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Recapturing the Corner Office

Final Report of the Election and Outreach Committee

of the Massachusetts Democratic Party

Co-Chairs: March 2005

Senator Jarrett T. Barrios (D-Cambridge)

Mayor Dorothy Kelly Gay

Worcester County Sheriff Guy Glodis

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Election and Outreach Committee Members

Edward Burley, Boston Michael P. Cahill, Beverly Kathleen A. Casavant, Jamaica Plain Robert Cassidy, Holliston Russell A. Ashton, Wayland George Barnoski, Somerville Janet M. Beyer, Concord Bilotta, Whitinsville Robert E. Colt, Winchester Richard Couture, Southbridge Kathleen M. Donaghue, Westboro Leonard Engel, Holliston Valerie Frias, Roslindale Jesse Gordon, Cambridge Alma Greene, Hyannis James Herbert, Winchester Jennifer Hodsdon, Jamaica Plain Thomas J. Holloway, Acton David Hoover, East Falmouth Martina T. Jackson, Newton Gregory A. Johnson, Boston Christina Kasica, Arlington

Jim Klocke, Wellesley Patty Lamarre, North Reading Preeti Mehta, Boston Christopher Meier, Charlestown Fanette Morrison, Ayer Mark H. Mulgay, Swampscott Joseph W. Mullin, Weston Spencer Nichols, Lexington Terrance Noonan, Newton George Pillsbury, Cambridge Melvin C. Poindexter, Watertown Tina Poindexter, Watertown Arthur Powell, Beverly Sue Reimers, Winthrop Eliot Rushovich, Cambridge Daniel Schlozman, Cambridge Jonathan Sclarsic, Sudbury Sam Seidel, Cambridge Nancy O'Connor Stolberg, Andover Douglas Thompson, Cambridge Robert Tumposky, Roslindale

Election Analysis Subcommittee

Subcommittee Report Prepared by: David Hoover and Bonnie Baranowski Assisted on U.S. Census data by: Robert Tumposky

Message and Outreach Subcommittee

Prepared by: Martina Jackson, Jennifer Hodsdon, Mark Mulgay and Jesse Gordon

Polling Subcommittee

Prepared by: George Pillsbury, Sam Seidel, Melvin Poindexter and Tina Poindexter

Report Authors

Colin B. Durrant, Chelsea Dalié Jiménez, Cambridge Jarrett Barrios, Cambridge John Hopkins, intern

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Message to the Democratic State Committee

A conversation has begun within the Massachusetts Democratic Party. It is both a conversation about our vision for the future, and a conversation about our values and the values we project. The hundreds of people who submitted testimony prove what we already knew: our Party is a lot more than its state committee, and that our future owes a great debt to the thousands of committed individuals who volunteer in myriad ways to help our party and its candidates work for Democratic ideals. The conversation we’ve begun about winning the corner office in 2006 must – by necessity -- include these good souls, and the voters who they strive to persuade.

This report is merely an attempt to distill in a more formal fashion findings and recommendations about our future direction. It is just another step forward in this ongoing conversation. It is not the end of the conversation.

We hope the Massachusetts Democratic Party and its members will use this report to spark discussion and then action. To some, the corner office may seem elusive to Democrats. But to us, it is well within reach.

The co-chairs would like to first thank the large number of rank-and-file citizens and concerned Democrats who took the time to communicate their thoughts through us to the Massachusetts Democratic Party. Nearly a thousand citizens testified at hearings or submitted testimony through the Internet.

Many individuals have performed yeoman’s work in conducting the business of this committee, and deserve specials words of thanks. Jane Lane, Sue Thomson and Patty Lamarre have helped to coordinate the many hearings and subcommittee meetings. Literally dozens of subcommittee members attended meetings, performed research and forged consensus on critical aspects of past elections and strategies that form the basis for many of this reports recommendations. Many thanks to all dedicated subcommittee members -- their hard work and commitment are reflected throughout this report. The large number of committee members who drove across the state to take information, share back with the co-chairs their own analyses and, in many cases, who dove into the subcommittees with conviction are the soul of our Party, and deserve many thanks as well.

Yours truly,

Senator Jarrett Barrios Mayor Dorothy Kelly Gay Sheriff Guy Glodis

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary ……………………………………………………………. 5

Introduction and Background ……………………………………………...,… 10

Communicating Democratic Values ………………………………………….. 12

Voter Turnout …………………………………………………………………... 17

Perceived Lack of Party Organization ………………………………………… 29

Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………. 31

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Executive Summary

“The crisis of our times provides the opportunity for boldness.” (Pat Evans, in testimony emailed to the committee)

In the fall of 2002 yet another loss at the ballot box left many Democratic Party faithful scratching their heads in disbelief. Weld, Weld, Cellucci, Romney; 2002 marked the fourth consecutive election where a Republican candidate had defeated the Democrat in the race for Governor of Massachusetts. In a state where Democrats hold hefty margins in both the House and Senate, the message from voters could not be ignored.

Does the Democratic Party do enough to inspire voters? Why are voters increasingly choosing to register as Independents? Is the Party’s message too liberal or too conservative? And how can lessons from recent defeats inform future gubernatorial campaigns? Debate within the Democratic State Committee centered on how best to position future Democratic gubernatorial candidates for electoral success.

Shortly after the 2002 elections, Massachusetts Democratic Party Chairman Philip Johnston established this Election and Outreach Committee to review the values, mission, message and direction of the Party. Johnston appointed Senator Jarrett T. Barrios (D-Cambridge), then-Senator Guy Glodis (D-Worcester), and Mayor Dorothy Kelly Gay to co-chair the Committee.

This report – informed by testimony from members across the state – seeks to provide direction in answering questions facing the Party. Its findings are the result of hearings, analysis and discussion. The series of recommendations suggest themselves to party activists and candidates as the means to achieving future electoral success in Massachusetts and nationally. But this report is just one step -- perhaps more formal than others already taken -- in the ongoing conversation. Re-branding and retooling the Massachusetts Democratic Party will require far more of us all.

Overview of Findings

“People, I believe, really do want progressive change…Give them a reason to vote – inspire them – make them believe that they can be a party of something bigger than themselves. That’s the kind of vision that is so sorely needed.” (Lawrence Kulig, Southborough in testimony submitted via email)

The central theme emerging from the Committee’s investigation is clear: the Democratic Party’s inability to secure the corner office requires immediate introspection, evaluation and change. This report suggests that the nature and form of our Party’s response be guided by the findings and recommendations below.

Communicating Democratic Values

The vast majority of testimony received by the Committee focused on the importance of values to the success of the Massachusetts Democratic Party. A large majority expressed a desire to return to the Party’s “foundational values” and to avoid the temptation to shift toward a “Republican-lite” message. Although a clear majority espoused “progressive” values, a significant minority – while not opposing those values – raised the point that the Party focused too much on controversial issues and should become more “centrist.”

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“Our party must be framed by us, not by the GOP.” (Testimony received at Northampton hearing)

Analysis of election results by this Committee showed nothing to suggest a change in the philosophical underpinnings of the Democratic party to a more conservative – or, for that matter, a more liberal -- position would make a difference in the election outcomes, since there are very different constituencies that must reached. Moving within the ideological spectrum is not the answer; we must instead refocus our efforts on “branding” Democratic values as a means of anchoring Democratic positions on issues.

Members who testified confirmed that redefining the Democratic Party’s vision must be rooted in our fundamental values and what it means to be a Democrat instead of attempting to delineate where the Party stands on specific issues.

• The Message and Outreach Subcommittee writes: “the most important theme to emerge from the testimony is the necessity of a clear message, rather than merely a debate over where that message falls or should fall on the scale from left to center.”

• The Election Analysis Subcommittee wrote: “Our analysis has found nothing that would suggest that a change to a more conservative or a more liberal position of the Democratic candidates is going to make a difference since there are very different constituencies that we must reach.”

Our conversation in Massachusetts mirrors a discussion now occurring among Democrats on the national political stage. In Framing the Dems,1 nationally recognized political linguist George Lakoff notes that national Democrats “have been hampered by a focus on specific issues, rather than the overall moral and ethical perspective that justifies specific policy choices.” The Polling Subcommittee quotes pollster Celinda Lake’s finding: “the lack of national message among Democrats” hurt the Party’s success in 2002, especially when contrasted to the Republicans who “did a better job of identifying their party’s national issues.”

The Committee’s analysis finds Democrats’ shortfall to be their tendency to communicate in terms of specific policies, rather than core values and visionary goals. Lakoff also states, “voters vote their identities and their values far more than their self-interests.”

In email testimony received by the Committee, Gloucester resident Peter Dolan cut straight to the chase. “People will join us because they believe our values are their values.” The question becomes, he asserted, “can the Democratic Party re-brand itself successfully to voters by clearly articulating its foundational values [rather than] should we become more liberal or conservative?”

Voter Turnout: The Key to Statewide Victory

Turnout remains one of the strongest variables for Democratic Party success in Massachusetts. Pollster Celinda Lake called turnout “the single most influential factor [in the 2002 election].”2

1 Available for download at: http://www.rockridgeinstitute.org/projects/strategic/ 2 Lake, Celinda. “What Voters Said in 2002 and What It Means for 2004.” Lake, Snell, Perry & Associates. March 2003.

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“People wi l l jo in us because they bel i eve our values are their values” (Peter Dolan of Gloucester in testimony submitted via email)

Urban vs. Suburban: Our efforts cannot be an either/or proposition with our urban voters and suburban “persuadables.” The Election Analysis Subcommittee found that variables like education and economic background or age by town yielded no statistically significant impact on the demographic vote. Instead, we find both to be critical in importance: turnout levels in urban areas must be near-comparable to suburban areas if Democrats are to win; and Democrats must close the performance gap in suburban, independent-leaning areas.

The Subcommittee concluded, “the Democratic candidate has to be able to hold the Democratic base in the larger communities that Shannon O’Brien did while appealing to a sufficient number of the voters in the suburban and rural areas to duplicate the percentages that Scott Harshbarger achieved in 1998.”

Winning Over Unenrolled, Suburban Voters: In 2002, turnout in solidly Democratic Greater Boston lagged behind suburban communities where O’Brien lost. A problem for O’Brien was the percentage turnout was only 48.6% in the 28 largest (mostly urban) communities that she won, while

it was 60.7% in the 322 other communities that she lost. In this environment, a key to winning is persuading and turning out largely independent suburban voters to vote for the Democrats.

Significant correlation and a high ratio of votes for Republicans to the percentage of unenrolled voters does give credence to the declaration that the hi-tech corridor (cities with the most unenrolled voters) is the state’s political “center of gravity”. Democratic field efforts should,

accordingly, reflect this shift.

The Message and Outreach Subcommittee concluded “unenrolled voters would be drawn to vote Democrat if the gubernatorial candidate express strong values in a clear and open manner.”

Perceived Disorganization at Party Level

Members who testified targeted much of their frustration about the loss of the 2002 gubernatorial election towards two points: First, the disorganized process of the nominating convention, and second, the lack of collaboration between Party headquarters and local activists.

Nominating Convention Reform: On this point, the Massachusetts Democratic has already moved forward. In January 2004, the Convention Reform Commission, chaired by former Governor Michael Dukakis and Congressman James McGovern, submitted fourteen recommendations that the Massachusetts Democratic Party has committed to implementing in advance of the 2006 Nominating Convention.

Lack of Coordination at Local Level: Local party activists note that coordination between the Party and Democratic constituencies must extend beyond the election cycle, and focus on involving local grassroots Democrats in decision-making processes and organization. The Committee makes the observation that during the 2004 mid-term legislative elections, the Party and its legislative leaders were successful in reaching out in a more coordinated fashion to local campaigns and activists through the circulation of message points and fundraising efforts.

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Overview of Recommendations: “Our foundational values…will unite the Democratic Party and establish a middle ground.”

(Representative John Fresolo, Worcester hearing)

Recommendation #1: Re-brand and communicate the Democratic Party’s fundamental values. The problem is not that Democrats lack a coherent moral framework – it is that Democrats and progressives tend to communicate in terms of specific policies rather than core values and visionary goals.

“Articulate your ideals, frame what you believe effectively, say what you believe and say it well, strongly and with moral fervor.” (George Lakoff, “Framing the Dems”)

Recommendation #2: Incorporate Democratic values – from the grassroots of the party to the leadership – into a strategy and key messages that persuade independent and Democratic voters. The challenge Democrats face in winning the governor’s race is to unearth those motivators to craft a positioning strategy and key messages that communicate in politically relevant language, which candidates can articulate and Massachusetts’s voters will embrace.

“We must offer a strong contrast to Republican vision.” (Unnamed, testimony received via email)

Recommendation #3: Express a clear and concise vision for the future of Massachusetts centered on the top four priorities of voters. Affordable and accessible health care, an economy that works for all of us, quality education for every child, and preventing crime and protecting our neighborhoods remain the priorities of voters.

“Politics at its best is about appealing to people's ideals about what's best for everyone. Democratic and Republican candidates alike suffer a loss of broad support when they appear to

pander to narrow, selfish interests, instead of standing up for what they believe to be right for all.” (Robert Reich, response to Eileen Kamarck on www.massinc.org)

Recommendation #4: Win Over Unenrolled, Suburban Voters. The key to winning is persuading largely independent suburban voters to vote for the Democrats. Suburban voters and the middle class cannot be treated as a uniform voting block to which uniform appeals can be expected to work. Likeability may be important, but values drive this – and all – issues in such a campaign. Democratic values can appeal to these voters too!

Recommendation #5: Increase Urban Turnout. Electoral success will continue to depend on a strong grassroots field campaign in traditionally Democratic urban areas.

Recommendation #6: Appeal to and Nurture Minorities in the Commonwealth. The growing minority populations in the Commonwealth cannot be ignored in future gubernatorial campaigns. The Party should increase its outreach to and nurturing of minority groups and leaders: whether it is communities of color, youth, the disabled, or those from rural areas.

Recommendation #7: Continue the process of reforming nominating convention by implementing the recommendations of the Dukakis/McGovern Report.

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Recommendation #8: Support proposals to move the state primary date to an earlier date. An earlier primary date will: encourage candidates to run grassroots campaigns by giving them more time to interact with voters; allow for greater contact with unenrolled voters; and provide service men and women overseas with the time to make an informed vote by extending the time for our soldiers to make a decision and cast their votes.

Recommendation #9: Speak with “one voice” by better coordinating issues and message with Party leaders and members at both the state and local levels. Just as the voters ultimately hold elected officials accountable, the Party must also hold them accountable.

***

Democratic values are rooted in the enduring spirit of the American experience, and the positive potential that government represents to our society – a force of tremendous opportunity for people from all walks of life. As one committee member stated: “we need to be honest, that we believe in government.” The Democratic Party’s first challenge is to be honest with Massachusetts voters about what values animate our actions and rationale.

So, what next? The conversation facing Massachusetts Democrats parallels a debate on the national level about the future of the Democratic Party. It is the Committee’s sincere hope that this report and its recommendations will serve as a guide to the Massachusetts Democratic Party as it continues this conversation. Democrats today find themselves at a crossroads. Will we embrace a bolder vision for the future? Or will we continue to be defined by our opposition?

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Introduction and Background

“The crisis of our times provides the opportunity for boldness.”3

Widely recognized as one of the most Democratic states in the Union, Massachusetts has elected a Republican to serve as governor in each of the last four elections. Republicans make up only 13% of the state’s registered voters. The Republican Party has no presence in the Congressional delegation and minimal representation in the state legislature. Yet despite its anemic performance in these other races, the Republican Party has been able to hold the governor’s office for fourteen years, beginning with Weld’s defeat of surprise Democratic nominee John Silber in 1990. Why can’t Massachusetts Democrats, who make up 36% of the electorate, and an overwhelmingly Democratic-leaning unenrolled electorate, put a Democratic governor in office?

Numerous studies suggest that voters consciously choose a divided government. One such examination described the 1990 Massachusetts election as an example of this phenomenon.4

Channeling frustration into a change of control in the Massachusetts legislature would have been extremely difficult and inefficient, given the overwhelming majority held by Democrats in the House and Senate. Instead, it is far easier for voters to both divide government and send a message to Democrats by electing relatively moderate-appearing Republicans to the governor’s office.

With this in mind, it is of no great surprise that the Republicans were able to win the corner office in 1990.5 John Silber’s candidacy, which was helped by his anti-Dukakis sentiment in the primary, but severely hampered by his volatile personal nature, caused 36% of registered Democrats to cross party lines and vote for Weld. Independents also fell to Weld by 54%.

In 2002 there was neither Dukakis nor a crippling recession for the Republicans to use as scapegoats. With Swift out of the primary race, Romney was able to move in without any opposition. And the public’s desire for divided government immediately dropped our party in the proverbial river, swimming upstream.

Incidents with Governor Swift reminded some voters about the economic problems of the closing years of the Dukakis administration in 1990. But Democrats were unable to avail themselves of her lack of popularity by painting Romney with the same brush. In part, it was a failure of adequate funding: Romney outspent O’Brien by just more than $3 million. His ads cultivated a public

3 Pat Evans in testimony submitted via email. 4 Fiorina, Morris P. Divided Government. 2nd Ed. New York: Longman, 2003. Fiorina and others’ data show that when a state government is unified (i.e. one party controls both houses and the executive office) for more than four years, it is far more likely that, when division occurs, the first change is in the executive office. Legislators may have been insulated from the public ire because of their abilities to distance themselves from the governor and keep close ties with constituents. 5 Weld’s cause was not hurt either by the Democratic candidate, John Silber. The general public developed a great distaste him -- and the incredibly poor press he generated The Globe, which traditionally supports Democratic candidates, officially endorsed Weld.

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frustration and dissatisfaction with Democratic leadership in the legislature.6 And he won, with the divided government preference contributing once again to continued Republican victories.

Perhaps the greatest perceived failing by Democratic election efforts has been the inability to create a unified front for the party, regardless of internal debate. Republican efforts in this field are a phenomenon to be emulated. Talking points and key phrases are quickly relayed through the “red ranks,” which make for easily memorable and conversational sound bites, a significant asset in forming a message for voters. This failure was on the minds of many with whom we spoke and from whom we heard around the state.

“It is a simple truth - for all the debates, etc, the election was decided by news bites and campaign ads. Mitt Romney gave positions, etc. and O'Brien said “I'm not Mitt.” That was the campaign, and it wasn't enough. The same thing is plaguing the current Democratic presidential campaign. Kerry seems mostly to be on the “I'm not Bush” tactic, and I have no idea what he stands for. I’m 110% Democrat, but I see where they lost it.”7

The Election and Outreach Committee, co-chaired by Massachusetts state Senator Jarrett T. Barrios, former Somerville Mayor Dorothy Kelly Gay and Worcester County Sheriff Guy Glodis, held statewide public hearings, including hearings on Cape Cod, and in Everett, Lawrence/North Andover, Northampton, and Worcester, along with hearings at the annual Town and City Chairs meeting in Marlborough in 2003 and at the party’s state convention that year. Comments were collected, analyzed and are included throughout this report. Three subcommittees focusing on election data analysis, polling and message and communication were created and coordinated by state committee members and party activists. Much of this report reflects the findings and writing of these subcommittees.

The motivation for change from within the Massachusetts Democratic Party was born out of the frustration expressed by Democrats at the grassroots level. The key findings and recommendations of the Election and Outreach Committee are rooted in the hundreds of emails and testimonials the Committee received from Party members and leaders throughout the Commonwealth.

6 Can anyone who follows state politics forget the extremely effective “Gang of Three” advertisement, a case study in Republican appeal to ticket-splitting? 7 Boston.com Ideas Message Board. “Why can't the Bay State elect a Democratic governor?” Written by Anne from Cambridge. Available at: http://www.boston.com/news/messageboards/ideas/110203/msg1.shtml.

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Communicating Democratic Values8

“Perhaps the most important theme to emerge from the testimony is the necessity of a clear message, rather than merely a debate over where that message falls or should fall on the scale from left to center…We need to focus on the common ground without ignoring our differences, and we have to be willing to work together and sometimes put aside those differences for the common good.” -- Report of Election and Outreach Committee’s Subcommittee on Message and Outreach. September 17, 2003.9

The vast majority of testimony received by the Committee expressed that the Massachusetts Democratic Party should return to its “founding values” and should not shift toward a “Republican-lite” message. Although a clear majority espoused “progressive” values, a significant minority felt that the Party focused too much on controversial issues and should be more “centrist”. It is the strong belief of this Committee that these two heart-felt positions are not by necessity in conflict, and that we can find our way through this political thicket by first tackling the challenge of defining and communicating our values.

Re-Branding the Democratic Party

“We must offer a strong contrast to Republican vision.”10

“People will join us because they believe our values are their values”11

Analysis of election results by this committee found nothing to suggest a change in the philosophical underpinnings of the Democratic party to a more conservative – or, for that matter, a more liberal -- position would make a difference in the election outcomes, since there are very different constituencies that must reached and motivated to support Democratic candidates. Instead, we must focus our efforts on “branding” Democratic values as a means of anchoring Democratic positions on the issues that flow naturally from our principles.

In the political context, a “brand” can be described as a set of principles and goals that communicate a coherent worldview and provide a clear framework through which voters can discern which parties and candidates best represent their own values and interests. A brand is a clear statement of what the party believes, whom it represents, and what it is fighting for. See Table 1 for some examples of visions and value statements to consider.

Linguist and author of Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think George Lakoff, correctly notes that people consistently vote their values and identity above all else – even their own self-interest.12 “Branding” is absolutely critical to winning elections.

8 Much of this section’s analysis on branding is indebted to the work of Doug Hattaway and Hattaway Communications, a Democratic political communications and strategy firm. Mr. Hattaway is currently engaged in a national effort on Democratic branding. 9 This subcommittee’s members attended all hearings, collected notes and processed testimony of countless participants. 10 Unnamed, testimony received via email. 11 Peter Dolan of Gloucester in testimony submitted via email.

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Table 1 – Examples of Vision and Value Statements for Democrats13

“Fairness and opportunity for all, not special privileges for a few.”

“A strong economy that creates jobs and benefits all hardworking people, not one that simply helps those at the top and leaves millions unemployed.”

“Fiscally responsible, effective government that meets the needs of all Americans – not deficits, debt and cuts that hurt people.”

“Strong defense starts with responsible world leadership so that we can build strong alliances to our security – not a go-it-alone arrogance that places all the burdens on American troops and taxpayers.”

“Fair taxes – everybody pays their fair share and real tax relief goes to working people and small businesses who need it most, not those who need it least”; alternatively, “Fair taxes, not just lower taxes.”

Individual freedom and respect for difference – not Big Brother government that intrudes into people’s private lives and dictates conformity to a narrow worldview.

Stronger communities in which people share responsibility for the common good, not a survival-of-the-fittest.

Effective government, not just smaller government.

Community values, not just family values as the highest virtue.

Crime prevention, not just criminal punishment.

In stark contrast to Republicans, Democrats do not have a clear, compelling and differentiated “brand positioning” such that the public understands what values they are getting from Democratic candidates. As a direct result of this, Democratic candidates are vulnerable to being defined negatively by their Republican opponents. The weakness of the brand greatly disadvantages our candidates, who must individually invent their own identity from whole cloth. They must fight the notion that they do not stand for anything and defend against negative pre-conceptions about Democrats.

What is a political brand? Or more precisely, what is it made up of? Some of the components are listed in Table 2.

12 Lakoff, George. Don’t Think of An Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame the Debate (White River Junction: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2004), xi. 13 These examples come from Doug Hattaway’s presentation on re-branding the national Democratic party.

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Table 2 – Components of a Political Brand

Target Audience Specific consumer subgroups selected for growth potential

Values Core principles

Vision Big-picture goals and deliverables

Governing Philosophy Philosophical and historical context

Agenda Strategic initiatives, policy proposals and wedge issues

Opposition Positioning Terms that define the competition

Issues Stem from Values

What the Democratic party needs to do is … to stop pandering to special interest groups such as feminists, gays, etc. … and go back to dealing with real bread and butter issues such as job security, health care and the huge disparity in incomes between the lowest paid employees in a company and the highest pay… Why is the right of a woman to an abortion more important than her right to have affordable health care. [sic] 14

At virtually every hearing of the Election and Outreach Committee, there was substantial debate – and seeming conflict – between those who think we have drifted too far to the left, and those who believe we have failed to espouse sufficiently progressive positions that resonate with voters.

Seeing past the “red” versus “blue” debate in our own party begins here: this committee believes Democrats can espouse values that unite the center and left – by cultivating a values-driven message from which our positions can appeal to the voter.

Talking about policy issues without overarching values will always leave Democrats at a disadvantage to Republicans – even in Massachusetts. For their part, “Republican” and “conservative” are clearly defined terms for voters -- with positive concepts that appeal on personal and political levels. Most voters can state the main goals and ideas that animate the Republican Party and its conservative constituencies. Some of these tenets are stated as goals, such as “smaller government, lower taxes and a strong national defense.” Others are stated as moral principles, such as “individual responsibility” and “family values.” Conservatives speak very confidently about these notions and rally around policy proposals that are packaged as advancing these goals and values.

This brand strength greatly benefits Republican candidates. The brand does 80% of the candidates’ work in communicating a set of values and goals to voters.15 When voters see an “R” after the candidates’ names on the ballot, the voters have a very good idea of what the candidates stand for. Working from the foundation of this values-based brand identity, Republican candidates are in a

14 Boston.com Ideas Message Board. “Why can't the Bay State elect a Democratic governor?” Written by jdyer from Cambridge. Available at: http://www.boston.com/news/messageboards/ideas/110203/msg2.shtml. 15 Doug Hattaway.

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much stronger position to set the terms of the debate – and to define their Democratic opponents in a negative light.

Recommendations on Communicating Democratic Values

“People, I believe, really do want progressive change…Give them a reason to vote – inspire them – make them believe that they can be a party of something bigger than themselves. That’s the kind of vision that is so sorely needed.”16

We need not engage in the perennial debate between moderates and liberals over positioning the party on issues toward the center or left through signature policy proposals. In order to grow, Democrats must transcend these differences on policy, expand its reach, and focus on defining our Party by core values and goals, not a laundry list of policy issues.

We must identify overarching principles that unite voters along the spectrum from center to left. Republicans have succeeded in developing a brand that provides a comfortable home to such disparate constituencies as religious conservatives, libertarians, fiscal conservatives, high-income individuals, blue-collar workers, corporate America and small business. In order to succeed, Democrats must do the same – for and with its disparate constituencies.

Recommendation #1: Re-brand and communicate the Democratic Party’s fundamental values at state and local levels. The problem is not that Democrats lack a coherent moral framework – it is that Democrats tend to communicate in terms of specific policies rather than core values and visionary goals. To win the governor’s seat, we must articulate coherent sets of values that communicate why Democrats are more suited to running state government, and link these value messages to key issues, contrasting Republican values and messages.

Recommendation #2: Incorporate Democratic values – from the grassroots of the party to the leadership – into strategy and key messages that persuade independent and Democratic voters. The motivators – these erstwhile values – that unite and animate Democrats from political activists to infrequent voters lie just beneath the surface of our political discourse. The challenge Democrats face in winning the governor’s race is to unearth those motivators to craft a positioning strategy and key messages that communicate in politically relevant language, which candidates can articulate and Massachusetts’s voters will embrace.

Skillful execution is key to the success of a brand positioning strategy. A key finding is that the Democratic Party must work with candidates, consultants and operatives to improve the way Democrats and progressives communicate. And we must be disciplined from the top to the grassroots. This leadership issue is immediately relevant at the national level with the recent debate over who should become the next chair of the Democratic National Committee. But it is as relevant in our own state when we ask ourselves how to win the corner office.

16 Lawrence Kulig, Southborough in testimony submitted via email.

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Recommendation #3: Express a clear and concise vision for the future of Massachusetts centered on the top four priorities of voters. Affordable and accessible health care, an economy that works for all of us, quality education for every child, and strong public safety remain the top priorities of voters and are natural issues for the Democratic Party to embrace. Focus on these winners by linking our values to these positions in contrast to state Republicans’ repeated broken promised and failures.

Next Step >> Conduct voter research to craft a positioning strategy and messages that express our values and vision.

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Voter Turnout

Increasing turnout of the Democratic base and converting more unenrolled and suburban residents to voting Democratic will be what wins Democrats the governorship. Noted Democratic pollster Celinda Lake concluded, “Turnout was the single most influential factor [in the 2002 election].”17 Analysis of the 2002 election by the Election and Demographic Analysis Subcommittee of the Election and Outreach Committee confirms this pollster’s finding in a more nuanced way.18

The Subcommittee first set out to test whether variables like education, economic background or age by community would yield trends that were statistically significant when correlated to voting results.19 They did not. The subcommittee used voting results by city and town and census data at the city and town level and did not find any patterns that were unexpected and statistically significant.

The second hypothesis tested by the Election and Demographic Analysis Subcommittee also failed to provide useful data. It examined 2002 Ballot Question #1, and whether it brought more Republicans to the polls. This ballot question asked voters whether or not to abolish the income tax; a “Yes” vote was to abandon the state income tax. The subcommittee analyzed whether this tax question – one which relates strongly to the “lower taxes” issue advocated by Republicans in the campaign – would inspire greater turnout of “base” voters for Republican candidates. Almost no relationship between the turnout and the vote on Question #1 was observed, so although there was a relationship between affirmative votes on Question #1 and votes for Republicans, it was not related to turnout. Hence, having Question #1 on the ballot did not by itself increase Republican turnout.

Next, the subcommittee focused more on comparisons between the results in the 2002 races for Governor and for Treasurer.20 The subcommittee also closely compared the 2002 and 1998 races for Governor and from these races some very significant findings emerged. Those conclusions are summarized below.

1. O’Brien’s Success in Cities. Shannon O’Brien was far more successful in reaching the urban Democratic base in 2002 than was Scott Harshbarger in 1998. Both the percentage turnout, the percentage voting Democratic and the number of register voters in these

17 Celinda Lake. “What Voters Said in 2002 and What It Means for 2004 (National Elections).” Lake, Snell, Perry & Associates. March 2003. 18 The charge to this subcommittee was to examine the voting statistics and the census data to identify voting patterns that might guide the overall Election and Outreach Committee in answering the question of why the Democratic Gubernatorial candidate lost and whether the Democratic Party should become more conservative or more liberal in the positioning of its candidate.” David Hoover and Bonnie Baranowski prepared the subcommittee report and were assisted on U.S. Census data by Robert Tumposky 19 Mathematical techniques such as correlation analysis and regression analysis were both used to answer some of the questions. 20 We make the assumption that lack of wide name recognition of the candidates prior to the race for Treasurer and the focus on the Governors race by the public meant that the Treasurer’s race, except in the home areas of the candidates, would be a proxy for the hypothetical race between an average Democratic and an average Republican. Variations by city and town and also by region would show where the Democratic candidate was more successful and where she was less successful.

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areas demonstrated real success by the O’Brien campaign and the local party establishments.

2. Harshbarger’s Success in Suburbs. Scott Harshbarger was far more successful than O’Brien in the suburban areas where the swing voters reside. His campaign would have been a winner if he could have energized the Democratic base in the largest communities of the state.

3. In 2002, Democrats Improved Their Turnout Efforts. In 2002, Shannon O’Brien received more votes than the 1998 winner, Paul Cellucci, primarily due to her energizing the Democratic base in the larger communities.

4. Democrats Failed to Persuade Independent Suburban Voters. Mitt Romney established his victory by beating Shannon solidly in the Boston suburbs and the exburban and rural areas outside of the Boston with only a few areas of strength for Shannon probably due to strong local organizations.

Analysis of voting data leads us to conclude that in order to win the 2006 Governor’s race, the Democratic candidate must be able to hold the Democratic base in the larger communities that Shannon did, while appealing to a sufficient number of the voters in the suburban and rural areas to duplicate the percentages that Scott Harshbarger achieved in 1998. It is important to note that the subcommittee’s analysis found nothing to suggest that a change to a more conservative or a more liberal position of the Democratic candidate is going to make a difference since there are two very different constituencies that we must reach, one reflecting the suburban vote that Scott Harshbarger got and one reflecting the Democratic base in the larger cities and towns.

In the following pages the subcommittee provides detailed information to support our conclusions. Our analysis will focus primarily on two approaches to the voting results of 1998 and 2002. The first approach emphasizes the differences in voting patterns between the 28 largest communities in the State and remaining 322 smaller communities. The second approach uses a way of breaking the State into ten distinct regions as defined by Robert David Sullivan in his article “The Lay of the Land” that appeared in the Massachusetts Institute for a New Commonwealth (MassINC) publication Commonwealth, Summer 2002. Although individual regions described by Sullivan may not entirely consist of adjacent communities, each region contains cities and towns that are likely to have strong common features and which are useful in explaining the results of individual campaigns.

Where Did O’Brien Find Her Votes?

Before one can answer the question of why Shannon O’Brien lost the 2002 election to Mitt Romney, it is necessary to identify where her strengths and weaknesses were. Table 3 presents the overall vote for Governor in 2002 and the percentage achieved by each candidate.

Table 3 – Overall Vote for Governor – 2002

Candidate Votes Percentage

Romney 1,091,988 49.18%

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O’Brien 985,981 44.41

Stein 76,350 3.45

Howell 23,044 1.08

Johnson 15,535 .69

All Others 1,301 .06

Blanks 26,122 1.18

TOTALS 2,220,301 100.00

From Table 3 it is possible to draw one immediate conclusion. Although Jill Stein, the Green Party candidate, probably took votes away from O’Brien, the outcome would not have been changed if all of the Stein votes were cast for O’Brien. Romney defeated O’Brien by 106,007 votes. The results of the election would have to have been substantially closer for O’Brien partisans to point a finger at the Green Party as a spoiler.

In this study the subcommittee chose to compare the results in the 28 largest Massachusetts cities and towns to the remaining 322 communities. Those 28 cities and towns represented approximately 40% of the registered voters; further, analysis compares only Romney to O’Brien votes since they jointly represented 93.6% of the total vote. Table 2 shows that O’Brien won the 28 largest communities by slightly more than 100,000 votes while losing the remaining communities by more than 200,000 votes.

Table 4 – O’Brien versus Romney by Community Size

All Communities 28 Largest Remaining 322

Candidate Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent

O’Brien 985,981 47.4% 405,983 57.1% 579,998 42.4%

Romney 1,091,988 52.6 304,511 42.9 787,477 57.6

Table 4 clearly shows the strength of O’Brien in the largest cities and towns but those 28 cities and towns contained only 39.6% of the total registered voters. Table 5 divides the State into the ten regions identified by Robert David Sullivan in his article. In the Appendix a more detailed description of the ten regions will be presented although we strongly recommend that the Sullivan article be read and used in interpreting our material.

Although O’Brien won Regions 1 Bigger Boston and Region 2 the Mini Metropolises by comfortable margins, the problems outside the larger communities and the immediate suburbs were substantial. O’Brien was able to win decisively in only two of the ten regions. She won Regions 1 & 2 by 112,248 votes. She was able to closely compete in three more while losing decisively in five

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regions. She won Regions 3, 4 and 5 by a total of 4,492 votes but lost the last five regions by 222,747 votes. Any formula for a Democratic victory in a race for Governor must include winning more votes outside the Regions 1 & 2 urban Democratic base.

Table 5 – Where O’Brien Found Her Votes by Sullivan’s Categories21

Region Votes Percent

1. Bigger Boston 140,434 67.2%

2. Mini Metropolises 115,413 60.6

3. El Norte 104,406 48.9

4. Shopper’s World 107,513 49.4

5. Vacationland 102,317 53.1

6. Up and Out 79,444 44.5

7. Movers and Makers 88,605 42.4

8. Cranberry Country 81,475 37.7

9. Stables and Subdivisions 78,923 36.2

10. Interchanges 86,614 37.5

Turnout

In 2002 the percentage turnout was up substantially. Statewide, turnout increased from 52.0% in 1998 to 55.9% in 2002 (see Table 6). This resulted in 285,025 additional voters. Unfortunately the location of 68.3% of the new voters was in the 328 smaller communities that Romney won by 58.8% (see Table 4) and only 31.7% of the new voters were in the 28 largest communities that O’Brien won by 57.1%.

Another problem for O’Brien was that the percent turnout was only 48.6% in the 28 largest communities that she won while it was 60.7% in the 322 other communities that she lost. Although the 28 largest communities had almost 39.6% of the registered voters in 2002, they only produced 34.4% of the voters who turned out to vote. A problem for Democrats in the future is that this gap in turnout appears to be widening when 2002 figures are compared to 1998 figures. The percentage turnout increased from 1998 to 2002 by 3.9% statewide, but only 2.1% in the 28 largest communities versus 5.1% in the 322 other communities. Table 4 illustrates the turnout problems O’Brien experienced based on community size.

21 See Appendix 1 for a definition of categories. For much better descriptions, read “The Lay of the Land”, Robert David Sullivan, Commonwealth, Volume 7, Number 4, Summer 2002, The Massachusetts Institute for a New Commonwealth (MassINC), pp.58-71.

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Table 6 – A Comparison of the Turnout Data in 2002 and 1998


Registered Voters - 2002 3,972,607 1,572,521 2,400,086

Turnout – 2002 2,220,301 764,221 1,456,080

Percent Turnout – 2002 55.9% 48.6% 60.7%

Registered Voters – 1998 3,719,273 1,448,726 2,270,527

Turnout – 1998 1,935,277 673,744 1,261,533

Percent Turnout – 1998 52.0% 46.5% 55.6%

Difference 2002-1998

Registered Voters 253,334 123,795 129,539

Turnout 285,025 90,477 194,547

Percent Turnout 3.9% 2.1% 5.1%

The turnout problem for O’Brien and the turnout problems for Democrats in the future become even more pronounced when the State is divided into the ten regions identified by Sullivan. Table 7 shows that the turnout percents are lowest in the two regions that O’Brien won decisively.

Table 7 – Comparison of Turnout Percentages by Region compared with O’Brien Percentage

Region O’Brien Turnout - 2002 Turnout – 1998 Difference

1. Bigger Boston 67.2% 44.8% 41.1% 3.7%

2. Mini Metropolises 60.6 45.8 45.6 0.2

3. El Norte 48.9 54.5 50.9 3.6

4. Shopper’s World 49.4 65.3 58.3 7.0

5. Vacationland 53.1 59.8 56.6 3.2

6. Up and Out 44.5 58.1 54.9 3.2

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7. Movers and Makers 42.4 53.9 52.6 1.3

8. Cranberry Country 37.7 61.2 55.8 5.4

9. Stables and Subdivisions 36.2 64.6 57.2 7.4

10. Interchanges 37.5 58.4 52.8 5.6

How Did O’Brien Compare to Cahill in Finding Votes?

In trying to analyze an election it is useful to have the data a hypothetical race between an unknown Democrat and an unknown Republican to compare with the election results for Massachusetts Governor. Because the Treasurer’s race is not a high profile race compared to the one for Governor, its results can be used as a proxy for this hypothetical analysis: where did your candidate exceed expectations and where he or she fail to meet them.

There are ways to develop a hypothetical race to get expected results by community for the race you are studying but they are complex, costly and time consuming. Accordingly, we opted to use the results of the 2002 Treasurer’s race and recognize the weaknesses in the data due to familiarity of the candidates in their home areas. Since Tim Cahill had been Treasurer of Norfolk County and been politically successful in his hometown of Quincy, we discount the election returns there. The same was done for his Republican opponent’s home communities around Ipswich. Still, we feel that a comparison between Tim Cahill’s results and Shannon O’Brien’s results will provide valuable information as shown in Tables 8 & 9.

Accepting the assumption that the Treasurer’s race was a proxy for the hypothetical matching of an average Democrat with an average Republican, Table 8 suggests that a relatively unknown Democrat can beat a relatively unknown Republican by a statewide margin of approximately 10 percent or 55.1% to 44.9%.22

The subcommittee did not assign blame or credit based on the statistics, but instead pointed out that O’Brien’s problems appeared to be statewide. She fell short of the percentage achieved by Cahill in both the largest 28 communities and the smaller 322 communities where the shortfall was even greater. One possible formula under which O’Brien would now be Governor would be if she had won 60% of the vote in the 28 largest communities and 45% in the 322 smaller communities. In that case she would have won by about 5,000 votes.

Table 8 – Comparison of O’Brien Percentage with Cahill Percentage by Community Size



22 Please note that by using our data we cannot conclude whether Romney was a great candidate who ran a great campaign against an average Democrat running an average campaign or whether O’Brien ran a bad campaign. We also are unable to determine the full impact of the Green Party candidates or whether the voters who voted in the Governor’s race but not the Treasurer’s race were mostly Democrats.

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O’Brien 985,981 47.4% 405,983 57.1% 579,998 42.4%

Cahill 1,040,281 55.1 395,520 62.9 644,761 51.2

Difference -54,300 -7.7 +10,463 - 5.8 -64,763 - 8.8

Table 7 presents a comparison of the results by the ten regions and helps define where O’Brien ran reasonably well in terms of Cahill and where there was something that clearly went wrong. In Bigger Boston the campaign was successful in two ways. Table 7 shows that she slightly beat the expected Democratic vote and Table 5 showed the percentage turnout was up by 3.7% from 1998. The only other region where O’Brien came close to matching the expected percentage was in Region 5 Vacationland where she fell short by only .7% but that was probably due to significant strength in the Western part of Vacationland, which was her home base in her legislative years.

Region 4 (Shopper’s World) in which O’Brien fell 4.7% behind Cahill is not as bad as it may look since Romney’s home community, Belmont is located in the region and that O’Brien came close to beating him. To fall only 4.7% behind Cahill suggests that Region 4 is one in which her campaign was competitive although not successful. There were no other regions in which O’Brien performed within 5% of what might have been expected if the candidates and the campaigns were hypothetically equal.

The major problem regions for O’Brien – where she fell 11% or more behind Cahill – were Region 6 (Up and Out), Region 8 (Cranberry Country) and Region 10 (Interchanges). Since Region 6 was Tim Cahill’s home base, some of the difference between Cahill and O’Brien can be attributed to that factor. Region 8 is adjacent to Region 6 as are parts of Region 10 so it will also be necessary to examine the 1998 Harshbarger/Cellucci race before conclusions can be drawn.

Table 9 – A Comparison of O’Brien Percentage with Cahill Percentage by Region

Region O’Brien Cahill Difference

1. Bigger Boston 67.2% 67.1% + 0.1%

2. Mini Metropolises 60.6 67.6 - 7.0

3. El Norte 48.9 57.5 - 8.6

4. Shopper’s World 49.4 54.1 - 4.7

5. Vacationland 53.1 53.8 - 0.7

6. Up and Out 44.5 62.3 -17.8

7. Movers and Makers 42.4 51.0 - 8.6

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8. Cranberry Country 37.7 49.2 - 11.5

9. Stables and Subdivisions 36.2 44.3 - 8.1

10. Interchanges 37.5 49.0 - 12.5

How Did O’Brien Compare to Harshbarger in Finding Votes?

The final race from which we were able to draw conclusions was the 1998 campaign for Governor in which Scott Harshbarger received 48.3% of the combined votes for the Democratic and Republican candidates. Approximately 65,000 votes separated the candidates. Table 10 shows limited differences between O’Brien and Harshbarger. Statewide, O’Brien received more votes than Harshbarger but that was due to an increased number of voters. There was less than 1% difference in the percent voting for each of them with O’Brien receiving 47.4% (in a head-to-head with Romney) of the vote and Harshbarger receiving 48.3 (in a head-to-head with Cellucci). O’Brien was more successful in the larger communities and Harshbarger offset that by being more successful in the 322 smaller communities.

Referring back to Table 8 reveals that Cahill achieved 62.9% of the vote in the 28 largest communities, which suggests that Harshbarger – who only needed 57.1% – was particularly weak in the larger communities. Table 11 confirms this weakness, and that the Mini Metropolises were a major problem for Harshbarger and that he fell 14% behind what Cahill achieved. This analysis forces the conclusion that significant room existed for O’Brien to have done better in Region 2 but that it was a disaster for Harshbarger; we find therefore that there was a lot of room also for O’Brien to have done worse in the cities.

Table 10 – Comparison of O’Brien Percentage with Harshbarger Percentage by Community Size



O’Brien 985,981 47.4% 405,983 57.1% 579,998 42.4%

Harshbarger 901,863 48.3 358,501 55.2 676,456 44.5

Difference +84,118 - .9 +10,463 + 1.9 -64,763 - 2.1

Table 11 is particularly valuable here. With the prior material, it allows us to begin to judge where O’Brien was successful and where she experienced the greatest difficulties. Compared with Harshbarger her best success was in Region 2 followed by Region 1. Region 4 (Vacationland) was her home base and she did well there as compared to Harshbarger. In both Region 3 (El Norte) and Region 7 (Movers and Makers) O'Brien trailed Harshbarger by less than a percentage point so these regions could be judged about even and in Region 6 (Up and Out) her results were only 1.1%

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behind Harshbarger’s performance. Region 4 (Shopper’s World) was the worst performing region for her compared with Harshbarger but that should be expected considering that Harshbarger’s base was Middlesex County in which he had held county-wide office.

Table 11 – A Comparison of O’Brien Percentage with Harshbarger Percentage by Region

Region O’Brien Harshbarger Difference

1. Bigger Boston 67.2% 64.2% + 3.0%

2. Mini Metropolises 60.6 53.2 + 7.0

3. El Norte 48.9 49.7 - .8

4. Shopper’s World 49.4 54.5 - 5.1

5. Vacationland 53.1 51.0 + 2.1

6. Up and Out 44.5 45.6 - 1.1

7. Movers and Makers 42.4 42.6 - .2

8. Cranberry Country 37.7 41.7 - 4.0

9. Stables and Subdivisions 36.2 40.5 - 4.3

10. Interchanges 37.5 40.2 - 2.7

When the subcommittee combined all of their data some conclusions began to appear. The O’Brien campaign had modest success in the 28 largest communities as a group when compared to Harshbarger (+1.9) but trailed Cahill by 5.8%. It is within the ten regions that the significant differences begin to emerge.

O’Brien held the base in Region 1 and turnout increased by 3.0% so her performance in Bigger Boston could be judged successful. There was limited room for improvement in this region. Since this is the strongest base, a candidate and a campaign will need to find ways to increase the turnout in this Region to offset the higher turnout in the other regions.

Region 2 (Mini Metropolises) was somewhat less successful in that O’Brien’s performance fell 7% short against Cahill but she did 7% better than Harshbarger so there improvement. Region 2 also showed the least increase in percent turnout from 1998 to 2002 which suggests that the campaign did not excite the communities or that the GOTV efforts did not work.

Region 3 (El Norte) should be the fourth most Democratic region based on Cahill’s 57.5% performance but it has produced disappointing results. Both O’Brien and Harshbarger failed to carry the region. More research is necessary to understand why this occurred.

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Region 4 (Shopper’s World) is a very competitive region and was primarily a Middlesex region with four Norfolk County towns. A Democratic candidate from who comes from neither of the counties as O’Brien would not expect to win the Region by more than 2% so O’Brien’s performance was satisfactory. Turnout was 7% higher so it appears that both campaigns had success with their GOTV efforts.

In Region 5 (Vacationland) O’Brien held the base and did better than Harshbarger but this was probably to due her strength in the Western part of Vacationland. In the other area where she did less well, O’Brien may have offset her home base advantage. Given the fact that Vacationland includes three different pieces, further study would be needed to draw clear conclusions about her success outside the Western part.

Region 6 (Up and Out) was Cahill’s home base so it is hard to determine how well O’Brien did here compared to a hypothetical race. It is clear that she was only 1.1% behind Harshbarger’s performance but there is little more that we can draw from that race.

Region 7 (Movers and Makers) is all Worcester County communities and it is clear that Democrats like Cahill can be competitive and even win but neither O’Brien nor Harshbarger were able to get beyond 42%. This suggests that the Democrats have not found a message or a candidate that causes a response in the voters.

Regions 8 and 10 (Cranberry Country and Interchanges) have a great deal in common in that Cahill was able to get 49.2% while O’Brien was stuck in the 37% range and Harshbarger around 41%. Both of these regions saw an increase in turnout around 5.5%, which represented the third and fourth highest increases in turnout. Again like in Region 7 the two Democratic candidates did not connect with the voters.

Region 9 (Stables and Subdivisions) is the strongest Republican region in the State and represents a growing number of voters. From 1998 to 2002 the number of voters who turned out increased by 18.6%. Tim Cahill was able to get 44.3% but O’Brien suffered her worst defeat in this region getting only 36.2% of the vote. Scott Harshbarger did slightly better with 40.5%.

Turnout Among Working Families

The Election Analysis subcommittee also concludes that most of the traditional Democratic demographics – urban blue-collar workers – had little impact on turnout. Yet Democratic Party messages were still overwhelmingly geared towards appealing to them. In every case and in all parts of Massachusetts, demographic analysis shows this groups having significantly decreased in influence. Statewide races are won and lost in the suburbs.

Stale appeals that sound as if they were written for factory workers of decades past are not enough to turnout 21st century independent voters. Whether blue collar or not, these messages no longer relate to most swing voters. Elaine Kamarck observed as much in a recent article for Commonwealth Magazine, noting that debates concerning the “minimum wage,” for example, had little influence on statewide elections.23 Instead, connecting Democratic values to issues that matter

23 Elaine C. Kamarck, Glass Ceiling (CommonWealth Magazine Summer 2003)

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to 21st century voters will help with turning out the urban base and persuading the suburban “uncollared” working voter.

O’Brien was expected to perform better with union voters, but a University of Massachusetts poll showed that O’Brien beat Romney by only 24 points among union households, a substantial decrease from previous years. The slip was attributed to the fact that union households are voting Republican on social issues.24 So, the only way union groups were going to break for O’Brien would have to be for economic reasons.

Recommendations on Voter Turnout

The Election and Census Analysis subcommittee sought to identify where the O’Brien campaign was more successful and where it was less successful. Our data does not answer whether the Democratic Party should move to the left or the right, but it does answer where the problem electoral areas were for O’Brien and Harshbarger. It demonstrates decisively the importance of turnout in key areas: turnout levels in urban areas must be comparable to suburban areas if Democrats are to win; and Democrats must close the performance gap in suburban, independent-leaning areas

Pollster Celinda Lake has observed that Massachusetts politicians could learn two important lessons from the 2002 elections. First, turnout remains the highest priority. Second, encouraging turnout without having a clear message on key issues is a wasted effort.25 The question turns to the method for boosting turnout. Lake suggests “clear message on key issues.” This report goes further in the first section – that we must re-brand the values of our party. By communicating the values and issues that flow from those values, turnout for Democrats can be enhanced across the Commonwealth.

Recommendation #4: Win Over Unenrolled, Suburban Voters. In 2002, turnout in solidly Democratic Greater Boston lagged behind suburban communities where O’Brien lost. A problem for O’Brien was the percentage turnout was only 48.6% in the 28 largest communities that she won, while it was 60.7% in the 322 other communities that she lost. Republicans have done better job of getting out the vote among their base. In this environment, the key to winning is persuading largely independent suburban voters to vote for the Democrats.

Significant correlation and a high ratio of votes for Republicans to the percentage of unenrolled voters does give credence to the declaration that the hi-tech corridor (cities with the most unenrolled voters) is the state’s political “center of gravity”. Harshbarger did well in 1998 in this region; O’Brien failed by any metric to persuade them.

The Romney campaign clearly succeeded in making the election one of urban versus suburban, exploiting and expanding a split between rural and suburban voters and the cities which they often blame for draining tax dollars away from schools and hospitals in their communities. Democrats did

24 Yvonne Abraham. “Election 2002: Massachusetts votes: exit polls; party base deserted O’Brien urban, union voters went for Romney.” Boston Globe. 6 Nov. 2002, 3rd ed.: B10. 25 Celinda Lake, Democratic Pollster, Lake, Snell, Perry & Associates (March 2003).

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not answer this attack. Suburban voters and the middle class cannot be treated as a uniform voting block to which uniform appeals can be expected to work.

In addition, there is an assumption that smaller communities are solid or near-solid Republican. While the majority of them demonstrably vote that way, Democrats lose by not shaping their message to appeal to such districts. It is not necessarily true that the candidate must change or that the message must change to appeal to rural Massachusetts. Likeability may be important, but values drive this – and all – issues in such a campaign. Democratic values can appeal to these voters too!

Recommendation #5: Increase Urban Turnout. The Democratic Party must build on Shannon O’Brien’s success in boosting turnout among highly Democratic urban communities. Electoral success will continue to depend on a strong grassroots field campaign in traditionally Democratic urban areas.

“The Democratic Party has almost completely ignored Black and Hispanic voters across the state, but especially in Boston and Springfield. The Republican Party is devoid of Black and Latino voters in general, but the Democrats seem to think that they must cater to white suburban voters in order to be elected to higher office, while rarely setting foot in loyal democratic strongholds like Roxbury, Dorchester, Mattapan, and so forth. If the Democrats refuse to campaign in low-income communities where Black and Hispanics are the majority, then Black and Latinos are going to stay home on Election Day. It's just that simple!”26

Recommendation #6: Appeal to and Nurture Minorities in the Commonwealth. The growing minority populations in the Commonwealth cannot be ignored in future gubernatorial campaigns. The Party should increase its outreach to and nurturing of minority groups and leaders: whether it is communities of color, youth, the disabled, or those from rural areas.

The Committee believes that this recommendation – which the Party partially began to implement in the 2004 election – should continue even when there isn’t an election in the horizon.

Next Step >> Conduct outreach and develop a communications strategy to win over unenrolled suburban voters and minorities between election cycles and during campaigns.

26 Boston.com Ideas Message Board. “Why can't the Bay State elect a Democratic governor?” Written by Arthur from Brookline. Available at: http://www.boston.com/news/messageboards/ideas/110203/msg7.shtml.

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Perceived Lack of Party Organization

Members who testified targeted most of their frustration on three points:

1. The disorganized process of the nominating convention.

2. Insufficient time for Democratic candidate to campaign between primary and general election.

3. Lack of collaboration between Party headquarters and local activists.

On the first point, the Massachusetts Democratic Party has already moved forward. In January 2004, the Convention Reform Commission, chaired by former Governor Michael Dukakis and Congressman James McGovern, submitted fourteen recommendations that the Democratic Party has committed to integrating into the 2006 Nominating Convention.

Recommendation #7: Continue the process of reforming nominating convention by implementing the recommendations of the Dukakis/McGovern Report.

Democratic Party members and activists also noted that the late primary date, combined with a bruising nomination battle, leave Democratic gubernatorial candidates at a distinct disadvantage during the general election.

“Move the primary from September to June…[this is] the single, most important reason for us being disadvantaged in gubernatorial races against unified Republicans. We run against each other for 2 months (or more!), and against the Republicans for six weeks.”27

Recommendation #8: Support proposals to move the state primary date to an earlier date. A bill filed by Senator Jarrett Barrios will move the primary from the 2nd Tuesday in September to the 3rd Tuesday in May. The bill will increase voter turnout by giving candidates more time between the primary and the general election to reach out to and meet with voters. An earlier primary date will: encourage candidates to run grassroots campaigns by giving them more time to interact with voters; allow for greater contact with unenrolled voters; and provide service men and women overseas with the time to make an informed vote by extending the time for our soldiers to make a decision and cast their votes.

On the third point, local party activists note that coordination between the Party and the Democratic constituencies must extend beyond the election cycle focused on integrating local grassroots Democrats into decision-making processes and organization. The Message Subcommittee concludes that “the state committee needs to listen to local communities to hear about their needs and concerns” and that the “party needs to engage in aggressive outreach efforts, particularly with youth and with minorities who often feel taken for granted in the Party.”

The Committee is happy to report that during the 2004 mid-term legislative elections, the Party and its legislative leaders were successful in reaching out in a more coordinated fashion to local campaigns and activists through the circulation of message points and fundraising efforts. The Party

27 Joseph W. Mullin of Weston in written testimony.

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must build on this work and the Committee intends for this report to continue the conversation between the Party and its members about how they can best be served in the future.

Recommendation #9: Speak with “one voice” by better coordinating issues and message with Party leaders and members at both the state and local levels. Just as the voters ultimately hold elected officials accountable, the Party must also hold them accountable.

Next Step >> Develop a statewide, integrated communications plan and provide training to party activists statewide on communication activities.

Next Step >> Coordinate communications between state Party, local activists and elected officials with distribution of talking points, regular conference calls, and a rapid response team.

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Conclusion

“Fortune favors the bold.” -- Virgil

Democratic values are rooted in the enduring spirit of the America and the role of government in society as a positive force in hard working peoples lives. As one member stated: “we need to be honest, that we believe in government.” The Democratic Party’s challenge – it seems – is to be honest with the voters of Massachusetts about what it truly believes.

So, what next? In a January 12, 2005 speech at the National Press Club addressing the future of the Democratic Party Senator Edward M. Kennedy said “We have a choice. We can continue to be buffeted by the harsh winds of a shrinking world. Or we can think anew, and guide the currents of globalization with a new progressive vision that strengthens America and equips our citizens to move confidently to the future.”

The conversation facing Massachusetts Democrats parallels the debate on a national level about the future of the Democratic Party. It is the Committee’s sincere hope that the report and its recommendations will serve as a guide to the Massachusetts Democratic Party as it continues this conversation. Democrats today find themselves at a crossroads. Will we embrace a bolder vision for the future? Or will we continue to be defined by our opposition?

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Appendix 1 – Describing the Ten Regions

This analysis owes a lot to the outstanding work of Robert David Sullivan in dividing the Massachusetts into ten areas designed to help explain where the Democrats and Republicans would find votes in Fall, 2002. We strongly recommend that the reader of this analysis to go to www.massinc.org to read the full article in the Summer 2002 edition of CommonWealth or to read it in a local library. The article is entitled Mapping Massachusetts Politics and begins on page 58. To access it from the web you will be required to register with MassInc but that is a simple, two minute task and will give you access to all of their articles and much more good information.

In remainder of this Appendix we will provide a brief description of each of the ten regions. In Appendix 2 we provide a list of the cities and towns that comprise each region. Appendix 2 is the result of the authors of this analysis reviewing the maps provided in the article “Mapping Massachusetts Politics” and was not provided by the author of the article.

Region 1 – Bigger Boston – This Region is comprised of Boston, Cambridge, Somerville and Brookline. It is the only region in which a majority of the voters are registered Democrats. The Region has the second highest education level in the State and is the most ethnically diverse.

Region 2 – Mini Metropolises – This region actually comprises three mini metropolises, one centered on Pittsfield and the surrounding communities, one centered on Springfield and one centered on Fall River and New Bedford. It is a key region for building a Democratic victory. These areas are outside the reach of the Boston media and have not been experiencing the economic growth in the rest of the State.

Region 3 – El Norte – This region is experiencing growing ethnic diversity and is centered in Lynn and the surrounding communities. It also includes Lawrence and Lowell. The number of Hispanics and Asians are increasing and make up a significant part of the population. The Region has the lowest percentage of enrolled Republicans.

Region 4 – Shopper’s World – Route 9 from Framingham to Newton in many ways represents this Region although it covers a number of the other communities adjacent to or near to Route 128 in Middlesex County. It also includes Needham, Randolph, Sharon and Wellesley.

Region 5 – Vacationland – This Region is like Region 3 in that it contains geographically separated communities. It is comprised of three primary areas. The first is the western one third of the State minus the mini metropolises of Pittsfield and Springfield that are in this region. The second is centered in the coastal communities of Cape Ann and the third includes Falmouth, Martha’s Vineyard, Nantucket and the eastern-most town on the Cape.

Region 6 – Up and Out – This region is primarily made up of the communities in the older suburbs of Boston. It includes many voters or their parents who chose to leave the Bigger Boston region for the attractions of the suburbs. The Republicans have been slowly gaining strength in this Region.

Region 7 – Movers and Makers – This Region includes most of Worcester County excluding the some of the high growth towns around 495. Worcester is the largest community in the region. The

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Region has been an increasing problem for the Democrats. Weld beat Kerry in the Senate race in 1996.

Region 8 – Cranberry Country – This Region is mostly Plymouth County plus five communities from Barnstable County communities from Bourne to Yarmouth and the towns of Cohasset, Easton and Rayham. It is the Region with the lowest percentage of registered Democrats and it experienced a 7.2% growth in Registered Voters from 1998 to 2002.

Region 9 – Stables and Subdivisions – This region is comprised of a section of Northern Middlesex County including all of the communities along the New Hampshire border and Western Middlesex County communities down to Stow and Maynard at the Southernmost point. It includes the Northeastern Middlesex communities excluding Lowell. In Essex County it includes the central part of the County until it reaches the Vacationland communities on the East and the Region 10 communities along the New Hampshire border. The Southern Border of Stables and Subdivisions is marked by the El Norte border communities, such as Woburn, Stoneham, Melrose, Saugus and Lynn. This Region is considered the most Republican in the State.

Region 10 – Interchanges – This is another region that is made up of three parts. The Westernmost part is Westfield and its adjacent communities. In the Northeastern part of the State it includes Haverill and several other communities on the New Hampshire border. The common features of these communities are their relationship to the major highways in the State, such as, I-495, I-95, I-91 and the Mass Pike. The areas around the key interchanges are areas if substantial population. This was Cellucci’s strongest region and it has been becoming more Republican and more conservative in the recent years.

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Appendix II – Communities Sorted by Sullivan’s Ten Regions

Community Name

County

1. BIGGER BOSTON 3. El NORTE (cont.) 5. VACATIONLAND (cont.)

Boston city SUF Saugus town EX Conway town FR

Brookline town NOR Stoneham town MDX Cummington town HPS

Cambridge city MDX Swampscott town EX Deerfield town FR

Somerville city MDX Winchester town MDX Eastham town BA

Woburn city MDX Easthampton city HPS

2. MINI METROPOLISES Edgartown town DU

Acushnet town BR 4. SHOPPER'S WORLD Egremont town BE

Adams town BE Acton town MDX Erving town FR

Berkley town BR Arlington town MDX Essex town EX

Cheshire town BE Belmont town MDX Falmouth town BA

Chicopee city HMD Concord town MDX Florida town BE

Clarksburg town BE Framingham town MDX Gill town FR

Dalton town BE Lexington town MDX Gloucester city EX

Dartmouth town BR Lincoln town MDX Goshen town HPS

Dighton town BR Natick town MDX Gosnold town DU

Fairhaven town BR Needham town NOR Granby town HPS

Fall River city BR Newton city MDX Granville town HMD

Freetown town BR Randolph town NOR Great Barrington town BE

Holyoke city HMD Sharon town NOR Greenfield town FR

Lanesborough town BE Sudbury town MDX Hadley town HPS

Ludlow town HMD Waltham city MDX Hampden town HMD

New Bedford city BR Watertown city MDX Hancock town BE

North Adams city BE Wayland town MDX Harwich town BA

Palmer town HMD Wellesley town NOR Hatfield town HPS

Pittsfield city BE Weston town MDX Hawley town FR

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Somerset town BR Heath town FR

Springfield city HMD 5. VACATIONLAND Hinsdale town BE

Swansea town BR Alford town BE Holland town HMD

Taunton city BR Amherst town HPS Huntington town HPS

Westport town BR Aquinnah town DU Ipswich town EX

Ashfield town FR Lee town BE

3. EL NORTE Becket town BE Lenox town BE

Chelsea city SUF Belchertown town HPS Leverett town FR

Everett city MDX Bernardston town FR Leyden town FR

Lawrence city EX Blandford town HMD Middlefield town HPS

Lowell city MDX Brewster town BA Monroe town FR

Lynn city EX Brimfield town HMD Monson town HMD

Malden city MDX Buckland town FR Montague town FR

Marblehead town EX Charlemont town FR Monterey town BE

Medford city MDX Chatham town BA Montgomery town HMD

Melrose city MDX Chester town HMD Mount Washington town BE

Peabody city EX Chesterfield town HPS Nantucket town NAN

Revere city SUF Chilmark town DU New Ashford town BE

Salem city EX Colrain town FR New Marlborough town BE

5. VACATIONLAND (cont.) 6. UP AND OUT 8. MOVERS (cont.)

New Salem town FR Avon town NOR Lunenburg town WOR

Newbury town EX Braintree town NOR Mendon town WOR

Newburyport city EX Brockton city PL Milford town WOR

Northampton city HPS Canton town NOR Millbury town WOR

Northfield town FR Dedham town NOR Millville town WOR

Oak Bluffs town DU Dover town NOR New Braintree town WOR

Orange town FR Holbrook town NOR North Brookfield town WOR

Orleans town BA Hull town PL Northbridge town WOR

Otis town BE Medfield town NOR Oakham town WOR

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Pelham town HPS Milton NOR Oxford town WOR

Peru town BE Nahant EX Paxton town WOR

Plainfield town HPS Norwod NOR Petersham town WOR

Provincetown town BA Quincy NOR Phillipston town WOR

Richmond town BE Stoughton NOR Princeton town WOR

Rockport town EX Walpole NOR Royalston town WOR

Rowe town FR Westwood NOR Rutland town WOR

Rowley town EX Weymouth NOR Southbridge town WOR

Russell town HMD Winthrop SUF Spencer town WOR

Salisbury town EX Sterling town WOR

Sandisfield town BE 7. MOVERS AND MAKERS Sturbridge town WOR

Savoy town BE Ashburnham town WOR Sutton town WOR

Sheffield town BE Athol town WOR Templeton town WOR

Shelburne town FR Auburn town WOR Upton town WOR

Shutesbury town FR Barre town WOR Uxbridge town WOR

South Hadley town HPS Berlin town WOR Warren town WOR

Southampton HPS Blackstone town WOR Webster town WOR

Stockbridge town BE Bolton town WOR West Boylston town WOR

Sunderland town FR Boylston town WOR West Brookfield town WOR

Tisbury town DU Brookfield town WOR Westminster town WOR

Tolland town HMD Charlton town WOR Winchendon town WOR

Truro town BA Clinton town WOR Worcester city WOR

Tyringham town BE Douglas town WOR

Wales town HMD Dudley town WOR 8. CRANBERRY COUNTRY

Ware town HPS East Brookfield town WOR Bourne town BA

Warwick town FR Fitchburg city WOR Bridgewater town PL

Washington town BE Gardner city WOR Carver town PL

Wellfleet town BA Grafton town WOR Cohasset town NOR

Wendell town FR Hardwick town WOR Dennis town BA

West Stockbridge town BE Harvard town WOR Duxbury town PL

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West Tisbury town DU Holden town WOR East Bridgewater town PL

Westhampton town HPS Hopedale town WOR Easton town BR

Whately town FR Hubbardston town WOR Halifax town PL

Wilbraham town HMD Lancaster town WOR Hanover town PL

Williamsburg town HPS Leicester town WOR Hanson town PL

Williamstown town BE Leominster city WOR Hingham town PL

Windsor town BE

Worthington town HPS

8.CRANBERRY COUNTRY (cont.) 9. STABLES AND SUBDIVISIONS 10. INTERCHANGES

Kingston town PL Andover town EX Agawam city HMD

Lakeville town PL Ashby town MDX Amesbury town EX

Marion town PL Ayer town MDX Ashland town MDX

Marshfield town PL Bedford town MDX Attleboro city BR

Mashpee town BA Beverly city EX Bellingham town NOR

Mattapoisett town PL Billerica town MDX East Longmeadow town HMD

Middleborough town PL Boxborough town MDX Foxborough town NOR

Norwell town PL Boxford town EX Franklin city NOR

Pembroke town PL Burlington town MDX Haverhill city EX

Plymouth town PL Carlisle town MDX Holliston town MDX

Plympton town PL Chelmsford town MDX Hopkinton town MDX

Raynham town BR Danvers town EX Hudson town MDX

Rochester town PL Dracut town MDX Longmeadow town HMD

Rockland town PL Dunstable town MDX Mansfield town BR

Sandwich town BA Georgetown town EX Marlborough city MDX

Scituate town PL Groton town MDX Medway town NOR

Wareham town PL Groveland town EX Merrimac town EX

West Bridgewater town PL Hamilton town EX Methuen city EX

Whitman town PL Littleton town MDX Millis town NOR

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Yarmouth town BA Lynnfield town EX Norfolk town NOR

Manchester-by-the-Sea town EX North Attleborough town BR

Maynard town MDX Northborough town WOR

Middleton town EX Norton town BR

North Andover town EX Plainville town NOR

North Reading town MDX Rehoboth town BR

Pepperell town MDX Seekonk town BR

Reading town MDX Sherborn town MDX

Shirley town MDX Shrewsbury town WOR

Stow town MDX Southborough town WOR

Tewksbury town MDX Southwick town HMD

Topsfield town EX West Springfield town HMD

Townsend town MDX Westborough town WOR

Tyngsborough town MDX Westfield city HMD

Wakefield town MDX Wrentham town NOR

Wenham town EX

West Newbury town EX

Westford town MDX

Wilmington town MDX

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