hopeful strategy

for reconciling differences between conservation and local needs. It is

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clear that developing a genuine participatory management system in the

Galapagos is of paramount importance. What is keeping the Galapagos

participatory management system from truly being participatory? Social

investments by all of the stakeholders are absent. Communication is

grossly inadequate and diplomatic recognition, absolutely crucial to all

aspects of communication, is non-existent. Lack of social investment and

inadequate communication are key contributors to the prevailing

atmosphere of mistrust. Without stakeholder trust in the participatory

management process it will be difficult to establish a credible system,

which is truly participatory. The skills of landscape architects could greatly

contribute to bridging the gap between conservationists and local

communities. Landscape architects, as well as planners and architects,

often find themselves in positions where they can positively assist in

facilitating the process of recognizing mutual self-interests and identifying

common goals. It is only through improved communication, diplomatic

recognition, and identifying mutual self-interests that the participatory

management system will enable the stakeholders to create a sustainable

Galapagos. The conservation and fishing sectors in the Galapagos have

more in common than they realize. Rising above their differences and

identifying and collaborating on common goals may be the initial step

necessary to achieve a sustainable Marine Reserve.

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3. Research Methods

In the following section I will describe why I chose the qualitative method

and the interview process to answer my question. It was really as I began

interviewing people that I noticed, in spite of all their differences, the

Galapagos stakeholders have more in common than expected. As a

result, my question (Do the conservation and fishing sectors have anything

in common?) evolved while I was conducting the interviews. In this section

I will also describe the reasons for choosing the eleven questions and how

I determined which people to interview. As the literature suggests

recognizing mutual self-interests can be helpful in the negotiating and

management process. Focusing on mutual self-interests could facilitate

the participatory management process in the Galapagos.

3.1. Why interviewing?

Before I left for the Galapagos, I read a variety of articles and books

about marine management, conservation and development throughout

the world, in Latin America, and the Galapagos. The dearth of information

regarding local views prompted me to organize a trip to visit the islands for

the months of February and March of 2005. I decided the qualitative

interview process would be the most appropriate method for answering

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my question: Do the conservation and fishing sectors have anything in

common?

The object of undertaking this study on the community dynamics of the

fishing, conservation and Park sectors was to gain a deeper

understanding of the root of the conflict in the Galapagos. Many studies

have been conducted in the Galapagos over the years. Management,

monitoring, enforcement and education are all valid goals. Other reports

and plans such as the Special Law, Galapagos Marine Reserve

Management Plan (GMRMP), Ben-Yami’s 2001 Consultancy Report and

Borrini-Feyerabend and Farvar’s 2001 Participatory Management Board

Evaluations are filled with insight and long-term visions. I became

interested in discovering at least one of the fundamental reasons why

these goals and visions continue to remain out of reach for the

Galapagos stakeholders. The qualitative interview process appeared most

promising in discovering the answers to this question.

I was well aware that arranging interviews with the fishermen could be a

challenge. Though the fishing community has a reputation for being vocal

through strikes and protests, they are also shy, private people often

accustomed to working alone. In addition, the fishing sector has been the

victim of strongly biased publicity and has been deprived the opportunity

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to convey its viewpoints to the international community. Part of the

conflict stems from the mistrust amongst the sectors. It was also important

to interview people in the Park and conservations sectors that were in

decision making positions, so I could better understand why certain issues

were handled in a specific manner. I knew it would be necessary to

become associated with a well-respected local organization in the

Galapagos if I were to have the opportunity to interview the appropriate

people for the study.

When I came across Fundación para el Desarollo Alternativo Responsible

para Galápagos (FUNDAR Galápagos) on the internet I decided to apply

for a volunteer position with this local non-profit organization. FUNDAR

works with the village communities, international NGOs, and the Park on

various projects to improve the local people’s quality of life in a

sustainable way. The founder and president is from the Galapagos and

has the insight and motivation to work with the locals. His father and some

of his brothers are fishermen, so he is also sensitive to the fishing sector’s

needs. As a member of the original organizing group for the Special Law

and the GMRMP he is not only familiar with the social dynamics of the

islands, but is a well-respected community member. I expressed my

interest in learning more about the community dynamics and the fishing

sector in particular. I was pleased to find out in the fall of 2004 that I would

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be able to volunteer through FUNDAR for the Participatory Management

Board located in the Galapagos National Park.

Most of the people in the Galapagos speak only Spanish. Since my

Spanish speaking skills were limited, I decided to spend three weeks in

January living with an Ecuadorian family in the capital of Quito while

attending a Spanish school five days a week for six hours each day.

Though it is impossible to learn a language in three weeks, this experience

helped tremendously and made my transition from Quito to the village of

Puerto Ayora in the Galapagos more pleasant.

Shortly after I arrived in the Galapagos I started volunteering at the

Participatory Management Board (PMB). My assignment was to write a

report summarizing the goals of the Galapagos Marine Reserve, including

observations and suggestions from the people in the fishing sector,

conservation sector, and the Park sector. This project would be an

important step in gathering information for my thesis and identifying a

relevant claim. I began by examining the current literature. Then, with the

assistance of the director of the PMB, his assistant, and the president of

FUNDAR, I arranged interviews with people in each sector. The island of

Santa Cruz, where I was living and where most of the population of the

Galapagos lives, is home to approximately a quarter of the fisher

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population. San Cristóbal has approximately another quarter and Isabela

has approximately half of the fisher population (Kerr, Cardenas, and

Hendy 2004). I arranged to interview people from all three islands. Most of

the people in the conservation sector and Park reside and work on Santa

Cruz. However, I also interviewed people in the Park system on Isabela.

3.2. Interviewee selection and interview process

The stakeholders on the Participatory Management Board are the

Galapagos National Park, Charles Darwin Foundation, Fishing, Tourism and

Guide sectors. Thirteen people were interviewed in the conservation

sector, six in the Park sector, and twelve in the fishing sector, three in

tourism, and one in the guide sector. Though I included general questions

regarding the operation of the participatory management system and

the fishing policies, my questions were formulated based on my interest in

learning more about the specific conflict between the fishing sector and

the other sectors. Only the conservation, Park, and fishing sectors were

included in the matrix, which was used to determine patterns and analyze

the data in a more systematic manner. Though, I would have liked to

include more people from the tourism and guide sectors, I quickly

discovered that many of the questions were difficult for people to answer

who were not in management positions in the tourism and guide sectors.

The responses of the three people in the tourism sector and the one

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person in the guide sector were not included in the matrix. However, I

considered the four interviews I did in the tourism/guide sectors a part of

the informal interview process and included their thoughts and ideas in

the report I wrote for the PMB.

The Park is considered separate from the conservation sector because

most people in the other sectors view them as separate entities. In the

end, the Park is able to overrule the consensus-based system of the PMB

and is considered more of a government representative, not always fully

supporting the conservation sector’s requests. The Charles Darwin

Foundation is strongly supported by national and international

conservation organizations, so was placed under the conservation sector

umbrella. The conservation sector is generally committed to scientific

research and recruits people and raises funds from the international

community to provide support for the conservation of the Galapagos

(MacFarland and Cifuentes 1996). I interviewed people from conservation

organizations representing five countries. Fishermen from each of the four

Galapagos fishing cooperatives were interviewed. The fishermen are

generally concerned with maintaining a Galapagos Marine Reserve, so

they and their children can continue to earn a living.

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The director of the PMB and the president of FUNDAR were able to

recommend many people to interview. Previous interviewees, and others I

met during my travels referred me to several interviewees. In each sector I

was careful to include people in decision making positions and people

who are not. The view of a leader does not always accurately represent

the rest of the members’ views.

The people interviewed have busy lives and many travel extensively, so it

was important to prepare a well-organized interview, which respected the

busy schedules of the interviewees. After the first few interviews, I

established the eleven questions most suited for my study. Technically, the

interview could be as short as thirty minutes. However, most interviews

lasted forty-five minutes to an hour, and a few lasted as long as two hours.

Generally, my Spanish-speaking skills limited the length of the

conversations and kept the line of questioning brief and to the point.

Whenever appropriate, I asked the interviewee for their approval to tape

the conversation. Otherwise, I relied on my notes. I introduced myself to

each interviewee, described the purpose of the study, and assured them

that the interview would be confidential. I also let them know that if they

had questions at any time to feel free to ask (see interview guide in

Appendix A).

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The questions were available for the interviewees to read in both English

and Spanish. This allowed for clarification of the questions for interviewees

who spoke English as their second language. After each interview, I

assigned a number to the questionnaire. For those interviews that were

tape recorded, the tape was numbered as well. The interview key was

kept on my computer and was accessible only to me.

All of the English-speaking people were either in the conservation or Park

sector and everyone I asked to tape record granted me permission.

Several of the English interviews I transcribed and the rest were transcribed

by a professional transcription service upon my return. The Spanish-

speaking interviewees were from the conservation, Park and fishing

sectors. All of the Spanish-speaking interviews in the conservation and Park

sectors were recorded and none of the interviews in the fishing sector

were recorded. I was told ahead of time that asking to tape record the

fishing sector interviewees would jeopardize my possibilities to interview

the fishermen. All of the interviewees were patient and generous with their

time. I was able to carefully complete the questionnaire as we went

through the interview process. During my stay in Ecuador, all of the

Spanish-speaking interviews were translated and transcribed by a native

Ecuadorian, a former freelance translator and transcriber for the New York

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Times. There may be different interpretations for certain words, so I have

been careful to make sure the quotes include the translations most suited

for the context.

3.3. Interview questions

The interview questions were constructed as a general framework for the

interview. Every question is in some way related to the management or

operation of the Galapagos Marine Reserve. Many of the questions were

broad to provide the interviewee the flexibility to give a short or more

elaborate answer. In cases where people had difficulty narrowing down

their answers, I would ask for just two or three examples. Due to the high

degree of conflict among the Galapagos stakeholders in recent years I

was especially interested in finding out what people thought were the

causes of conflict and what could be done to improve the present

situation.

3.3.1. General questions

The first two questions are overarching inquiries regarding general goals

for fisheries management in the Galapagos Marine Reserve and effective

fishing policies. The latter was a two-part question that also asked how the

interviewees would implement an effective fishing policy. In most

instances it is fairly straightforward to pinpoint general failures, but

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challenging to find constructive long-term solutions. Asking general

questions at the beginning allowed people to create a sort of a wish list

and then think about the reality of what it takes to implement these

requests.

3.3.2. Management plan questions

The question of identifying the successes and problems of the Galapagos

Marine Reserve Management Plan (GMRMP) highlights the attributes and

defects of the system. While it is easy to see the whole management plan

as a failure, this question asks people to take a minute to think of its

redeeming qualities. After all, much effort and collaboration went into

creating this well-intentioned plan. The interviewees were often hard-

pressed to answer this question, so I emphasized only one or two

examples would suffice.

The fifth question asks for examples of successful co-management

strategies of fisheries in other parts of the world. This was an indicator

question because it shows how open people are to learning from others.

The Galapagos is undoubtedly a special place. The innocence, curiosity

and trust of the Galapagos wildlife are truly unique. However, many of the

islands’ problems are not unusual. In fact, it is more common to see

artisanal fishing sectors at odds with their local communities than not. Most

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areas with fisheries are experiencing serious challenges, Mexico, Chile,

Argentina, the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, the United States, are just a

few of the regions facing problems. Many are dealing with the threat of

losing their fisheries and destroying their ecosystems, and many already

have. It is important to acknowledge that there is no perfect marine

management plan, and that learning from the successes and failures of

other plans could be beneficial.

3.3.3. Specific issues

Questions five through ten address more specific issues, such as finding

out when people think the conflicts began, communication obstacles,

whether it is necessary to reduce the fishing efforts, what the current

alternatives are for leaving the fishing sector, how do the fishermen

benefit from the fishing policies and what the successes and failures are of

the Participatory Management Board (PMB).

3.3.4. Conclusive question

Clearly, the purpose of asking the stakeholders what their common goals

are is to inspire people to think about what everyone has in common.

Without common goals, they would not have been able to orchestrate

the approval of the 1998 Special Law and the 1999 Galapagos Marine

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Reserve Management Plan (GMRMP). It is perfectly acceptable not to

agree on everything, but it is important to know the stakeholders’

common interests and where these interests differ (Margoluis and Salafsky

1998).

3.4. Summary

At the end of the interview, we often discussed the implications of the

current situation and the various steps that could be taken to improve the

circumstances. Many interviewees recommended books and literature.

This was helpful because it gave me a better understanding of how their

views are formed. At this stage, I also received recommendations for

other individuals to interview.

The California State Polytechnic University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB)

approved the research methods for my thesis. The IRB is responsible for

carefully examining the questioning practices planned for research

conducted by university students. The IRB is especially concerned that the

interviewees’ rights are not violated as a result of the research conducted

by a California State Polytechnic student. The risk of adversely affecting

the interviewees during this study was low. The confidentiality of the

information gathered during the interview is key to maintaining the low

risk. Every precaution has been taken to assure confidentiality.

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3.5. Limitations of the study

Several limitations of the study are my minimal knowledge of Spanish, not

tape recording the interviews with the fishermen, and not interviewing

more people in the tourism sector, guide sector, and local community.

A solid understanding of the language would have allowed me to ask

more follow-up questions based on the interviewees’ answers. The ability

to ask specific questions based on certain answers often helps to shed

light on greater issues. Having a firmer grasp of the Spanish language

could have assured that less would be lost in the translation, especially in

the interviews with the fishermen. As with all the interviewees, the people

in the fishing sector were generous with their thoughts and ideas for

improving the situation in the Galapagos. I would have benefited from

being able to take more detailed notes.

The details of an interview are often revealed after repeatedly reviewing

taped conversations. An in-depth record of the conversations would also

have allowed for lengthier quotes in the findings section. Perhaps by not

asking that the fishermen be tape recorded I was able to interview more

fishermen than if I proposed that they be recorded. I found it of greater

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importance to interview a larger cross-section of the fishing sector in less

detail, than interviewing fewer people in more depth.

Clearly, it would have been beneficial to interview people for each of the

five stakeholder sectors. As previously mentioned, specific marine reserve

management questions made it difficult for a cross-section of people in

the tourism and guide sectors to answer all the questions. In this case, time

was a particularly limiting factor. Had there been more time it may have

been possible to formulate questions, which everyone from each sector

could answer. One of the many reasons it would have been helpful to

include the tourism and guide sectors is because these sectors are

frequently mentioned by the conservation and Park sectors as potentially

providing alternative job opportunities for the fishing sector. Establishing a

general idea on how the tourism and guide sectors perceive this proposal

could be useful.

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4. Findings

As a result of the findings, it became clear that the conservation, Park,

and fishing sectors have more in common than expected. However,

many of the responses highlight issues that continue to deepen the chasm

between the fishing sector and the rest of the stakeholders. The interviews

with each sector verify the importance of finding mutual self-interest and

how closely the futures of each of these groups are linked. The answers to

the questions asked also indicate that many stakeholders are not

necessarily aware of their similar interests and goals. The recognition of

mutual self interests and common goals could open doors for

collaborations and successful partnerships, helping to rebuild the trust and

confidence instrumental in creating a sustainable Galapagos Marine

Reserve.

4.1. Mutual self-interests of the conservation, park and fishing sectors

In Margoluis and Salafsky’s Measures of Success they emphasize the

importance of finding common goals in conservation project

collaborations. In the Galapagos the stakeholders’ overarching common

goal is to create and maintain a sustainable Galapagos Marine Reserve.

One person in the Park appropriately summarizes:

[Everyone] is looking for the sustainable management of the

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Reserve. I think that is the common goal. The fishermen wantpermanent activity. The CDF wants to have a Reserve with theconservation of the species, and the National Park wants to have aMarine Reserve with economic activity, conservation and research.They have this in common.

Not everyone recognizes the common goals. One person in the

conservation sector observes:

The fishing industry appears to have the goal of exploiting inwhatever way it can, the marine resources of the Galapagos. Theyapparently refuse to take onboard the concept of long-termsustainability of the resource on the basis that it will always be there,or there will always be another target species available

One person in the fishing sector did not recognize common goals either.

When asked: “What are the common goals of the Galapagos National

Park, the Charles Darwin Foundation, the fishing sector and the tourism

sector?,” this person answered:

The Park and CDF [Charles Darwin Foundation] have conservation.

Sustainability has different meanings depending on with whom you speak.

Generally, fishermen want a stable economic base for themselves and

their future grandchildren. As one fisherman aptly put it:

Everyone would like to see a sustainable Galapagos withcommunity and animals. Now, there is more concern with animals.People need to feed their families.

Conservation wants a balanced ecosystem, where species thrive and are

able to withstand climatic fluctuations and anthropogenic influences.

One conservation person explains:

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. . . we’re in a World Heritage Site Marine Reserve, so we have tothink well beyond just making sure that two, three, or four primaryextractive species are managed properly . . . [we have to] makesure that all non-extractive species aren’t negatively affected . . .

Many in the conservation sector also realize the importance of economic

sustainability for the Marine Reserve. When asked, “What are your goals

for the fisheries management in the Galapagos Marine Reserve?” one

conservationist answered:

The first objective of the fisheries in the Galapagos should be tomaintain them [the fisheries] for the long term. The second wouldbe to keep their [the fisheries’] yields sustainable in order toimprove the fishermen’s economy. And third, having a qualityfishery that will add value and obtain better prices on the market.

On the other hand, there are fishermen who also understand the

ecological aspect of maintaining a healthy Marine Reserve. When asked,

“ What are the common goals of the Galapagos National Park, the

Charles Darwin Foundation, the fishing sector and the tourism sector?”

one fisherman responded:

The most important [goal] is conservation. The fishing sector is justone grain of the big picture.

In Human Settlements and Planning for Ecological Sustainability, Keith

Pezzoli observes that the all-encompassing term of “sustainable

development” is often used by environmental organizations seeking

environmentally sound solutions to economic development (Pezzoli 1998).

It is an ambiguous term and, perhaps because of its ambiguity, is

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convenient to use. Its vagueness discourages accountability and leaves

much to interpretation. Nevertheless, “sustainability” serves as a start for

identifying priorities. The Galapagos stakeholders recognize that they

have this big abstract idea of a sustainable Marine Reserve in common,

but fail to realize that the key to the solution is breaking down this

daunting goal into manageable stages and collaborating with one

another to achieve it.

The danger of loosely using this all-encompassing term, “sustainability,” is

that depending on which sector’s definition is being used, it can create a

sense of urgency that encourages top-down, short-term solutions from a

select few, rather than an integrated, in-depth approach addressing

long-term issues at the local level. Claiming there is no time for the latter

will eventually become a self-fulfilling prophecy and set the foundation for

irreparable damage to the Galapagos Marine Reserve.

Defining various terms used in the participatory management system is

crucial to constructive discussion and negotiation. If a system is to be

transparent everyone must be informed of the vocabulary and what it

means to the different sectors. As Margoluis and Salafsky suggest in

Measures of Success, it is important to recognize the similarities and

differences of various stakeholders’ mission statements (Margoluis and

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Salafsky). Each of the stakeholders needs to be clear about what they

hope to achieve. The following person from conservation describes how a

joint discussion of the meaning of a fishing policy will assist in shaping

fishing policies acceptable to the fishing sector.

First of all, we should meditate on [ponder] the fishing policies’ realmeaning. We should think, have discussions, debates, andencourage more writing about this subject. The JMP should havemore discussion among its members about what fishing policies trulyare. Another very important step is to decide which fishing policy isthe right one to follow; decide what is expected from the fishingsector. This will come out from discussion and dialogue.

It is generally acknowledged that all the stakeholders are interested in a

sustainable marine reserve. However, defining key terms such as

“sustainability” and “fishing policies” will be necessary in order for the

stakeholder groups to move forward in a unified manner.

When answering the question about what the stakeholders’ common

goals are, a conservation person assesses the Galapagos stakeholder

situation and makes a perceptive observation:

That’s a very interesting question. Though the fishing sector mightappear to disagree with the Park, the Station [Charles DarwinFoundation], and tourism sectors, I think there is a fundamentalpremise touching all users, which is maintaining and conserving theMarine Reserve resources. They [the fishing sector] don’t wantlobster and the sea cucumbers all gone. They try to make gooddecisions to assure these resources exist through time. Then amongall different sectors, the fundamental objective is to achieve theconservation of the Marine Reserve. I believe that all sectorstogether want to have a good and sustainable use of the MarineReserve. The problem arises when discussion about what to use andhow to use it starts. There each sector has a different approach, but

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the goal for all of them is the maintenance and conservation of theMarine Reserve’s resources.

Recognizing the importance of having the common overarching goal of

a sustainable Galapagos Marine Reserve and identifying the

collaborative steps necessary to accomplish this goal will assist in

determining the future of the Galapagos Marine Reserve for its

stakeholders.

4.2. Participatory management and why it is not working

In the mid-90s, the Galapagos stakeholders (Galapagos National Park,

Charles Darwin Foundation, fishing, tourism and guide sectors) succeeded

in laying the legal foundation for the development and management of

the Galapagos Islands. The idea was to continue this team effort and

manage the islands and their surroundings in a participatory manner. In

Ben-Yami’s 2001 Consultancy Report for the Charles Darwin Foundation,

he emphasizes the importance of involving the fishermen in the design

and implementation of the Galapagos fisheries management system

(Ben-Yami 2001). He suggests co-management as an option, which

fishermen trust and take part in (ibid.). However, if the fishermen do not

feel they are truly part of the decision making process, co-management

will not live up to its potential (ibid.). Ben-Yami articulates that, “Even the

best intended and well-based fishing laws and regulations, are usually

doomed to remain on paper, or even worse, to be counterproductive, if

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they are perceived by the fishing people to be against what they

consider their best interests, and/or against their fishing logic and life

experience.” (Ben-Yami 2001, 3).

The legal framework of the Galapagos Marine Reserve was built on

collaboration and consensus, creating a trusted base for a promising

Galapagos future. However, shortly after its inception, this commendable

group of collaborators began to disintegrate. As a result, insincere

interactions, stakeholders’ focus on differences and their neglect to

identify common goals, renders the participatory management system

cumbersome and ineffective. One person in conservation concisely

describes the deterioration of the participatory management system and

the importance of the Galapagos fishermen’s contribution to the process.

The artisanal fishermen of the Galapagos were instrumental in banning

industrial fishing in the Marine Reserve.

The united atmosphere couldn’t be maintained among sectors. Itwas present when the process started until the law [Special Law ofthe Galapagos 1998] was approved. When each sector began tohave specific interests, people started to separate. What initiallybrought people together and working towards a commonobjective became affected by particular interests. Promises wentunfulfilled, and confidence and credibility began disappearing.

The most important catalyst was the change of personnel in eachsector. People arrived in the midst of the process. They didn’tunderstand the idea of participatory management. People whocame from outside of the Galapagos arrived with a conventionalmanagement idea where fishermen are the problem. For themindustrial fishermen and Galapagos fishermen are the same. They

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didn’t know the fishing sector was a key factor in initiating theparticipatory management process and allowing the Park to havejurisdiction over the Marine Reserve. Without them [the fishermen]there wouldn’t be 40 miles of Reserve and industrial fishing wouldn’thave been excluded.

There were people who didn’t know there was a background ofpromises and confidence among sectors. People came without ahistory and that hurt every sector. This has generated mutual distrust,a sort of deception.

This mutual distrust continues to result in a lack of confidence in the

participatory management system and is further exacerbated by a

number of factors. Insufficient economic activity, a climate of insincerity

and mistrust, poor communication among the sectors, and weak,

disorganized sectors are many of the challenges facing the Galapagos.

Acknowledging and addressing these reoccurring issues in a collaborative

way could be the beginning of improving the Galapagos situation. As

Dollar and Pritchett observe in Assessing Aid, if projects are to be truly

helpful and effective in the long-term, there is no avoiding the interaction

and collaboration of local communities (Dollar and Pritchett 1998).

4.2.1. Insufficient economic activity

In Marine Reserves, Sobel and Dahlgren point out that small-scale

fishermen may have increased costs and become fully or partially

displaced when a marine reserve is established (Sobel and Dahlgren

2004). Although the fishermen are acknowledged as stakeholders on the

participatory management board, they continue to find themselves

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marginalized and losing out economically. One person in the fishing

sector remarks:

There is no market setup to sell the fish, so it’s pepinos [seacucumbers] and illegal [fish]. It has to do with being able to sell fishto tourist boats [which is not taking place on a significant scale],storing and retaining quality. [We] don’t have ice machines. [Thefish] needs to be iced, packed on ice, but can’t be frozen.

A person in the Park sector also recognizes the importance of the

fishermen being able to sell the fish:

[The fishermen] don’t have their own support ship. USAID, WWF andCITES should help invest in a ship like this for here. There isn’t amother ship to carry fresh fish. You need to help the fishing sectordevelop their sector. Help is only given for tourism and science. It isnecessary to help everyone equally. They [the fishermen] need tooffer fresh products.

A conservation person evaluates the current economic situation facing

the fishing sector:

As it stands now, this [the Galapagos] is an expensive place to live,and white fish will not cut it. You can buy white fish anywhere else inthe world caught with industrial methods or closer to the market. So,only through a subsidy is white fish ever going to produce adequateincome for fishermen, which leaves, shark fins, sea cucumbers andlobster. And, possibly big-eyed tuna fresh to the [Asian] sushimarket. These are the only things that produce the incomes thatallow you to live at what you need, which is basically, the estimateis, you probably need $1000 dollars income [per month] for a familyof four, it’s the minimum.

One person in conservation candidly acknowledges the lack of incentives

for fishermen to leave the fishing sector and describes what would be

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necessary in creating alternative opportunities, though proposes that

ultimately it would be best if the fishermen left the islands altogether:

I do not believe any incentives are currently in place, though therehas been talk of encouraging them to move over to the tourismindustry, though there is not much opportunity there. To be reallyeffective any incentive must provide considerable financial benefitand include retraining in an appropriate skill, builder, plumber,electrician, etc. Ideally the incentive would encourage them toleave the islands.

Another idea that conservation organizations have been proposing is

essentially to pay fishermen to stop fishing and leave the islands. One

person in conservation describes this scenario:

There are a number of people who would get out of fishing andleave Galapagos if they were paid. You can buy them out. It iscontingent on the fishing being closed. Many are not from here andonly fish twenty percent of the year.

Another observation from someone in the conservation sector regarding

incentives for the fishermen to leave the fishing sector:

It’s all very well to offer alternatives, but, really, it’s got to come fromwithin. And, I think it’s, to a certain extent, there’s a lot ofpaternalism in Galapagos at offering things.

Someone in the Park makes a similar comment regarding offering

incentives to leave the fishing sector:

Alternatives should be searched and followed. [However] peopleget used to receiving because they are in Galapagos. Alternativesshould be supported by the person who wants to change.Alternatives are a person’s decision.

In Ngugi’s study of the economic impact of the no-take Mombasa Marine

Park in Kenya on local fishermen, she finds situations of conflict and

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resentment (Ngugi 2002). She also observes that though the economic

effects of no-take reserves on fishermen are more dramatic, many of the

same challenging issues arise in marine protected areas (ibid.). In the

Future of Integrated and Conservation and Development Projects, Wells

et al. present the practice of marginalizing local people from protected

areas without providing alternative livelihoods as unjust and not politically

realistic (Wells et al. 2004).

Undoubtedly, fishing could become more economically viable while

being sustainable. There could be more efficient and progressive methods

of fishing and commercializing the catches, reducing the need to catch

large amounts of fish and damage the ecosystem. However, many in the

conservation sector see the need for this, but don’t necessarily feel it is

their job to implement it.

Our line is not diversifying fisheries or increasing fishing markets.We’re not in the business of increasing fish catch or making fishingmore profitable. We’re in the business of reducing the total numberof fishermen and making happy ex-fishermen do things that areconsistent with the long-term goals of our World Heritage Site.

The conservation groups are probably not the most suitable organizations

to carry out diversification of fisheries. As Chapin mentions in his World

Watch article when describing the roles of conservation organizations,

“The fact that conservation organizations were perhaps not suited to work

in the social and economic realms was missed in all the excitement.”

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(Chapin 2004, 20). However, in order for diversification to be successful in

the Galapagos support and encouragement from the conservation

sector will be necessary. Conservation organizations are generally quite

influential in assessing the ecology and policymaking in the Galapagos

regarding human and environmental interaction.

4.2.2. Insincerity and lack of trust

Insincerity becomes apparent when the fishermen are strongly

encouraged by the conservation and Park sectors to seek alternative

occupations, but few alternatives exist. Tourism is often suggested as an

alternative. However as a person from the fishing sector points out the

legal provisions are not in place:

It is necessary to facilitate obtaining tourism permits. The Park wantsthis statute [which would allow people to get tourism permits], butthe Park needs to publish this statute.

The following Park person further comments on the need to put the legal

regulations in place to make start-up businesses in tourism a viable option

for fishermen:

The Galapagos National Park Statutes should be implemented. It isa regulation, which explains in detail the steps that need to befollowed to open the possibility for new tourist operators’ licenses.

One person from the fishing sector points out that once the fishermen turn

to a different occupation, particularly in tourism, they are not given nearly

enough time to find out if the new job is economically viable. They are

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encouraged to leave their current fishing occupation, but are on their

own if it does not work out.

In the Law a fisherman that wants to change to tourism mustdecide after 18 months which activity he will continue [fishing ortourism]. It is not possible [to determine this] after this amount oftime. More time is needed.

Were the Galapagos fishermen to look for work with one of the tour

operators, rather than try to start their own business, they may still run into

difficulties finding a job. As one of the fishermen states:

In tourism most of the people working are from the continent[mainland Ecuador]. They can pay them less because the cost ofliving on the continent is cheaper.

The lack of a credit system is another obstacle to moving into the tourism

sector or developing a more efficient business. Currently, there is nowhere

for the fishermen to turn if they need to apply for financing or take out a

substantial loan. There are discussions among the conservation groups to

develop a credit system. However, there are no credit opportunities yet.

The fishermen need their independence and want to run their own

businesses, be it sport fishing, diving, or marketing fish. One of the

fishermen states:

The fishing sector needs to be able to move their boats to thetourism sector, so the number of boats in the fishing sector willdecrease and the number of boats in the tourism sectorincrease…Fishermen could use the same boats and beindependent.

Another fishermen comments:

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For four years we have been looking for credit to improve theprocessing and selling, but nothing, no assistance.

In most business development situations loans are essential for starting or

improving a business. Most conservationists and Park people interviewed

do not critically consider the cost of starting a new business and

transitioning to an unfamiliar profession. There continues to be talk of

assisting the fishing sector, but the aid is often conditional and theoretical.

As the following conservation person describes:

I believe a good portion of the fishing sector wants a sustainableand feasible option for work that could be profitable for them andthen [they would] leave fishing. Many fishermen are orienting theirfuture activities outside of the fishing sector and there are a goodsegment of them. That’s the people we should work with and focusall the efforts in the future.

Yet, most stakeholders agree there still are not any concrete alternatives

in place. Repeatedly talking about alternatives and instilling hope that job

opportunities outside the fishing sector will become available when, in

fact, the possibility of this happening is far from being realized continues to

breed mistrust and convey a strong sense of insincerity. Encouraging

fishermen to leave the fishing sector is a viable option if the opportunities

exist to make it happen.

There are certainly those in the conservation and Park sectors with more

realistic expectations. When discussing alternative occupations for

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fishermen and the proposal to pay fishermen to leave the fishing sector

one conservationist emphasizes:

I don’t really believe much on incentives to leave the fishingactivity. The only alternative I see is to create profitable enterprisesout at sea [referring to offshore fishing]. It is hard since fishermendon’t have that experience [many fishermen are used to coastalfishing].

A person in the Park sector agrees that offering financial incentives for

fishermen to leave the fishing sector and go into tourism is not a promising

option:

I don’t think that is a good policy. It is not an effective policy,because you can work very hard [to develop financial incentives],but I am sure that only a small percentage of the fishermen aregoing to want to do another activity. That is not a solution for thesector. It is a solution for no more than one or two percent of thesector.

As the literature suggests marginalizing local people from protected areas

without providing economic opportunities is unrealistic (Wells et al. 2004).

Requesting that local fishermen find alternatives or improve their fishing

enterprises continue to be common requests even though it is recognized

the fishermen do not have the financial resources or practical knowledge

to fulfill these requests.

Trust is usually compromised when hopes are repeatedly raised,

assurances remain unspecific and projects are not seen through

completion. Efforts have been made to construct buildings for the

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fishermen to process the fish. One Park person describes the results of this

effort:

The construction of the building of the Centro de Acopio is a kindof fishing facility that was built for the fishermen. There are three.One on Isabela, one on San Cristóbal and one on Santa Cruz.None of them are working now. The thing is some studies weredone, but they are not very good studies and they did not link thefacilities in a way that would help the fishermen improve their well-being. The main problem is trading the catches. If they cannot sellthe fresh fish they [the fishermen] capture, they won’t get the bestprice. So, it doesn’t mean because you have this type of facilityyou can keep the fish forever.

It is clear that funds for constructing buildings alone will not suffice. Until a

facility is fully operational it is difficult for it to be profitable. One fishermen

emphasizes:

[We] need to have closer assistance and [we] need to be part ofthe team, not just on the sidelines. Confidence is lacking in theseprograms.

In McConney’s paper describing participatory management in the

Caribbean, McConney discusses the importance of creating incentives

and benefits for all stakeholders in order to sustain motivation to believe

and participate in the system (McConney). Money has been given,

buildings have been contructed, but the tools for organizing and

operating the plants are non-existent. Lack of trust is a result of

uncompleted projects and continued pressure on the fishing sector to

seek out alternative job opportunities without having the necessary

resources available. As the following fisherman explains:

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There are just rumors for business [operational assistance for thefishing sector] and alternatives are just illusions.

Insincerity and lack of trust are the backdrop for many of the dilemmas in

the Galapagos among the conservation, Park and fishing sectors.

Working together will be key to building trust and confidence in the

system. One person in the conservation sector recognizes:

The only solution we’re ever going to have here is through workingtogether and working through differences. It is the individuals, andin some cases even institutions whose way of working is divide andconquer, those are the ones that are hurting us and the problem isthat they are finding more fertile ground right now than those of uswho are building bridges. The solution is convincing everyone toreject any thesis, which is built on not listening to another sector.

Effective co-management is based on teamwork and “Working together

towards common goals requires collective action. Trust and mutual

respect are essential for this to happen without undue conflict.”

(McConney 2004 p.16).

4.2.3. Non-participatory and token participation

In the Galapagos there is the well-publicized facade of co-management

and working together as a team with the local community, when in reality

the efforts made on the part of the conservation organizations could be

interpreted as token gestures. Well-intentioned documents stay

unimplemented and talk of participatory management remains just that,

talk about participatory management. The climate of insincerity and lack

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of trust by the stakeholders is revealed in the non-participatory and token

management system. One of the people interviewed in the conservation

sector said it best:

From my perspective, while we talk about participatorymanagement we have retained centralized management. I thinkthat we need to think about more skills, persons that are actuallyexperienced in doing participatory management and use thoseskills here to reinforce the legislative basis to truly do participatorymanagement, instead of taking decisions one at a time. I think thatbecause we are going through change and we have a situationwhere we have had a top down management system, whathappens if you don’t have experience you end up getting hurt byit.

The Galapagos participatory management system falls between non-

participatory and tokenism on Sherry Arnstein’s “Ladder of Participation.”

The first two rungs of participation are identified as non-participatory

where the objective is not to truly have the participants have a say, but

where those with the power try to “educate” or “cure” the other

stakeholders (Arnstein 1969). A problem perceived by the conservation

sector is that the fishermen don’t understand why there are regulations:

They [the fishermen] were overwhelmed with all the regulationsand still need to understand the benefits these policies carry. If theywould understand better, I think they would respect the rules more.I believe they violate and disrespect the rules due to lack ofunderstanding.

While discussing the successes of the Participatory Management Board

(PMB) one of the conservationists points out:

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In the first place that it exists at all is a success. It [the PMB] has triedto implement an effective management plan with the input andagreement of all parties, but until the fishing industry understandsthe concept of long-term sustainability, and accepts it as the basisfor fishing policy, there is little chance of it being successful.

In fact, the fishermen also desire to have a continuous resource, though

they require an economically viable resource. When several people in the

fishing sector were asked, “What are your goals for the fisheries

management in the GMR?” their answer was:

[A] sustainable fishery that provides sufficient economic income.

Another concern expressed by the conservation sector is that the

fishermen need to learn how to manage their finances:

Ideally, we’d also like to emphasize the importance of fiscalresponsibility in the household, which is universally recognized aspart of the problem. It’s not just how much income they have, it’show they manage the income they do have, partly because it allcomes in four months and then they’ve got to manage it for therest of the year, and partly because, at least what thegeneralization is of how fishermen tend to spend their income.

The next three rungs on the “Ladder of Participation” are associated with

tokenism, where those in power allow the others to voice their opinion,

knowing full well that the powerholders will be the ones who ultimately

decide the outcome (Arnstein 1969). One person in conservation honestly

put it:

They [the fishermen] don’t believe in the system, unfortunately,based on a very simple reality, which is they are one out of fivegroups that sit at the table and their activity is diametricallyopposed to the interest of everyone else at the table, so they

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never get their way. The reason they never get their way isbecause, the bottom line, is their activity is not compatible with theeconomic interests of this country and these islands. Tourismproduces 150 million dollars for this country every year and fishing,in its best year, generates 6 million. We don’t have the institutionalstrength or the stakeholder level of commitment to long-terminterests and we don’t have the resource levels, and this would behotly debated, to support an extractive fishery.

As a minority it is difficult to believe in a participatory system if everyone is

not fairly represented and respected. Another person in conservation

comments on the defensiveness of the fishing sector:

The fishermen are always ready to fight because they think theyare being taken.

A person from the Park expresses why the fishermen are choosing to

circumvent the participatory management system:

Due to the weakness of the government they [fishermen] learn thatthey can get what they want. After 2003, they started again withstrikes due to weaknesses in the government. Instead of using theParticipatory Management Board and Inter-institutionalManagement Authority they knew they could obtain what theywanted outside the system.

In the March 2004 issue of MPA News, Cecilia Falconi of WildAid describes

the above incident, where the fishermen went straight to the federal level

rather than discussing their issues with the participatory management

board, “The fishing sector started planning to eliminate the fishing

regulation and impose the adoption of longlines after witnessing how the

tourism sector got what it wanted without playing by the rules.” (MPA

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2004, 6). It is interesting to note that when discussing the above incident

the fact that the tourism sector has also taken this tactic was never

mentioned.

4.2.4. Special Law is not implemented and migration continues

In theory the Special Law and the Galapagos Marine Reserve

Management Plan (GMRMP) are worthy documents. However, many

parts of these documents continue to be ignored, resulting in mistrust and

mismanagement of the GMR. The participatory management process

lacks the team spirit and credibility necessary for people to take the

Special Law and GMRMP seriously. Inadequate communication among

sectors, uneven application of the laws, and a short supply of funding for

enforcement are a few of the contributing factors to this conflictive

atmosphere. In the 2001/2002 Galapagos Report the total number of

residents reported, including temporary residents, was 15,846 (Galapagos

Report 2002). A recent Science article on the Galapagos cited the

population as 27,000 (Boersma, Vargas, and Merlen 2005). As migration

increases, all issues will intensify, including fishing. The most common form

of illegal fishing is Hookah diving, which requires relatively little skill. The

Hookah air system “uses no high pressure air tanks [such as SCUBA]. . .

Instead, it uses a small air compressor, which is located at the surface. It is

commonly powered by a portable gasoline engine or electric motor, and

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the air is delivered to the diver via a floating air hose.”

(www.keeneengineering.com). A major success of the Special Law is that

the Galapagos community was able to ban industrial fishing in the GMR,

yet because of lack of enforcement industrial fishing still takes place. As

one fisherman points out the failure of the Special Law is that:

It does not assure that only legal fishermen are fishing within theMarine Reserve.

When a Park person was asked if there are industrial fishing boats in the

GMR right now, the reply was:

I am sure of it, since the Park can no longer enforce as they didbefore.

In addition to lack of enforcement, it is often difficult to prosecute

offenders due to corruption. Many of the industrial ships are based on

mainland Ecuador and have significant political clout. The artisanal

fishermen of the Galapagos realize this and perceive themselves as the

scapegoat for more powerful law offenders. Early this year in Quito’s

primary newspaper, El Comercio, 11 January 2005, a Galapagos artisanal

fisherman was interviewed for an article by Franklin Vega regarding the

controversial use of the longlining method in the Galapagos:

Until now only the large tourism companies, the conservationists,and the industrial fishing fleets from Manta [mainland Ecuador] andCosta Rica use the resources of the property, which they do notown. The large fishing boats enter the Reserve uncontrolled. Thedifference between the large boats and the small fishermen, is thatthey [those enforcing the law] only watch our every move.

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It is important to realize that even if the Galapagos fishermen left the

islands, there would be many illegal fishermen to take their place.

The Special Law also describes in detail the prerequisites for becoming a

permanent or temporary resident (Special Law, 1998). Nevertheless, the

Galapagos population is rapidly increasing. A Galapagos resident

mentioned that there is an estimated forty percent of the total population

living illegally on the islands. One person in conservation states:

Migration has to stop. Management of a place depends on thevolume. If it keeps going up it can’t work.

Regarding the migration issues facing the Galapagos, a fisherman

emphasizes:

After the law [Special Law of the Galapagos 1998] migrationincreased, the opposite of what was intended.

In any environment population growth will threaten conservation issues.

Mistrust and lack of collaboration compounds the problem. The

participatory management system is clearly not living up to its

expectations. Illegal fishing and migration are largely a result of an

inadequate system perpetuated by mistrust and an unwillingness to work

together. The Galapagos fishermen could be a valuable asset in

enforcing the law, since they spend a good part of their time out at sea

and could help the Park patrol. However, because the fishermen are

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often targeted by these very institutions and are not equally included in

the participatory process there is an inherent mistrust of the system and no

desire to work together.

4.2.5. Poor communication among sectors

Ineffectively sharing information and selective interpretation of data are

two areas repeatedly discussed among the stakeholders. The importance

of engaging in dialogue is mentioned, yet communicating information

continues to be an enormous obstacle in the participatory management

system. Poor communication precipitates misunderstanding and

misinterpretation, and provides a shield to hide behind. Much can be

blamed on poor communication. One conservation person summarizes

the communication situation:

I would say the communication between sectors is grosslyinadequate.

Each sector describes the necessity to have a way to distribute

information and engage in dialogue. Many describe the damage being

caused by not having more interaction. Communication should take

place at every level. When asked about the present state of

communication, one conservation person answered:

I don’t think there is something organized for accessing researchinformation. I don’t believe there is a strategy. A strategy should be,for example, having all relevant information at the ParticipatoryManagement Board (PMB) office, and everybody should know that

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information is transparent and available for them. A tool to achievethis could be digitalizing all information and make it availablethrough a website. This website should also have the minutes andother documents generated by the PMB. Every sector should keepits own information and have their own internal policies concerningwhat they will share.

The GMRMP specifically states the responsibility of the PMB to “design,

fulfill, evaluate, propose, aid and implement communication and

information systems . . . to ensure and guarantee participation and

representation of each sector.” (GNP Management Plan 1999, 6.3.3.3.d.).

All organizations could benefit by taking responsibility in disseminating

information and keep people informed. One conservationist candidly

said:

I think we’ve perhaps not done as much as we could [referring togetting information to the local community]. For example, wesometimes use terminology that can be interpreted in differentways. When we talk about economic extension of a species, youknow, some of the people, as good as they are, find this as sayingsea cucumbers are going extinct. Sometimes I think we need to beclearer and perhaps speak more with the local community. . . So,there is certain terminology that scientists use that needs to betranslated into laymen’s terms. And, I think that’s something we’vegot to look into.

One of the fishermen discusses the need to clarify and distribute

information more effectively as well as using data from a variety of

sources:

There is a lot of scientific and technical information from the CDF[Charles Darwin Foundation]. [We] need to figure out how todisseminate the information, so everyone understands. There needto be scientists working for the fisheries sector. The Instituto de

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Pesquera Nacional [National Fisheries Institute] doesn’t exist in theGalapagos.

In Ben-Yami’s Managing Artisanal Fisheries of Galapagos report, there is

an emphasis on the importance of having outside, unbiased participation

in evaluating the fisheries if there is to be adequate credibility in the

system (Ben-Yami 2001).

In Robert Chambers’ The Origins and Practice of Participatory Rural

Appraisal, he recognizes the contributions of social anthropology to

participatory practices. Several valuable points are, “the idea of field

learning as flexible art rather than rigid science, the value of field

residence, unhurried participant-observation, and conversations, [and]

the importance of attitudes, behavior and rapport.” (Chambers 1994,

955). Spending more time and effort on helping the different sectors

understand each other was repeatedly expressed by the fishing sector:

If people who are involved in management go on the fishing boats,they can get a better understanding of the type of work beingdone. [Among the sectors we need] more joint projects, moreteamwork and alliances to develop projects.

Stakeholders recognize that they need to learn how to discuss their ideas

and reach a consensus, but little is being done to achieve this goal.

Several conservation stakeholders raise this issue. One person describes:

Problems start when consensus is not understood. If you don’t knowhow to reach a consensus, there will never be dialogue, analysis or

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discussion, and proposals won’t be presented. When every sectortried to impose their criteria, dialogue stopped.

Another conservation person emphasizes the lack of knowledge and skills

regarding productive discussion:

People need to understand what a consensus is, how to argue.Right now, we don’t even know how to argue. We go and we fightour point and that’s not the way to reach a consensus. So, we havea system in place, but none of us, and that’s including theconservation sector, know how to use it yet. It’s new. It’s a learningprocess.

Another person in conservation points out:

. . . the root problem is a lack of confidence between the sectors,that’s the root problem. It’s got to be through openly discussingwhat the problems are, creatively seeking solutions and responsiblyimplementing them, it’s the only way.

Several people in the conservation, Park, and fishing sectors brought up

the need to have meetings and discussions without the pressure of having

to make immediate decisions. Presently, participatory management

meetings are held primarily when pressing issues need to be resolved. In

general, these issues, such as sport fishing or longlining, are highly

controversial, causing the stakeholders to enter their meetings in a

defensive mode. The following fishermen comments on the need for

general dialogue:

It is important to have conversations without the politics of eachsector. . .Things cannot be done by force. People have to moveforward willingly. All need to speak and have dialogue withoutforce.

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Many mention the need to meet on a regular basis throughout the year

and the necessity of being notified of meetings well in advance. People

are often notified of meetings on such short notice that it is impossible for

them to attend. One person in the fishing sector described being

informed of a meeting just a few days in advance. This group of fishermen

is from another island and needs several hours travel time.

It is not respectful to have meetings on short notice. People need toplan ahead and it is costly.

The Caribbean co-managers in the McConney et al. article stress “the

need for considerable improvement in communication, cooperation and

coordination.” (McConney 2004, 21). Formal communication is critical to

the success of co-management. Sometimes informal avenues may

appear more efficient, but in the end “transparency and institutional

memory are weakened by the absence of recorded decisions.” (ibid., 21).

4.2.6. Selective interpretation of data

In Ben-Yami’s article “Fisheries Management: something has gone wrong,”

the importance of scientific validation if fisheries management plans are

to be supported is described (Ben-Yami 2003, 2). Often the methods used

to evaluate fisheries and establish management rules and regulations are

inaccurate or do not objectively represent the collected data. Inevitably,

this will result in questionable results and not surprisingly will elicit objection

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from the groups adversely affected. There must be a unanimously agreed

upon evaluation procedure in place and as Ben-Yami states, “scientific

recommendations put forth to managers should always be critically

assessed by scientists totally independent on the recommending

institutions and the managing authorities.” (Ben-Yami 2003, 3). Accurate

representation of information and objectivity in data evaluation is

essential if fisheries rules and regulations are to be respected and upheld.

One of the many reasons for monitoring and research in the Galapagos

Marine Reserve is to determine if certain types of fishing practices

adversely affect the environment. Due to the increasing concern of

coastal resource extraction, the conservation, and Park sectors continue

to encourage the fishermen to seek alternative job opportunities or to

approach their field of work in a different way, such as reducing fishing

efforts, selling higher value fish in lower quantities, and fishing offshore.

Coastal areas are more fragile and endangered than the offshore

locations of the Reserve. A common fishing technique used offshore is the

longline fishing method.

Longline fishing is frequently used for catching tuna and other types of

deep-sea fish. The illustration on page 95 shows how a longlining ship

deploys its lines. Originally, longlines stretched as far as 130 kilometers with

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up to 3,200 hooks hanging from the line (www.seafood.com). However,

today’s longline gear tends to be more conservation friendly, does not

cover as broad an area, and the space between the hooks is slightly less

than the length of a football field, reducing the amount of bycatch

(www.seafood.com). Bycatch is defined as “living creatures that are

caught unintentionally by fishing gear.” (SeaGrant, 1). Also, using lighter,

longer monofilament gear increases the survival rate of the targeted fish,

and the bycatch, which is then released alive. (www.seafood.com).

Nevertheless, the longlining technique is controversial because certain

types of longlining gear use result in high bycatch percentages.

www.birdsaustralia.com.au/ albatross/longline.html

Figure 4.1 Surface longlining diagram

One of the reasons the conservation and tourism sector in the Galapagos

are particularly concerned about longlining in the Marine Reserve is that

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certain types of tuna are found along the thermocline. Www.esr.org

defines thermocline as the “depth at which the rate of decrease of

temperature with increase of depth is the largest. . . A simplified view is to

consider the thermocline as the separation zone between the mixed-layer

[of water] above . . . and the deep ocean. In the tropics [Ecuador], the

thermocline can be quite shallow . . .[164 feet] (www.esr.org). The

Galapagos thermocline is particularly shallow, 30 to 100 feet

(www.galapaguide.com). Placing longlines at this shallow depth

increases the chances for bycatch.

GALAPAGOS

THERMOCLINE

library.thinkquest.org/ 20901/overview_4.htm

Figure 4.2 Galapagos thermocline diagram

In an article by the National Fisheries Institute and the Blue Water

Fishermen’s Association, the authors describe how previously the goal of

longlining was to catch the greatest amount of fish in the least amount of

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time, but now conservation and sustainability are becoming the focus

(www.fishingnj.org). As the deputy director of World Wildlife Fund-US

(WWF) mentions in a recent article, “The good news is that researchers

have found that simple, inexpensive changes in fishing hook technology

can reduce longline turtle mortality by as much as 90 %, while not

adversely affecting the fishery catches.” (WWF 2004, 1). The Inter-

American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), the U.S. National Oceanic

and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and WWF have been

conducting fishing experiments and working with fishermen in Ecuador on

more environmentally friendly longline fishing methods (WWF 2004, 1).

Nevertheless, when the possibilities for offshore longlining were recently

discussed in the Galapagos, the longline fishing technique was turned

down by the Participatory Management Board. The Inter-Institutional

Management Authority at the federal level is currently evaluating it. One

member of the conservation sector observes:

The failure of the Galapagos Marine Management Plan (GMRMP)

was leaving a loophole for longlining. It is in the GMRMP that

longlining is an accepted fishing method subject to special

regulations and in my opinion, having left it there, although it was

necessary at the time, it’s important to recognize it’s a flaw, but it’s

a flaw maybe that was inevitable.

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Allowing longlining in the GMRMP was a stipulation that needed to be

included in order for the Management Plan to be approved. Although

longlining was accepted in the GMRMP, in 2000 longlining was prohibited

from the Galapagos Marine Reserve. Given these circumstances, it would

seem reasonable to discuss in-depth some of the more conservation-

oriented methods of longlining. One fisherman recommends revisiting a

study carried out by the Park and the fishermen in 2003:

Longlining should be permitted ten miles offshore. They need to

review the longline offshore Pilot Plan 2003 done between 30-100

meters [100-329 feet] deep.

The Participatory Management Board (PMB) uses monitoring and research

as tools for decision making and shaping fishing policies. At first glance,

the system appears fair and resembles the Robert Chambers’

Participatory Rural Appraisal process, which is “more participatory and

empowering, meaning that outsiders are convenors, catalysts and

facilitators who enable people to undertake and share their own

investigations and analysis.” (Chambers 1994, 958). Galapagos

researchers and Galapagos National Park personnel occasionally join

fishermen on their fishing boats to collect data. However, once the data is

collected and sorted, there is the tendency to present it in an unobjective

manner.

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In the 2003 Pilot Plan the bycatch from a March longlining trip recorded

77% bycatch (7.7 out of 10 was unintended catch)(Figure 4.3). In October,

November, and December a total of seven longlining trips averaged 35%

bycatch (3.5 out of 10 was unintended catch)(Figure 4.4). In the pie charts

the various longlining methods are represented as one method. No

bycatch differentiations are made for the various longlining methods

used. The bycatch of the fisherman with whom I spoke was only 16% (1.6

out of 10 was unintended catch). This fisherman used a more

environmentally friendly longlining method. However, this low statistic was

averaged in with the bycatch of other boats, resulting in the higher

percentage of 35% (Figure 4.4).

Source: Galapagos Pilot Report 2004 Source: Galapagos Pilot Report 2004

Figure 4.3 Bycatch pie chart for one Figure 4.4 Combined bycatch pie fishing trip chart for seven fishing trips

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In his 2001 Consultancy Report, Ben-Yami explains that monitoring systems

are important aspects of participatory management systems, but are

often issues contributing to skepticism and mistrust in the system (Ben-Yami

2001). In Fisheries Management: something has gone wrong, Ben-Yami

recognizes that one of the many reasons fishery management can go

wrong, is the science used for stock assessments. He continues, “Use of

figures obtained from mathematical models that don’t reflect realities of

the system produces flawed assessment of the stock and hence of the

recommended allowable catch or effort.” (Ben-Yami 2003, 6). Ben-Yami

also emphasizes the importance of assessments independent of the

recommending institutions and the managing authorities (Ben-Yami 2003).

One Park person expressed satisfaction with the current participatory

management and monitoring systems:

I think it [the decision making system] is transparent and clear. The

Foundation [CDF] does the investigations and the National Park

analyzes the investigations [research] and lets everyone know the

results, so they [the stakeholders] can analyze the results for

themselves. The problem is the results don’t always favor the

fishermen, therefore they think it is not clear, not transparent, not

good, and must be different. But, I think it is clear and transparent

and they can participate in the investigations.

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The level of participation must extend from collecting the data on the

fishing boats to analyzing and interpreting the data in a manner, which is

acceptable to all involved stakeholders. In John Forester’s Planning in the

Face of Power, he discusses how information is a complex source of

power and that “some misinformation will be unavoidable; it will flow from

some division of labor and thus knowledge, expertise, and access to

information.” (Forester 1989, 443). If stakeholders recognize that data is

represented in a biased way they will surely become uneasy and mistrust

what masquerades as collaborative efforts. Forester continues, “treating

random distortions as though they were systematic is a sign of paranoia;

treating systematic distortions as though they were merely ad hoc

phenomena is to be ethically and politically blind, assuring only repeated

surprise, disappointment, and, most likely, failure.” (Forester 1989, 443).

When discussing Galapagos fisheries zoning in general, one conservation

person summarizes the situation and the importance of reaching a

consensus without seeking international assistance.

[Regarding] specific fishing effort, it means improving respect for

and the distribution of no-take zones. That has to do with a

combination of education-based compliance and providing

incentives. Since compliance is legally binding, in theory you

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shouldn’t have to provide incentives, but in reality that may be

necessary. Also, it may become necessary to reconfigure no-take

zone based on information that becomes available. The provisional

zoning that exists now, first of all, is not fully implemented. Second, it

hasn’t been adequately tested, and third, it was established based

on what was politically feasible more than what was biologically

optimal. So, there will come a time, presumably, where adjustments

will be made, will be required. The trick will be making the

conditions attractive enough, so that those adjustments are made

through consensus rather than having to, you know, look for

international support to pressure the government to take away

fishing areas, which won’t work.

It is important to note that although to “look for international support to

pressure the government to take away fishing areas” is described as an

undesirable tactic running counter to the spirit of participatory

management by one of the conservation interviewees. A recent editorial

in Science by leaders in the Galapagos conservation sector titled “Living

Laboratory in Peril” emphasizes, “Our responsibility as scientists is to alert

institutions, governments and the public to the de-evolution of the

Galapagos Islands. The international science community must garner

strong global political support for the natural wonders of the Galapagos.

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Only then will this laboratory of evolution have a chance to persist for

another 100 years.” (Boersma, Vargas, and Merlen 2005, Editorial).

In a recent conversation with people in the fishing sector, they explained

that the conservation sector was unwilling to review their research

regarding longlining and that they [the conservation sector] were

probably under great international pressure. In fact, as the Science

editorial indicates, the conservation sector is actively soliciting this

international pressure.

Seeking outside assistance is only useful if the process is transparent and

everyone agrees that outsiders should be consulted. It is for this very

reason that the conservation sector frowned upon the fishing sector in

2004 for bypassing the Participatory Management Board and going

straight to the Inter-institutional Management Authority at the federal

level. When any stakeholders are excluded in important decision making

processes, it becomes clear they are not part of the team. Unilaterally

imposed top-down rules and distorted information represent betrayal and

continue to breed mistrust in a participatory management system. Trust is

earned over a long period and each time it is lost it becomes increasingly

difficult to rebuild.

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4.2.7. Disorganization and weakness of the sectors

Overall it appears that each sector is struggling to organize and

strengthen their sectors, though some are currently better organized than

others. Clearly, everyone in the conservation sector does not agree on an

effective strategy for integrating the conservation of the Galapagos

Marine Reserve with the social and economic needs of the islanders. The

Park has suffered greatly as a result of financial cutbacks and a constant

change in management. The four fishing cooperatives find it challenging

to establish a political hierarchy and collaborate among themselves. A

gradual simultaneous restructuring at every level is necessary. When asked

about the failures of the Galapagos Marine Management Plan one

person in the conservation sector gives an accurate description of the

situation:

Another failure of the process is not to strengthen the sectors frominside. Their organization level hasn’t been improved, neither hastheir ability to participate and negotiate. An intra-sectoral work ismissing. They are still disarticulated, disorganized; don’t have agood communication level between leaders and the bases.

When discussing effective fishing policies, one person in the fishing sector

said it is necessary to:

Restructure the cooperatives. [However] before restructuring thecooperatives, an analysis must be done of the present socialsituation of the cooperatives.

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A person from the Park sector discusses the confusion with the

disorganized fishing sector:

I was talking . . . with some fishermen . . . and they asked me to tellthe National Park that they needed a lawyer, an accountant,andsome technicians to help them to control the equipment in thefacility. One of the weakest points for the fishing co-operative is theorganization. Organization is poor. Some are thinking that if theyare, for example, president or the head of the co-operative thatthey have the power to make some decisions and are able to sayyes or no. This is the kind of problems that they have. For example, inSan Cristobal there was until two months ago, two presidents of oneco-operative and, they were dealing with the law and . . . generalco-operative [fishing] administration from Ecuador in order to figureout who was the real president. So, the people with the money . . .have to talk with both of them [fishing co-operative presidents],because they didn’t know who was the real president . . .

Regarding the organization of the fishing cooperatives another Park

person points out:

To communicate between the representatives of the fishermen andthe fishermen is important. It is not working and that[communication between fisher leaders and fishermen] is one ofthe most important problems in the communications, but the fishergroups must work on this. [What if they don’t work on it?] We needto help them, but it is very difficult because you can establish asystem of communication, and maybe it works only one or twoyears and then they change their leadership and you return to thefirst position without communication.

It is interesting to note the Park person’s concern regarding leadership

changes in the fishing cooperatives when, in fact, the Park leadership has

changed eleven times since January 2003.

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The Park is in a good position to assist in scientific, technical and

developmental issues, were it strengthened and more organized. There is

a certain amount of respect for the Park from both conservation and the

fishing sectors. However, as one Park person states:

Ideally the Park should [administrate]. Sadly, it is too weakenedand does not have the capability to do it at the moment.

In response to the question: What are your goals for the fisheries

management in the Galapagos Marine Reserve? one Park person

describes the potential of the Park:

I think the first one is you have to deal with is the National Park . . .the National Park is the administrator of all the natural resources. Inthe Marine Reserve they need their own team, their own technicalteam with expertise not only with management of fisheries, but alsoon economic and social aspects and also they need a kind ofstronger thing composed of biologists. I think it has to be in this waybecause we are talking about the administration of the naturalresources. It’s not that the people who are working now aren’tcapable of doing this, but they have some limits. I think peoplewho have a career like biology . . . can improve the work for theNational Park, in that sense.

Lack of confidence among sectors is exacerbated by disorganization of

the sectors.

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5. Implications and Conclusion

Overfishing and migration have played a significant role throughout the

latter part of Galapagos history and as long as the islands provide a

higher standard of living than the rest of Ecuador the Galapagos will

continue to attract migrants seeking a better life. Hoping that the

overfishing and migrant issues subside has and will continue to prove

counterproductive. For a variety of reasons, whether it is giving financial

compensation to fishermen who leave the islands, or insisting on

“knowing” what is best for the islands, the Galapagos stakeholders have

neglected to commit to a long-term plan which acknowledges that the

fate of social and economic developments are inextricably linked to

conservation. Identifying mutual self-interests among the stakeholders

could be the beginning of a long-term plan.

As the literature suggests, conservation efforts and local economic needs

commonly clash. Co-management and participatory management are

viewed as strategies with higher success rates than top-down, centralized

management. However, implementing participatory management

properly continues to challenge many regions throughout the world.

Taking a look at how other fields address conflict management could be

beneficial in evaluating the Galapagos situation in a more objective

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manner. Landscape architects and planners could play an important role

in assisting to bridge the gap between the environmental and biological

sciences, and the social and economic sciences. Identifying mutual self-

interests could serve as a starting point in gradually building the trust

necessary to move towards the goal of creating a sustainable Galapagos

Marine Reserve.

Interviewing stakeholders in the conservation, Park, and fishing sectors,

revealed that the Galapagos stakeholders have mutual self-interests, but

are not recognizing them. All the stakeholders want a sustainable Marine

Reserve and agree they will have to work together on some level to

achieve this goal. Insufficient economic activity, a climate of insincerity

and lack of trust, poor communication, and weak sectors continue to

drive the stakeholders apart. In theory, the participatory management

system provides a suitable framework, but a non-participatory

atmosphere and tokenism continue to dominate. By focusing on

differences and bypassing the participatory management system, mistrust

prevails and a collaborative environment fails to take hold. In order to

achieve a long-term sustainable Galapagos the stakeholders must work

together.

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Specific mutual self-interests mentioned by a number of stakeholders are

improving communication, creating reliable news sources, and improving

data collection and monitoring techniques. The conservation, Park and

fishing sectors all mentioned the importance of conducting meetings to

discuss issues without the pressure of having to make immediate decisions.

A consistent, efficient, transparent method for distributing information

(website, radio, etc.) would assist in keeping the stakeholders current on a

variety of issues.

The World Bank’s 1992 Study of International Fisheries Research criticized

fisheries research for being “disengaged from the needs of national

development objectives and from policy needs in general and for failing

to deliver information of practical value to management decisions.”

(SIFAR 2004, 1). In answering the question “Why does sustainable

management remain such an elusive goal in many fisheries systems?” the

article discusses that policy making is often still viewed as a problem-

solving process, which is “rational, balanced, objective and analytical,

informed by research and with decisions being made in logical and

sequential phases.” (ibid.) This, of course, could not be farther from the

truth. The article points out that “Fisheries management outcomes may

thus depend not so much on the knowledge available, as on the

effectiveness of the institutions in deploying that knowledge to drive policy

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processes.” (ibid.). Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)

are “an essential component of development initiatives and can act as a

powerful overall enabler of development.” (Digital Opportunities Initiative

2005, 1).

The importance of developing communication methods to promote

dialogue and debate on community and environmental issues is being

recognized throughout the world. In 2002, the United Nations Educational,

Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) started the Small Islands

Voice initiative. Their task is to use newspapers, magazines, radio,

television and the internet to build capacity and strengthen local,

regional, and inter-regional communication. Enabling islanders to have a

collective voice is key to sustainable development (UNESCO 2003).

When the interviewees from the conservation, Park, and fishing sectors

were asked where they generally get their information, there were a

variety of answers and suggestions for improvement. People turn to the

radio for fisheries information and the Charles Darwin Foundation for

scientific information. According to several sources there are reports and

regulations, but no central place to retrieve them. One person suggested

having a clearly documented yearly report available to all. Others

recommended a website and a regularly distributed newsletter. The

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Participatory Management Board (PMB) was mentioned numerous times

as the appropriate place to disseminate and house information. The

aforementioned suggestions are generally factored into the basic

operating costs of any successful company or organization.

Most agree that enabling the fishing sector is not only necessary, but is an

integral part of the long-term sustainability of the Galapagos Marine

Reserve. The certification process of the Galapagos fisheries would require

that the Park, conservation, and the fishing sectors work together closely

to develop and implement a long-term plan for a sustainable fishery in the

GMR. This could also provide the impetus for the fishing cooperatives to

organize from within. This should not be viewed as a responsibility by the

other sectors, but as an opportunity to work together and build stronger

relations among the sectors. In discussing the types of fisheries eligible for

funding, the Sustainable Fisheries Fund (SFF) emphasizes, “Although some

degree of controversy is almost inevitable in any certification process, the

level of controversy must be manageable.” (Resources Legacy Fund 2005,

1). In addition to the economic and environmental benefits of

certification, this process could contribute to a stronger participatory

management system.

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Developing a system for processing certified fish would add value to

Galapagos fish and could reduce overfishing. Currently, only a small

percentage of fish are sold directly to tour operators. The fishing

cooperatives simply are not equipped to process the fish needed by the

tourism sector. The fishing sector needs to build the infrastructure for this to

happen. The preparation necessary for the certification process will allow

the fishing sector to supply fish locally on a larger scale. Niche markets

add value to fish and provide marketing advantages. Galapagos tour

boats will pay more for certified fish than they pay for industrially caught

fish from the mainland. However, the tour companies can easily pass on

the cost to the tourists while emphasizing the importance of supporting

the local community and a more sustainable Galapagos Marine Reserve

(GMR). Conservation organizations could initiate and promote the

development of the infrastructure to process Galapagos certified fish.

Creating an economically justified community interest in the environment

would benefit all the stakeholders.

Certification could give incentive to modernize boats, improve fishing

techniques and develop the infrastructure for processing. Modernizing

boats has many benefits. It increases safety, improves vessel hygiene

conditions and facilitates the adoption of selective fishing methods

(ECFMA 2005). Selective fishing techniques, such as using certain mesh

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sizes according to the species being fished, help limit capture of other

species (ibid.). In the medium term, selective fishing benefits fishermen

(ibid.). Certification programs “have greatly reduced the incidence of

destructive fishing processes.” (UNDP 2002, 1).

Until there is truly a participatory management system in place the local

community respect necessary for the management of a sustainable

reserve will remain unattainable. Without sincerity, trust, and

accountability the participatory management system will continue to be

challenged to move beyond the current state of tokenism. The

stakeholders recognize the importance of a sustainable Galapagos.

However, there appears to be a constant tug-of-war as to what is more

important. In fact, all the concerns are significant and part of the larger

picture. There needs to be a sense of unity and understanding that the

sustainability of the Galapagos is highly dependent on the relationship

between people and wildlife.

Common goals need to be identified and a genuine attempt to reach

these goals must be made. It is important to recognize that each

individual may have a different reason for wanting to achieve the goal,

but, in the end, what is most important is that goals are achieved in a

way, which builds and reinforces a truly participatory management

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system. The stronger the system becomes, the more it will be able to

withstand. Seemingly out of reach goals will become attainable.

Identifying mutual-self interests, creating goals that include these interests,

breaking down these goals into achievable projects, and collaborating to

implement these projects will contribute to an authentic and well-

respected participatory management system.

The Galapagos Islands are truly a unique environment facing many

idiosyncratic and challenging issues. Improving communication skills,

successfully addressing conflict, and integrating participatory fisheries

management with conservation and a growing human population

continues to challenge a number of regions in the world. It is important to

turn to other places dealing with similar issues and to keep in mind no two

circumstances will ever be identical. Proactive and innovative efforts

could encourage stability and credibility in the Galapagos participatory

management system. The Galapagos Islands have the potential to be a

positive and inspiring example of successful integration of conservation

and human needs.

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APPENDIX A: Interview Guide

Interview Questions

I. What are your goals for the fisheries management in the GalapagosMarine Reserve?

¿Para Usted, cuáles cree que deberían ser los objetivos de manejode las pesquerías en la Reserva Marina de Galápagos?

II. What is necessary to have an effective fishing policy? How wouldyou implement it?

¿Qué es necesario para tener una política pesquera efectiva?¿Cómo implementaría esa política pesquera efectiva?

III. What has been successful and not so successful in the GalapagosMarine Reserve Management Plan?

¿Cuáles fueron los éxitos y los problemas durante la elaboracíon delPlan de Manejo de la Reserva Marina de Galápagos y su posteriorimplementacíon?

a. Successful: Éxitos

b. Not so successful: Fracasos

IV. Do you know of any examples of successful co-management offisheries in other parts of the world?

¿Conoce otros ejemplos que han sido éxitosos en el co-manejo delas pesquerías?

V. When do you think the problems with the different sectors started toincrease? What do you think are the primary reasons for theincreased problems?

¿Cuándo cree Usted que los problemas con los diferentes sectorescomenzarón a empeorar? ¿Cuáles son las principales razones parael incremento de los problemas? VI. What are the current channels of communication for scientific

developments, changes and decision of the fisheries? Which stepsshould be taken to improve communications between the fisheriessector and other stakeholders?

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¿Cuáles son las estrategias de comunicación para realizarinvestigación y tomar decisiones sobre el manejo pesquero en laRMG? ¿Cuáles son las medidas necesarias para mejorar lacomunicación entre el Sector Pesquero y los otros sectores?

VII. Do you think it is necessary to reduce the concentration of fishingefforts in order to make the GMR more sustainable? How would youpropose to do this?

¿Usted cree que es necesario reducir el esfuerzo pesqueroconcentración para asegurar la sostenibilidad de la RMG? ¿Cómo sedebería hacer?

VIII. What are the incentives to leave the fishing sector? What type ofassistance is presently available for fishermen choosing to leave thefishing industry?

¿Cuáles son los incentivos para dejar la actividad pesquera? ¿Quétipo de asistencia está actualmente disponible para los pescadoresque decidan dejar su actividad?

IX. How do the fishermen benefit from the fishing policies?

¿Cómo los pescadores se han benificiado de la actual políticapesquera?

X. ¿Cuales considera Usted, que son los exitos y los problemas de laJMP?

Success: make decisions together

Failure: the mixed political interests

XI. What are the common goals of the Galapagos National Park, theCharles Darwin Foundation, the fishing sector and the tourismsector?

¿Cuáles son los objetivos comunes entre el Parque NacionalGalápagos, la Fundación Charles Darwin, el Sector Pesquero y elSector Turismo?

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117

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