I. INTRODUCTION

Itiswellestablishedunderthecommonlawthatstatementsmadeoutofcourtthatareadducedtoprovefactscontainedinthestatementsaregenerallynotadmissibleasevidence–thisrulebeingotherwiseknownasthehearsayrule.1LordNormand’sjudgmentinthecelebratedPrivyCouncildecisionofLejzorTeper v. The Queen isofteninvokedtoexplaintherationaleofthisrule:

Theruleagainsttheadmissionofhearsayevidenceisfundamental.Itisnot

* LL.B. (Hons) (University of Melbourne);Assistant Registrar, Supreme Court ofSingapore**LL.B.(NUS)2007,LL.M.(Harvard)2010;LecturerofLaw,SingaporeManagementUniversity1 ThisdefinitionofthehearsayrulewasadoptedbytheHouseofLordsinRegina v. Sharp [1988]1W.L.R.7at11andRegina v. Kearley[1992]2A.C.228at254and259.ButinRegina v. Kearley,LordAcknerobservedat254that“theprecisescopeoftheruleagainsthearsay is in some respectsamatterof controversy [and] thereareavarietyofformulationsof the rule”.Thus, inColinTapper,Cross & Tapper on Evidence (OxfordUniversity Press, 11th Ed, 2007), it is stated at p 587 that the “hearsay rule has oftenbeenregardedasoneofthemostcomplexandmostconfusingoftheexclusionaryrulesofevidence”.Atthemostbasiclevel,however,itmaybesaid,asisstatedinPhipson on Evidence(HodgeMMalekgened)(Sweet&Maxwell,16thEd,2005)atpara28-01,“astatementmadeoutsidethecourtroom,regardlessofitsrelevance,cannotbeadducedinevidenceforahearsaypurpose”.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HEARSAY RULE

Lee Chez Kee v. Public Prosecutor [2008] 3 Sing. L.R.(R) 447Public Prosecutor v. Lee Chez Kee [2007] 1 Sing. L.R.(R) 1142

The Court of Appeal recently delivered an important judgment on the admissibility of a specific type of evidence that is an exception from the hearsay rule. What happens when, in a “group crime” situation, the Prosecution adduces evidence in the form of a confession of a deceased co-accused who was not jointly tried? Does s. 378(1)(b)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Code become an avenue for the admission of such a piece of evidence, or does s. 378(1)(b)(i) need to be read together with s. 30 of the Evidence Act? This note considers if the Court of Appeal was correct in overruling the High Court’s decision that answered the former question in the affirmative. It also analyses the Court of Appeal’s broader and perhaps more important discussion on the relationship between the hearsay rule, the Evidence Act, and the Criminal Procedure Code.

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NathaNiel YoNg-erN KhNg* aNd CheN SiYuaN**

23 Recent Developments In The Hearsay Rule (2010)

thebestevidenceanditisnotdeliveredonoath.Thetruthfulnessandaccuracyofthepersonwhosewordsarespokentobyanotherwitnesscannotbetestedbycross-examination,andthelightwhichhisdemeanourwouldthrowonhistestimonyislost.2

InSingapore,therelationshipbetweenthiscommonlawruleandtheEvidenceAct3–withoutfirstmentioningtheCriminalProcedureCode4–hasquiteclearlybeenamatterofcontroversyinthecourtsandevenintheacademiccircles.5Thereareanumberofviews–sufficeittosaythatononeview,thecommonlawhearsayruleessentiallyoperatesindependentlyoftheEvidenceAct;6onanotherview,thehearsayruleoperatesthroughs.62oftheEvidenceAct,whichrequiresoralevidence(andonlyoralevidence)tobedirect;7andonyetanotherview,thehearsayrule“operatespurelyinthecontextofwhetherastatementisdeclaredtoberelevantorirrelevantinPartIofthe[Evidence]Act.”8Bethatasitmay,boththeEvidenceActandtheCriminalProcedureCodeseeminglycontainexceptionsto thehearsayrulefor theadmissionofhearsayevidence.9

Recently,intheseminaldecisionLee Chez Kee v. Public Prosecutor (“Lee Chez Kee”),10 a casewhich involved amurder committed in furtherance of a commonintention,theCourtofAppealsetoutitsopinionon:(a)theconceptualbasisfortheapplicabilityofthehearsayruleintheEvidenceAct(andconcomitantlytheCriminalProcedureCode);and(b)theambitofoneexceptiontotheruleinthecriminallawcontext,viz,s.378(1)(b)(i)oftheCriminalProcedureCode.Thisprovisionstates:

378.—(1)Inanycriminalproceedingsastatementmade,whetherorallyorinadocumentorotherwise,byanypersonshall,subjecttothissectionandsection379 and to the rules of law governing the admissibility of confessions, beadmissibleasevidenceofanyfactstatedthereinofwhichdirectoralevidencebyhimwouldbeadmissible,if—

(b)itisshownwithrespecttohim—(i)thatheisdead,orisunfitbyreasonofhisbodilyormentalconditiontoattendasawitness;…

2 [1952]A.C.480at486.SeealsoRegina v. Blastland [1986]1A.C.41at54.3 (Cap.97,1997Rev.Ed.Sing.)(“theEvidence Act”).4 (Cap.68,1985Rev.Ed.Sing.)(“theCriminal Procedure Code”).5 SeeJefferyPinsler,Evidence, Advocacy and the Litigation Process(LexisNexis,2003)at70.6 SeeSubramaniamv. Public Prosecutor[1956]M.L.J.220at222.7 SeeLim Ah Oh v. Rex[1950]M.L.J.269at270andSoon Peck Wah v. Woon Che Chye,[1997]3Sing.L.R.(R)430atpara.27.SeealsoPSAtchuthenPillai,TheLawofEvidence(N.M.TripathiPrivateLimited,1984)at85.8 Pinsler,Evidence, Advocacy and the Litigation Process,supranote5,at70.SeeRoy S Selvarajah v. Public Prosecutor,[1998]3Sing.L.R.(R)119atpara.40.9 Seeforinstancess.6–40oftheEvidence Act;andss.378–382oftheCriminal Procedure Code.10 [2008]3Sing.L.R.(R)447.[2008]3Sing.L.R.(R)447.

InLee Chez Kee,themajorityofthecourtcomprisingV.K.RajahJAandChooHanTeckJtooktheviewthatcertainstatementsoftheappellant’saccomplice,TooYinSheong(“Too”),whohadalreadybeensentencedtodeathafterbeingconvictedinanearliertrial(forthesamemurder)andwassubsequentlyexecuted,werewronglyadmittedasadditionalevidencebythetrialjudge.Themainreasongivenwasthats.378(1)(b)(i)oftheCriminalProcedureCodehadtobereadtogetherwiths.30oftheEvidenceAct,andnot independentlyofit.11Itwillbeappropriatetosetouts.30oftheEvidenceActatthisjuncture:

30.Whenmorepersonsthanonearebeingtriedjointlyforthesameoffence,and a confessionmade by one of such persons affecting himself and someother of such persons is proved, the courtmay take into consideration theconfessionasagainsttheotherpersonaswellasagainstthepersonwhomakestheconfession.

Explanation.—“Offence”asusedinthissectionincludestheabetmentoforattempttocommittheoffence.

(a)AandBarejointlytriedforthemurderofC.ItisprovedthatAsaid“BandImurderedC”.ThecourtmayconsidertheeffectofthisconfessionasagainstB.(b)AisonhistrialforthemurderofC.ThereisevidencetoshowthatCwasmurderedbyAandBandthatBsaid:“AandImurderedC”.ThisstatementmaynotbetakenintoconsiderationbythecourtagainstAasBisnotbeingjointlytried.

WooBihLiJ(theminority),ontheotherhand,wasoftheopinionthatthetrialjudgedidnoterrinadmittingthestatementsinquestion,giventhatitseemedapparentonseveralcountsthatParliament’sultimateintentionwastoadmittheconfessionsofaccomplicesunders.378(1)(b)(i)oftheCriminalProcedureCode.12

AlthoughtheleadingjudgmentofRajahJAalsoaccordedsubstantialtreatmentinattemptingtoresolvethetroublingdoctrineofcommonintentionunders.34ofthePenalCode,13thisnotefocusessolelyonthecourt’sconsiderationofthehearsayissue.14Tothatend,itconsidersboththejudgmentsofthemajorityandtheminority,andcomestotheconclusionthatwhilethemajority’sjudgmentclearsupmuchofthe uncertainty that exists in this area of law, some uncertainties remain. Briefly,uncertaintiesremainastotheextenttowhichcommonlawexceptionstothehearsayrulethatarenotfoundintheEvidenceActareapplicableinSingapore,aswellasthepossibilityofadmittingstatementsmadebydeadaccomplicesvias.32(c)ofthe

11 Ibid.atpara.103–117.12 Ibid.at295.13 (Cap.224,1985Rev.Ed.Sing.).(Cap.224,1985Rev.Ed.Sing.).14 �or a case comment on the common intention issue, seeNathanielKhng andChen�or a case comment on the common intention issue, seeNathanielKhng andChenSiyuan,“RecentDevelopmentsinCommonIntention”(2009)21SAcLJ557.

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EvidenceAct.Beforegoingintothat,however,itmightbehelpfulto:(a)setoutabriefsummary

of thefactsof thecase;and(b)summarisethedecision(inspecificrelationtothehearsayissue)ofthetrialjudge.15

II. THE�ACTSO�LEE CHEZ KEE

Toohadbefriendedthedeceased(“D”),amaleprofessor,sometimein1993.Theirfriendshipgrew,andeventually,ToowasinvitedtoD’shouse.InthecourseofToo’svisit,DsuddenlystartedtouchingToo’sbodyandthighs.Toofeltveryuneasyandleft.Hethenmetupwithhisfriends,NgChekSiong(“Ng”)andtheappellantLeeChezKee(“Lee”),andtheyhatchedaplantorobDathishouse.

On12December1993,thetrioexecutedtheirplantorobD.TooarrangedtomeetDathishomeonthepretextofintroducingafriendtohim.Uponreachingthehouse,TooandLeechattedwithDoverdrinks.Whathappenedafterthatwasthesubjectofconflictingaccounts.

AccordingtoLee,whilehechattedwithD,Toohadtakenaknifefromthekitchenandpassedittohim,whereuponheusedittothreatenD.Dstruggled,andLeestabbedhis abdominal region twice, but theknife didnot penetrate successfully.Lee alsorainedanumberofblowsonD.Afterthat,TooandLeeledDupstairstoabedroom.They tiedhimup.Lee ransacked thehousewhileToo remained in the room.Leeeventuallywentdownstairs andonhisway,he sawToocoveringD’s facewithapillow.Ngcameintothehousetosearchformorevaluablesbeforethetrioescaped.

According to Too, when D chatted with Lee, he slipped into the kitchen andtookaknife.Whenhereturned,Leebrandishedhisknife.ToodidlikewiseandtheydemandedinformationfromDastowheretheycouldgetmoney.TheytookDtothesecondfloorandtiedhimupinhisroomandransackedthehouse.Beforetheyleft,LeestabbedD.TheknifedidnotpenetratefullysoLeeusedacordtostrangleDinstead.LeeonlyreleasedhisgripafterDbeganfrothingatthemouth.TooandLeecontinuedsearchingforvaluablesandatsomepoint,LeehitD’shead.TooandLeethenleftthehouse.

Twodayslater,thepolicefoundD’sbodyinhishousewhichappearedtohavebeenransacked.Dwasfoundwithapillowoverhisface.Hiswristsweretiedtogetherwithanelectricalcord,andhisfeetboundbyabelt.Anotherelectricalcordwasfoundacrossthefrontofhisneck.Abentknifewasfoundbeneathhisbody,andachopperwasalsofoundinthehall.Intotal,18externalinjuries(includingstabwounds)werecausedtoD.Thecauseofdeathwasasphyxiaduetostrangulation;thestabwoundswerenotacutelyfatal.

TooandNgwereconvictedin1998.Toowasconvictedofmurder,andNgwasconvictedofrobbery,theftandcheating,allwithcommonintention.Leewasonlyarrestedin2006andhistrialproceededwithouttheoraltestimoniesofTooandNgas:(a)theformerhadbeensentencedtosufferdeathandhadbeenexecuted;and(b)thelatterhadbeenrepatriatedandcouldnotbefoundthereafter.Attheendofthe

15 Public Prosecutor v. Lee Chez Kee,[2007]1Sing.L.R.(R)1142.

trial,Leewasconvictedandsentencedtosufferdeath.Onappeal,hisconvictionandsentencewereupheld.

III. THEDECISIONO�THETRIALJUDGEINRELATIONTOTHEHEARSAYISSUE

Abriefrecapitulationofwhattranspiredattrialisnowinorder,beforeanalysingthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealon:(a)theconceptualbasisofthehearsayruleintheEvidenceAct (and concomitantly the interplay between the common law hearsayrule, theEvidenceAct,and theCriminalProcedureCode);and(b) theambitofs.378(1)(b)(i)oftheCriminalProcedureCode.

SinceTooandLeewerenottriedjointly,theProsecutionsimplycouldnotattempttoadmitToo’sconfessionsunders.30oftheEvidenceAct.16TheProsecution,however,arguedthatsinceToohaddied,hisconfessionswereneverthelessadmissibleunders.378(1)(b)(i)oftheCriminalProcedureCode.Thedefencecounteredthisbyarguingthatthestatementswerenotonlyhearsayanddidnotfallunderanyexceptionstothehearsayrule,butthats.378(1)(b)(i)–andtherestofs.378forthematter–couldnotactasaplatformtoadmitotherwiseinadmissibleconfessions.

Indeed, theheartof the issue resided in theproperconstructionofaparticularphrase(whichthetrialjudgehadtermedthe“qualifyingphrase”)ins.378(1)oftheCriminalProcedureCode;specifically,“subject…totherulesoflawgoverningtheadmissibilityofconfessions”.Inotherwords,didthequalifyingphraseonlyrefertotherequirementsofthevoluntariness ofconfessions,17ordiditrefertoall the rules of law (suchass.30oftheEvidenceAct)governingtheadmissibilityofconfessions?

Thetrialjudgedetermined,asapreliminaryissue,thatToo’sstatementsnecessarilyfellwithinthegeneralpurviewofthehearsayrule.Heconsideredthehearsayruleasbeing“exclusionary”innature,althoughthehearsayrulewasrestatedstatutorilyinan“inclusionary”formvias.37718oftheCriminalProcedureCode.19SinceToowasabsentfromtheproceedingsbeforehim,hisstatementsfellwithinthepurviewofs.377,andcouldonlybeadmissibleif“oneofthestatutoryexceptionsundereitherthe[CriminalProcedureCode]ortheEvidenceActcouldbeshowntoapply.”20

Thetrialjudgethenrecitedthebackgroundtos.378(1)oftheCriminalProcedureCode.21He stated that s. 378(1)was initially s. 371C(1)(b)(i)within cl. 23of the

16 Seepara.4wheres.30oftheEvidenceActisfullysetout.Seepara.4wheres.30oftheEvidenceActisfullysetout.17 ThetestforwhetheraconfessionhasbeenvoluntarilymadeisdeterminedbywhetheritThetestforwhetheraconfessionhasbeenvoluntarilymadeisdeterminedbywhetheritwascausedbyanyinducement,threatorpromise:sees.122oftheCriminalProcedureCodeands24oftheEvidenceAct.SeealsoChan Chien Wei Kelvin v. Public Prosecutor, [1998]3Sing.L.R.(R)619atpara.45.18 “Inanycriminalproceedingsastatementotherthanonemadebyapersonwhilegiving“InanycriminalproceedingsastatementotherthanonemadebyapersonwhilegivingoralevidenceinthoseproceedingsshallbeadmissibleasevidenceofanyfactstatedthereintotheextentthatitissoadmissiblebyvirtueofanyprovisionofthisCodeoranyotherwrittenlaw,butnototherwise.”19 Public Prosecutor v. Lee Chez Kee,supranote15,atpara.27–28.20 Ibid.atpara.28.21 Ibid.atpara.36.

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CriminalProcedureCode(Amendment)Bill1975(“theCPCBill”).22Theproposeds. 371C(1)(b)(i) had been adapted from cl. 31(1) of theDraft Criminal EvidenceBill (“the UK Bill”) suggested by the United Kingdom Criminal Law RevisionCommittee.23Thetrialjudgehighlightedthefactthats.378(1)wassimilarlywordedtocl.31(1)oftheUKBill,albeitcontainingadistinctioninthatcl.31(1)was“subject…tosection2[ie,cl.2oftheUKBill]ofthisAct”,asopposedtobeingsubjecttothequalifyingphrasefoundins.378(1)oftheCriminalProcedureCode.24

Proceedingonthatbasis,giventheconnectionandthesimilaritybetweens.378(1)oftheCriminalProcedureCodeandcl.31(1)oftheUKBill,thetrialjudgeconcludedthat “the rules of law governing the admissibility of confessions” necessarilycorresponded to the rules set out in cl. 2, viz, the requirement of voluntariness.25Pertinently,thetrialjudgemadethisobservation:26

Though no explanation was expressly furnished in either the parliamentarydebatesortheSelectCommitteediscussionsontheCPCBill,givenitslineage,thequalifyingphraseintheproposeds.371C(1)oftheCPCBill–andsubsequentlyins.378(1)ofthe[CriminalProcedureCode]–waspresumablyintendedasasubstituteforthereferenceincl.31(1)oftheUKBilltocl.2ofthesameBill.Theequationofthequalifyingphraseandcl.2oftheUKBillwouldalsocomportwiththeclosecoincidencethatotherwiseexistsbetweens.378(1)ofthe[CriminalProcedureCode]and cl. 31(1) of theUKBill. Significantly, the other provisos to s. 378(1) of the[CriminalProcedureCode]appeartomirrorthoseincl.31(1)oftheUKBill.Apartfromthequalifyingphrase,s.378(1)additionallyprovidesthatitis“subjecttothissectionandsection 379”[emphasisadded].Clause31(1)wasinturnexpressedasbeing“subjecttothisandthe next following section”[emphasisadded].Notwithstandingtheapparentdisparityinlanguage,“thenextfollowingsection”tos.378ofthe[CriminalProcedureCode],ie,s.379,wasinfactadoptedfromcl.32oftheUKBill,whichwasitself“thenextfollowingsection”tocl.31:seethecomparativetabletotheCPCBill.Thisgeneralcoincidenceoftherespectiveprovisostos.378(1)ofthe[CriminalProcedureCode]andcl.31(1)oftheUKBillleadsclearlytotheconclusionthatthecurrentqualifyingphraseintheformerwasintendedtocorrespondwiththereferencetocl.2inthelatter.

Thetrialjudgenextreferredtothelegislativedebatesurroundings.378(1)’sfirstemergenceindraftform.Heconcluded:27

“Parliament’sintentionto“admitallhearsayevidence…to the greatest extent possible”[emphasisadded]clearlyaccordswithamorelimitedinterpretationof thequalifyingphrase.Thedangersofmanufacturedorunreliableout-of-court confessionsbeingadmittedunder s.378(1)wouldalsobe sufficientlyprotectedagainstbytherequirementofvoluntariness.”

22 BillNo.35of1975.BillNo.35of1975.23 Public Prosecutor v. Lee Chez Kee,supranote15,atpara.36.24 Ibid.atpara.38–39.25 Ibid,atpara.38–41.26 Ibid.atpara.39.27 Ibid.atpara.43[emphasisinoriginal].

�inally,hestated:28

“A blanket exclusion of all out-of-court confessions from the sphere ofs.378(1)of the [CriminalProcedureCode]wouldnotonlybeunnecessary,but would additionally lead tomanifest absurdity and inconsistency in theapplicationofthesubsection.AsIhighlightedduringthecourseofcounsel’soralsubmissions,theDefence’sinterpretationofthequalifyingphrasewouldturn the concern regardingmanufactured or unreliable hearsay evidence onits head. Inculpatory out-of-court statements would be excluded from thepurviewofs.378(1),whilstexculpatoryout-of-courtstatementswouldremainpotentiallyadmissibleundertheexceptionstohearsayenshrinedtherein.Thisresult would be unjustifiable given that confessions, which implicate theirmakers,aregenerallyregardedasbeingmore reliablesincetheyareagainstthemakers’interests.Incontrast,statementswhichpurporttoexculpatetheirmakerswouldperceivablybelessreliablesincetheywouldbemorelikelytobemanufacturedevidence.Topermit theadmissionof the latterbutnot theformerthroughtheexceptionstohearsayunders.378(1)would,therefore,beabsurdandirrational,tosaytheleast.

Theseconsiderations ledme to theconclusion that thequalifyingphrasemerely had the effect of excluding involuntary confessions from the ambitof s. 378(1) of the [Criminal Procedure Code]. Contrary to the Defence’ssubmissions,s.378(1)wasindeedcapableofrenderingadmissiblevoluntaryout-of-court confessions that would otherwise have been inadmissible byvirtueof thehearsay rule.Asnoobjection tovoluntariness arose regardingToo’s statements, I therefore ruled thatToo’s statementswereadmissible inevidencebyvirtueofthestatutoryexceptiontohearsayevidenceenshrinedins.378(1)(b)(i)ofthe[CriminalProcedureCode].”

Havingsetoutthesalientpartsofthetrialjudge’sjudgment,weturnnowtoouranalysisofthedecisionoftheCourtofAppeal.

IV. ANALYSISO�THECOURTO�APPEAL’STREATMENTO�THECONCEPTUALBASISO�THEHEARSAYRULEINTHEEVIDENCE

ACT

Rajah JA began his analysis of the evidential issues by stating that rather thancharacterising thehearsay rule as an exclusionary rule that exists eitherwithinorindependentlyof theEvidenceAct, theEvidenceActmerelycontains“an implicitacknowledgementoftherule”.29

28 Ibid.atpara.44–45[emphasisadded].�orabriefresponsetothisaspectofthedecision,seeTayEu-Yen,“LeeChezKeev.PublicProsecutor:MurderBeyondReasonableDoubt?”,LawGazette,October2008(1).29 Lee Chez Kee,supranote10atpara.67[emphasisinoriginal].Itisdifficulttorefute

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Thatistosay,theEvidenceActtreatshearsayevidenceasbeingastatementofrelevant facts,which isprima facie an irrelevant fact and inadmissibledue to thelackofgeneralprovisionsmakingstatementsofrelevantfactsthemselvesrelevantfacts.30Itistheprovisionsthatsetoutthetraditionalexceptionstothehearsayrulethatallowstatementsofrelevantfactstoberelevantfacts,andthusadmissible.31Inthatsense, theEvidenceActdoesnotprescribeanyrealexceptions to thehearsayrule.Therefore,tobereallyprecise,theEvidenceActonly“gives effect to…commonlawexceptionstothehearsayrule”.32Indeed,inourviewanotherwaytolookatthisiswhereas theUKcommon law applies a three-step approach in ascertaining theadmissibility of hearsay evidence (first,whether the evidence is relevant; second,whether the evidence is excluded by the operation of any exclusionary rule; andthird,whetheranyexceptiontotheexclusionaryruleinquestionapplies),Singaporeappliesa two-stepapproach(first,whether theevidence isrelevantunderss.6–11oftheEvidenceAct;andsecond,evenifitisnot,doesitneverthelessfallunderss.14–57oftheEvidenceAct).33

Accordingly, rather than approaching issues of hearsay with a common lawanalysis, i.e. askingwhethera statement fallswithin thedefinitionofhearsayandthenaskingwhetherastatementfallswithinacommonlawexceptiontothehearsayrule,34thekeyquestionwhendealingwithwhatthecommonlawwouldconsidertobehearsayevidenceisasfollows:35

Theimportantquestionisthuswhetherthestatementtobeadmittedsatisfiesany of the definitions of legal relevancy (which is a separate issue fromwhetherthestatementislogicallyrelevant)inthe[EvidenceAct].Ifso,itisrelevant,andismadeadmissiblebys.5ofthe[EvidenceAct]andthatistheendof theenquiry. Itdoesnotmatterwhetherevidenceof the relevant factthusestablishedmatchesthatwhichthecommonlawdenotesasbeingoriginalevidenceorasbeinghearsayevidenceadmissibleunderanexceptionto thehearsayrule.RajahJAthenconsideredtheprevailinglocaljudicialopinionsonthebasisforthe

hearsayruleintheEvidenceAct.Thefirst,whichbasicallycallsfortheapplicationofcommonlawrules,36wasdismissedasbeingcontraryto“thetoneofthe[EvidenceAct]”.37�urthermore,RajahJAwrotethattakingthisapproachwouldbecontrarytos.2(2)oftheEvidenceAct,ofwhichtheprovisioninhisviewrepealsallrulesthatare

this,evenifitmayseemlikeapedanticpoint.SeealsoHalsbury’s Laws of Singapore,vol.10(LexisNexis,2006Reissue)atpara.120.87.30 Lee Chez Kee,supranote10atpara.67.31 Ibid.atpara.67–68,74.32 Ibid.atpara.67[emphasisinoriginal].33 ButseeTanYockLin,“Stephen’sHearsay”(1991)12Sing.L.Rev.128.ButseeTanYockLin,“Stephen’sHearsay”(1991)12Sing.L.Rev.128.34 Lee Chez Kee,supranote10atpara.70.35 Ibid.atpara.69[emphasisinoriginal].36 Supranote6.37 Lee Chez Kee,supranote10atpara.71.

notpreservedbystatuteandwhichareinconsistentwiththeEvidenceAct.38WepausetonotethatProfJeffreyPinslerhashelpfullyidentifiedvariouscategoriesofpossibleincompatibilitiesorinconsistenciesbetweenthecommonlaw(includingthejudicialstatutoryinterpretation)andtheEvidenceAct.39Thecategoriesare:

(a)whenaprovisionisvagueorimprecise;(b)whenthereisacompleteabsenceofacommonlawdoctrineintheEvidenceAct;(c) when the Evidence Act recognises a common law doctrine but limitsitsparameters toa specificareaof legalpractice(d)when theEvidenceActrecognisesacommonlawdoctrinebutlimitsitsgeneralapplication;(e)whenthereisadirectconflictbetweenthecommonlawandtheEvidenceAct;(f)whenboththecommonlawandtheEvidenceActrecognisearudimentarylegalprinciplebutdifferinitsoperation;(g)whenboththecommonlawandtheEvidenceActrecognisearudimentarylegalprinciplebutdifferinitsconceptualbasis;and(h)whentheadoptionofacommonlawprinciplethreatenstounderminethestructureoftheschemeoftheEvidenceAct.

The second prevailing judicial opinion on the basis of the hearsay rule in theEvidenceAct,which argues that s. 62 of theEvidenceAct, a provision requiringoral evidence to be direct, reflects the common law hearsay rule,40 was likewiserejected.Thiswasbecauses.62relatestothemodeofproofratherthanthetypeofproof.41Additionally, thisapproach,whichacceptsthatcommonlawexceptionstothehearsay rule are applicable,would run contrary to the intentionsofSir James�itzjamesStephen,thedrafteroftheIndianEvidenceAct,42uponwhichtheEvidenceActwasmodelled;43Stephenhadclearlydesiredtocomprehensivelyformulatethetraditionalexceptionstothehearsayruleinss.17–41oftheEvidenceAct.44

RajahJA’sviewsareawelcomeclarificationontheconceptualbasisforthehearsay

38 Ibid. atpara.75.SeealsoLaw Society of Singapore v. Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008]2 Sing.L.R.(R) 239 at para. 126,where theCourt ofAppeal states that “the overarchingprincipleinthe[EvidenceActis]thatallrelevantevidenceisadmissibleunlessspecificallyexpressedtobeinadmissible.”39 JeffreyPinsler,“ApproachestotheEvidenceAct:TheJudicialDevelopmentofaCode”(2002)14SAcLJ365.40 Supranote7.41 Lee Chez Kee,supranote10atpara.73.SeealsoTanYockLin,Criminal Procedure(LexisNexis,2007)vol.2atchXVIatpara.51.42 ActNo.1of1872(“theIndianEvidenceAct”).43 �oranexcellentpieceonthehistorytotheenactmentofthepredecessortothecurrentEvidenceAct, theStraits SettlementsEvidenceOrdinance (OrdinanceNo 3 of 1893), seeAndrewPhangBoonLeong, “OfCodes and Ideology: SomeNotes on theOrigins of theMajorCriminalEnactmentsofSingapore”(1989)31Mal.L.R.46.44 Lee Chez Kee,supranote10atpara.74;seealsoPinsler,Evidence, Advocacy and the Litigation Process,supranote5at13.

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ruleintheEvidenceAct.ItistruethatStephenhadintendedhiscodeofevidencelawtobe,onthewhole,all-encompassing.Asitwasonceobserved, the“effectof thecommonorunwrittenlawwas…tobeeradicatedasfaraswaspossible”.45Stephenhimselflaterwroteinanintroductiontoatreatisethat:46

“Intheyears1870–71IdrewwhatafterwardsbecametheIndianEvidenceAct(ActIof1872).ThisActbeganbyrepealing(withafewexceptions)the whole of the Law of Evidence then in force in India,andproceededtore-enactitintheformofacodeof167sections,whichhasbeeninoperationinIndiasinceSeptember1872.”

However,moreneedstobesaidontheextenttowhichcommonlawexceptionscontinue to apply, if at all, inSingapore.Rajah JAhad stated that if there is “theapplicationofallthecommonlawexceptionswithoutdiscrimination”(emphasisinoriginal), therewill be a divergence from the intentions of Stephen.47Thismightbe interpreted as being a hint byRajah JA of his remaining open to the possibleapplicationofcommon lawexceptions to thehearsay rule.Thereareundoubtedlycertain common lawexceptions to the hearsay rule that are not recognisedor areonlyreflected inamodifiedformin theEvidenceAct48–somethingwehavealsoalludedtoacoupleofparagraphsback.Needlesstosay,byvirtueofs.377oftheCriminalProcedureCode,49whichrequireshearsayevidencetobeadmittedbyvirtueofstatute,commonlawexceptionstothehearsayrulecannotapplywherecriminalcasesareconcerned.Yet,thereisostensiblynothingtopreventtheapplicabilityofcommonlawexceptionstothehearsayruleiftheyareconsistentwiththeprovisionsoftheEvidenceAct(ienotcontrarytos.2(2)oftheEvidenceAct).50

But inprinciple, thecontinuingapplicabilityofcommon lawexceptions to thehearsay rule would appear to be erroneous. Rajah JA had stressed that Stephendesired to comprehensively codify the traditional exceptions to the hearsay rulein ss. 17–41 of theEvidenceAct. If that had beenStephen’s intention, it followsthatnootherexception to thehearsay rulewouldbeconsistentwith theEvidenceAct.51 If theoppositeviewwere tobe taken, the fact remains that therearemany

45 SeePhang,“OfCodesandIdeology:SomeNotesontheOriginsoftheMajorCriminalEnactmentsofSingapore”,supranote43at72.46 Sir James�itzjamesStephen, A Digest of The Law of Evidence (MacMillan andCoLimited,12thEd,1936)atvii.[emphasisadded].47 Lee Chez Kee,supranote10atpara.74.48 Ibid. at para. 74; see also Pinsler, “Approaches to the EvidenceAct: The JudicialDevelopmentofaCode”,supranote39at382.49 Section377hasbeendescribedasrestatingthehearsayrulestatutorilyinaninclusionaryform:Public Prosecutor v. Lee Chez Kee[2007]1Sing.L.R.(R)1142atpara.28;andChinTetYing,“Hearsay–ADoctrineinRetreat?”32(1990)Mal.L.R.239at241.50 Section377hasbeendescribedasrestatingthehearsayrulestatutorilyinaninclusionarySection377hasbeendescribedasrestatingthehearsayrulestatutorilyinaninclusionaryform:Public Prosecutor v. Lee Chez Kee, supra note 15 at para. 28; andChinTetYing,“Hearsay–ADoctrineinRetreat?”32(1990)Mal.L.R.239at241.51 SeePinsler,“ApproachestotheEvidenceAct:TheJudicialDevelopmentofaCode”,supranote39at382.

commonlawexceptionstothehearsayrule,andbeingbasicallyad hocresponsestothehearsayrule, theseexceptions lackcoherence.52Thedifficulty thatwouldarisewouldbeindeterminingwhenanexceptionisinconsistentwiththeEvidenceAct.53Nofurtherguidanceontheapproachtobetakenindeterminingwhetheranexceptionis consistent or inconsistentwith theEvidenceActwas provided for inLee Chez Kee.Ifindeedthereisstillroomforcommonlawexceptionstothehearsayruletobeapplicable,thenundoubtedly,furtherguidancefromourcourtswillbenecessary.

V. ANALYSISO�THECOURTO�APPEAL’STREATMENTO�S.378O�THECRIMINALPROCEDURECODE

Rajah JA prefaced his consideration of s. 378 of the Criminal Procedure Codeby observing that theCriminal ProcedureCode could potentially be construed aswideningthescopeofadmissibilityforhearsayevidence.54However,hewascriticalof, inter alia, the inconsistencies and the “lack of symbiosis” between provisionsin the Criminal Procedure Code inter se and between provisions in the CriminalProcedureCodeandtheEvidenceActinrelationtotheadmissibilityofstatementsofpolicewitnesses.55Inhisopinion,theidealsolutionwouldlieinlawreform.Hestated:56

“Thewayforwardmustsurelyinvolveareconsiderationoftheseprinciplesandtheirappropriatestatutoryreformulation.However,untilsuchreformulationisactuallyrealised, thecourtswilldowell tobesimplyawareof thedifferentconceptualbasesunderpinningtheadmissibilityofhearsayevidenceinboththe[EvidenceAct]andthe[CriminalProcedureCode],andbeequallyalivetotheproblemswhichmightariseasaresult.”

Torecapitulate,thetrialjudgehad,inessence,equateds.378(1)withitscounterpartcl.31(1)oftheUKBill,andhad,accordingly,acceptedthatthequalifyingphrasewasintendedtohavethe“limitedeffectofimportingtherequirementofvoluntariness”.57RajahJA,althoughagreeingwiththetrialjudgethatlegislativeintentionshouldbesoughtininterpretingaprovision,wasoftheopinionthata“rudimentarycomparisonofthelanguage”ofthetwoprovisionswouldnotbesatisfactoryasbothprovisionsare not entirely on all fours with each other.58 He posed the following rhetoricalquestions:59

52 Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore,supranote29atpara.120.101.53 SeePinsler,“ApproachestotheEvidenceAct:TheJudicialDevelopmentofaCode”,supranote39at366.54 Lee Chez Kee,supranote10atpara.76.55 Ibid.atpara.76–77.56 Ibid.atpara.77.57 Public Prosecutor v. Lee Chez Kee,supranote15atpara.40.58 Lee Chez Kee,supranote10atpara.79–80.59 Ibid.atpara.81[emphasisinoriginal].

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“Whatare the rulesof lawgoverning theadmissibilityofconfessions?Wasthetrialjudgecorrectinequatingtherulesoflaw[inthequalifyingphrase]totherequirementcontainedincl.2oftheUKBillsimplybyreasonofthesimilarityinstructureandhistoricalconnectionbetweentheUKBillandthe[CriminalProcedureCode]?Toanswerthesequestions,onemustfirstaddressthethresholdquestionofwhethertheUKBillcan,andshould,beregardedastheequivalent,andthereforethehistoricalpredecessor,ofthesectionsofthe[CriminalProcedureCode]asamendedin1976.”

RajahJAthenanalysedtheavailableparliamentarymaterial,andobservedthatsubsequenttotheparliamentarydebatesthatthetrialjudgehadalludedto,aSelectCommitteedeclinedtocompletelymodeltheeventuals.378(1)aftercl.31(1);justasimportantly,whilecl31(1)containedasub-clausedealingwiththeconfessionsofaco-accused,s.378(1)didnothaveacorrespondingequivalent.60Instead,thiswasdealtwithbys.30oftheEvidenceAct.61RajahJAconcluded:62

“Thus,whilethetrialjudgewascorrectinsayingthatthereferencesto“thenextfollowingsection”intheUKBillandto“section379”inthe[CriminalProcedure Code] pointed to broadly similar sections, he had, with respect,neglected to have regard to the fact that the references to “this… section”[emphasis added] in both the UK Bill and the [Criminal Procedure Code]didnotlikewisepointtobroadlysimilarsections.Theimportantomissionofcl.31(2)of theUKBill (which touchedon theconfessionofaco-accused)froms.378ofthe[CriminalProcedureCode]meansthatthequalifyingphrasecouldnothavebeenintendedtocorrespondentirelytocl.2oftheUKBill.”

Reasoningon that footing,Rajah JAheld that insofar as thequalifyingphrasewasconcerned, ithadtobe thatconfessionsweregovernedbyotheradmissibilityrequirements in the EvidenceAct apart from the requirement of voluntariness.63In cases involving twoormoreoffenders jointly tried (for the sameoffence), theconfessionofoneoffendermightonlybetakenintoconsiderationagainsttheotheroffendersifs.30oftheEvidenceActwassatisfied.Thecorollarythenwasthat“therulesoflawgoverningtheadmissibilityofconfessions”includeds.30oftheEvidenceAct.Tointerpretthequalifyingphraseotherwisewouldresultindivorcebetweentheinterpretationofthetwostatutes(viz,theCriminalProcedureCodeandtheEvidenceAct),andalsorenderthevoluntarinessprovisionsintheEvidenceActotiose.64

RajahJAconcludedhisanalysisbyopiningthats.30oftheEvidenceActcontainedapositiveprohibitionagainsttheadmissionofstatementsthatwereconfessionsmade

60 Ibid.atpara.82–91.61 Ibid.atpara.91.62 Ibid.[emphasisinoriginal]63 Ibid.64 Ibid.atpara.95–102.Thislineofreasoning–thatthecorrectstatutoryinterpretationmustnecessarilyavoidtheconsequenceofrenderinganotherstatuteotiose–alsopermeatedthecommonintentionaspectofthejudgment.

by an accomplice in a separate trialwhowas not called to testify in the accusedperson’strial.65Ass.378(1)(b)(i)oftheCriminalProcedureCodewassubjecttos.30oftheEvidenceAct,Too’sstatementswerenotadmissible.66Headdedthat therationale fors.30of theEvidenceActwas toavoid the intellectualdifficulty thatwouldplagueajudgeinajointtrialwhereoneaccusedmakesaconfessionaffectinganotheraccused,andthereforecouldnotbeextendedtocoverToo’sstatements.67

Asforthedecisionoftheminority,WooJopinedthat“therewassomeforceinthetrialjudge’smatchingofthewordsins.378(1)[oftheCriminalProcedureCode]withcl.31(1)oftheUKBill.”68HeobservedthattherelevantreportoftheUnitedKingdomCriminalLawRevisionCommittee indicated thatonce the requirementsforcl.31(1)andcl.2weremet,astatementwouldstillbeadmissible.69Hefurtheropinedthatthemajority’sinterpretationofthequalifyingphrasewouldresultinnoconfessionofadeadaccompliceeverbeingadmittedintoevidence.70Thefactthatsub-para (v)ofcl.31(1)(c)of theUKBillwasnotadopteddidnotmean that theUKpositionon the qualifyingphrasewas alsomeant to be departed from.71Thisdifference,inhisopinion,wasneutral.72Hethenstated:73

“I… do not think that adopting the interpretation of the trial judge wouldrenderprovisionsonadmissibilityofconfessions,likes.30[oftheEvidenceAct],otiose.Iamoftheviewthatthetrialjudge’sinterpretationwouldonlymeanthats.30willnolongerapplywhentheconditionsins.378(1)[oftheCriminalProcedureCode]aremet.Inotherconditions,s.30[oftheEvidenceAct]continuestoapply.”

Heconcludedthatiftherationalefors.30oftheEvidenceActwastoavoidtheintellectualdifficulty thatwouldplaguea judge ina joint trialwhereoneaccusedmakesaconfessionaffectinganotheraccused,thenthereisnothingtoprevents.30fromnotapplyingtoexcludetheadmissibilityoftheconfessionofadeadaccompliceunders378(1)(b)(i)oftheCriminalProcedureCode.74Inthecaseathand,however,hewouldhavegivennoweighttoToo’sstatements.75But,headded,inanothercase,weightcouldbegiventotheconfessionofadeadaccomplice.76Hegavetheexampleof an accomplice who had given a confessionwhich exonerates another accusedperson.77

65 Lee Chez Kee,supranote10atpara.103.66 Ibid.atpara.103,117.67 Ibid.atpara.114.68 Ibid.atpara.285.69 Ibid.atpara.287.70 Ibid.atpara.288.71 Ibid.atpara.289.72 Ibid.atpara.290.73 Ibid.atpara.291.74 Ibid.atpara.294.75 Ibid.76 Ibid.77 Ibid.

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WhiletheopinionofWooJwaswell-reasoned,itwouldappearthatitwouldnotbecorrect.Ofcourse,hisobservationthatthefactthatthequalifyingphrasedifferedfromthatfoundincl.31(1)oftheUKBillhassomestrengthofreasoning.Afterall,theamendmentstotheCriminalProcedureCodewhichgaverisetos.378(1)wereclearlybasedontheUKBill.�urthermore,theamendmentswereenacted:78

(1) toadmitallhearsayevidencelikelytobevaluableto thegreatestextentpossiblewithoutunduecomplicationordelaytotheproceedings;(2)toensurethatevidenceshouldcontinuetobegivenforthemostpartorallyby allowinghearsay evidenceonly if themaker of the statement cannot becalledoritisdesirabletosupplementhisoralevidence;and(3)toincludenecessarysafeguardsagainstthedangerofmanufacturedhearsayevidence.

WhileRajah JAwas of the opinion that the trial judge’s approach necessarilyplacedfartoomuchemphasison(1)and(2)andthatemphasishadtobeplacedon(3)aswell,onecannotbutobservethattheamendmentsgivingrisetos.378(1)oftheCriminalProcedureCodewereforthepurposesofallowingfortheeasyadmissibilityofhearsayevidencewherethemakerofthestatementcouldnotbecalledfor(see(2)).

Nonetheless,themajority’sopinionwouldbepreferable,especiallyinlightofs.377oftheCriminalProcedureCode–aprovisionwhichneitherthemajoritynortheminorityconsidered.Thissectionrequiresthatastatementcanonlybeadmissible“byvirtueofanyprovisionofthisCode[ie,theCriminalProcedureCode]oranyotherwrittenlaw,but not otherwise”(emphasisadded).Onitsface,thisprovisionwouldindicate that the phrase “rules of law governing the admissibility of confessions”shouldbeareferencetowrittenrulesoflaw.Section377wasinsertedbycl.23oftheCPCBillandcorrespondstocl.30(1)oftheUKBill,whichstates:

Inanyproceedingsastatementotherthanonemadebyapersonwhilegivingoralevidenceinthoseproceedingsshallbeadmissibleasevidenceofanyfactstatedthereintotheextentthatitissoadmissiblebyvirtueofanyprovisionof thisActoranyother statutoryprovision,orbyvirtueofany ruleof lawmentionedinsection40ofthisAct,butnototherwise.

TheUKBill,ofcourse,hadcl.2,whichwas,asmentionedearlier,concernedwithvoluntariness.However,theCPCBillhadnosuchprovision.Theonlyothersourceofwritten law concerning the admissibility of confessionswould be found in theEvidenceAct.Thus,RajahJA’sviewswouldappeartobecorrect.

Woo J’s trepidation that the statements of dead accomplices would never beadmissiblecouldpossiblyberesolved,becauseonepointwhichwasnotcanvassedwasthepossibilityofToo’sstatementsbeingadmissibleunders.32oftheEvidenceAct.ThiswasbecausetheProsecution,forreasonsthatarenotrecorded,hadconceded

78 Sing.,Sing., Parliamentary Debates,vol.34,col.1223(19August1975)(MinisterforLawandtheEnvironmentMrEWBarker).

thatthestatementswerenotadmissibleunderthatsection.79However,itwouldseemthatthereisthepossibilitythatthestatementswouldhavebeenadmissibleunders.32(c),whichstates:

32. Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is deadorwhocannotbefound,orwhohasbecomeincapableofgivingevidence,orwhoseattendancecannotbeprocuredwithoutanamountofdelayorexpensewhichunderthecircumstancesofthecaseappearstothecourtunreasonable,are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:…oragainstinterestofmaker;(c)whenthestatementisagainstthepecuniaryorproprietaryinterestofthepersonmakingit,orwhen,iftrue,itwouldexposehimorwouldhaveexposedhimtoacriminalprosecutionortoasuitfordamages;…[emphasisadded]

Therelevanceandapplicabilityofs.32(c)tostatementsmadebydeadaccomplicesagainsttheirinterestisoneareawhichthecourtshouldresolveifgiventheopportunity.Therehadbeencaseswherethestatementsofadeceasedaccomplice,whichwereagainsthisorherinterest,havebeenheldtobeadmissibleunders.32(3)oftheIndianEvidenceAct(ie, theequivalentofs.32(c)of theEvidenceAct).80 InMohammad v. Emperor, thestatementofadeceasedaccomplicewasheldby theLahoreHighCourttobeadmissiblesofarasitreferredtoorexplainedthepartwhichthedeceasedaccomplicehadadmittedtohavingtakeninthecrime.81InNga Po Yin v. Emperor,82acasewhichwouldappeartobesimilartoLee Chez Kee,theconfessionofadeadaccomplicewasheldtobeadmissiblenotwithstandings.30oftheIndianEvidenceAct(ie,theequivalentofs.30oftheEvidenceAct).ThecaseconcernedthemurderofoneKonMin.OnePyaNyowastriedfortheoffence,convictedandsentencedtodeath.HewasexecutedbeforethetrialoftheappellantPoYin.OneoftheissuesinthecasewaswhetherPyaNyo’sstatementtotheCommittingMagistratethatPoYinhaddecapitatedthevictimcouldbeadmittedunders.32(3).TheCourtofJudicialCommissioner,UpperBurma,heldthatthestatementwouldberelevantandthereforeadmissibleunders.32(3),unlessbarredbyanotherprovision.83Itwasfurtherheldthat:84

79 Lee Chez Kee,supranote10atpara.49,64,103.80 SeeRatanlalRanchhoddas&DhirajlalKeshavlalThakore,Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s The Law of Evidence(WadhwaandCompany,2006)at577;andMCSarkaret. al,Sarkar’s Law of Evidence(WadhwaandCompany,2007)at684–685.81 (1925)26CrLJ1308at1313;seealsothedecisionofthePrivyCouncildismissingthepetitionforspecialleavetoappealagainstthesentenceofdeathinUmrao v. EmperorAIR1925PC52.82 (1906)5CrLJ300.83 Ibid.at301.84 Ibid.at301–302.

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“Section 30 merely enacts a special exception to the general rule that aconfession(admission)canbeprovide(only)againstthepersonwhomadeit.Itdoesnotlimittheoperationofsection32.Illustration(b)tosection30cannot…beconstruedtohavethiseffect.”

Incontrast,inAchhay Lal Singh v. Emperor,85thePatnaHighCourtdeclinedtoadmitthestatementofadeadaccompliceunders.32(3).86Theprincipleunderlyingthatprovision,accordingtothecourt,wasthatastatementmadebyapersonrenderinghim liable to prosecutionwould likely be a true statement.87Therefore, the courtcontinued,thestatementshouldnotbeadmitted,asbeforethedeadaccomplicehadmadethestatement,therewasalreadyevidenceinexistence“whichwouldinevitablyhaveledtohisprosecutionandmightbyitselfhaveledtohisconviction”.88However,inNarpat v. The State,89thestatementofadacoitimplicatinghisaccompliceswasadmittedunder s. 32(3) even though thedacoit haddiedof gunshotwounds.TheAllahabadHighCourtconsideredAchhay Lal Singh v. Emperor,butstated:90

“It isnotnecessary to suppose thatS.30 IndianEvidenceAct contains theonlyexceptiontotherulethataconfessioncanbeusedonlyagainstitsmaker.…Anotherexceptionistobefoundincl.(3)ofSec.32IndianEvidenceAct.Thisclause laysdownthat,when thestatement is likely toexposeapersontoacriminalprosecution,thestatementmaybeadmittedifthemakerofthestatementisdead.…

[A] statement admitted under Cl. (3) of Sec. 32, Indian EvidenceActneednotbeconfinedtothatportion,whichexposesthemakertoacriminalprosecution.Thestatementmaywellextendtoconnectedmatters.Sosuchastatementmaybeadmittedinevidenceinsofarasitimplicatesaccomplicesandthemakerofthestatement.”

VI. CONCLUSION

Lee Chez Kee isawelcomedecisionsimplybecauseithasprovidedsomeimportantclarificationsontwoquestions:first,theconceptualbasisofthehearsayruleintheEvidenceActandCriminalProcedureCode;andsecond,theambitandapplicationofthehearsayexceptionintheformofs.378(1)(b)(i)oftheCriminalProcedureCode.

85 AIR1947Patna90.86 SeealsoEmperor v. Keshav Narayan Manolkar (1913)25BomLR248;andJanu s/o Kadir Baksh v. EmperorAIR1947Sind122.87 Achhay Lal Singh v. Emperor,supranote85at96.88 Ibid.89 (1961)62CrLJ591.90 Ibid. at 592. But seeMMonir, Principles and Digest of the Law of Evidence (TheUniversityBookAgency,8thEd,1991)at468,whereitisindicatedthatasthegeneralruleisthataconfessionisevidenceagainstonlyitsmaker,thereshouldbereluctanceinallowingforafurtherexception.

However, aswe have sought to point out, there remain a number of unansweredquestionsthatwehopeourcourtscanresolvewhenthenextopportunityarises.

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