QLD’S MOST VULNERABLE FARM ANIMALS

- CAN WE STOP THEM SLIPPING THROUGH THE ANIMAL WELFARE REGULATORY NET?

Rebekah Eyers Sociolegal Research CentreGriffith Law School Renewing Regulation Colloqium, 2 July 2010

PRESENTATION OUTLINE (2)Part 1- Qld regulatory system for the welfare of farmed animals in

saleyardsa) Regulatory problemb) Principles of ‘Smart Regulation’ strategy - to prescribe plan to address this

prob c) Reg framework surrounding the problem – why difficult to regulate?d) Case study – Reg actor groups coercive capacities and different views on

the reg problem, and best solutions to address ite) Case study – Converging views (all actor groups) on preferred reg

mechanisms to address problem, and of barriers to using these mechanisms

Part 2 – Applying Insights from ‘Smart Regulation’ Apply ‘Smart Regulation’ insights into:I. How reg actors can act as surrogate regulatorsII. How characteristics of Aus Ag Ind regulation apply to regulating livestock

sector III. Tools to complement info mechanisms IV. Towards solutions to this reg problem

AUSTRALIAN AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY SECTOR- REGULATORY CULTURE AND CONTEXT (3)

‘Traditionally, regulation of agriculture has been informal, based upon the provision of information and persuasion by government authorities, whose fundamental role has not been to police agricultural producers, but to assist them to do the right thing’ (Grabosky et al, 1998)

REGULATORY PROBLEM (4)

‘Australia is a world leader in animal welfare’ (AAWS, Animal Welfare Strategy, Fed Govt, 1998)

The Problem - Despite legislation, codes and policy - Qld’s animal welfare regulatory net is failing to stop animals who are in a compromised physical condition (often of low economic value) from being transported long distances to be sold in saleyards or delivered to slaughterhouses.

My Argument – ‘Smart Regulation’ advises us to utilise a broad range of reg tools/reg actor groups to solve reg problems, and to be informed by the unique reg culture/context of the reg system. To do this, I first need to gain insights from the reg actors “on the ground” about their perspectives on:

the source of the reg problem the reg instruments that might be supported by range of reg actor groups the barriers that reg actors foresee for the use of certain reg instruments

EMACIATED

CRIPPLE LEG

CHRONIC MASTITIS

LOADED ONTO TRAILER WITH A BROKEN LEG

HORN SNAPPED OFF DOWN TO THE ROOT

‘DOWNER’ COW

WEAK CALF – 1 WEEK OLD

“DOGGERS”, “SUSPECTS”, “DOWNERS”, “BUYER’S RISK”, “BURGERS”, “PET FOOD ANIMALS” “UNFITS”, “FAULTYS”

LEGAL FRAMEWORK - PARTS RELEVANT TO REGULATING “UNFIT” ANIMALS (6)

o Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) and ‘Voluntary’ Codes of Practice for the Welfare of each species of farmed animal. Ind regulator, Qld DEEDI administers Act.

Code compliance is ‘voluntary’ - but is a defence (exemption) from cruelty/duty of care omission convictions under Act. Use of exemptions is limited, accused must meet certain conditions. Few complaints made, even fewer convictions. (Cruelty max-$75,000 or 2 yrs; DOC max-$22,500 or 1 yr)

LEGAL FRAMEWORK - PARTS RELEVANT TO REGULATING “UNFIT” ANIMALS CONT... (7)

Relevant parts of section17 and 18 of the Act provide that:Act objective – ‘To promote the responsible care and use of animals

and to protect animals from cruelty’Section 17 Breach of duty of care prohibitedSection 18 Animal cruelty prohibitedRelevant parts of the Codes of Practice provide that:Codes of Practice, Introduction - ‘The code aims to minimise stress in

all livestock by encouraging efficient and considerate treatment and handling’

2.1.5 Management personnel – ‘The saleyard manager should ensure that high standards are maintained in relation to obtaining prompt veterinary attention for diseased, sick or injured animals...’

4.4 Unloading of injured animals – ‘...If in the judgement of a veterinarian or stock inspector an injury is minor and is not causing undue pain and or distress, affected animals should be promptly segregated and treated. Animals requiring emergency slaughter should be shot or stunned and bled without moving them further than necessary to effect euthenasia’

REG CULTURE/CONTEXT OF AUS AG IND- WHY SO DIFFICULT TO REGULATE? (8)

Aus Ag sector reg characteristics (Gunningham et al, 1998) Political culture – self regulation + govt subsidies Increasingly intensive/globally competitive production methods Traditional industry, averse to regulatory/procedural change Causes of reg problem are diffuse and educating and monitoring of

reg targets is expensiveFarm animal, ‘Livestock’ production sector Welfare = For market access only Welfare not exact science (ind pays for reg impact and scientific

studies) Diffuse causes – expensive monitoring/enforcement Offences are ‘out of public eye’ Lack $ incentive –improve treatment of low value animals Pet food – stable market demand Prohibiting cruelty – not enough to secure ongoing compliance (like

enviro regulation, a ‘stewardship’ ethic is needed)

REG CULTURE/CONTEXT OF AUS AG IND- WHY SO DIFFICULT TO REGULATE? (9)

Telling an individual, surrounded by his peers/culture, how to use their own property (farmed animals), which is, the individual’s livelihood.

Existing research - Enviro regulation (See Cahn, 1995; and Babcock, 2009)

Existing research – Aus Ag ind regulation (See Grabosky et al 1998)

Existing research - Key factors that make reg inspectors from ind background more prone to ‘capture’ include:

Revolving door - Inspectors recruited from ind are less prosecutorial (offered ind jobs)

Individual inspectors meet with ind + inspect 1 geographical territory

Inspectors see more of ind they regulate than they do of general public

Agency reg few companies or co from single ind use less formal means of gaining compliance

Inspectors in frequent contact with same co’s use less formal sanctions (Braithwaite et al, 1986)

REG CULTURE/CONTEXT QLD SALEYARDS- WHY SO DIFFICULT TO REGULATE (10)

Producer

Transport drive

r

Saleyard

animal drafte

rs

Transport drive

r

Slaughterhouse

, feedlot or port animal

drafters or new produc

er

1 - DEEDI(RSPCA, Police) and Reg

Targets

2 - Rational Animal PIGs

and Consumers

3 - Banks

3 - Insurance Companies

2 - Industry Org’s e.g.

QA systems

3 - Retailers

CASE STUDY IV’S – 3 REG ACTOR GROUPS- PERCEPTION OF SOURCE OF REG PROBLEM (11)

Lack C

C+prescr

iptive

law

Econo

mic prob

lem

Lack i

nfo di

ssem

Lack i

nfo di

sclosu

re0

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100120

SY Man Risk assessorAnimal PIG

CASE STUDY IV’S –- PERCEPTION OF BEST REG SOLUTIONS (12)

More C+C

$ ince

ntive

/disin

centiv

e

More In

fo dis

sem

More In

fo dis

closur

e

Ind QA s

ystem

s0

20406080

100120

SY ManagerRisk assessorAnimal PIG

AVAILABILITY OF REG TOOLS– THIS REG SYSTEM (13) Increases C and C (direct regulation) QA systems Financial incentives/disincentives Info mechanisms

Note – Enviro reg research on regulating the behaviour of individuals’ use of natural resources reinforces appropriateness of using these 2 instruments (see Johnson, 2009):

C and C mechanisms = least appropriate Info dissemination and disclosure mechanisms and financial

incentives = most appropriate

ADVANTAGES OF USING INFO MECHANISMS TO INFLUENCE INDIVIDUALS TO BE MORE COMPLIANT (14)

First step - introduce information tools Low cost Improve attitudes/behaviour/management systems Perceived as equitable/less interventionist Harness self interest of reg targets and provide ongoing

incentives Educate NGO’s + 3rd parties to participate effectively (reg

process) Help legitimize sacrifices reg targets must make (+ make

coercive strategy palatable) Help close gap between public/private interests Good foundation for use of other reg instruments Induce voluntarism– if info instruments represent

convergence of producer/public int In mandatory disclosure form – acts as 3rd party montiroring

mechanism

CASE STUDY IV’S - PERCEPTION OF BARRIERS TO SUCCESS OF PREFERRED REG TOOLS (INFO MECHANISMS) (15)

Ind won

't allo

w

Peop

le won

't do

Theo

retica

l not

practi

cal

Too c

ostly

to im

plemen

t0

20406080

100120

SY ManagersRisk assessorAnimal PIGs

APPLYING ‘SMART REGULATION’ - TO ADDRESS REG PROBLEMS (16)

‘Smart Regulation’

What is it? Cautions for using ‘Smart Reg’ What it says about the Aus Ag Ind Applying its 3 step design process to Qld farm animal

welfare reg system

POTENTIAL COERCIVE CAPACITY (SANCTIONS/STRATEGIES) OF 2ND AND 3RD PARTY ACTORS – ARE THEY LIMITED? (17)ANIMAL PIGS, IND QA, TRANSPORTERS BANKS, INS, RETAIL

Mobilise adverse publicity (international)

Mobilise adverse publicity (domestic)

Mobilise publicity for change

Collaborate with other PIGs and private actors

Collaborate with Regulator

Work constructively with Ind (QA licensing??)

APPLYING ‘SMART REGULATION’ - TO ID REG RESPONSES (18) (UP DYNAMIC REG INST TILL REG GOAL REACHED)

(Most interventionist)E.g. Criminal

charges/license revocation

Increase direct C and C regulation

Admin sanctions – e.g. Fines (not criminal)

Mandatory info dissem/disclosure

underpinned by direct regulation.

(Least interventionist)Non mandatory info

dissemination

APPLYING THE ‘SMART REG’ PRESCRIPTIONREG DESIGN PROCESS TO QLD S.Y. A.W. REGIME (19)

Step 1- ProcessesID regulatory objectiveID characteristics of problem confrontedID available policy options/issues of consultation and participation

Step 2 – Design principlesPrefer policy mix with broad range instr/reg actorsPrefer less interventionist measure if possibleAscend responses up a dynamic reg instrument pyrmd until reg goal achieved

( also gives early warning of probs/acts as trigger) Empower participants who are in best position to act as surrogate regulators Expand boundaries for ‘win win’ solutions and encourage reg targets to go

beyond compliance with existing legal reqirements

Step 3 – Sequence instrument combinations To avoid counterproductive results and maximise no of circumstances this

combination can be useful for

AG IND AND ENV REG RESEARCH FINDINGS PROVIDE A ‘TOOLBOX’ OF REG TOOLS/STRATEGY TO - APPLY TO MY REG SYSTEM(20)

Stewardship ethic Supply chain pressure instrument (E.g. QA) Legally mandated targets Vol agreements between ind and regulator Risk reduction initiatives Incentive to join accreditation programs Persuasive info mechanisms showing harm of non

compliance Positive and neg instruments mixed – to compensate for lack

of market incentive to comply Beyond C and C solutions – to encourage ind resourcefulness

for how to solve themselves Tools to address whole range of people adversely affected

by non-compliance

AG IND AND ENV REG RESEARCH FINDINGS PROVIDE A ‘TOOLBOX’ OF REG TOOLS/STRATEGY TO COMPLIMENT INFO MECHANISMS – IN MY REG SYSTEM (21)

Incentives to back up ‘peer to peer education’ Tripartism – get all groups of reg actors involved in

monitoring/auditing Reg info disseminated to all groups of reg actors Financial incentive instruments – to compensate for

sacrifices made by reg targets Mix voluntary and price based instruments – to compensate

for lack of dependability of info instr Where public and reg target interests don’t converge – use

instruments to both coerce and induce Oversight mechanisms – to counter ind manipulation of

disclosure instruments and provide accountability to info mechanisms