ReasonofStateandPredatoryMonarchyintheDutchRepublic,1638‐1675

TheLegacyoftheDucdeRohan

MarianneKlerk

ReasonofStateandPredatoryMonarchyintheDutchRepublic,1638‐1675

TheLegacyoftheDucdeRohan

StaatsraisonenRoofzuchtigeMonarchieindeNederlandseRepubliek,1638‐1675

DeerfenisvanDucdeRohan

MarianneKlerk

i

ReasonofStateandPredatoryMonarchyintheDutchRepublic,1638‐1675

TheLegacyoftheDucdeRohan

StaatsraisonenRoofzuchtigeMonarchieindeNederlandseRepubliek,1638‐1675

DeerfenisvanDucdeRohan

THESIS

ToobtainthedegreeofDoctorfromtheErasmusUniversityRotterdam

Bycommandoftherectormagnificus

Prof.dr.H.A.P.Pols

AndinaccordancewiththedecisionoftheDoctorateBoard

Thepublicdefenseshallbeheldon

Thursday27Octoberat11.30hours

By

MarianneBarbaraKlerk

BorninMiddelburg,theNetherlands

 

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DoctoralCommitte:

Promotor:

Prof.dr.R.C.F.vonFriedeburg

OtherMembers

Prof.dr.H.J.M.Nellen

Prof.dr.L.vanBunge

Prof.dr.K.vanBerkel

Co‐promotor:

Prof.dr.C.Condren

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HawkRoosting

Isitinthetopofthewood,myeyesclosed.

Inaction,nofalsifyingdream

Betweenmyhookedheadandhookedfeet:

Orinsleeprehearseperfectkillsandeat.

Theconvenienceofthehightrees!

Theair'sbuoyancyandthesun'sray

Areofadvantagetome;

Andtheearth'sfaceupwardformyinspection.

Myfeetarelockedupontheroughbark.

IttookthewholeofCreation

Toproducemyfoot,myeachfeather:

NowIholdCreationinmyfoot.

(…)

byTedHughes(1930‐1998),Lupercal(London:FaberandFaber,1960).

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TableofContents

Chapter1Introduction 1

1.1Thecrisisoftheruleoflawandthestruggletorestoreorder 31.2Restating‘statebuilding’:dynasticagglomerate,societyofprincesand

monarchytransformed 61.3Theearlymodernfashionofreasonofstate 81.4Predatorymonarchy 141.5ApproachandContents 16

Chapter2Del’interest(1638)byHenrideRohan:satirethroughinterestanalysis 19

2.1HenrideRohan:Huguenotwarrior,nobleprinceandfamousauthor 23 2.2ThebackdropofRohan’sreasonofstate 26

2.2.1Frenchreasonorinterestofstate? 272.2.2MonarchyincrisisandRichelieu’scrisismanagementofreasonofstate 312.2.3Betweenfactandfiction:thethreatofthe‘newmonarchy’ 33

2.3Satirebyinterestanalysis:SpanishunrestrictedtyrannyandFrenchpatrioticunity 37

2.3.1‘TheinterestofSpaine’ 382.3.2‘TheinterestofFrance’ 432.3.3Failedinterestmanagement:argumentfromhistory 47

Chapter3Republicanismrevisited:reasonofstateand‘wardespotism’byPieterdelaCourt 53

3.1‘Wardespotism’ 57 3.2PieterdelaCourt:textilemerchant,aspiringregentandcontroversialauthor 60 3.2.1Intellectualbackground:self‐interest,reasonofstateandharmonyofinterests62 3.2.2‘Wardespotism’inHetwelvarenderstadLeyden(1659) 67 3.2.3TheOrange‐Republic 69 3.2.4Thestadholderlessregime:warfare,taxation,debating‘interest’and‘freedom’ 71 3.2.5TheOrangistrevivalof1660‐1661 74

3.3Reasonofstateand‘wardespotism’inInterestvanHolland 77

3.3.1‘Holland’unifiedinan‘interest’ 783.3.2The‘interest’of‘wardespotism’ 793.3.3The‘interest’ofHollandinEurope 873.3.4Freedomoftrade,religionandgovernment 90

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Chapter4LisolaandLouisXIV’sFrenchmonarchy:universalmonarchyandreasonofstate 99

4.1Illustriousdiplomatandanti‐FrenchpamphleteerduringtheriseofLouisXIV101

4.1.1High‐profilediplomat 1024.1.2Polemicalpublicist 1054.1.3Bouclier:reasonofstateandlegalargumentation 1064.1.4TheriseoftheFrenchmonarchy:expansionistand‘absolute’ 109

4.2Bouclier:reasonofstate,EuropeanlegalorderandtheFrenchhazard 112

4.2.1Preface:agentleattackonLouisXIV 1124.2.2Firstfivearticles:legalrebuttalandtheimageofapredatorymonarchy 1154.2.3Sixtharticle:interestofstate 1194.2.4TheinterestofSpain:goodgovernmentversusFrance’spredatorymonarchy 1224.2.3TheinterestofFrance:‘Robberies’,‘Conquerors’,‘absolute’,‘MastersofEurope’ 124

Chapter5PetrusValkenier’s‘tVerwerdEuropa(1675):reasonofstatetorestoreorder 131

5.1Valkenierand‘tVerwerdEuropa(1675):anti‐Frenchdiplomacy,crisisoforderandLisola’slegacy 134

5.1.2PetrusValkenierandhisanti‐Frenchandpro‐Protestantdiplomacy 1355.1.3TheCrisisofOrderandthe‘YearofDisaster’,1672 1395.1.4Lisola’slegacy:universalmonarchy,balanceofpowerandreligion 151

5.2‘tVerwerdEuropa:theruleoflawandreasonofstate 154

5.2.1FivepillarsofeveryPoliticalState 1565.2.2FrenchinterestsofstateandPredatoryMonarchy 1665.2.3InterestanalysisofEurope 1725.2.4Dutchinterestofstate 175

Chapter6Conclusion 181

SourcesandBibliography 187

Archivalmaterial 187 Primaryprintedsources 187 Secondaryliterature 194Summaries 209

CurriculumVitae 219

Acknowledgements 221

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Thisresearchwas fundedbytheNetherlandsOrganisation forScientificResearch(NWO).Thestudy is part of a larger research project ‘Reason of state’ or ‘reason of princes’? The ‘newmonarchy and its opponents in France, Germany and the Netherlands, during the seventeenthcentury (2011‐2016). The research was supervised by prof. dr. R.C.F. von Friedeburg andcomprisedfourprojectsofwhichthepresentstudyisone.IngmarVroomenexaminedtheuseoffatherland rhetoric in Dutch pamphlets (1618‐1672) as a response to foreign threats andinternalstrife.AnnemiekeRomeinstudiedtheemploymentoffatherland‐terminologyinestatedebates in Jülich and Hesse‐Cassel between 1642‐1655, and in Brittany France in the period1648‐1652. Jesper Schaap examined the use of the idiom of reason of state in the politicalwritingsofHenriDucdeRohan(1579‐1638)andGabrielNaudé(1600‐1653).

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Chapter1Introduction

A common view among historians has been that in there was a disintegration of the late

medievalandrenaissanceregimenpoliticumetregale,basedonChristianhumanism,ruleoflaw

(divine,divinelynaturalandpartlypositive),andonvirtueessentiallybasedonChristianity,as

illustrated by Erasmus’ Institutio principis christiani (1516); and that in its place arose the

polarities of absolutism and republicanism, with France and Spain versus England and the

Netherlands as foremost examples.1 This view has slowly collapsed: the historiographical

conceptofabsolutismhasbeenrathererodedordemythicized,atleastinthesenseofamonarch

being free from law–Louis XIV scrupulously followedpositive law and ruledwith consent or

consultationoftheEstatesandparlements;2andrecentlythenotionofrepublicanismhasbeen

challenged –Helmer Helmers has convincingly argued that the Dutch were full‐heartedly

‘RoyalistRepublicans’ after the execution of Charles I; or it has beenqualified as entailing by

degrees a monarchical element, as is suggested by Patrick Collinson’s notion of the English

‘monarchicalrepublic’.3Andrepublicsmightbeno lessshyofassertingaprincipleofabsolute

                                                            1SeeinparticularHelmutG.Koenigsberger,‘MonarchiesandParliamentsinEarlyModernEuropeDominiumRegaleorDominiumPoliticumetRegale’,TheoryandSociety5:2(1978),191‐217.2 See for instanceRobert vonFriedeburg and JohnMorrill (eds.),Monarchy transformed:princesand theirelites inearlymodernWesternEurope(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2017,forthcoming),inparticularintroductionand conclusion; Nicholas Henshall, The Myth Of Absolutism: Change And Continuity In Early Modern EuropeanMonarchy (London: Longmann, 1992); Ronald G. Asch andHeinz Duchhardt (eds.),DerAbsolutismus‐‐einMythos?:Strukturwandel monarchischer Herrschaft in West‐ und Mitteleuropa (ca. 1550‐1700) (Cologne/Weimar/Vienna:Bölhau,1996);JohanSommerville,‘EarlyModernAbsolutism’,inCesareCutticaandGlennBurgess(eds.),Monarchismand Absolutism in EarlyModern Europe (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2012), 117‐130. Sommerville (re)definesabsolutist political thought in line with revisionist socio‐economic historical research as a model of ‘socialcollaboration’betweentheCrownanditselites.3HelmerHelmers,TheRoyalistRepublic.Literature,Politics,andReligionintheAnglo‐DutchPublicSphere,1639–1660(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2015).Helmers persuasively explained the staunch support amongst theDutch for Stuart royalism under the ‘republican’ (stadholderless) regime of 1650‐1672 after the regicide; PatrickCollinsonhasstressedtherepublicancharacter(highlevelofsocialcollaborationbetweenCrownanditselites)oftheEnglish monarchy for Elizabethan England. Patrick Collinson, ‘The Monarchical Republic of Queen Elizabeth I’, inBulletin of the John Rylands Library LXIX (1987), 394‐424. Mark Goldie stressed this republican character of theEnglish monarchy on a more general level. Mark Goldie, ‘The Unacknowledged Republic: Officeholding in EarlyModernEngland’, inTimHarris(ed.),ThePoliticsoftheExcluded,c.1500‐1850(London:PalgraveMacmillan,2001),153‐194.SeeSommerville’scriticalremarkontheoverlappingdefinitionofrepublicanismandabsolutismintermsofthe social collaboration model. Sommerville, ‘Early Modern Absolutism’, 118‐119. See also in the same volumeMichael J. Seidler’s comment that the contestation of ‘absolutism’ as political language ‘has also undermined thecounterpart language of “democracy” or “republicanism” (…) the opposition assumed in such discussions ismisconceived.’ Michael J. Seidler, ‘Monstrous’ Pufendorf: Sovereignty and system in the Dissertations’, in CesareCutticaandGlennBurgess(eds.),MonarchismandAbsolutisminEarlyModernEurope(London:PickeringandChatto,2012),159‐176,p.159;SeeforinstancePerez’sZagorinreviewofthetwovolumesfrom2002onrepublicanismbyMartinvanGelderenandQuentinSkinner,inwhichhestressedthevarietyofunderstandingsof‘republicanism’andthesubsequentconfusionofwhatrepublicanismentails; itmaybereadasageneralcritiqueon theconcept.PerezZagorin, ‘Republicanisms’,BritishJournalfortheHistoryofPhilosophy11:4(2003),701‐712;RobertvonFriedeburg,‘RepublicsandRepublicanism’,in:HamishScott(ed.),TheOxfordHandbookofEarlyModernEurope(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2015),538‐559.

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sovereigntyasamonarch.ForwriterslikeHobbessovereigntywasaprincipledefiningapolity

beyondthevagariesofparticularform.Inaddition,enlightenedthoughtasthatofPufendorfor

Montesquieu is perceived as monarchy constrained by law rather than absolutism or

republicanism.4PerhapsweshouldkeepinmindthatearlymodernEuropeanssharedamuch

broaderconsensusabout thenecessityof theaccountabilityofgovernment than thenotionof

‘republicanism’ as a subversive ideology suggests, so helping to create an exaggerated

dichotomybetweenitandtheconceptof‘absolutism’.TherupturesinconfessionalChristianity

oftheReformationandthegrowingscaleofEuropeanwarfarebroughtforthaperceivedcrisis

of the rule of law beyondmodern ideological divisions. Authors struggled to reconstruct and

defend a rule of law, while its own basis, confessional Christianity and Aristotle, slowly

dissolved.

The purpose of this thesis is to explore changes in understandings of ‘interest’ and

‘reasonofstate’;notasabstractandcoherent theoriesaboutmodernisationandasecularised

conceptionofthepolitical,butasresponsestoverypracticalandimmediatepoliticalproblems,

challengesandcrises,producingquiteunintendedconsequences.Itdoessothroughtheadaptive

referencetoandrelianceuponHenriDucdeRohanwhoprovided,asitisargued,avocabulary

organisedintoawayofseeingthepoliticalworldthatwasitselfstimulatedandconstrainedbya

perceived crisis, both national and ‘international’, secular as well as religious. Through the

subsequent use of Rohan and the employment of his vocabulary of interest we can see

somethingoftheingenuityofargumentunderdirectpressures.Theresultwasbothtoestablish

Rohanasanauthority,providingaseminalandpersuasively inescapable text thatshapedand

constrainedargument;andasresourceforadaptation.Inallthecasesdiscussedandcoheredby

reference toRohan, the stimulus to argumentwas a sense of immediate anddire threat, best

summarised by the notion of a predatorymonarchy, sometimes deemed despotic, sometimes

tyrannical,usuallyarbitraryinitsactionsoranticipatedconduct,sometimesallthree,butalways

endangeringafragilepeace,andasenseofacceptableorder.Suchapostulatedorderwasoften

takenasinvolvingaruleoflaw,sometimesamoralregimeshieldedfromcorruption,sometimes

a putative balance of power between competing interests. In all cases what mattered was

specifyingandanalysingthedanger,thepredator.What itthreatenedcouldoftenberelatively

unspecific,evenopentothereadertoidentifyforhimself.Thisfocusontheevilsofapredatory

monarchywascentral toRohan’swholeunderstandingof interest—interestwasthemeansof

casting light on its dangers. But having set the tone in demonising Habsburg‐Spain with the

concomitantimperativetoFrancetostandopposedinitsowntrueinterest,Rohan’sperspective

wascomplimentedbythewealthofevidenceprovidedbytheimperialdiplomatFrançois‐Paul                                                            4 Seidler, “Monstrous” Pufendorf’; Paul A. Rahe, Montesquieu and the Logic of Liberty:War, Religion, Commerce,Climate,Terrain,Technology,UneasinessofMind, theSpiritofPoliticalVigilance,and theFoundationsof theModernRepublic(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2009).

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deLisola,who turned the forceofargumentagainstFrance.Thenotionsof interest, reasonof

stateandpredatorymonarchycouldbegivendifferent,evenopposingcontent,asisclearfrom

the contrasts between Rohan and Lisola, the Dutch authors Pieter de la Court and Petrus

Valkenier.5

The result is a textual history through crises that adds a different dimension to

expressionsof‘reasonofstate’and‘interest’,establishedlawasasocialnorm,politicalsocietyas

morethandependentonthemoralityofaruler,andtheambiguitiesofsecularisation, insome

waysaprocessthatwastheunintendedconsequenceofdeeplyheldreligiousbeliefs.

Thisgeneralpictureofasecularisingchangeinthetermsthroughwhichtheruleoflaw

couldbe reformulatedwill bediscussedmorebelow. Immediately, however, it shouldbe said

thatitprovideslessadirectcontextthanabackgroundforthisstudy.Thatis,thetextsstudied

did not share a preoccupationwith a crisis in the rule of law. Rather, by their concernwith

predatory monarchy, with arbitrary conduct and tyranny, that knows no boundaries, they

presupposed theexistenceof lawsandnorms that couldbeviolatedandemphasised thedire

consequencesofdoingso.Thusasanunintendedconsequenceofparticularandevenopposing

concernswiththepredatory,theyhelpedestablishaspaceinwhichattemptstoreconceptualise

theruleof lawcouldbeplayedout. Inotherwords, thegeneralpictureconcernswhatoverall

was happening, this concerns what people were doing, responding to what worried them in

waysthatfacilitatedsuchchanges.

1.1 Thecrisisoftheruleoflawandthestruggletorestoreorder

Theruleof lawintheseventeenthcenturywasahighlyevocativeexpressionandentailednot

necessarily a conceptual contentwithwhichwe are familiar, not least the independence of a

judiciary and an agreement on constitutional ground rules; it rather amounted to a variable

topos, sustaining authority, directly or indirectly fromAristotle’s insistence that lawmade for

betterrulethanmen(Politicsbk3).6MedievalcommentatorsmouldedfromancientGreekand

                                                            5HenrideRohan,Del’interestdesprincesetestatsdelaChrestienté(1638);François‐PauldeLisola,Bouclierd'EstatetdejusticecontreledesseinmanifestementdécouvertdelaMonarchieUniverselle,souslevainprétextedespretentionsdelaReynedeFrance([Brussels:FrançoisFoppens],1667);V.D.H.,InterestvanHollandoftedeGrondenvanHollands‐Welvaren (Amsterdam: ‘Cyprianus van der Gracht’, 1662); Petrus Valkenier, ‘t Verwerd Europa ofte politieke enhistorischebeschrijvingederwaarefundamentenenoorzakenvandeoorlogenenrevolutieninEuropavoornamentlijkinen omtrent de Nederlanden zedert den jaare 1664. Gecauseert door de gepretendeerde UniverselenMonarchie derFranschen(Amsterdam:HendrikenDirkBoom,1675).6See for instanceMartinKrygier, ‘TheRuleofLaw:Legality,Teleology,Sociology’, inGianluigiPalombellaandNeilWalker(eds.),RelocatingtheRuleofLaw(Oxford:HartPublishing,2009),45‐69.Krygierstressesthedifferencewitharulebylaw,whichreferstopoliticalpowerexercisedbylegalmeans,butrequirementsoftheruleoflawarelacking;forexample, the ruler isnot reliablyandeffectively constrainedby law,or lawsare secret, impossible toknow, tounderstand,toperform;Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,13;Aristotle,Politics,Politics:BooksIIIandIV,translatedwith

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Romansourcesand fromRomanLawadivineanddivinely inspirednatural law.Althoughthe

Fall obscured it to some extent, commentators such as Thomas Aquinas argued that God

imprintedonmankindvirtuesandknowledgeonhowtolivetogetherinsociety.Allmenhadto

operate under divine natural law. During the second half of the sixteenth century scepticism

arosetowardstheextremelybroadAristotelian‐Christiannotionoftheruleoflaw,ofrulebound

society.7 From the late sixteenth up to the end of the seventeenth century incessantwarfare,

confessional strife, civil wars and coercive princely politics gave rise to a perceived crisis of

order,muchofwhich focussedon the absenceor erosionof reliable law. The ‘crisis of order’

culminatedinthenumerousrevoltsthroughoutEuropeinthe1640sand1650s.InEngland,for

instance, thekillingofKingCharlesIandArchbishopLaudrupturedandevensubvertedbasic

assumptionsabouthierarchy,disciplineandorder,aboutsocialandpolitical legitimacy.8From

the last third of the seventeenth century onwards authors, such as Pierre Bayle, increasingly

blamedconfessionalpropagandaandclergy(insteadofpoliticalactors)forthestrangeupsurge

ofconflictsandcivilwarsfromthe1620until1650s.Moreover,contemporariesmoreandmore

underlined thedangerofpoliticaldisintegrationunder therisingburdenof taxationanddebt,

broughtforthbytheintensificationofwarfare.9

Thepicturewasasconfusedasitwasenrichedthroughtheprintingpress,butMichael

Stolleis has suggested a general trend that makes sense of much that was written: ‘As the

foundations of Christianity were increasingly undermined in the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuriesbytheformationofdifferentconfessionsandbysuccessivewarsofreligion,sotoodid

modern politics and the rule of law determined by principalities become increasingly

emancipatedfromprescribedreligiouscontent.’Heobservestwoshiftsaccordingly.Therewas

an increasing stress on experience and observation to examine the nature of the political

(temporal) world. The historical example functioned to determine natural law or to predict

behaviour of political actors as in interest analyses. Second was ‘an erosion of the Christian

element in the justification of law.’ The growing practice of ‘communal and territorial laws’

                                                                                                                                                                                          anintroductionbyRichardRobinsonandasupplementaryessaybyDavidKeyt(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995),BookIII,1287a‐1278b,p.58‐63.7RichardTuck,PhilosophyandGovernment,1572–1651(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1993),31‐64.8RobertvonFriedeburg,‘How"new"isthe"NewMonarchy"?ClashesbetweenprincesandnobilityinEurope'sIronCentury’,inLeidschrift.Aanhethof.Rivaliteit,legitimiteitensuccessiestrijdaandeEuraziatischehoven,1250–175027(2012),17‐30;JustinChampion,"Religion'sSafe,withPriestcraftistheWar":AugustanAnticlericalismandtheLegacyoftheEnglishRevolution,1660‐1720’,TheEuropeanLegacy5:4(2000),547‐561,‘crisisoforder’onp.548‐549;BlairWorden,‘MarchamontNedhamandtheBeginningsofEnglishRepublicanism’,in:DavidWootton(ed.),Republicanism,Liberty,andCommercialSociety(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,1994),45‐81,a‘crisisofmonarchy’1640s‐1650sonp.72;GlennBurgess,ThePoliticsoftheAncientConstitution:anIntroductiontoEnglishPoliticalThought1603‐1642(Basingstoke:Macmillan,1992),fortheidealofthe‘pacifiedpolity’p.159‐164andforthecrisisofthattheideal,the‘crisisofthecommonlaw’chapterVIIandVIII.9 Heinz Schilling, ‘Confessional Europe’, in Thomas A. Brady, Heiko Augustinus Oberman, James D. Tracy (eds),Handbook ofEuropeanhistory,1400‐1600: lateMiddleAges,Renaissance,andReformation,Volume2 (Leiden: Brill,1995),641‐682,p.667‐670;RobertvonFriedeburg,‘How"new"isthe"NewMonarchy"?’,17‐30;MichaelSonenscher,Before theDeluge.PublicDebt, Inequalityand the IntellectualOriginsof theFrenchRevolution (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2007).

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underminedtheinvocationofGodanddifferentiatednotionsoflegality.10Asaresult,theruleof

law survived as a basic normative issue despite the breakdown of the major religious

foundationsithadinconfessionalChristianity.Thetwoshiftshenotesarecertainlypertinentto

thewritersdiscussedhere.Theydoputfaithinthedetailsofempiricalexperience;andalbeitfor

very different reasonsmarginalise confessional divisions. In the case ofRohan, this has given

risetothemythofobjectivityinhisconceptionofinterest; inthecaseofPetrusValkenier,the

distinctionbetweentheuniversalcontentofreligionfrominstitutionalisedconfessions,(derived

verymuch fromHugo Grotius)was ameans bywhich he could assert a genuine pietywhile

isolatingreligioussectsaspartofacrisisoforder.

Atdifferent levelsof formalitywriters in the lateseventeenthcenturywereconcerned

withacrisisoforder,moreorlesssystematicallyfocussingonconceptionsof law.Atthemost

sustained level of philosophical coherence Samuel Pufendorf remains the most significant.

Pufendorf’snaturallawargumentwasaconsciouslylaunderedversionofHobbes’sargumentsin

Decive;the‘state’aslegalpersonasguardianoflawwasthesolutiontodisorder;thestateheld

undivided sovereignty and was likewise represented by the ruler. Unlike Hobbes, however,

Pufendorfstressedthefacultyofapeaceablesociabilitythatenableshumanslivinginthestate

ofnaturetoassociateandestablishastateforathoroughprotectionoflifeandproperty,choose

a form of government and be subject to the ruler, ‐a situation that could be reversed if the

sovereign subverted the fundamental laws, or theoverriding purposes forwhich societywas

instituted.11Pufendorf’s empirical‐historical analysisof interestofEurope inEinleitungzuder

HistoriedervornehmstenReicheundStaatenso itzigerZeit inEuropasichbefinden(1682)was

rooted in his natural law theory.12 Pufendorf stated that rulers had their (natural law)

obligations,particularly toprovidesecurity, for theirsubjects.Tothisend, itwasnecessaryto

analyseandadapttothe ‘true’ interestsofstateasdeterminedbyitsparticularcharacteristics

                                                            10MichaelStolleis,‘TheLegitimationofLawthroughGod,Tradition,Will,NatureandConstitution’,inLorraineDastonandMichaelStolleis(eds.),NaturalLawandLawsofNatureinEarlyModernEuropeJurisprudence,Theology,MoralandNaturalPhilosophy(Farnham:Ashgate,2008),45‐55,p.46.11HansErichBödeker,Debatingtherespublicamixta:GermanandDutchPoliticalDiscoursearound1700, inQuentinSkinner andMartin van Gelderen (eds.),Republicanism:A SharedEuropeanHeritage.Volume I,Republicanism andConstitutionalism in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 219‐246, p. 229‐237;RobertvonFriedeburg,Luther’sLegacy.TheThirtyYearsWarandtheModernNotionof'State'intheEmpire,1530sto1790s(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2016),315‐317.12MichaelSeidlerpointstootherwritersbeforePufendorf,whohadstudiedthehistoriesofEuropeanpolitiesorhadwrittencontemporaryinterestanalysesofEuropeexemplifiedbyoneoftheauthorsofthisthesis,PetrusValkenier.SeidlerarguesthatPufendorf’sinnovationwashisanalysisofinterest(stressonmodernhistory)rootedinhisnaturallaw theory; ‘The latter is an internal, constitutivematter involvinga state’s legitimate claim to sovereignauthorityover itsmembers,whiletheformerisexternallyorientedandconcernstheeffectiveperformanceof itsnatural lawobligations (particularly security) in an international context, onwhich the claim to internal sovereignty rests. Inshort, a state’s raisond’état is rooted in its raisond’etre.’Michael J. Seidler, ‘Introduction’ toSamuelPufendorf,AnIntroductiontotheHistoryofthePrincipalKingdomsandStatesofEurope,translatedbyJocodusCrull(1695),editedbyMichaelSeidler(Indianapolis:LibertyFund,2013),ix‐xl,quotedfromp.xxxiiandfortheassociationwithValkenierp. xvii; See also FriedrichMeinecke for the positioning of Petrus Valkenier’s ‘tVerwerdEuropa in the tradition ofPufendorf’s interestanalysisofEuropeanregimes.FriedrichMeinecke,Machiavellism:TheDoctrineofRaisond’Étatand Its Place in Modern History, translated by Douglass Scott, introduction by Werner Stark (New Brunswick:TransactionPublishers,1997),287‐288.

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and circumstances, as well as relations with other rulers. He distinguished a real from an

imaginaryreasonofstate,suchasthepretendedinterestof‘universalmonarchy’towhichstates

wereinclined;andaperpetual interest(geography,characterofthepeople)fromatemporary

one(externalrelations).13Interestingly,inthetraditionofLisolaandValkenier,heassessedthe

predatory nature of the French monarchy that ruled a densely populated territory with a

passionately warlike people given to robbery by conquest and threatened the survival of

neighbouringpolities. Foreignpolicy implieda careful considerationof external affairs,which

couldeasilytransformintodomesticconflictsandviceversa,anddemandedaconstantadaption

tochangingcircumstances.However,insuchaworldofchangeandconflicttheChristianmoral

dutyofmentowardstheirfellowmenremainedthebasisofsecuritywithinsocieties.14

Perhaps because he did not pretend to the sort of philosophical coherencewe find in

Pufendorf,Valkenier offered his readers no explicit conception of the rule of law; but he did

share contemporary concerns for the consequences of expanded warfare and fractured

confessional religion:mob rule,meddling priests, power‐hungry regents and plunder princes,

for all of which the imperatives of divine law and the order that might stem from it was

inadequateprotection.ForValkenier,theevocationoftheruleoflawwasameansofcombining

a reassuring appeal to justicewith reason of state, and of urging the necessity of a powerful

prince(withprerogativesofaction)whilecastigatingthearbitrarinessofpredatorymonarchy.

1.2 Restating‘statebuilding’:dynasticagglomerate,societyofprincesandmonarchy

transformed

HistorianshavearguedthattheintensificationofwarfareinearlymodernEuropepressedrulers

to develop standing armies and administrations eventually leading to the establishment of

modern bureaucratic tax states. This transformation was defined as early modern ‘state

building’inwhichrulersbuiltuptheirstateapparatusbycoerciveextractionofresources,e.g.

throughtaxationoftheirunwillingsubjectsandinsubordinateelites,whichincreasedtheruler’s

means to coerce themevenmore. 15Historianshave also claimed that the growinguseof the

                                                            13Pufendorfthirdlydistinguishedbetweenaprivateandpublicinterestconcerningthedangerofthepursuitofthepersonal interests of domestic factions or the ruler in opposition to the common welfare. Samuel Pufendorf, AnIntroductiontotheHistoryofthePrincipalKingdomsandStatesofEurope,translatedbyJocodusCrull(1695),editedbyMichaelSeidler(Indianapolis:LibertyFund,2013),5‐9.14SeeforthisassessmentVonFriedeburg,Luther’sLegacy,324:‘Tobesure,Pufendorfstressedthatmonarchyandtheestablishmentofunityina‘state’wereindispensablegiventhepredatorynatureofkingdomslikeFranceandSpain’;Seidler,‘Introduction’,xxv‐xxxii.15SeeinparticularCharlesTilly,Coercion,CapitalandtheRiseofthestate(Oxford:BasilBlackwell,1990);Regardingtheconceptofthe‘coercion‐extractioncycle’readSamuelE.Finer,‘State‐andNation‐BuildinginEurope:theRoleoftheMilitary’,in:CharlesTilly(ed.),TheFormationofNationalStatesinEurope(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1975),84–163.

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vocabularyofreasonofstatemirroredtheearlymoderntransformationofChristianEuropeinto

aEuropean systemof sovereign ‘states’.16Regarding thehistoryof political thought,Maurizio

Virolihasrightlypointedtotheseventeenth‐centuryshift fromthenotionofpoliticsbasedon

consentanddivinelaw,to‘reasonofstate’,i.e.governmentbasedoncoercion.17However,when

discussing‘reasonofstate’,authorsaddressedthenotionofrulerspursuingtheirinterests,not

‘states’pursuing‘nationalinterests’.

Since the 1950s the received notion of ‘state building’ as an intentional or strategic

activity has come under question.18 Institutionalised ‘states’with self‐conscious knowledge of

their ‘reason’ did not develop. First, historians have increasingly stressed the heterogonous

nature of European principalities.19 John Morrill recently coined the term ‘dynastic

agglomerates’ to address that dynasties ruled overmultiple landswith each polity having its

own customs, laws and societal power structures.Morrillwants to underline particularly the

unstablenatureofdynasticruleandtheinstabilityofhowtheseagglomerateswereformedor

rather collected by the ruling dynasties, and how they constantly changed form through

marriage politics, warfare, and inheritance; the success of modern states should not be

interpreted as an inevitableproductof their earlymodernpredecessors.20 Furthermore, early

modernruleentailedprimarilysovereignactsbyrulersasbearersofsovereignty(excludingthe

fewrepublics).Assuch,Europewasa‘sociétédesprinces’21morethanasystemof‘states’inthe

modernsenseofaunityof law,territoryandnation.Rulersbelongedtothesocietyofprinces

throughboundsofkinshipandmarriage;anditdeterminedlargelythemotivationsandaimsof

rulers’ ‘foreign’ policy in relation to the struggle over territories, resources and status.

Therefore,theadministrationofthedifferentagglomerates,therelationwiththelocalelites,was

ofvital importance forrulingdynasties.Moreover, thenumberofmembersof thissocietyhad                                                            16 As one of the firstmodern historians, FriedrichMeinecke addressed earlymodern commentaries on ‘reason ofstate’asproductsoftheassumedriseofthemodernstate.Meinecke,Machiavellism.TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,1‐22;See for instanceWilliamF.Church,RichelieuandReasonofState, (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1970),13‐101, who wrote: ‘For this reason, his [Richelieu’s] massive program of state‐building was accompanied by anunremittingefforttoarticulatetheconceptofreasonofstate.’Church,RichelieuandReasonofState,101.17Viroliarguesthatthelatesixteenthandseventeenthcenturywitnessed‘arevolutionofpolitics’,i.e.‘thetriumphofthelanguageofreasonofstate’.Thisrevolutionarytriumphwasbasedonanideologicaltransitionfromthenotionof‘politicsastheartofpreservingarespublica,inthesenseofacommunityofindividualslivingtogetherinjustice’to‘politicsastheartofthestate‐theartofpreservingastate, inthesenseofaperson’sorgroup’spowerandcontroloverpublic institutions’.MaurizioViroli,FromPolitics toReasonofState.TheAcquisitionandTransformationof theLanguageofPolitics1250–1600(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1992),2‐3.18 For an early commentary seeKordulaWolf, ‘Il XCongresso Internazionaledi Scienze Storiche,Roma, settembre1955. Un bilancio Storiografico, Convegno Internazionale’, accessed May 7, 2016, http://dhi‐roma.it/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf‐dateien/Tagungsberichte/2005/tagung_1955.pdf.19Within thehistoriographya transition inaddressingearlymodernpolities isobservable, from RichardBonney’s‘dynasticstates’,viaJohnElliot’sterm‘compositemonarchies’,toMorrills‘dynasticagglomerate’.Thislatercoverstheorigins aswell as the nature of these polities: Richard Bonney,TheEuropeanDynastic States, 1494‐1660 (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press, 1991); ‘Compositemonarchies’was first formulated byH. G. Koenigsberger in 1975, see:JohnH.Elliott,‘AEuropeofCompositemonarchies’,Past&Present,No.137,TheCulturalandPoliticalConstructionofEurope (1992), 48‐71; JohnMorrill, “Uneasy lies thehead thatwearsa crown”.Dynastic crises inTudorand StuartBritain1504–1746TheStentonLecturefor2003(Reading:UniversityofReading,2005),11.20JohnMorrill,“Uneasyliestheheadthatwearsacrown”.21LucienBély,LasociétédesprincesXIVe‐XVIIesiècle(Paris:Fayard,1999).

8

decreased after the1650s as theEuropeanmilitary competition took its toll in respect of the

defeatofmanysmallpolitieseffectivelysubjectedbythepowerfuldynasticagglomerates.22

What is more, the true innovation brought forth by the growing scale of European

conflict was governmental debt on an unprecedented scale, which consequently transformed

monarchies intowar‐driven and debt‐ridden regimes. Since the 1490s, European rulerswere

sucked intoamaelstromofmilitarycompetition,not least fuelledby thedynasticcompetition

betweenHabsburg‐SpainandValois/Bourbon‐FrancefoughtintheEuropeanarena.Tofinance

theircostlywarfare,rulershadtofindnew,substantialresourcesbeyondrevenuetaxes:saleof

landsandoffices,suchastaxfarming,andborrowinghugeamountsofmoney.Thisresultedin

new collaborations with old and new elites, which took up the financial restructuring ‐

governmentbecameincreasinglyreliantonitselites.However,thesenewresourcesneverfilled

therapidlygrowinggapsinthebudgetsandbankruptcywasarecurringissueforearlymodern

monarchies.Monarchieswere transformed, based on a necessarily successful participation in

thewarcompetition.Withinthesemonarchiesthepoliticsofsellingofflandsandofficesresulted

indebatesaboutsuchpractices:aboutthefavouringofnewinvestorsovertheoldelites;about

themisuseofoffices;aboutthebestcourseinforeignpolicy;abouttheprinceunderminingthe

rule of law and endangering the rights and properties of the elites and subjects.23 At last,

controlling rising ‘opinion’, especially amongst those who ought to be persuaded to supply

resources,becameanothercrucialissuefordynasties.24Insuchdebatesargumentsofreasonof

statetookcentrestage.What,inshort,hasbeenseenasstatebuilding—thebusinessofstriving

towardstheconsummationofamodernstate,waslargelythecontingentoutcomeof tryingto

dealwithsuchawelterofspecificissuesandcrisesconfrontinggovernmentalcontinuity.Thus

ratherthanreflectinganintentiontobuildstates,reasonofstatemustbereconsidered.

1.3 Theearlymodernfashionofreasonofstate

The success of ‘reason of state’ was indebted to the prior, European‐wide acceptance of the

terminology of ‘state’. In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, Italian authors began                                                            22VonFriedeburg,'How'new'isthe'NewMonarchy'?’,22‐23;Confessionalisationcontributedtopoliticsofreasonofstate, not chiefly in accordancewith dynastic interests, butwith the interests of the different agglomerates.HeinzSchilling, Konfessionalisierung und Staatsinteressen. Internationale Beziehungen 1559‐1660 (Schöningh: Paderborn,2007).23VonFriedeburgandMorrill(eds.),Monarchytransformed,inparticularintroductionandconclusion.24 Successes in the military competition were of grave importance for ruling dynasties as it contributed to theirpositioninthesocietyofprincesaswellastheirstatusofbeingafavorable investment.SeeinparticularTimC.W.Blanning,TheCultureofPowerand thePowerofCulture.OldRegimeEurope1660‐1789 (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2002).Oneimportantaspectwerethenewmanifestationsofpoliticallegitimations,especiallythatof‘nationalidentity’ in the sense of the monarchy as useful and vital for the nation. He argues that Prussian and Britishmonarchieseventuallysucceededinthis,whiletheFrenchCrownwasunabletolegitimiseitself.ForhisargumentontheFrenchRevolutionseechapter8,pages357‐427.

9

discussing the ways to maintain the ‘state’ of the parvenu ‘new princes’ such as the Medici,

withoutrelyingonmore traditional idiomsof legitimationprovidedbyappeals tocivicvirtue.

From the1550s authors in Spain, France and theUnitedProvinces andEngland accepted the

terminologyof‘state’inallitsambiguousrangeofmeaningsfromprincelystatustoregime,and

wouldadopttheterminologyofreasonofstateintheextraordinarycircumstancesofreligious

civil strife from the end of the sixteenth century onwards.HarroHöpfl argues that ‘reasonof

state’becamepartofthe‘vocabularyoffashionablepoliticalcynicism’aboutthe‘true’motivesof

rulersspurredbytheexperiencesofreligiouswars,especiallyintheLowCountriesandFrance.

This vocabulary encompassed popular aphorisms and maxims such as necessitas non habet

legem andoderintdummetuant, andwas closely associatedwith the terminology of ‘politics’

(politics, policy, politica, politicus, politique), ‘statecraft’, ‘statism, ‘Machiavellism’, ‘interest of

state’, the Tacitist term arcana imperii, ‘secrets’ and ‘mysteries’. All these terms were fluidly

related and often interchangeable. Moreover, ‘reason’ and ‘state’ could mean many different

things.‘Reason’couldrefertoreasoning,ortheoutcomeofsuchargumentation,theintellectual

capacitytoreason,plainknowledge,arationaleorpurpose,andlegitimationofcertainactions.

‘State’couldmeanstatus,aconditionofsomething,princelystatus,anoffice,regime,respublica,

commonwealthanddominion.25Höpflarguesthat‘reasonofstate’hadaprecariousidentityand

was a highly suggestive term of art; and, therefore, it ought not to be seen as a theory or

concept.26

Yet, exactly because of its opacity reason of state became fashionable. Reason of state

wasemployedandtheorisedbydifferent,mostlyItalianauthorsearlierinthesixteenthcentury

andbecameapopularphrase fromthe1590sonwards. In1589 theex‐JesuitGiovanniBotero

publishedhisfamousworkDellaRagiondiStato,inwhichhedefinedreasonofstateas:‘Stateis

a stable dominion over people, and Reason of State is knowledge of the means suitable for

founding, conserving and augmenting a dominion established in this way. (…) Although

everythingdonewiththeseendsinviewissaidtobedoneforReasonofState,neverthelessthis

termisusedratherabout thingswhichcannotbereducedtoordinaryandusualragione.’27 In

this sense,politics concerned themanagementof thestate that is createdandbuild further,a

                                                            25HarroHöpfl,‘OrthodoxyandReasonofState’,HistoryofPoliticalThought23:2(2002),211‐237,p.216–219.26Höpfl,‘OrthodoxyandReasonofState’,215;LikewisearguedbyConalCondren,‘ReasonofstateandsovereigntyinEarlyModernEngland:aquestionofideology?’inParergon28:2,2011,5‐27;IwanttothankHarroHöpflforallowingmetousehispaperon‘reasonofstate’givenattheconferenceMonarchyTransformedinWesternEurope:its"reasonofstate"anditsopponents(1620s‐1720s)inRotterdam,May11‐14,2016.27Citedfrom(andtranslatedby)Höpfl,‘OrthodoxyandReasonofState’,213.GiovanniBotero,Dellaragiondistatoedellecausedellagrandezzadellecittà(Venice,1598)was the firstwritingwith the term in its titleandestablishedreasonofstateasaEuropeantopos. Itquicklywentthroughseveraleditionsandtranslations intoGerman,French,Spanish andLatin; PeterBurke, ‘Tacitism, scepticism, and reasonof state’, in J.H.Burns /MarkGoldie (eds.),TheCambridgeHistoryofPoliticalThought1450‐1700 (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 199), 479–498,p. 479‐480;Höpfl points toBotero’s explanationof ‘ragione’ as equivalent tonotizie,whichhis translators took tomeanknowledge;hemostlyused it tomean ‘reasons’, i.e. reasonswhy thingshappened, causes,butalso reasons in thesenseofgoodreasons,i.e.justifications.Papergivenattheconference‘Monarchytransformed’.

10

resourceonlyotherrulershad.28AccordingtoTrajanoBoccalini(1556–1613),eventheporters

atthemarketplacediscussed‘reasonofstate’.In1621,LodovicoZuccolowrotethatbarbersand

otherhumbleartisansthoughtthemselvesfittodeliberateon‘reasonofstate’.29Authorsallover

Europebegantoemploythis‘vogueterm’,adaptingittotheirownspecificcontexts.30

Beforethevogueofreasonofstatetookoff,‘Machiavellian’or‘Machiavellist’wasalready

employedonagrandscaleinFrance,notablybyInnocentGentillet.InhisfamousAnti‐Machiavel

(1576) Gentillet blamed ‘Machiavellian philosophy’ for the Bartholomew’s Day Massacre of

FrenchProtestantsin1572,andexplaineditasasetofpracticesequaltotyrannyandaboveall

against three foundations of a commonwealth: religion,morality and legality. Neither he nor

Machiavelli actually used the expression reason of state, but nevertheless contemporaries

associateditwiththemtowhichwasaddedtheaccusationthatreasonofstatemeanttheuseof

religionforpoliticalends;andpolitica,sostronglylinkedtoTacitus,couldalsobecollapsedinto

reasonofstate.31Attheendof thesixteenthcentury,religiouslyorthodoxwriters(e.g.Botero,

Ribaneira, Possivino) began to theorise reason of state to cope with its, as they understood,

Machiavellian andpolitiquesperspectives of politics. Its canonical author, the ex‐JesuitBotero

condemned its popularmeaning, i.e. political actions, executedwith a complete disregard for

moral, legal and religious constraint, as Botero believed to be prescribed byMachiavelli and

Tacitus. However, due to Machiavelli’s controversial reputation, Tacitus was often used, as

Boteroalreadyobserved,asasupplementaryorevenalternativeauthoritytoMachiavelli.Most

authorsasBoteroandJustusLipsiusmightpursueanti‐Machiavellianarguments,yetwerefully

                                                            28DavidWootton,‘MachiavelliandtheBusinessofPolitics’,inTimothyFuller(ed.),Machiavelli'sLegacy:‘ThePrince’AfterFiveHundredYears(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,2015),87‐104,p.92.29Meinecke,Machiavellism.TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,78;TrajanoBoccalini,RagguaglidiParnassoescrittiminori,ed.LuigiFirpo,3vols. (Bari:Laterza,1948);LudovicoZucculo,ConsiderazioniPoliticheeMoralisopracentooracolid’illustripersonaggiantichi(Venice,1621).30Guicciardini’sunpublishedworkDialogodelRegimentodiFirenze fromtheearly1520s is tobebelievedthe firstrecordeduseoftheterm.AlthoughHöpflarguesthatGuicciardini’susedoesnotsuggest thatthetermwasalreadyestablished,by1547GiovannidellaCasausedtheterminorationtoCharlesVwithoutfeelingtheneedtoexplainit,‘OrthodoxyandReasonofState’,214;Boterowrotethat,aftervisitingseveralEuropeancourtshehad‘beengreatlyastonished to find Reason of State a constant subject of discussion’, quoted from Noel Malcolm, Reason of State,Propaganda,andtheThirtyYears’War,anunknowntranslationbyThomasHobbes(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2007),92;seefortheGermanintroductionoftheterminologyof‘reasonofstate’HorstDreitzel,‘ReasonofStateandtheCrisisofPoliticalAristotelianism:anEssayontheDevelopmentof17thCenturyPoliticalPhilosophy’,inHistoryofEuropean ideas 28 (2002), 163‐187 and Michael Stolleis, ‘Arcana imperii und Ratio status. Bemerkungen zurpolitischenTheoriedesfrühen17.Jahrhunderts’,VeröffentlichungderJoachimJungius‐GesellschaftderWissenschaftenHamburg 39 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980), 5‐12; for the English reception of ‘reason of state’ seeMalcolm, Reason of State, Propaganda, and the Thirty Years’ War, especially on Hobbes and ‘reason of state’argumentationandCondren, ‘ReasonofstateandsovereigntyinEarlyModernEngland;foritsintroductioninearlymodernFrancereadChurch,RichelieuandReasonofState,ÉtienneThuau,Raisond’étatetpenséepolitiqueàl’époquedeRichelieu(Paris:ArmandColin,1966)andLaurieCatteeuw,Censuresetraisond’État.Unehistoiredelamodernitépolitique(xvie‐xviiesiècle)(Paris:AlbinMichel,2013).31JanWaszink,‘LipsiusandGrotius:Tacitism’,inHistoryofEuropeanIdeas39:2(2013),151‐168,p.158;Seeforthefact that thePoliticawasplacedon the Index categorised as ‘reasonof state’, JanWaszink, ‘Introduction’ to JustusLipsius,Politica.SixbooksofPoliticsorPoliticalInstruction,ed.,transl.andintrod.byJanWaszink(Assen:VanGorcum,2004),120‐122,173‐187;Höpfl,‘OrthodoxyandReasonofState’,223;[Gentillet,Innocent.]DiscoursesurlesmoyensdebiengouverneretmaintenirenbonnepaixunRoyaumeouautreprincipauté[…]ContreNicholasMachiavelFlorentin(1576).

11

familiarwith thecontentsofThePrince, sincerefutationsdemandeda textand therewereno

existingtextsforreasonofstateotherthanMachiavelli’sThePrince.32

Onethingcansafelybeclaimedaboutreasonofstate:itwaspresentedasrelevanttothe

practiceofpolitics(unlikethe‘mirrorforprinces’literature).Reasonofstatetakennegatively,it

was a matter of evil advice, positively, it offered prudence, a means to practice politics

intelligently to therulerandhisadvisorsandamatterofwisecounsel taken fromexperience

andhistory.Initsmorenarrowunderstanding,reasonofstateentailedthe‘Machiavellian’claim

that in cases of necessity rulers had room tomanoeuvre beyond the bounds of normal legal,

moralandreligiousconstraints.Thepracticalreflectionwasoftensummarisedin‘maxims’and

frequentlyaccompaniedbyfashionabletermssuchas‘interest’.Acrucialdifferencewithmirror

forprincesliteratureisthat,becauseofconfessionalstrifeandincessantwarfare,reasonofstate

could no longer rely on the premise that the ruler could enhance the common good and the

virtueandpietyof thesubjectsbyupholding the truereligionwithoutendangering the ‘state’.

Thus, authors could reason for a merciless restoration of confessional unity, but when it

endangeredthe‘state’religioustolerationbecameanecessaryoracceptableevil.Furthermore,

argumentsonthemoralresponsibilityoftherulertoexecutequestionedconductinemergency

circumstances, frequently resulted in downplaying of the traditional princely virtues (e.g.

clemencyandliberality).33

Conal Condren argues that to understand reason of state properly, historians have to

dissect this casuistic reasoning in regard to the stress on a devilish/bad reason of state

distinguishedfromatrue/goodone.Thelatterwasmostlydefinedasservingthecommongood

andvirtuousrule,itcouldbecalledprudenceandwasbasedon‘tenuousandhighlyfragmented’

evidence. Whereas authors usually paraded a bad reason of state in ‘detailed, graphic and

unreliable’termsofarulerfollowinghisownprivateintereststhatledtothedestructionofthe

common good. Expressing a bad reason of state was ‘a means of mobilisation and

encouragementintimesofdeepdivision’.34Reasonofstatewasmostoftentoucheduponinthe

context of accusations against certain factions or officeholders in terms of neglecting or

subvertingtheprincelydutiestowardsthedivineandnaturallaw.However,asVonFriedeburg

stresses,suchargumentscouldcontributetothecrisisoftheruleof law.Furthermore,certain

authors indeed attempted to overstretch the licit scope for room tomanoeuvre to free rulers

                                                            32Höpfl, ‘Orthodoxy and Reason of State’, 216‐217; Harro Höpfl, ‘Reason of State’, in Henrik Lagerlund (ed.),Encyclopedia ofMedieval Philosophy (Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London/New York: Springer, 2011), 1113‐1115; JanWaszinkunderlinestheattractivenessofTacitism,andthatofJustusLipsiusforcontemporaries;itofferedthe‘true’causesand(self‐interested)motivesoffamouspoliticalactorsinhistoryandthehistoricalworkingsofpowerpolitics,whichencompassedprudenceutilisableforpoliticalpractice.Waszink,‘LipsiusandGrotius:Tacitism’,156‐158.33Höpfl,‘ReasonofState’,114:‘Intheseconflictsreligion,reliedonbyallknownpeopleastheprincipalsocialcement,wasinitselftheforemostcauseorjustificationofdivisionandinsubordination.’;ConalCondrenwrites:‘thepersonaeoccupying any office, as a sanctioned realm for responsibility, might claim a “reason” for it in order to justifyquestionedconduct.’Condren,‘ReasonofstateandsovereigntyinEarlyModernEngland’,13.34Condren,‘ReasonofstateandsovereigntyinEarlyModernEngland’,16‐17.

12

from the constraints of confessional religion, law, and collaboration with elites.35 Appeals to

reasonofstatecouldbothseeminoppositiontoandsupportofaruleoflaw.

From the late sixteenth century onwards, ‘interest (of state)’ became a term thatwas

more or less synonymous or associative to ‘reason of state’. Already in the course of the

sixteenthcentury‘interest’wasdepictedasthedrivingforcebehindprincelypolitics,basedona

pessimisticviewofpoliticsandhumannatureoftenwithreferencetoAristotleandAugustine.

AsDavidWoottonarguedtheidiomofragiondistatowasderivedfromcommerce,takenfrom

merchant’sbalancesheetsthattriedtoestablishprofitandlosswithregardtothestato(estate)

ofprinces;politicsconcernedthebusinessofmaximizing‘interest’,makingprofitandavoiding

loss.36InhisDiscourseof1516thatdiscussedthemeansfortheMedicitomaintaintheir‘stato’,

Guicciardini assumed that ‘particular interest is the true motive of men’s actions.’37 The

justifiable notion of profit or utility for reason of state became increasingly integrated in the

term‘interest’.ThetermoriginatedinItalyandmovedmoreslowlythan‘state’or ‘politics’to

the northernparts of Europe –inEngland itwas only established in the 1640s.38 In 1588 the

French ambassadorRene de Lucingewrote that princesweredrivenby honour or profit and

becauseprofitwasprevailing,heclaimedthat: ‘Weshallthereforeconcernourselvesonlywith

profit, which we may call “interest”.’39 Botero likewise defined interest as the leitmotiv for

princelypolitics.Claimingthatprudenceandvalourwerethetwopillarsofgovernment,Botero

remarkedthatconcerningthefirstandbasicmaximofprudence:‘itshouldbetakenforcertain

thatinthedecisionsmadebyprinces,interestwillalwaysoverrideeveryotherargument;and

thereforehewhotreatswithprincesshouldputnotrust in friendship,kinship, treatynorany

othertiewhichhasnobasisininterest’.40InaslightlymoredisgruntledmannerBoccaliniwrote:

‘It isself‐interestthat inspiresthetongueofprinces,not justiceandnota loveof thecommon

weal.’However,Boccaliniassertedthat‘Theprince,whorulesaccordingtonecessityandnotas

                                                            35VonFriedeburg,Luther’sLegacy,199‐201.36Unaragionwasalsoatermforanaccountbookaswellasbusinessenterprise,inwhichonecaninvest.Inthissense,reasonofstatetranslatesinthebusinessofpoliticsandwasconcernedwiththepursuitofinterest:makingprofitandavowingloss.Wootton,‘MachiavelliandtheBusinessofPolitics’,96‐97.37 Quoted from Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State, 140; Whereas Guicciardini underlined the Aristotelianargumentof the legitimacyof self‐interestwhen it served thecommongood,hisuseof vocabularyof interestwas‘quitenovel’accordingtoLionelA.McKenzie.Guicciardiniborrowedthisvocabularyfromcommerciallanguage,andtherefore defined interest as ‘the material advantage that a political agent could expect to gain from adopting aspecifiedcourseofaction,whetherindomesticorinforeignaffairs’.L.A.McKenzie,‘Naturalrightandtheemergenceoftheideaofinterestinearlymodernpoliticalthought:F.GuicciardiniandJ.deSilhon’,HistoryofEuropeanIdeas2:4(1981)277‐298,279.38Malcolm,Reasonof State,Propaganda,and theThirtyYears’War,94;Wootton, ‘Machiavelli and theBusiness ofPolitics’,95.39QuotedfromMalcolm,ReasonofState,Propaganda,andtheThirtyYears’War,94.40QuotedfromQuentinSkinner,TheFoundationsofModernPoliticalThought.Volume1:TheRenaissance,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1978),249.

13

hisspiritwills,isobligedtodothingswhichhehatesandabominates.’41Boteroclaimedinalater

workthatreasonofstatewaslittlelessthanreasonofinterest.42

Rohanpopularised the term ‘interest’ inhisDe l’interest thatbecame theblueprint for

writings on ‘the (true) interest of states of Europe’. Rohan’s famous interest analysis

complimentedcriticalanalysisofthemoralpersonoftherulerwithcloseattentiontothenature

of the societies he ruled (e.g. the present geographical position, political structures, religious

make‐up,military prowess and relationswith other rulers), so adding a further dimension to

interest as reason of state. According toMeinecke, these interest analyses resulted from ‘the

spiritofmodernhistoricalresearch’emergingwithinreasonofstatewritings.43Morerecently,

Richard Devetak has similarly traced back the foundations of the late seventeenth‐century

notion of European ‘states‐system’ in Renaissance humanist history writings, which attacked

claimstouniversalauthorityoftheChurchorEmpireaswellaslegitimisedapoliticalruleand

its ‘state interests’ by historical analysis. Such critical historical analyses ‘allowed for the

internationaldimension(…)tobemoreclearlydistinguished’,andmeticulouslyexplainedand

analysed.44 Starting in the 1630s, authors likeRohan, began to consider the characteristics of

variousdynasticagglomerates,fromwhichallegedlyobjective‘trueinterestsofstates’ofEurope

were derived. In doing so, they could defend one political faction asmost likely to pursue a

certain ‘foreign’ policy, consequently delegitimising another.What ismore,Rohandiminished

theguidingimportanceoftheethicsofofficebyprimarilyfocusingontheruledsocieties.45

Fromthe1650sonwards,suchinterestanalysesoftenwerecomplementedwithexplicit

criticismofprincelycoercionandsovereignauthorityanddefencesoftheruleoflaw,aswewill

see in the chapter on De la Court. Historians have underlined the fundamental influence of

Rohan on English civil war debates, but his influence on popular Dutch debates on the true

                                                            41QuotedfromMeinecke,Machiavellism.TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,82.42Boterowrote:‘Intheirfriendshipsandenmities,princesareguidedbywhatisadvantageoustothem.Justastherearefoodswhich,thoughunpalatablebynature,aremadepalatablebytheseasoningthecookgivesthem;sotheyareturned, by their nature or their emotions, to this side or that, according as self‐interest directs their minds andemotions; because in the last resort ragione di stato is little less but ragione d’interesse.’ Quoted fromMeinecke,Machiavellism.TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,68–69.43ItschaptersixMeineckediscusses‘TheDoctrineoftheBestInterestoftheStateinFranceatthetimeofRichelieu’’.Meinecke,Machiavellism.TheDoctrine ofRaison d’État, 146‐195.Meinecke believed that interest of statewritingsfounditsoriginsinRenaissanceVenetianrelationereportsestimating‘theinnermotivesofitsrivals’bylookinginto‘theparticularsituationofaparticularindividualcountry’,butgaineditsfullpotentialunderRichelieu’sgovernment,whenFrancere‐enteredtheEuropeanwarcompetition;SeealsoChristianLazzeri,‘Introduction’toHenrideRohan,Del’intérêtdesprincesetlesEtatschrétienté(Paris:PressesuniversitairesdeFrance,1995),87forlocatingtheoriginsofinterestanalysesinVenetianrelationereports.44RichardDevetak,‘HistoriographicalFoundationsofmodernInternationalThought’,HistoryofIdeas41:1(2014),62‐77, quote on p. 64. Notably, by ‘international dimension’ Devetak means ‘the external interactions of sovereigns,republics,empiresandprincipalitieswithothersuchpublicandprivateactors.’45ConalCondren,ArgumentandAuthority inEarlyModernEngland(CambridgeUniversityPress:Cambridge2006),344:‘thisambivalentrelationshipwithanddevelopmentfromnotionsofficeallowedofficeandinteresttorubalongalmost in as complementary a fashion as honestas and utilitas. But it also allowed for forms of explanationindependentofanyethicsofoffice.’;RyanWalter, ‘SlingsbyBethel’sAnalysisofStateInterests’,HistoryofEuropeanIdeas41:4(2015),489‐506,495.

14

interest of state is hardly researched.46 This thesiswill suggest his legacy for Dutchwritings

intertwinedwith theEnglishdebates and re‐workedby authors such as Lisola andValkenier,

whichprovidedafoundationforanti‐Frenchwritingsinthelateseventeenthcentury,notleast

indepictingLouisXIV’smonarchyasapredatorymonarchy.

1.4Predatorymonarchy

For all the writers discussed in this work, the very real fears of a breakdown of social and

political order, of there being no effective legal constraints, focussed on the threat of violent

militaryactivity,a fearofcatastrophicandexorbitantlyexpensivewarfare.Central to thiswas

the fearof thepredatorymonarch: forRohan theHabsburg‐Spanishruler; forDe laCourt the

internalthreatoftheHouseofOrange;forLisola,andValkenier,LouisXIV.Analysesofinterest

ofstateenabledauthorstostressthespecificnatureofapolityandbythatanexplicitsystemof

government. In all cases the predator’s circumstances, interests and use of reason of state

explained and heightened a sense of immediate danger. The specific characterisation of the

demonisedenemyvaried fromwriter towriterand indeedwithineachof the textsdiscussed.

Sometimes theenemy’s actionswere tyrannical ordespotic, sometimesarbitrary; expressions

such as ‘arbitrary rule’, ‘tyranny’, ‘war‐tyranny’, ‘the utmost tyranny’, ‘new monarchy’,

‘conquest’, ‘Turkish rule’, and ‘slavery’ are freely distributed throughout the texts and many

others in their idiom. Accusations of despotic rule were favoured by many during the

seventeenth century, as it was activity explicable in terms of a type of rule, the rule over a

household of slaves, and also because it enabled easy comparison with the feared and

unchristian Ottoman Turks. Sometimes despotism amounted to tyranny, which also, by its

                                                            46 Rohan’sDe l’Interest was the likely source of this influential ‘maxim’ for English authors during the Civil WaraccordingtoGunn.AccordingtothehistorianJ.A.W.Gunn,Rohan’smaxim‘interestwillnotlie’,‘emergingnearthemiddleoftheseventeenthcentury,wasofgreaterimportinEnglandthanthewell‐knowndictaaboutprincelyvirtue,theartsofwar,orthemanagementofcourtfactions’.JohnA.W.Gunn,“Interestwillnotlie”,Aseventeenth‐CenturyPoliticalMaxim’, in: JournaloftheHistoryof Ideas29:4(1968),551–564,552.TwoEnglisheditionsofDe l’InterestwerepublishedinLondonin1640and1641andreprintedin1663,AtreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,translatedbyH.Hunt.;AlanHouston,‘Republicanism,thepoliticsofnecessity,andtheruleoflaw’,inAlanHouston and Steve Pincus,ANationTransformed.Englandafter theRestoration (CambridgeUniversity Press:Cambridge,2001),241‐271;ForliteratureonDutchusagesoftheidiomofreasonofstateseeJohanC.Boogman,‘Deraisond’etat‐politicusJohandeWitt,’inJ.C.Boogman,Vanspelenspelers(TheHague:MartinusNijhoff,1982);ErnstH.Kossmann, ‘Somelate17th‐centuryDutchwritingsonRaisond'Etat’, inRomanSchnur(ed.),Staatsräson:StudienzurGeschichte einespolitischenBegriffs (Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 1975), 497‐504; For an comparison betweenDutch and English expressions of interest see Jonathan Scott, ‘Classical Republicanism in Seventeenth‐CenturyEnglandandtheNetherlands,’inMartinvanGelderenandQuentinSkinner(eds.),Republicanism:ASharedEuropeanHeritage.Volume I,RepublicanismandConstitutionalism inEarlyModernEurope (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002);JanHartmanandWeststeijn,‘AnEmpireofTrade:CommercialReasonofStateinSeventeenth‐CenturyHolland’, in Sophus Reinert and Pernille Røge (eds.), The Political Economy of Empire in the EarlyModernWorld(Basingstoke:PalgraveMacmillan,2013),11‐31;HansW.Blom,‘TheRepublicanMirror,TheDutchIdeaofEurope,’inAnthonyPagden(ed.),TheLanguagesofPoliticalTheory inEarly‐ModernEurope (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1999),91‐115.

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natureknewnoboundsandalsocreatedaworldofslaves.Arbitrarinesswasoftenthefirstsign

oftyranny.Theexpression‘wardespotism’(explainedinchapter3)hasbeencoinedrecentlyto

cover critiques of the range of policies and practices thatwere somuch feared, but although

valuable,itcanobscurethefluidityofthevocabularyofaccusation,andwhererulersalienated

orsoldofftheirassets,partofthehousehold,toraisemoneytofight,despotismhardlyseems

appropriate.47Predatorymonarchyisusedhereasamoregeneraltermthatcapturessomething

ofthebestialimageryofthetyrant,withoutexcludingthetyrantasdespotandthearbitrariness

ofthepassionateandlawless.

In itsmostwelldevelopedexamples, the imageofpredatorymonarchywasacomplex,

partiallyexplanatorybutultimatelycondemnatorysocialconstruction.Thepredatorymonarchy

hadadefininginterestinwagingwarinordertosupressanddeludeitspeople,toextractmoney

andtopursuefurtherwarfare,asVonFriedeburghasshownforPufendorf’sinterestanalysisof

the ‘predatory nature’ of Rome, Spain and France.48 To unmask such informing interestswas

also to reveal a cohesive reason of state, negatively understood. Particularly in the case of

Valkenier, the promotion of Louis XIV’s nefarious interest was facilitated by a barbaric

householdrulebasedonthenatureofslavishsubjects,whocarriedthewarburdenswillingly,

onpower‐hungerpriests,whoinstrumentalisedreligionforpoliticalgain,onFrance’srelentless

soldiers,who plundered and raped the conquered peoples, and on the favourites at court, as

beneficiariesofwarprofit. ForDe laCourt, thepredatoryHouseofOrange requireda similar

network of facilitating minions, but whose existence corrupted citizens rather than simply

exploited the slaves of an existing polity as household. In short, regardless of specifics the

posited interest and reason of state of the demonised predatorymonarch provided away of

redescribingawholesociety,somagnifyingthedangerstothethreatened.

                                                            47 JeanMarieConstantusedthetermforFrenchcritiquesagainstallegedly ‘despotic’practicesof theCrowntakingmoney,propertyandprivilegestofundwarfare.Jean‐MarieConstant,‘DerAdelunddieMonarchieinFrankreichvomTode Heinrichs IV bis zum Ende der Fronde (1610‐1653)’, in Ronald Asch (ed.),Der europäische Adel im AncienRegime.VonderKrisederständischenMonarchienbiszurRevolution(1600‐1789)(Cologne/Weimar/Vienna:Böhlau,2001),129‐150, thetermp.146;This termis furtheredbyRobertvonFriedeburg inhisLuther’sLegacy inamuchmoresystematicdefinitionusedforFrenchandGermansourcesasanewinterpretativeheuristictool(ratherthanaparadigm).48VonFriedeburg,Luther’sLegacy,322‐324.VonFriedeburgarguesagradualshiftinaccusationsoftyrannybasedonthemoralpersonoftheruler,i.e.hislackofvirtuesandneglectorevensubversionofthedivineanddivinely‐inspirednatural law as a piousprince, to political delegitimations basedon analyses of a particular systemof government,whichhasbeenassertedforcritiquesofdespotismasexaminationsofsocietaldevelopmentsdeprivingpeople,bothwithin a country and outside, of their property. The argument by Pufendorf on necessary predatory behaviour ofthesekingdomsseesVonFriedeburgin linewithearlierGerman(chapter6‐7)andFrenchsources(chapter8);SeealsoJoan‐PauRubiés,‘OrientalDespotismandEuropeanOrientalism:BoterotoMontesquieu’,JournalofEarlyModernHistory 91/2 (2005),109‐180,whereinheexplainsdespotism (byexaminingMontesquieuandearlier critiquesofdespotism) as ‘a system of rule, and that it should be therefore (unlike tyranny) be seen as a structural feature ofcertain polities.’ Rubies, ‘Oriental Despotism’, 169; For the seventeenth‐century tendency to conflate tyrannywithdespotismseeMarioTurchetti, 'Despotism' and “Tyranny”Unmasking aTenaciousConfusion’,European JournalofPoliticalTheory7:2(2008),159‐182.

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1.5 Approachandcontents

Thisthesisexaminesfourinterestanalysesrichinsuchaccusations.Itaims,aswesawabove,to

explore changes in understandings of ‘interest’ and ‘reason of state’ as arguments under

pressure responding to verypractical and immediatepoliticalproblems.Each chapter studies

the function of reason of state in the respective source against the background of its specific

context(s)ofcrisisandcontemporaryusagesoftheidiomofreasonofstate.Butthetextsarenot

as disparate or isolated as it might seem. On one level, they each employ much the same

conceptual, explanatory vocabulary to pinpoint the nature and extent of the problem of the

predatory monarch. More specifically as all rely on and in different ways use Rohan, and

Valkenieralsoengagedwithor isdependentupon theotherauthorsdiscussed,wehavewhat

mightamounttoatraditionofspeculation,orasub‐genreofpoliticalthought.Asthereferences

inthechaptersmakeclear, thesewerenot lonevoicesandsothegenrerequiresconsiderably

morework.

In the second chapter, the famous book De l’Interest (1638) by Henri de Rohan is

examined.Ithasbeenassessedasasecular,rationalandobjectivework.However,thischapter

reinterpretsitasaworkbelongingtothe‘genreofcriticalcurrent‐affairscommentary’emerging

during the Thirty Years’ War in which a satiric employment of reason of state (in terms of

implicit criticism) was combined with reports on current affairs. It is studied against the

backdropofpressing factionaldebates inFranceover thepursuitofwarfare intertwinedwith

debatesaboutmuchneededfinancialreformandtheissueofFrenchProtestantism,andRohan’s

dire need for a prestigious office as an exiled ex‐Huguenot leader. From this follows that the

seeminglyobjectiveandsupra‐confessionalinterestanalysisenabledRohan,firstly,toimplicitly

accuseSpainofpursuingunrestrictedanduniversal tyrannical control,while correspondingly

sidesteppingreligiouspolemics;and,secondly,toenvisageapatrioticFrenchunityinwhichthe

formerHuguenotrebelcouldre‐claimanoffice.

Pieter de la Court’s successfulwork InterestvanHolland (1662)will be treated in the

following chapter. This chapter reassess his alleged ‘republicanism’ or ‘anti‐monarchism’ in

termsof‘wardespotism’.TodiminishthethreatofanOrangerestoration,DelaCourtvigorously

attacked the Orange dynasty by identifying the interest of the plunder prince, who pursued

foreignwarfare toextractexorbitant taxes,supress the fundamental lawsandtheauthorityof

thecivicassemblies,subjectthelegalsubjects,consequentlyenslavingthemall.Hisargumenton

theneed to harmonise the interests between rulers and ruledwas at onewith contemporary

EnglishargumentsoninterestgroundedonRohan’sideathattheprincemayrulethepeople,but

that interest ruled the prince. From this follows the second argument, that the Interest van

Holland isbetterseenasadistinctvariationonthethemesenunciatedbyRohan.Althoughhe

preferred the republican constitution for theDutchRepublic, kingship in itselfwas legitimate

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andinotherpolitiesmonarchywassimplyacceptable.DelaCourtsuggestedanidealorderfor

Holland where the privileges and properties of citizens were protected against raids of the

plunderprinceandthepower‐hungrymembersofhishousehold(priests,soldiers,favourites)in

ordertopromoteeffectivelythefoundationofthetrueinterestofHolland:commerce.

In the fourth chapter the international bestsellerBouclier (1667) by François‐Paul de

Lisolawillbeexamined.Historianshaveshownitssignificanceforlateranti‐Frenchwritingsin

rejuvenatingthenotionofuniversalmonarchypowerbyturningitagainstFranceandstressing

thenecessarymaintenanceoftheEuropeanbalanceofpowerresultinginasecularandmodern

notion of Europe. However, this chapter proposes a reinterpretation of Lisola’s argument. It

arguesthatitrestedonadeliberatereversionofRohan’sinterestanalysisofSpainandFrance.

The imperialdiplomatrequiredasupraconfessionalargument forpersuading foreignrulersof

various confessions to assist in the battle against Louis XIV. He literary copied arguments of

Rohan, but turned thesewith a great flair for irony against France as the blueprint for Louis

XIV’suniversalmonarchy.Theresult iseffectively,perhapsself‐consciouslyasatiricparodyof

Del’interest.InamoresystematicmannerheassessedtheFrenchsystemofrule,notonlybased

on the rule of conquest, but, echoing De la Court’s argument, on the slavish nature and its

inherenthouseholdrule,robbingtheprivilegesandpropertiesofpeoplesathomeandabroad,

to finance warfare for universal dominion. Against this, the European legal order should be

guardedbyamutualpursuitofreasonofstateandjustice.

PetrusValkenier’s ‘tVerwerdEuropa(1675)willbescrutinised in the fourthchapter.This

book is a response to the ‘Year of Disaster’ 1672 inflicted upon the Dutch Republic by the

invasionofLouisXIVresultinginmassivecivilriotsandtherestorationofOrange.Hisworkhas

been (dis)credited as a mere anti‐French pamphlet and his thought qualified as ‘Orange

republicanism’, but this chapter will re‐evaluate his argument against the background of the

perceivedcrisisoftheruleoflawandwithintheinternationalcontextoftheidiomofreasonof

state.Heused and transformed the arguments ofRohan,De laCourt andLisola. This chapter

pinpoints two continual problems in Valkenier’s work: how to support Orange princely rule

deeplyrooted in thearmyyetattackingthebelligerentprincely interestofFrance.Valkenier’s

preoccupation was with the French despotic beast. It necessitated the prince of Orange as

supremecommander,yetconstrainedbytherepublicanconstitutionandwithoutinterferenceof

confessionalreligion.OrangeprincelyrulecouldsteertheRepublicinamiddlecourse,between

anarchy and oligarchy, between libertine tendencies and priestcraft, and between plunder

princes and power‐hungry regents, and effectively represent the Republic within the fierce

dynasticcompetitionofEurope.Assomanyofhiscontemporaries,hestruggledtorestoreorder.

Finally,theconclusionassessesthesignificanceoftheseinterestanalyses.Theuseandreuse

of the exactmethod and type of argument for different, even opposing objectives shows the

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highly polemical function of interest analysis and its European context rather than solely

localised context. Furthermore it suggests that the modern constructions of absolutism and

republicanismmaydistortthecoreofitsargument.Aboveall,itdemonstratesapreoccupation

with predatory monarchy, painted with Rohanesque maxims and concerted interest in

dominance and destruction, tyranny and despotism. In this way this thesis expands our

understandingofearlymodernusageof the idiomofreasonofstateand inconclusionushers

thatmuchmoreresearchisnecessaryonthistraditionofspeculation.

 

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Chapter2Del’interest(1638)byHenrideRohan:satirethroughinterestanalysis

Althoughgenealogiesholdnoexactbeginnings,onecansafelyarguethatValkenier’sworkonreason

ofstate ishugely indebtedtothebookDe l’interestdesPrinceset lesEtatsChrestienté(1638)bythe

HuguenotleaderHenriDucdeRohan(1579‐1638).49Del’interestwasoneofthefirstwritingsinwhich

Europewasanalysedasan interdependentpoliticalorderofrivalling ‘states’,eachpursuing itsown

specific‘interests’.Rohan’sinterestanalysisfunctionedasaprimeexamplefornumerousseventeenth‐

centurywritingson‘interestsofstates’.50Hisopeningstatementwasfrequentlyquoted:

‘The Princes commaund the People, and the Interest commaunds The Princes. The

knowledgeofthisInterest isasmuchmoreraisedabouethatofPrincesactions,asthey

themselvesareabouethePeople.ThePrincemaydeceiuehimselfe,hisCounsellmaybe

corrupted,buttheinterestalonecanneuerfaile.Accordingasitiswellorillvnderstood,

it maketh States to liue or die. And as it allwaies aimeth at the augmentation, or at

leastwisetheconseruationofaState,solikewisetogetthither,itoughttovarieaccording

tothetimes.SothattoconsiderwelltheinterestofthePrincesofthistime,weeneednot

remountveryhigh,butonelytakethestandingofthepresentaffaires.’51

Almostfortyyearslater,PetrusValkenierimitatedRohan’sinterest‐analysisandliterallycopied

wholepassagesfromDel’interest.TheDutchjuristdidnotevenfeeltheneedtomentionRohan’s

                                                            49ItsfirstpublicationwasanonymouslyintheMercureFrançois,nr20(Paris,1937),46–126(fortheyears1634–1635).De l’Interest was posthumously republished togetherwith anotherwriting of Rohan, LeParfaitCapitain in1638en1639.ThesetwoeditionsincludeadedicationtoRichelieusignedbyRohan.JohnHearseyMcMillanSalmon,‘Rohanandtheinterestofstate’,inRomanSchnur(ed.),Staatsräson:StudienzurGeschichteeinespolitischenBegrifss(Berlin:Duncker&Humblot,1975)121‐140,p.132.50 Rohan’sDe l’Interest was the likely source of this influential ‘maxim’ for English authors during the Civil WaraccordingtothehistorianJohnAlexanderWilsonGunn,“Interestwillnotlie”,Aseventeenth‐CenturyPoliticalMaxim’,JournaloftheHistoryofIdeas29:4(1968),551‐564,p.552.51HenriRohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome.WritteninFrenchbythemostnobleandillustriousPrince,theDukeofRohan.TranslatedintoEnglishbyH.H.(Paris,1640)2‐3.Inthisthesisallreferencesare to the English edition translated byHenryHunt and published in 1640, exceptwhen differences between theEnglish and French versions occur; The French text reads: ‘Les princes commandent aux peuples et l’intérêtcommande aux princes. La connaissance de cet intérêt est d’autant plus relevée par‐dessus celle des actions desprincesqu’eux‐mêmeslesontpar‐dessuslespeuples.Leprincesepeuttromper,sonconseilpeutêtrecorrumpu,maisl’intérêtseulnepeutjamaismanquer.Selonqu’ilestbienoumalentendu,ilfaitvivreoumourirlesEtats.Etcommeilatoujourspourbutl’accroissementou,pourlemoins,aconservation,aussipourparvenirfaut‐ilqu’ilsechangeselontetemps.Desortequepourbienconsidererl’intérêtdesprincesd’aujourd’hui,iln’estpointbesoinderemonterforthaut,maisseulementdeprendresur lepieddesaffairespresents.’Quoted fromthemoderneditionandannotatedversion by Christian Lazzeri of Henri de Rohan, De l’intérêt des princes et les Etats chrétienté (Paris: PressesUniversitaires de France, 1995), 161. Lazzeri used the edition of 1646, published in Paris, andwhich contained adedication to Richelieu with the note ‘Dernière édition’, ‘jouxte la copie imprimée’. It was bound with five otherwritings,asRohan’sMemoirs,LeparfaitCapitaineandDiscours thatdescribed issueshappenedafterRohan’sdeathandentailedalongintroductionbyJeanSilhonorDanieldesPerreau.ChristianLazzeri,‘Introduction’toDel’intérêtdesprincesetlesEtatschrétienté,byHenrideRohan(Paris:PresseuniversitairesdeFrance,1995),154.

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name in echoing his famous sentences: ‘Of this Interest a certain very wise and experienced

militaryofficerattemptedtosay;thatitrulesoverthePrinces,aliketheyoverherSubjects(...).’52

As explained in the introduction, the dynastic rivalry between Habsburg‐Spain and

Valois/Bourbon‐France triggered the early modern military competition between European

rulers as theywere forced to participate for their survival. From this conflict, the Habsburg‐

Spanishdynastic agglomerate emerged,with lands scatteredoverEurope, evenoverdifferent

continents,bringingnewriches,peoplesandpolitiesunder its rule.Rohanreflectedupon this

volatile situation and offered counsel to the French monarchy, and specifically to Cardinal

Richelieu,ontworelatedfronts:tofollowananti‐Spanishandpro‐Protestantcourseabroad,and

indirectlytoaccommodateHuguenotsathome.Eachwaspresentedandanalysedasamatterof

‘interest’,aconcepttakenoverandrefinedfromearlierwritings(seebelow)thatheheldtobe

central to understanding all counsel and policy. Rohan claimed that every ruler and regime,

whether Catholic or Protestant, should fear the ‘secret design’ or ‘true interest’ of Habsburg‐

Spain to establish a ‘newmonarchy’, i.e. a political andmilitary hegemony in Europe, which

couldonlybeeffectivelyopposedbytheFrenchmonarchytakinguparms.The‘trueinterest’of

eachindependentEuropean‘state’dependedonacarefulmanagementofthefragileequilibrium

of power between Habsburg‐Spain and Bourbon‐France or as Rohan wrote: ‘there be two

PowersinChristendome,whichareasthetwoPoles,fromwhichwhencedescendtheinfluenceof

peaceandwarreupontheotherstates,towit,thehousesofFranceandSpain.’53

CommentatorsonDe l’interesthaveemphasised itsgreatsignificance for thehistoryof

political thought. Historians have described Rohan’s writings as essential for the (modern)

analysisofforeignpoliticsintermsof‘interestsofstates’.54Del’interestis‘oneoftheearliestand

ablest’writingsontheinterestsofstatesaccordingtoWilliamFarrChurch.55FriedrichMeinecke

regardedRohanasoneofthe,butmostinfluential,foundersof‘theDoctrineoftheBestInterest

of the State’ and in his elaborate study of reason of state under Cardinal Richelieu, Étienne

                                                            52Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,24.Theentirepassage:‘OfthisInterestacertainverywiseandexperiencedmilitaryofficerattemptedtosay;thatitrulesoverthePrinces,aliketheyoverherSubjects;AndhowmuchhigheraPrinceisaboveher,somuchgreaterbecomestheknowledgeofStatedemandedofhim[theprince,MBK],asofallhisotherissues.APrincecanbedeceived,andhiscouncillorscanbemisguided,thetrueInterestcanneverdeceiveorbefalse;becauseasmuchastheInterestiswronglyobserved,somuchwilltheStatedecreaseorincrease.’; ‘VanditInterestpleeg seeker seer wijs en ervaren Veld‐Oversten te seggen; dat het regeert over de Princen, gelijk die over hareOnderdanen;EnhoeveelhoogereenPrinsbovenhaaris,soveelgrooterkennisvanStaatwordinhemvereyst,alsvanalsijneanderesaaken.KaneenPrinsaltemetbedrogen,ensijneRaads‐luydenverleytwarden,hetwaareInterestkannoytmissenofbedriegen;wantvoorsoveelhetInterestwelofqualijkwordwaargenomen,voorsoveelneemtdenStaatdaardoorafofaan.’53Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,2.54NoelMalcolmstatedthat‘bythe1630s,whentheeminentHuguenotHenri,ducdeRohan,madeit[‘interest’]thebasisofhisinfluentialtreatiseL’Interestdesprinces(...),theanalysisofgeopoliticswasunthinkablewithoutit.’NoelMalcolm,ReasonofState,Propaganda,and theThirtyYears’War(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2007),95; Inanrecent,introductoryoverviewofthehistoryofinternationalpoliticalthought,EdwardKeenewrote:‘Rohancapturedthecentralthrustofanewwayofthinkingaboutinternationalpoliticswhichtookthe“interest”or“reasonofstates”asitscentralconcept(...)’,InternationalPoliticalThought,andintroduction(Cambridge:PolityPress,2005),107.55WilliamF.Church,RichelieuandReasonofState(Princeton,NewJersey:PrincetonUniversityPress,1972),352.

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ThuaucalledRohan’sbookthe‘chef‐d’oeuvre’ofthisnew‘genre’inpoliticalliterature.56Besides

Rohan’svalue for themodernanalysisof foreignpolitics in termsof ‘interestsof states’,he is

praisedforhisallegedlyobjectiveandrationalanalysisofthepracticeofforeignpolicy,cleansed

fromconsiderationsofmoralityandreligion.ForMeinecke‘pureempiricismhastriumphed’57in

Rohan’s examination of foreign power politics. Albert Otto Hirschmann and Quentin Skinner

creditRohantobethefirstauthorwhoopposedpassiontointerest,since,accordingtoRohan,

theinterestisinterpretedbytruereasonindependentlyoferraticpassions,prejudicesandother

human defects.58 Nannerl Overholser Keohane writes that for Rohan ‘interests of state are

objective facts thatcanbediscernedormisunderstood’.59Thuau followsMeinecke inclaiming

that De l’interest ‘vise à être un tableau objectif de la situation en Europe’, although his

‘objectivitéadeslimites’becauseitisviewedfromaFrenchperspectiveandattemptedtojustify

direct warfare against Spain in the Thirty Years’ War.60 Church states that ‘Rohan’s book is

significant,notforitspositiveinfluencebutforitsfranklysecularandpragmaticviewofFrench

stateinterestsandtheappropriatemeansofimplementingthem.’61AccordingtoHeinzSchilling,

De l’interest is a token of the notion of state’s interests as ‘säkulares Prinzip und oberste

HandlungsmaximederPolitik’,executedprogrammaticallybyRohan.62Inhisannotatedversion

ofDe l’interest,ChristianLazzeriaddressesa ‘momentRohan’,echoingPocock’s ‘Machiavellian

moment’, by arguing that Rohan redefined the concepts of interest as a rational category,

withoutanyconsiderationsofmoralor legalobligations.63 InarecentbiographyontheRohan

familiy,JonathanDewaldwritesthat‘Rohanpresentsaradicallysecularvisionofpoliticallifeas

centeringonself‐interestandrationalcalculationratherthanpiety,tradition,ormorality.’64

                                                            56Meinecke,TheDoctrineofRaisond’État, 162‐196;ÉtienneThuau,Raisond'Etatetpenséepolitiqueà l'époquedeRichelieu(Paris:ÉditionsAlbinMichel,2000[re‐editionof1966]),312.57 ‘When one reads Rohan, it is as if one were stepping over from the sixteenth to the seventeenth century. Theprincipleofpureempiricismhastriumphed,andthereisafundamentalrejectionoftheoldtendencytofollowfamousexamples and cling on to the past. He accords importance only to the fresh spring of life around him, constantlygushinganew.’MeineckecomparedRohanwithMachiavelli,Bodin,BoteroandHugoGrotius,theimportantauthorson ‘statepower’whoall ‘still’usedhistoricalexamplesandtheauthoritativeauthors fromantiquity.Meinecke,TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,166,19.Seefootnote60forMeinecke’scritiqueofRohan’sempiricistcapabilities.58AlbertOttoHirschman,ThePassionsandtheInterests:PoliticalArgumentsforCapitalismBeforeItsTriumph,20thed.(Princeton,NewJersey:PrincetonUniversityPress,1997),42.59NannerlOverholserKeohane,PhilosophyandtheStateinFrance.TheRenaissancetotheEnlightenment(Princeton,NewJersey:PrincetonUniversityPress,1980),174.60Thuau,Raisond'Etat,313;Meinecke,almostdisappointedly,had toadmit thatRohanwas ‘incapableofcompleteobjectivity’, sinceheanalysed the interestsofother rulers fromaFrenchperspective.Besides, theunderdevelopedstage of ‘historical knowledge at his time’ did not benefitted Rohan’s analysis according to the German historian.Moreover,hedirectlycriticisedRohan‘forthewayinwhichthese[Rohan’sbasicideasandintentions]arecarriedoutandappliedinconcreteinstances.’Meinecke,TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,170,169,170.61Church, Richelieu and Reason of State, 354. Church rejected Meinecke’s treatment of Rohan’s and Richelieu’sperspectivesoninterestasonesingularconceptofreasonofstate.Richelieu’swritingswereincontrasttoRohan’s,imbuedwithhisreligiousandmoralbeliefs,accordingtoChurch,RichelieuandReasonofState,352.62HeinzSchilling,KonfessionalisierungundStaatsinteressen.InternationaleBeziehungen1559‐1660,vol.2(Schöningh:Paderborn,2007),152.63Lazzeri,‘Introduction’,145‐146.64 JonathanDewald,Status,power,and identity inearlymodernFrance:theRohan family(1550‐1715) (Philadelphia:PennStateUniversityPress,2015),71.

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Theargumentofthischapteristhattheseassessmentsneedtobereconsidered;Rohan’s

emphasis on examining current political affairs in order to determine the interest of states

appearsmuchlesstoinvolveprinciplesofobjectivityorpoliticalautonomywhenplacedinthe

context of, what Noel Malcolm calls, ‘a genre of critical current‐affairs commentary’.65 This

extremely popular body of propagandistic literature evolved during the Thirty Years’ War,

claimingtopublicisethetruth,thesecretadviceofprincelycouncilsandtounveilevilcounsel,

the arcana imperii of inter‐princely actions or ‘mysteries of state’, the ‘reason of state’ or

‘interest’ofprinces,whilesimultaneouslycriticisingopponentsinasatiricmanner.BysatiricI

amalluding toa conventional styleofmoral critique familiar in theearlymodernworld from

Roman culture, rather than to more recent understandings that have taken it as a largely

humorousliterarygenre.Satiricwritingasrelevanttotheargumenthereinvolvedexaggeration

andevenfabricationinordertocreateanimageofatargetdesignedtodiscredit,andexposingit

toridiculeanddistrust.66Asexplainedintheintroduction,thevocabularyofreasonofstatewas

usednotonlytodefendacertainpolicyorrule,butalso,andperhapsmoreso,tocondemnone,

often satirising the alleged enemy asMalcolm shows. Machiavelli’sThe Prince would also be

calledasatireinthissenseofunmaskingofevil,asHenryNevilleinaprefatoryletter(allegedly

writtenbyMachiavelli) tohis translationofMachiavelli’sworks from1675writes that itwas

‘both a Satyr against them, [tyrants] and a true Character of them.’67 Although some

commentatorspoint rightly toRohan’spropagandistic aim to justify anoffensive anti‐Spanish

foreignpolicy,68theyhaveoverlookedthesatiricexaggerationanddemonizationinhisinterest

analysisofSpain.

Thisseeminglyobjectiveandsupra‐confessionalinterestanalysisenabledRohan,firstly,

to implicitly accuse Spain of pursuing unrestricted and universal tyrannical control, while

correspondingly sidestepping religiouspolemics; and, secondly, to envisageapatrioticFrench

unity in which the former Huguenot rebel could re‐claim an office. This chapter aims at

elucidatingthistwofoldfunctionof‘reasonofstate’terminologyinDel’interest.Tobeginwith,it

presentsabiographicalsketchsuggestingthathismisfortunesprovideapartialcontextforthe

writingofDe l’interest.At thevery least,aworkofpoliticaladvice thatstudiouslyavoidedthe

predictable and conventional recourse to religiouspolemicwas ideally suited toRohan’sown

difficult position and confessionally uncertain history. This section is followed by an short

                                                            65Malcolm,ReasonofState,34.66 On the difficulties involved in defining satire read Conal Condren, ‘Satire and definition’,Humor: InternationalJournalofHumorResearch25:4(2012),375‐399.Onpage389Condrenwrites:‘Whathasbeendesignatedsatirehasnotalwaysbeenintendedasinanywayhumorousorjoking.(…)Itmaywellbethecasethatoveritslonghistory,thehumorous has become increasingly important in satire beyond the Mennipean, yet to read humour back as anessentialfeatureofanythingcalledsatire,letalonedefinesatireintermsofit,isboundtodistort.’67TheWorksoftheFamousMachiavell,CitizenandSecretaryofFlorence(London:JohnStarkey,1675);FelixRaab,TheEnglishFaceofMachiavelli:aChangingInterpretation,1500‐1700(London:Routledge&KeganPaul,1964)219‐221,267‐272.68AsThuau,Raisond'Etat,313;Meinecke,TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,163,170.

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outlineof theuseof reasonof state terminology inFrance in the firsthalf of the seventeenth

century,thepoliticaldebatestriggeredbytheEuropeanwarcompetitionandconfessionalstrife

inFranceduringthe1620sand1630s,thegenreofcriticalcurrent‐affairscommentary,andthe

propagandistictraditionofaccusingtheopponentofaspiringto ‘universalmonarchy’. Inthese

contexts,thefunctionofreasonofstateinDel’interestwillbeanalysed.

2.1HenrideRohan:Huguenotwarrior,nobleprinceandfamousauthor

Rohan’smisfortunes as a noble prince, losing the patronage of KingHenry IV after the king’s

assassinationin1610,andasamilitaryofficerinhisultimatelyfailedHuguenotrebellionagainst

LouisXIII inthe1620s,relatetohisseeminglyobjectiveandsecular,orasthischapterargues,

hissatiricalandsupra‐confessionalaccountoftheinterestsofSpainofFrance.

Rohanpickeduphispentoinfluence‘opinion’inFrance,i.e.tosteeropiniontowardsan

anti‐Spanish and pro‐Huguenot policy while simultaneously applying for a position to help

furtherthispolicy.Del’interestwaswrittenontheeveofthedirectmilitaryinterventionofthe

French monarchy in the Thirty Years’ War against the Habsburgs dynasty in 1635.69 After

Sweden’sdevastatingdefeatatthebattleofNordlingenon5and6September1634,theFrench

pawnonthechessboardoftheThirtyYear’sWarwasseverelyblocked.FromJuneuntilOctober

of 1634,Rohan stayed at the royal court inParis, hoping to convinceRichelieu toofferhim a

militaryoffice and,perhapsnot coincidentally, incitehim toundertakeadirectmilitary stand

against Spain.70 As an eminent Huguenot military leader, Rohan was Richelieu’s former

antagonist in the threeHuguenot rebellions (1620‐1622,1625,1627‐1629).After thedecisive

Huguenotdefeatin1629andRohan’ssubsequentexiletoVenice,Rohansoughtthepatronageof

Richelieu and although receiving several military assignments, Richelieu had never entirely

trustedtheambitiousRohan.71DuringhisstayatcourtRohanfinishedhisbook,probablyadded

adedicationtotheCardinalandpresentedittoRichelieu.72Inthisdedication,Rohanwrotethat

although Richelieu was not expressly present in the entire treatise, it would speak of the

                                                            69Lazzeriarguesthattheeditingoftheworkbeganin1630,whichRohanfollowedthroughindifferentphasesuptill1634. He gives an overview of the difference in opinion amongst historians about the period of writing. Lazzeri,‘Introduction’,153–154.70RichelieudidnotfollowRohan’scounselandexhaustedallotheralternativesbeforeenteringtheThirtyYears’War.Church,RichelieuandReasonofState,354.71Meinecke,TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,164.72ThehistorianPetitotreportedoftheexistenceofamanuscriptofDel’InterestintheroyalLibraryinPariswiththedateofParis,1August1634,attheendofthededication.Lazzeri,introduction,154.Meineckewrote:‘Rohanwantedtoinfluencehimbymeansofthebook,toestablishhimselfasamanwhocouldbetrusted,andatthesametimeincitethecardinal.’Meinecke,TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,165.

24

cardinal, to whom Rohan exclaimed his eternal loyalty as Richelieu’s very humble, very

affectionateandobligedservant.73

BesidesaniconicHuguenot,Rohanwasafamousnobleman.Hewashonouredpublically

inGeneva,VeniceandParisafterhisdeathin1638.DucdeSaintSimonpraisedRohan:‘whomall

Europeadmiredforhiswisdomandhonouredforhisvirtue’.74 TheRohanfamilybelongedto

thehighnobilityofFrance,withtheirestatespredominantlybasedinBrittany.Theyturnedto

Protestantism in the 1550s and became a highly visible Protestant noble family after the

Bartholomew’sDayMassacre1572,whenagreatnumberofhighProtestantnoblesconvertedto

Catholicism.TheRohanshadimportantconnectionstotheroyalcourt,e.g.FrançoisedeRohan

was a permanent dame d’honneur of Cathérine de Médicis in the 1550s and the family was

related, close cousins, to the later King Henry IV (1553‐1610) through the female line.75

ThereforeitisnotsoremarkablethatHenrideRohandreamtofbecomingamilitaryleaderlike

Caesarandanindependentprince,asJonathanDewaldargues.76

Unfortunately forRohan,his life tookadifferent turn.Under theHuguenotKingHenry

IV, he enjoyed royal patronage and favouritism, beingmadeDuc de Rohan, andwas strongly

supportedinhisunsuccessfulmarriageplanswiththesisteroftheSwedishkingandlaterinhis

marriagetothedaughterofHenry’sprincipaladviserMaximiliendeBéthune,DucdeSully.After

the assassination of Henry IV in 1610, however, Rohan lost his high and beneficial position.

Whereas the Huguenot nobility had profited from their newly formed collaborationwith the

Crown under Henry IV, now their standing was severely diminished. Within the Protestant

nobility, factions arose between thosewhowanted collaborationwith, and amoremoderate

policytowardstheCrown,andthoseexpressingtheneedforamoreradicalandoffensivepolicy

as Rohan supported. Simultaneously, the regency of Maria Medici brought forth several

aristocratic factions inwhichRohanwasvariously involved.Hefirst foughtagainst theregent,

but with her after her exclusion and imprisonment by her son King Louis III in 1617. One

consequence of these shifts in allegiance was the nickname ‘Catiline’ for his intrigues and

ruthless ambition. 77 After 1610, the Huguenot’s religious freedom and property rightswere

severely reducedby the FrenchCrown.Over the course of the 1620s civilwars broke out, in

which Rohan switched sides between the divided Huguenot power groups on a number of

occasions. Within the Huguenot camp Rohan was mistrusted and accused of treachery for

                                                            73Theclosingsentenceswereasfollowing:‘Vousvousverrezdoncdanspeudelignesreprésentétoutentier:entoutce traité, il ne sera parlé que de vous, bien qu’il n’en soit jamais parlé. Votre modestie et ma franchise ne mepermettentpasdem’exprimerenautrefaçon,tenantqueleslouangesordinairesfonttortàceuxdesquelslesactionsparlentsiclair.Cen’estpasaussiparlàquejemeveuxrendredignedevosbonnesgrâces.Maisbienpardesservicesproportionnésauxobligationsquevousavezacquisessurmoi,quiseraitoutmavie,Monsieur,Votretréshumble,trèsaffectionnéetobligéserviteurHenrideRohan.’HenrideRohan,Del’intérêtdesprincesetlesEtatschrétienté,160.74QuotationfromDeWald,Status,power,andidentityinearlymodernFrance,35.75Dewald,Status,power,andidentityinearlymodernFrance,17‐19.76Dewald,Status,power,andidentityinearlymodernFrance,38.77Salmon,‘Rohanandtheinterestofstate’,123.

25

negotiatingtrucewiththeCrownofFrance.InSeptember1629RohansignedthePeaceofAlès,

agreeingontherestorationoftheRohanfamilyproperties,asacompensationforhiswartime

losses and for his exile to Venice. Here he started writing the De l’interest amongst other

treatises.

Perhaps it is not surprising that Richelieu mistrusted Rohan when he sought a

prestigiousofficeafter1629.Nevertheless,at theendof1631,hewassentasaFrenchenvoy

and lieutenantgeneral toassist thecantonofGrisons inexpelling theSpanish forces fromthe

Valtellinepasses.Thesepassesformednotonlythestageofseveralbrutalconfessionalconflicts

between the Catholic inhabitants and their Protestant rulers, but also a strategic passage

between theHabsburgs’ Austrian and Spanish territories, important to the competing parties

within theThirtyYear’sWarand accordinglymuch foughtover.78There,hewas suspectedof

being a spy by another French envoy and subsequently lost his post in 1632. A year later he

resumedhispost,butlosthisambassadorialstatus.Inthesummerof1634hestayedattheroyal

court in Paris, where he finished and presented De l’interest. Soon after his visit, he was

recruitedfortheFrenchcampaignsagainsttheHabsburgsandachievedsomegreatsuccesses,

butheconstantlyclashedwiththeroyalcounciloverfinancesandfurthermilitarysupport.After

hisforcescollapsedintheValtellineinthebeginningof1637andCondé’sattempttoarresthim

in1637,RohanjoinedtheforcesofBernardofSaxe‐Weimarasagentleman‐ranker.Hediedon

thebattlefieldinRheinfeldenin1638.79

IntheyearsofhisexileinVenicebetween1629and1634,Rohanwrotehisthreemost

famous treatises: De l’interest, Le parfait capitaine (1638) that embodied admiring

commentariesonJuliusCaesarandreflectionsonmilitarypractice,dedicatedtotheFrenchking,

andhisMémoirs (first threebooksprinted in1644)of theHuguenotrebellionsof the1620s.80

The first publication stream ofDe l’Interest occurred from 1637 to 1639,when after Rohan’s

defeat, the issue of control over the Valtelline passes rose again in France.81 In 1637, it was

anonymouslypublishedwitha royalprivilege in theMercureFrançois for theyears1634and

1635.MosttreatisesinthiseditiondealwithcurrentpoliticalaffairsregardingtheThirtyYears’

War,butthevolumealsocontainsnewsofroyalpolitics,andevenmentionsRohan’sreturnto

                                                            78AftertherevoltoftheCatholicinhabitantsagainsttheGrisonsProtestantrulers,Habsburg‐SpanishforcesoccupiedtheValtelline.In1623FranceHabsburgs‐SpainturnedittothePapalforcesunderpressureofFrance.ThefollowingyearanallianceofFrenchandSwisstroopsexpelledthePapalforces,butthepeacetreatyofMonzonin1626betweenFranceandSpainforcedthewithdrawalofFrenchtroopsinthevalley.However,in1631Rohan’stroopsrestoredtheFrenchcontroluntil1637,whenasubstantialpartofthemilitaryforcesoftheGrisonsrebelledandsteppedovertotheHabsburgside.79David Parrott, Richelieu’s Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624‐1642 (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,2001),489‐490.80Dewald,Status,power,andidentityinearlymodernFrance,70.81Dewald,Status,power,and identity inearlymodernFrance,37‐84;Salmon, ‘Rohanandtheinterestofstate’,104–107;DavidParrot,Richelieu’sarmy:war,governmentandsociety,114–122.

26

court in1634andthesubsequentroyaldecisiontosendhimtotheSwissCantonofGrisons.82

AfterRohan’sdeathin1638,Del’interestwasre‐published,butnownamed,andboundupwith

the Parfait capitaine. Dewald and Meinecke both argue that Rohan intended to publish De

l’interest.83 Dewald explains that in 1632 Rohanwrote to his friend, the theologian Théodore

Tronchin, inGenevathathewasworriedaboutpublishinghiswritingsonthestateofpolitical

affairsinEurope.Hesuggestedforgingastoryofaccidentalpublicationtoavoidproblemswith,

asRohanwroteinhisletter,theEstatesoftheLowCountriesandotherauthoritiesandpersons

whomight be offended. After his death, an edition (bound upwith LeParfait capitaine) was

introducedbystatingthatitwasnotintendedforpublicationandthatitreachedthepublisher

byaccident.However,notonlyhadRohansuggestedthis,buthealsowrotetoTronchinthathe

hadalreadypresentedacopytothekingofSwedenandinhisfollowingletters,heoversawthe

publicationprocessclosely.84Dewaldconcludes: ‘hewantedtoreachawideaudience,without

regard to its social contours.’85 It is alsoworthnoting,however, that the fictionof accidental

publication and the initial anonymitywas entirely appropriate to the genre of propagandistic

writingthatunmaskedsecretdesigns.ItwouldberesortedtoagaininHenryNeville’sspurious

letterbyMachiavelliconcerninghissatiricintentionstoexposeevilanditsinventedprovenance

byhisprinterJohnStarkey.86Regardlessofthispossibility,allthreeexilewritingsbecamehuge

successesinthecourseoftheseventeenthcentury.De l’interesthadmanyeditionsandseveral

lateradaptionsorimitations,whichare,asSalmonstates,oftenconfusing,becausetheydonot

resembleRohan’soriginaltreatiseatall.87

2.2ThebackdropofRohan’sreasonofstate

Rohan’s interest analysis on a European scale enabled him to criticise implicitly Habsburgs‐

SpainandtoforgeapatrioticunityforFrancebysidesteppingthedivisivenessthataccompanied

assertions of confessional integrity. To explain this, we have to sketch the backdrop against

whichRohanproducedhisinterestanalysis.Acloserlookwillbetakenattheuseofreasonof

statevocabularyinearlyseventeenth‐centuryFranceandthepoliticaldebatesinFranceduring

the1620sand1630s.ThenwewilllookintoRohan’sinterestanalysisinrelationtothegenreof

critical current‐affairs commentary, and propagandistic accusations of ‘universal monarchy’,

revolvedaroundtheFranco‐Spanishrivalryintheearlymodernmilitarycompetition.

                                                            82MercureFrançois(Paris1637),forRohanatcourtread220‐222.83Dewald,Status,power,andidentityinearlymodernFrance,72;Meinecke,TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,174.84Dewald,Status,power,andidentityinearlymodernFrance,72‐73andfootnote149onpage209.85Dewald,Status,power,andidentityinearlymodernFrance,73.86TheWorksoftheFamousMachiavell,CitizenandSecretaryofFlorence(London:JohnStarkey,1675).87Salmon,‘Rohanandtheinterestofstate’,132.

27

2.1.2Frenchreasonorinterestofstate?

DewaldregardsRohan’spoliticalthought,includinghisinterestanalysis,asMachiavellian,88but

itreflectsamuchbroader,contemporaryvocabularythatHarroHöpfldefinesas,a‘fashionable

politicalcynicism’aboutthe‘true’motivesofrulersspurredbytheexperiencesofreligiouswars,

especiallyintheLowCountriesandFrance.Asexplainedintheintroduction,theidiomofreason

of state became integrated from the late sixteenth century onwards in this broad vocabulary

resulting in several synonyms for ‘reason of state’ such as ‘interest of state’, the Tacitist

expression arcana imperii, ‘secrets’ and ‘mysteries’.89 Before the reception of reason of state

vocabularyinFranceinthelatesixteenthcentury,theterms‘Machiavellism’and‘Machiavellist’

werealreadyestablishedandinpopularuse.90DuringthereligiouswarsinFrance(1562‐1598),

accusationsof ‘Machiavellism’ thrivedamongstall factions involved.91 In the1570s, Italiansat

the Parisian court defended themonstrosities of the religiouswarswith a cynical outlook on

politics, using Machiavelli, Guicciardini, and Tactius or Tacitean language.92 The reading of

Tacitus’accountsofthemisdemeanoursofRomanemperorsbecameextremelypopularamidst

thenoblefactionsandcourtlypoliticsofthewars.Theancienthistorianwasusuallyusedasa

supplementary or even alternative authority to the extremely controversial Machiavelli.93

According to Jacob Soll, Justus Lipsius created an ‘accessible version of political prudence for

casuistically Christian monarchs’, i.e. prudentiamixta, which became an essential element in

Frenchpoliticalthought,illustratedbyPierreCharron’sDelasagesse(1601).94However,Tacitist

                                                            88Dewald,Status,power,andidentityinearlymodernFrance,47‐49.89HarroHöpfl,‘OrthodoxyandReasonofState’,inHistoryofPoliticalThought,23:2(2002),211‐237,p.216‐217.90 JanWazink, ‘Introduction’ toPolitica:SixBooksofPoliticsOrPolitical Instruction,by JustusLipsius(Assen:RoyalVanGorchum,2004),45.91ThepreacherBoucherclaimedthatHenryIIIcarriedacopyofThePrinceinhispocketandattemptedtointroduceMachiavelli’s policies in France. The Catholic League accused the politiques of Machiavellism by allegedlysubordinating theCatholiccause topoliticalconsiderations. In turn, thepolitiquesaccused theLeagueofconveyingtheirpersonalinterests,drivenbypowerpolitics,underthecloakofappealingtothe‘bienpublic’.InhisfamousAnti‐Machiavel (1576) the Huguenot Innocent Gentillet blamed Machiavellian philosophy for the Bartholomew’s DayMassacreofFrenchProtestantsin1572.Church,RichelieuandReasonofState,47‐50;HarroHöpfl,‘ReasonofState’,inHenrikLagerlund(ed.),EncyclopediaofMedievalPhilosophyPhilosophybetween500and1500(Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,2011),1113‐1115,1113;Notably,Rohan’sbookinventorylistsincludedacopyoftheAnti‐MachiavelaswellasaFrenchtranslationofMachiavelli’sThePrince.SvenStelling‐Michaud,‘LeDucdeRohanetseslivres’,inRevueduVieuxGenève14(1984),18‐27.92JanWaszink,‘Introduction’,45.93WhileaprosperousmarketforMachiavelli’seditionsexistedinFrance,readingthemwasstillforbidden.JacobSoll,‘ALipsianLegacy?Neo‐Absolutism,NaturalLawandtheDeclineofReasonofStateinFrance1660‐1760’,inErikdeBom,MarijkeJanssens,ToonVanHoudt,andJanPapy(eds.),(Un)maskingtheRealitiesofPower:JustusLipsiusandtheDynamicsofPoliticalWritinginEarlyModernEurope(Brill,Leiden2011)307‐323,309;ReadforashortdiscussionofMachiavellinismandreasonof state inFrance,MarcelGauchet, ‘L’Etataumiroirde la raisond’Etat: laFranceet lachrétienté’,inYvesCharlesZarka(ed.),Raisonetdéraisond’Etat.Théoriciensetthéoriesdelaraisond’EtatauxXIVeetXVIIesiècles(Paris:PressesUniversitairesdeFrance,1994),193‐244.94 Pierre Charron outlined prudence as the legitimate scope for rulers to act freely from legal and/or religiousconstraints for the common good, which in his opinion ought to be analysed by reading Lipsius. Soll, ‘A Lipsian

28

writings often were (dis‐)qualified as reason of state, and associated with Machiavellism for

recommending the use of religion forpolitical gain.95Most readers on ‘reasonof state’would

have been appalled by such recommendations,96 which we ought to keep in mind when

discussingRohan’s counselof religiousdissimulation forSpain.Tacitism(and reasonof state)

offeredcontemporariesthe ‘true’causesandself‐interestedmotivesoffamouspoliticalfigures

inhistoryandthehistoricalworkingsofpowerpolitics.Suchcriticalpoliticalhistorybecamea

tool of early modern governments to legitimise their rule in external and internal power

struggles,asSollillustratesbythe‘FrenchRoyalTacitism’,i.e.theroyalpromotionofeditionsof

TacitusandpublicationsofTacitistpolitico‐historicalstudiesstartingfromKingHenryIVupto

the1660s.97

Another important aspect of French reason of state is the transition in French official

politicalvocabularyfromthe1560sonwardsandcompletedunderKingHenryIV’s,whichJames

Collins has described as a linguistic shift from the ‘monarchical commonwealth’ to the

‘monarchicalstate’.Inthecontextofthedisastrousandtraumaticreligiouswars,royalofficials

searchedforalternativestothetraditionalvocabularyofthe‘respubliquefrançoyse’intermsof

appealing to the ‘bienpublic’, adhering the ‘true religion’ and following thepreceptsof ‘piety’

and ‘justice’.ThenotionofaFrenchrespublicaasonepoliticalcommunityofcitizens,ruledby

lawandconsent,strivingtoobtainthe‘bienpublic’,hadbecomeseverelydiscredited,notleast

due to the extensive use of appeals to the ‘bien public’ by the Catholic League.98 First the

politiques and then the juridical elite increasingly promoted ‘le bien de l’Estat’ (and the

intermediate‘lebienduserviceduroi’).The‘state’servedasaconceptualsolutiontounifythe

shatteredFrenchsocietyandthetermbecamesynonymouswiththepoliticalcommunityitself

aswellaswiththegovernment.Thekingwasaddedtothe ‘state’,consideredasthesourceof

thisunityandbyhis‘puissanceabsolue’,theultimatesourceofthelaw.Notably,Collinswritesof

‘discourse confusion’ inmanyFrenchdocuments in the first thirdof the seventeenth century,

since‘state’mostoftenmeantthegovernmentortheking’sadministration,besidesaddressing

order, disposition or policies.99 The ‘commonwealth’ gradually became the ‘state’ and rulers

could henceforth claim to actas, rather than for the commonwealth. Appeals to the common                                                                                                                                                                                          Legacy?’,309‐311andcitation from310; JanWaszink, ‘LipsiusandGrotius:Tacitism’,Historyof Ideas39:2(2013),151‐168,158;ParticularlyinFrance,‘LipsianTacitism’flourished,forexamplesseeJacobSoll,PublishingThePrince.History,Reading,&theBirthofPoliticalCriticism(AnnArbor:TheUniversityofMichiganPress,2005),36‐37.95Höpfl, ‘OrthodoxyandReasonofState’,223;Politicawascategorisedasreasonofstateonthe Index. JanWazink,‘Introduction’,120‐122,173‐187.96Malcolm,ReasonofState,97.97Waszink,‘LipsiusandGrotius:Tacitism’,157‐158;Soll,PublishingThePrince,38‐40.98 This definition of political order developed from the middle of the fourteenth century until the late sixteenthcentury, influencedbyAristotle,PolybiusandCicero.Collins,TheState inEarlyModernFrance 2nd ed. (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2009),3‐4.99Thevocabularyofthe‘respubliquefrançoyse’continuedtobeusedespeciallyfortownsineconomicmatterssuchascorporationsasguilds incharters.Collins,Republicanismand theState in latemedievalandearlymodernFrance(forthcoming). 74; Rohan’s memoirs shows this discourse confusion in using both elements of the vocabulary(commonwealthaswellasstate),accordingtoCollins.PersonalcorrespondencewithJamesCollins.

29

good,basedonideasoftheAristoteliangoodlife,shiftedtojustificationsinthe‘interestofstate’

or‘reasonofstate’,definedbynotionsofutilityandnecessity.100

Theterminologyofreasonofstatewasincidentallyusedinthe1590s,buttwodecades

later Antoine de Lavall exclaimed that reason of state, this novel language from Rome and

Venice, had become so popular that everyone, great as well as small men, discussed it

everywhere. Even newspapers could speak of nothing else, according to Lavall.101 The French

term ‘raisond’état’wasa translationof the Italian ‘ragiondistato’andtheLatin ‘ratiostatus’,

bothsixteenth‐centuryneologisms.102At thecloseof thesixteenthcentury,Botero’sandmany

other Italian writings discussing reason of state became popular in France.103 Similar to

religiouslyorthodoxwriterssuchasBotero,LavallandmanyotherFrenchauthorscondemned

reason of state as Machiavellian immorality and indifference to law, while simultaneously

elucidatedandjustifiedreasonofstateundertheauspicesofprudenceandnecessity.104

Rohan’susageofthephrase‘the(true)interestofstate’wasbuiltuponexistingideasof

interest.As clarified in the introduction, the justifiablenotionofprofit orutility for reasonof

statebecameincreasinglyintegratedintheterm‘interest’,manifestedinargumentsof interest

asthedrivingforcebehindprincelypoliticsandanincreasingusageof‘interestofstate’asmore

or less synonymous with ‘reason of state’. The closely related, even sometimes synonymous

expressionsofinterestandraisond’estatprovidedawellestablishedcurrencyofdebatebythe

timeRohanwrote.In1588,RenedeLucinge(afriendofBotero)wrotethatprincesweredriven

by honour or profit and because profit was prevailing, he claimed that: ‘We shall therefore

                                                            100 Collins,TheState inEarlyModernFrance, xxiii;Malcolm,ReasonofState, 94. This transition in Frenchpoliticalvocabularyoverlapsthelate‐sixteenthcenturyshift,arguedbyMaurizioVirolianddescribedintheintroduction,fromalanguageofunderstandingpoliticsaspreservingtherespublica(acommunityofcitizensruledbylawandconsent)to maintaining the state, (a ruler’s dominion over political institutions and peoples, ruled by force) the latterexpressedbyreasonofstatevocabulary.Viroli,FrompoliticstoReasonofState;Lazzeriunderlinesthissubstitutionofrespublicaby‘Estat’inFrenchpoliticalthoughtandperceivesRohan’snotionof‘Estat’asinlinewiththeaccountsofRichelieu,Naudé,Silhon,astheyemphasisethenecessityofsovereigntyintegratedinthestateinordertomaintaintheruleoflaw.Lazzerigivesasimilaroverviewofthechangingdefinitionsof‘state’inFrenchpoliticalthought,fromthe thirteenthcenturydescriptionsof ‘state’as thesocietyoforders (socialand legal conditionof certaingroupascorporation) and the state of the prince as the condition by which he exercised his royal power via certaincorporations,tothesubstitutionofrespublicaby‘state’inthesecondhalfofthesixteenthcenturyby‘constitionalist’writersasClaudedeSeyssel,TheororedeBèzeandFrançoisHotman.Theseauthors, thoughsomewhatdifferently,defined ‘state’ as a corporate bodywhere the union ofmemberswas superior to the head, i.e. the king. This newunderstandingof‘state’wasfurthertransformedthroughtheincorporationofthenotionofsovereigntyintosuchanideaofbodypoliticbyBodin,andtakenupbyauthorsasCardinleBret,JeandeSilhon,CardinalRichelieuandGabrielNaudéinthetimeofRohan.Lazzeri,‘Introduction’,120‐125.101Salmon,‘Rohanandtheinterestofstate’,126;AntoinedeLavall,Desseinsdeprofessionsnoblesetpubliques(Paris,1605,1612);Theeditionof1612encompassedasectiononreasonofstate,inwhichLavallreviewedseveralwritings,wasonlytosomeextentpleasedwithAmmirato’scommentaryonTacitusbecauseitarguedthatreasonofstatehadalwaysbesubordinatedtoreligion.Church,RichelieuandReasonofState,78‐80;Gauchet,‘L’Etataumiroirdelaraisond’Etat’,195‐196.102Höpfl,‘OrthodoxyandReasonofState’,215‐216;Church,RichelieuandReasonofState,44‐47,seefootnote94onpage45forexamplesofearlyuseofthephrase‘raisond’état’inFrance.103ThefirsttranslationofDellaRagiondiStatowasmadebyGabrielChappuysandpublishedasRaisonetgouvermentd’estatinParisin1599.Church,RichelieuandReasonofState,62‐72.104Church,RichelieuandReasonofState,78‐80.

30

concernourselvesonlywithprofit,whichwemaycall“interest”.’105Duringtheturbulentperiod

of theregencyofMariadeMedici from1610to1617, the term ‘interest’wasmorecommonly

usedthan‘raisond’estat’.HuguenotwritingsfromColignyin1572similarlyarguedintermsof

interest and reason of state, with perhaps increasingly, interest being the notion to which

greater attentionwasgiven.106Richelieu’spublicistsmade intensiveuseof the terminologyof

‘interest’andbythetimeDel’interestwaspublished(1638)itwaswellestablished.107

TostatethatRohan’sinterestanalysisshouldbeseeninlightofhyperbolicexaggeration

(central to theThirtyYears’Wargenreofcriticalcurrent‐affairscommentary), isnot toargue

thatDel’interestcannotbeseenasablueprintforwritingsontheinterestofstatesofEurope.As

explainedintheintroduction,Rohan’sfamousinterestanalysisrepresentsthecomplementation

inreasonofstatewritingsasexaminations(andcriticisms)ofpredominantlythemoralperson

oftheruler,withcriticalanalysesofthesystemofgovernment, i.e.thefeaturesofhisland,his

rule vis‐à‐vis his subjects and relations with other regimes. These interest analyses resulted

from the increasing employment of historical analysis, which enabled authors to indicate the

circumstances and characteristics of the societies of the rulers and to distinguish these from

‘foreign’polities.108

Moreover, in claiming that interest ruled rulers, he indeed diminished the guiding

importance of the ethics of office. Conal Condren and Ryan Walter have pointed to Rohan’s

contribution to a gradual dissociation of ‘interest’ from ‘notions of office’.109 By primarily

                                                            105QuotedformMalcolm,‘“ReasonofState”andHobbes’,94106 Salmon, ‘Rohan and the interest of state’, 102‐103, 108, 126‐127, footnotes 44 and 45; Maria’s regency waspesteredbyrebellionsofmajornoblesandendedwiththemurderofMaria’sfavouriteConcinoConcini,executedbyLouisXIIandhismen.Collins,TheStateinEarlyModernFrance,xxix;Inseveralwritingsofthe1610s,Rohanlikewiseargued for a pro‐protestant foreign policy against France’s belligerent Spanish neighbour. The Huguenot leadersimilarlypointedtothe(mis‐)useofreligionaspoliticalpretextasit,accordingtohim,hadbeenutteredintheFrenchWars of Religion and byHabsburgs‐Spain in itswars against foreign princes and peoples. See Salmon, for a shortsummaryforeachspecificwriting.Salmon,‘Rohanandtheinterestofstate’,100‐103.ForatotaloverviewofRohan’swritings and editions of De l’interest read Lazzeri, ‘Introduction’, 153‐156; Étienne Thuau points to a particularcollectionof anonymouspamphlets from the1610s and1620swherein the advancementof theHabsburg‐SpanishmonarchywasperceivedasagravethreattotheexistenceofFranceandtherestofEurope,andthat,consequently,the Frenchmonarchy should rise up against Spain. Thesediscourseswereboundup in a bookpublished in 1632.Thuau,Raisond'Etat,309‐311.107Malcolm,ReasonofState,94.108Meineckediscussesinchaptersix‘TheDoctrineoftheBestInterestoftheStateinFranceatthetimeofRichelieu146‐195’.InterestofstatewritingsfoundtheiroriginsinRenaissanceVenetianrelationereportsestimating‘theinnermotives of its rivals’ by looking into ‘the particular situation of a particular individual country’, but gained its fullpotential under Richelieu’s government,when France re‐entered the Europeanwar competition.Meinecke arguedthattheWarsofReligionfosteredthe‘recognitionofthetruecollectiveinterestofthewholeofFrance’:anti‐Spanishandreligioustoleration.TheseideaswereputintopracticeundertheruleHenryIV,butduringtheregencyofMariadeMedici, Franceneglected this interestuntil thegrowthofHabsburg‐Spanishpower, theHabsburgsgeographicalenclosureoftheFrenchmonarchyandthemarriagenegotiationsbetweentheSpanishinfantandtheyoungCharlesproducedsubstantialfearamongstFrenchpoliticians.Meinecke,TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,146,147,151;Lazzeri‘Introduction’, 87 for origins of interest analyses in Ventian relatione reports; Richard Devetak, ‘HistoriographicalFoundations of modern International Thought’, History of Ideas 41:1 (2014), 62‐77, quote on p. 64. Notably, by‘internationaldimension’Devetakmeans‘theexternalinteractionsofsovereigns,republics,empiresandprincipalitieswithothersuchpublicandprivateactors.’109ConalCondren,ArgumentandAuthorityinEarlyModernEngland(CambridgeUniversityPress:Cambridge2006),344‘thisambivalentrelationshipwithanddevelopmentfromnotionsofofficeallowedofficeandinteresttorubalongalmost in as complementary a fashion as honestas and utilitas. But it also allowed for forms of explanation

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focusing on the nature of societies of rulers, e.g. the present geographical position, political

structures,religiousmake‐up,militaryprowessandrelationswithotherrulers,hewasableto

marginalise well‐established questions concerning princely virtue, piety and confessional

integrity. For an ex‐rebellious Huguenot prince living under a Catholic ruler and desiring an

office,anyreligiouspolemicoughttobeavoided.

2.2.2MonarchyincrisisandRichelieu’scrisismanagementofreasonofstate

MostoftheresearchintoFrenchusagesofreasonofstatevocabularyfocusesontheperiodof

Richelieu’sministry(1624‐1642),his‘monopolisation’ofthisterminology,and,subsequentlyon

writingsofhishiredpensasGuezdeBalzac,JeandeSilhon,PhilipdeBéthune,GabrielNaudéas

wellasRichelieu’sownmemoirs.110Duringthefirstdecadesoftheseventeenthcentury,Tacitist

andItalianreasonofstatewritingsasbyBoteroandBoccaliniwereusedtocriticisethekingand

his advisers and ‘unveil’ their secretive political schemes. Richelieu turned this dangerous

criticismintorathersuccessfulpropagandafortheCrownbypublicationstrategiesandasystem

of censorship, reaching a relatively large readership.111 Laurie Catteeuw argues that these

outburstsonreasonofstatesubsequently transformedtheassociatednotionofnecessitas: the

extraordinary became ordinary. Under the auspices of the terminology of reason of state, the

ancient maxim of ‘necessity knows no law’ gradually transformed into an argument that

‘necessity makes law’.112 Nonetheless, in the context of crisis, reason of state became quite

openly andheavilydebated, andRichelieucouldnotprevent critics fromdiscussing reasonof

                                                                                                                                                                                          independentofanyethicsofoffice.’;RyanWalter, ‘SlingsbyBethel’sAnalysisofStateInterests’,HistoryofEuropeanIdeas41:4(2015),489‐506,495.110Meinecke,TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,164‐204;Church,RichelieuandReasonofState;Gauchet,‘L’Etataumiroirdelaraisond’Etat’;Thuau,Raisond'Etat.111JacobSoll,‘EmpiricalHistoryandtheTransformationofPoliticalCriticisminFrancefromBodintoBayle’,JournalofHistoryof Ideas64:2(2003),297‐316, inparticular306,309;LaurieCatteuw, ‘L’inacceptable faceauxnécessitéspolitiques : les relations entre censures et raisonsd’état à l’époquemoderne’ inLesDossiersduGrihl [online], Lesdossiers de Jean‐Pierre Cavaillé, Les limites de l'acceptable, (14 juin 2013), accessed January 17 2016. URL :http://dossiersgrihl.revues.org/5978.112Talkingaboutanunacceptablereasonofstateformedaframeworkinwhichcertainactionscouldbeacceptedandfinallywereaccepted.Catteeuw,‘L’inacceptablefaceauxnécessitéspolitiques’;LucFoisneau,‘SovereigntyandReasonofState:Bodin,Botero,RichelieuandHobbes’, inHowellA.Lloyd(ed.),TheReceptionofBodin (Brill;Leiden2013),323‐342, p. 333; The most famous or notorious example of Richelieu’s promotion of reason of state is probablyConsidérations politiques sur les coups‐d'état (1639) by the Cardinal’s librarian, Gabriel Naudé, who, inspired byCharronandLipsius, extended the legitimatescopeofprudenceorpolitical fraud toeverymemberof governmentinsteadofsolelytotheprince,anddistinguishedbetweenan‘ordinary’andmoralprudenceand‘extraordinary’andopenly immoralprudence.The latterpolitical fraudwasnotmerelypersonaldissimulationof theprincebut couldinvolveboldandintervenientaction,overstretchingordinarymoralandlegalboundaries,justifiedforthesakeofthecommongood.Itwashoweverimperativeforitssuccessthatsuchactionwasexecutedintheutmostsecrecy,asheassessed the Bartholomew’s Massacre as ‘very just’ but unfortunately ‘done by halves’. Peter Burke, ‘Tacitism,Scepticism andReason of State’, in J. H. Burns andMarkGoldie (eds.),TheCambridgeHistoryofPoliticalThought,1450–1700(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1991)479‐498,p.496‐498;Soll,‘ALipsianLegacy?’,312‐315.

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state.113

Instead of mirroring policies of ‘statebuilding’ or ‘absolutism’ of the Bourbon

monarchy,114 French use of reason of state vocabulary largely reflected pressing political

problems,broughtforthbywarfareanditsfinancialconsequences.Inthelate1620s,concerns

abouttherise inpowerofHabsburg‐Spain,coincidedwithdomesticpoliticaldebates,wherein

two ill‐defined factions could bedistinguished. Thedévots, led by theQueenRegentMarie de

MédicisandthekeeperofthesealsMicheldeMarillac,favouredthesuperiorityoftheVaticanin

domesticecclesiasticalmattersandapro‐Habsburg,non‐belligerentforeignpolicythatensured

timeandmoney to initiatemuchneeded internal reformsand toannihilate theProtestantsat

home.OntheothersidestoodthebonsFrançais,headedbyCardinalRichelieu,whoarguedfor

therelativeautonomyoftheFrenchChurchand,aboveall, thedireneedforanoffensiveanti‐

Habsburg war and, therefore, a postponement of domestic reforms. This debate dominated

FrenchpoliticsuntilthepeaceofthePyreneesbetweenSpainandFrancein1659.Accordingto

Collins,thedévotsreflectedarenewedstressonpersonalpietyandamorerigorousreligionin

France.WilliamChurcheven claims thatunderhisministry,Richelieudealtwitha revitalised

Catholicism ‘which was stronger than any similar religious movement in the three earlier

reigns.’115

Other crucial issues that pressured the Crown were dynastic fragility (the later King

LouisXIVwasbornnotuntil 1638), thepowerfulgrandees, aswell as thegrowinggap in the

government’sbudget,illustratedbythepartialbankruptcyof1634.BythetimeDel’interestwas

published, France’s involvement in the Thirty Years’War had severely affected its society by

massivelyincreasingtaxation,introducingnewtaxesandsellingofficesastaxfarmingandlands,

whichledtoincreasingcriticismofabuseofsuchoffices,widespreadnon‐paymentoftaxesand

constantinternaldisorderasrebellionsoccurredinprovincesandtowns,eventuallyspreading

toParis,explodinginaseriesofrevoltsbyofficersandgreatnobilityduringtheFrondeof1648‐

                                                            113MarcelGauchetarguesatransitionfromtheideaofthesecrecyofpolitics,mysteriesofstatedecipherablesolelybyrulers and their advisors, to the notion of openly debating reason of state, analysed by rulers and ruled, andconsequently reason of state developed into a weapon against the Crown. Gauchet, ‘L’Etat aumiroir de la raisond’Etat’;JacobSolldemonstratestheCrown’srejectionoftheidiomofreasonofstatefromthe1660sonwards,largelysetupbyfinancialminster,JeanBaptistedeColbert,whoexclaimedtheineffectivenessanddangerofNaudé’spoliticalviews, and promoted a panegyric, more eloquently Ciceronian history‐writing instead of a critically political andTacitistone.Soll,‘Alipsianlegacy?’.114 See for instance Church, Richelieu and Reason of State, ‘Part III Internal Affairs, State‐Building, and AttendantControversies,1624‐1632’,p.173‐282;Soll,PublishingthePrince,seepages7,58onabsolutismandreasonofstate;Thuau,Raisond'Etat,11.115Collins,TheStateinEarlyModernFrance,35;Church,RichelieuandReasonofState,41,93;TheCardinalintroducedmilitaryandadministrativereformsandcreatedavastclientnetworkinFrance,whichwasresentedbymanynobles,asthedévots,especiallybyMariadeMédicisandGaston,theKing’sbrother.Collins,TheStateinEarlyModernFrance,59‐68;AccusationsofMachiavellism,allegedlyfanaticallypractisedbyRichelieu,werenotuncommon,e.g.theabbédeChoisyclaimedthattheCardinalhadacopyofthePrinceonhisbedsidetable.Soll,PublishingthePrince,47.

33

1653. Collins even speaks of ‘the twenty years crisis 1635‐1654’.116 These crisis years fuelled

debates on reason of state, discussing and stretching the legitimate scope for the regime to

execute extraordinary measures against domestic political agitators and competitors, and

againstforeignregimesgenerally.117

Church states that under Richelieu foreign affairs were more frequently discussed in

Frenchreasonofstatewritingsthandomesticones,however,suchmattersweremostoftenthan

not intertwinedaswitnessed indebatesbetween thedévotsandbonsFrançais.118Themarket

was floodedwithpublicationsdefending anti‐Habsburgpolicies in the ‘interest’ of theFrench

‘state’ and, often added, in the interest of Catholicism.119 The FrenchCrown’s return to costly

anti‐Habsburg foreign policy received massive criticism, but because the growing financial

pressureswereaccompaniedby resurgentCatholicism, itwas farharsher than attackson the

anti‐HabsburgpoliciesofthereignsofFrancisI,HenryIIandHenryIV.Afterenteringdirectly

thewaragainstSpain,theCardinalwaswidelyaccusedofplacingthe ‘interestsofstate’above

theCatholicfaith.InhisdefenceRichelieuemphasisedaconfessionaldimensiontohisusageof

reasonofstateinclaimingthatpursuingwarfareagainstthegrandCatholicmonarchyofSpain

was thedivinemissionofCatholicFrance, itsultimate interestofstate,becausedefending the

balanceofpowerbetweenEuropeanprincesmaintainedtheautonomyoftheCatholicChurch.120

2.2.3Betweenfactandfiction:thethreatofthe‘newmonarchy’

Apartfromitsdomesticcontext,Del’interestmaybeunderstoodasanextensionofthegenreof

criticalcurrent‐affairscommentary,fuelledbytheThirtyYears’,inwhichreasonofstatewasa

favourite subject, aroundwhich exaggeration and lurid accounts of dubiousmotivation easily

                                                            116Collins,TheStateinEarlyModernFrance,chapter2pages71‐99,whichendswiththecoronationofLouisXIVatReimsin1654,sincetheperiodoftheregencyofhismotherAnneofAustriafrom1643‐1651againproducedinternalpowerplaysdisastrouslyaccumulatingintheFronde.117GeneralfunctionofreasonofstatedevelopedduringreligiouscivilwarsaccordingtoHöpfl,‘ReasonofState’,1114.118Church,RichelieuandReasonofState,38;ReadChurch,RichelieuandReasonofState,197‐282onreasonofstatewritings triggered by the power struggle between Richelieu, and Maria de Medici and her third son and heir‐presumptiveGastond’Orléans,escalating in theDayof theDupes(±10November1630)andLouisXIIIsubsequentdecision in favourofRichelieuandagainstGastonandhis followers,declaringthemguiltyof lèse‐majesté,ofwhichseveralhighnoblesweretrialledandexecuted.119ReadforvariousexamplessuchasRichelieu’sownwritingsThuau,Raisond'Etat,308;EarliestexamplesfromtheValtelline episode of 1624‐1626. For pamphlets defending Richelieu’s anti‐Habsburgs policy in terms of reason ofstatevocabularyduringthisepisodeseeChurchchapteron‘theValtellineepisode’,RichelieuandReasonofState,103‐172,especiallypaged126‐173.Notably,thesedefenceswereratherforaforeignreadershipthanadomesticonesincethedévots initiallysupportedFrenchintervention in the Italianvalley.A famousexampleofa treatisedefendingananti‐Habsburgspolicyas the interestofFranceandof theVaticanaswell: [Ferrier, Jérémie.], Catholiqued’estatouDiscourspolitiquedesalliancesduroytrès‐Chrestiencontrelescalomniesdesennemisdesonestat(Paris1625).Church,RichelieuandReasonofState,128‐141.120ChurchrejectedMeinecke’streatmentofRohan’sandRichelieu’sperspectivesoninterestasonesingularconceptof reason of state. Richelieu’s writings were in contrast to Rohan’s, imbued with his religious and moral beliefs.Church,RichelieuandReasonofState,352;Foisneau,‘SovereigntyandReasonofState’,333‐338;

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gathered.Regimesstrovetocontrolrising‘opinion’andreadersdemandednewsfromthechaos

of the many involved parties, interdependent conflicts and ever‐changing alliances. Malcolm

distinguished threegroupsof readers: the largestpartmayhave readpopular satire for their

amusement,theelitemayhaveratherreadofficialdeclarationsofbothsidesinordertovalidate

the legalityof thedemands,andthemajorpartof theeducatedreadingpublicmayhavebeen

fascinated, evenexhilaratedby reasonof state.This lattergroupwasalreadyacquaintedwith

many writings on the subject and could now, as the war evolved, delve deeper into the

seemingly secretive princely politics of reason of state, which appeared to be tested and

demonstrated in the,asMalcomwrites, ‘hugepublic laboratory’of theThirtyYears’War.121A

famousexampleofthisgenreisMysteriapolitica(anonymouslypublishedin1625),writtenby

MaximilianofBavaria’spublicistandJesuitAdamContzen,whichcriticisedRichelieu’sexpulsion

ofPapaltroops,supportedbySpain,intheValtellineof1624byofferingeight‘genuine’letters

revealingsecretivepoliticalaffairsatforeigncourts,satirisingFrenchpoliticsthatwerefoolish

and damaging to Catholicism, while displaying Spain as defenders of the religion. Counter‐

pamphlets were published in the Mercure français, suggesting the Crown’s approval, and

accused Spain by the commonly used argument of instrumentalising religion to expand their

dominion,inthiscaseintheValteline,122asRohandescribedtheSpanishinterestaswell.

ThepropagandisticpurposeofthisgenredoesnotimplythatRohanmeanthisinterest

analysisnot tobetakenseriouslyortorejectreasonofstate,northathisdisplayofEuropean

political affairs is false. Malcolm claims that this genre ‘hovered somewhere between the

publicationsofgenuinedocumentsontheonehand,and,ontheother,thefanciful(andinthis

period, novel and entrancing) political fiction of Boccalini’s Raguagli di Parnasso, with their

shrewdlyargueddiscussionsbetweenkings,philosophers,andotherfamousfiguresofboththe

presentandthepast.(...)[I]twasagenrethatpermittedsomeblurringofthebordersbetween

factand fiction,betweengenuineanalysisandsatiricalexaggeration.’123Theunmaskingof the

opponent’s dissimulations and simulationswas evenmore effectivewhen it told the truth, as

MalcolmpointstoRohan’sadvicethattheFrenchmonarchyoughttoexposeSpanishandPapal

misusesoftheCatholicreligion‘tomaketheCatholickesperceiuethevenomehiddenvndes(sic.)

the same’.124 Reason of state could be used ‘to build on its credibility and exploit its

disreputability’.125 Insomeextremecasesapurelyparodicversionof reasonof statecouldbe

presented, but one should be aware that contemporary readers familiarwith reason of state

argumentswould not be shocked bymany of the details, e.g. by recommendations to stir up

conflictamongtheenemies.TheTacitistandMachiavellianpreceptofinstrumentalisingreligion                                                            121Malcolm,ReasonofState,30‐34,quote31.122Malcolm,ReasonofState,32‐33;Church,RichelieuandReasonofState,121‐126.123Malcolm,ReasonofState,34.124Malcolm,ReasonofState,109;Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,14.125Malcolm,ReasonofState,34,107‐108.

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forpoliticalgainremained,however,acontroversialissue.Moreover,thereexistedadegreeof

argumentbyimplicationinthismaterial.Whatwasfearedandmustbetakenseriouslywerethe

implications and extremes to which policy might lead, often attacked through urgent

exaggeration as if theywere alreadypracticed.Thus,writingswithin this genre could involve

satiricelementswhilesimultaneouslytheywere‘meanttobetakenseriously’.126Theintegration

of current political affairs granted such writings a sense of authority that accompanied the

hyperbolicallydesignedaccusations.127

Inthelightofthisintricatecontextofargumentoninterestandreasonofstate,itisnow

possibletosuggestwhatpreciselyRohanmeantbycallingSpaina‘new’monarchy,foritwasnot

recognition of modern state building in the sense of an institutionalised fiscal‐military state.

Rohan’shostileimageofSpainastheaspiring‘newmonarchy’resteduponalongertraditionof

propaganda on ‘universal monarchy’, which in early modern Europe was shaped by the

intensificationofwarfarefromwhichpowerfuldynasticagglomeratesemerged.Bythetimeof

Charles V the notion of universal monarchy has lost its predominant theoretical nature in

conflicts between the pope and the emperor and had been transformed into a subject for

politicaldebateregardingtheorganisationofEuropeanpolitics.Moreover,thenotionwasused

prejudicially, suggesting that one power within Europe acted by ‘illegal power politics’, and

occurredmoreoften thannot indebates about theFrench‐Spanish rivalry.The associationof

universalmonarchywiththeimperialdignityoftheHolyRomanEmpirevanished,becausethe

Spanish kings had taken over the original imperial duty to protect the Catholic Church and,

subsequently,asimilarclaimovertheotherEuropeanrulers.InthecontextoftheThirtyYears’

War, the use of the universal monarchy argument exploded in pamphlets against Habsburg‐

Spain; its aspiration for universal monarchy seen as the prime cause of the war. Universal

increasinglyreferredtoafearedmilitaryhegemony.128

Rohan’s hyperbolic portrayal of the Spanish interest, i.e. seeking ‘new monarchy’ by

dissimilatingpietyandpoliticalandmilitaryoppression,illustratesthisnegativeconnotationof

‘universal monarchy’. Since propaganda against Charles V, universal monarchy was often

delegitimisedasanunjustrule,motivatedsolelybytheruler’spersonaldesireforgloryandgain.

Thiswasconsideredtobe,inthewordsofthehistorianFranzBosbach,‘ameretyranny,because

the subjects were kept in unchristian slavery and treated as the personal property of the

                                                            126Malcolm,ReasonofState,106,34.Besides,asMalcolmstresses,thesatiriceffectcouldonlyworkwhenreadersatleastcouldimaginethatrulersandtheiradvisorsdeliberatedsuchMachiavellianpoliticsofreasonofstate.127Malcolm,ReasonofState,51.128Bosbach, ‘TheEuropeanDebateonUniversalMonarchy’, inDavidArmitage(ed.),Theories inEmpire,1450‐1850(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 81‐98, p. 84‐92; It should be noted that Philip II likewise endorsed propagandalegitimisinghis claim foruniversalmonarchy, for instance to justifyhis inclusionofPortugal.MartinvanGelderen,‘UniversalMonarchy,theRightsofWarandPeaceandtheBalanceofPower.Europe'sQuestforCivilOrder’inHans‐ÅkePersson,BoSträ(eds.),ReflectionsonEurope.DefiningaPoliticalOrderinTimeandSpace(Brussels:P.I.E.PeterLang,2007),49‐71,55.

36

universal ruler.’129 English literature on tyranny followed a similar pattern. A subordinate

allegation to such charges of tyranny was rapacity creating slavery, a rule by accumulative

conquest of each European polity.130 Recent historical research has even qualified Habsburg‐

Spainasamonarchybasedonviolentconquest.131Famousexamplesaretobefoundintheso‐

called ‘Black Legend’ pamphlets, which usually conveyed accusations of Spanish universal

monarchy through religious‐apocalyptic imagery demonizing the Habsburgs rulers and the

Spanishsoldiers.132Furthermore,theaccusationofSpain’s(andlaterFrance’s)usageofreligion,

a zeal for Catholicism to cover their desire for universal dominion instead of defending the

societaschristiana,wasarecurrentargumentinsuchpropaganda.133 Chargesoftyrannywere

central toreligiouspolemics,whichcanexplainwhyRohan,notwishingtoexciteconfessional

differences within France, refrained from overtly using this language. However, since the

legitimating language of tyrannywas extremely slippery, relating to a vast number of terms,

therewasnoneedtobeexplicit.134

Overall, Ihave suggestedan inter‐related setof contextsdirectly relevant toL’interest.

Rohan grew up during the tumultuous period of civil wars, confessional strife, rebellious

princely factions, and dynastic crisis. This fuelled the popularity of ideas on the utility and

necessityof(princely)practicalprudence,ondissimulationandsimulation,onreadinghistoryto

discover the ‘true’causesandself‐interestsofrulers,onthe ‘state’asaanabstractunity,and,

subsequently,broughtforththevogueterminologyofreasonofstate,ofwhichhemadefrequent

                                                            129SuchaccusationsremainedpartofuniversalmonarchypropagandaagainstPhilip IIand lateragainstLouisXIV.Bosbach, ‘TheEuropeandebateonuniversalmonarch’,89,95‐96;Lazzeri,168 footnote1examplesofdefences forFrench anti‐Habsburgspolicy inFrenchpublications from the1620s, but also theFrench translationofBoccalini’sfamouswork,Lapierredetouchepolitiqueof1626andGabrielNaudé’sconsiderations.130 Conal Condren has reported the wide range of accusations of ‘tyranny’ for seventeenth‐century England andpointedtoacertainsubordinateaccusation, tracingbacktoPlatonicpleonexia,whichmeantenslavingoneself to ‘adisorderingofthesoul,manifestedbyalicentiousgrasping,rapacity’thatultimatelyleadstoviolenceandcrueltyandthe enslavementofothers, i.e. unrestricted corruption.This fearof ‘licentious rapacity and systematic interferencewith others’ became embedded in the literature triggeredby the French religiouswars and in debates concerningCharles I’s shipmoney taxof the1630s.ConalCondren, ‘TheUsesofTyranny, andLiberty inSeventeenth‐CenturyEngland’ Louis Green Lecture on IntellectualHistory and the Social history of Ideas for 2013 (Melbourne, MonashUniversity:AncoraPress,2014),1‐31,quotedfrom10,11.131 JoséJavierRuizIbáñezandGaetanoSabatini, ‘MonarchyasConquest:Violence, SocialOpportunity, andPoliticalStabilityintheEstablishmentoftheHispanicMonarchy’,TheJournalofModernHistory81:3(2009),501‐536.132 In the Black Legend‐literature, the Spanish were depicted as heathen and demonic, and King Philip II wasportrayedassinful,ambitiousandgreedy,asatyrantenslavingsubjectswhereverheruled,evenmorecruellythantheOttomans.InbothFrenchandDutchpamphletstheconfessionaldifferencesbetweentheProtestantandCatholicpartieswere camouflaged. Conversely, the Spanishwere depicted as non‐Christian and demonic derivatives of thebarbaricMoors. The universal claim of the Spanish tyrannywas dramatically portrayed by their dealingwith theAmericanIndiansinthebooksofLasCasas,especiallypopularintheDutchRepublic,wheretheyweretranslatedThemirroroftheSpanishtyrannyintheWestIndiesorAshortaccountofthedestructionoftheIndies(1606).OnFrenchBlack Legend literature Judith Pollmann, ‘ Eine natürliche Feindschaft: Ursprung und Funktion der schwarzenLegende über Spanien in den Niederlanden, 1560‐1581’ in Franz Bosbach (ed.), Feindbilder: die Darstellung desGegners inderpolitischenPublizistikdesMittelaltersundderNeuzeit (Köln [etc.]: Böhlau 1992), 73‐93. For FrenchBlack Legend literature read pages 84‐87, and for Dutch pamphlets read pages 88‐92; Van Gelderen, ‘UniversalMonarchy’,56.133 Lazzerri,De l’intérêt des princes et les Etats chrétienté, 168, footnote 1 examples of defences for French anti‐HabsburgspolicyinFrenchpublicationsfromthe1620s,butalsotheFrenchtranslationofBoccalini’sfamouswork,Lapierredetouchepolitiqueof1626andGabrielNaudé’sconsiderations.134ConalCondren,‘TheUsesofTyranny’.

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use in his writings. During the 1620s and 1630s, Rohan faced resurgent Catholicism, the

incredible rise inpowerof theSpanish‐Habsburgs, thedebatesbetween thedévots andbonne

Françaisoverforeignpolicy,domesticreformandthepersecutionofhisco‐religionists,andthe

subsequentfocusonthe‘true’reasonofstatebehindtheprincelypoliticsinthecontemporary

constellationofEuropeanwarfare.Againstthisbackground,exiledandinneedforaprestigious

office, Rohan wrote De l’interest and handed it over to Cardinal Richelieu in 1634. The ex‐

military Huguenot leader proposed costly, grand scale warfare against Habsburg‐Spain,

defendingtheconstructionofawarmachineforFrance,whileimplicitlycriticisingtheSpanish

monarchybyaccusationsofunrestrictedtyrannicalcontrolinthenameofreligion,hiddenunder

hisseeminglyobjectiveinterestanalysisofEuropeanprincesandtheirsocieties.

2.3Satirebyinterestanalysis:SpanishunrestrictedtyrannyandFrenchpatrioticunity

Directlyafterhisassertionof interest rulingprincesand the irrelevanceofclassicalhistory to

interpret interest of state, Rohan declared that the Bourbon‐French and Habsburg‐Spanish

dynastieswere the two great powers in Christendom. They functioned as opposite poles and

consequentlydecidedthefaithoftheotherprincesintheEuropeantheatreofwar.Accordingto

Rohan, the secret design of Habsburg‐Spain was to further their advancement towards

establishingasupremelypowerfulandgrandnewmonarchy.However,Rohanstated that this

designcouldnolongerbehidden:

‘This[Power]ofSpainefindingitselfeaugmentedallatonce,hathnotbeeneable

toconcealethedesignesheehadtomakeherselfeMistresse,andcausetheSunne

ofanewMonarchietoriseintheWest.’135

Being the opposite pole of Spain, Bourbon‐France attempted to counterpoise this Spanish

design,butasitbecomescleartothereader,thiswasnotundertakeneffectively.Rohanclaimed

that ‘interest (as it hath beene well or ill followed) hath caused the ruine of some, or the

greatnesseofothers’136and,therefore,hewoulddescribethe‘trueinterest’ofBourbon‐France

andHabsburg‐Spainand thoseof theother rulerswhoseemed tobedependenton these two

greatdynastiesfortheirprotection.Inthesecondparthewouldshowthroughrecenthistorical

caseshowrulershadbadlymisunderstoodordepartedfromthetrueinterestoftheirstatesby

followingtheirpassions,superstition,prejudiceorpersonalinterests,orhadbeenmisguidedby

                                                            135Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,2.136Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,2.

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their corrupted ministers. Behind this seemingly objective and secular interest analysis of

European ‘states’ lieshissatiricaccountof the interestof theSpanishmonarchy: itsdesire for

establishing a ‘new monarchy’, a tyrannical control predominantly by dissimulating piety,

backedbyahighlydevelopedmachineryofwarandintelligence.Thisinterestanalysisenabled

him to implicitly criticise Habsburg‐Spain and to forge a patriotic unity for France by

sidesteppingpotentiallydivisivequestionsofconfessionalintegrity.

2.3.1‘TheinterestofSpaine’

OnthebasisofhisinterestanalysisofeveryEuropeanrulerandregime,Rohanclaimedthatthey

allshouldfeartheconcealed‘designe’ofHabsburg‐Spaintoestablisha‘newMonarchie’,which

only could be opposed by the French monarchy taking up arms.137 Consequently, he starts

l’Interestwith ‘the interestof Spaine’.Heopenedwithemphasising theexcellent geographical

position of the Spanish monarchy, being ‘the head of Europe’ and protected by its natural

boarders(theOcean,theMediterraneanSeaandthePyrenees)while‘somanyStatesspreadin

diversepartsoftheworld’depended‘uponthisgreatCountrysowellsituated.’Hecontinuesby

referring to the late King Philip II, who ‘attempted to extend this vast power to the top of

greatnesse.’HeironicallypraisedPhilip’sstatesmanship:

‘Philip King of Spaine (…) (finding himselfe lesse fitt for warre then ciuill

businesses)judgedthatMonarchiesgotasitwereinpost,bythevalourofwarlike

Princes,arenotoflikecontinuanceasthosewhichtheygetbyestablishinghagood

Counsell,andwhicharefoundedvpongoodmaximes.’138

Rohanused,withoutreference,Machiavelli’sfamousargumentthatconqueredpolitiesthatare

accustomedtolivingundertheirownlawsaredifficulttomaintainbecauselesscourageousmen

often succeed ‘these great Conquerrours’ and the conquered citizens tend not to forget their

oncebeloved‘libertie’.139Machiavellistatesthattheconquerorcouldsetupanindirectruleand

allowthemto liveunder theirown laws,butbelieves itmoreefficient to live therehimselfor

destroy thesepolities, scatter the inhabitantsorcreate internaldivisions.140Rohanunderlined

                                                            137Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,2.138Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,4.With‘asitwereinpost’Rohanreferstomonarchiesfoundedbythebelligerentspiritoftheruler.139Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,5.140NiccolòMachiavelli,ThePrince,ChapterV,‘Howcitiesorprincipalitiesshouldbegovernedthatlivedbytheirownlaws before theywere occupied’ [translated and edited by Peter Bondanellawith an introductionMaurizio Viroli](OxfordUniversityPress:NewYork2005),19‐20;‘Forinfact,thereisnosecuremeansofholdingontocitiesexceptbydestroyingthem.Anyonewhobecomesmasterofacityaccustomedtolivinginlibertyanddoesnotdestroyitmay

39

this counsel in believing that the once free citizens ‘are easily carried to any change, seeing

themselues deliuered from the feare of him that had subjected them’.141 However, Rohan

emphasisedthatPhilipwasperhapsnotawarriorprince,buthewasatruestatesmanandsohe

‘chooseacoursemostagreeabletohisimpenetrablehumour,thatis,toprosecutehisdesignes

vnderaprofounddissimulation.’142MostcontemporaryreaderswouldhaveunderstoodRohan’s

implicitreferencetoinfamousMachiavellianpowerpoliticsandtheimperativeofconcealingthe

truth.143ThereadermayconcludethattheSpanishrulewasestablishedbyconquest,oppositeto

the rule of law, seeing ‘that these great Conquerrours, (…) thinke onely of vanquishing, and

extendingtheirdominions,andnotof foundingLawesfortheirsubsistence’,144andthat itwas

maintainedthroughacalculateduseofdissimulation,andthereforeencompassedanunjustrule.

RohancontinuedthissatiricpictureofPhilipIIbystatingthat

‘he fixed the seatofhisdominion inSpaine, thathemight from thence conuiegh

warmth to the members loosened from his body, and might with more ease

(conseruingpeacebyhispresence)troublealltherestofEurope.’145

Furthermore,Philip’sstatecrafthadresulted in thegrowthof theSpanishmonarchy tosucha

greatextentthathissuccessorshadeasilycarriedonhisplansforuniversalhegemony.146This

picture functions as awarning for France, not only against the dangers of being absorbed by

Spanishrapacitybutalso,onceconquered,ofnotbeingabletooverthrowtheSpanishuniversal

tyrant. Rohan’s use of ‘domination’ (also in original French text) may refer to ‘rule’, but is

additionally suggestive of the Latin dominatus, a term in the ambit of tyranny and universal

monarchy.147 This negative association of ‘dominion’ with universal aspirations, seeking an

unrestrictedmastershiporlordshipoverothersovereigns,stoodincontrastwithRohan’soutcry

to protect the ‘liberties of Christendome’. This argumentation of ‘liberties’ endangered by an

aspiringuniversalmonarchwasanintegralpartinaccusationsofuniversalmonarchyfromthe

timeofCharlesVtotheageofLouisXIV.Furthermore,aswewillseeinthefollowingchapters,

                                                                                                                                                                                          expecttobedestroyedbyit,becausesuchacityalwayshasasarefugeinanyrebellionthenameof libertyanditsancientinstitutions,neitherofwhichiseverforgotteneitherbecauseofthepassingoftimeorbecauseofthebestowalof benefits. And it matters very little what one does or foresees, since if one does not separate or scatter theinhabitants,theywillnotforgetthatnameorthoseinstitutions.’141Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,2.142Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,4,5.143Rohan,Del’intérêtdesprincesetlesEtatschrétienté,164.144Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,5.145Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,5.Notethathere,Rohanacknowledgedthepotentialdifficultlyrulingsuchadynasticagglomerate,underlinedtheheterodoxcharacterofearlymodernSpain,i.e.‘tothemembersloosenedfromhisbody’,whatJohnMorrillhasdescribedas‘dynasticagglomerate’.146Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,5.147Bosbach, ‘TheEuropeandebateonuniversalmonarch’,92;DominatuswastheLatinrenderingfortheNeoLatin‘despotism’.Ontheseventeenthcenturyreappearanceoftheterm‘despot’anditsderivativesinattacksonprincelyruletoindicateahouseholdrule,readthefollowingchapteronDelaCourt.

40

particularlywithDelaCourtandValkenier,thisargumentationwouldbedevelopedintoattacks

onprincelyruletoindicateahouseholdrulemodelledonrobberybyconquest;princeswho,to

finance their endless desire for warfare, robbed their subjects of their lives, livelihoods and

liberties,eventuallyenslavingthem.

Rohandistinguishedfive‘maximes’whichtheSpanishinterestembodied:1)religion,i.e.

falselyupholdingagreatzealfortheCatholicfaith;2)acquiringsecretintelligenceaboutcurrent

affairs in other ‘states’ by ambassadors, monks and priests and by bribery of counsellors of

foreignprinces;3)signing(secret)treaties,feigningstrivingforpeace,strikingotherdynasties

when they least expect it, and acting as mediator between other princes in conflict; 4)

maintaining a constant state of armament to repress their own subjects, to intimidate other

princes, to oppose enemy plans and to surprise enemy princes; 5) carefully sustaining its

reputation,whichisdependentuponthefirstfourmaxims.148Thesefivemaximswerepresented

asrecommended techniques, carefullyanalysed,bywhichHabsburg‐Spaincouldmaintainand

extenditsdominion.Eachofthesemaximshasexplicitreferencetodissimulationoroppression,

andby the applicationof them,Rohanwas able to construe allHabsburg‐Spain’s policies and

conductasonegreatevilstrategy,consequentlyhyperbolepassesforsimpleanalysis.

Religionwas Spain’s firstmaxim, its key principle in obtaining universal dominion by

politicsofdissimilation.Rohanunderlined thecontroversialMachiavellianandTacitist ideaof

the instrumentaluseof religion.Without anydisclaimerormoral justification thatonewould

expect,Rohanstated:

‘ThefirstisgroundedvponReligion,asthatwhichforconsciencesakedoesmake

peoplevndertakeanything.’149

Under their proclaimed zeal for Catholicism, Spanish rulers and their agents ought to seek

supportfromthePopetostrengthenitspowerandstirupconflictsinothercountriestodestroy

them from within. Rohan counselled that the Spanish monarchy should incite civil war by

stimulatingopenly theFrenchcrowntopersecute itsProtestantsubjectsbutat thesametime

secretly supporting the rebellious groups amongst the Protestants.With the English King he

ought tomake peace in order to protect his possessions in the Indies and to infiltrate in the

realm by setting up Jesuits schools, giving free education to boys in the Catholic religion and

training themtobecomemartyrs for theSpanishmonarchyagainst theirownEnglishking. In

the Holy Roman Empire, with its powerful Protestant princes, the Spanish ruler ought to

maintain the Austrian branch of the Habsburg dynasty ‘as the sole bullwarke against the

                                                            148Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,7‐12.149Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,6.

41

Protestants, and he should augment it from their spoyles, vnder pretence of Religion, and a

desire thereby todefendChristendomeagainst theTurks.’150 In theSwiss cantons, theSpanish

ruler ought to keep Catholics in such a high distrust of their Protestant neighbours that

differencesmightmorereadilybeexploitedtoSpain’sadvantage.IntheUnitedProvinces,Spain

oughttoprovokeasocietalschism.

AlthoughRohanconstantlywrote‘heought’,forthereaderitwasimmediatelyclearthat

hewastalkingaboutactualrecentevents,suchastheSpanishsupportfortheHuguenotgroups

duringtheFrenchReligiousWarsand likewise forCatholicgroups incertainSwisscantonsas

themuchfoughtoverValtellinepasses.Similarly,thiscounselcouldbewitnessedintheSpanish

involvement in the Thirty Year’sWar on the side of theHabsburgs emperors and during the

religious and political upheavals of the Twelve Year’s Truce in the Dutch Republic (1609–

1621).151Theunstatedbackgroundofeventsmarshalledthroughtheuseofmaximswouldhave

been familiar to readers; it constitutes a form of aposiopesis ‐leaving silent an obvious or

inevitableconclusion,a rhetorical restraint froma totalunmaskingof theenemy.At thesame

time,Rohan’spreferenceforanimperativeidiom,whatoughttobedoneinthetrueinterestsof

Habsburg Spain, was a less objective analysis than a form of Devil’s advocacy ‐a pretence of

honestcounselinordertoexposeandcondemn.

RohandevotedfewerpagestotheotherfourmaximsoftheSpanishinterest,intelligence,

negotiation of treaties, permanent armament and reputation. Compared to the maxim of

religion, thesedescriptionswerenotclarifiedby indirectexamplesofpolitiesthattheSpanish

monarchy recently had disrupted. Nevertheless, these four recommended techniques all

encompassed, although not explicitly stated, calculated political action of dissimulation, by

which, andagainRohan let the reader conclude this, theSpanishmonarchywould attempt to

bring down the European polities, and force themunder its tyrannical rule. The thirdmaxim

(negotiation of treaties) dictates that the Spanish ruler ‘must allway shewe a desire of peace,

therebytocastothersasleepe,andinthemeanetimepreparehimselfetowarre,fortosurprise

thevnprouided.’152Furthermore, theSpanishmonarchyought toactas ‘IudgeorArbitrator’ in

conflictsbetweenotherprincesforthesolereasontodividethem,andconsequentlytoconquer

themall;‘incensingthem(ifhecan)insteadofappeasingthem,consentigwiththeonetodiuide

thespoilesoftheother,andvponthediuisiondispossessebothtwo.’153Aconstantstateoffull

armament, i.e. the fourth maxim, was to construct a reputation of invincibility towards the

Spanishsubjectsaswellalneighbouringprincesandtoattackthelatterbysurprise.Rohanalso

recommended evil secret strategies in Spain’s second maxim on obtaining intelligence ‘by

                                                            150Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,8.151Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,6‐9.152Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,9‐10.153Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,10.

42

meanesofEmbassadours,aspersonstowardswhomrespect isborne.LikewisebyMonkesand

Preachersthathauegreatpowerintheirpulpitsandalsoinparticularfamilies’.Anothermeans

wasbuyingconfidentsandbribingforeignministersorprinces.Forthosewhowerefoundtoo

faithfultobebought,theSpanishmonarchyoughtto‘ruinetheminanywisehowsoeuer.’154The

(unstated)Spanishunrestrictedtyrannicalrulewaspractisedbydivide‐and‐conquerstrategies

hiding behind a careful constructed reputation as guarantor of peace and defender of the

Catholicfaith.

Rohan added ‘reputation’ as the lastmaxim that depended on the first four, but as he

stated ‘neuerthelesse being simply considered, it establisheth a fifthmaxime,wherebySpaine

gainethasmuch,asbyanyoftherest.’155Asmostreasonofstateauthors,156Rohanunderlined

theimportanceforarulerofmanaging‘opinion’amongstsubjectsaswellasforeignprincesand

theirsubjects,becauseitcouldcommandaweandfear,andthereforemaintainandexpandtheir

‘state’.Thefirstmaximofreligion,oftheSpanishrulerpresentinghimselfasthetrueprotector

oftheCatholicfaith,isfurtheredbyarepresentationofdevoutpietythatconstructsapowerful

reputation,recommendedinthisfifthmaxim;

‘Consideringthattheopinionconceiuedofthegreatzeale forthemaintenanceof

theCatholickeReligion,couerswiththecloakeofpietie,allherotherdesignes,and

holdsthepeopleinawonderfullawe.’157

BesidesSpain’spromotionofpietyandtheCatholicfaith,otherprincesandtheirsubjectsfeared

theSpanishmonarchyfortheir‘profoundintelligences’,their‘prudentdexteritie,(knowinghow

to advantage herself in Treaties)’ and ‘estate of her armes’.158 The Spanish rulers built their

reputationupontheseprudentmaxims.RohanconcludedhisaccountoftheSpanishinterestby

warning the readerof thenatureof the Spanish reputation; ‘Fromall these things results the

reputationofSpaine.Herinterestis,tomanagewellthispietie.’159ThedesignsofHabsburg‐Spain

weremuchgreaterthanthoseofotherrulersandthereforetheSpanishrulershadtobeextra

careful inmanaging their reputation, counselledRohan ironically.160The readerhad toderive

from this counsel that the Spanish monarchy illicitly treated religion as a mere political

instrument to cover up its rapacity in acquiring universal domination. Rohan ended his

discourseontheSpanishinterestwithhishopeforconvincinglyunveilingtheSpanishdesignsto

                                                            154Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,9.155Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,11.156Malcolm,ReasonofState,104;Höpfl,‘OrthodoxyandReasonofState’,234.157Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,11.158Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,11.159 Rohan,ATreatiseof the Interestof thePrincesand StatesofChristendome, 12;Henri de Rohan,De l’intérêtdesprincesetlesEtatschrétienté,18,‘sonintérêtestdebienménagercettepiété.’160Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,12.

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aidthedownfallof itsmonarchy: ‘Thishuge framecomposedofsomanyparts,andas itwere

incumberedwithitsowneweight,mouesbyitssecretsprings,whichloosetheirforceeuenas

theyarediscouered.’161

Thatisnottoarguethat‘interest’wasmerelyofinstrumentalvalue.Asexplainedabove,

Rohanwroteoninterestbeforeandhisoeuvrewasimbuedwith‘interest’ascategorytodiscuss

political action.162 This disregard ofmoral, religious and legal considerations in unveiling the

‘trueinterest’oftheSpanishruler(dissimulatingpietyandazeal forCatholicism),exemplified

bytrueevents,istoturninteresttosatiriceffect:inlinewiththegenreofcriticalcurrent‐affairs

commentary, he simultaneously seeks to build on the credibility and exploit the disreputable

connotationsofreasonofstate.

2.3.2‘TheinterestofFrance’

Rohandeliberately and explicitlydefined the true interestofFrance in opposition toSpain. It

followsthattherightcourseforFrance’sdynasticpolicywasabelligerentanti‐Spanishandpro‐

Protestantpolicy.RohanstartedhisanalysisoftheFrenchinterestwithageographicalposition

ofthelandsoftheFrenchmonarchy.HeclaimedthatSpainwasthenaturalenemyofFrance:

‘FrancebeingseatedbetweenetheAlpesandthePyreneanmountaines,andflanked

by two seas, seemes to be inuited by nature to oppose it selfe against the

proceedings of this puissant Neighbourhood. For shee appeares like a banke

against this torrent, and the opportunitie of her situation is such, that sheemay

hinder thedistributionof thehead to themembers of theMonarchiewhichdoes

oppugneher.’163

France dispatched the head of the Spanish political body from its members by which Rohan

indirectly referred to the Spanish Low Countries, its Italian possessions and the dynastically

related lands of the Holy Roman Empire. The hindrance of France for the Spanish dynastic

agglomerate was, however, ‘not sufficient’ to oppose the Spanish design to universal

monarchy.164ThereforeRohanstatedthat‘theinterestofFranceis,totakeallthecounter‐course

                                                            161 Rohan,ATreatiseof the Interestof thePrincesand StatesofChristendome, 12;Henri de Rohan,De l’intérêtdesprinceset lesEtatschrétienté,19, ‘Cettegrandemachine composéesde tantdepartieset commeempêchéede sonproprepoidss’émeutparcessecretsressortsquiperdentleurforceàmesurequ’ilssontdécouverts.’162Salmon,‘Rohanandtheinterestofstate’,121‐140;Dewald,Status,power,andidentityinearlymodernFrance,73.163Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,13.164Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,13.

44

(toimpeachallsheemayherdesignes)bymaximes,whichweecomenowdeliueruntoyou.’165

In stark opposition to his ironic praising of Philip II, Rohan heralded the lateHuguenot King

HenryIVfor‘havingbettervnderstoodthem[maximes]thenanyotherbeforehim,(…)hefirst

confirmed the true interest of France, which is to thwart or counterpoint Spaine in all these

points.’166 From all this, the reader should conclude that the current French King, Louis XIII,

should oppose Habsburg‐Spain by its own maxims. Citing Henry as an exemplum for Louis

personifies thediminutionof confessionaldifferenceandsuggestsadynastic thread to tie the

‘trueinterest’oftheFrench ‘state’together,asCollinsarguedthattheFrenchkingbecamethe

source of the newly constructed fictive unity of the French ‘state’, justified in terms of its

‘interestofstate’.167

Regardingitsfirstmaxim,theFrenchmonarchyoughttoshowallCatholics‘thevenome

hidden vndes the same’, i.e. under the Spanish zeal for Catholicism the Spanish monarchy

persecutedProtestantsforitsownadvantage.SimilarlytoRichelieu’sinterestargumentationfor

ananti‐Habsburgpolicy,Rohanclaimedthat theauthorityof thepope ‘neverhasmore lustre,

thenwehen thepowerof theChristianPrincesandstates isballanced’.168Thegreatdifference

betweenRohan’sandtheCardinalRichelieu’defencesforananti‐Habsburgpolicywasthefact

thatRohandidnotpresentitasaprincipalCatholicduty;andfurthermore,hepaintedratheran

evil picture of the Spanish motives for persecuting Protestants: ‘to let the Court of Rome

vnderstand that the hopes which Spaine giues her to augment her treasures by the ruine of

Protestants, is not but to further her designe towards theMonarchie’.169 From this the reader

might infer that not only did the Spanishmonarchy persecute Protestants solely for political

gain,butthatalsothePopehadbeendupedintoservingSpain’sinterest.AsRohanwarned:‘the

PopemustbecomeherServant’.170ThustheSpanishdesireforuniversalmonarchyconstituteda

political and military hegemony, and not at all a spiritual one. Secondly, the reader would

understandthattheFrenchmaximofreligionconstitutedessentiallyanecessarydefenceofthe

ruleoflawinallChristianpolities,CatholicandProtestant.BesidesconvincingotherCatholicsof

Spain’s religious pretexts, the Frenchmonarchy should assure Protestant rulers and regimes

that it was not intent on persecuting their Protestant subjects, but rather converting them.

Moreover, the French monarchy should communicate its willingness to support Protestant

rulersandregimes‘freelyagainstallthosethatwouldtroubleorchangeanythingintheirStates

                                                            165Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,13.166Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,14.167Collins,TheStateinEarlyModernFrance,xxii‐xxiii.168Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,14.169Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,14.170Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,14.

45

andliberties.’171Withoutnamingtheseenemies,thereaderwouldhaveknownimmediatelythat

RohanmeantHabsburgSpain.

Interestingly, the following three maxims of France, i.e. intelligence, diplomacy and

armament, constituted the equivalent of the Spanish ones in terms of contents. However, the

language throughwhich theFrenchmaxims areput forward ishardly asnegativenordoes it

containsinstructionsofdeepdeceitandoppressiveviolence,butratherdoesitstatedefensive

violence,tofightviolencewithviolence.RohanadvisedFrancetoinvestinastrongnetworkof

‘spiesandpensioners’toattaindetailedandaccurateknowledgeofthecurrentpoliticalaffairs

across Europe, to construct new alliances and ultimately to block the Spanish methods of

intelligence at everyEuropean court. Rohanoffered the same advice for the thirdmaxime: ‘it

oughtnottobesuffered,thatSpainemeddleinanyTreatie,butthatFrancealsostepbetweenon

herpart.’ He stressed thegrave importanceofmeddling in Italianaffairs to counterpoise the

almostprevailingstandingofSpainthere.Heindirectlyreferredtothenecessityofmaintaining

theAlpinepassesoftheValtellineforsurvivalofthewholeofEurope: ‘oneport toenterthere

[Italie],whichsheeought tokeepe,euenso longassheewillopposetheothersgreatnesse’.172

LikewiseconcerningthefourthmaximofFranceRohanwrote:‘Thereoughttobeopposedforce

toforce.Forneitherperswasions(sic.),northeIusticeofarmswillawehimthatsarmed.’173

Especially the last maxim shows a rather cynical and pessimistic view of politics

presentinghisbelief that to survive theEuropeanmilitarycompetition,oneshouldbeheavily

furnishedwithtroopsandarms.Thus,theCrownoughtnottofinancetheenemiesofHabsburg‐

SpainnortoattempttocontrolthepassagesbetweenthedifferentpartsoftheSpanishempire,

but,inlinewiththeargumentofthebonsFrançais,shouldinvestaswellinheavilyarmedFrench

troopstoopposeHabsburg‐Spainonthebattlefield;

‘So as that France ought to cutt off all vnnecessarie expences, and be allwaies

powerfully armed, hauing sufficiently to doe the same, without borrowing

elsewheresoldiers,munitionandmoney.’174

UnfortunatelyRohandidnotfeeltheneedtoexplainexactlywhichbudgetcutsFranceoughtto

implement,buthemayhavebeenalluding tocrippling interest rates fromwardebts thathad

weakenedtheFrenchCrowninthe1620s.175HeendedhisaccountoftheinterestofFranceby

arguing that the first fourmaximswould harm the reputation ofHabsburg‐Spain and elevate

thatofFrance.So,whilesatirisingSpainforitsMachiavelliantechniques,heofferedtheFrench                                                            171Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,14.172Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,15‐16.173Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,16.174Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,16.175Collins,RepublicanismandtheStateinlatemedievalandearlymodernFrance(forthcoming).

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monarchyacounselon‘statecraft’ofalmostthehighestlevel,convincedthatFrancecouldonly

survive the European war competition in this way. This would lead to France opposing the

Spanishinterestofcarefullymanagingitsreputationofthemostpiousmonarchy,bygainingthe

reputation‘asthebullwarkeofChristianlibertie.’176

In presenting a ‘true interest of France’ in fierce opposition to the ‘interest’ of the

Spanishmonarchy,Rohanattemptedtocreateasenseofcollectivelysharedpoliticalaims.Such

aninterestoverruledconflictinginterestsofHuguenotsandCatholicswithinthe‘state’.Bythis,

Rohan,theHuguenotnoblemanandex‐militaryofficer,couldpresenthimselfasafully‐fledged

memberoftheFrenchmonarchy,defendarelativetolerationtowardsHuguenotsandattackthe

Catholic Spanishmonarchy. InRohan’sDe l’Interest the ‘state’ as apersona ficta is not clearly

witnessed, yetwedo find themore commondefinition for state as the political standing of a

ruler. Thepolitical actionswere still undertakenbyprinces, notprinces as representatives of

statesaslegalpersonsasbecomesclearintheintroduction:‘toconsiderwelltheinterestofthe

Princesof this time’, that is ‘thehowses (sic.) ofFranceandSpaine’ and the ‘otherPrinces’.177

Moreover as argued in the introduction, speaking of a ‘Spaine’ and a ‘France’ was a useful

shorthand for rulers and did not symbolised the existence of institutionalised bureaucratic

states.For instanceRohanwrote: ‘AndthoughallPrinceshold forageneralmaxime, that they

should carefully conserve their reputation, Spaineought to (..).’ ‘Spaine’ refers to the Spanish

king.YetRohanrecognisedtheexistenceof,whatJohnMorrilhascalled,dynasticagglomerates

composedofdifferentmemberseachwithitsownlegalandpoliticalsystem.178Consequently,he

alsowroteaboutthetrueinterestsofprincesandstatesofEurope:‘whenthepowerofChristian

PrincesandStates isballanced’; ‘and theotherChristianPrincesandStates’.179 It couldbe that

here Rohan rather referred to princes and other prevailing regimes or particular forms of

governmentasrepublics.Moreover, itseemsthatRohanalsoreferredtostatesasthepolitical

dominionof the ruler in linewithBotero: ‘in their [‘ProtestantPrinces]States and liberties.’180

Apartfromstateasthepoliticaldominion,Rohanmayalsohaveusedthewordstatetoreferto

areasoverwhicharulerought toexercisecontrol,combinedwithmeansof thiscontrol.State

canevenrefertoabodypolitic,inwriting:

‘WilliamofNassauPrinceofOrange,whoalone in thisAgehad thehonour to founda

State, [..]wasconstrained toassemble thepeeces for tocomposeabodie thereof,with

                                                            176Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,16.177Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,2.178Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,12;JohnMorrill,‘ThinkingabouttheNewBritish History’, in David Armitage (ed.), British Political Thought in History, Literature and Theory (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006),44‐45.179Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,14,16‐17.180Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,15.

47

suchconditionsaseachTowneandProuincerequired.Forhauingmetwithpeoplethat

haue euer affected their libertie more then their very liues, he could not alter the

conditionswhereupontheyfirstjoynedthemseluesvntohim.’181

Over all, the variation in Rohan’s usage provides little evidence to justify toDe l’interest the

notionofthestateasalegalpersondistinguishablefrombothrulerandruled.

AfterunveilingthetrueinterestofSpainthatRohanstatedoughttobeopposedinevery

maximbyFrance,hetreatedthe interestsof ‘states’ thatwere linkedtotheSpanish‐Habsburg

dynastyeitherbyalliancesorbywarfare.SoFrance’sinterestwasfollowedupby‘theInterestof

the Princes of Italie’, ‘the interest of the Sea of Rome’ and ‘the Interest of Germanie’, and he

ended his first partwith ‘the interest of the Swisses and of the United Provinces of the Low

Countries’and‘theinterestofEngland’.182Fortheargumentofthischapteritsufficestosaythat

Rohan presented England as the balancing party between Spain and France, a counsel that

recurred inmany later interest analyses such as the one by Valkenier. Every interference of

SpainintheItalianpolitiesoughttobehinderedforfearofFrance’sencirclement.Inlinewith

Richelieu’sreasonofstateargumentsRohanbelieved thePapalStates tobe thebeneficiaryof

anti‐Habsburgs policy; and he treats them in a way at one with the Gallican defence of an

independentFrenchChurchasapoliticalentity.RegardingtheHolyRomanEmpire,thegreatest

threat to its ‘libertie’,183 was the Austrian branch of the Spanish‐Habsburgs, who made the

imperial crown de facto hereditary and was determined to usurp the entire empire under

Habsburg rule. The Swiss Confederation and the Dutch Republic served as two arms of the

Empire,bothwerefearedbyothers,andweredefendersofliberty(theSwissasmercenariesfor

othersand theDutchasdefendersof theirown liberty).Bothareprosperous, since theSwiss

haveenriched themselvesbypeaceand theDutchby thecontinuanceofwarfare.Eachshould

therefore ally itselfwith France against Spain. Rohan underlines the importance ofmoderate

confessionalpolicieswithinpolities, suchas theHolyRomanEmpire, theSwissConfederation

andtheDutchRepublic,forthesakeofsheersurvival.

2.3.3.Failedinterestmanagement:argumentfromhistory

                                                            181Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,85.182Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,‘oftheinterestofSpain’4‐12,‘ofFrance’13‐17,‘ofthePrincesofItalie’18‐21,‘oftheseaofRome’22‐25,‘oftheDukeofSavoy’22‐25,‘ofGermanie’26‐30;‘ofthe Suisses and of the united Prouinces of the Low‐Countries’ 31‐33, ‘of England’ 34‐37. Note that in the FrenchoriginaltexttheinterestoftheDukeofSavoyisdealttogetherwiththeinterestofthePope.183Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,26.

48

Thesecondpartofhisbookincludesasimilarsatiricalexaggerationofpoliciesandconductby

sidesteppingconfessionaldispute,tohidehiscriticismagainstSpainandtorefrainfromdirectly

criticisingFrenchpersecutionof theHuguenots.AsSalmonremarks,historianshavepaid less

attention to this second and larger part of the book.184 Herein, Rohan presented seven

discourses,whichrepresented‘principallaffairesagitatedinChristendomeforthespaceoffiftie

yeares past’ to illustrate the neglect of interest, established in the first part of the book. It

encompassesa‘mirrordevice’,185showingrulersthat‘inmatterofState’,theyshouldnotbeled

by‘inordinatedesires’,‘violentpassions’,norby‘superstitiousopinions’butbe:

‘guidedbyreasonaloe(sic.),whichoughttobetheruleofouractions,totheendthatby

suchexamples,weeseeing (as inamirrour) the faultesofothers,may therebybenefit

ourselues.’186

Thesediscoursessharplyshowcasethesymbioticrelationbetweendomesticpoliticaleventsand

foreignaffairsandviceversa,orhowforeignprinces,toprotecttheirinterestofstate,meddlein

domesticaffairsof,oraffairsbetweenothers.Historicalanalysisenabledadistinctionbetweena

domestic and international level, as Meinecke and Devetak argued. Moreover, instead of

disqualifying these princes by their lack of listed virtues (as inmirror‐of‐prince literature or

reason of state writings focusing on the moral person of the ruler), Rohan examines recent

historicalconflicts/crisesandclearlyoutlinesthefailedinterestmanagementoftheprincesand

factions involved. Princely success is founded upon following the ‘true interest’ of the entire

‘state’,insteadoftheprince’sprivatepassions,hislackofcertainvirtuesortheadvicegivenby

hiscouncillors.Byfocusingonthefeaturesoftheruler’ssocieties,hisrulevis‐à‐vishissubjects

and relationswithother regimes,Rohancouldarguehispro‐Protestantandanti‐Spanishcase

independent of the ruler or ‘any ethics of office’, as Collins and Walter have argued,187 and

consequentlytorefrainfromopenlycriticisingtheSpanishCrownaswellastheFrenchCrown

whilesimultaneouslypresentinghimselfasasupporteroftheFrench‘state’.

Thereaderwasofferedseeminglyneutralhistoricalanalyses,butineverydiscourse,the

Spanish monarchy emerged as the instigator or at least the supporter of conflicts, that had

damaged or brought down the European polities from within. The illustrative material was

designedtosupportthenecessityofanti‐HabsburgpolicyandofastablecivilorderforFrance

                                                            184Salmon,‘Rohanandtheinterestofstate’,139.185TermbyRyanWalterreferringtothemirror‐of‐princesliteraturefromwhichreasonofstatewritingsdeveloped.Walter,‘SlingsbyBethel’sAnalysisofStateInterests’,5.186Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,39.187 Condren, Argument and Authority in Early Modern England, 344; Walter, ‘Slingsby Bethel’s Analysis of StateInterests’,495.

49

acrossconfessionallines.188Anexcellentexampleofthistwofoldargumentisthefirstandoneof

thelongestdiscourses,abouttheformationoftheCatholicLeague.189Rohanexplainedthatthe

religiouswarsundertheruleoftheFrenchKingsFrancisII(1559‐1560)andCharlesIX(1560‐

1574)wereprincipallycausedbydynasticfragilityor‘theyouthofthesetwoPrinces’,190which

ledtorivalling interestgroups, i.e.QueenCatherinedeMediciagainsttheprincesof theblood

andsecondly,betweenthenoblehousesofDeGuiseandDeMontmorancy,seekingcontrolover

theCrown. Rohan led the reader to believe that confessional differenceswere subordinate to

these power struggles. As he summed up the series of confessional conflicts and monstrous

eventsinasinglediminishingsentence:

‘Likewise there was amongst them difference of Religion. The warres about Religion

weregreatandbloodie,andlastedeuentothedeathofCharlestheninth,andhisbrother

Henry the third succeeded him. He was of age capable to gouerne, he had goodly

qualities,andgauehopesofahappyReigne.’191

However, Henry III preferred to ‘plunge himselfe in idlenesse and pleasures, [rather] then to

reignewell.’ImmediatelyhereafterRohanintroducedthesecondHenry,DucdeGuise:‘aPrince

endowed with great qualities, and full of loftie thoughts’.192 Since Henri III and his brother,

FrancisdukeofAnjouandAlençon,didnotprovideanheirtothethroneand‘thefirstPrincesof

the blood’ professed Protestantism (referring to Henry de Bourbon), Henry de Guise saw

opportunity to ‘aspire vnto theRoyaltie, and to get thither,makes himselfe Protecteur of the

Catholikes, and thePersecutourof theProtestats’.193DewaldqualifiesRohan’sanalysisof (and

praisefor)HenrideGuiseas‘toshockeveryseventeenth‐centuryreader’andunderstandsitasa

productofhisMachiavellianpoliticalviews,194but it ratherconstitutesacriticalexaggeration,

                                                            188Moreover,mostdiscourses explicitly emphasised that since the Spanishpowerhad rose considerably, itwas inevery ruler’s interest, whether Catholic or Protestant tomaintenance of the balance of power between Spain andFrance,asRohancounselledfor‘Italie’andthePopeintheseconddiscourse,inthefourthandfifthdiscoursefortheDutchUnitedStatestocontinuetheirwarfareagainstSpainandforFrance,EnglandandtheGermanprincestoassisttheDutchtherein,andforFranceintheseventhdiscourseontheWaroftheMantuanSuccession(1628–31)againstHabsburg‐Spaindescribed‘TherevolutionofFrance’andconcludedinthelastsentenceofthebook‘thattheglorieoftheKing,thegreatnesseofhisState,andtheeminentreputationthathenowenjoyeth,willcontinueaslongasheshallremaineconstantinthisresolution.’Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,citedfrom127,firstdiscourse40‐57.189 Under the title ‘upon the affaire of the League.’ Rohan, A Treatise of the Interest of the Princes and States ofChristendome,40‐57.190Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,40.191Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,40‐41;Ladiversitédereligions’ymêla.Lesguerresdesreligionsfurentgrandesetsanglantesetdurèrentjusqu’àlamortdeCharlesIXetHenriIII.’192Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,41.193Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,41.194 Dewald, Status, power, and identity in earlymodern France, 75. Rohan’s analysis ‘treated plans of regicide andusurpation as expressions of lofty ambition and greatness of spirit; it praised a likely organizer of the St.Bartholomew’sDaymassacreofFrance’sProtestantnobles,aneventthathadtouchedRohan’sownfamilyandstillfrightenedProtestants throughoutEurope; and it presentedaCatholichero asmovedbypersonal ambition ratherthansincerefaith.TheaccountcriticizesGuiseonlyforhesitancyinexecutinghisplan.’

50

presenting Henry de Guise as the Machiavellian prince who evilly used religion for his own

personalgainandunscrupulously‘stirredupdiuerswarres’againsttheProtestants’195.Rohan’s

praiseforHenry’sgoodqualitiesshouldbeunderstoodasutterlyironic,whilehispraiseforhis

formerpatronHenrydeBourbon,thelegitimateheirofHenryII’s,wassimpleandclear:‘Kingof

Navarre, firstPrinceof theblood,Chiefof theProtestantspartieandaPrinceadornedwithan

heroïquevertue,successfullywageddiuerswarresinfauouroftheProtestants.’196

Themainsubjectofthisfirstdiscourse,theWaroftheThreeHenry’s(1587‐1589),was

explainedbytheirconflictinginterests:

‘TheKing tomaintaine his lawfull authoritie. TheDukeofGuise to possesse the Kings

place,andtheKingofNavarretohindertheKingofFrancehisruine,whichwasindeed

hisowne,andofhispartiewhichwasmadehimsubsistinreputation.’197

Hedescribes theevents, theassassinationsofHenrydeGuise,Henry IIIand thecoronationof

Henry IV,whoby the changing situationofhisoffice,quitshis formerly followed interestand

embraces the interest of the French ‘state’, which the reader should understand as proper

interest management, by placing his own factional interest under the interest of ‘state’ once

crownedKingofFrance.HenryIVwashoweverstillthwartedbytheLeague,butespeciallyby

the Spanish King Philip II, who did not acknowledge Henry’s kingship on the grounds of his

Protestant confession. The following pages Rohan devoted to Philip’s strategies to obstruct

Henry IV by supporting the League and Henry’s other enemies with subsidies and troops,

inciting the Pope to excommunicate Henry, even not stopping when Henry IV converted to

CatholicismandthePope,althoughformerelypoliticalreasons,acknowledgedHenryasKingof

France. Eventually Henry declared war against Philip, obtaining many successes for France,

which ended in the peace of Vervins signed in 1598, afterwhichPhilip soondied.198Again, a

seeminglysimpleinterestanalysiscoversRohan’scriticism,andthereadermustconcludethat

Philip’sactionsweresolelymotivatedbytheSpanishdesignforuniversalmonarchy,toconquer

the French monarchy by inciting civil war and factional conflicts. Rohan leaves silent this

inevitable conclusion, even when he writes quite cynically that Philip’s support for Henry’s

enemieswasmotivated‘nottoruinetheoneinsuchsort,asthattheothermightsubsistwithout

him,willingtoweariethemwhomhemaintained,totheendthattheyshouldbeconstrainedto

giuethemseluesvptohim’,or,regardingPhilippersuadingtheLeague‐noblestochooseanew

                                                            195Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,41.196Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,41‐41.197Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,42.198Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,43‐48.

51

Kingtowhomheofferedthehandofhisdaughter,‘SothatPhilipthoughtbythisdiscordtodraw

themtomakechoiceofhim.’199

InthelastpartofthediscourseRohanofferedthereaderinsightinto‘theinterestofthe

Princesinuelopedinthisaffaire,whatfaultestheythereincommitted,andwhatweretheeuents

thereof.’200 The princes involved in the War of the Three Henry’s were naturally the three

Henry’s,however,PhilipIIwasalsogivenaleadingrole.FirstRohanironicallypraisedPhilipfor

calculatinghisadvantageinchangingcircumstanceswhilecontinuing‘courageouslyhisdesigne’

almostasapredatorenclosingitsprey:

‘Nootherconsiderationdiuertethhimfromhisprofounddesigne,heholdsthatallwaies

couered vnder the vaile of Pietie, and of his great zeale to the Catholike Religion. He

trauelles there stepby stepwithoutbeing impatient through the lengthof theway, or

precipitatedthroughanyaccident.’201

Again,theanalysisofPhilip’sinterestmanagementsatirisedtheSpanishkingasapower‐hungry

tyrant,whose fault itwaswanting France entirely, instead of dividing themonarchy amongst

factionalLeague‐noblesafterthedeathofHenrydeGuise.Bysuchadistribution,Philip

‘couldmore easily reduce them [League‐nobles] to his ownewill. […] And afterwards

vpon thedifferences thatarewont tohappenbetweeneusurpers, itwouldhauebeene

farre more easie for him to gett by peece‐meale, what he would haue carried all at

once.’202

Rohan concluded this discourse by stressing the danger of letting in the Spanish enemy by

divisionwithintheFrenchmonarchy: ‘todiuidethismightieKingdome,thewhichbeingVnited,

doeseuerywhereimpeachtheamplificationofSpaine.’203

Theexperienceoftheshatteringsocietalconsequencesofthereligiouswarsandthesubsequent

establishmentofamainconfessionalidentityinpolitiesbroughtforth‘interestofstate’writings

from the1630s, such asRohan’spivotalDe l’interest, notper se reviewing suchmatters. This

should not be interpreted asmodern secularization or a diminution of religious controversy.

Rohansidesteppedconfessionalargumentsnotbecauseoftheirirrelevance,butbecauseoftheir

dangerous potency, especially in times of resurgent Catholicism. With De l’interest Rohan                                                            199Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,44,46.200Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,48.201Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,55.202Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,56‐57.203Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,57.

52

participated in contemporaryFrenchdebates about foreignpolicy anddomestic affairs, about

the extent of warfare (defensive or offensive), which enemy to fight and who was the best

candidatetoleadthetroops.Mostprobably,Rohan’spersonalinterestwastoreclaimanoffice

asamilitary leader,awishthatmightberealizedthroughdecisivewarfareagainstHabsburg‐

Spain.HepresentedEuropeasconsistingofrulersandtheirlands,fightingeachotherinawar

competition driven by understandings of their interests. A ruler’s standing in the military

constellationdeterminedpoliticalactions,certainlynotreligion,whichwasusedonlyasamere

political instrument as by Habsburg‐Spain, or could shape a certain political faction as the

Huguenots under Henry IV, being attacked by the noble house of De Guise in its search for

controlovertheCrown.

ThepraiseaccordedtoRohanforhisobjectivityisone‐dimensionalandmisleading,

overlookinganumberoffactorsashiscircumstancesandidiomofinterestreveal—notleasthis

own interest in not stirring confessional dispute in France, and assimilating that of Spain to

establishedpatternsofsatiricdenigration.

53

Chapter3Republicanismrevisited:reasonofstateand‘wardespotism’byPieterdelaCourt

In 1662, therewas outrage in TheNetherlands at the publication of Interest vanHollandofte

Hollands‐Welvaaren [Interest of Holland or Holland’s Wellbeing] that stated: ‘the people of

Holland[sc.theprovince,MK]couldnotencounteragreaterevilthantoberuledbyaMonarch,

PrinceorHead.’204ThisstatementwasdirectedagainsttheHouseofOrange,itsprincesbeingthe

historicalofficeholdersofthestadholderateintheRepublicoftheSevenUnitedProvinces.From

1650 until 1672 they were, however, excluded from this office by Holland and most other

provinces during the ‘First Stadholderless Era’, or the epoch of ‘True Freedom’ as some

contemporaries celebrated it.205 The anti‐Orangist polemic of Interest of Holland produced a

vigorous political controversy.206 Its blunt anti‐Orangism and fierce anti‐clericalism attracted

ridicule and rebuke; its author was condemned for his ‘false calumnies and adorned lies’,

‘hazardouswritings’,anddescribedasa ‘newbornDutchCromwellaliasLeidenQuaker’anda

mere‘favorite’ofJohandeWitt,thedefactoleaderofthecontestedstadholderlessregime.207

Pieter de la Courtwrote Interest vanHollandduring an Orangist revival in the Dutch

Republicat thebeginningof the1660s.TheStuartRestorationacross theNorthSeaandKing

Charles II’s support for his young nephewWilliam of Orange gave rise to high expectations

among the Dutch about the future prospects of an Orange‐stadholderate, backed by the

Stuarts.208

ThisimmediatecontextprovidesastarkcontrasttoPieter’shostilitytotheveryideaofa

statdholder;andindeed,thehistoriographyofthepoliticalthoughtoftheDelaCourtbrothers

has predominantly focused on their ‘republicanism’, representing it as ‘the first unequivocal

                                                            204V.D.H.,InterestvanHollandoftedeGrondenvanHollands‐Welvaren(Amsterdam,1662),Voor‐Reede[preface].205See Jonathan Israel,TheDutchRepublic ItsRise,GreatnessandFall,1477‐1806 (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1998),700‐726.206 Gerrit O. Klashorst, ‘ “Metten schijn vanmonarchie getempert” de verdediging van het stadhouderschap in departijliteratuur’1650–1686’, inHansW.Blomen IW.Wildenberg (eds.),Pieterde laCourt inzijn tijd (1680–1685)aspectenvaneenveelzijdigpublicist (Amsterdam:APA‐HollandUniversityPress, 1986), 93–136;ArthurWeststeijn,CommercialRepublicanismintheDutchGoldenAge.ThePoliticalThoughtofJohan&PieterdelaCourt(Leiden:Brill,2012),56‐58.207IngmarVroomen,TaalvandeRepubliek‐hetgebruikvanvaderlandretoriekinNederlandsepamfletten,1618‐1672(PhD dissertation, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2012), 203; Weststeijn, Commercial Republicanism, 3, 58‐59;HaeghsHof‐Praetje,ofte ’t samen‐spraeck tusscheneenHagenaer,Amsterdammer,endeLeyenaar.Op ende tegensdevalschecalumnienendeversierdeleugenenvanPieterlaCourt,gesteltinsijnalsoogenoemdeIntrestvanHollandendegronden van ’tHollandswelvaren (Leiden, 1662);Hollands Op‐Komst, of Bedenkingen op de schaadelyke Schriften,genaamtGrafelykeRegeeringeenInterestvanHollanduit‐gegevendoorV.D.H.tendienstevanalleliefhebersdiehetwareInterestvanHollandbeminnen(Leden,1662);J.C.,Deganschedistructievandennieuw‐geboorenHollantschenCromwelaliasLeydtschenQuaker,genaemt t’Intrest vanHollandt,oftegronden van ‘sHollantswelvaren (Schiedam, 1663); 'tLevenenbedrijfvanmr.JanvanOldenbarnevelt,over‐eengebraghtmetdatvanmr.JandeWit(1672).208SeeinparticularHelmerHelmers,TheRoyalistRepublicLiterature,Politics,andReligionintheAnglo‐DutchPublicSphere,1639–1660(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2015),233‐258.

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expression’ofDutchrepublicanism,209as‘commercial’210and‘radical’211republicanism,orclear‐

cut ‘anti‐monarchism’212 (unlike other, moderate defences of an Orange‐stadholderate). This

chapteraimstoshiftscholarlyattentiontoDelaCourt’suseoftheterminologyofreasonofstate

inarguingagainstmilitarybelligerenceandfinancialexpropriation.Indoingso,itquestionsthe

commonimageoftheexplicitorextremerepublicanismoftheDelaCourts.

This chapter argues the alleged ‘republicanism’ or ‘anti‐monarchism’ of De la Court

needs to be reinterpreted in terms of the new interpretative heuristic tool ‘war despotism’,

contemporarypolemicsattackinga systemof rule thatbypursuingcostlywarfare robbed the

citizens of their property and privileges, effectively enslaving them, polemics aswitnessed in

FranceandtheHolyRomanEmpire.213Aswillbemadeclear,Pieterarguedthatnewmonarchies

weredrivenbyaninterest,namelythepromotionofwarfareandthenecessaryimpoverishment

oftheirpeoples,contrarytotheinterestofasocietylikeHolland.

Fromthisfollowsthesecondargument,thattheInterestvanHollandisbetterseenasa

distinctvariationonthethemesenunciatedbyRohan.AsIhaveargued,Rohan’sunderstanding

of ‘interest’was developedwithin and from the casuistic and legitimating idiomof ‘reason of

state’.Reasonofstateentailedtheclaimthatincasesofnecessityrulershadroomtomanoeuvre

beyond the bounds of normal legal and moral constraints. This particularly applied to the

emergency circumstances brought forth by the intensification ofwarfare, that in the name of

interest allowed the rule of law to be put aside and finances raised by extraordinarymeans.

Starting in the 1630s, authors like Rohan, began to consider the characteristics of various

dynasticagglomerates, fromwhichallegedlyobjective ‘true interestsofstates’ofEuropewere

derived. Indoing so, theycoulddefendonepolitical factionasmost likely topursuea certain

‘foreign’ policy, consequently delegitimising another. From the 1650s onwards, such interest

analyses oftenwere complementedwith explicit criticism of princely coercion and sovereign

authority anddefences of the rule of law. For theEnglish case, the researchbyAlanHouston

                                                            209 Eco Haitsma Mulier, ‘The language of seventeenth‐century republicanism in the United Provinces: Dutch orEuropean?,’ in Anthony Pagden (ed.), The Languages of Political Theory in Early‐Modern Europe (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1999),179‐195,p.188.210Weststeijn,CommercialRepublicanism.211JonathanIsrael,Monarchy,Orangism,andRepublicanismintheLaterDutchGoldenAge,SecondGoldenAgeLecture(Amsterdam:AmsterdamsCentrumvoordeStudievandeGoudenEeuw,2004). Israelarguesonpage6thatDutchrepublicanism compared to the English variant was ‘more coherently radical, (…) more emphatically anti‐monarchical,anti‐hierarchicalandmoreconcernedwithequalitythanEnglishrepublicanism’.212WygerVelema,‘“ThataRepublicisBetterthanaMonarchy”:Anti‐MonarchisminEarlyModernDutch Political Thought’, in Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner (eds.), Republicanism: A Shared EuropeanHeritage.Volume I,RepublicanismandConstitutionalism inEarlyModernEurope (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),9–25.213RobertvonFriedeburg,Luther’sLegacy:TheThirtyYearsWarandtheModernNotionof‘State’intheEmpire,1530sto1790(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2016),354‐380;ThehistorianJeanMarieConstantsummarizedthiscritique as attacking ‘war despotism’. Jean‐Marie Constant, ‘Der Adel und die Monarchie in Frankreich vom TodeHeinrichsIVbiszumEndederFronde(1610‐1653)’,inRonaldAsch(ed.),DereuropäischeAdelimAncienRegime.VonderKrisederständischenMonarchienbiszurRevolution(1600‐1789) (Cologne/Weimar/Vienna:Böhlau,2001),129‐150,thetermp.146.

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underlinesthis,butresearchonDutchexpressionsofreasonofstateisthin.214

It is, as Hans Blom has argued, ‘easy to overlook’ the influence of the vocabulary of

reasonofstateoncontemporarydebates,sinceDutchauthorsweredividedoverthepositionof

the prince of Orange, but ‘united’ in ‘an interest‐based conception of politics’.215 Moreover,

historians tendtoexamineDutchpamphletwarssolelywithinanational framework; ‘Noneof

themrefertothefactthatthemajorpoliticaldebatesoriginatedinthecontextofinternational

warfare.’216ThefiercelycompetitiveconflictsofEuropeanrulersthatproducedwar‐drivenand

debt‐ridden regimes isprecisely thehistorical context inwhichwewill examineDe laCourt’s

usageofthelanguageofreasonofstateinInterestvanHolland.Itisimportanttonotethatthe

small Dutch Republic participated in this competition.217 Due to almost incessant warfare, it

experienced an unprecedented level of public debt, and consequently an unparalleled rise of

taxation, sale of public loans and annuities. Taxation per head was considerably higher in

HollandthaninotherEuropeanpolitiesandthisprovincepaidformorethanhalfoftheUnion’s

warbudget.218Consequently, thecentral issueforDutch ‘opinion’ inthe1650sand1660swas

                                                            214AlanHouston, ‘Republicanism,thepoliticsofnecessity,andtheruleof law’, inAlanHoustonandStevePincus,ANationTransformed.EnglandaftertheRestoration(CambridgeUniversityPress:Cambridge,2001),241‐271;SeeforthereceptionofRohan’sunderstandingofinterestinEnglishCivilWardebatesalsoGunn,“Interestwillnotlie”;ForliteratureonDutchreasonofstateseeJohanC.Boogman, ‘Deraisond’etat‐politicusJohandeWitt,’ inJ.C.Boogman,Van spel en spelers (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982) and Ernst H. Kossmann, ‘Some late 17th‐century DutchwritingsonRaisond'Etat’,inRomanSchnur(ed.),Staatsräson:StudienzurGeschichteeinespolitischenBegriffs(Berlin:Duncker & Humblot, 1975), 497‐504; For an comparison between Dutch and English expressions of interest seeJonathan Scott, ‘Classical Republicanism in Seventeenth‐Century England and the Netherlands,’ in Martin vanGelderen and Quentin Skinner (eds.), Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage. Volume I, Republicanism andConstitutionalisminEarlyModernEurope(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002);Boogman,andtoagreaterextent, HansW. Blom andWeststeijn have underlinedDe la Court’s use of ‘reason of state’ terminology and haverepresented it as a special type of republicanism, i.e. reason of state adjusted to the mercantile Dutch Republic.Boogman,‘Deraisond’état‐politicusJohandeWitt’,382.Scott, ‘ClassicalRepublicanism’,63.Weststeijn,CommercialRepublicanism, 205–283. Jan Hartman and Weststeijn, ‘An Empire of Trade: Commercial Reason of State inSeventeenth‐CenturyHolland’,inSophusReinertandPernilleRøge(eds.),ThePoliticalEconomyofEmpireintheEarlyModernWorld (Basingstoke:PalgraveMacmillan,2013),11‐31,p.12.H.W.Blom,MoralityandCausality inPolitics.TheRiseofNaturalisminDutchSeventeenth‐CenturyPoliticalThought(PhDdissertationUniversityofUtrecht,1995),157–182 and Hans W. Blom, ‘The Republican Mirror, The Dutch Idea of Europe,’ in Anthony Pagden (ed.), TheLanguagesofPoliticalTheoryinEarly‐ModernEurope(Cambridge;CambridgeUniversityPress,1999),91‐115.215Blom,‘TheRepublicanMirror’,quotationp.110;HistoriansoftenpresentthisdivisioninDutchpoliticaldebatesastwo strands of ‘republicanism’ (a respublica mixta one including an Orange‐stadholder and a anti‐monarchical,stadholderlessrepublicanism);BothArthurWeststeijn,CommercialRepublicanismandJonathanScottexaminedDelaCourt’s political thought regarding the language of ‘interest’, but predominantly through the looking glass of‘republicanism’. Jonathan Scott, ‘Classical Republicanism in Seventeenth‐Century England and the Netherlands,’ inMartinvanGelderenandQuentinSkinner(eds.),Republicanism:ASharedEuropeanHeritage.VolumeI,RepublicanismandConstitutionalisminEarlyModernEurope(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),61–81.216Blom,‘TheRepublicanMirror’,113.217SeeforinstanceMaartenPrakTheDutchRepublicintheSeventeenthCentury:TheGoldenAge,translatedbyDianeWebb(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2005),especiallythechapteron‘Aworldpower(1650‐1713)’,45‐60.218 Oscar Gelderblom, ‘Introduction’, in Oscar Gelderblom (ed.), The political economy of the Dutch Republic(Surrey/Burlington: Ashgate, 2009), 1‐18; Wantje Fritschy, ‘The efficiency of Taxation in Holland’, in in OscarGelderblom,Thepoliticaleconomyof theDutchRepublic (Surrey/Burlington:Ashgate,2009),55‐84; JanLuitenvanZanden and Maarten Prak, ‘Towards and economic interpretation of citizenship: The Dutch Republic betweenmedieval communes andmodern nation‐states,’EuropeanReviewofEconomicHistory10 (2006), 111‐145, p. 130;Marjolein ‘tHart, Joost Jonker and JanLuiten vanZanden, ‘Introduction’, inMarjolein ‘tHart, Joost Jonker and JanLuitenvanZanden(eds.),AfinancialhistoryofTheNetherlands(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1997),1‐10;Marjolein ‘tHart, ‘Themeritsofa financialrevolution:public finances1550‐1700’, inMarjolein ‘tHart, Joost Jonkerand Jan Luiten van Zanden (eds.),A financial history ofTheNetherlands (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1997),11‐36,especiallythesection‘theburdenofwarintherepublicanexpenses’,16‐17.

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thestadholderate linked to thepursuitofwarfare:whether topursuecostlyoffensivewarfare

againstthegrandEuropeandynastiesunderthemilitaryleadershipoftheprinceofOrangeand,

by implication, tosustain large land forcesandhightaxes,or tostrive forpeacewithastrong

fleet toprotect theprosperous tradewithout theneed for anOrange‐Stadholder and ‐captain

general.ThesedebateswereinformedbythepopularEuropeanidiomof‘interest(ofstate)’.219

De laCourtwroteprincipallyas a citizenof theDutchRepublic,whichwas ruledbya

minority regime. Johan De Witt estimated that only 0.1 per cent of the common populace

supportedthestadholderlessregime.220TheprovinceofHollandconstitutedaclosedoligarchy

ofregenten, controlledbycertain families,whohadmade their fortunes throughcommerce in

theearlyseventeenthcenturyanddividedamongstthemselvesoffices inurbanandprovincial

councils, in boards of trading companies and minor offices. These offices were viewed as

negotiableprivateproperty.Themagistratesevenassertedtheirpoliticallegitimacyintermsof

divinerightandabsoluteentitlement.221TheDutchRepublicbecamea true ‘RoyalistRepublic’

after the regicide of King Charles I for a diverse range of reasons, as Helmer Helmers has

convincingly argued recently.222 Civil disorder, especially the violent and enduring nature

witnessed in the English CivilWars,was greatly feared and in the Interest vanHolland De la

Courtpersistentlyexpressedacontemptfortheignorantrabbleeasilyincitedtorebellion.The

dynasticpretentionsof theHouseofOrangeand thepursuitofglory in theEuropeanmilitary

competition,gravelytroubledtheregents,especiallythoseinHolland.223DeWittwassupported

amongsttherulingelitesinceitsafeguarded,asKossmannwrites,‘itsmonopolyofpower(..)for

thetimebeing.’224However,intimesofemergencylargepartsofsocietycouldsuddenlyriseup

against the regime for a complexnumber of reasons, but often conveyed through support for

Orange. Thiswas the republican reality ofDe laCourt. ThehistorianHerbertRowen stressed

that Organist pamphleteers used ‘the familiar theories of kingship’ in defence of an Orange‐

stadholderate, which led to counterattacks on the royal aspirations of Orange. He writes:

                                                            219 Blom, ‘The Republican Mirror,’ 91‐115; J. C. Boogman, ‘De raison d’état‐politicus Johan de Witt’, Bijdragen enMededelingen betreffende deGeschiedenis derNederlanden. Deel 90 (The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), 379‐407,380;MurkvanderBijl,‘Pieterdelacourtendepolitiekwerkelijkheid’,inH.W.BlomenI.W.Wildenberg(eds.),Pieterde laCourt inzijntijd(1680–1685)aspectenvaneenveelzijdigpublicist (Amsterdam:APA‐HollandUniversityPress,1986), 65‐93, p. 67; Klashorst, “Metten schijn van monarchie getempert”, 135–136; Weststeijn, CommercialRepublicanism,42–50.220JohandeWitttoVanBeverninghon11July1653,BrievenvanJohandeWittvolume1,R.FruinandG.W.Kernkamp(eds.),(Amsterdam:Müller,1906),96.221 Ernst H. Kossmann, ‘The Dutch Republic’, in F.I. Carsten (ed.), The New Cambridge History Volume 5: TheAscendancy of France (1648‐1688) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), 275‐300, p. 275‐276; Ernst H.Kossmann,Politieke theorie engeschiedenis.Verspreideopstellen en voordrachten (Bert Bakker: Amsterdam, 1987),136‐138.222Helmers,TheRoyalistRepublic.223 Kossmann, ‘The Dutch Republic’, 276‐281; The historian Herbert H. Rowen calls the princes of Orange ‘quasi‐dynasts’.HerbertH.Rowen,JohndeWitt.Statesmanofthe“TrueFreedom”(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1986),7.224Kossmann,‘TheDutchRepublic’,279.Furthermore,theUnion’sgovernmentwasweaksinceeachprovincesentitsdelegatestoStatesGeneral,whocouldonlydecideovermilitary,federalandforeignaffairsunanimously,andwhichwasdominatedbyHolland.

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‘Because the participants in the debate knew all too clearly what was intended, no one was

disturbedby this twisting of terms, and it is later generations of historians and their readers

whohavebeenledastray.’225

ThischapterwillelucidatethefunctionofthelanguageofreasonofstateinDelaCourt’s

critiqueof‘wardespotism’inInterestvanHolland.Wewillsetouthisbackground,sketchingout

hisbiography,theintellectualclimateandanearlierversionofhisargument.Then,wewilllook

into thehistorical contextof theOrangeRepublic, the stadholderless regimeand theOrangist

revival of 1660‐1661. But first, it is important to clarify the critical current against ‘war

despotism’.

3.1‘Wardespotism’

Theterm‘wardespotism’isanewinterpretativeheuristictool,coinedbyJeanMarieConstantto

describe complaints of the assemblies and thepublishedpolemics in France against allegedly

coercive practices by the regime, which through the pursuit of costly warfare, purportedly

suppressedandeffectivelyenslaved the subjects. Itwas thendefinedandusedbyRobertvon

Friedeburg for interpreting French and German sources with a rather more systematic

definition in mind.226 Before explaining this further, we must take note of the actual

developmentsthatwereaddressedandtheuseoftheterminologyinthesecritiques.Aswehave

seenintheintroduction,duringthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturies,Europeangovernments

were transformed under pressure of the intensification of warfare and the consequent

unprecedented level of government debt. Regimes were forced to find new resources, for

example, selling offices (as tax farming) and taking out high‐interest loans. While new

officeholdersandcreditorsbenefittedfromthepursuitofwarfare,others,suchastheoldlanded

gentryandurbanmerchantelites,feltexcludedbythesechangesingovernment. 

In France, the Crown was forced to take desperate financial measures to meet the

immediate problems raised by the wars with the Habsburgs. From the 1570s, especially the

unparalleled creation and sale of offices andmounting governmental debtwere addressed in

estate assemblies and structural reformdemanded.227KingHenry IV couldnot reorganise the

Crown’s financial infrastructure, and, as mentioned in the chapter on Rohan, even had to

                                                            225Rowen,JohndeWitt,54‐55.226 Jean Marie Constant, ‘Der Adel und die Monarchie in Frankreich’, 146; Von Friedeburg, Luther’s Legacy, inparticular chapter 8 ‘Readings ofDespotism:TheAttack on “War‐Despotism” betweenBodin andMontesquieu’, p.336‐36.227 Mark Greengrass Governing Passions: Peace and Reform in The French Kingdom, 1576‐1585 (Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,2007);Collins,TheState inEarlyModernFrance;RobertvonFriedeburg, ‘How“new” is the “NewMonarchy”? Clashes between princes and nobility in Europe’s Iron Century,’ Leidschrift. Aan het hof. Rivaliteit,legitimiteitensuccessiestrijdaandeEuraziatischehoven,1250–175027:1(2012),17–30.

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undertake new loans with exorbitant interest rates and other actions to raise ready money.

France’sdirectinvolvementintheThirtyYears’Warendedallhopesforfinancialreforms.The

Frenchnobilityresentedthesocietalriseofnewofficers,butlessprosperousnoblesadditionally

facedincreasingnon‐paymentsbytheirtenantswhowereburdenedbynewmeasures.France’s

participation inwarfarewasdeemedthecauseforthegravestateof themonarchy. Invarious

assemblies the nobility voiced its concerns and appealed for the restoration of ancient

constitutional agreements that safeguarded the common good, the privileges and property of

elitesandsubjects,andthepoliticalparticipationofnobility.228

The concerns generated a substantial polemical literature, typical of which was Jean

Bourgoin’sLaChasseauxLarrons[TheHuntfortheThieves.],itstitleproclaimingtheimperative

to hunt down the rapacious financiers who were doing so much damage.229 Von Friedeburg

stressesthatinparticularthepolemicsareaddressedwiththisterm.Although,thepracticesthat

generated the polemics might be seen as directly despotic, i.e. taking money, property and

privileges; others, such as the sale of offices and out‐sourcing, might have disastrous effects

were not even slightly ‘despotic’. From the 1630s, the adjective ‘despotic’ reappeared in

polemics delegitimising a certain system of rule that undermined the property rights and

privilegesofitssubjects.Authorsconveyedtheirattacksthroughcomparisonswithahousehold

governmentthattreateditssubjectsasslavesexemplifiedbyspecificpracticesofOttomanrule,

to which the example of Christian Moscow was often added. They recapitulated sixteenth

century tropes of ‘Turkish tyranny’ and applied them to Habsburg‐Spain, thus depicting it as

unchristian and illegitimate, with no regard for its subjects or the rule of law.230 In the

seventeenthcenturythevoiced fearofdominationandthe lossofprivilege,becamecentral to

certain practices of princely rule. Quentin Skinner has taken this to involve the defence of a

specifically neo‐Roman liberty, revolving around the stark contrast between free citizens (sui

iuris)andslaves,thosewhoaresubjecttothejurisdictionofanotherandsowithinthepowerof

someoneelse(alieniiuris).231

Irrespective of whether there was a distinctly neo‐Roman concept of liberty, the

polemicalfocuson‘slavery’contributedtotheerraticseventeenth‐centurypracticeofconflating

‘tyrannical’ with household i.e. ‘despotic’ rule. Aristotle had distinguished both notions. He

designated tyrannyaspolitically illegitimate,pointing to the situationwhenaparticular ruler

pursued his own interests instead of the common good and against the will of the citizens,

                                                            228VonFriedeburg,Luther’sLegacy,346‐349.229Lachasseaux larronsouavantcoureurde l'histoirede lachambrede justice.Des livresdubienspublic,&autresoeuvresfaitspourlarecherchedesfinanciers&deleursfauteurs(Paris,1618).Thetitlepagehasatellingquotefromthe Book of Isaiah (33:1): ‘Malheur sur toi qui pille: car tu seras pillé’ [Woe to youwho plunder: for youwill beplundered];VonFriedeburg,Luther’slegacy,348.230VonFriedeburg,Luther’sLegacy,339‐345.231QuentinSkinner,Libertybeforeliberalism(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998),40‐41.SkinnerreferstothestatushominiintheDigest.

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against their nature. Despotic government constituted an arbitrary rule, but was legitimate,

since it ruled according to the nature of the people, which in the case of the Persians, was

inherently slavish.232 Although medieval authors sometimes echoed this argument, the term

‘despotic’ almostdisappeared in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Its seventeenth‐century

reappearancewasnot intended to restore itsprecisemeaningbut servedpolemicalpurposes,

often supplemented attacks on tyranny and underlined the illegitimate system of rule, rather

thanillicitcircumstancesthatturnedarulerintoatyrant.Attheendoftheseventeenthcentury

the noun ‘despotism’ appeared with its qualifications of ‘arbitrary’, ‘absolute’, Turkish’,

‘Tyranny’,whichwasoftenemployed inpropagandaagainstLouisXIV’s regime, and found its

quintessentialreflectioninMontesquieu’sDel’espritdeslois(1748).233

DuringtheFronde,severalpamphletsappealedtothehistoricallyestablishedprivileges,

and thus the rightofparticipationof certaingroups inFrance’s constitutional frameworkand

distinguishedthisconstitutionfrom‘despotic’rule,asallegedlyfoundintheOttomanEmpireor

Spain. Von Friedeburg stresses that these critiques did not entail a systematic critique of the

institutionofmonarchyassuch.ThedisintegrationofcivilorderexemplifiedbytheBritishWars

ofReligionandtheexecutionofCharlesIin1649wasfearedamongallinFranceandtheHoly

RomanEmpire(aswellasintheDutchRepublicaswewillseebelow).AlthoughinFrance,such

critiquesfocusedpredominantlyontheinvolvementofagroupofroyalofficialsandfinancers,

Germancritiquesagainst‘wardespotism’,e.g.byRamslaandSeckendorff,directlyattackedthe

princes.234

PieterdelaCourt’sinterestanalysisreflectsthenatureofthesecontemporarycritiques

and illustrateshowFrenchwritingwasapartial context forDutch reflection.Todiminish the

threat of an Orange restoration in Holland, De la Court needed to go to extreme lengths. He

warnedthereaderagainsttheprinceofOrange,whowouldbuildupahouseholdgovernment

with ‘leechesofstate’235 thatsucked theresourcesoutof thepeopleofHolland,especially the

merchants who create Holland’s prosperity. An Orange‐stadholderate would systematically

resultinthelossoffreedomsand,ultimately,intheenslavementofsubjects.TheDeWittregime,

although its high taxation policies agitated De la Court, safeguarded the interests of the

merchantsbest:‘freedomofreligion’,‘freedomoftrade’and‘freedomofgovernment’.Notethat

                                                            232Aristotle,Politics:Books Iand II, translatedwithacommentarybyTrevor J.Saunders (Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995),1252a31,1256b23.However,Aristotledoesaddsnuancestothisdistinctionastyranny,andevenpolity,canturnintodespoticrule.Politics,1279b15‐19,1292a4‐36.IowethisnuancetoPaulA.Rahe.233 Mario Turchetti, 'Despotism' and “Tyranny” Unmasking a Tenacious Confusion’, European Journal of PoliticalTheory7:2(2008),159‐182,p.169‐171;Joan‐PauRubies, ‘OrientalDespotismandEuropeanOrientalism:BoterotoMontesquieu’, Journal of EarlyModern History 9 1/2 (2005), 109‐180, p. 115 and 169; Von Friedeburg, Luther’sLegacy, 336‐340; Paul A. Rahe,Montesquieu and the Logic of Liberty:War, Religion, Commerce, Climate, Terrain,Technology,Uneasiness ofMind, the Spirit of Political Vigilance, and the Foundations of theModern Republic (NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2009),95‐98.234VonFriedeburg,Luther’sLegacy,346‐358.235V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden[preface].DelaCourtusestheDutchterm‘BloedzuigersvandenStaat’.

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in De la Court’s view, the latter essentially means a regime without an Orange‐prince as

stadholderandcaptaingeneral and containsneither a systematic rejectionofmonarchynor a

pleaforpoliticalparticipation.DelaCourtevenwritesinhisprefacetoInterestvanHollandthat

Louis XIV’s monarchy and other northern European monarchies are legitimate governments

opposed to the ‘absolute Monarchies’ that ruled the Asian, African and southern European

peoples.236Moreover, his argument against the closed trade companies and the closed regent

officesismoreconcernedwithattackingoligarchictendenciesthandefendingdemocraticones

andsupportshisownsocialaspirationsasatextilemerchantandthesonofanimmigrant.

3.2PieterdelaCourt:textilemerchant,aspiringregentandcontroversialauthor

In1618, in the year of the so‐called coupd’état of stadholderMauriceofOrange, Pieterde la

Courtwasborn inLeiden.His fatherhadmigrated fromFlanders to theDutchRepublicat the

beginningofthecentury,andbecameasuccessfulentrepreneurinLeiden’stextilebusinessby

which hewas able to buy citizenship rights. After finishing the Latin School in Leiden, De la

CourtwentonaGrandTour throughEurope,visitingEngland,France, theSwissConfederacy,

theRhinecitiesandtheSpanishNetherlands.Hisdiaryrevealsakeeninterestindisplaysofthe

differentconfessionalbeliefsand‘foreign’politicalpractices;hedescribeswithscepticismbelief

inthedevil,‘Thedivilwasheeverseene?,’237anddisplaysacertaincynicaldelightattherichly

embellished royal entry of Charles I in London inNovember1641.238Afterwards, Pieterde la

Court joinedhisbrother Johan,studying theology,atLeidenUniversity,whereProtestantLate

Humanism prevailed. He followed in his father’s footsteps after his studies and established a

prosperoustextilebusinesstogetherwithJohaninLeiden.However,Johandiedin1660andleft

Pieterhisunfinishedmanuscripts.239

AgainstthewishesofJohan,PieterpublishedJohan’sworks,editedandaddednewpassages

and sometimes even made substantial changes. Consequently the exact authorship of the

differentwritingsofthebrothersDe laCourt iscontested.Twenty‐fiveeditionsofsixdifferent

titleswere printed in 1662.240 The bestseller Interest vanHollandwas part of this publishing

campaignandreceivedatleasteightfurthereditionsinthesameyear.Pieterpublishedin1669

                                                            236V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden[preface].237 Willem Frijhoff, ‘De reisnotities (1641‐1643) van Pieter de la Court. Uit het manuscript bezorgd en vancommentaarvoorzien’, inHansW.Blom&IdoW.Wildenberg(eds.),Pieterde laCourt inzijntijd.Aspectenvaneenveelzijdigpublicist(Amsterdam&Maarssen:APA‐HollandUniversityPress,1986),11‐34,32.238Weststeijn,CommercialRepublicanism,28.239 Weststeijn,CommercialRepublicanism,30‐31,51. 240SeethefulloverviewofthebrothersDelaCourt’publicationsinIdoW.Wildenberg,Johan(1622‐1660)&Pieter(1618‐1685)delaCourt:bibliografieenreceptiegeschiedenis(AmsterdamAPA‐HollandUniversityPress,1986),andpp20‐24forthehistoriographicaldebateabouttheauthorship.

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arevisionoftheInterestvanHollandunderanewtitle:AanwysingederheilsamepolitikeGronden

enMaximenvandeRepublikevanHollandenWest‐Vriesland [Demonstrationsof theBeneficial

PoliticalFoundationsandMaximsoftheRepublicofHollandandWest‐Friesland].241

TheparadoxofthebrothersDelaCourt’slifewastheirdifficultstandingasWalloons(a

despised minority) while at that the same time they owned a flourishing textile business in

Leiden, the centre of Europe’s textile industry. Not surprisingly, they advocated unlimited

immigrationandeconomicfreedomintheirwritings.242Apart fromcommercialsuccess,Pieter

pursued an office in the urban government, but hewould never succeed. Blom describes the

brothersas‘sociallyaspiring.’243ThroughhistwomarriagesandhiswritingsPieterestablished

contactswiththegovernmentalelite.Hissecondmarriageof1661withCatharinavanderVoort

fromaninfluentialAmsterdamfamilyconnectedhimtothegroupofregentssurroundingJohan

deWitt.ThecouplemovedtoAmsterdamin1662,wherePieterlinkedhiseconomicactivitiesto

hispoliticalaspirations. Fromthenon, the familynamewouldbe ‘De laCourtvanderVoort’

withafamilyestate‘Meerburg’,situatednearLeiden.In1670Pieterobtainedadoctorateinlaw

at the university of Orleans and two years later he took the oath as lawyer of the court of

Holland.Sadlyforhim, itwastoolatetofillsuchanoffice, fortheregimeofDeWittcollapsed

undertheinvadingarmiesofLouisXIVandthesubsequentrevoltsinthecitiesofHollandand

Zeeland. Four days after the first attempted assassination ofDeWitt, Pieter fled to Antwerp,

wherehewastostayformorethanayear.244Thereisalong‐standingbutunconfirmedrumour

thatitwasadeaththreatthatpromptedDelaCourttoflee.Inthesummerof1672agroupof

rebelliousOrangists gatheredatPieter’shouse inLeiden.When theydidnot findDe laCourt,

theytiedadog,withitsbellycutopen,toatree.Inthedog’sstomachtheyputacandlewitha

notestating:‘LaCourtifyoudonotshutyourmouth,wewilltreatyoulikethisdog.’245

Alreadyduringhis lifetimeDe la Court’swritingsmetwith harsh criticismand strong

opposition. The anti‐stadholderate perspectives in the Interest produced a vigorous political

controversyandafloodofpamphletswerepublishedindefenceoftheHouseofOrange.Itwas

                                                            241AanwysingderheilsamepolitikeGrondenenMaximenvandeRepublikevanHollandenWest‐Vriesland(LeidenandRotterdam, 1669), whichwent through a second edition in 1671 andwas translated in GermanAnweisungen derheilsamenpolitischenGrundeundMaximenderRepublicqenHollandundWest‐Friesland(Rotterdam,1671)followedbyanEnglishandaFrenchtranslationatthebeginningiftheeighteenthcenturiesthatattributedtheworktoJohandeWitt,contributingtothecontestationofauthorship.TheTrueInterestandPoliticalMaximsoftheRepublickofHollandandWest‐Friesland.WrittenbyJohndeWitt,andOtherGreatMeninHolland(London,1702),andMémoiresdeJeandeWit,GrandPensionairedeHollande,trans.M.de***[Mme.VanZoutelandt](TheHague,1709).242Weststeijn,CommercialRepublicanism,25.243 Hans W. Blom, ‘Democratic Tendencies in Anglo‐Dutch Republicanism’, in Dirk Wiemann and Gaby Mahlberg(eds.),EuropeanContextsforEnglishRepublicanism(Farnham:AshgatePublishing,2013),121‐135,p.125.244Weststeijn,CommercialRepublicanism,25‐57;C.‐E.Levillain,‘L’AngleterredelaRestaurationaumiroirdela“vraieliberte” (1660–1672).Larencontreentrerepublicanismesanglaisethollandais a travers les ecritsdePieterde laCourt’, E‐rea [En ligne], 1.2 j 2003, mis en ligne le 15 octobre 2003, consulte le 08 mai 2014. URL:http://erea.revues.org/205;DOI:10.4000/erea.205,5;Blom,‘DemocraticTendenciesinAnglo‐DutchRepublicanism’,125.245 ‘La Court zoo je niet snoert Uw mond, Doen we je als deezen hond.’ Cited from Weststeijn, CommercialRepublicanism,4;Wildenberg,Johan&PieterdelaCourt,45.

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not only supporters of the House of Orange that disputed the writings of the brothers De la

Court.EvenJohandeWittwasconcernedbyitsintransigenttones.246

FurthermoretheorthodoxLeidenconsistorystartedaninvestigationintothecontentsof

InterestandalsothePoliticalDiscourses,alsopublishedin1662.Rumourswerecirculatingthat

Pieterwastheauthorofbothworks,writtenbyananonymousauthor,V.D.H,theinitialsfor‘Van

denHoven’, theDutch translation ofDe laCourt.After two interrogationsbydelegates of the

consistory,severalattemptstobanpublicationofbothbooksandDeWitt’srefusingtohelphim,

DelaCourtclaimedbeforethecourtoflawthathewastheauthoronlyofInterest.Infact,ithas

beenshownthatseveralimportantregentswereimplicatedinwritingInterest,suchasPieterde

Groot and the Leiden regentHendrick vanWillighen.But JohandeWitt especially intervened

substantiallybycorrectinglargepartsofthework.Historicalresearchhasshownthathetoned

down De la Court’s criticism of the oligarchic rule of Holland and its cities, deleted certain

passagesandthatheevenaddedtwochaptersjustifyinghisrule.Yet,soonafterthepublication

ofInterestvanHollandDeWittdistancedhimselffromDelaCourt.247

3.2.1Intellectualbackground:self‐interest,reasonofstateandharmonyofinterests

ItiscrucialtopresentabriefsketchoftheimmediateintellectualbackgroundagainstwhichDe

laCourtwrote,mostimportantly,theinfluenceoftheso‐called‘newphilosophy’onhispolitical

thought.248 First of all, scholarship stresses the brothers’ fierce criticism of Political

Aristotelianism. De la Courts’ writings, however, often employed Aristotelian traditions of

structureandvocabulary,andwerepartofthetraditionofpolitica.249Yet,bothbrothersdidnot

assertnatural sociabilityor thehuman facultyof reason.Theywereprofoundly influencedby

the new theories of the passions that dominated Dutch mid‐seventeenth‐century philosophy

providingacrucialroleforDescartesLesPassionsdel’âme(1649).250DelaCourtevenexplicitly

referred toHobbes inarguing thatman followedhispassionswithnoeffectively constraining

roleforreasonprovided,leadingtoastateofnaturewithawarofallagainstall.Theinevitability

                                                            246Wildenberg,Johan&PieterdelaCourt,11‐12.247JohannesHermanKernkamp,‘Pieterdelacourt,zijnaansprakelijkheidvoorhetInterestvanHollandendePolitikeDiscoursen’,inHetboek22(1933/34),191‐196;Wildenberg,Johan&PieterdelaCourt,37;DanielVeegens,“JohandeWittalspublicist,”inDeGids31(1867),1‐31;HerbertH.Rowen,JohndeWitt,55‐56.248WiepvanBunge,FromStevintoSpinoza.AnEssayonPhilosophyintheSeventeenth‐CenturyDutchRepublic(Leiden:Brill,2001),34‐64.249MartinvanGelderen, ‘Aristotelians,MonarchomachsandRepublicans:Sovereigntyandrespublicamixta inDutchandGermanpoliticalThought, 1580–1650,’ inVanGelderen and Skinner (eds.),Republicanism:ASharedEuropeanHeritage.Volume I,RepublicanismandConstitutionalism inEarlyModernEurope (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000)195‐218,p.214;Weststeijn,CommercialRepublicanism,37,62‐65.250 Velema, ‘”That a Republic is Better than aMonarchy”’, 14; Eco HaitsmaMulier, TheMyth of Venice andDutchRepublicanThought intheSeventeenthCentury(Assen:VanGorcum,1980),131;VanBunge,FromStevintoSpinoza,85–88;ErnstH.Kossmann,PoliticalThoughtintheDutchRepublic.ThreeStudies(Amsterdam:KNaW,2000),62–63.

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ofself‐interestandself‐preservationwasthedrivingforcebehindallactionsofgovernment.251

Furthermore, thebrothersDe laCourtwere inspiredbywritingsonreasonofstate,as

thosebyGuicciardini,Botero,Boccalini,aswellasRohan.Throughouttheirwritings, theDe la

Courts referred to Francesco Guicciardini’s works, one of the first authors on interesse del

stato.252Theeconomicfoundationofacity’swell‐beingwasalreadyunderlinedinBotero’sDelle

causedellagrandezzadellecittà,oftenpublishedtogetherwithDellaragiondistato.253Although

Boterohadpredominantlyfocusedonhowaprinceandhiscourtmightmaintainandexpandthe

grandezza of cities, unlikeMachiavelli he favoured commercial rather thanmilitarymeans to

thisend.254Boccalinisimilarlyarguedfordefensiveforeignpolicytoprotectcommerce,buthe

conveyedhisviewoncontemporarypoliticsthroughasatireofpower‐hungryrulersandtheir

Tacitist courts in his Ragguagli di Parnaso (1612‐1613). In the Dutch Republic Boccalini’s

writingswerehighlypopular,especiallyinthe1660s.ScholarshaveoftenunderlinedBoccalini’s

praiseforcontemporary‘Germanic’republicssuchastheDutchrepublic255,butitishisaversion

tothetransformationofEuropeangovernmentthatismorerelevantforDelaCourt’sargument

of thebellicoseplunderprince.Boccaliniwroteabout the contemporarynoveltyofHabsburg‐

Spain,whichwasruledbyprinceswhoweredrivenbyself‐interestandpassions,seekingtheir

gloriousadvantage in ruinouswarfare, collecting lands to integrate into theirmonarchiesand

pursuingdivisionamongsttheirsubjectsandotherprincestomaintainpower.256

Inaddition,DelaCourtwasacquaintedwithRohan’swritings.257Thesewereextensively

re‐printedinProtestantEuropeandinpartsoftheHolyRomanEmpireduringthesecondhalfof

the seventeenthcenturyandElsevierwasparticularlyactive in theirpromotion;but although

their impact in England has been extensively studied, Rohan’s influence on Dutch political

thought has received comparatively little attention. However, editions of De l’interest and

updatedversionsbyotherauthors flooded theDutchbookmarket;258and in thesameyearof

                                                            251 Malcolm perceives De la Court’s political thought as intermediary between that of Hobbes and Spinoza. NoelMalcolm,“HobbesandSpinoza,”inNoelMalcolm,AspectsofHobbes(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2002),27–52:42–44;HansW.Blom,MoralityandCausalityinPolitics.TheRiseofNaturalisminDutchSeventeenth‐CenturyPoliticalThought(PhDdissertationUtrechtUniversity,1995),170‐182.252SeeforinstanceV.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,183; ‘Namely,thatallSupremepowers,andespeciallytheMonarchs,also inEurope,playwiththeiralliances, likechildren’sgames,andestablishandnullifytheseastheyseeplease’astoldin‘thehistoriesofFranciscoGuicciardini’.253 Giovanni BoteroOn the Causes of theGreatness andMagnificence of Cities, 1588, translated and introduced byGeoffreySymcox(Toronto/Buffalo/London:UniversityofTorontoPress,2012).254HartmanandWeststeijn,‘AnEmpireofTrade’,14.255 Van Gelderen, ‘Aristotelians, Monarchomachs and Republicans’, 195; Hartman and Weststeijn, ‘An Empire ofTrade’;Velema,‘”ThataRepublicisBetterthanaMonarchy”’,15‐16.256 Meinecke, The Doctrine of Raison d’État, 74‐75. Meinecke wrote on page 74: ‘Boccalini had a sense that theabsolutistandcourtlymonarchy,whichhaddevelopedinrecenttimes,did,withitsmortallyruinouseffects,representsomethinghistoricallynew.’257Weststeijn,CommercialRepublicanism,54,174,207,221,346.258SeeinparticularJ.A.W.Gunn,“Interestwillnotlie”,Aseventeenth‐CenturyPoliticalMaxim’,JournaloftheHistoryofIdeas29:4(1968),551‐564; JesperSchaaphas listedalleditionsofDe l’interest inhisPhDdissertation(ErasmusUniversity,forthcoming).ThefirstseparateeditionoftheworkwasprintedbyElsevierin1639(2editions),in1641twofurthereditionswerepublished,in1645aLatineditionprintedbyJustusLivius,andtheyears1648,1649and1659allwitnessedanedition.In1654theonlyDutchtranslationwasprinted,Deninterestderprincenendestatenvan

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publicationofInterestvanHolland,apamphletwaspublishedechoingRohan’sinterestanalysis:

Den tegenwoordigen interest der Christen princen [The present interest of princes of

Christendom].ItsheadingsweresimilarbutitwasmuchshorterthanDel’interest,itreflected

on recent events and addedan emphasis on commercial interests. Thus, an importantpart of

Spain’sinterestwastoavoidoffensivewarfarenowthatthebalanceofpowerwithFrancehad

shifted.FranceoughttoentangleSpainincostlywarfaretoexhausttheSpanishresourcesand

thekingdomshouldpromoteitsseafaringandfishery.TheDutchinterestwastomaintainand

promote seafaring, commerce and fishery, which De la Court likewise argued. But secondly,

unlikeDelaCourt’sargument,thepamphleturgedtheformationofdefensiveallianceswithall

neighbouringpolitiesagainstoffensivewarsand‘otherBanditries’.259

Moreover, the influence of contemporary English interest debates on contemporary

Dutch analyses of the ‘national’ interest have not been examined, although several historians

have pointed to notable similarities, most often in terms of their supposed ‘republicanism’,

betweenDe la Court’s interest analysis and English ones byMarchamontNedham, Algernon

SidneyandSlingsbyBethel,260whoallwentintoexileinHollandaftertheStuartRestoration.261

Inparticular,Nedham’sinterestanalysiswasexplicitlyindebtedtoRohan’sDel’interest.262The

parallelsbetweenInterestvanHollandandNedhams’sInterestwillnotlie.Or,aViewofEnglands                                                                                                                                                                                          Christenrijck.In’tFrancoysbeschrevendoordenHertogvanRohan(Amsterdam,1654),arguablytosatisfyabroaderdemandofRohan’s interestanalysis,whichperhapswasbrought forthbyrisingpublicationson the interestof theDutchRepublicinthere‐instalmentoftheStuartmonarchyin1653.Seeinparticular:L’interestdesProvincesUniesduPaysBasdans le restablissementde samajestede laGrandeBretagne (1653) and itsDutch translationHoe veeldeVereenigde Provintien behoort gelegen te zijn, de her‐stellinge van den coninck vanGroot‐Britangie (The Hague: H.Cornelsz., 1653). Updated versions or writings echoing Rohan’s interest analysis were for instance: Dentegenwoordigen interest der Christen princen (Enkhuizen: Dirk Klaer‐Oogh, 1662); Maximes des princes et estatssouverains (Cologne, 1665 [Amsterdam: Daniel Elsevier, 1665]), which underwent further editions in 1665, 1666,1667,1670,1676and1683.259 It encompassed eight pages and did not treat the interest of the Swiss cantons and of the Italian ‘states’.Dentegenwoordigen interest der Christen princen (Enkhuizen: Dirk Klaer‐Oogh, 1662), quoted from p. 8 [‘andereRooverijen’].260 Jonathan Scott, England's Troubles Seventeenth‐Century English Political Instability in European (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000),300‐301,371‐372;JonathanScott,AlgernonSidneyandtheEnglishRepublic1623‐1677 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 207‐216, 301;Weststeijn, Commercial Republicanism, 352;RyanWalter, ‘SlingsbyBethel'sAnalysisof State Interests’,HistoryofEuropean Ideas41:4 (2015),489‐506,p.280,459; Charles‐Édourard Levillain, ‘L’Angleterre de la Restauration au miroir de la “vraie liberté” (1660‐1672). LarencontreentrerépublicanismesanglaisethollandaisàtraverslesécritsdePieterdelaCourt’E‐rea1.2(2003)fromhttps://erea.revues.org/205;JonathanScotthasevendescribedNedhamas‘DelaCourt’smostimportantpredecessor(…)adecadeearlierontheothersideofthechannel.’JonathanScott,‘ClassicalRepublicanisminSeventeenth‐CenturyEnglandandtheNetherlands,’inMartinvanGelderenandQuentinSkinner(eds.),Republicanism:ASharedEuropeanHeritage.Volume I,RepublicanismandConstitutionalism inEarlyModernEurope (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),61‐81,p.68;However,NedhamalsorespondedtoDutchwritingson‘interest’,e.g.inTheCasebetweenEnglandandtheUnitedProvinces(1652)hecounteredtheJustificatievoordevereenichendeNederlandstenProvincienthat justified the Dutch refusal to ally with the English ‘rebels’ in terms of the law of nations and interest. Blom,‘DemocraticTendenciesinAnglo‐DutchRepublicanism’,129:261 Nedhamwent into exile in Holland after the restoration of Charles II from April 1660 until September 1660.SidneyandBethelsharedexileintheDutchrepublicduringthemid‐1660s.262ContemporariescloselyidentifiedNedham’suseof‘reasonofstate’withRohan’swritings.‘Hewasin1647alreadyknownasthe‘chief“interest‐mongers”intheland’,writesJ.A.W.Gunn,“Interestwillnotlie”,Aseventeenth‐CenturyPoliticalMaxim’,JournaloftheHistoryofIdeas29:4(1968),551‐564,555;However,Nedham‘brazenlychampionedraisond’etataspreachedbytheducdeRohan,arguingthatitismaterialinterest,notjustice,honour,orreligionthatmakestheworldgoround.’PaulA.Rahe,AgainstThroneandAltarMachiavelliandPoliticalTheoryUndertheEnglishRepublic,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2008),181–182.

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True Interest of 1659 are striking. Nedham examined the specific ‘interests’ of the different

‘domestic’powergroups,notablytheroyalists,parliamentandthearmy,andconcludedthatitis

in ‘the InterestofeveryParty (exceptonly thePapist) tokeephim[CharlesStuart]out.’263As

severalhistorianshavestressed,AlgernonSidney’sCourtMaxims(manuscriptwrittenin1664‐

1665)andSlingsbyBethel’sThePresentInterestofEnglandstated(1671)inturndrewheavily

fromDelaCourt’sinterestargumentation.264

TheinterestanalysesofDelaCourtandthoseoftheabovementionedEnglishauthors

allurgethe importanceofaharmonyof interestsbetweenrulersandruled.AlanHoustonhas

claimed that this emphasis on harmonization was a means of freeing interest from dynastic

considerations, effectively delegitimizing Stuart rule. Royal government, argued Sidney and

Nedham,unbalanced theconstitutionbypursuingonly the interestof theruler.265De laCourt

likewisearguedthattoacquire‘free’governmentwastoensurethatrulersandruledsharedthe

same interests, as the merchant‐regents ruled mercantile Holland. These interest analyses

facilitated attempts to reconstruct the rule of law, i.e. government conceived under divine

(natural) law, as Houston writes: ‘Despite its modern association with conflict, discord and

struggle, the languageof interestwasprized for itsability to illuminatenewbasesofpolitical

order and social cooperation.’266 Amongst these was an emphasis on commerce and co‐

operationbetweenthoseengagedintradeasapivotalsourceforthecountry’swelfare.Inthis

sense,interestanalysescametoserveadvocacyoftheruleoflawagainstthebackgroundofthe

transformationsinearlymoderngovernments,mostnotablytheso‐called‘crisisofmonarchy’in

mid‐seventeenthcenturyEurope.267

                                                            263 Marchamont Nedham, Interestwill not lie.Or, a View of Englands True Interest in reference to Papist,Royalist,Presbyterian,Baptised,Neuter,Army,Parliament,CityofLondon[…](London1659).264Sidney,Algernon.CourtMaxims[manuscriptwrittenin1664‐1665],editedwithanintroductionbyHansW.Blom,EcoHaitsmaMulierandRonald Jansen (eds.) (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996);SlingsbyBethel,ThePresentInterestofEnglandStated(1671)andalsoBethel’sTheWorld’sMistake inOliverCromwell(1668);HartmanandWeststeijn evenconclude: ‘Muchmore researchcanandshouldbedoneon thede laCourts’ influenceon thisWhigeconomicandpoliticalthought’,in‘AnEmpireofTrade’,24‐25.265AlanHouston, ‘Republicanism,thepoliticsofnecessity,andtheruleof law’, inAlanHoustonandStevePincus,ANationTransformed.EnglandaftertheRestoration(CambridgeUniversityPress:Cambridge,2001),241‐271,p.255‐256.Infootnote255AlanHoustonalsostressestheneedforfurtherresearchoninterestanalyses:‘Thehistoryofthisprocess[interestofstateanalyses: it facilitatedthereconsiderationofanumberofpostulatesortheoremsthathadlonggovernedtheconductofstates’]hasyettobewritten.’266Houston,‘Republicanism,thepoliticsofnecessity,andtheruleoflaw’,255,256;SeealsoJohnA.W.Gunn,PoliticsandthePublicInterestintheSeventeenthCentury(London:Routledge&KeganPaul,1969)andGunn,“Interestwillnotlie”.267 To outline Nedham’s context, BlairWorden writes: ‘Since 1640s an epidemic of revolutions, from Portugal toSweden,hadproducedacrisisofmonarchy,inwhichcontemporaries(Harringtonamongthem)sawthehandofGod.’Blair Worden, ‘Marchamont Nedham and the Beginnings of English Republicanism’, in: David Wootton (ed.),Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 45‐81, p. 72. Thisepidemic receded in 1656.Worden refers to Nedhams’s newspaperMercurius Politicus, where he warned for theoverthrowofthetyrannies‘abroad’,followingtheEnglishoverthrowofthemonarchyinthe1650s‐editions;ThomasPoole,ReasonofState:Law,PrerogativeandEmpire(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2015),127‐131;StevePincus,‘Fromholycausetoeconomicinterest:thetransformationofreasonofstatethinkinginseventeenth‐centuryEngland’, inHoustonandPincus(eds.),ANationTransformed.EnglandaftertheRestoration(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 2001), 272‐298; Victoria Kahn, ‘The metaphorical contract in Milton’s Tenure of Kings and

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Finally,theteachingsoftheDelaCourts’professorofrhetoricandfrom1648ofhistory

atLeidenUniversity,MariusZuerisBoxhorn(1612‐1653),areworthnoting.268Boxhornrejected

the Aristotelian notion of human sociability and instead claimed fear and self‐interest as the

mechanismsbehindtheestablishmentofpoliticalgovernment.Hedisputedthecommonbelief

in the viability of a mixed constitution, wherein the different elements, the stadholder

(monarchical), the States (aristocratic), and the sometimes added town councils (democratic)

naturally balanced each other.269 Instead, Boxhorn based his interpretation of the mixed

constitution on the notion of self‐interest. Because stable government is based on the love of

subjects for the ruler, he advocated involvement in governmentby each section of society. In

practice,however,Boxhornbelievedadministrativeofficesshouldbeassigned to theelite, the

noblesandthewealthy,fortheyarelikelytobemoredevotedtothecommongood,whenit(and

theirownproperties)wouldbeharmed.IncaseoftheDutchRepublic, theprivate interestsof

the rich merchants of the province of Holland corresponded to the greatest extent to the

common interest, and thereforeHolland’s formof governmentwasanaristocracy.Yet, due to

theriseofcommercialcapital,revoltsofpoliticallyexcludedmerchantscouldbeexpectedandso

he advised shifting to amore open aristocratic government.270Boxhorn echoedHugoGrotius’

argument about the capacity of the principal assemblies to restrain the stadholder. Grotius

famouslytheorisedinDeAntiquitateReipublicaeBatavicae(1610)thatsinceBataviantimesthe

States possessed the sovereignty, which in day‐to‐day politics was sharedwith the prince of

Orange with the States retaining the highest authority and power to command in times of

disagreement. 271 In the literature Grotius’s ‘Batavian myth/model’ is often taken as the

dominant idea of Dutch republicanism, which eroded after 1650, not least because of De la

Court’srejectionofthemixedconstitution.272

Thethemesofthe‘newphilosophy’outlinedabovewereclearlyapparentinDelaCourt’s

                                                                                                                                                                                          Magistrates’, in David Armitage, Armand Himy and Quentin Skinner (eds.),Milton andRepublicanism (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998),82‐105,p.103.268 His posthumously published Institutiones politicae (1657) reflect his lectures on the traditional politica genrecombined with new topics such as reason of state, which he applied to Dutch current affairs. Jaap Nieuwstraten,HistoryandPoliticsinSeventeenth‐CenturyDutchPoliticalThought.TheCaseofMarcusZueriusBoxhorn(1612–1653)(PhDdissertationErasmusUniversityRotterdam,2012),245‐247;Moreover,historianshavepointedtotheinfluenceofHeereboord,professorofphilosophyatLeidenUniversity,whoechoingDescartesmethods,attempted to forma‘newphilosophy’freedfrominterferenceoftheology.Weststeijn,CommercialRepublicanism,32.269Thisisoftenarguedintermsofthestadholderconstitutingthemonarchicelement,theprovincialassembliesthearistocratic and, sometimes added, the city councils the democratic elements. M. van Gelderen, ‘Aristotelians,Monarchomachs and Republicans’, 201‐204. However, Justus Lipsius described monarchy as the best form ofgovernment inhisbook IIofPolitica. JustusLipsius,Politica.SixbooksofPoliticsorPolitical Instruction, introducedandtranslatedbyJanWaszink(Assen:RoyalvanGorchum,2004).270Boxhorncriticisedasmall,closed‐offaristocracyaseasilycorruptibleandpronetooligarchictyranny.ThegrowthofprivatewealthofthecitizensofHollandformedamajorpillarofHolland’swelfare.Nevertheless,arevoltcouldbeexpected, because the rich segment of the citizenry would no longer tolerate that they were excluded fromgovernment.271 Grotius stressed that in cases of disputes the individual provincial assemblies held the supreme power. HugoGrotius,TheAntiquityoftheBatavianRepublic,introducedandtranslatedJanWaszink(Assen:VanGorcum,2000).272IvoSchöffer,‘TheBatavianMythduringtheSixteenthandSeventeenthCenturies,’inJ.S.Bromley&E.H.Kossmann(eds.),BritainandtheNetherlands.Volume5:SomePoliticalMythologies(TheHague:Nijhoff,1974),78‐101.

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attackonearlymodernprinces.AsErnstKossmannstates:‘UnlikeBoxhorn(…)lateseventeenth

centurywritersofHuber’sorDe laCourt’snaturewere far fromamusedat theviciousnessof

politicalaffairs.(…)Unwarrantedcynicismwasanoutcomeofaprofoundlypessimisticviewof

thehumancondition.’273Reasonwasneitherthebasisofpoliticalvirtuenor the instrumentto

acquiretheknowledgeofthetrueinterestofstate.Rather,legitimategovernmentwasfounded

uponharmonizingof the (self‐)interestsof ruledand rulers. In thisway,De laCourtarguably

contributed to the so‐called ‘crisisofPoliticalAristotelianism’.274But first and foremost,De la

CourtemployedthevocabularyofreasonofstateinInterestvanHollandtodefendthepolitical

and military exclusion of the House of Orange. This brings to the fore De la Court’s

preoccupationwith‘wardespotism’thatpre‐datesInterestvanHolland.

3.2.2‘Wardespotism’inHetwelvarenderstadLeyden(1659)

Interest van Holland was actually based on an early work of the De la Court brothers, a

manuscripttitledHetwelvarenderstadLeyden[ThewellbeingofthecityofLeiden],finishedin

1659.275JohanmostprobablywrotetheinitialtextthatPieterexpandedintoasharpcritiqueof

the municipal government that allegedly constrained the economic, religious and political

libertiesofthecitizens.Itwas,however,notpublished,butviahiswife’sbrother‐inlaw,Johan

Eleman,themanuscriptcirculatedintheregenten‐factionsurroundingDeWitt.Itfoundakeen

audience amongst these powerful regents and so Pieter de la Court expanded the interest

analysistotheentireprovinceofHolland.InthesummerofJohandeWittreceivedafirstdraftof

InterestvanHolland.276

Hetwelvaren der stad Leyden has been considered as part of the tradition of Italian

ragiondistatoliterature,appropriatingItalianreasonofstatetotheseaborne,mercantileDutch

Republic constructing a ‘commercial reason of state’. 277 The brothers explicitly stated in the

introductionofthistreatisethattheywouldanalysethewell‐beingofthe‘republic’ofLeiden,i.e.

ofrulersandruledcombined,‘sopralaraggiondiStato’.278HetwelvarenderstadLeydenstated

thatthepreservationandadvancementoftheinhabitantsdependedonunrestrictedtradethat                                                            273ErnstH.Kossmann,‘Somelate17th‐centuryDutchwritingsonRaisond'Etat’,inRomanSchnur(ed.),Staatsräson:StudienzurGeschichteeinespolitischenBegriffs(Berlin:Duncker&Humblot,1975),497‐504,quotationon499.274HorstDreitzel,‘ReasonofStateandtheCrisisofPoliticalAristotelianism’,JonathanScottqualifiesitasa‘scepticalDutchreasonofstate[that]eliminatedthemoralbasisofAristotle’stheory’.JonathanScott,‘ClassicalRepublicanism’,61‐81,quotedfromp.69.275FirstversionwastitledAenmerkingeophetwelvarenenIntrestderStadLeyden[CommentsontheWell‐beingandinterestoftheCityofLeiden].Weststeijn,CommercialRepublicanism,54‐55.276Weststeijn,CommercialRepublicanism,54‐55.277Inthissense,WeststeijnandHartmanviewthebrothersDelaCourtastheoristsof‘jealousyoftrade’ratherthanofaprototype‘politicaleconomy’.HartmanandWeststeijn,‘AnEmpireofTrade’,12.278 [De la Court],Hetwelvaren van Leiden.Handschriftuithet jaar 1659, edited F. Driessen (The Hague:MartinusNijhoff,1911),3.

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neededfavourabletaxationandrulesofimmigrationandadefensiveforeignpolicy.

Alreadyinthistreatisewecanobserveelementsofcontemporarycritiques,whichhave

been defined as attacking ‘war despotism’. In chapter 64, the De la Courts exclaim: ‘a furore

monarcharum libera nos Domine’ [Save us from the fury of monarchs, oh Lord].279 While a

monarchic formofgovernmenthas theadvantageofeffectiverule, for itconcernedonesingle

man, ‘nogreaterdisastercanbethought, ifa freeCityorRepublicwouldfall intoaMonarchic

government, because generally all sciences, arts, virtues, Prosperity and commerce would be

destroyed, yes the inhabitants would be devoured like bread.’280 Interestingly, the brothers

underline the contemporary transformations of European governments, appealing to ancient

rightsofcertainpartsofsocietytoparticipateinpolitics,ascontemporaryFrenchandGerman

authorslikewiseargued.Theywrite:‘InoldtimesEuropewasruledsatisfactorilybyRepublics,

andwhichhave leftsomanyremnantsofpowerto thesubjects,CitiesandProvinces’ that the

monarchscouldnotsubvert.281Monarchicalgovernmenthadfunctionedperfectlywellwhenit

waspartofalayeredsystemofgovernmentbyconsentthroughcityandprovincialassemblies

(arepublicansystem/monarchicalcommonwealth),butconverselyallpresentmonarchs,theDe

la Courts write, follow the examples of ‘Tartars, Turks, Persians, Muscovites, and all other

countries, where a personwithout any contradiction rules and is obeyed’.282Without further

explanation they assert that ‘Spain, France, Sweden, the German rulers and the Netherlands’

transformed into such illegitimate systems of rule, and instead concentrate on showing ‘how

disadvantageoustheslaveryorcoercionofthesame[absolutegeneralfreedomofinhabitants]

fortherulersofLeidenis.’283

Herewewitnessthenatureof theDe laCourts’argument, intheirattackon,allegedly,

new practices of rulers. They make the standard comparison with Oriental regimes deemed

despotic.LiketheOrientals,therulersofChristendomcoerceandsubverttheruleoflaw,they

plunder the polity, effectively enslaving the subjects. For theDe la Courts, these propensities

characterisedearlymodernrule;itsnewnesslayintheshiftfromconsentandtheauthorityof

lawservingtherespublicatoarbitraryruleandenslavement.Ratherthanrejectingmonarchyas

such,itisthenewdespotismsthatareattacked.LikeRohanbeforethemonthe‘new’monarchy

of Spain, the De la Courts treated newness prejudicially. Indeed, the negativity surrounding

innovation was entirely conventional, yet has been overlooked by modern commentators in

their search for republicanism; the result has been amisplaced emphasis: it is not that new

monarchy is a recent illustration of illegitimate rule, but thatmonarchy is evil insofar as it is

newlytransformed.InInterestvanHolland,Pieterexpandedontheearlierargument.                                                            279HetwelvarenvanLeiden,143[Chapter64].280HetwelvarenvanLeiden,143‐144[Chapter64].281HetwelvarenvanLeiden,144[Chapter64].282HetwelvarenvanLeiden,144[Chapter64].283HetwelvarenvanLeiden,144[Chapter64]

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3.2.3TheOrange‐Republic

De la Court’s severe criticism of certain corrupt practices of princes, in Interest vanHolland

essentially entailed anti‐Orangism. It reflected a long‐term constitutional crisis of the

stadholderateintheDutchrepublic,whichusuallyeruptedunderforeignpoliticalpressures.284

ThestadholderatewascreatedbyEmperorCharlesVtoreplacetheabsentHabsburgrulerand

retained by the Union of Utrecht from 1579 onwards.285 This office comprised a hybrid

collectionofpowers,privilegesandinformalinfluences.SinceinpracticetheprincesofOrange

successivelyoccupiedtheoffice,thestadholderatewasalsoadynasticinstitution.Theprovincial

estates chose the stadholder independently from each other. The States General awarded the

stadholderwith thehighestmilitaryofficeofcaptain‐general in thecontextof thewaragainst

Spain. Formally, the stadholderate was a civil office, which had developed de facto into an

importantmilitaryone.286Rowencallsthestadholderatetherefore‘animprovisation’andstates

that ‘it was difficult for contemporaries to fit it into the standard categories of political

analysis’.287

The joint Orange‐office of stadholder and captain‐general proved to be a danger for the

States of Holland in the crisis years of 1618 and 1650, when respectively the Stadholders

Maurice andWilliam II of Orange pressured successfully the provincial assembly bymilitary

force.Duringreligiousdisputesin1610s,aconflictrosebetweentheStatesofHollandandthe

StatesGeneralaboutthelegalpowertoorganizemilitaryforcestoquellinternalreligiousriots.

On theauthorityof theStatesGeneral, StadholderMauricepressured theStatesofHollandby

militaryforceandarrestedtheGrandPensionaryofHolland,JohanvanOldenbarnevelt,in1618,

whowastriedandexecutedin1619.In1650,Maurice’snephew,StadholderWilliamIIandthe

States of Holland were involved in a conflict about reduction of the army, which resulted in

William’sattempttotakeoverthecityofAmsterdambyforceandthearrestofeightmembersof                                                            284Klashorst, “Metten schijnvanmonarchie getempert”, 99;Rowen stated that from the1650suntil the fall of theDutchRepublic in1759, ‘thecentralconstitutionalquestionbecamethestadholdership, itsdesirabilityand itsveryexistence. It was not whether the country should be a republic or a monarchy, as in nineteenth‐century France.’Rowen, JohndeWitt, 54;WygerVelemaunderlines this: ‘anti‐monarchismwas theoutcomeof adomesticpoliticalneed.’Hestressesthatitwouldbe‘incorrecttoequateOrangismwithmonarchism’.However,Velemabelieves‘anti‐monarchism’tobetheessentialaspectofatypeofDutch‘republicanism’thatencompassedasystematicrejectionofmonarchy,asheobservesinDelaCourt’swritings.Velema,‘“ThataRepublicisbetterthanamonarchy”’,12.285 Actually Charles V installed three stadholders corresponding to the three administrative parts of the northernNetherlandsin1543.AccordingtoJonathanIsrael,theUnionofUtrechtextendedthepowersofthestadholderateforitwasdecided thathemust takeup themediatorpositionbetweenprovinces in the absenceof a king. Israel,TheDutchRepublic,301;ForfurtherinformationontheUnionofUtrechtreadJohanChristiaanBoogman, ‘TheUnionofUtrecht:itsGenesisandConsequences’,BMGN–LowCountriesHistoricalReview94:3(1997),377‐407.286Israel,TheDutchRepublic, 305; Levillain, ‘L’Angleterrede laRestauration’, 4;Velema, “That aRepublic is betterthanamonarchy”,11–12. 287HerbertH.Rowen,ThePrincesofOrange.TheStadholdersintheDutchRepublic(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1988),ix,1.

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the provincial assembly of Holland.288 His premature death, however, paved the way for the

stadholderlessregime.

RohanconsideredthatitwasMaurice’sparticularinteresttopursuecontinuouswarfare.289

Interestingly, the princes of Orange themselves even argued that their aspirations benefitted

fromastrongarmyandanOrange‐militarycommand,astheirmostimportantpowerplaywas

participatingintheEuropeanwars.In1674StadholderWilliamIIItoldtheambassadorGabriel

Sylvius that ‘Hewas right and itwas inhis interest (…) to favour thepursuit ofwar inorder

therebytoestablishhisauthority.’290Afterthemeltdownofthestadholderlessregimein1672,

hewasofferedarangeofnobletitlesbutheconstantlydeclined.AccordingtoCharles‐Édouard

Levillain, he preferred to stretch the stadholderate to its full capacity; ‘Better awarrior king

without a kingdom than awarrior kingwithout an army.’291 His father,William II of Orange,

however, had severely overstretched the legitimate scope of the stadholderate in 1650. The

peace with Spain was an utmost nuisance forWilliam II as he tellingly wrote to the French

ambassador d’Estrades: ‘Iwish that I could break the necks of all the villains that signed the

peace.’292HestressedtheimportanceofwarfarefortheDutchnobilityandtheutteregoismof

Hollandmerchant‐regents: ‘TheMerchants never think of anything other than commerce and

how topromote it, theydonot lookout for the restof the countryand theNobility.’293Leslie

PricearguesthatWilliamIIhadactedratherrashlyfromsheerfrustrationatHolland’sattempts

to limit thenumberofhis troops.294Thestadholderless regimebuilton the recentmemoryof

William’s 1650 subversion of the rule of law, in the light ofwhichMaurice’s actions of 1618

lookedalotmoresinister.295

                                                            288 Itwasan ‘attempt’, forhis landforceswerespottedbyamessengeronhisroutetoAmsterdam.Themessengerwarnedthecityandsodefensivemeasurescouldbetaken.Israel,‘TheStadtholderateofWilliamII,1647–1650’,TheDutchRepublic,595‐609.289However,Maurice’sinterest‘wasjoinedwiththetrueinterestoftheStates’,becausetheUnitedProvinces‘flourishby thecontinuationofwarre.’Rohan,ATreatiseof the Interestof thePrincesandStatesofChristendome,84‐85,32;Dutchpoliticaldebatesregardingwarandpeaceshiftedafter1648, fromanemphasison theprofitofwarfaretoastressofthebenefitsofpeace.HansW.Blom, ‘Oorlog,handelenstaatsbelanginhetpolitiekdenkenrond1648’,Dezeventiendeeeuw13(1997),89‐96.290Quoted fromCharlesÉdouardLevillain, ‘WilliamIII’sMilitaryandPoliticalCareer inNeo‐romanContext,1672–1702,’TheHistoricalJournal48:2(2005),213–350,p.322.291Levillain,‘WilliamIII’sMilitaryandPoliticallyCareer’,327and333.292 Roeland Harms, De uitvinding van de publieke opinie: pamfletten als massamedia in de zeventiende eeuw(Amsterdam:AmsterdamUniversityPress,2011),92: ‘Ikwoudatikallenschurken,diedenvredegeslotenhebben,denneklatenbreken.’293 Harms,Deuitvinding vandepubliekeopinie,92; ‘De Coopluyden denkcen nievers op als op de trafyc en die tebeneficieren,voorderestvanhetlandtendenAdeldaersijnse[zienze,RoelandHarms]nietnaerom.’294 The States of Holland only overstretched its authoritywhen theypaid off troops assigned to them in order toreduce thewarbudget and toblockplannedwarfare againstHabsburg‐Spain. JohnL. Price,Hollandand theDutchRepublicintheSeventeenthCentury:ThePoliticsofParticularism(Clarendon:OxfordUniversityPress,1994),159,163‐164.Pricestatesonp.159:‘Inanycase,hewasverymuchanexceptionamongthestadhouders,whoingeneralwerenomorelikelytowant,ortobeable,todestroythepoweroftheregentsthancontemporarymonarchswereabletocontemplaterulingwithoutnobilities.’295Price,HollandandtheDutchRepublic,170.

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3.2.4Thestadholderlessregime:warfare,taxation,debating‘interest’and‘freedom’

All this isnottosaythatamilitaristicaggrandisementwasexclusivetotheprincesofOrange.

Therepublicanregimeof JohandeWitt feltno lessobligedtoparticipate inthewarsbetween

European rulers. During the 1650s the Dutch Republic fought the English in 1652‐1654,

intervenedintheBalticareaagainstSwedenandEnglandin1656‐1659,plannedtointervenein

Münsterlandin1657andpursuedwarfareagainstPortugalin1657‐1660.296Duringthe1660s,

apart fromtensionswithEngland leadingupto theSecondAnglo‐DutchWar(1665‐1667),De

Witt’smain concern regarding foreign affairswas to keep a safe distance from the ascending

Frenchmonarchy.ShortlyafterthePeaceofPyreneesin1659,Spainhalvedthesizeofitsarmy

in the Spanish Netherlands, leaving the south of the Dutch Union vulnerable to a potential

French invasion. Nonetheless,many Dutch regents shared scepticism about the usefulness of

SpainasanallyagainstFranceandviewedthelatterasaprofitablebusinesspartner.297In1662

a Franco‐Dutch defensive alliancewas signed. A famousDutch sloganwas: ‘Gallia amica, non

vicina’[ratherFranceasfriend,thanneighbour].298

War related burdens brought great pressure to the Dutch inhabitants during the

stadholderless regime. After the peace of 1648, Dutch war expenses fell drastically, but rose

againduetothenaval interventionintheBaltic in1658andpeakedduringtheSecondAnglo‐

DutchWar (over30million guilders in1665 compared to22million guilders annually in the

1630s). Moreover, after 1648 debt charges, especially Holland’s, rose, even though De Witt

managedtolowertheminthebeginningofthe1650suntilDutchwarfareincreasedattheendof

the decade.299 The subsequent rise in taxation, sale of loans, annuities and new short‐term

obligationsproducedamountingdiscontentamongstDutchinhabitants.300

ScholarshavestressedtheexistenceofaDutch ‘discussionculture’thatcouldmobilisethe

population, largely through pamphlets.301 Gert Klashorst remarks that particularly during the

epochof ‘TrueFreedom’(1650‐1672)pamphletdebatesragedoutsidegovernmentalbodiesin

the Dutch Republic and the regime attempted to influence Dutch ‘opinion’.302 The minority

                                                            296Israel,TheDutchRepublic,637‐638:in155870,000men,in166133,000menandsoonafter20,000men.Between1667and1712FrancerepeatedlyinvadedtheSpanishNetherlands,whichwillbediscussedinthefollowingchaptersonLisolaandValkenier.297Israel,TheDutchRepublic,744.298 Rowen, Johan de Witt, 115‐124; Gijs Rommelse, The Second Anglo‐Dutch War (1665‐1667) Raison d’état,mercantilismandmaritimestrife(Hilversum:Verloren,2006),73‐75.299ThegovernmentaldebtoftheUnionhadrisenfrom923000guildersin1596toalmost14millionguildersin1650,anamountthatsteadilygrewduringthe1650s.Provincialdebtlikewiserose,andHolland’sdebtwaseventenfoldtheamountoftheUnion’sdebtin1700(200millionguilders).Marjolein‘tHart,‘Themeritsofafinancialrevolution’,16‐20.300LucPanhuysen,DeWareVrijheid.DelevensvanJohanenCornelisdeWitt(Amsterdam:Atlas,2005),296.301WillemFrijhoffandMarijkeSpies,DutchCultureinaEuropeanPerspective:1650,hard‐wonunity(Assen:RoyalvanGorcum, 2004), 220;Michel Reinders,PrintedPandemonium:PopularPrintandPolitics in theNetherlands1650‐72(Leiden:Brill,2013).302Klashorst,‘Mettenschijnvanmonarchiegetempert’,157.

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regimeofDeWittwasfragileintimesofforeignthreatandeconomicdistress.Asstatedbefore,

DeWitthimselfevenestimatedthesupportforthestadholderlessregimeasonly‘one‐tenthof

onepercentofthecommonpeople’.303LucvanPanhuysenarguesthattheprimaryreasonforDe

WitttoaddtwochapterstoInterestvanHollandwas‘specificallytodefendtheplagueofexcise

duties,customsduties,tenth,twentieth,hundredsandtwo‐hundredspennies’.304

Thus, the stadholderless regime was stuck between intensified European warfare and

growing hostility to high and new taxation,whichwas exacerbated by an Orangist revival in

1660‐1661.Aswiththeconstitutionalcrisisof1618,thatof1650fuelledpamphletwarsabout

whopossessedthesupremepoweroverforeignpolicyandtheUnion’sarmy.305Fromthe1650s

onwards,animportanttropeinthesepamphletswas‘interest’,i.e.theself‐interestoftheprince

orregents,asopposedtothe‘true’interestofthedifferentprovincesortheUnitedProvinces.306

Against the claim that the princes of Orange were driven by self‐interest to harm the ‘true

interest’, many defenders of the stadholderate argued that in the ‘mixed constitution’ the

passionandself‐interestweresubordinatedtothecommoninterestbythebalancingdynamics

of themonarchicandaristocraticelements.Asstatedabove, thecentral issue inthese interest

debateswastheroleoftheprinceofOrangeconveyedthroughforeignpolicy,whethertopursue

anoffensivewarfareagainstthegreatEuropeandynastiessuchasFrance,orresumewaragainst

Spain,andthereforenecessarilytosustainlargelandforcesandhightaxes;ortostriveforpeace

supportedbyastrongfleettoprotecttheprosperoustrade.SupportersoftheHouseofOrange

generallyadvocatedthe firstoption,arguingthatonlytheprinceofOrangewithhiscombined

politicalandmilitaryofficescouldprotecttheinterestoftheUnitedProvinces.Authorsopposing

anOrange‐stadholderateoftenpromotedthesecondoption,reasoningthatgiventheirwarlike

castofmind, theprinceswouldonly further their self‐interestandruin theDutchRepublic.A

                                                            303JohandeWitttoVanBeveringhon11July1953,BrievenvanJohandeWittvolume1,R.FruinandG.W.Kernkamp(eds.),(Amsterdam:Müller,1906),blz96.304Panhuysen,DeWareVrijheid,297.Penniesweredifferenttaxationsonmovableandrealgoods.305Theyears1650,with1618and1672werethethreepeakyearsoftheGoldenAgeforbothquantityandvehemenceofpoliticalandtheological‐politicaltractsissuingfromtheDutchpresses.’Israel,TheDutchRepublic,608.306Althoughwritingsonreasonofstate,thearcanaandTacitismwerepreviouslyavailableintheDutchrepublic,thelittle scholarship there is on this topic observes a popular use of the idiom of ‘interest’ from the 1650s onwards,largelyinfluencedbythepeacenegotiationsatWestphaliaandtheconsequentpublicationof‘critical‐currentaffairs’writings,filledwithforeigntractsandtreatisesusingthisidiom,suchasthediplomatLieuwevanAitzema’spolitical‐historicalSakenvanStaetenOorlogh(1657‐1671).Blom,‘Oorlog,handelenstaatsbelanginhetpolitiekedenkenrond1648’, 89. Blom points especially toMunstersPraetie:DeliberantDum fingerenesciunt (1646) inwhich the use ofreason of state terminology takes center stage in explaining that solely ‘personal benefit’, which the French callInteresse’determinessuchnegotiations;Otherpamphletsaretobefound:PierredeTouche.DesveritablesInterestsdesProvincesUniesduPaïs‐bas:etDesIntentionsdesdeuxCouronnes,furlestraittezdePaix.SecondeEdition(Dordrecht,1647);LettreescriteparvnGentilhommeFrancoysfaisantprofessionde laReligionReformée,avnamyHollandois,ausujetdeslibellesdiffamatoiresquisepublientenHollandecontrelesFrancois,&purfairevoirquel’InterestetseuretédelavrayeReligiontantdehorsquededanslesProvincesUnies[…]dePaixsanselle(Hamburg,1647);Foraspecificpamphlet as part of ‘critical‐current affairs’ genre see: Staet representerende de generale affairen, midstgadersd’hoedanicheden ende gestalenis van alle koninckrijcken, prinsdommen ende republiquen van Europa. Vanden Jaren1654.Totden jaere1655(TheHague,1655);Notably, the influenceof the1648‐negotitationsshouldberesearchedfurther, as well as the earlier discussed similarities between 1650s‐1670s English and Dutch interest analyses,whereinRohan’sDel’interestappearstohaveakeyposition.

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famous early exampleof theuse of ‘interest’ isDeWitt’s ownDeductie,oftedeclaratievande

StatenvanHollandtenWest‐Vrieslandtof1654,justifyingtheexclusionoftheHouseofOrange

laiddowninthehighlycontroversialActofExclusion,signedwiththeCromwellianregime.307

IntheDutchRepublictheterm‘freedom/liberty’washighlycontestedandusedbymany

authors of different factions to state their respective claims.308 Klashorst examined a diverse

rangeofofficialdocumentsandpamphlets from theperiodof ‘True ‘Freedom’, andconcluded

thatpolitical‘liberty’meantprimarilythesecurepossessionandtheunthreatenedenjoymentof

one’sownspecial ‘liberties’, i.e.propertyandprivileges.WhiledocumentsofZeelandstressed

OrangeasthedefenderoftheancientprivilegesagainstSpanishservitudeandviewedtheUnion

ofUtrechtof1579astheconstitutionalrestrictiononHolland’sprovincialsovereignty,Holland’s

official papers argued for an absolute provincial sovereignty that chiefly entailed the right to

refuseanyfinancialrequestfromotherparties.Moreover,Klashorstsuggeststhattheterm‘free

republic’inHolland’sofficialpapers,primarilymeantfreedomfrominterferenceoftheHouseof

Orange. In the pamphlets he investigated, Klashorst observed similar patterns. ‘Orangists’

usuallyapplied‘freedom’totheentireDutchRepublicoftheSevenUnitedProvinceswhilepro‐

DeWittpamphleteersargued for theabsolutesupremepowerofHolland.309Moreover,within

thecommercialDutchRepublic‘liberty’wasalsoregardedastheruleoflawthatfosteredcrucial

protectionoftradeandcommerce.310

                                                            307Apartfromdefendingprovincialsovereignty,DeWitt,similarlytoDelaCourt,warnedforcoerciveprincelyrule,forcefullyoverthrowingregimesruledbyconsentandlaw,illustratedbymanyrecenthistoricalexamples,especiallyWilliamII’scoupd’étatof1650.Deductie,oftedeclaratievandeStatenvanHollandtenWest‐Vrieslandt(TheHague,1654);Alreadyduring the firstAnglo‐DutchWar (1652‐1654), but especially after thepublication ofDe la Court’sInterestofHollandin1662andtheFrenchinvasionin1672,anexplosiveriseofDutchpublicationswith‘interest’intheir titles is detectable, used in political and religious issues. See for instance:Hoe veel deVereenigdeProvintienbehoortgelegentezijn,deher‐stellingevandenconinckvanGroot‐Britangie(TheHague:H.Cornelsz.,1653);HollandsOp‐Komst, of Bedenkingen op de schaadelyke Schriften, genaamt Grafelyke Regeeringe en Interest van Holland uit‐gegevendoorV.D.H.tendienstevanalleliefhebersdiehetwareInterestvanHollandbeminnen(Leiden,1662);I.N.D.P.[JeanNicholss de Parival],Ware interest vanHolland;gebouwd opde ruïnen vanden Interest vanHolland, onlangsuitgegevendoorD.V.H.(Leiden:JanPrincen,1662);DentegenwoordigeninterestderChristenprincen(Enkhuizen:DirkKlaer‐Oogh, 1662); Johan Corbet,Het interest vanEngelandt, in dematerie van religie (Amsterdam: Steven Swart,1663); Gelasius Mullens [Guilielmus Saldenus],Neerlands interest, tot vrede der kercke, enwegh‐neminge van alleopkomendemisverstandenindeselve(Middelburg:YemantHendricksz.,1664);L’interestdel’Allemagne,engeneraletenparticvlier (Cologne:PierreMarteau,1668 [printed in theNetherlandsbyWeller]); WillemGuthry,Hetgrooteinterest van een christen; ofteHet deel van een geloovige getoetst […]wie heeft ende hoe te krijghen, […] En in ‘tNederlandts vertaaldtdoor JacobusKoelman (Vlissingen; Abrahamvan Laren, 1669);DavidMontanus,Stemmedesgejuygs endesheilsover’tgroote interest van een christen […] ingezangen vervat (Vlissingen: Abrahamvan Laren,1672);Holland’s interest, gestelt tegen dat van Jan deWitt; voor‐gevallen tusschenHans, raedts‐heer, enArent, eenborger (1672); Engelands interest, ofte tegenwoordich waerachtig belangh. By een trouwhertigh lief‐hebber vanEngelands eere desselfs en gantsch christen‐rijcks vrede, uit D’Engelsche spraeck in de Neder‐duytsche overgeset[Translated from English] (1672); Discoursen over den tegenwoordigen interest van het landt. Tusschen een Zeeu,Hollanderenraedsheer(Amsterdam,1672);[JosephHill],TheinterestoftheseUnitedProvinces.BeingadefenceoftheZeelander choice.Byawellwisherof the reformed religion,and thewellfareof these countries (Middelburg: ThomasBerry,1672);Deschoolenderprince,eninterestdervoornaemstepotentatedeswerelts(Cologne,H.Albedeuyt,1673).308Blom, ‘TheRepublicanMirror’,97;For long‐termDutch intellectual traditionofarguing libertyseeEcoHaitsmaMulierandWygerVelema,and(eds.),Vrijheid:eengeschiedenisvandevijftiendetotdetwintigsteeeuw(Amsterdam:AmsterdamUniversityPress,1999).309Klashorst,‘Mettenschijnvanmonarchiegetempert’,165‐176.310 Ida Nijenhuiswrites, ‘civil liberty –the rule of law‐ became an essential feature of commercial society’ for thesimplereasonthattradeneededthebasicjudicialprotectionofpropertyandperson.‘Republicanliberty’inthissense,promoted‘wealthandnumbers’.IdaNijenhuis,“ShiningComet,FallingMeteor”.ReflectionsontheDutchrepublicasa

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Constitutionaldebatesonthe ‘freerepublic’311overlappedwithdebatesabout freedom

of consciencewhich, asMartin van Gelderen states, ‘was the core of all Dutch debates’.312 In

1618theologicaldebatesbetweenorthodoxCounter‐RemonstrantsandmoderateRemonstrants

ledtodiscussionsaboutwhoheldsupremeauthorityinconfessionalmatters,theChurchorthe

States General, or perhaps the individual provinces or towns? Hugo Grotius had provided a

strong defence of freedom of conscience and for governmental authority over church affairs,

deeming the church an intrinsic member of the res publica. However, Maurice of Orange

successfully intervened on the side of orthodox Counter‐Remonstrants.313 Echoing these

troubles,duringthe1650s‐1660sa‘Voetian‐Cocceiancontroversy’ragedintheDutchRepublic.

ItinitiallyinvolvedtheologicaldisputesaboutSabbathobservance,butdevelopedintopolitical

debates. TheorthodoxCalvinist ‘Voetians’, strict anti‐Cartesians and in favourof anti‐Catholic

legislation,attemptedtoenforcestricterreformedmannersinsociety,regardedgovernmentas

aninstrumentforthis,andassociatedwithOrangismtocounterthepoliticalprimacyofHolland.

Orangist pamphleteers had practically monopolised the claim of being the ‘protector of the

fatherland’andDutchCalvinism,bothallegedlyfreedfrom‘Spanishtyranny’bythecourageous

princes of Orange.314 The ‘Cocceian’ adherents, affiliated with De Witt‐faction and against

orthodoxCalvinistprimacy in society,proposedmoremoderateworship, andstressedcareful

readingbyskilledphilologistsofthecomplexBible.Pro‐DeWittpamphleteersfrequentlyargued

alongGrotianlines,defendingtheregents’powertomediateinchurchaffairs,thesebeingaffairs

oftherespublica,andpleadedforgreaterfreedominworship.315

3.2.5TheOrangistrevivalof1660‐1661

De la Court wrote Interest vanHolland at the height of an Orangist revival in 1660‐1661, in

defence of the stadholderless regime (1650–1672). After Stadholder William II of Orange

suddenlydiedofsmallpox in1650, themajorityofprovinces, ledbyHolland,decidedto leave

theofficeofstadholdervacant,adecisionthatlastedforjustovertwodecades.TheStadholder’s

son, princeWilliam, was born eight days after his father’s death. The presence of the young

Princeremainedaconstantthreattotheregime,especiallyintroubledtimesoppositiontothe

                                                                                                                                                                                          CommercialPowerduringtheSecondStadholderlessEra’, inJ.A.F.deJongsteandA.J.Veenendaal(eds.),AnthonieHeinsiusandtheDutchRepublic,1688‐1720:Politics,War,andFinance(TheHague:InstituteofNetherlandsHistory,2002),115‐129,p.120.311Blom,‘TheRepublicanMirror’,97‐98.312 Martin van Gelderen, ‘Arminian trouble: Calvinists debates on freedom’, in Martin van Gelderen and QuentinSkinner(eds.),FreedomandtheConstructionofEurope(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2009),21‐37,p.22.313VanGelderenpointstotheironythattheinterventionofOrangestressedthedefactopowerofcivilgovernmentinchurchmatters.VanGelderen,‘Arminiantrouble’,31‐36;314IngmarVroomen,TaalvandeRepubliek.315Israel,TheDutchRepublic,661‐666;Klashorst,“Mettendeschijnvanmonarchiegetempert”,165‐166.

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regimeoftenturned into fierceOrangism. In thebeginningof the1660sDe laCourtsetout to

diminishthisthreat.Inthisperiod,thefortunesoftheHouseofOrangewererevivingbecauseof

the restoration of the English King Charles II and his favouring of the interests and political

prospects of the young Orange‐Prince William, his nephew. Furthermore, Princess Mary,

William’smother and Charles’ sister, promoted her son’s cause to each province. During this

periodofOrangistresurgence,DelaCourtsentpartsofhismanuscripttoDeWitttobereadand

correctedbeforepublishingitatthebeginningof1662.

However,DutchRoyalismwasnot co‐extensivewithOrangism,asadherentsof theDe

WittfactionalsosupportedtheStuartcause.Manyregentswerewillingtosupportthehouseof

Orange now that its fortunes were reviving. When in the spring of 1660 Charles spent two

monthsintheDutchRepublicbeforesailingtoEngland,provincialassembliesandtowncouncils

competedwitheachotherintheireffortstopleasetheking,culminatingintheexorbitant‘Dutch

Gift’: this included severalRenaissancepaintings and a yacht. Jonathan Israel speaks ofmany

opportunistsamongtheregents,whowereimpressedbytheadvantages,politicalandeconomic,

of better relationswith Englandmore than they feared any Orangist revival. 316 In 1661, the

provincesofZeeland,Friesland,OverijsselandGelderland,andeventheHollandcitiesofLeiden

and Haarlem proposed the re‐instalment of the Prince of Orange. In February of that year,

William wrote to his uncle that ‘there will never be a better opportunity to secure that

designation’.317At theendof1661,DeWittwassavedbyrenewedAnglo‐Dutch tensionsover

tradeespeciallyintheCaribbeanandWestAfrica.TheprovinceofZeelandhadhugeinterestsin

these markets, which outweighed support for the Orange‐Stadholder. Similar priorities were

evident inHollandandsowith theresurgenceofAnglo‐Dutch tensions therewasadecline in

Orangism.318

Recently, Helmer Helmers has explained the seeming paradox of a Dutch ‘Royalist

Republic’ by researchingadiverse rangeof sources frompamphlets topaintings.Widespread

StuartsupportintheDutchRepublicwasformedfromthelate1640sonwards,whenbothsides

in the civilwar issued ferociouspropagandacampaigns to influenceDutch ‘opinion’,but after

theexecutionofCharlesI,theDutchclosedranks.Royalistpropagandaappealedtoawiderange

ofDutchmen,notonlytotheOrangists,butalsotomoremoderateRemonstrantbelievers,who

identified with the Church of England and the struggle against the political fanaticism of

orthodoxProtestants.Furthermore, theregicide, the totalcollapseofcivilorderandsustained

                                                            316Israel,TheDutchRepublic,751‐758.317WoutTroost,Stadhouder‐koningWillemIII:eenpolitiekebiografie(Hilversum:UitgeverijVerloren,2001),44.318Duringthecourseof1662,Anglo‐DutchnegotiationsinLondonstagnated(fortheDutchamajorstickingpointwasCromwell’sprotectionistNavigationAct).DeWittandhissupporters,backedbytheprovincesofZeelandandUtrecht,evenpreferredwarwithEngland.Israel,TheDutchRepublic,751‐758.

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civilwarwerestronglydislikedbyalmostallDutchmen.CharlesIwaswidelyseenasapolitical

andreligiousmartyr,whereasCromwelllargelyemergedasatruetyrantinDutchopinion.319

Moreover,Helmerunderlinesthat‘monarchistandabsolutistmodesofthoughtwereas

deeply embedded in the United Provinces as anywhere else in Europe.’ He also stresses the

dominance of mixed constitution‐arguments in Dutch political thought as a cause for Dutch

resistance to English ‘republican’ arguments. Because of the Orangist revival of 1660 and its

powerfuldynasticconnectiontotheStuartmonarchy,DelaCourthadtocomeupwithafierce

attackonthemixedconstitution,butnotablyavoidingreferencestoEnglishrepublicansandthe

EnglishCommonwealth that, in theeyesofmanyDutchmen,hadturnedout tobeacorrupted

kingdominallbutaname.320ThismayexplainthelackofexplicitreferencestoEnglishinterest

analyses, suchasNedham’s, in InterestvanHolland.321Theallegation thatakinglesspolity ‐as

theDutchRepublicwasfirstandforemostanaristocracy‐musthavehadastructuralaversionto

kingshipmighttrulydistortourunderstandingofcomtemporarybeliefsandpractices.

Insum,DelaCourtwroteInterestvanHollandinclosecooperationwithJohandeWittin

ordertocounteranOrangistRevivalandmountingdiscontentwithhightaxation intheDutch

Republic.De laCourtused the languageof interest, influencedbynewphilosophicalviewson

humannature,andcomplementedwithelementsofcontemporarycritiquesof ‘wardespotism’

to counter the public clamour for the re‐instatement of theHouse of Orange in the offices of

stadholder and captain general. The fact that the DeWitt‐regime ruledwithout the House of

Orangemadeitnolessa, thoughperhapsmorereluctant,participant intheEuropeanmilitary

competition. Its inhabitantswereoppressedbywar‐related taxburdensandcalledout for the

illustrious House of Orange, by the Stuart Restoration even more illustrious, to defend their

economic, political and religious liberties against the oligarchic regents. De la Court

counterattacked with the argument that princes, courtiers, priests, nobles and soldiers with

their lust for warfare, power and luxuries would destroy Holland from within, robbing

                                                            319AsHelmers concludes: ‘TheRestoration symbolizedmany restorations atonce. (…)Charles II’s restorationwasalso the restoration of his father, whose fate had made such a profound impression in the Dutch Republic. (...)Secondly,friendandfoeintheDutchRepublicagreedthattherestorationoftheStuartsinEnglandwouldleadtotherestorationoftheHouseofOrangeintheDutchRepublic.(...)DutchobserversalsoreadanotherrestorationinCharlesII’sreturntograce:thatofJohanvanOldenbarnevelt[symbolforRemonstrantviews](…)TheRestorationofCharlesII, they believed, would bolster the Anglo‐Dutch opposition to Anglo‐Dutch‐Scoto Puritanism (…). Lastly, theRestorationofCharlesII,asasignofGod,alsosymbolizedageneralrestorationoforder.’Helmers,RoyalistRepublic,259‐261.320 Helmers, Royalist Republic, cited from 262, 313. Helmers points to the ‘absolutist tendency in Dutch“republicanism”, as some political writers such as Dirck Graswinckel applied divine right theories to regents andothersarguedaHobbesiannotionofsovereignty.Helmers,RoyalistRepublic,132.321 Helmers’ argument –because of the widespread Dutch support for Stuart, Dutch authors needed to avoidreferencestoEnglish‘republicanrebels’‐appearsmoreconvincingthanthatofArthurWeststeijn,whoclaimsthatDelaCourt‘didnotlookwestwardsforanymajorinspiration.’Bycomparingwritingson‘republicanism’inEnglandandthe United Provinces between 1650 and 1670,Weststeijn argues that De la Court radically differed from English‘republicanwritings’becauseDe laCourt categorically rejectedanymonarchical element in themixedconstitutionanddefendeda republicanself‐containedcity‐state insteadofa centralizedmonarchical republic, asHarrington.A.Weststeijn, ‘Why the Dutch Didn’t Read Harrington: Anglo‐Dutch Republican Exchanges, c. 1650–1670’, in GabyMahlberg/DirkWiemann(eds.),EuropeanContextsforEnglishRepublicanism(Aldershot:Ashgate,2013),105‐120.

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inhabitantsoftheirliberties,livelihoodsandlivesandenslavingthemall.Hisargumenthowever

entailednorejectionofmonarchyassuch,sincehisattackwasdirectedspecificallyatasystem

ofdespoticrulethathadonlyrecentlyemergedinEurope,aswesawinhisHetwelvarenderstad

Leyden. InInterestvanHollandDelaCourtevendeemedthemonarchyofLouisXIVandother

northern monarchies legitimate. He wrote against a hereditary kingly rule and office in the

handsoftheOrangedynasty.Heproposedaharmonyofinterestsbetweenrulersandruledthat

wouldupholdtheruleoflawandsocouldprotectthefreedomoftradeandofreligion.Buthow

didthevocabularyofinterestfunctioninthistreatise?OnwhatgroundsdidDelaCourtattack

the House of Orange? And how precisely did he perceive the relation between church and

government?Furthermore,inwhatwayshouldHollandfunctionwithintheDutchRepublicand

howshouldit,withouttheHouseofOrange,actintheEuropeansocietyofprinces;whatspecific

foreign policies should it follow?And, lastly, howdidDe la Court visualise ‘true freedom’ for

Holland?

3.3Reasonofstateand‘wardespotism’inInterestvanHolland

Interest of Holland consists of a long theoretical preface, in which De la Court’s critique of

certainprincelypracticesiselaborated,andforty‐sevenchapters.Firstheanalysestheinterest

of Holland, arguing that the foundations of Holland’s splendour are fishery, commerce and

manufacture(ChaptersI‐XII).Itshouldbeprotectedbythe‘FreedomofallReligions’,freedomof

immigration and trade, and above all by a reduction of taxation (XIII‐XVI). This splendour,

however,isthreatenedbyclosedtradecompanies,byrestrictionsonimmigrationandreligious

worship,byheavytaxesandespeciallythehighconvoyburdens(XVII‐XXI).Thefundamentsof

Holland’sinterestarecurrentlynotmaintainedandcertainlynotenhanced,aboveallduetothe

pursuitofwarfarebytheUnion(XXII‐XXV).TheanalysisofHolland’sinterestisfollowedupwith

aprofoundcritiqueofwarmongeringandrobbingprinces,explicitlycondemningtheprincesof

Orange as having robbedHolland of its liberties in their quest formilitary glory. De la Court

backs this critique by stressing the fortunes the ‘free government’ (government freed from

Orange)hadproducedbyprotectingthelibertiesofHolland’sinhabitants(XXVI‐XXI).Afterthat,

he offers his counsel on foreign policy andmilitary affairs. Since externalmilitary invasion is

very unlikely, the costly land forces are to be reduced. Military protection at sea, from a

commercialviewpoint,isvital.Hewarnsofalliances(defensiveandoffensive)withotherrulers,

since they contain a risk of being dragged into expensive and extremely destructive warfare

(XXXII‐XXXVIII). De la Court includes the other Dutch provinces in his anti‐alliances view.

HollandhasnoneedfortheUnionofUtrechtsinceHollandisinvinciblewithitsfortifiedcities

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andwillnolongerbeforcedintoawarduetothedynasticambitionsandrelationsoftheHouse

ofOrange,orbedividedbyinternalriftsbytheschemingofOrange(XXXIX‐XLIV).Heendswith

threeconcludingchaptersclaiming thatHolland’s interest isbestpromoted through ‘freedom,

protectionoftheseaandpeace’.322ThroughouttheentirecontentsofInterestvanHollandDela

CourtidentifiesandunderlinesthegreatestdangertoHolland’ssplendourandinhabitants:the

HouseofOrange.

His anti‐Orangism in Interest van Holland can be divided into three parts conveyed

throughtheterminologyof‘interest’.Firstly,DelaCourtrepresentedtheprovinceofHollandas

a single political and societal entity, with its own ‘interest’. In this way, he could present

‘Holland’ as a strong opponent of the House of Orange, and to a lesser extent of the other

provinces, within the United Provinces. For his attack on the House of Orange, De la Court

neededaproperprotagonist,ratherthansomeindividualregents.Likewise,onaEuropeanlevel

hepresented‘Holland’asaforcetobereckonedwith,withouttheneedforaprinceofOrange

leadingtroopsintobattle.Secondly,theauthorprovidedacritiqueofthenatureofmonarchical

rule,whichfunctionedasatheoreticalframeworkforhisrejectionofthestadholderate.Thirdly,

he analysed the interest ofHolland in relation to the three ‘super powers’: Spain, France and

England.HeconcludedthattheonlyconsiderableexternalthreattoHollandwasStuart‐England,

duetoitsdynasticconnectionswiththeHouseofOrange.

3.3.1‘Holland’unifiedinan‘interest’

Inthefirstchapter,DelaCourtquitesurprisinglywrotethatbecauseHollandwas‘notoneland,

it cannot have one Interest.’323 According to the author, historically the province of Holland

consisted of multiple republics, by which he meant the cities, poleis. In line with Grotius’

argumentaboutHolland’sancientconstitution,Holland’sheadofstatewasinitiallyacountand

thisofficewaslaterfilledbyastadholder,whowastobecontentedwithhisowndomains,and

asanadministratorshouldacceptthefactthateveryareaandcityoughttoberuledaccordingto

itsownhistoricallyestablishedlawsandcustoms.Itwasimmediatelycleartothereaderthatthe

stadholder, however, had overstretched these legal limitations to his rule as the Spanish‐

HabsburgsCountshaddonebeforehim.Strategically,DelaCourtexcusedhimselfforhislimited

knowledge of all themultiple political bodies,whichwith ‘diversity ofRulers, Subjects, lands,

andsituationcausednecessarilyadiversityofinterests’.324Soforthesakeofargumenthewould

goon todiscuss all the specific interests of the different cities and areasunderone title: ‘the                                                            322V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,265.323V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,1.324V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,2.

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interest of Holland’.325 Viewing Holland as consisting of multiple republics was far from

innovative,buthis interestconceptionofHollandwasarecent instrumentinDutchdebatesof

the1650sand1660s,whichDelaCourtpresentedindetailedanalysis.Notcivicvirtues,butthe

interestofHollandformedthecrucialanalyticalapparatusforassertingtheprovince’ssupreme

power.

Based on a geographical, demographic and historical analysis of Holland, De la Court

arguedthatthefoundationsofHolland’ssplendourarefishery,commerceandmanufacture,as

well as extremely powerful and densely populated cities. From official documents, often

appended to current affairs literature such as Aitzema’s326, he took various figures about

Holland’s population, economic activities and situation, such as fertile morgens of land

(400,000),yearlyincome(11millionguilders),volumeofsaltedfishorherringcaughtandsold

(300,000 ‘lasten’), and men in whale trade traveling to the North (12,0000).327 De la Court

calculated the population of Holland, employment and profit rates in various sectors and

concludedthatHollanddependedonfishery,commerceandmanufacture(agriculturealonewas

insufficienttosustainitspopulation).Fisherystimulatedcommerceandtogethertheypromoted

manufacture, such as the fabrication of fishing nets, ships, salt, silk, flax, wool, which bound

together the inhabitants of Holland. Furthermore, he explained in detail the historical rise of

Hollandasthemostmercantilepolityoftheworld.328HedefinedtheinterestofHollandas‘the

conservationandexpansionoftheinhabitantsoftheLand,consistingofregentsandsubjects’.329

Therichtextilemerchantdescribedthissplendourindemographicaswellaseconomicterms,

indeed,stressingacommercialinterestforHolland.Thissplendour,however,wasthreatenedby

closedtradecompanies,byrestrictionsonimmigrationandreligion,byheavytaxes,butabove

all,bywarmongeringprinces,accordingtoDelaCourt.

3.3.2The‘interest’of‘wardespotism’

ThesecondpartofDelaCourt’sattackontheHouseofOrangewasafiercecritiqueofcertain

coercive princely practices, i.e. his variation on attacks of ‘war despotism’. This critique

functionedasatheoreticalframeworkforhisrejectionoftheStadholderateandtheoccupancy

of thehighestmilitaryofficebyaprinceofOrange. Inhispreface,heprovidedamoregeneral

argumentagainstbellicosepoliciesofmonarchiesdrivenbyself‐interest.Thereaderwasoffered

adetailedreasoningtoshowthatHollandwasbetteroffwithoutaprinceofOrangeincharge.De                                                            325V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,2.326V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,6,65.327V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,5,6,10.328V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,[Chapters2–12],2‐56.329V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden.

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La Court described the interests ofmonarchies and republics or as he called the latter: ‘free

governments’.330Interestmeantthewellbeingoftherulersandsubjectscombined.Heassumed

that allmen always preferred self‐interest in all societies. Therefore he believed that a good

governmentdemandedthattherulersandtheruledhadthesameinterests;

‘While any country’s true interest consists of the welfare of the Rulers and Subjects

combined, and that in turn it evidently depends on a good government, somustmen

knowthatagoodgovernmentisnotwherethewellorill‐beingofthesubjectsdepends

onthevirtueorvicesoftherulers;but(whichisworthyofobservation)wherethewell

or ill‐being of the Rulers necessarily follows or depends on thewell or ill‐being of the

Subjects.’331

To follow the interest of state ought to be the object of government, as Rohan had

argued, but for the Dutch textile merchant this explicitly meant the conservation and the

numerical expansion of the inhabitants ofHolland rather than the ruler’s standing. Following

recently articulated conceptions of human nature, De la Court regarded self‐interest as an

effectivemechanismforconstitutinggovernment,sinceherejectedRohan’sclear‐cutopposition

betweenerraticpassionsandguidingreason.332Therefore,DelaCourtarguedforharmonising

these interests of the rulers and ruled. Moreover, he reconstructed the Ciceronian notion of

reconcilingtheself‐interestsofcitizenswiththegeneralinterest,notbystressingtheprimacyof

thegeneral interest,buttakingprivateinterestsorself‐loveasthefocalpointtoprocuregood

government.

The harmony of interest argument, already present in the writings of Boxhorn and

several English contemporaries, functioned primarily as a counter to the core Orangist

argument. In theOrangistpamphlets threeexplicit taskswereemphasised for the stadholder.

The first and most importantwas maintaining unity within the United Provinces; secondly,

representingthemajestasofthestate;thirdly,supportingeffectivegovernmentbyspeedingup

theexecutionofgovernmentaldecision‐making.Thestrongestcounterargumentofanti‐Orangist

pamphletswasthattheprinceisdrivenbyself‐interest.Bymeansofacomparableperspective

ofcommoninterestversusself‐interest,thestadholderlessregimeisjustifiedandpresentedas

necessary in thesepamphlets.333 InDe laCourt’s case,under theruleofone, theprince’s self‐

interest prevails over the self‐interests of his subjects,making aharmonisingof interests and

therefore good government impossible. In this way, he radicalised Boxhorn’s argument in                                                            330V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden.331V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden.332Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,39;Seepage48ofthisthesisforfurtherexplanation.333Klashort,‘Mettendeschijnvanmonarchiegetempert’,111‐112.

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categoricallyrejectingthestadholderateorthecommandoverthearmyfortheprinceofOrange

withintheDutchconstitutionalframework.

Anti‐Orangistargumentsalsoexpressedthefearthatthepre‐eminenceofthestadholder

would result in a monarchy; one way of making this point was to compare the office of

stadholder andmonarch, treating them as essentially the same. For De la Court the effective

collapseoftheseofficesintoonewasameanstoaccentuatethedifferencebetweenamonarchy

and a republic in the starkest of terms. Thewell‐being of the people differed greatly in these

forms of government. More importantly, the language of interest allowed him to frame his

criticism of monarchical rule reflecting commentaries of ‘war despotism’. De la Court

delegitimiseditbylistingthespecificmechanismsofaprincelysystemofgovernmentthathad

deleterious effects on its subjects. According to De la Court, the first and true interest of all

sovereignswastobuilduptheir lands,empireorcitiestosuchapowerfulposition,thatthese

were protected against external violence. He contended that monarchs, lords and ‘heads,’ by

their evil upbringing and living in splendour, followed their own lusts and handed over the

government to favourites and courtiers,whowould neglect this first interest. The interest of

monarchs, and their favourites and courtofficials,was tomaintain thepowerlessnessof their

subjects. He defined the interest of church officials, courtiers and soldiers as follows: ‘by

corruptionofgovernment,enrichingtheirselves,orseekinggreatness,elevatingthemonarchic

governmenttoheavenfortheirownprofit’.334Subjectsofamonarchweredeliberatelydeprived

ofknowledgeand judgmentby these ‘leechesof the state’.335 In contrast, the interestand ‘the

seconddutyofallRulersofRepublics andgreatCities’was to build and tomaintain large and

denselypopulatedcities,inorderthatallgovernors,magistratesandinhabitantswouldseetheir

profitsrising.DelaCourtreferstoexistingandearlierEuropeanrepublics,whereart,commerce

andthepopulationflourishedextremely.WithregardtotheinterestofHolland,hewritesthat:

'thepeople of theprovinceofHolland couldn't encounter a greater evil than tobe ruledby a

monarch,princeorhead.'336

De la Court promised the reader that he would conclude his preface with

counterarguments against the commonly accepted view that a monarchy is the best form of

government.337Actually,heaimedat rejecting thenotionof thenecessityof thestadholderate

for the province ofHolland, by explicitly questioning it.De la Court dismissed the idea of the

blunt, factional and bad‐tempered nature of Holland’s men, which was often used as an

argument for the necessity of an ‘eminent head’ backed by the rule of the Counts of Holland

(KingPhilipIIofSpainbeingthelastofficeholder)andtheirsuccessorstheOrange‐stadholders

                                                            334V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden.335V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden.336V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden.337V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden.

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ashistoricalproof.De laCourtreversed thisargument.SinceHollandersdependedon fishery,

manufactureandcommerce, theywerepeaceful.Only intimesofcoercionandsuppressionby

aneminentheadwouldtheyriseup,andhereferredtotheperiodoftheCountsaspredecessors

of the stadholders: ‘The times of the previous Counts were very horrifying times […] with

permanent abhorrent wars, revolts and atrocities caused by and solely to the benefit of the

eminent Head’.338 He continued this fictive debate by stating that one could argue that times

have changed over the last century and so could ask himself if under the Orange‐

stadholders/captain‐generals times were much happier than under the Counts. De la Court

achnowledgedthetransformationofHollandbyclaimingthathundredyearsagointheperiodof

theCountsHollandlargelydependedonagricultureanditscitiesweremilitarilypowerful,while

theCountshadnogreatsoldiers,fortifiedcitiesandfinances,andcouldonlyrelyonconsentfor

troopsandmoney.However,DelaCourtcynicallyfollowedthisupbystating

‘thatHollandnowadaysdependsoncommerce,andthataneminentHead,Captain

General, or Stadholder, here would have a bodyguard in the Hague, place of

Summons, as well as the favour of a heavily financed army, of all Priests, and

throughthem,thefavourofallcommoninhabitants.Andthathe,moreover,bythe

DeputiesoftheGeneralities,coulddisposeashepleasesofthoseinvinciblefrontier‐

cities of non electing Lands [Generality Lands under direct control of the States

General,MBK],providedthathewouldenforcehispowerbynoforeignAlliances.

In thiswayhe could inpassingoverpowermostofHolland’scities,whichnow lie

open, and therefor one could truly say: that theHollanders, by choosing such an

eminentHead,wouldberuledas ignorant lambsbyan irresistible [absolute,MBK]

Sovereign.’339

With military and clerical support, the princes of Orange could easily conquer and coerce

Holland’scities.Heendswith theclaimthat ‘agenerationofpeople in freedommuststruggle,

beforemencanjudgerightfully;inthiswaymenmustgivethesametoGodandtime,thereafter,

if these slavishadversaries [Orange supporters,MBK]will be survived, to pass judgementpro

and con.’340 Freedom in this sense is simply defined as government without an Orange‐

stadholder and captain general and stands in strict opposition with servitude. The stark

distinction he has drawn betweenmonarchies and republics, is used above all to isolate the

HouseofOrangeasalien toHolland’s interest.Rather thansystematically rejectingmonarchy,

De la Court attacked the rule of the princes of Orange as necessarily enslaving peace‐loving                                                            338V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden.339V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden.340V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden.

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Hollanders through military ambitions aided and abetted by religious indoctrination. It is a

clear‐cutexampleofwhatMarieConstanthascalled‘wardespotism’.

An important part of De la Court’s critique of the House of Orangewas stressing the

dangerof thecombinedofficesof captaingeneralandstadholderbeingheldby theprincesof

Orange. Opponents of Interest van Holland condemned him for this: ‘under the pretence of

politicaldiscourses,[DelaCourt]stirsupthestateagainsttheprinceofOrangesothattheywill

notmake him captain general’.341 De la Court regarded the offices of stadholder and captain

generalasincompatible,onthebasisofatheoreticalframeworkreiteratingGermanandFrench

critiques of ‘war despotism’.He stated that even an ‘eminent head’would always strive for a

situationof continuouswarfarewithhimselfassupremecommanderof thearmy.De laCourt

elucidatedthisstatementinchapter26,entitled:‘Todisintegrateintoamonarchyofone‐headed

government would mean an irreversible death.’ First of all, De la Court sardonically wrote:

‘Giventhatkingsandcaptaingeneralsaresounnecessaryintimesofpeaceandthattheirvirtue

isonlyobviousintimesofwar,sotheyforevercausestrifethroughouttheworld.’342Secondly,

De laCourtarguedthatwhenagreat lordpossessedanarmy,everyone’spropertieswouldbe

endangeredevenwhenhisofficewasconstitutionallyrestrained.Togetherwiththesoldiers‘the

ignorantpeoplewill choose thesideof agentle,politeandcourageous tyrant.’343Theregents,

includingthewisestandmosthonestamongstthem,wouldeventuallyhavetoacceptviolation

oftheseconstitutionalrestraintsandeventuallyacceptsubjection.

Followingthisargument,DelaCourtstatedthatthroughhiscourtandhisarmy,aruler

wouldputa financialstrainonallhissubjects,butespeciallyon itsprosperousmerchants.He

made it clear that by ruler, hemeant allmonarchs, princes, dukes, counts, earls, but also and

moreimportantly, ‘stadholdersandcaptaingenerals’.Theirloveformoneywasbasedontheir

love for luxuriesandwarfare.344Ashehadalreadysaid,warfarewasanecessarymeans fora

monarchtoremainfirmlyonhisthrone.Interestingly,DelaCourtunderlinesthegraveneedfor

moneyofthesewar‐drivenregimes:

‘Rulers, their favourites, and soldiers, as being evilhouseholders, continually seek

money;at leasttoenrichthemselves,atmosttospendittoabundanceandcrazy

warsandnowherecould they find thatmoreeasily, thanwith themerchants,who

havemanymoveable goods, and are not part of government, these [goods/cash

moneyMBK]are generallydemanded tobe loaned, orby refusal takenby force,

                                                            341CitedfromHarms,Deuitvindingvandepubliekeopinie,155.342V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,70–71.343V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,71.344V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,71‐72.

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andinbothcasesthemerchanthascertainlylosthisproperty.’345

Moreover,France,Spain,England,Denmark,SwedenandPolandalsoplunderthemerchantsat

seabytheirexcessivetollsandtheirfleets,

‘without protecting seaborne affairs, because the respective Rulers will not

command the Fleets themselves, and thusmust trust it to others;which neither

they,northeirfavourites,couldbecommittedto,exceptthatallcrewandwarfare

atseamustbepaidwithcash;andalsobecausethefavouriteswouldratherplunder

thetreasuriesofmonarchstoenrichthemselves,thantousethisforthegreatergood

ofthecountry.’346

Inchapters29and30attributedtoDeWitt,theGrandPensionarymakesacasefor,respectively,

‘why the inhabitants of Holland, by the government of the princes of Orange, are no longer

ruinedby[theterminationof]thegovernmentoftheprincesofOrange,’and‘whatgoodfruitthe

principlesofa freegovernmenthavealreadyyielded’.DeWittpresentsrecenthistoricalcases

thatdemonstrate thewar‐despotic practices of the House of Orange. He states that the First

Anglo‐DutchWarandthewarsintheBalticregion,whichallhappenedduringhisregime,were

theconsequencesofthedynasticrelationsoftheHouseofOrangewiththeEnglishkingCharles

IIandtheElectorofBrandenburgFredricWilhelm.ThelatterwasmarriedtoLouiseHenriettaof

Nassau,daughterofFrederikHendrikofOrange.AfterthedeathofthestadholderWilliamII,De

WitthadpetitionedtheEnglishCommonwealthforrenewalofthe1459‐TreatyofEntrecoursto

protectDutchcommerceandfisheryagainstthedamagingActofNavigation.Healsoaskedthe

RumpParliament fora friendship treaty.Butaccording toDeWitt, thiswasblockedby ‘those

whoattachedthemselvesasslavestothehouseofOrange’andtheyinstigatedthe‘dumbrabble’

againsttheambassadors.

Inchapter30DeWittgivesafewexamplesofthestadholders,drivenbyself‐interestand

passions and applying a divide‐and‐conquer policy in order to enhance their authority in the

face of Orangist arguments about the necessity of the stadholder. The princes of Orange

intervenedmilitarilyininternalconflictsnotwiththeinterestofHollandinmind,butpurelyon

thebasisofself‐interest,producingchaos,civildisorderandbloodshedtosubjecttheDutchto

their despotic rule. He states that ‘the greatest rupture happened recently in the United

Netherlands,[with]thesaddivisionoftheProvinceofOverijssel’in1654.Thestadholderofthe

northern provinces (Friesland, Groningen and Drenthe)William Frederick, Prince of Nassau‐

                                                            345V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,71‐72.346V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,72.

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Dietz and related to theHouseofOrange, had accepted theoffices of stadholder and captain‐

general, offered to him by only a part of the provincial States of Overijssel. It led to extreme

violencethat lasted fouryears.Luckily, the interventionof ‘theGrandPensionary’broughtthe

conflicttoanend,ashepraiseshisownactions.WorthyofobservationisDeWitt’sreferenceto

theendingof internalconflicts inHolland,whichwere inhisopinioncausedbytheprincesof

Orange;

‘all issues and disputes,which since the death of the late Prince of Orange have

erupted in greatnumbers everywheremostly by stirringup thedesire for slavery,

havebeensoothedandstoppedwithmuchbetterorderandeffectthan inthepast;

(…) whereas (…) the Stadholder often caused disputes, [and] always cherished

[disputes],inordertofurtherhisinterestandresources;(…)itbeingthemaximof

allGrandees,divide&impera,divideandproduceruptures,sothywillrule’.347

Moreover,DeWittaddsif theyoungprincehadhadthechancetostageacoupd’état in1650,

‘whocoulddoubt, that the lust for revengewouldhave shivered theentireState [ofHolland],

andgreatquantitiesofChristianbloodwouldhavebeensacrificedforthatpassion.’348

BesidescounteringOrangistarguments,DeWittalsoaimstojustifytheheavytaxburden

ofhisregime.This,heargued,wasalegacyoftheruleoftheOrange‐princes,withtheirdynastic

ambitionsandlustforglory.Again,weencounterattacksonwar‐despoticpracticesofprinces.

TheFrenchpiracyonDutchcommercialenterprisesintheLevantduringtheyearsof1650‐51

had cost tonsof gold.Nearly the entire treasury ofHollandwas spent on the ambitionof the

captaingeneral toraise large land forces,amongstother things.Theresourcesweresqueezed

from the Holland inhabitants uncompromisingly. As DeWitt writes so powerfully: ‘accepting

thatthesweatandbloodofthegoodinhabitantsofthesameProvinceweresqueezed.’349Under

the pretext of peace with Spain parts of the fleet had been sold and the remaining fleet put

towardsfightingtheRumpParliamentofEnglandbythecaptain‐general,toserveOrangefamily

interestswith the Stuart kings. To conclude the Grand Pensionary disqualifies the stadholder

WilliamIIasonewho isnot interested inhispolitical responsibilities.Hedescribesmonarchs

suchasWilliamasmostlyspendingtheirtimein‘hunting,bowling,dancingandotherinfamous

debaucheries’.350TheresultwasamassivetaxburdenforHollandamountingtothirteenmillion

guildersinrunningdebtandfortymillionininterest.

                                                            347V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,127‐128.348V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,129.349V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,100.350V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,101‐102.

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The stadholders andhis flatterers financed large land forces, garrisons and citadels in

ordertothreatenandeventuallysubjectHolland.DeWittwrites:

‘And firstly, what concerns the aforesaid negotiated hundred and forty million

guilderswiththerunningdebts,isitwellknown,andalsoeasytounderstand,that

the same burden by the Captain General and his flatterers, strangles the good

Regents, because the aforementioned Capital has been wasted in the pursuit of

ambitionandglorybythissaidCaptainGeneral,inordertosetuplargearmies,and

surprisesieges,whicharestill today,assaidbefore,aheavyburden forHolland;

and the thing to complain about the most was that when the abovementioned

FrontiercitieswereplacedatthedispositionoftheCaptainGeneral,withregardto

theappointmentoftheGovernors,orCommanders,andtheplacementofgarrisons

inthesame[cities,MBK],whenineveryrespect,thisonlyservedtocreatesomany

citadels,inordertomaintainHollandinshackles.’351

DeWittwritesabout‘usignorantpoorHollanders,whomayrightlybecalledstupidHollanders’.

Hemakesacomparisontoorphanedchildrenwhoareunawareoftheburdenstheycarryand

havecarriedfortheoutrageousexpendituresoftheHouseofOrange,andevencryoutforthe

experienceofwealthundertheirpreviousguardian.Heaskshimself:

‘howlongshallweremaininourinfancy,inoursillyyouth,withoutnoticingthatthe

splendour,thatweexperiencedthen,onlycameforthfromtheevilprofligacyofthat

overspendingguardian,whonegotiatedthatCapitalofhundredandfortymillionas

our burden? After all, we should understand, that we firstmust be valued and

trimmed, to yieldandpay the interests of thatCapital: from taxation only by our

presentwardens,otherwisetheentirehouseholdwouldfalldown.’352

DeWitt constantly referred toHolland’s subjects underOrange as slaves or children, as legal

possessionorminorsunderamasterorpatriarch.Notethathedefinedthestadholderlessrule

asthatofawarden,ofamereadministratorofthehousehold.

InterestvanHolland is filledwithreferences toslaveryunderOrange,with theRoman

Law status of a slave, i.e. alieni iuris or being under the control and jurisdiction of another

person, in contrast to the status of a free‐men sui iuris, with the power over one’s will and

actions.DelaCourtequatedthehighpolitico‐militaryofficesoftheprincesofOrangewiththe

                                                            351V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,96‐97.352V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,99.

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monarchicalformofgovernment,definingthelattersimplyasaone‐headedrule.Hisargument

wasthattheinterestofallrulerswastocoercetheirsubjectsintopowerlessness,inorderthat

theywould bear thewar related burdenswillingly as slaves. The combined offices of captain

generalandstadholderhadproven tobe thegreatestdanger to theprivileges,propertiesand

livesofHolland’s inhabitants.TheHouseofOrangehadrapaciously taxed,stolenandextorted

money.Butwhattheyamassedwasalwaysinadequateandsotherewereeverincreasingdebts.

Orangist rule in thepasthadbeena system inwhichcourtiers, flatterers, soldiersandpriests

hadplayedtheirdestructiveparts;andthestadholdersnowhadtocopewiththedisasterthat

hadresulted.DelaCourt’spersonalprofitwasmadethroughcommerce,which,heheld,could

providetheonlyjustificationforwarfare.Theintensityofthediatribewaspartlydrivenbyhis

own desire for office and partly by his knowledge that Orangist fortunes were reviving. He

wishedtocometotheaidofanendangeredshipofstateandtoalertwideropiniontothecrisis

ofrulethatmightevenseethere‐instatementofadynastyofOrangeprinces.

3.3.3The‘interest’ofHollandinEurope

ThethirdpartofDe laCourt’santi‐Orangismwasbasedonan interestanalysisof ‘Holland’ in

relationtootherEuropeanrulers.Inchapter17oftheInterestvanHollandDelaCourtexplains

that it is not his intention to analyse the interest of Holland in relation to the neighbouring

countries for that ‘will entail an endless knowledge and very great labour to develop and to

devoteto,whichIfindmyselfineveryrespectincapableof.’353Thisstatementmustbeseenas

an excuse, for he does try to sketch an interest analysis of Holland on a European level. In

general, he discussed the desirability of forming alliances with neighbouring rulers, and in a

moredetailedmannerheanalysedtheconsequencesofformingpactswithwhatheregardedas

the greatest contemporary powers of Europe: ‘France’, ‘Spain’ and ‘England’.354 De la Court

arguedthatnoalliances(defensiveandoffensive)shouldbeformedwithanyEuropeanruler,to

avoid theriskofbeingdragged intoexpensiveandextremelydestructivewarfare.De laCourt

considerspeacepactsacceptable,fortheycontainamutualpromisenottoharmeachother.But

again,heemphasizesthedisloyaltyofprinces,whowouldonlyusepeacepactstoplayfortime

beforerecommencingwar.DelaCourtexplains:‘becauseKingsfeelnevercommittedtoanyone,

only to theirowngreatness and lusts,which they try toacquire [always]’.355Hestated thatby

their nature, men pursue the improvement of their own position without regard for oaths,

written pacts and seals. This Machiavellian maxim would not have shocked many readers                                                            353V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,145‐146.354V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,145‐146.355V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland151.

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familiarwithreasonofstateliterature.356Rathercynically,heconcluded:‘theState[has]neither

bloodnorreligion’,so‘trustnot,thenyouwon’tbedeceived.’357

ToprotecttheinterestofHollandi.e.,itsfishery,manufactureandcommerce,peacewith

other European rulers should be pursued at all times, and at almost any price.358 Military

protectionof thesea, fromacommercialstandpoint,wasveryremote.Land forcesweretobe

reducedtoanecessary,butsmallernumber,forthecostsaretoohighandthepossibilityofan

externalmilitaryinvasionwasveryunlikely.DelaCourtincludedtheotherDutchprovincesin

hisvision.ThedefensiveUnionofUtrechthadprovedtobehighlyunprofitablefortheprovince

of Holland, it paid the largest part of the Union’s finances and received hardly any support,

especially from the land provinceswhen Holland’s interest was threatened.359 Holland under

(what he calls) the ‘Free Government’ can easily dealwith external threats given its fortified

cities, andwill no longer be forced into awar by the dynastic ambitions and relations of the

House of Orange. Internal conflicts cannot occur, because the princes of Orange with their

combinedofficesofstadholderandcaptaingeneralwillnolongerplaytheroleof instigator in

internalaffairs.

Since the monarchies of Spain, France and England maintained a constant state of

armament,theydidnotfearHolland.AsRohanhadalsostressed,aconstantstateofarmament

was a primal feature of the interest of every monarchy that wanted to thrive in European

warfare.However,DelaCourtbelievedthatHollandshouldnotfearthem.Hollandcouldpursue

its true interest in relation to the French monarchy, for France depended largely on the

commercewithHolland.WithregardtoHolland’sinterestintheSpanishmonarchy,DelaCourt

triedtodemonstratewhyawaragainstSpain,muchdesiredbytheOrangist faction,wouldbe

mutuallydamaging.So inthe interestofHolland,noallianceshadtobemadewiththeFrench

andtheSpanishmonarchy.360

De la Court considered England to be the greatest threat to Holland. He warned the

reader: ‘Such an England now with Scotland, with extensivemanufacture and shipping and

greatlyaugmentedinpowerwillbeformidablethroughoutEurope,especiallyasunlikeFrance

and Spain it is not ruled by favourites but by a king able to exert much force against his

neighbours.’361However,justlikeSpainandFrance,EnglanddependedontheDutchtrade,soit

would be reckless to declare war against Holland. Furthermore, the Dutch naval force could

considerably damage the English fleet. Secondly, the treasury of Charles II could not support

such warfare, and the Parliament would not easily grant him the necessary finances.

                                                            356NoelMalcolm,ReasonofState,Propaganda,andtheThirtyYears'War,51357V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,151.358V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,151.359V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,145‐159.360V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,60‐164,164‐167361V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,170.

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Nonetheless, De la Court concludes that although Holland could significantly harm England,

EnglandcouldentirelyruinHolland.SothegovernmentofHollandshouldusesoftandfriendly

wordsintheircommunicationwithCharlesII.Cynically,DelaCourtaddsthatHollandshouldlay

inwait,becauseitis,accordingtoDelaCourt,onlyamatteroftimebeforethenewlyrestored

Englishmonarchywilldegenerateduetothecorruptionoftheking’sfavourites,andpassions,or

otherwiseduetointernalconflictandcivilwar.362

InPieter’sanalysisoftheEnglishthreat,thedynasticrelationsbetweenKingCharlesII

andhiscousintheyoungPrinceofOrange,aretreatedasanevengreaterdanger.

‘Andaboveall,considerthatwe,topreventawarwithEngland,mustnotletourselvesbe

pushedintochangingtheState‐wiseGovernment[ofprovincialsovereignty,MBK]intoa

Monarchy, because Leo vinciri liber pernegat. The free lionmust not be bound, is the

motto Holland endeavours to live by. And if we,with a freeGovernment, were to find

ourselves compelled to meet the king in his wishes, (…) he would for his own self,

desiring absolute Sovereignty, make us themostwretched nationwhich could ever be

governedbyaMonarch.’363

Interestingly, De la Court judged the French monarchy and other northern European

monarchiesaswellgovernedbyexcellentrulers,underfreedomaccordingtothenatureofthe

peoples.WehaveseenthatinhisprefaceDelaCourtgavecounterargumentsagainstthe,byhim

asserted,commonbeliefthatasingleruleshouldbepreferredtoarepublicangovernment,but

actuallyhewasconcernedonlywithdiscreditingthenotionthatastadholderwasnecessaryfor

Holland.Butheprovidedno systematic rejectionofmonarchy.Hequestioned theAristotelian

ideathatbytheirnaturesomepeoplemustberuledbyamonarch,i.e.‘thepeoplesofAsiaand

Africa,aswellasallEuropeanpeoplessituatedtowardtheSouth’.364Sincedefendersofthisidea

hadalsotoconfessthat‘thepeoplessituatedmoretotheNorth,weremoreadequatelygoverned

by an excellentHead and enjoyedmore freedom, likewise from France onwards to theNorth

luckily all absoluteMonarchicalGovernments ceased to exist’.365 By this argument De la Court

intendedtodiscreditthenotionof thenecessityofanOrange‐stadholderateandnottostatea

casefor‘republicanism’,assuch.Remainingspecific,hewentontorejecttheOrangist‐argument

that the allegedly factious nature of the people of Holland necessitated the rule of ‘a very

excellent Head’. i.e. an Orange‐stadholderate. To the contrary, De la Court argued that the

factiousnaturewasthehistoricallycontingentresultofthehorrifyingruleofthestadholdersof

                                                            362V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,168‐179.363V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,176‐177.364V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden.365V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden.

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Orangeandtheirpredecessors,theCountsofHolland.

Thisargument,whichaccepts,theexistenceofwellgovernedmonarchiesandexcellent

monarchs is striking, for he claimed that ‘freedom’ could be pursued by subjects within a

monarchy; for therewasanessentialdifference inaccountabilitybetweensouthern ‘absolute’,

illegitimateandnorthernlegitimatemonarchicalgovernments.Remarkably,aswehaveseenin

Het Welvaaren van Leiden, De la Court had stressed recent developments of European

monarchies, including France, Sweden and German princes, into barbaric and despotic

governments,whichisabsentfromInterestvanHolland.WhydidPieterleavethisargumentout

ofInterestvanHolland?PerhapsJohandeWittregardeditastoodiplomaticallysensitivetobe

associatedwithsuchopenlyhostilecritiquesofneighbouringregimes,especially inviewofDe

Witt’s carefully defensive policy towards France; or perhaps it was the hands of his brother

JohandelaCourtintherespectivetreatises.ThePoliticalBalanceevendevotedalargesectionto

the Turkish system of rule as ‘the bestmonarchical government’, although this praise is best

seenasanironiccritiqueofadespoticsystemofrule.366Inanycase,DelaCourtacknowledged

differences in the systems of government ruled by one person, but above all underlined the

illegitimacy of bellicose despotic regimes. First and foremost, De la Court wrote Interest van

HollandwiththeconstitutionalspecificsoftheDutchRepublic inmind;hewantedtodiminish

theOrange‐threatandtojustifythestadholderlessregime,nottodefendthemoralsuperiorityof

republicsoverprincipalities.

3.3.4Freedomoftrade,religionandgovernment

AccordingtoDelaCourttherewerethreepoliciesnecessarytosustainHolland’s ‘trueliberty’.

Firstly, the government had to improve commerce and reduce the land army, redeploying

resourcestostrengthenthefleet.Secondlyitshouldguaranteeabsolutefreedomofconscience

and private worship in order to stimulate the economy and temper the dangerous political

influence of the clergy. The common people were blinded and stirred up by the preachers

againsttheirlawfulgovernment.Moreover,inlightoftheirpower‐hungryambitions,heclaimed

thattheReformedChurchclergy,alliedwiththeHouseofOrange,desiredtooverthrowthe‘free

government’ofHolland.Thirdlyandmost importantly,allmeansmustbeused toexclude the

stadholderandtoprotecttheprivileges,propertyandpersonsundertheruleoflaw.

                                                            366V.D.H.,ConsideratienvanStaat,oftePolitykeWeeg‐schaal(Amsterdam,1662),[Book2]172‐229.ThissectionwasfollowedbyBook3 onmonarchical government inEurope, in particular in France, explaining its highpotential todisintegrateintoaTurkishhouseholdrule,whichhadlongbeenobscuredbyfactionalconflictsatcourtsanddynasticfragility.

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De laCourtdevotedvarious chapters to restrictions, imposedbyDutch regents,which

harmedthepillarsoftheinterestvanHolland:closedtradecompaniesandguilds(chapterXV),

high taxation (XVI), restriction of freedom of conscience (XVII), constraints on freedom of

fisheryandtradebythemonopoliesofthetradecompanies(XVIII),freedomofmanufactureby

restrictionsoncitizenshipandmembershipofguilds(XIX).Inviewofhisownsocialaspiration,

his critique of Holland’s regents who imposed limitations on citizenship to protect their

monopolyofpower,standsout.

However, given the present focus on De la Court’s argument against destructive war

policiesofmonarchswewillexaminehiscritiqueoftaxation.Thiswasmainlydirectedagainst

regents within Holland and other Dutch provinces who advocated military expenditures of

Hollandto theUnion. Inchapter12heexclaims: ‘against these fundaments [fishery, tradeand

manufacture]many have erred’.367 Taxation has been unreasonably increased over the past

decades,so‘placingastraparoundtheneckthroughwhichallfoodshouldenterthebody’.368He

stresses that warfare maybe an excuse for raising and introducing taxes, as during the war

againstHabsburg‐Spain.ThentaxationonHolland’smercantileandmanufactureactivitieswas

legitimatedbythequintessentialreasonofstatemaxim,‘necessityhasnolaw’.369However,‘itis

nowagreat follytomaintainthis(hightaxation)whennecessityhasended’,whenpeacewith

Spain was concluded more than a decade ago.370 Because the land provinces of Groningen,

Overijssel,Friesland,GelderlandandUtrechthavealwaysproperlydefendedthemselvesagainst

externallandtroops,theyhavenotbeenpressuredheavilybyinternalrifts.DelaCourtwrites:

‘as such there is no pretext of reason, to believe that these provinces, by Holland’s money

provided with bastions, artillery, weapons, and ammunition‐buildings, now cannot protect

themselvesinfullpeace,withtheirownpowerandinhabitantsagainstanattackbytheirmuch

weakerneighbours.’371 Onthecontrary,thelandprovincesdonotwanttocontributetonaval

forces, obstructing the much‐needed defence for Holland’s seaborne trade. And thus, he

exclaims,nowthetimehascome

‘forHollandtomanageitsowninterest,tounburdenitselfofallexpensesonthose

Provinces, and to spend that amount on its own defence on land, but

predominantly at sea; because indeed, if thatmaximofotherProvinces, that the

seamust support itself, is true; (…) then (...)Hollandmustalwayscarry itsown

                                                            367V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,52.368V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,53369V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,54(LiterallyDutchoriginalexpression:‘necessitybreakslaw’)370V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,54.371V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,55

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burdens, and those of the other Provinces; and in peace‐time they should

converselyfattenthemselveswithHolland’smoneyinlazinessandexcess.’372

TodefendHolland’sreductionof land forces fromthe late1640sonwards,De laCourt

alsodirectshiscritiqueofcoercivewar‐taxpoliticsagainsttheotherprovincialStates.Notethat

forthesakeofargument,heconvenientlyleftouttheseabornemercantileprovinceofZeeland.

DelaCourtsetsupanargumentforHolland’sabsoluteauthoritytodecideovermilitarymatters

and foreignpolicy interventions.Ashesayssomewhat later in the text: ‘Hollandcanperfectly

maintain its own interest, [and] couldmake a State on its own here inEurope, without being

dependentonanyoneelse’.373

RemarkableinhisattackonthehouseofOrangeishisextremeanti‐clericalism.Priests

incite the common people in order to promote their own interests. He uncompromisingly

advocates guaranteed freedom of religion as a counter to their power and it will attract

immigrantsnolessthaneconomicliberties.374HeelaboratesthisinchapterXIItitled‘Amongst

the means to maintain this prosperous blessing of God, the first is the Freedom of all

Religions’.375 In this chapter he gradually intensifies his attack on Dutch orthodox Calvinist

ministers.FirsthewritesthattheReformedreligion‘couldnotmakeupbyfarahundredthpart

of the peoples’ of the entire world and consists merely of one twentieth of all Europeans.376

Moreover,hardlyhalfofHolland’sinhabitantsarereformed,andfollowingthecontrarymaxim

of maintaining just one strictly exclusive denomination, the other half would have to be

banished. Secondly, and more aggressively, he compares the Calvinist orthodox clerics and

regents in the Dutch Republic to the Catholic Church and the Spanish Crown. Rome and the

Spanish kings drove out adherents of other faiths and supported Catholic believers during

uprisingsinotherpolities.Thechasingawayoftenant‐farmers,farmersandnoblesisnotonly

damaging, but cruel andunreasonable. This applies likewise for the regents and clergy of the

ReformedChurch:

‘who always assert that they have fought for the freedom; that in one country

variouspublicReligionscanbepractisedpeacefully;(…)andthatthere[couldbe]no

biggersignofafalseReligion,(…),thantoprosecutedissenters:Andthatbystrict

meansofeducationthepeoplearemadeaverse,andobstinateintheirownReligion.

PersecutioestsemenEcclesiae:persecutionisalwaystheseedofthechurchthatis

prosecuted;butafterbeingpersecutedbecauseofreligionthecompliantattitude                                                            372V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,55‐56.373V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,188.374V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,35.375V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,35.376V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,36.

93

of thepeoplegenerallychange intopowerandviolence,whentheyhavebecome

masterthemselves[overthereligiousaffairswithinapolity,MBK].’377

DelaCourtarguesexplicitlyagainsttheVoetianpositionofenforcingfurtherorthodoxreformof

manners in society and of establishing one exclusive public church. He ties these hard‐line

arguments to the previous persecution of Protestants by Rome and the Spanish overlords in

Holland, suggesting their tyrannicalbeliefsandactionsandexplicitly calling ita false religion.

Cynically, he reasons that intolerant orthodoxy usually springs from suffering persecution as

cruelty and violence could only bring forth the same rotten fruits. He ends this chapter

condemning the clergy: ‘Nothing pressures them, and they are free from inconveniences that

plague other persons; to such an extent they [are] obsessedwith arrogance, and violence. As

covered with a garment.’ 378 Here he refers to Psalm 73, echoing the jealousy towards the

advantagesandwealthofthesenon‐believers. NotonlydoesheequatetheorthodoxCalvinist

clericswithnon‐Christians,healsocallsthemconceited,power‐hungryandviolentbarbarians.

Inoneofhisletters,PieterhadevenwrittenthatVoetianswere‘godlessmen,muchworsethan

atheists',whointheirlustforpowerhadruinedthefruitsoftheReformationandScripture.379

DelaCourtexplainsthatthelibertiesuponwhichtheinterestofHollanddepend,suchas

the freedom of privateworship, are being violated. In chapter 17, titled ‘That in Holland the

freedomofReligionistroubledagainstallreason’,hestressesthatthegreatleveloffreedomof

conscience inHolland, famously fought forduring theRevolt and the focal attractionofmany

immigrants, is gradually diminishing. Along these lines, he sets himself in the tradition of

Remonstrants likeGrotius,who had famously argued for absolute freedomof conscience and

governmentalauthorityoverchurchaffairs(insteadofchurchofficialsdangerouslydividingthe

commonwealth by denominational disputes). Alluding to Maurice of Orange’s interventionist

actionsinthereligioustroublesof1618;

‘since the year 1618 [government] gradually deferred from this praiseworthy

maxim. (..) First by persecuting the Remonstrants, and banishing them to other

Countries.AfterwardsmoreandmorethwartingtheCatholicsintheirgatherings,

that to enjoy this liberty, a heavy yearly taxation was imposed on the same

[Catholics] in favour of the Bailiffs and Sheriffs; which is not less unreasonable

thandamagingtotheCountry;becauseincasewemaynotlosetheadvantagesof

                                                            377V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,36‐37.378V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,37.379CitedfromIsrael,TheDutchRepublic,673;LetterfromPieterdelaCourttoW.enJ.vanderVoort,Leidenon27September 1663, ‘Brieven uit de correspondentie van Pieter de la Court en zijn verwanten (1661‐1666)’, J.H.Kernkamp(ed.) inBijdragenenMededelingenvanhetHistorischGenootschap. 70(Groningen–Jakarta:J.B.Wolters,1956).

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their residence and commerce,why shouldweprohibit thatwhichwithout they

cannotlivehere.’380

Thus,firstlyMaurice’sinterventiononthesideoftheorthodoxCounter‐Remonstrantsandthen

the gradual imposition of restrictions on Catholic worship undermined the freedom of

conscience. Note that De la Court is not speaking of Catholicworship in public, but of ‘small

gatherings in the homes of known Citizens under the guidance of Clerics, dedicated to the

Rulers.’381Thislastpartunderlinestheimportance,inDelaCourt’sopinion,ofpriestsloyaltoDe

Witt‐regime, insteadofVoetiansattackingthestadholderlessregimewith theirdangerousmix

of exclusive Orangism and orthodoxy. Finally, it is important to note that De la Court (like

Hobbes) stresses the dangerous influence clergymen have on people’s thoughts and actions

through the pulpit and education. In his preface De la Courtwrites that the common people,

‘barredfromknowledgeandjudgment’,isblindfoldedandstirredupagainstthelawfulregents

by‘ClericswhostriveforDominion,ofwhomlikewisesomeinHollandaswell(Godforbid),and

thesurroundingProvincesarefound.’382

ThetitleofchapterVIIIgrandlyasserts:‘ThatallInhabitantsofHollandliveinfreedom,

magnificentlyboundtoeachotherbyasharedwell‐beingandill‐being.’383Butitannouncesnot

smugself‐satisfactionbutananalysisintermsoffearandself‐interest.AccordingtoDelaCourt,

thesedominatehumannatureandprovidethedrivingforcebehindallactionsofgovernment,as

Hobbeshadargued.But it isnot thesovereignthatunifiessociety,butrather, theharmonyof

interestsbetweenrulerandruled.Goodgovernmentexistsinsuchawaythatthewelfareofthe

subjectsdeterminedthewelfareofthegovernors.Inparticular,fishing,manufactureandtrade

bindtogethertheinterestsoftheinhabitantsofHollandinaneconomicchain.ThereuponDela

CourtdeliberatelymisquotesHobbestoopposefreegovernmenttoanoppressiveprincelyrule,

oractuallytoopposethestadholderlessregimetoanOrange‐princelyrule.Hewrites:

‘Homo homini Deus in statu Politico, man is a God to man under a good

Government,whichisforthisCountryaninexpressibleblessing,thatheresomany

peoplearefedbyhonestwork,andprimarilythatthewellbeingofallInhabitants

(excludingtheNoblesandsoldiers)fromtheleasttothemost[fortunate,MBK],is

                                                            380V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,43.381V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,43382V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reede.Hobbeslikewisewarnsforthecontrolpriestshaveoverthedistributionof ideas, which can easily cause societal disintegration and opposition against governmental authority. JohanSommervillestatesthatinLeviathan,hismainpracticalcounsel isarguablythesovereign’scontroloftheeducationanddistributionofideas.JohannP.Sommerville,‘EarlyModernAbsolutisminPracticeandTheory’,inCesareCutticaandGlennBurgess(eds.),MonarchismandAbsolutisminEarlyModernEurope(London:PickeringandChatto,2012),117‐130,p.122‐123.383V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,15

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socloselylinked:andaboveall,thatnoonetrulyismorecommittedtothecountry’s

wellbeing,thantheRulersofthisAristocraticgovernment.’

DelaCourtbelievedthattheinhabitantsofHollandweremutuallyinterdependentand

thattheburdenswerereasonablyequallyshared.RegentsprofitfromthesplendourofHolland’s

enterprises.Farmerscansellall theirgoods, fora largepartofthepopulationconsistsofnon‐

agrarians.Toprocuregoodgovernmentwastoensurethattherulersandruledsharedthesame

interests. He concludes this chapter, again, with the greatest threat Holland’s harmony of

interestscanencounter:re‐installationoftheHouseofOrange.

‘Nevertheless this praiseworthy harmony could, and accordingly, will be broken,

ruining all Inhabitants, none excluded, than courtiers and soldiers, by only one

mistake,namelychoosingasupremeHead,becausegiventhattheLords,courtiers,

nobles and soldiers necessarily prey upon the hard‐working Inhabitants, they

would use all their power to their own benefit and to the disadvantage of the

common[people];andinorderthattheywouldnotbeblockedbythegreatmighty

Cities; they would obviously make all Cities small, and the inhabitants poor, in

orderthattheywithoutcontradictionwillobey.Suchasmenherealwayshaveto

praytoGod,àfuroreMonarcharumliberanosDomine,ohGodsaveHollandfroma

Head.’

The last sentencewehavealreadyencountered regardingHetwelvaarenvanLeyden,wherein

thebrothersDelaCourtunderlinedthechangesinearlymodernrulefromrulebyconsentand

law to a ruleby coercion anddomination aswitnessed. In InterestvanHolland Pieterdidnot

stressthischange,butsimplyequated suchabelligerentandcoerciverulewith ‘monarchical’

rule,probablytofurtherthepolemicalovertonesofhisanti‐Orangistargument.

Like French debates during the 1630s, in the Holland pamphlet wars of the 1650s‐1660s

discussionwasintermsoftheinterestofstate,whichcoursetofollowinforeignpolicy,howthis

should be financed,which faction promoted it best, often in combinationwith a confessional

allegiance.AgreatdifferencebetweenRohanandDelaCourtisinthehandlingofthenexusof

aggressive war, wealth and oppression. Whereas Rohan delegitimised Habsburg‐Spain as a

tyrannicalrulebyconquest,arapaciouswarmachine,DelaCourtdirectlyconstructstheruleof

Orangeasahouseholdgovernment,robbingthe inhabitantsof theirpropertiesandprivileges,

effectively enslaving them all.With bothwriters interest (and the reason of state that comes

withit),shapesanenemy,asithelpsdefineapotentialvictim.Rohan,however,hideshisattack

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againstSpainbehindtheformofsatiriccounsel.HestressedthemisuseofreligionbySpain.De

laCourtdirectlyattackstheprincesofOrangebyassertingtheirdespoticsystemofrulethatis

inherentlydestructivetothe interestofHolland. JustasRohanwantstolerationofProtestants

withinFrance,De laCourtgoes furtherbuildingon the tolerationistexperimentofHollandby

arguinganti‐clericallibertyofconscienceaspartofHolland’sinterest.

Furthermore, De la Court presents a harmony of interests argument formulating his

understanding of ‘True Freedom’ in Holland as the unspoiled possession and pursuit of

privileges andpropertyprotectedby the rule of lawagainstwarmongeringprinces, scheming

priestsandoligarchicregents.HenriDucdeRohanhadsomewhatdisassociated‘interest’from

dynastic consideration, analysing the particularities of the lands of the ruler, which the ruler

oughttoconsiderinhispolicymaking.Yet, theHuguenotmilitary leaderprimarilyfocussedon

thestandingoftheFrenchCrowninrelationtoitsforeigncounterpartsandontheimportanceof

amilitarilystronganti‐Spanishpolicy.Bycontrast,PieterdelaCourtwasextremelyconcerned

withaninternalthreat.

TheOrangistrevivalatthebeginningofthe1660sdangerouslypressuredtheminority

regimeofDeWittregime.Pieterhadtomakeanexceptionallystrongcaseforthestadholderless

regime. Infusedwithnew ideasof thepassions, and theharmonisingof interests,De laCourt

build up the case why Holland did not need an Orange‐prince. The argument of Holland

consisting of a nexus of great citieswhere themerchants controlled the political powerwas,

however,conventional.Theinnovativepartofhisargumententailsthecombinationoftheidiom

of interestwithelementsofcontemporarycritiquesof ‘wardespotism’,whichtransformedhis

caseintotheissueofwhytheHouseofOrangewasHolland’snaturalenemy.

Already present in the earlier work of the brothers De la Court (HetWelvaaren van

Leyden),‘monarchy’seemstobeequatednotsomuchwith‘tyranny’aswithaspecificsystemof

government,which robbed its subjects of their property and rights in order to pursue costly

warfare. In InterestvanHolland the features of this system are elaborated and applied to the

Orange‐Princely rule. Apart from the ruler, other important actors in this system are the

‘courtiers’, ‘clergymen’, ‘soldiers’ and ‘favourites’ and ‘flatterers’. Because of the clergy, the

ignorantrabbleholdstheprinceinawe.Soldiersliterallycoercesubjectsandtogetherwiththe

courtiers and the favourites, who practically run monarchical governments, they form the

stakeholdersofthewar‐despoticcorporation.

The changes in earlymodern governmentwere stressed and fiercely criticised, aswe

haveclearly seen inDe laCourt’s InterestvanHolland.De laCourt’s attackonprincely rule is

extremelyvicious,leavingoutearlierviewsoftheriseofanewtypeofmonarchiestoaccentuate

his anti‐Orangism argument. However, Pieter does underline differences in monarchical

governments,consideringthewesternEuropeanmonarchiesaslegitimategovernments,where

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subjects can enjoy their freedoms. His direct and open criticisms of certain coercive princely

practicesarenotprincipally‘anti‐monarchic’or‘republican’.Theevilsarecommontodifferent

regimes;newandhighertaxes,saleofandaccesstooffices,stateloans,statedebts,andpursuit

ofwarfaremakethedifferencesbetweenrepublicsandmonarchiesfarlessimportantthanthey

haveappearedinmoderndiscussionsofhiswork.Howmuch,andforwhatpurposewemight

extrapolateauniversalisedrepublicanismfromhiswork,isthen,amootpoint;buttherelentless

hostilitytothe‘new’monarchyofOrangeisevidentenough.

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Chapter4

LisolaandLouisXIV’sFrenchmonarchy:universalmonarchyandreasonofstate

Givenhissignificanceduringthelateseventeenthcentury,François‐PaulLisola’sBouclierd’Estat

(1667)hasbeenrelativelylittlestudiedbymodernscholars.Thereare,however,severalmore

specific reasons for his inclusion in this thesis. First, thework exhibits an extensive use and

criticismofRohan’sseminalDel‘interest.AsitusedtobeurgedthatMarxwasHegelstoodupon

hishead,soLisolainvertedthewholethrustofRohan’sunderstandingofinterestandreasonon

state. It is a relationship that has hardly been explored, and indeed it displays the polemical

dexteritywithwhichthetopoiofinterestandreasonofstatecouldbedeployed.Second,Lisolais

asimportanttoValkenier’srejectionofDelaCourt’sunderstandingofDutchinterestasRohan.

Third and more generally, an account of Bouclier illustrates how an international context of

argumentisimportantforunderstandingworkswithaDutchdomesticfocus.

François‐Paul de Lisola (1613‐1674) was one of the first authors to warn Europeans

about the French dangerous desire to erect a ‘universal monarchy’. In 1667 his book was

published (anonymously) with the telling title Bouclier d'Estat et de justice, contre le dessein

manifestementdécouvertde laMonarchieUniverselle,sous levainprétextedesprétentionsde la

ReynedeFrance. ItwasaresponsetoFrenchpropagandajustifyingLouisXIV’s invasionofthe

SpanishNetherlandsin1667.Themilitaryoffensivewasprecededbyapropagandacampaign,

wherein Frenchpublicistsandlawyersclaimedaterritorialcompensationforthenon‐payment

of QueenMaria Theresa’s dowry, Louis XIV’swife and daughter of Philip IV of Spain. Due to

incessantwarfare,Spainwasbankrupt,asMazarinhadalreadypredictedatthetime.TheFrench

pamphleteersdugupaprivateinheritancelawfromtheprovinceofBrabant,theso‐called‘right

ofDevolution’ to nullify theQueen’s renunciation of all rights to her deceased father’s estate,

renounced at themarriage of 1660. This ‘War of Devolution’was a clear proof that after the

PeaceofthePyranees(1659)thebalanceofmilitarypowerbetweenRohan’spolesofEuropean

politics, France and Spain haddecisively shifted towards Louis andhis expansionarypolicies.

The fear generated by what was increasingly seen as an attempt to establish France as a

universal monarchy helped make Bouclier an immediate bestseller. It was translated in six

languages, includingDutchandEnglish,andunderwenttwentyeditions.384Bouclierturnedout

                                                            384Bouclier d'Estat et de justice contre le desseinmanifestement découvert de laMonarchieUniverselle, sous le vainprétexte des pretentions de la Reyne de France ([Brussels: François Foppens], 1667); Verdedigingh van staet engerechtigheyt:tegenshetbaerblijckelijckontdecktvoorneemendergantschemonarchye,onderd'ydeledeckmantelderpretentien,ofeysschingenvandekoninginvanVranckrijck.MitsgadersDerechtenderkoninginvanVranckrijck,doordeFranschengepretendeert,&c.vanhenselvenkrachteloosgemaeckt,envernietight.AllesuytdeFranscheTaelvertaelt.(Amsterdam [1667]); The Buckler of State and Justice Against The Design manifestly discovered of the Universal

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tobethestandardworkforanti‐FrenchpamphletliteratureinEuropeduringthelatermilitary

conflictswiththeSunKing.385InFranceitwasacrimetoreadthework.386

As I shall show, much of Lisola’s attempted refutation relied upon reason of state

arguments he took directly from Rohan but gave them added force by turning them against

France.Recentresearchhasarguedthatduringtheseventeenthcenturytherewasanincreasing

stress on the ‘economic (national) interest’ at the expense of arguments reliant onnotions of

natural law;with this apparent shiftwent a fear of universal, effectively predatorymonarchy

and theneed tomaintainabalanceofpower.387Remarkably,Bouclier is largelyoverlooked in

this dominantly Anglophone research. The historian Charles‐Édouard Levillain, however, has

studiedLisolaandBouclieras‘theintellectualoriginsoftheAnglo‐DutchAllianceof1677.’The

historian remarks that the scholarship on early modern anti‐French polemic is caught in

nationalwebs, asDutchhistoriansmay claimDutchProtestants founded thisdiscourse,while

EnglishauthorswillsayEnglishProtestantsoriginatedit.Instead,Levillainstresses,‘thefuelfor

anti‐French,anti‐catholicand,byextension,anti‐Stuartpropagandawasprovidedbyapublicist

calledFrançois‐PauldeLisola,whowasnoProtestantbutoriginallythecatholicservantofthe

catholic Holy Roman Emperor.’388 In his recent book Levillain even underlines an intellectual

correlation between Lisola and Slingsby Bethel, both of whom were involved in the London

radical underground. As we have discussed in the chapter on De la Court, Bethel’s famous

interest analysiswas indebted toDe laCourt’s one; and it appears that heprobablywas also

inspiredbyLisola’stext.389ThefewreferencestoLisolaencompasshisrevitalisationofRohan’s

                                                                                                                                                                                          MonarchyUnder the vainPretext of theQueen ofFranceherPretensions.Translated out ofFrench. (London: JamesFlesher,1667).AllfurtherreferencesaretothisEnglishedition;Lisolawrotethisworkanonymously,butintheyearofitspublication,hisauthorshipwasalreadyknown.ThisappearsfromletterswrittenbyLisolaandlaterreferencesof authors. Markus Baumanns,Das publizistischeWerk des kaiserlichenDiplomaten Franz Paul Freiherr von Lisola(1613‐1674). Ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis von Absolutistischem Staat, Öffentlichkeit undMächtepolitik in der frühenNeuzeit (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994),165. Read there p. 357‐381 for an overview of every edition andtranslationofBouclierandotherwritingsbyLisola.385 MartinWrede,Das Reich und seine Feinde. Politische Feindbilder in der reichspatriotischen Publizistik zwischenWestfälischemFriedenundSiebenjährigemKrieg(Mainz:PhilippvonSabern,2004),48‐49,330‐333,379‐381.386AcaseisknownofCharlesPatin,thesonofthecelebratedphysicianandmemorialistGuyPatin,whohadtofleeParisbecause thebookwas found inhishome.HerbertH.Rowen,Theking'sState:proprietarydynasticism inearlymodernFrance(NewBrunswick,N.Y.:RutgersUniversityPress,1980),107.387StevePincus,‘Fromholycausetoeconomicinterest:thetransformationofreasonofstatethinkinginseventeenth‐century England’, in Houston and Pincus (eds.), ANation Transformed. England after the Restoration (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001),272‐298;RichardDevetak,'Thefearofuniversalmonarchy':balanceofpowerasan ordering practice of liberty’, in Tim Dunne and Trine Flockhart (eds.), LiberalWorld Orders (Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,2013),121‐137;SlingsbyBethel,TheWorld’sMistake inOliverCromwell(London,1668);SlingsbyBethel, The Present Interest of England Stated (London, 1671); Slingsby Bethel, The Interest of Princes and States(London,1680);388Charles‐ÉdouardLevillain,‘TheintellectualoriginsoftheAnglo‐DutchAlliance,1667‐1677’,Séminairederecherchésur les îles Britanniques, XVIIe & XVIIIe siècle, accessed February 9, 2016, URL http://britaix17‐18.univ‐provence.fr/texte‐seance5.php.389 Charles‐Édouard Levillain,LeProcèsdeLouisXIV.Diplomatie etdiscoursd’oppositionà l’époquemodern.Le casFrançois‐PauldeLisola (1667‐1674) (Paris,Tallandier, 2015), 183‐184.With ‘radical’ Levillain refers to restorationradicalism; Londonwas ahotbedofdissenters.RichardGreaves,DeliverUs fromEvil:TheRadicalUnderground inBritain,1660‐1663(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1986).

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notionofuniversalmonarchyandtheideaofthebalanceofpower.390Theimportanceofbothof

whichareemphasisedbyLevillainandMarkusBaumans.391

ThischapterproposesareinterpretationofLisola’sBouclierpreciselybyexamininghow

he employed De l’interest of Rohan. It argues that Lisola deliberately used Rohan’s interest

analysistoturnitagainsttheFrenchmonarchyitself;theimperialdiplomatpresentedthetext

as the blueprint of the French war machine. From this follows that he indeed rejuvenated

Rohan’saccusationofuniversalmonarchybyreversingitsapplicationfromSpaintoFrance.Asa

corollary,FrancebecamethepredatorythreattoChristendom,Spainthepeace‐lovingdefendant

of law and balance. In Spain lay the image of good government. Throughout irony was the

principal tropeused to invertRohan’s satiric condemnationofHabsburgSpain.Theargument

would form the basis for later anti‐French polemics in the Dutch Republic and England, and

would contribute to subsequent attempts to reconstruct the ruleof law, suchas in ‘tVerwerd

EuropabyValkenier.

Before examining Bouclier in detail we will look into Lisola’s diplomatic and literary

career, then into the nature of the French pamphlet campaign leading up to the War of

Devolution, which provoked his response. Thereafter we will discuss the rise of the French

monarchyfromthe1650sonwardsand‘themythofabsolutism’,asLisolaaccusesLouisXIVof

rulingasan‘absolute’monarch.

4.1Illustriousdiplomatandanti‐FrenchpamphleteerduringtheriseofLouisXIV

Three issues stand out when reviewing the biographical literature on Lisola. First his anti‐

French standpoint seems to be a thread common to his career as a publicist and imperial

diplomat. Most of his diplomatic activities at several European courts are characterised by

attempts toraiseoppositionand/or to formalliancesagainst the increasing influenceofLouis

XIV, hisministers, diplomats and publicists in Europe. However, Lisola often instigated these

anti‐FrenchactivitiesonhisowninitiativeandignoredordersfromtheimperialcourtinVienna.

As a result, hemade a lot enemies. French diplomats, as well as prominentmembers of the

                                                            390Amongstothers,HerbertH.Rowen,TheAmbassadorPreparesforWar:TheDutchEmbassyofArnaulddePomponne1669–1671 (The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff, 1957), 108;Michael Sheenan,TheBalance ofPower.History andTheory(London/New York: Routledge, 2004), 40‐41; Tony Claydon, Europe and the Making of England, 1660‐1760(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2007),177;JohnRoberston, ‘Empireandunion:twoconceptsoftheearlymodernEuropeanpoliticalorder’,inJohnRobertson(ed.),AUnionforEmpire:PoliticalThoughtandtheBritishUnionof 1707 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 3‐36, p. 21; Wrede, Politische Feindbilder, 375; Charles‐EdouardLevillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,5.391Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,198;Levillain,LeProcèsdeLouisXIV,61,177;Moreover,anineteenth‐centurymonographonLisolaexists:AlfredF.Pribram,FranzPaulFreiherrvonLisola(1613‐1674)unddiePolitikseinerZeit(Leipzig:VerlagVonVeit&Comp.,1894).

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imperialcourtandevenDutchandEnglishofficialswereoftenfrustratedbyhisrelentlessanti‐

Frenchmanoeuvring.

4.1.1High‐profilediplomat

FrançoisPauldeLisolawasborntoawealthyfamilyinSalinsin1613.Hisfather,JeromeLisola,

wasofItalianoriginandreceivedcitizenryofBesançonintheSpanishFranche‐Comtéin1592.

JeromeLisolaworkedhiswayupfromaclerkoftheArchbishoptothehighestmagistrateatthe

representative Spanish‐Habsburg court in Besançon. On 20 December 1633 François Paul de

LisolareceivedadoctorateinlawatDôleandbeganpractisinglaw.392Duringthistimeaconflict

rose between the Spanish King Philip IV and the city council over newly introduced taxes to

finance the construction of fortifications in the battle against France. Lisola emerged as the

leader of the city’s faction that resisted these taxes by invoking the city’s autonomous status,

establishedundertheHabsburgEmperor inthe fourteenthcentury.Theconflictescalatedand

theSpanishGovernordecidedtopresenttheissuetotheEmperorFerdinandIII.Consequently,

LisolatravelledtoViennatodefendhiscaseattheimperialcourt.TherehewasnoticedbyCount

MaximilianTrautmannsdorf,whorecommendedLisolatotheemperor.393

Lisolabecameanhigh‐profilediplomat,developedthereputationofa‘trouble‐maker’,394

struggledwithpro‐FrenchfactionsatforeigncourtsaswellasinVienna,andparticipatedasan

intermediary in many famous diplomatic issues, executing ‘shuttle‐diplomacy’395 in the

complexityofEuropeannegotiations.OnhisfirstmissionLisolawassenttoLondontoattempt

to persuade Charles I to take a neutral stand in the Franco‐Spanish conflict. Yet due to the

powerful French influence at court he was unsuccessful. The governor of the Spanish

Netherlands,Manuel Castel‐Rodrigo invited him to take part in the negotiations amongst the

opponents of France in the Thirty Years’ War. During his stay in Brussels, Lisola’s London

residencewas looted, allegedly initiatedbyFrenchenvoys. In that sameyear,Trautmansdorff

sent him to the negotiations in Münster, where he tried on his own instigation to forge an

alliance between Brussels and Vienna, which Trautmansdorff forbad him in several letters.

Moreover, the French diplomats complained about Lisola’s hostile attitude towards their

monarchy. After a quiet stay at the Polish court in 1648 and 1649, Lisola resumed his anti‐

FrenchstandandsupportedCastel‐Rodrigoinhiseffortto‘free’thecitiesofBreisach,Strasburg,

Freiburg andBasel fromFrench influence.At the peacedealings of the SecondNorthernWar

                                                            392Levillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,3.393Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,127‐128.394Levillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,5.395Levillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,3.

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(1655‐1660),Lisolaachievednotablesuccess,astheEmperorwasseenastheprotectorofpeace

and France as the war‐monger. As a reward for his efforts, Lisola was granted the title of

‘Freiherr’in1659.

Throughout the 1660s, he faced fierce opposition at several courts, as in 1660‐1661

whenthePolishKingrequestedViennatorecallLisola;andhisdesireddiplomaticappointment

in Regensburg was blocked by his enemies in Vienna several times. In particular Lisola

encounteredFrenchobstruction,suchasattheCourtinMadridin1664,and,duringhisjourney

fromMadridtoLondonin1666.Inthisperiod,relationsbetweenthetwoHabsburgsbranches

wereseverelycooledandtheSpanishcourtwasdominatedbyastrongpro‐Frenchfactionthat

successfully thwarted Lisola’s attempts to revitalise the Habsburgs connection. During the

journeytoLondon,LisolahadtakencautiontosailaroundFrance,however,severalattemptson

hislifeweremade,supposedlyorganisedbytheFrench.396

In 1666 and 1667 Lisola stayed in London, from where he visited Brussels at the

beginningof1667,topromotepeacetalksbetweenEnglandandtheDutchRepublic,designedto

conclude the Second Anglo‐Dutch War (1665‐1667). In April and May he held several

unsuccessfultalkswithJohandeWitt.InMay,LouisXIVdeclaredwaronSpainandinvadedthe

Spanish Netherlands. The emperor and his councillors were hesitant to take action, and the

princesoftheHolyRomanEmpire,especiallythoseinthe,so‐called,‘LeagueoftheRhine’with

Louis XIV, were reluctant to intervene, which rather frustrated Lisola and Frederico Castel‐

Rodrigo (the new governor of the Spanish Netherlands). Eventually Lisola succeeded in his

missionastheRepublicandEnglandsignedapeacetreatyon31July1667.Duringthatsummer,

while Louis and his troops took city after citywith little opposition, LisolawroteBouclier. In

August1667itwasprinted,whichmarkedthestartofhisanti‐Frenchpublicationstream.

In that month, he travelled back to London. The Under Secretary of State, Sir Joseph

Williamson, received various anonymous warnings about his ‘noxious underground

influence’.397However,LisolastoodindirectandgoodcontactwiththeSecretaryofState,Henry

Bennet,1stEarlofArlington,whowasheadoftheSpanishfactionatcourtandwhosponsored

thepublicationofLisola’sbook.BesidesArlington,theimperialdiplomatassociatedwithGeorge

Villiers,2ndDukeofBuckinghamwithwhomheengaged(togetherwithBethel) intheradical

circles of London. Through them he attempted to set up a pro‐Habsburgs faction at court.

AlthoughEnglandwastechnicallyatwarwithFrance(supporting itsally theDutchRepublic),

the courtwas predominantly pro‐French and, thus, Lisola’s officialmission, i.e. to promote a

coalitionbetweenEngland,theemperorandotherEuropeanpowers,provedextremelydifficult.

WhatLisoladidnotknow,wasthaton19January1668theEmperorLeopoldIsignedasecret

                                                            396Levillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,3‐4;Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,129‐131.397Levillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,5.

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agreement with Louis for the partition of Spanish‐Habsburg possessions expecting daily the

death of the sickly five‐year old Spanish King Carlos II. Moreover, Charles II was extremely

reluctant to form a Habsburg alliance when he had already committed himself to France.

France’smilitarysuccessesintheSpanishNetherlands,however,forcedEuropeanregimesinto

action.TheDutchRepublicandEnglandhadalreadysignedthePeaceofBredainJuly1667and

further negotiations between the two regimes resulted in a coalition treaty in January 1668,

whichSwedenjoinedsoonafterwards.LisolacontributedprofoundlytothisTripleAlliance(that

promisedmilitary intervention against French aggression),which eventually led to the peace

treatyofAacheninMay1668.398

Lisolahad tried to include theemperor in thealliance,butLeopoldwasunwilling,and

thepro‐FrenchfactionattheViennacourtintensifiedtheircampaignagainstLisola’sdiplomatic

manoeuvres.LisolaseemeduntouchedbythisandafterhisunauthorisedstayinAachenhewent

to TheHague to discussmatters of the alliance, especially subsidy payments. Although Lisola

was called back to Brussels, his efforts for a strong anti‐French alliance were not entirely

unfruitful, because in January 1670 England, Sweden and theDutchRepublic signed a treaty,

which assuredmilitary support should France violate the Treaty of Aachen. Spain joined the

coalition in May 1670. Although the French occupation of Lorraine greatly concerned the

Emperor,hewaspressured,due tohis fragilerelationshipwith theprincesof theEmpireand

severelackoffunds,tosignatreatywithLouisinNovember1671,bywhichhepromisednotto

intervene in conflicts outside theHabsburgdominion. In the run‐up to theFranco‐DutchWar

(1672‐1679),FrenchdiplomatslockedinEuropeanrulersbyvarioustreatiesandalliances,such

asthesecretTreatyofDover(1670)withKingCharlesIItoleavetheTripleAllianceinexchange

forsubstantialfinancialsupport.Moreover,LouissignedtreatieswiththeSwedishKingCharles

XI and thePrince‐Bishopric ofMünster andArchbishop‐Elector of Cologne.At the timeof the

French invasion in theDutchRepublic in thesummerof1672,Lisolastayed inTheHague.He

discussed the Dutch defences with the reinstalled Stadholder William III of Orange and

negotiatedanalliancewiththeEmperor(militaryaidinexchangeforconsiderablesponsorship),

whichwassignedinOctoberofthatyear.Yet,thetreatystillgaveLeopoldroomtomanoeuvre

towards France, against Lisola’s counsel. The imperial military advance encountered many

obstacles and Leopold was ready to join the peace negotiations in Cologne, organised by

Sweden.399FromJune1673peacetalkswereheldinCologne.Lisolagainedafewsuccesses, in

convincingthelastreluctantGermanprincesto jointheanti‐Frenchcoalition,butnegotiations

provedtobedifficult,sinceFrancewantedtosignpeacewitheachpartyindividually,especially

                                                            398Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,144;Levillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,7.399PerhapstherehemetPetrusValkenier,suggestedbyEcoO.G.HaitsmaMulier,‘DiePolitisch‐historischenIdeenvonPetrusValkenier’,inAlbertdeLangeandGerhardSchwinge(eds.), PieterValkenierunddasSchicksalderWaldenserum1700(Heidelberg:VerlagRegionalkultur,2004),108‐122,p.118.

105

theDutchRepublic.Inthesummerof1674,LisolahadtoreturntoViennabecauseofill‐health.

Hebecameoneof the intimates surroundingLeopoldandwas finally givenanoffice at court,

whichhehadlongdesired.Hediedthereon9December1674,butevenonhisdeathbedLisola

triedtoconvinceLeopoldthatheoughttoallywiththeSwedishKing.400

4.1.2Polemicalpublicist

Accordingto thehistorianKennethHaley,Lisola’s ‘greatnesswasasapublicistrather thanan

ambassador;Bouclierd’Estatwasonlythemostfamousofseveraldirectlypropagandistwritings

whichdidmuchtoinfluenceEuropeanpoliticalopinionagainstFrance’.401AlthoughLisolawas

oneof themostnotableambassadorsofhis time,byhisunabashedandpolemicalanti‐French

actionsandwords,hewasscoldedforhisundiplomaticfrancophobiabypeople,suchasJohan

deWittandtheEnglishambassadorinTheHague,SirWilliamTemple.402AfterBouclier,Lisola

wrotemanyotherpamphlets,allincludinganti‐FrenchpolemicsandacallforaEuropeanwide

coalition against the rise of France. The historian Markus Baumanns remarks that his later

worksaremore refined;Lisoladevelopedhis ironic tone, and the ratherobscure structure in

Bouclier was replaced by more direct and clear argumentation.403 Furthermore, Baumanns

clarifiesproblemsconcerningthesupposedauthorshipofLisola’stexts,which,heargues,have

two causes. Firstly, printers and book traders often published under false names and feigned

printingplaces.Manyanti‐Frenchpamphletswerehoweverprinted in theDutchRepublic, for

example by the printing house of Elsevier. Secondly, Lisola’s fame led to contemporaries

assigning randomly anti‐French texts tohim. Lisola complained about this practice and about

the fact that printers andpublishers falsifiedhiswritings or bound them togetherwith other

writings, attributed to him. 404 While many attributions to him are questionable, Lisola’s

authorship of Bouclier is certain and was established very early. Soon after its publication

contemporariesknewthathewroteit.405

During thepeace talks inAachen in1668LisolawroteRemarques sur leProcedéde la

France,TouchantlaNegociationdelaPaix.Headdedtothetextauthenticdocumentsandletters

fromtheSpanishandFrenchsides,inwhichhecriticisedFrenchpoliticsofconsensusregarding

theoccupiedpartsoftheSpanishNetherlands.LisolastatedthatthetalksinAachenfunctioned

                                                            400Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,149‐157.401 KennethH.D.Haley,AnEnglishDiplomat in theLowCountries:SirWilliamTempleand JohndeWitt,1665‐1672(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1986),317.402Haley,AnEnglishDiplomat, 317‐318. Temple and Lisola stayed in TheHague at the same time and negotiatedabouttheTripleAlliancein1668inBrussels.403Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,197‐198.404Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,165;Levillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,4.405Valkenier,’tVerwerdEuropa,68en71.

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asapretextforLouisandhisministers.InrealityFrancewantedtoobstructthenegotiations.406

On several occasions the imperial diplomat responded to current political affairs. The French

advance in Lorrain of 1670 was discussed by Lisola in Esclaircissements sur les affaires de

Lorrainepour tous lesprinces chrestiens (1671). Thepositive attitude of theDuke of Lorraine

towards the Triple Alliance allegedly frustrated Louis. Lisola likewise warned about the

consequencesoftheseizureofLorrainefortherestofEurope,beingafirststeptowardsFrench

universal dominion.407 In various pamphlets Lisola tried to influence European opinion that

France attempted to set a precedent by annexing the Spanish Netherlands, Lorraine and the

DutchRepublicinordertotakeEuropeinitsentirety.408

4.1.3Bouclier:reasonofstateandlegalargumentation

FrenchauthorsattemptedtojustifytheneworientationofLouis’sforeignpolicyfromthemid‐

1660sonwardsbypresenting itasanecessity inamassivepropagandacampaign.Theyoften

opposed the traditional image of the Spanish hegemony in Europe against the French

monarchy.409 Inaddition, theyemployed legal arguments tobuttressLouis’s claimson certain

partsbelongingtobothbranchesoftheHabsburgsdynasty.Theselegalclaimshadalreadybeen

createdbyCardinalRichelieu’sjurists,basedonfeudalpropertyrights,privatelawandnatural

law,andtookcentrestageintheWarofDevolution.410Notably,Lisolareadmostoftheseauthors

attheuniversityofDole,arenownedlawuniversity.Afterthedeathin1665oftheSpanishKing

                                                            406Remarques sur leProcedéde laFrance,Touchant laNegociationde laPaix (1667);Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,360.407Esclaircissements sur lesaffairesdeLorrainepour tous lesprinces chrestiens (Strasbourg, 1671);Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,363.408SuitedudialoguesurlesdroitsdelareineTrès‐Chrétienne.ParoùsedécouvrelavanitédesprétentionsdelaFrancesurlesPays‐Bas(Brussells:FrançoisFoppens,1668);ConférenceinfructueusedeWindisgrats,ouViolencedelaFranceàobtenir laLorraineavec cequi s’estpassé là‐dessusd eplus remarquable (Charleville, 1671); La SauceauVerjus,Strasbourg, 1674. Entretien sur les affaires du temps (Strasbourg, 1674); L’orateur français ou harangue del’archevêqued’Embrun, interprétéepar lesévénementsdenotretempset l’étatdesaffairesprésentes(Cologne:MartinLambert, 1674); L’apologiste refuté ou response aux calumnies de certain prétendant justifier les guerres de Francecontre lesmouvementset la justicedesarmesdeSaMajesté Imperiale (Cologne,1674);see forarecentoverviewoftextsbyorattributedtoLisola,Levillain,LeProcèsdeLouisXIV,373‐374.409Wrede, Das Reich und seine Feinde, 327‐328; Collins, The State in Early Modern France, 118; Levillain, ‘Theintellectualorigins’,3.410 For example the jurists Pierre Dupuy and his co‐author Denis Godefroy had to list all foreign polities andprincipalities,whichtheFrenchCrownmayclaim.Traiteztouchantlesdroitsduroytrès‐chrestiensurplusieursestatsetseigneuriespossedéespardiversprincesvoisins:etpourprouverqu’iltientàjustetitreplusieursprovincescontestéesparlesprincesestrangers(3editions:Paris,1631;3editions:Paris,1655;2editions:Paris,1670);ThejuristJacquesdeCassanwrote in1632a legalargumentof therightsof theFrenchking tocertainHabsburg‐Spanishdominions.RecherchesdesDroitsdesRoisdeFrancesurlesRoyaumes,Duchés,Comtés,VillesetPaysoccupéparlesPrincessurlesRoyaumes,Duchés,Comtés,VillesetPaysoccupésparlesPrincesEtrangers(Paris,1632;Rouen,1634;Paris,1646,1649and1663).Cassanalsowroteapamphletin1665basedontheBrabantlawofdevolutiontosubstantiatetheFrenchclaimontheSpanishNetherlands.DeductioExquaprobaturclarissimisArgumentisnonesseIusDevolutionisinDucatuBrabantiaenecinallisBelgiiProvinciisRationePrincipumearum,proutquidemconatisuntasserere(1665).Baumanns,Das publizistische Werk, 83‐84. Notably, Baumanns considers Rohans De l’interest as belonging to Richelieu’scampaignaswell.Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,84.

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Philip IV, leaving the throne to the sickly minor Carlos II, Louis XIV seized the opportunity.

However, he did not simply stake his claim by military force, but, first of all, attempted to

persuade European rulers of his entitlement to parts of the Spanish Netherlands through a

massive pamphlet campaign. Louis’s lawyers presented the War of Devolution as no French

invasion,butasreclaiminghiswife’srightfulinheritance.411

LisolarespondedspecificallytotwoofsuchFrenchpamphlets.ThefirstwasTraitédes

droits de la Reine Tres‐Chrestienne sur divers Estats de laMonarchie d’Espagne by the jurist

AntioneBilain,commissionedbytheFrenchminsterColbertandpublishedbytheroyalprinter

in Paris in various editions and translations including German, English and Spanish.412 Bilain

declaredtheQueen’srenunciationofherinheritancerightsnullandvoid,basedonnaturallaw,

droit divin and various other legal categories to defend the inalienability of these rights.

Secondly,helegitimisedMariaTheresa’srightsbytheBrabantlawofdevolutionthatproperty

‘devolved’ upon the children of a firstmarriage,whether female ormale.413 Bilain’s tractwas

handed to the English ambassador in Paris by the foreign minister, Hugues de Lionne, to

circulatethelegaltextinEngland.CopieswereapparentlyfoundateverycourtinEurope.414

The second pamphlet waswritten Antoine Aubery’sDes justes Prétentions duRoy sur

l’Empire. This pamphletwas not authorised by the Crown for its strongly polemical contents.

Aubery did not only claim the imperial throne for Louis XIV, but the entire Empire itself.

According toFrenchSalicLaw,Auberyargued that theMerovingian,CarolingianandCapetian

dynasties formed the ‘present’ French monarchy and thus their possession belonged to the

FrenchCrown.Notably,hedefendedtherighttonewlyconqueredlandsbyreasonofstatethat

subjects juridical considerations. He demonstrated Louis’s direct descent from Charlemagne,

thus deemed theEmperorship of no valuewithout the rule of France.Moreover, the imperial

titlewaschosen(unliketheFrenchkingship),andconsequentlynotsovereignbynature.French

kingship was therefore of a supreme and stable quality compared to the German ‘kingship’.

AuberyconcludedthateveryEuropeanruler, includingtheEmperor,weremerevassalsof the

Frenchkings,asthetruedescendantsofCharlemagne.Francewas,accordingtoAubery,thefirst

and most sovereign monarchy of Christendom. To reduce the potential for conflict with the

Germanprinces,hewasput in theBastille.Yet, fiveweeks laterhewasreleased.TheSpanish

                                                            411Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,81‐83,166‐167; JohnA.Lynn,TheWarsofLouisXIV1667‐1714 (Routledge;NewYork2013),105‐106.412 AntoineBilain,Traitédesdroitsde laReineTres‐Chrestienne surdiversEstatsde laMonarchied’Espagne (Paris,1667).413MariaTheresawas theyoungestand theonly livingchild fromthe firstmarriageof theSpanishKingPhilips IVwith Elisabeth of France. FromhismarriagewithMariaAnna ofAustria, two children lived in 1667, ofwhich theyoungestchildbecameKingCarolusII.Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,88‐91.414Levillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,4.

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Governor apparently confronted Lisola with these French pamphlets at Lisola’s arrival in

BrusselsinMay1667.415

The‘guerredeplume’escalatedwithLisola’spublicationinAugust1667.Frenchtroops

enteredtheSpanishNetherlandsinMay1667.HewroteBouclierbetweenMayandJulyandin

August it was published.416 Herbert H. Rowen as well as Levillain state that, although Lisola

rebuttedthedevolutionclaimonlegalgrounds,Louismadeastronglegalcaseforhisrightsto

the SpanishNetherlands.417 Previous commentaries onBilain’s case of the right of devolution

haddeemedit ‘plausible’,asthediplomat‐historianLieuwevanAitzemavalidatedit,or,asthe

juristPeterStockmans,whohadtoadmitthepatrimonialcharacteroftheLowCountries,which

CharlesVhadwillinglygivenawayatthemarriagetreatybetweenPhilipIIandMaryTudorin

1554, favouring their children over Philip’s son, Don Carlos, of his firstmarriage.418 Lisola’s

reponse was preceded by the Deductie (1667) of Stockmans stating that customs in private

property were not applicable to dynastic succession. However, Bouclier became the most

importantrebuttalofthedevolutionclaim.GottfiedWilhelmvonLeibniz,forinstance,wrotein

1696thatLisola’s legalwas infinitelysuperiortothatofStockman’s,andPierreBaylethought

thatBouclierwasunmatchedinitsfireandrhetoric.419

As we saw in the chapter on Rohan, under Richelieu’s ministry, reason of state was

appropriated by the government to justify certain political actions deemed illegitimate, but

argued as necessity in extraordinary circumstances. The extensive debates on reason of state

made the extraordinary ordinary and, furthermore, it became a popular tool to criticise

government.420 As a result, from the 1660s onwards the Crown began sponsoring ‘royal

panegyric’ historywriting celebrating the gloryofLouis first and foremost, insteadofTacitist

‘critical political history’.421 The French minister Colbert placed numerous historians, poets,

scholars and artists on the payroll, such as the Jesuit René Rapin, who in his Instruction sur

l’histoire(1677)attackedTacitusandcriticisedtheuseofreasonofstatein(political)writings.

                                                            415AntoineAubery,DesjustesPrétentionsduRoysurl’Empire(1667).TheextremityofthisisinterestinginitselfandwouldcertainlyhaveencouragedaparanoiaaboutFrance’sexpansionistintentions—presumablywhyhewaslockedupforawhile. Itwasafeatureof latemedievalreligiouspolemic‐papalapologistswouldclaimforthepopedirectcontrolovereverythingpreciselywhenRomewashavingtroublegettingitsowncandidatesappointedtobishoprics‐italertsustothefactthathyperbolicmismatchofrightandrealitywasitselfapartofpolemics;Wrede,DasReichundseineFeinde,328;Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,95‐100,165.416Levillain,LeProcèsdeLouisXIV,97.417Rowen,Theking’sState,106;Levillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,4.418Rowen,Theking’sState,104;[PierreStockmans],Deductie,waaruytmetklareendebondigebewijsredenengetoontenbeweesenwordt,dattergeenrechtvandevolutieis,inhethertogdomvanBrabandt(Amsterdam1667).419Rowen,Theking’sState,105;OnLeibniz,Levillain,LeProcèsdeLouisXIV,307;PierreBayleinhiscorrespondencetoMinutolion1Mai1675,citedfromLevilain,LeProcèsdeLouisXIV,306‐307:‘J’enailuquelques‐unsquim’ontparubien frivoles.Onn’yvoitquedes lambeauxde feumonsieurdeLisola, cousus fortgrossièrementavecquelque lieucommun,etdesreditesperpétuelles.’[‘Ireadafewwhichseemedtomeveryfrivolous.WeonlyseeshredsofthefireofLisola,veryroughlystitchedwithsomecommonplaces,andperpetualrepetition.’]420Catteeuw,‘L’inacceptablefaceauxnécessitéspolitiques’;Gauchet,‘L’Etataumiroirdelaraisond’Etat’.421 Jacob Soll argues, ‘to promote purely eloquent historical propaganda,while outlawing critical political history’,PublishingThePrince,50‐51.

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Colbert revitalised the royal Gallican tradition of collecting archival documents for

propagandistic uses, legitimising military offensives and territorial claims by historical legal

documentsinsteadofreasonofstate.422LisolatriedtobeattheFrenchontheirowngroundsin

Bouclier by countering French reason of state and legal argumentation. There exists no exact

evidenceonitssources.LevillainbelievesthatthetitleofBouclier[‘shield’]wasmostprobably

inspiredbytheFrondepamphletLaraisond’ÉtatetBouclierduParlement(1649).423Itdefends

theparliament’sactionsintermsreasonofstate,as ‘qu’ilsn’avoientrienentreprisquepourle

biendupublic,&pourl’intérêtdeleurRoy.’424Theterm‘bouclier’,however,wasusedbyvarious

authorsandthisspecificpamphletdoesnotpresentanimageofaFrenchpredatorymonarchy,

unlike many other Fronde pamphlets as discussed in the chapter. Yet Lisola was probably

acquaintedwith these polemics as hewaswith anti‐French propagandawritten in the Dutch

Republicduringthepeacenegotiationsofthe1640s.425Theidiomofreasonofstatecombined

with the image of awar‐driven French regime entered in Dutch debates partly through such

pamphlets.426 For instance, the famous Munsters Vrede‐Praetje [Munster’s Peace‐Talk] from

1646discussedwhetherthecountry’swelfarewasfoundedonpeaceorwar; itexclaimedthat

theFrenchgrandeesnecessarilypursuedwarfaretoempowerandenrichthemselves,andthat

thesolerationaletomaintainalliancesandtreatieswasone’s‘ownAdvantage,whichtheFrench

call Interest.’427 The function of reason of state inBouclier, and its specific relation to French

writings,inparticulartoRohan’sDel’interesthas,however,notyetbeenstudiedanditneedsto

bereadagainstthebackgroundof‘absolutism’sooftenseenaspersonifiedbyLouisXIV.

4.1.4TheriseoftheFrenchmonarchy:expansionistand‘absolute’

NicolasHenshall speaksof a ‘zenithofEuropeanmonarchy and its elites’meaning theperiod

after the mid‐seventeenth crisis of monarchy that was tempered by newly restored and re‐

strengthened power structures between the Crown and its elites (estates, church, land

propertied nobles). However, as we have discussed in the chapter of De la Court, certain

developments disadvantaged the old elites, especially the rise of lower social groups in the

                                                            422 Soll, PublishingThe Prince, 41‐55, on p. 51 on René Rapin, Instruction sur l’histoire, (Paris: SebastienMarbre‐Cramoisy,1677).423Levillain,LeProcèsdeLouisXIV,28.424Laraisond’ÉtatetBouclierduParlement(Paris;JeanHénoult,1649),p.6.425Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,100‐101.426HansW.Blom,‘Oorlog,handelenstaatsbelanginhetpolitiekdenkenrond1648’,Dezeventiendeeeuw13(1997),89‐96.427Munsters Vrede‐Praetje. Vol alderhande Opinien/ off d’AlgemeeneWel‐vaert deser Landen in Oorlogh off Vredebestaat.Deliberantdumfingerenesciunt(1646).QuotationfromC3leftpageandonwar‐drivenFrenchgrandeesseeC2 rightpage: ‘omonderdiepretextdenOorlogh te continueren.WantdeGroote inVranckrijck soeckenhaer selfdeurderOorloghnoodtsaeckelijckbesaemt,rijck,endemachtichtemaecken.l’Appetitvientenmangeant.’

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abundantly sold or newly created offices. This should, nevertheless, not be interpreted as a

triumph of the monarch over its elites, but rather as a relative re‐stabilisation of European

monarchies. The revitalised co‐operation and consensus resulted in the capacity to maintain

larger armies and pursue prolonged warfare. Stable monarchies were based on the secure

relationship between its rulers and elites, i.e. negotiated power‐sharing with churches

(‘confessionalisation’),withnobles(armyoffices)andwithnewpowergroups(creditors).428

In the combination with the urge for dynastic acquisition and the European war

competition, these revitalisedmonarchies couldattractaccusationsof ‘despotic’or ‘absolutist’

rule,andLouisXIV’sreignformedthepivotalexample.However,scholarshiphasdebunkedthe

the modern notion of ‘absolutism’ and underlined that while Louis presented himself as an

‘absolute’ ruler and the Sun King (although most images represented Louis as Mars not

Apollo429), in practice he did not rule without consent or consultation of the Estates and

parlements (provincial high courts). ‘Absolutism’ (a late‐eighteenth century coinage), or

‘absolute’ rule was executed in theory.430 After periods of severe civil conflicts and political

factions,not leastby the regenciesof the1610s and1640s, the imageof theLouis’sBourbon

monarchywasmarketedonanunprecedentedlevelfromthe1660sonwards.Yet,stressingthe

absolutenatureofmonarchywasnonewargumentnorarchetypal fortheBourbons.Itserved

the restoration of the ‘natural’ order of society, an obsession for Louis and many of his

contemporaries.431 At the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth centuries,

‘absolute’ was used as a legitimate adjective, meaning the Crown had no superior within or

withouttherealm,asingleultimatesourceoflaw(neverthelesssubjectedtodivineanddivinely‐

inspired natural law), but in the course of the seventeenth century under polemical

manipulation itbecamedefinedasarbitrary,andthusas illegitimaterule,often inconjunction

with ‘tyranny’ and ‘despotic’ rule.432 It is then, important to keep distinct the negative use of

terms in the ambit of absolute from claims actually made in the name of sovereign, legal

authority. It is confusion on this score that construes recognition of co‐operation between

monarchs and elites as exposing amyth of absolutism. Co‐operationhardly compromised the

principleofanultimatesovereignauthority,itwasratherameansbywhichitcouldbeexercised

                                                            428Henshall,TheZenithofMonacrhy.429Collins,TheStateinEarlyModernFrance,104.430NicholasHenshall,TheMythOfAbsolutism:ChangeAndContinuityInEarlyModernEuropeanMonarchy(London:Longman,1992);RichardBonney,TheLimitsofAbsolutisminAncienRégimeFrance(Aldershot,1995);RonaldA.Aschand Heinz Duchardt, Der Absolutismus‐‐ein Mythos?: Strukturwandel monarchischer Herrschaft in West‐ undMitteleuropa (ca.1550‐1700) (Bölhau, 1996); S.J. Barnett,TheEnlightenmentandReligion:TheMyths ofModernity(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003); Collins, The State in EarlyModern France; William Beik, ‘TheAbsolutismofLouisXIVasSocialCollaboration’,PastandPresent188:1(2005)195‐224;Sommerville,‘EarlyModernAbsolutism’.431Collins,TheStateinEarlyModernFrance,101‐102.432GlennBurgess,‘Tyrants,AbsoluteKings,ArbitraryRulersandTheCommonwealthofEngland:SomeReflectionsonSeventeenth‐Century English Political Vocabulary’, in Cesare Cuttica and Glenn Burgess (eds.), Monarchism andAbsolutisminEarlyModernEurope(London:Pickering&Chatto,2012),147‐158.

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or expressed, especially in a world in which bureaucratic apparatus of the state was

rudimentary,erraticorhardlyexistent.Co‐operationwas,however,somethingthatsat illwith

absolute rule construed as tantamount to tyranny. But it is equally important not to take the

legitimatingclaimsofabsolutesovereignruleatfacevalue.

Thetwentyyears’crisisoftheFrenchmonarchy(1635‐1654)wasfollowedbyaperiod

of restoration in which the government was restructured from the late 1650s onwards, a

relativepeacewasreturned, taxdeclined,andcommercialactivities increased tonewheights.

The year 1661marked supposedly a sharp discontinuity inwhich Louis XIV seized ‘personal

rule’.However,whatwasattackedby theFrondepamphlets in1648‐1652,wasnotLouisXIV

himself,but theearlier influenceof the firstMinisterRichelieuandnowMazarin. Inawaythe

personal rule from1660s onwardswaswhat these pamphleteers hadwanted. Louis XIV did

makehimselfchiefministerafterMazarin’sdeathinthatsameyear,andformedanewcouncilof

state, cleansed frompotential factions of the princes of the blood, theQueenMother and the

chancellorofFrance.ThenewCouncilofStatehadfourmembers:Fouquet,quicklyfollowedup

by Colbert (finances), Michel Le Tellier (war), Hugues de Lionne (foreign affairs) and Louis

himself. Financial reorganisation entailed replacement of the older council of finances and a

reduction the number of intendants. However, Louis could not run government without the

cooperationofthemanyestablishedofficesheldbythelocalelitesoftherealm.TheCrownruled

not by a supposed build‐up of the standing army and bureaucracy, but through collaboration

with thevarioussocietalgroups inorder to respondmoreadequately to immediateproblems

raisedbywarfare.433

Althoughwe shouldnot overstate Louis’s power inmilitary appointments (in practice

arrangedbythelocalrulingmilitaryelitethroughfamilyconnections),underLouisthemilitary

wasfurtherreformed,rootedinLouisXIII’sabolitionorcurtailmentofsomeindependenthigh

military offices.During the1660s and1670s Francehad amore efficient andbetter supplied

armythanintheThirtyYears’War,whichservedLouis’smajorwars,i.e.theWarofDevolution,

theFranco‐DutchWar (1672‐1679), theWarof theLeagueofAugsburg (1689‐1697),and the

WaroftheSpanishSuccession(1702‐1714),ofwhichthefirsttwowarsresultedinconsiderable

advantages for the Frenchmonarchy. After the Peace of Pyrenees in 1659 the French forces

werereducedtoasizeofaround50,000men,butafter1665Louisincreaseditandby1667he

had massed an army of 80,000.434 The death of his father‐in‐law, King Philip IV, the heavy

reductionofarmytroopsintheSpanishNetherlandsandthefavourablecircumstancesofother

European regimes locked in warfare or in France’s diplomatic schemes, paved the way for

Louis’squicksuccesses, insixthmonthscapturing themost importantcities, suchasofDouai,

                                                            433Collins,TheStateinEarlyModernFrance,100‐115.434Lynn,TheWarsofLouisXIV,106.

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Lille, Courtai, and Tournai. The signing of the Triple Alliance between the Dutch Republic,

EnglandandSwedenobstructedLouis’splans,forthetimebeing.

Louis gained the conquered northern cities, but had to return Franche‐Comté. As his

successes in the war were not matched by the territorial gains, his ministers prepared for

furtherwarfare, against the Dutch Republic. Thismarked a change in France’s orientation in

foreign affairs from aligning with the Dutch Republic since the 1560s and with the German

Princesagainstitsnaturalenemy,theHabsburg.CollinsdistinguishedthreeelementsofFrench

thinking on foreign policy,which reflected the change in European order after the decline of

Spain: the reduced Spanish threat, the domination of Dutch commerce, and the need for

expansionandstabilisednorthernfrontierstoprotectParis.ThemainthreattoLouis’sclaimsto

theSpanish‐Habsburgestateswas formed,notbySpain,butby theDutchRepublic(especially

Holland)andtheGermanprinces,whoannulledtheLeagueoftheRhinewithLouisin1668.435

4.2Bouclier:reasonofstate,EuropeanlegalorderandtheFrenchhazard

Thepresent analysis ofBouclierwill unravel Lisola’s specific reversal ofRohan’sDeL’interest

thatledtoarevitalisationofaccusationsofuniversalmonarchyanddefencesofthebalanceof

power in lateseventeenth‐centuryanti‐Frenchpropaganda.Secondly, itwillscrutinizeLisola’s

negative image of France; how he complemented Rohan’s portrayal of Spain, as a predatory

monarchybasedontheruleofconquestwithimplicitaccusationsofadespoticrule.However,

thisreversaloccurspredominantlyintheculminatingsixthandlastpartofthebook,inwhichhe

presentshisinterestanalysisofSpainandFrance.So,firstwewilldiscussthepreface,wherein

theformerlawyercolourfullyoratesabouttheFrenchlegaltractsdefendingLouisXIV’sclaimon

theSpanishNetherlandsandverygentlybuildsuphiscase that theallegedgloriousandmost

ChristianKingLouiswasinfacttheinstigatorofthesedefamatorybooklets.Thenwewill look

intoapartofLisola’slegalrebuttalthatoutlineshissupposeddesignforuniversalmonarchy.

4.2.1Preface:agentleattackonLouisXIV

Lisola opened Bouclierwith a vivid image ‐which we observed in Rohan’s depiction of the

Spanish interest436 and we will see later revived by Valkenier‐ of rulers lulled into sleep by

seemingly assured alliances and treaties. The imperial diplomat spoke about ‘we’ meaning                                                            435Collins,TheStateinEarlyModernFrance,116‐118.436Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,9‐10:‘sheweadesireofpeace,therebytocastothersasleepe,andinthemeanetimepreparehimselftowarre,fortosurprisethevnprouided.’

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Habsburg‐Spain, ‘rested quietly under the shade of Peace’ (of the Pyrenees) but awakened by

Frenchwarpreparationsandby‘diverseLibells’.Theselibelswere:‘theusualfore‐runnersofWar

(…)spredupanddownpromiscuouslyamongsttheNobilityandtheCommonpeopletoseducehis

Majestie’sfaithfulSubjects,undercolourofsomePretensionsofthemostChristianQueenuponall

these Provinces.’437 And he immediately named three titles, one of which we have discussed

above,TraitédesdroitsdelaReineTres‐ChrestiennesurdiversEstatsdelaMonarchied’Espagne

by Antoine Bilain and yet another by Bilain titled Dialogue sur les droits de la reine Très‐

Chrétienne (1667) and the anonymousSoixante‐quatorze raisonsquiprouventplusclairque le

jourquelarenonciationfaiteparlareineMarie‐Thérèsed'Autricheensoncontratdemariageaux

couronnesetEstatsde feuPhilippe IV,sonpère,estnulle(1666).Lisolausedtheseprimarily to

sumupthe‘Pretentions’oftheFrenchCrown,whichwerearguedbytheallegedinvalidityofthe

Queen’s renunciationof her rights to theHabsburgpossessions, and towarnof the extensive

territorialcompensationFranceclaims.438

WithsustainedironyandconsiderablerelianceonthetropeoflitotesLisolaarguedthat

‘themostChristianKing’couldhaveneverauthorisedthepublicationof‘suchWritings’.Notethat

henot oncenamedLouisXIVbutpersistently calledhimby this traditional French royal title

purportedly accorded by the Papacy to the Frankish King Clovis. Lisola built up this case so

colourfully that in theend the readerwouldhaveassumed that theoppositewas in fact true;

Louis XIV authorised thewriting and distribution of these texts and the French kingwas no

guardian of peace, justice or religion. First of all Lisola argued that the pamphletsweremere

‘passe‐volants’,and‘theeffectsofsomeidlePens’,theircontents‘irregular’and‘brittle’andtheir

style ‘unhandsome’.439Besides, arguing from the standpoint of justice, and the ties andbonds

betweentheFrenchandSpanishKings,itispurelogictobelievethatLouiswouldfirstexhaust

allmeansbeforepursuingwarfare.Moreover,theFrenchKinghadguaranteedthepreservation

of thesignedpeacebetween the twodynasties.Thus,Lisola reasoned that theSpanishCrown

couldonlybelievethegoodintentionsofFrance,addingtheinfancyoftheSpanishKingCarolus

II,Louisbrother‐in‐law,asafurtherreasonnottoexpectanyintendedharmfromFrance.Asthe

FrenchinvasionintheSpanishNetherlandswasalreadyinprocessbythetimeofpublicationof

Bouclier the reader would definitely know that the French indeed pursued warfare in

contradiction to theirpeace treaties.Lisola restated thatbypointing to theFrenchsupport to

PortugalinitsrevoltagainstHabsburg‐Spain(1640‐1668).Thisprovedthat‘FaithofTreatiesof

Oath were much inferior to the Interest of State’ in (as the reader would have to conclude)

Frenchpolitics.ButthebeliefthatLouisdidnotauthorisethesewritingscrumbled,whenword

                                                            437[Lisola],TheBuckler,Preface.[italicsinoriginalquotes]438[Lisola],TheBuckler,Preface.439[Lisola],TheBuckler,Preface.

114

wasreceived that these libelswerepresentedat theStatesGeneralof theDutchRepublic, the

ImperialDietandeventosomeprincesoftheHolyRomanEmpire.

He ventured on by claiming his patriotic duty towards: ‘myKing,my Country and the

Publick’ to rebut ‘false impressionswhich theartificeofa slightEloquence,muchmore then the

solidityofReasons,mightproduceintheopinionofcredulousspirits,notthoroughlyversedinour

LawsandCustomes.’440 By analysing the primary legal tracts, such as the peace andmarriage

treaties, he allegedly discovered factual ‘Falshoods’, ‘malicious Artifices’ and ‘hyperbolic

Exaggerations’ in these legal analyses of the French publicists, especially slander towards the

personof thepreviousSpanishKingPhilip IV.Thereaderhadtounderstand itas treacherous

propaganda ‘to castdust in the eyesof theneighbouringPrinces’ and ‘topervert thepeople’.441

Conversely, but surely most deliberately, he ended his preface with several hyperbolic

exaggerationsregardingLouisXIV’sdemeanour. Insteadofdisplayingsomerespectandcredit

forLouisXIV,LisolamockedLouisXIVthroughembellishedpraises:

‘Thoughwe cannot doubt of theApprobationwhich themost ChristianKing hath

given to those injuriousWritings, I cannot yetbepersuaded thathe ever took the

pains to reade themover,andwill ratherbelieve (tohishonour) thathisweighty

Affairs,andhisgreatapplicationtothisloftieArming,havesotakenupallhistime,

thathehadnonetosparetocasthiseyesuponworkswhichhavesolittlesympathy

withhisgeniusandQualitie.(…)hehastoomuchGenerosity,andLovefortheQueen

his Consort, to suffer that any should so unworthily defame theReputation of his

Father‐in‐Law (…)hehath toomuch Justice, topermit that they shouldmake the

mosttenderFatherandbestofKingspassforaTyrant,constraininghisDaughter,by

a barbarous Disinheriting her, or a Cheater (…) he hath too great a minde, to

approve of triflingupon Jewels, or todesire thatanaccompt byway of Inventory

shouldbegivenhimofall theKnackswhichbelonged to theQueenhisMother‐in‐

Law,andthatalltheEarthshouldbealarmedaboutaDomestickconcernment(…)

hehathtoomuchPrudenceandloveforTruth,evertoconsenttothepublicationof

somany falseAllegations so inconsideratelypacked togetheroneupon thebackof

another;notquestioningatall,but ifthathehadattentivelyconsideredthem,they

wouldhavetouchedhimwithjustindignationagainstthosewhohavesoimpudently

abusedhisName’.442

                                                            440[Lisola],TheBuckler,Preface.441[Lisola],TheBuckler,Preface.442[Lisola],TheBuckler,Preface.

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Theseconsiderations,Lisolaclaimed,weremucheasiertobelieve,leavingthereadertoassume

thattheoppositeisactuallytrue.HeevenwrotethathisrebuttalmightconvincetheKing: ‘the

soliditieofourreasonswillnotonelyconducetofortifiethePeople,andpersuadetheneighbour‐

Princes,butevenpiercetheheartofthemostChiristianKing;(…)andhavingovercomebyReasons,

wehopethattheArbiterofSovereignsandsupremeProtectorofJusticewillnotletussinkunder

theweight of his arms.’443 The indirect criticism of Louis in the preface ended with a rather

incredible disclaimer, but traditional in the sense of not blaming the ruler but his advisors

instead:‘IpretendthemostChristianKing’sSacredPersontobeexcepted;andthatIdoascribeall

theEvilswhichareintendedtowardsusonelytothosemeanIncendiarieWriters’.444

Oneotherissueoftheprefacedeservesourattention,i.e.theuseofthevocabularyand

imageryofreasonofstate.AfterclaiminghispatrioticdutyLisolaexclaimedthathehasafurther

obligationtowardstheneighbouringrulersto‘letthemevidentlyunderstand,thatallthePretexts

withwhichtheFrenchdolabourtodisguisethevastDesignsthattheyhaveinhand,arebutfalse

colourstomaskthetrueSpringwhichgivestheMotiontothisMachine,andtomakeanAmbition

whichgoesatagreatpace to theUniversalMonarchiepassunder the veilof Justice.’445 Aswe

witnessedinthechapteronRohan,acommontoposofreasonofstatewritingswastheunveiling

of the malicious motives and actions of rulers and/or his advisers, hidden behind masks or

coveredunder cloaksofmorality, legality and religion.More interestingly, in this exclamation

LisolausedtheconclusivephraseofRohanregardingtheSpanishinterest:‘Thishugeframe[the

French original text states ‘machine’, MBK] composed of so many parts, and as it were

incumberedwithitsowneweight,mouesbyitssecretsprings,whichloosetheir forceeuenas

they are discouered.’446 Butwhereas Rohan’s argumentwas to unveil Spain’s vast designs of

universalmonarchyhiddenbehindaCatholiczeal,LisolamadehiscaseofunveilingtheFrench

cloakoflegality,oftheirlegalclaimswhichwereamerecoverupfortheirplanstoestablishan

universalmonarchy.

4.2.2Firstfivearticles:legalrebuttalandtheimageofapredatorymonarchy

Painstakingly Lisola subjected Louis’s legal claims to forensic legal analysis in the first five

articles. He integrated the legal arguments of French writers as Bilain and Aubery and then

rebuttthese.Thetitlesrevealwellthecontent:

                                                            443[Lisola],TheBuckler,Preface.444[Lisola],TheBuckler,Preface.445[Lisola],TheBuckler,Preface.446Rohan,ATreatise of the Interest of the Princes and States of Christendome, 12; Henri de Rohan,De l’intérêt desprinceset lesEtatschrétienté,19; ‘Cettegrandemachine composéesde tantdepartieset commeempêchéede sonproprepoidss’émeutparcessecretsressortsquiperdentleurforceàmesurequ’ilssontdécouverts.’

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(1)‘Of theEndswhichFRANCEdothproposeunto it self in thisWar,and in these

Libells’; (2) ‘That theEntryof theKingofFrance into theEstatesof theCatholick

King in the Low‐Countries is a evidentRupture’; (3) ‘That thisRupture is unjust,

admittingthattheRight[s]ofthemostChristianKingwerewellfounded’;(4) ‘That

theRenunciationof theFrenchQueen is just, irrevocable,necessary,andusefull to

thePublickgood,norcontainsinitselfanycauseofNullitieorLæsion;andthatthe

QueenofFrancehathbeendulyDoted’;(5) ‘ThattheSuccessionoftheSoveraigntie

of theDutchyofBrabant,andotherProvinces,whichare specified in theseLibells,

oughtnottoberegulatedbyparticularCustoms.’447

SincewearemoreconcernedwithLisola’suseofthelanguageofreasonofstateandhisimageof

theFrenchmonarchy,wewillconcentrateonthefirstarticleinwhichheoutlinesLouis’sdesign

foruniversalmonarchy.

Immediately Lisola attacked ‘the dull conceit’ of the writers of the French libels, and

indirectlycondemnedLouisXIV’sdouble‐dealings:

‘TheauthoroftheseLibells(…)extollsthelovewhichhisMasterhathforPeace,at

the very instantwhen he is breaking it; (…) he requires Peace, and bringsWar;

attaques without Rupture, forces without constraint, and plaies with so much

contempt upon the Ignorance and Credulity which he supposes to be in the

JudgmentofhisReaders,thathewillneeds(sic.)havethewayofFacttopassfor

Justice,ViolenceforModeration,UsurpationforTitle,andDefenceforaCrime’.448

ThepurposeoftheFrenchpropagandawasnotonlytosoftenthe‘ugliness’and‘Scandal’ofthe

militaryoffensive,butalsotolegitimisewarandmis‐usethepromotionofpeaceasameansto

erectan ‘AbsoluteEmpire’.449With ‘absolute’,Lisola referred touniversaldominion,andaswe

willseebelow,intermsofarbitraryrule, inparticularahouseholdrule.Lisolaarguedthatthe

promisesofFrance, that theyonlypursuedanhonesttreatywithSpainandthattheypursued

warfareagainsttheirwill,werecontraryto‘ActionsandMotions[which]tendtowardavastand

deepDesign’:toestablishanuniversalmonarchy.450

Lisola’s casedependson the useof paradiastole, or subdistinctio, that is re‐describing

the evidence of his opponents to mean the opposite of what they claim; and by this he is

                                                            447[Lisola],TheBuckler,1‐19;20‐41;42‐84;85‐173;173‐273.448[Lisola],TheBuckler,1‐2.449[Lisola],TheBuckler,4.450[Lisola],TheBuckler,6.

117

continuing the established idiomof criticismby unmasking secret designs and evil intent.He

referred to the considerable armature, the excessive expenditures in their foreign relations,

forming alliances, instigating conflicts between other rulers, exemplified by their support for

Sweden in the Thirty Years War and the French intermeddling in the issue of the Polish

succession.451Thesewere:

‘proofs capable to convince the darkest understandings, that all this immense

PreparationofArmsandIntrigueshathsomethinginitofgreaterextentthenthe

bareConquestofsomeProvinces,(whichourover‐muchCredulityhathexposedto

themas aprey) andendsnot in a simpledesireof tearingaway a fewpiecesof

thembyaTreatie.ThesehugeMountainsarenottobringforthMice,buttovomit

outFlamesastheVesuve,tosetthewholeneighbouringCountriesonfire.’452

Time and again Lisola put forth the image of France as a predatory monarchy, driven by

rapaciousconquest,nottobestoppedafteritsviolentplunderoftheSpanishLowCountries.

Furthermore, Lisola discredited the person of the King. Louis XIVwas spoon‐fedwith

desires for conquest and military glory. Colbert supposedly educated him by virtue of the

historiesoftheBishopofRhodes453inthespiritofLouis’sgreat‐grandfatherHenryIV,thefirst

BourbonKing;

‘Hehath,inimitationofhim,takengreatcaretoaccumulatemuchTreasure,sought

forAlliances abroad, and at lengthhath raisedmost powerfullArmies.Wemust

thereforeconclude,thatheactsupontheverysameDraughts;andthatallwesee

atpresentarebutrenewedProjects,andtheeffectsofthoseImpressionswhichhe

hathsuckedinwithhismilk.’454

Louis XIV set up similar war efforts to those of Henry IV: accumulation of money, external

warfare,andcontrolling largearmies.However,Lisolawarnedthereader thatbecauseLouis’s

reignentailedalongerperiodandamorepowerfulstandthanthatofHenryIV,andthedesireof

gloryhadnobounds, ‘sowecannot reasonablyexpect that theswiftnessof theRihneshallbe

abletostophim’.455Moreover,Louis’swritershadnourishedhiminthesethoughtsofmilitary

gloryandconquestswithgreatdiligence,asLisolareferredtothepreviouslydiscussedAubery’s

DesjustesPrétensionsduRoysurl’Empire.                                                            451[Lisola],TheBuckler,6.452[Lisola],TheBuckler,6‐7.453PaulPhilippeHardouindeBeaumontdePéréfixe,HistoireduroyHenryleGrand(Amsterdam1661).454[Lisola],TheBuckler,7.455[Lisola],TheBuckler,8.

118

The imperial diplomat presented evidence that in fact France pursued no peace with

Habsburg‐Spain. The French support to the Portuguese in their revolt against Spain and,

secondly,invalidatingMariaTheresa’srenunciationdestroyedtheentirePeaceofthePyrenees

betweenFranceandSpain.ThepeacetreatythattheWarofDevolutionwouldbringforthwould

onlyserveasapretextforfurtherconquests;

‘Thepeacewhich shall bemade cannotbebut the seedof a newWar; itwill be

impossible to cut the evil by the root. ‘Tis here were the Mediators shall find

themselves puzzled: and if all their Pretensions be granted, then will they be

absoluteMastersof theNetherlands,and inaconditiontotakepossessionbythe

same Title not onely of that part of Brabant of which the States of the United

Provincesstandpossessed,butalsoofalltherestoftheirCountreys’.456

He concluded the first article with an exclamation to all European politicians: France ‘aims

absolutelyattheentireDestructionofaMonarchywhichistheBulwarkofalltherest(...)Itis

lefttowisePoliticianstomakenecessaryreflexionsuponamatterofsuchhighconcernment.’457

In his legal rebuttal Lisola pinpointed the illegitimate rule of conquest by France. He

emphasised the French breach of law, French war crimes, which would become recurrent

themes in lateranti‐Frenchpolemics.Lisola likewisestressedFrance’s threat to theEuropean

legalorder.Theinvasionwascontrarytothe‘LawofNations’,tothe‘customsandpracticeofthe

CivilandMunicipalLaws’.Moreover,nottocallitawar,accordingtoLisola,wastodenythatthe

militaryoffensivecouldbejudgedbythe‘LawofWar’and,consequently,renderedit:

‘… aDepredation andPiracie; and if it be not an infringing of thePeace, it is an

unjustAttempt,whichgivesa shock toallLawsandForms. (...) theydestroy the

principal Foundation of it, and take from themselves the means of establishing

theirConquestupontherightofWar,bydeclaringthattheywillConquerwithout

breakingthePeace.’458

ThroughoutBouclierLisolawarnedaboutuniversallossoflegalityifLouisdevolutionclaimsand

hisinvasionoftheSpanishNetherlandsweregrantedvalidity: ‘IfSovereigntieswereregulated

byLocalCustoms(…)TheorderoftheWorld(…)mustbeabsolutelyoverthrown’.459

                                                            456[Lisola],TheBuckler,16.457[Lisola],TheBuckler,19.458[Lisola],TheBuckler,24‐25.459[Lisola],TheBuckler,175.

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4.2.3Sixtharticle:interestofstate

The sixth article of Bouclier is ourmain object of inquiry, since here Lisola puts forward an

interestanalysisofSpainandFrance,andpresentsthereaderwithhispoliticalargumentagainst

theillegitimacyofFrance’smilitaryoffensiveandinfavourofanalliancebetweenthedifferent

authorities of the Holy Roman Empire and Habsburg‐Spain against Louis XIV.460 Lisola

understoodwellthepowerofthelanguageofreasonofstatetoinfluencetheopinionofabroad

public,moreinfluentialthanhislegalrebuttalandtouchinguponaEuropean‐widereadership.

Ashewrotetellingly‘InterestofState(…)ismoreuniversall,andmoreconsideredatthisdayin

theWorld’than‘thestrictObligationofJustice.’461Thelawyerexplicitlydistinguishedthisarticle

fromthepreviousfiveones,claimingto‘resolvetoshakeoffallmannerofinteressedthoughts

whichImayhaveformyparts;(…)IwillfoundmyDiscourseonnootherPrinciplesbutthose

whichIshalldrawoutofFrenchAuthors.’462

ItunderlineswhatwealreadyhavediscussedinthechapteronRohan,thattheidiomof

reasonofstatewasappropriatedbytheFrenchCrownunderRichelieubutincreasinglyturned

intoaweaponagainstgovernmentduring,whatCollinscalls, ‘thetwentyyears’crisisof1635‐

1654’.463 As has also been noted, from the 1660s the French Crown sponsored writings of

panegyricshistoryprincipallycelebratingLouisXIVandofarchivally‐basedclaimstoHabsburg

possessions, instead of employing reason of state.464 Through ironic inversion, Lisola turned

these features of French public discourse against France, just as he exploited and redirected

Rohan’sunderstandingofSpanishinterest.Asheasserted,‘theydarenolongermakeuseofthat

ridiculousscarecrowoftheUniversalMonarchieaimedatbytheSpaniards.’465Aswereadinthe

chapter on Rohan, interest analysis was a means to address the true chaos of interrelated

Europeanwarfareandcivilconflicts,andsimultaneouslytosatirisecertainpoliticalactions.We

findbothelementsinBouclier.Asalreadystated,perhapsthepureironyforusisthatRohanalso

employed the language of reason of state in a satiric way, and that, furthermore, later anti‐

French polemics by Dutch and English authors were indebted to a French Huguenot author

defendingtheBourbondynastyandaSpanishCatholiclawyeradvocatingtheHabsburgdynasty.

ItistothespecificinversionofRohan’scasethatwecannowturn.

                                                            460[Lisola],TheBuckler,273‐311.461[Lisola],TheBuckler,274,273.462[Lisola],TheBuckler,276.463Collins,TheState inEarlyModernFrance, 71;Catteeuw, ‘L’inacceptable faceauxnécessitéspolitiques’;Gauchet,‘L’Etataumiroirdelaraisond’Etat’.464Soll,PublishingThePrince.465[Lisola],TheBuckler,299.

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First,Lisolare‐employedRohan’simageofthe‘commonBulwark’againsta‘vastdesign

for conquest’,466 an image that later anti‐French writings often reiterated as the entity to be

protected against the barbaric Frenchmen.467 However, he enhanced the image of the rule of

conquest with addressing its consequence for the liberty of Europe: slavery. He states in

hyperbolicterms:

‘ItisourpurposetodefendthecommonBulwarkagainstavastDesign,whichhath

for its cause nothing but the predominant desire of Conquests, for its end

Dominion,foritsmeansArmsandIntricacies,norforitslimitsanythingbutwhat

Chancewillprescribe.Infine,weareheretodecidethefortuneofEurope,andto

pronouncetheSentenceeitherofitsFreedomorSlaverie.’468

‘CommonBulwark’ referred to theHabsburg estates in the SpanishNetherlands, aswell as a

more abstract notion of fencing off the European legal order against France’s. Apart from

slavery,LisolacomplementedRohan’simageofthepredatorymonarchybystatingthatFrance

threatenedtosubvertthe‘LawofNations’,‘PublickFaithoftreaties’, ‘LawofArms’established

bythe‘UniversalConsentofallNations’,andto‘destroythewholeCommerceofmankind’and

‘render humane Societies as dangerous as the company of Lions and Tigers.’469 The French

invasion in the Spanish Netherlands meant the first step towards their design of universal

monarchy.ThisisalsowitnessedinhiscomparisonoftheFrenchthreatwiththeTurkishthreat

toEurope.With‘bulwark’RohanhadmeanttheFrenchdefenceofthelibertiesofChristendom

againstSpain’srapacioustyranny.Lisolaviewedthe

‘UnionoftheempiretothepowerofSpaininthepersonofCharlestheVthwasrathera

step to the design of becoming greater, then any addition to his power (…) this

powerfulMonarchieseemstohavebeenraisedbyGodtobe theBulwarkof therest,

againsttheTurkinHungarieandinItalie,againsttheMoorsinSpain,andagainstFrance

bothintheLow‐CountreysandItalie’.470

                                                            466BothFrenchoriginalsuses‘boulevard’;Lisola,Bouclier,317;Rohan,Del’interest,17;Rohan,‘commonbulwark’:ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,16andSpanishdesignforuniversalmonarchy:2,5,7,9(aselection).467TonyClaydon,‘Protestantism,UniversalMonarchyandChristendominWilliam’sWarPropaganda1689‐1697,inEsther Meijers en David Onnekink, RedefiningWilliam: the impact of the King‐Stadholder in international context(Aldershot:Ashgate,2007),125‐142,p.140.468[Lisola],TheBuckler,275.469[Lisola],TheBuckler,274.470[Lisola],TheBuckler,281.

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The ‘rest’ signifies the Freedom of Europe that was threatened with slavery by these

Conquerors,includingtheFrenchdespoticmonarchy.NotethatLisoladidusethetermEurope

as an intellectual and political entity in danger of France’s universal monarchy, as well as,

althoughtoalesserextent,theword‘Christendom’.

Spain’sascendancyhadcaused‘Envy,wehaveseengrowingintheheartofFrance the

lamentableseedsofthisunjustEmulation,whichforsomanyyearstogetherhathproducedall

theMisfortunes&TroublesofChristendom.’Therefore,hearguedthat theprincipalmotiveof

French publicists was ‘to diffuse this Jealousy everywhere’ rendering Habsburg ‘a fearfull

Phantasm’andFranceas‘theonelyPerseus’sabletodeliverfetteredEuropefromthefuryofthis

ChimericalMonster’,butthat in factFrancedidnotwanttoprotect theEuropeansagaisntthe

allegedSpanishenemy,butaimed‘tobecometheirMasters,andmakethemtheInstrumentsof

theirEnds.’Lisolacontendedthat:

‘ThisArtificewassosuccessfull,thatapartofEuropeputitselfinArmsagainstthe

Valour and Good fortune of Charles the Vth, and the profound Wisedom of his

Successour:andallthisCommotionwasfoundedupononeonelyPrincipleofState

which the FrenchWriters have establishedwith an extraordinary diligence, and

uponwhich theDukeofRohanhadmade [run] allhisTreatiseof the Interestof

Princes;ThattherearetwoPowersinChristendomwhichbelikethetwoPoles,from

whencealltheInfluencesofPeaceandWardodescendupontheotherStates.From

whencehedrawsthisMaximetoregulate theConductofallotherPrinces, [t]hat

theirprincipal Interest is tohold theBalancesoequallybetwixt these twoGreat

Monarchies’.471

Thus French publicists stirred up European rulers against Spain keeping all European rulers

lockedincombatwhiletheysecretlysetuptheirdesignforuniversalmonarchybytheprinciples

ofinterestofstate.Rohan’sDe l’interestwastheexplicitblueprintofFrance’sdesign.Although

the imperial diplomat found that Rohan ‘doth applie thisMaxime [tomaintain the balance of

powerbetweenSpainandFrancethrougharmsornegotiations]veryilltotheparticularuseof

France’,472hebelievedthatitentailedacertaintruth.Yet,theeffectivepropagandaofFranceled

EuropeanrulersintobelievingthatSpainfunctionedastheunbalancingfactor‘andthatbythis

very reason of State they were obliged to put the Counterpoise into the French Scale of

Balance.’473LisolareferredtothebalanceofpoweronlywithdirectreferencetoRohaninorder

totransmitthethreatoftheimpendinguniversalmonarchyfromSpaintoFrance.Therefore,to                                                            471[Lisola],TheBuckler,277‐278.472[Lisola],TheBuckler,278.473[Lisola],TheBuckler,279.

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persuade theEuropeanrulersof theerror theyhadmade inabandoning ‘their trueReasonof

State’474hecomparedthesystemsofruleofFranceandSpainbytheirgeographicalsituation,the

nature of the rulers andpeoples, themaximsof government and the specific history for each

regime up till now. As we have discussed earlier, Rohan’s interest analyses of the two

monarchies contained exactly the same variables, but now Lisola had added an important

componenttotheequation:thenatureoftherespectiverulersandpeoples.Thiswillservetoset

forththemonarchiesassystemsofruleaccordingtothenatureofthepeoples:peacefulandlaw‐

abiding(theSpanish) inoppositiontoaggressive,rebelliousandsavage‐like(theFrench),asa

resultrenderingtheFrenchregimedespotic.

4.2.4TheinterestofSpain:goodgovernmentversusFrance’spredatorymonarchy

Lisola turned Rohan’s image of Spain’swarmachine around, by claiming that its situation ‘is

advantagious (sic.) for its own Defence, being compassed with the Sea and the Pyrenean

Mountains: but it is inconvenient for invading other States, because of the defect of a nearer

conjunctionbetwixttheMembersthereof’.475TheSpanishdynasticagglomeratewasanuisance

fortheHabsburgs,butgivenbyGodtoactasthe‘Bulwarkoftherest’againstthebarbaric,brutal

and bellicose Turks, Moors and French. Furthermore the Habsburg rulers ‘are naturally

Courteous, and inclined to Vertue’, and more importantly not belligerent by nature at all.

AlthoughCharlesV‘lovednobleGlory’,he‘hadsolittleAmbition,thatheresignedtheEmpireto

his Brother, and all his Kingdoms to his Son’. Lisola directed his pen against Rohan’s

‘inconsistent’ representation of Philip II.476 The Huguenot warrior had written that Philip

‘finding himselfe less fit for war than civille businesses (…) prosecuted his design under a

profounddissimulation’477,bywhichRohanindirectlyreferredtoMachiavelli’sargumentabout

thedifficultiesofmaintainingconqueredpolitieswhen‘greatConqeurrours’weresucceeded,as

Rohanarguedwasoften the case,by less courageous rulers.478 Sohowcould itbe thatRohan

wasable ‘to representhim [Philip II] inoneand the same timeas anenemie toWar, andyet

ardenttoobtainConquests.’WehavereadRohan’srepresentationofPhilipassatire,describing

himasashrewdMachiavellianconqueror,notasapeacefulprince,butthelatterisexactlywhat

Lisola attempt to underline, as he writes, ‘according to the confession of the Duke of Rohan

himself,[PhilipII]hadnoinclinationatalltoArms,norevertookthemupbutforhisDefence’.479

                                                            474[Lisola],TheBuckler,279.475[Lisola],TheBuckler,280.476[Lisola],TheBuckler,282.477Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,4478Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,4‐5.479[Lisola],TheBuckler,282.

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The same ‘rare Clemency’ applied to Philip’s successors, states Lisola.480 Moreover, whereas

RohanspeaksoftheSpanishpeoplesononlyoneoccasion,whenpointingtotheSpanishmaxim

of maintaining a constant state of armament ‘to keepe his Subjects in obedience’481, Lisola

reversedthisimage;‘ThepeopleofSpain,andoftheotherKingdomswhichliveunderthesame

Dominion,arenaturallyfriendstoQuietness,enemiestoNovelties,satisfied,withtheirpresent

Condition,andhavenottheleastpropensionoritchingtotroubletheirNeighbours.’482

In Rohan’s interest analysis themaxims (methods of government to achieve universal

monarchy)ofSpainstoodinoppositiontoFrenchrule;inLisola’saccounttheSpanishmaxims

‘opposethoseoftheConqerours’, i.e. theBourbon‐Frenchdynasty.However,Lisolawasnotso

muchinterestedintheSpanishmaxims,whichusuallytookupasinglesentence,butratherin

makingimplicitcomparisonswiththeFrenchmaximsandsoindirectlyassertingFrenchdesigns

of universal monarchy. The first Spanish maximwas ‘to keep inviolably the Faith of publick

Treaties, which are powerful bridles to the Ambition of a Prince who desires to extend his

Limits,anddoputgreatobstaclestohisDesigns,bymakinghimaSlavetohisWorld.’483Lisola

claimedthatnotoneHabsburgrulerhasever‘brokenorprevaricatedinanyTreatie,norbegana

War for the inlargingof theirLimits.’484The reader couldhaveeasily guessed thatLisolawas

talkingoftheFrenchdynasty,especiallyLouisXIV’sactionsconcerningtheWarofDevolution.

Louisappearsasarapaciousconqueror,justasRohandescribedPhilipII,butLisolaaddedthe

componentofahouseholdrulethatLouisasMasterwantedtoimposeonEurope.Spain’ssecond

maximwas‘[t]opreferReligionalwaysbeforeReasonofState;whichisdirectlycontrarytothe

Rule of Conquerors,who do dexterouslymake use of all sorts of Sects to compass their own

Ends.’485AsLisolahadalreadystatedbefore,Franceruledsolelybytheprincipleof interestof

state, and religionwould only be used to serve their design, as also Rohan accused Spain of

hidingtheirplansofuniversalmonarchyunderthepretextofdefendingCatholicism.Thethird

Spanishmaximwas‘NottomakeuseoftheirVictories,andtheAdvantagesoftheirArms,norof

thoseoftheirAllies’.486Yetagain,thereaderhadalreadyreadthatthiswastheexactlycasewith

France.

ThefourthmethodofSpanishgovernmentwas:

‘[t]oruleaccordingtotheLaws,andleavetheirPeopleinthepeaceablepossession

oftheirPrivileges;whichamongstConquerourswouldpassforanessential fault,

                                                            480[Lisola],TheBuckler,282‐283.481Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,10.482[Lisola],TheBuckler,283.483[Lisola],TheBuckler,283.484[Lisola],TheBuckler,283‐284.485[Lisola],TheBuckler,284.486[Lisola],TheBuckler,284.

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againstthefirstPrinciplesoftheirPoliticks,whichrequirebeforeallotherthings,

thattheymakethemselvesabsoluteandindependentathome,andthattheybreak

alltheChainsofDomestickLawswhichmighthindertheiractingsabroad.’487

Herewe finda goodexampleof implicit accusationsofwar‐drivendespoticmonarchy turned

now against Louis’s monarchy, that his rule undermined the rule of law by taking away the

privilegesofitspeoplessubvertinginternallawanddestroyingallinternalobstaclestopursue

its war politics. As we will see below, under the heading of France’s interest of state Lisola

discussedtheprocessofmakingLouisXIVan ‘absolute’rulerinordertoimposeitshousehold

ruleonEurope.ThefifthmethodofSpanishgovernmentwasagainanindirectattackonFrance’s

implicitlyputativedespoticrule:

‘Never to admitneither League, norAlliance, norCommerce, norpeacewith the

common Enemie of Christendom. This is a bad undertaking of the Design of

rendring(sic.)themselvesMastersofEurope,whentheydrawuponthemselvesthe

emulationandthehatredoftheTyrantofAsia.’488

Lisolareferredto theFranco‐Ottomanallianceof theearlymodernperiod, famouslyendorsed

by Henry IV and later by Louis XIV, andmore often than not directed against the Habsburg

dynasty.489HeexplicitlypointedtotheresultsofFrenchforeignpolicy,commerceandconduct

of war, relying on comparisons with and insinuations of Turkish tyranny: French rule was

unchristian and illegitimate, particularly cruel towards its subjects and had no regard for the

ruleoflaworprivateproperty.AsweknowfromthechapteronDelaCourt,GermanandFrench

authors shaped their accusations of ‘war despotism’ through comparisonswith a household

governmentthattreateditssubjectsasslavesexemplifiedbyspecificpracticesofOttomanand

Muscovite rule, comparisons that contributed to the erratic seventeenth‐century practice of

conflating‘tyrannical’withanhouseholdrule,i.e.‘despotic’.

4.2.5TheinterestofFrance:‘Robberies’,‘Conquerors’,‘absolute’,‘MastersofEurope’

LouisXIV’smonarchyhadtheadvantagethatit:

                                                            487[Lisola],TheBuckler,284‐285.488[Lisola],TheBuckler,285.489 Benjamin Kaplan, Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe(CambridgeandLondon:HarvardUniversityPress,2007),306;SuraiyaFaroqhi,TheOttomanEmpireandtheWorldAroundIt(LondonandNewYork:I.B.Tauris,2006),73.

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‘hath all its Parts united, abounding withMen, industrious in Commerce, which

gainswiththeirBaubles490andtheirModesthemoneyofallotherNations,which

hath considerable Harbours upon the Ocean and theMediterranean Sea, and in

their neighbourhood no considerable powers to fear but that of the House of

Austria.’491

Thus, Francewas powerful by its lands,men, commerce (note that he views French clothing

fashion as an instrument to extract wealth from abroad492), and harbours all of which

strengtheneditspositioninEuropeanwarfare.WhereastheSpanishpeoplewerenaturallylaw‐

abidingandpeaceful,theFrench,however,werewar‐mindedbynature,almostsavage‐likemen,

ragingwith fire, directed by the natural urge of conquest and unconstrained by anything as,

Lisolaalreadystated,thepreceptsofreligion,orlegality.493

LisolaclaimstohavededucedtheFrenchmaxims ‘fromtheirConductbothpassedand

present,bytheirownWriters,andbythesameTreatiseoftheDukeofRohan.’494Thefirstmaxim

of French rule is to ‘entertain always War abroad and exercise their young Nobility at the

expenceoftheirNeighbours’.Forthereasonthat‘theGeniusoftheNationissuch,thatitcannot

endure to subsist long in the Idleness of Peace; theremust be Aliment for this Fire (,..), or it

wouldformtoisselfmatterathome.’Suitingthecustomesofnoblesuccessionleaving‘almost

nothingtotheyounger[brothers]buttheirIndustryandSword(…)thereisnothinglefttothem

but theWarrsorRobberies, topreservethemselves fromMiserie.’495Thusbesides thenatural

belligerenceofFrenchmen,thefinancialweaknessoftheyoungersonsofthenobilityrequires

they be distracted from causing domestic harm by being diverted to aggression abroad; ‘the

PolititiansofFrance held itnecessary to furnish themwithanothergatebywhich theymight

evaporate this Flame, which would gnaw their Bowels if it did not find another vent.’496

Furthermore,Lisolaexplicitlystates:

‘asthegreatestRevenuesoftheCrownofFranceconsistinthePurseofthePeople,

andthattheexcessiveContributionscannotbeexactedintimesofPeace,without

makingagreatmanyMalecontents;itisnecessarytofeedthemwiththesmokeof

                                                            490A‘bauble’isa‘small,showytrinketordecoration’;‘somethingofnoimportanceorworth’.AngusStevenson(ed.),OxfordDictionaryofEnglish(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2010;thirdedition),140.491[Lisola],TheBuckler,285‐286.492ThisbecameacommonlygivenfeatureoftheFrenchsystemofruleinanti‐Frenchpolemics,aswewillseeinthechapteronValkenier.493 [Lisola],TheBuckler, 286. ‘Thegeniusof theNation isnaturally inclined toarms, full ofheat,unquiet, loversofNovelty,desirousofConquests,quick, active, and inclinable toallmannerofExpedientswhich they conceive tobeadvantageoustotheirparticularEnds.’494[Lisola],TheBuckler,286.495[Lisola],TheBuckler,287.496 [Lisola],TheBuckler,288. 

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someConquestsandalwaystohavepretextstoremaininArms,andmaintainby

force theRoyalAuthority,whichhath so strangelyoverflowed the limitsof their

fundamentallaws.’497

InthefirstmaximofFranceweobservethesocialconstructionofthepredatorymonarchy:the

warlike nature of the people and the financialweakness of parts of the elite demandwar (to

keep them satisfied and occupied, and to keep disorder out), that in turn justifies further

taxationby theCrown,which finances furtherwarfare.A vital part of this construction is the

subversionoftheruleoflawtocreateabsoluteauthority;asincessantwarfareneedsaconstant

stateofarmature,uponwhichcoerciveforcethemasterlyrulereliestoplunderathome,aswell

asabroad.

Thesecondmaximof theFrenchsystemofrulewasto interfere inotherrulers’affairs

underthepretextofdefensivealliances,beingan‘Arbiter’and‘Mediator’,498amaximthatLisola

relocatedfromRohan’sinterestanalysisofSpainandthatinthissensewasnotanewelement

addedtotraditionaldebatesonuniversalmonarchy.499France’sthirdmethodofgovernmentis:

‘TohavefortheironelyRuletheInterestofState,sothattheFaithofTreaties,the

goodofReligion,orthetiesofBloudanAmitiecannotholdthem.‘Tisthisthatthe

Duke of Rohan puts for the fundamental Principle of all his Work; The Princes

commandoverthePeople,InterestcommandsoverPrinces.’500

Whereasmid‐seventeenthcenturyEnglishauthorsrejuvenatedtheaxiomindefenceoftherule

oflawarguingthattherulershouldabidebythe‘true’interestofstate,Lisolaturneditintothe

allegedly guiding principle of the French monarchy, unconstrained by the rule of law and

religion.AsprimeexampleLisolagivestheFrance‐Ottomanalliance.France’sfourthmaximwas

to divide and conquer ‘as much as they can forrein States’.501 Duplicitous diplomacy and

incitementtodomesticrevoltorexternalwarsLisolatooktobeapersistentfeatureofFrench

policy,citingasinstancesofinterferenceinEngland,theHolyRomanEmpire,theItalianpolities,

Denmark and Spain, and in thepresent times in Poland (Frenchmeddling at thePolish court

during the Second NothernWar) and the United Provinces (Franco‐Dutch defensive alliance

1662).As a diplomatLisolawitnessed thepowerof Frenchdiplomacy, in isolatingHabsburg‐

Spainandlater,theDutchRepublic.Heconcluded:

                                                            497[Lisola],TheBuckler,288‐289.498[Lisola],TheBuckler,289.499Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,9‐10.500[Lisola],TheBuckler,291.501[Lisola],TheBuckler,293.

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‘All theseMaxims are proper to Conquerours, and asmany infalliblemarks of a

vast and profound Design long ago contrived. The Predecessors of the most

ChristianKingcouldnotbringittoperfection,becausetheCivilWars,thepowerof

Spain, and the just Limits which the Royal Authoritie then acknowledged, were

powerfulBarrstostopthem:butatpresent,havingimposedathomeanabsolute

LawoveralltheirSubjects,andhavingputDissentionamongstallStrangers,there

remains nothing but that they overcome the third Impediment [the power of

Spaine],bycompleatingtheoverthrowoftheMonarchieofSpain.’502

As Lisola had already stated, ‘absolute’ rule was the first principle of conquerors to rule

independently at home, break all the domestic laws and render all property of subjects as

theirs.503‘Absolute’rule,arbitraryruleorthesubversionoftheruleoflawwasthefoundationof

theFrenchpredatorymonarchy.

Lisola’s interest analysis of France puts forth an illegitimate system of rule, absolute,

barbaric, arbitrary, unchristian, tyrannical, belligerent, according to the nature of the peoples

and theelite. It is, effectively, adespoticwarmachinerypursuingwarfare abroad toplunder

foreignpolitiestofinanceFrenchnoblemenandcoercetaxationonitsownsubjects.Againstthis

hostile image Lisola presented an example of good government, the Spanish monarchy that

ruledaccordingtopreceptsoflawandreligion,andthatconductedwarfareforthesolepurpose

ofdefence.Thesedifferences inmaximsemphasised that the realdanger toEuropeanpowers

was not Habsburg‐Spain, but France. French publicists, in particular Rohan, had deceived

EuropeanrulersandtheirnationsbypropagatingtheideaofthehazardousHabsburg‐Spanish

monarchy.Hehadneverusedtheterm‘despotic’todesignateFrance,butasRohan,hereferred

to‘theConquerors’.504However,hefurtheredthisideaofaruleofconquest:exemplifiedbythe

Turks and Moors and outlined in terms such as ‘Tyrants’, ‘absolute’, ‘Masters (of Europe)’,

‘Slavery’, ‘Piracie’, and ‘robberies’.505 The most plausible explanation for the absence of the

terminologyof‘despotic’isamatterofaposiopesis‐thetropeofleavingunstatedaconclusionan

audienceshoulddrawfor itself. It thusimplicatedthereaderintheaccusationandwasatone

withLisola’srelianceonirony,litotes,andthestudiedinterplaywithRohan’stext,withwhichhe

assumed the readerwas familiar. Furthermore, he assessed the French regime as evenmore

                                                            502[Lisola],TheBuckler,293.503 [Lisola],TheBuckler, 284‐285: ‘The fourth [maximof the Spanish interest], To rule according to the Laws, andleavetheirPeopleinpeaceablepossessionoftheirPrivileges;whichamongstConquerorswouldpassforanessentialfault,against the firstPrinciplesof theirPoliticks,whichrequirebeforeallotherthings, that theymakethemselvesabsolute and independent athome, and that theybreakall theChainsofDomestickLawwhichmighthinder theiractingsabroad.’504[Lisola],TheBuckler,forinstanceonpages283,285,292,298.505[Lisola],TheBuckler,tyrant:285;absolute:4,15,16,68,285,289,293,294,masters:277,slavery:275,piracy: ,robberies:286(amongstotherpages).

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evolved,and,consequently,beingagreaterthreatthantheseOrientalregimes;

‘All theMaximeswhich Ihaveabove relatedare thoseofConquerours;but their

[France’s] manner of executing them is so much the more to be feared, as it

consists altogether inQuickness and Activity, and that noReason of Justice, nor

anyCondescension to the InterpositionofNeighbours,andof theirownAllies, is

abletostopthecurrentofit.’506

Heusedthelanguageofreasonofstatetopersuaderulers,especiallytheGermanprincestoally

withHabsburgagainstFrance,thatistheir ‘trueReasonofState.507Inthelastpartofthesixth

articlethatcentredon‘thepreciseObligationoftheEstatesoftheEmpirefortheWarrantieof

the Circle of Burgundy’,508 he opposed the French system government ruled by the ‘sole and

supremeprincipleofRuleofInterest’509tothe‘Body’orthe‘Union’oftheHolyRomanEmpire,

whichincludestheCircleofBurgundyasa‘Member’andofwhicheverypartisobligedtodefend

theSpanishNetherlandsaccordingto‘theruleofLaw’.510Withthisargumentheeventurnedthe

secrettreatybetweenLouisandLeopoldofnotmeddlinginaffairsoutsidetheirdominionintoa

positiveargument;sincetheBurgundianCirclebelongedtotheEmpire,theEmperorhadtotake

action.511TheEuropeanlegalordershouldbeprotectedagainsttheFrenchpredatorymonarchy

striving foruniversalmonarchy,and inparticular theprincesandrulersof theEmpireshould

formanalliancewithHabsburgtocountertheFrenchoffensiveintheSpanishNetherlands;their

very interestofstaterequired it.Therefore,Lisolareasonedat theverybeginningof thesixth

articlethat:

‘There are twoMotives of different nature which ought to incite the Princes of

ChristendomtoundertakethedefenceofourCause;theoneistheInterestofState,

the other is a strict Obligation of Justice. The first regards generally all the

PotentatesofEurope;thesecondisparticularonelytothePrincesandStatesofthe

Empire: the one [interest of State] depends upon the foresight and their wise

conduct;theother[astrictObligationofJustice]isjoinedtothedutyofthelast,to

the Fundamental Laws of their State [Princes and States of the Empire], to the

                                                            506[Lisola],TheBuckler,298‐299.507[Lisola],TheBuckler,279.508[Lisola],TheBuckler,273.509[Lisola],TheBuckler,300.510[Lisola],TheBuckler,303.511[Lisola],TheBuckler,304‐307.

129

Treaties of peace and Warrantie, and the reciprocal bond which unites all the

MembersofthisvastBody’.512

ByturningFrenchreasonofstateagainstLouisXIV,Lisolaconstructedthenatureoflateranti‐

Frenchpolemics: the toposof fearofuniversalmonarchy, thenotionofaEuropeanbalanceof

powerand, ironically,reasonofstatevocabulary. Its foundationwastheHuguenotRohan’sDe

l’interest whose supraconfessional and indirect attack through a putatively objective interest

analysisservedthepurposesofLisolawell.Thetwomajorelementsofhisargumentarethathe

turnedtheSpanishcaseagainstFranceandenricheditwithimplicitaccusationsofdespoticrule;

theresultiseffectively,perhapsself‐consciouslyasatiricparodyofDel’interest.Lisolapresented

a social construction of a predatorymonarchy that needs towagewar in order to delude its

peopletoextractmoretaxes,and,consequently,tomakemorewars.Theinherentenemyimage

wastransformedfromaSpanishwarmachinemisusingreligiontoaFrenchdespoticsystemof

rule,basedonthenatureofthepeoples,whowereruledasslavesandheldnopropertyrights.

LikeRohan,Lisolarequiredasupraconfessionalargumentforpersuadingforeignrulers

ofvariousconfessionstoassistinthebattleagainsttheaspiringuniversalmonarchy.TheFrench

predatory monarchy was opposed to the European legal order, to Christianity as well as a

hazard to its commerce. The term Europe was used as a political and spiritual entity and

interchangeablywithChristendom,althoughLisolaemployedthefirsttermsubstantiallymore

often.ThenotionofbalanceofpowerdidnottakecentrestageinBouclier;itwasonlyreferred

to in countering Rohan’s interest analysis of Spain’s desire to conquest and its design for

universalmonarchy.However,hedidassociatethisimageexplicitlywiththethreatofslaveryfor

allofEurope.

Lisola’swhole case reconfiguringRohan’s seminal study, struck a nerve and it proved

central to anti‐French arguments for the rest of the century. Bouclier produced serious

commotion in the Imperial Diet aswell as in France,where itwas forbidden to read Lisola’s

book.513 During the War of Devolution Lisola’s observations and plea for blocking Louis’s

expansionistplansgainednohearing,but fromtheFranco‐DutchWaronwardshisarguments

resoundedinnumerouspamphlets:Frenchbreachof law,Frenchwarcrimes, ‘Frenchtyranny’

and the imminent French universal monarchy. In the Holy Roman Empire pamphleteers

defendedthe‘Germanliberty’,andfromthestatusofProtectorGermaniaeLouisXIVwasturned

                                                            512[Lisola],TheBuckler,273‐274.513WithintheImperialDietdebatesevolved,initiallyaboutthepreciseauthorshipofBouclierandwhenitwasknownwho wrote the work, the debates centred on removing Lisola from his diplomatic office. The Emperor, however,remainedveryreticent.TheImperialCouncilofficiallyproclaimedthatBouclierwaswrittenwithoutauthorisationorconsentandthatitdidnotembodythevisionofLeopold.Rowen,Theking’sState,107;Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,165‐166,197‐198,312‐314.

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intothe‘Erbfeind’and‘Antichrist’.514AswewillseeinthechapteronValkenier,theanti‐French

argument ofBouclier developed intomore vicious anddirect attacks on Louis’s rule after the

FrenchinvasionintheDutchrepublicof1672.Newelementswereintegratedinaccusationsof

universalmonarchy,suchasLouis’sdesigntosubjectEuropethroughthemisuseofthe,claimed,

office of arbiter belli et pacis; and the metaphor of the balance of power became the ideal

opponentoftheFrenchpredatorymonarchy.515Louis’sthreatto‘Christendom’wasemphasised,

in order to place his regime outside of the European Christian order, and it often implied

accusationsofanOttomansystemofrule,cruel,antichristianandbarbaric,athemeunderlined

byreferences to theearlymodernFranco‐Ottomanalliances. 516 Inaddition, the term ‘Europe’

finallyestablisheditself inthestruggleagainstLouisXIV.517Levillainconcludesthatunderthe

effectofDutchpropaganda(followingthe1672FrenchinvasionintheRepublic)Lisola’sideas

aboutFrenchuniversalmonarchytransferredintoaProtestanttaleandpermeatedAnglo‐Dutch

politicalculture.518DutchandEnglishpamphleteersappealedtothedefenceofthe‘Libertiesof

Europe’ often in conjunction with the rationale of the freedom of commerce, the Protestant

religion(especiallyaftertheRevocationoftheEdictofNantesin1685),andthe‘interests’and

‘balanceofEurope’.Helmut SchmidtbelievesLisola lay the foundationsof thesenewpolitical

overtonesof ‘Europe’ byaddressing the threatof Louis’s striving for auniversalmonarchy to

Europe’s liberty,religionandcommerce.519 It is inthiscontextofhighlystructuredhostilityto

FrenchpolicythatwecanpartiallyplaceValkenier.

                                                            514Wrede,DasReichundseineFeinde,48‐49,325‐327,330,332‐333,337,378‐380.515Bosbach,‘TheEuropeandebateonuniversalmonarch’,84.516TonyClaydon,‘Protestantism,UniversalMonarchyandChristendom’,125‐142.517AlreadyusedinthewarswiththeOttomansreceivedvariousconnotationsfromthelatefifteenthcenturyonwards.See the collection of essays in Heinz Duchhardt and Andreas Kunz (eds.) Europäische Geschichte alshistoriographischesProblem(Mainz:PhilippvonZabern,1997).518Levillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,11,6‐7.519HelmutDanSchmidt,‘TheEstablishmentof“Europe”asaPoliticalExpression’,TheHistoricalJournal9:2(1966),172‐178. On Lisola and his Bouclier Schmidt writes on page 173: ‘The publication of the Buckler (…) in French,GermanandEnglishinthatyearhadthepurposeofchangingthatviewoftheinternationalscene.(…)[Lisola]allegedthat[France]wasplanningtheestablishmentofaCatholicUniversalMonarchyandbecomingathreattothelibertyofEurope,toreligion,andcommerce.HethusforgedanassociationwhichlinkedEuropewiththeconceptofreligiousliberty,balanceofpower,andexpandingcommerce,ideasthatcommentedthemselvesatoncetomenlikeArlingtonandSirWilliamTemple.’

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Chapter5.PetrusValkenier’s‘tVerwerdEuropa(1675):reasonofstatetorestoreorder520

As an eyewitness of the so‐called ‘Year of Disaster’ in 1672, Petrus Valkenier had seen the

powerful DutchRepublic succumb under the invading armies of Louis XIV and his allies. The

coastal provinces includingHollandwere not conquered, butwithin their citiesmassive riots

broke out. These disastrous events prompted the breakdown of the stadholderless regime

(1650‐1672). PrinceWilliam III ofOrangewas appointed stadholder and captain general; the

House of Orange‐Nassau as officeholders of the stadholderate was restored. The Grand

PensionaryofHolland,JohandeWitt,whowasgenerallyregardedastheleadingsymbolofthe

stadholderlessregime,andhisbrotherCorneliswerebrutallyslaughteredbyanangrycrowdin

TheHague.521

Inthesuccessfulbook‘tVerwerdEuropaof1675ValkenieraccusedDelaCourtofattacking

withmalicious intent thegoodnameandreputationof theprincesofOrangeandservingasa

publicistofJohandeWitt.522ValkenierbelievedthatDeWitt’sregimewastoblameforthequick

downfallof theRepublic. Inhis large treatiseValkenier tried togivea ‘PoliticalandHistorical

Account Of the true Foundations and Causes of the Wars and Revolutions in Europe,

predominantly in and surrounding the Netherlands since 1664, caused by the pretended

UniversalMonarchyoftheFrench’.523Thiswasattemptedthroughanempiricallybasedinterest

analysisofeveryEuropeanpolitycombinedwithanin‐depthhistoricalanalysisoftheregimesof

LouisXIVandDeWitt,andof theeventsof1672,withtheaimofhelpingtorestoreorder.He

relieduponandengagedwiththeotherwriterswhohavebeencentraltothisthesis:—because

                                                            520 I have published on Petrus Vakenier’s use of the vocabulary of reason of state in 2015.Marianne Klerk, “Theunheard Changes in Europe, and the strange Revolutionswhich happened in our United Provinces in our times”:reasonofstateandruleoflawinPetrusValkenier’s‘tVerwerdEuropa(1675)’,inRobertvonFriedeburgandMatthiasSchmoeckel(ed.),Recht,KonfessionundVerfassungim17.Jahrhundert.West‐undmitteleuropäischeEntwicklungen(Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 2015), 285‐335. In this chapter I add the case of Lisola’sBouclier and several Dutchwritingson reasonof state in the1670s to the context and further thegeneral argumentof this thesisonRohan’slegacyofreasonofstateandpredatorymonarchyasasub‐genreofpoliticalthought.521JonathanIsrael,TheDutchRepublic,796‐806;Fortheimportantroleburghersplayedintheeventsof1672readMichel Reinders, ‘Burghers, Orangists and “Good Government”: Popular Political Opposition during the 'Year ofDisaster'1672inDutchPamphlets’,SeventeenthCenturyJournal23:2(2008),315‐346.522Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,236.Onthispage,Valkenierreferredtothere‐editionofInterestvanHolland,entitledAanwysingderheilsamepolitikeGrondenenMaximenvandeRepublikevanHollandenWest‐Vriesland(Leiden1669),whichembodiedarearrangementof thechapters,someup‐to‐date informationandanewpreface. InDe laCourt’sexcused himself for the controversial contents of Interest of Holland for which the printers were to blame.Nevertheless,AanwysingalsoreceivedsharpcriticismbytheChurchauthoritiesandconsequentlywasprohibitedbytheStatesofHolland.Weststeijn,CommercialRepublicanism,61‐62;ValkeniermentionedDelaCourtandhiswritingsonpages236‐237,246,249and669;JillSternremarksthatthe‘contrast[of‘tVerwerdEuropa,MK]withtheInterestvanHollandwasdeliberate.’JillStern,OrangismintheDutchRepublicinWordandImage,1650–1675(Manchester&NewYork:ManchesterUniversityPress,2010),102.523Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,[titlepage].

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ofhisrelianceonthesepreviousworkshemaybeseenaspartofatraditionofreflection,and

providesasuitableterminusfortheargument.

InthecourseoftheeighteenthcenturyValkenier’sfavourablereputationdeclined,especially

regarding his chronologyof the French invasion in 1672.524 Several historians considered his

historical description of theYear ofDisaster as extremely biased.525Albert de Lange suggests

that togetherwith the dismissal of his historical credentials, Valkenier’s defence of republics

togetherwithhis fiercestand for theHouseofOrangehashelpedconsignhispolitical theory,

prominentintheearlierpartsof ‘tVerwerdEuropa,torelativeobscurity.526Thehistoriography

on Valkenier’s political thought is indeed very thin; recent commentaries revolve around his

alleged‘republicanism’,orhis‘(secular)Orangerepublicanism’.ThomasMaissenarguesforthe

fundamentalinfluenceofValkenier’srepublicanismonSwisspoliticaldiscourse;JonathanIsrael

claims‘secularOrangerepublicanism’founditsmostdevelopedformin‘tVerwerdEuropa;and

JillSternstatesthathisdefenceofthemixedconstitutiongalvanisedtheOrangiststrugglefrom

party‐faction to thebattleagainstFrance, conveyed through thedichotomyof freedomversus

slavery.527

Valkenier’semploymentoftheidiomofreasonofstatehaslikewisehardlybeenresearched.

HansBlombelievesthat ‘tVerwerdEuropadoesnotbelongto‘thetraditionofreasonofstate’,

sinceValkeniersupposedlyunderstoodthenotiononlynegatively;concentratingon‘thedutiful

                                                            524Albert de Lange, ‘Pieter Valkenier. Ein Überblick über sein Leben undWerk’, in Albert de Lange and GerhardSchwinge(eds.),PieterValkenierunddasSchicksalderWaldenserum1700(Heidelberg:VerlagRegionalkultur,2004),61‐107,p.75.525 The historian Petrus Johannes Blok (1855‐1929) judged Valkenier’swriting as ‘without any literary value andobviouslycharacterisedbyhisintentiontopresentthestatecraftofWilliamIIIinthemostpositivemanner.’PetrusJ.Blok,GeschiedenisvanhetNederlandschevolk.Deel3(Leiden:A.W.Sijthoff,1925,thirdrevisededition)708;MathijsBokhorst called thework ‘a large pamphlet’ that contained twomain themes: ‘Orange‐love and French‐animosity’.Matthijs Bokhorst,Nederlands‐Zwitsersebetrekkingen voor enna1700 (Amsterdam:H.J. Paris, 1930), 31, 1; DanielRoordadescribedValkenierasnotbeingobjectiveandaccusedhimofdeliberatelywithholdinginformationinfavouroftheOrange‐Faction.DanielJ.Roorda,Partijenfactie.Deoproerenvan1672indestedenvanHollandenZeeland,eenkrachtmetingtussenpartijenenfacties.(Groningen:Wolters‐Noordhoff,1978),12‐14.526DeLange,‘PieterValkenier’,75.527 Thomas Maissen, ‘Petrus Valkeniers republikanische Sendung. Die niederländische Prägung des neuzeitlichenschweizerischen Staatsverständnisses’, Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte 48 (1998), p. 149‐176; Israel, TheDutchRepublic,674,786;JillStern,OrangismintheDutchRepublicinwordandimage,1650‐75(Machester:MachesterUniversityPress,2010),21,102,113,151‐152; JonathanIsraelclaims thatEricWalten ‘respected(…) theOrangistrepublicanPetrusValkenier’ as his political ideas (unlikeDe la Court’s) enabledWalten to supportOrange and itscauseof1688,whilesimultaneouslyadvocatingaformofpopularsovereignty.Israel,Jonathan.Monarchy,Orangism,andRepublicanism intheLaterDutchGoldenAge(Amsterdam:AmsterdamsCentrumvoordeStudievandeGoudenEeuw, 2004), 21; InWalten’s popular and often cited pamphlet Spiegel derwaarheyd [Mirror of truth] of 1690 ‘tVerwerdEuropa is one of themost important sources for his claim that the bad policy of the Amsterdam regentscausedthepresentandpreviouswarswithFrance.Spiegelderwaarheyd,oftet'samensprekingetusscheneenarmiaanendevroompatriot,waarinnekrachtigvertoontendebewesenword,datdoordequadedirectieendetoelegvaneenigeheerschenderegententotAmsterdam,onslandin(…)desenoorlogisingewikkeltmetVrankryk(1690).ManypamphletswerepublishedinthatyearoftheconflictbetweenAmsterdamandWilliamIIIonAmsterdam’srefusal tosendthenominationlistformagistratestoEngland,onthegroundsthatintheabsenceofthestadholder,the(High)CourtofHollandcoulddecide.AsatiricpamphletcalledDePoliticqueLotery(1690)statedthatAmsterdamwouldselltwelveraffles in favour of the ‘repressed Truth’, one of whichwas a golden statuewith in the one hand the Spiegel derWaerheyt and in the other ‘the famousBookbyValckenier’.Depoliticque lotery,bestaende invieren twintighnoytgesiene,onwaerdeerlijcke enonschatbare looten,welcke ten voordeele vande verdrucktewaerheyd engerechtigheyt,konnengetrockenwerden.(1690).IwouldliketothankFrankDaudeijforthisreference.

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administrationoftheDutchinterest,notitscunningpromotion.’Valkenier’s‘preferenceforthe

stadhouder‐system(…)isbutatameaffaircomparedwiththereasonofstate‐basedarguments

forabsolutemonarchy.’Moreover,BlomdiscreditsValkenier’sequationof‘interestofstate’with

‘reasonof state’ overlooking the interchangeableuse of these expressionsby contemporaries.

Instead, and implausibly, he wishes to restrict the rise of reason of state to an expression

mirroringself‐consciousstatebuildingandthe ‘programmesofpoliticalmodernisation’lacking

in the decentralised Dutch Republic.528 In a short article, Friedrich Meinecke paid exclusive

attention to Valkenier’s ‘Lehre von den Interessen der Staaten’. He praised Valkenier for

expanding Rohan’s interest analysis of European rulers and their societies, for theorising

interestofstateandforconstrainingitbylegalclaimsandethics.HefoundValkenier’stendency

to discuss economic factors in his interest analysis instructive. Conversely, he held that

Valkenier’s treatmentofFrance lacked thepenetrationandvalueofLisola’s, andcriticisedhis

politicalthoughtforitssubjectivity,whichtheGermanhistoriandiscerned‘inmanymodernwar

writings’, and judged it as containing ‘not very original ideas.’ Above all, Meinecke accused

ValkenierofcopyingentirepassagesofDel’interestwithoutsubstantiatingthis.529

This chapter argues that Valkenier’s political thought should be re‐assessed. First, his

derivativeargumentshowsthehighlypolemicalfunctionofinterestanalysis–theexactmethod

and type of argument was used and re‐used for different, even opposing objectives; Rohan’s

juxtapositionofinterestanalysesofrulerswithsurveysofthesocietiestheyruled,asameansof

denigratingSpanish,was,asIhaveshown,reappliedtotheprincesofOrange(DelaCourt)and

LouisXIV(Lisola).Valkenieremployed thesameRohanesquemodusoperandi againstwhathe

deemedtheruthlesspredatorymonarchyofFranceandtheoligarchicdecadenceoftheDeWitt

regime.Secondly,itunderlinestheinternationalcontextoftheidiomofreasonofstateandhis

argumentshouldbeunderstoodaccordingly.ItrequiresmorethanalocalDutchcontext.Last,‘t

Verwerd Europa exhibits several potentially tensile themes. Behind the politico‐historical

account of 1672 appears the feeling of the crisis of the rule of law and how order should be

restored. Valkenier defended the stronghold of the Dutch Reformed Church in society, and                                                            528H.W.Blom,MoralityandCausalityinPolitics.TheRiseofNaturalisminDutchSeventeenth‐CenturyPoliticalThought(PhDdissertationUtrechtUniversity,1995),162‐166,quotation164.BlomseesinDelaCourt’suseoftheterminologyastheonlyrelevantcontributiontothe‘doctrine’inthesenseoftheformulationofreasonofstatedoctrinewithintheDutch debate, which led to a republican positive interest of state theory (unlike Valkenier’s supposedly negativetheory).529 ‘Man erwarte von dem patriotischen Holländer nicht sehr tiefe und auch nicht sehr originelle Gedanken. ErkämpfteproarisetfocisgegeneinenflagrantenExzessbrutalerInteressenpolitik,undseinBuchzeichnetesich,wiesomanchesErzeugnismodernerKriegsliteratur,mehrdurcheindringlichesPathosundWärmederEmpfindungalsdurch eine rein aus Erkennen gerichtete Gedankenschärfe aus.’ FriedrichMeinecke, ‘Petrus Valckeniers Lehre vondem Interesse der Staaten’, inAusPolitikundGeschichte.Gedächtnisschrift fürGeorg vonBelow (Berlijn: DeutscheVerlagsgesellschaftfürPolitikundGeschichte,1928)146‐155,quote147;InMeinecke’sDieIdeederStaatsräsoninderneueren Geschichte Valkenier’s reason of state employment was addressed in a footnote. Meinecke, The Age ofMachiavellism,230‐231footnote5:EcoHaitsmaMulier(wrongly)rejectedMeinecke’saccusationofcopyingRohan.EcoHaitsmaMulier,‘DiePolitisch‐historischenIdeenvonPetrusValkenier’,inAlbertdeLangeandGerhardSchwinge(eds.),PieterValkenierunddasSchicksalderWaldenserum1700(Heidelberg:VerlagRegionalkultur,2004),108‐122,p.146.

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attackedtheallegedatheismandlibertinismofpolitiques,suchasDeWitt;yethealsocriticised

theologiansofdividingsocietywiththeirquarrelsandincitingprincesandpeoplesintowarfare.

HerejectedDelaCourt’sfull‐frontalattackonwar‐mongeringprinces,yetcondemnedplunder

despots. He favoured Orange princely rule powered by expanded military and financial

resources,yetwithintheconstraintsoftheestablishedrepublicanconstitution.Itwasoperating

within such an order, protecting persons, property and privileges that stopped a prince

becomingapredatorymonarch.Furthermore,Valkeniernotonlystressed that interestshould

bepursuedasamatterofjustice(ashadLisola),butheattemptedtospecifyhowthisshouldbe

donebytheorisingreasonofstate.Inthissense,reasonofstatewasseenatonewiththeruleof

law.

Hisargumentreflectsthegenuinestrugglesofpoliticalthoughtinthe1650s‐1680s;asearch

for alternatives to civil order and the European legal order, for stability. The breakdown of

regimesandtheconsequentcrisisoforderinthemid‐seventeenthcenturygaverisetodrastic

theoriesofpoliticallegitimacy;suchasstrongroyalauthority(e.g.Hobbes)‐as‘olderresistance

theories’ (e.g. Beza and Althusius) had proven to be lethal for upholding civil order. It also

fuelled vicious attacks on princely coercive practices (e.g. De la Court) and on the danger of

religious fanaticism and superstition. Conversely, the political thought of the 1680s was

characterised by a stress on the danger of such extreme theories and on arguments towards

stabilisingsociety(e.g.Pufendorf’slaunderedversionofHobbes’stheory).530

AsValkenieralludestoit,theruleoflawisavariabletopos,sustainingauthority,directly

or indirectly fromAristotle’s insistencethat lawmade forbetterrule thanmen(Politicsbk3).

ForValkenier,thisinvolvedaboveallelse,arejectionofarbitraryrule,theunrestrainedwillof

therulerwiththeconsequentunpredictabilityoftheexerciseofpower.As,however,‘arbitrary’

rule was an entirely prejudicial formulation, some sense of an opposing rule of law was a

commonplace, giving it substance was a more tricky matter. As such it did not necessarily

amounttoanyfixedsetoflaws,orafaithintheindependentauthorityoflawyers;forValkenier,

itsevocationwasameansofcombiningjusticewithreasonofstate,andofurgingthenecessity

of a powerful prince (with prerogatives of action) while castigating the arbitrariness of

predatorymonarchy.

5.1Valkenierand ’tVerwerdEuropa:anti‐Frenchdiplomacy, crisis of orderand Lisola’s

legacy

                                                            530VonFriedeburgandMorrill,MonarchyTransformed,introductionandconclusion.

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The tensions and potential fault lines in Valkenier’s arguments suggest a turbulence of

intellectualcontext,anditistothisthatwewillturn,supplementingthepartialcontextalready

providedbythepreviouswritersdiscussedinthisthesis.Butfirst,somethingneedstobesaidof

Valkenier’scareer.Valkenier’stextwas, likeLisola’satonewithhisdiplomaticexperience,but

its francophobia informedhis diplomatic career rather than being shaped by it. Thenwewill

look into the perceived crisis of order and how Valkenier’s professor at the university of

Franeker, Ulricus Huber, attempted to restore it. Furthermore, the events of 1672 and the

responses it generatedwill be outlinedbefore turning to Lisola’s legacy inDutch andEnglish

anti‐Frenchwritings.

5.1.1PetrusValkenierandhisanti‐Frenchandpro‐ProtestantdiplomacyLittle is known about the life of Petrus Valkenier before writing ‘t Verwerd Europa.531 After

publicationhewasgrantedadiplomaticpost inFrankfurt,presumablyongroundsof itsanti‐

Frenchandpro‐Orangistmessage.HisdiplomaticcareerinFrankfurt(1676‐1683),Regensburg

(1683‐1690)andZürich(1690‐1704)isbetterdocumented,althoughnopersonalenvoyarchive

ofValkenierismaintained.HisperiodinZürichisextensivelyresearchedbyMatthijsBokhorst,

whoinparticularhasmadeclearValkenier’ssuccessinbreakinguptheFrenchmonopolyofthe

recruitmentoftroopsintheSwissCantons.532

There has been some doubt as to Valkenier’s year of birth,533 but Bokhorst has

established that he was born in 1641, evidenced by a personal letter of Valkenier to the

secretaryoftheStatesGeneral,FrançoisFagel,of1671,inwhichhewrotethathehadreached

theageof60.Furthermore,theregistrationtotheUniversityofLeiden22October1665states

theageof24andthecityofEmmerikashisbirthplace.534On27April1661Valkenierregistered

                                                            531AbrahamJakobvanderAa,BiografischwoordenboekderNederlanden.Deel20(Haarlem:J.J.vanBrederode1877),21;ChristinevonHoningen‐Huene,BeiträgezurGeschichtederBeziehungenzwischenderSchweizundHollandimXVII.Jahrhundert(Berlin:Duncker,1899),125‐195;MatthijsBokhorst,Nederlands‐Zwitsersebetrekkingenvoorenna1700(Amsterdam: H.J. Paris, 1930); Otto Schutte, Repertorium der Nederlandse vertegenwoordigers residerende in hetbuitenland1584‐1810(TheHague:MartinusNijhoff,1983),152(nr.100);EcoHaitsmaMulierandAntonvanderLem,‘Petrus Valkenier’, in idem, Repertorium van geschiedschrijvers in Nederland (The Hague: Nederlands HistorischGenootschap,1990),414‐415;AlbertdeLange,‘PieterValkenier’,61‐107.532Bokhorst,Nederlands‐Zwitsersebetrekkingen;AlbertdeLangeenGerhardSchwinge(eds.),PieterValkenierunddasSchicksalderWaldenserum1700(Heidelberg/Ubstadt‐Weiher/Basel:Regionalkultur,2004).533 Hajo Brugmans, ‘Valckenier, Pieter’, in P.C. Molhuysen and P.J. Blok (eds.), Nieuw Nederlands BiografischWoordenboekdeel5(Leiden:A.W.Sijthoff’sUitgeversmaatschappij,1921),988‐989.534 Bokhorst, Nederlands‐Zwitserse betrekkingen, p. 1 footnote 3; Willem Nicolaas Du Rieu, Album StudiosorumAcademiaeLugdunoBataveMDLXXV‐MDCCCLXXXV:acceduntnominacuratorumetprofessorumpereademsecula(TheHague:MartinusNijhoff,1875),526;ThereexistsapresumptionofPetrus’kinshiptothefamousAmsterdamregentfamilyValckenier,towhichthefamousAmsterdammayorGillisValckenierbelonged,yetnoconvincingevidencecanbefound.AlthoughBokhorstunderlinedthis,heassumedtheprobabilityoftherelationship,sincePetrusValkenierusedthecoatofarmsoftheAmsterdamregentfamilyand,moreover,referredtoA.FerwerdaresearchwhoclaimedthatbothGillisandPetrusrepresentedtwobranchesoftheoffspringofGillisValckenierwholivedinKampenaround1500. In Elias’ De Vroedschap van Amsterdam 1578‐1795 Petrus Valkenier does not appear. Bokhorst moreover

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attheProtestantuniversityofDuisburg,andafterafirstyearofphilosophy,Valkenierbeganto

studylaw.On30OctoberheenrolledasalawstudentattheuniversityofFranekerinFriesland.

On5July1666heobtainedhisdoctoratewiththethesisDeofficiojudicisatUlricusHuber,who

had become professor in law in that same year. The manuscript, however, is lost. One year

beforeattaininghisdoctorate,ValkenierregisteredattheuniversityofLeiden.AlbertdeLange

believesthathereheprobablymetGisbertCuper,whostudiedatLeideninthesameperiodand

ofwhomacorrespondencewithValkenieriskept.535

In the 1670s, Valkenier practised law in Amsterdam, which also appears from the

captionofhisportrait ‘olimcelebrr.Reipubl.AmstelodamensisAdvocatus’.536 Inallprobability

hemoved toAmsterdam in thebeginningof1670,where later thatyearhemarriedCharlotte

BecxvanOersbeek (1652‐1722), adaughterof thebookkeeperof thepowerfulmerchant and

canon‐producerLouisdeGeer.On19December1676Valkenierwasregisteredasa citizenof

Amsterdam, after he was appointed as the representative (resident) of the States General in

Frankfurt a few months before.537 The anti‐French and pro‐Orange contents of his book ‘t

VerwerdEuropawrittenafter1672probablycontributedtohisappointment.

Afteritspublicationin1675‘tVerwerdEuropabecameanimmediatesuccessanditwas

reprinted in that same year. A German translation was published in 1677. In his preface

Valkenierwrotethathesetouttotreattheeventsof1672upto1675,butpeoplehadpressured

him to publish his writings immediately. Perhaps this was an overstatement, nevertheless ‘t

VerwerdEuropawas one of the first systematic interest analyses of the causes of the Year of

DisasterwrittenintheDutchlanguagecomplementedbyatheoreticaldeliberationonreasonof

state. He promised the reader that a second edition about the events of 1673 and 1674was

alreadywith theprinter, but itwas neverpublished. In 1667Valkenier received adiplomatic

officeinFrankfurt.HissecretaryAndreasMüllerfulfilledValkenier’spromiseandpublishedtwo

folioeditionsin1680and1683.538Thebookwasalsogivenasequel intheyearoftheOrange

                                                                                                                                                                                          stressed that contemporaries regarded Petrus Valkenier related to the Amsterdam burgomaster. Albert de Langepursued this direction further in his biographical essay on Petrus Valkenier. A. Ferwerda, Adelijk en aanzienlijkWapenboek vande zevenprovincien;waarbijgevoegd zijn eengrootaantalGenealogien van voornaameAdelijke enAanzienlijkeFamilien (Leeuwarden, 1760‐1781); Bokhorst,Nederlands‐Zwitsersebetrekkingen, 2; Johan E. Elias,DeVroedschapvanAmsterdam1578‐1795,Vol.1and2(Haarlem:Loosjes,1903‐1905).Bokhorst,Nederlands‐Zwitsersebetrekkingen,2,footnote1;DeLange,‘PieterValkenier,’61‐67.535 Sybrandus Johannes Fockema Andreae and Theodorus Josephus Meijer (eds.), Album studiosorum AcademiaeFranekerensis (1585‐1811, 1816‐1844): naamlijst der studenten (Franeker: Wever, 1968), 196; Thedorus JosephusMeijer(ed.),AlbumpromotorumAcademiaeFranekerensis(1591‐1811)(Franeker:Wever,1972)42;NationaalArchief(TheHague)CollectieCuperus,1.10.24;KoninlijkeBibliotheek(TheHague)CollectioCuperus.536DeLange,‘PieterValkenier’,67;HaitsmaMulierandVanderLem,PetrusValkenier,414‐415;Brugmans,Valckenier,988‐989.537PetrusandCharlottehadfourchildren,ofwhichonlyIdaCharlotte(1671‐1702)reachedadulthood,butdiedontheageofthirty‐one,childless.DeLange,‘PieterValkenier’,67.538PetrusValkenier,DasverwirrteEuropa:oder,politischeundhistorischeBeschreibungderinEuropa,fürnehmlichindem Vereinigten Niederlande, und in dessen Nachbarschaft, seither dem Jahre 1664 entstandenen, und durch diegesuchteallgemeineMonarchiederFrantzosen, verursachtenblutigenKriege,und leidigenEmpörungen,nebenstdenauthenticquen Copeyen der Briefe und gewissen Berichten (Amsterdam: Jacob von Meurs/Johannes von Someren/Hendrich and Diederich Boom, 1677); Matthijs Bokhorst, Nederlands‐Zwitserse betrekkingen voor en na 1700

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rise to the English throne in 1688, and was reprinted in 1742 at the end of the Second

Stadholderslessperiod(1702‐1747), inwhichtheDutchRepublicsufferedseverelossesinthe

WaroftheAustrianSuccession(1740‐1748)andopinionroseinfavourofthere‐instalmentof

Orange.539

His entire diplomatic career is marked by his defence of the Protestant faith, and in

particular his anti‐French perspectives. In Frankfurt Valkenier enjoyed no successes; his

advocacyofananti‐FrenchcoalitionwasnotsympatheticallyreceivedbyGermanprinces.540In

thisperiod,hissecretaryAndreaMullercontinuedhiswritingsandpublishedtwofoliovolumes

in 1680 and 1683.541 Valkenier was promoted to Regensburg in 1683. Bokhorst describes

Valkenier’scorrespondencefromthistimeas‘aweakefforttopresenttheStateGeneralaclear

image of the chaos of these conflicts.’542 From 1685, however, Valkenier started a secret

correspondencewithJohanHeinrichHeidegger,professoroftheology,representativeofthecity

ofZürich.OnlyStadholderWilliamIIIandthesecretaryoftheStatesGeneralwereinformed.The

cause for this correspondencewas Louis XIV’s expansionist policies (he hadalready annexed

neighbouringFranche‐ComtéandStrasbourg)and, inparticular, theRevocationof theEdictof

NantesinOctober1685.TherevocationhadresultedinaninfluxofHuguenotrefugeesinZurich

andotherSwissProtestantcities.Valkenierwasincensedbyit.Heideggerbelongedtoagroupof

Protestantclergymen,withgreatpoliticalinfluence,whichdefendedaconfessionalalliance.The

central issue of this pro‐Dutch lobby entailed chiefly the Frenchmonopoly in recruitment of

Swisstroops,intheCatholicaswellastheProtestantcantons,andthepresenceofSwisstroops

                                                                                                                                                                                          (Amsterdam1930),3;AndreasMüller, DesVerwirretenEuropæContinuation,oderWahreHistorischeBeschreibunqDerer in der Christenheit/ fürnehmlich aber in dem Vereiniqten Niederlande Teutschland/ und henach in denangräntzendenReichenFürstenthümerhundHerrschafften/zeitherdem jahre1673.biβauffdas jahr1676.durehdieWaffen des Königes in Franckreich erregter blutiger Krieqe/ Empörung und Verwüstung. Abgetheilet in drey Theile(Amsterdam: J. van Sommeren/Henrich andDiedrich Boom, 1680); AndreasMüller, DasVerwirrteEuropa dritterTheil:WahreHistorische BeschreibungDerer in der Christenheit, fürnehmlich aber in dem VereinigtenNiederlande,Teutschland,undhernachindenangräntzendenReichen,FürstenthümernundHerrschaffen,zeitherdemJahre1676.bißauffdasJahr1682.durchdieWaffendesKöniges inFranckreicherreichterbluhtigerKriege, leidigenEmpörungenunderschrecklicherVerwüstung.Abgetheilet in dreyTheile (Amsterdam: J. van Sommeren/Henrich and Diedrich Boom,1680).539Vervolg van ’t verwerdEuropa,ofPolitijke enHistorsicheBeschryving vanallegedenkwaardigeStaats‐ enKrygs‐Voorvallenzoobinnen,alsbuyten’tChristen‐Ryk,VoornamentlijkinenomtremtHoog‐enNeder‐Duytsland,enderzelveraangrenzendeRijkenenStaaten,zedertdenJaare1672tot1675.DoordeFranscheWapenenveroorzaakt.(Amsterdam:HendrickandthewidowofDirkBoom,1688);Vervolgvan ’tverwerdEuropa,ofPolitijkeenHistorsicheBeschryvingvan alle gedenkwaardige Staats‐ en Krygs‐Voorvallenzoo binnen, als buyten ’t Christen‐Ryk, Voornamentlijk in enomtremtHoog‐enNeder‐Duytsland,enderzelveraangrenzendeRijkenenStaaten,zedertdenJaare1672tot1675.Doorde Fransche Wapenen veroorzaakt. (Amsterdam: A. Schoonenberg and J. Rotterdam, 1742); Petrus Valkenier, ‘tVerwerd Europa ofte politieke en historische beschrijvinge derwaare fundamenten en oorzaken van de oorlogen enrevolutien in Europa voornamentlijk in en omtrent de Nederlanden zedert den jaare 1664. Gecauseert door degepretendeerdeUniverselenMonarchiederFranschen(Amsterdam:A.SchoonenbergandJ.Rotterdam,1742).540Moreover,hischildrendiedataveryyoungageinFrankfurt.Bokhorst,Nederlands‐ZwitserseBetrekkingen,2;DeLange,‘PieterValkenier,’78‐79;541Bokhorst,Nederlands‐Zwitsersebetrekkingen,2‐3;AlbertdeLangestressesthelimitedmaterialonValkenier’stimeinFrankfurt,butheascertainsthatValkenieroftenattendedtheDutchreformedservicesinHanauandthatheheldprivateservicesinhishome.DeLange,‘PieterValkenier’,82.542TheNationalArchives inTheHagueholdsdiplomatic lettersbyPetrusValkenier toGasparFagel,CoenraadvanHeemskerck,andAnthonieHeinsius;Bokhorst,Nederlands‐Zwitsersebetrekkingen,3.

138

intheProtestantRepublic.ThecorrespondenceendedwhenValkenierwastransferredtoZürich

in1690.543

ThearchiveofGisbertCuperattheNationalArchivesinTheHagueholdsananti‐French

andanti‐CatholicsatirebyValkenier,accompaniedbyacopiedlettertotheStatesGeneralfrom

11April1686.Intheircorrespondencetheysharedtheirobsessionforantiquities,especiallyfor

ancient fossils and coins, and kept each other informed about current political affairs. In the

traditionoftheIuliusexclususecoelisof1514(asatireonPopeJuliusIInotbeingallowedinto

Heaven),ValkeniersatirisesLouisXIVwho‘couldattainnoplaceinheavenwhenhefulfilledhis

destiny’,butFatherPopefeltsorryforhissonandbeatifiedhimonearth;‘AndsoLouisresides

asexilefarfromheaven,butcredulousRomehonourshimasasaint.’544

In ZürichValkenier fought relentlessly against the presence of Swiss troops in Louis’s

armies, which is documented in detail.545 In the first years of his stay, Valkenier often

complainedattheSwissTagsatzunginBaden,whererepresentativesofallthethirteencantons

gathered,aboutthistransgression.SwissparticipationinLouis’swarswasoffensive,whilethe

treatybetweenFranceandtheSwissConfederacyof1663stressesthedefensivenatureofthe

Swisssupport.Inlinewiththisargument,Valkenierpointedtothe‘false’neutralityoftheSwiss

cantons. In1691hedistributedanappeal, addressing this.546 Itappearedsuccessful. InMarch

                                                            543AmongstotherDutchrepresentatives,ValkenierpromotedthepublicationofatreatisebyHeidegger,inwhichhepleaded foran alliancebetween theDutchCalvinists and theLutheransagainst theCatholic (French) threat. JohanHeinrichHeidegger,Inviamconcordiaeprotestantiumecclesiasticaemanuductio(Amsterdam1687);DeLange,‘PieterValkenier’,84‐85,Bokhorst,Nederlands‐ZwitserseBetrekkingen,2‐3.544ThecorrespondencebetweenCuperandValkeniercoverstheperiodfromValkenier’speriodinRegensburguntilhis death in 1712. NA, collection Cuperus, 1.10.24, inv.nr. 12: 3; ‘Valkenirus eodem tempore sequentes versus adOrdinesmisitLudovicusCanonizatus1IncoelisdecimusLudovicusinordinequartusnonpotuitfatofunctushaberelocum3Viditid,etdoluitRomanaepresbiteraulaePapapaternatitristiafatasui.5Hinceris,incoelissinonpotesesse,beatusInterris,igiturTemeaRomacolet,7Dixit,etaeternisLudovicinominafastisinscripsit,sanctisinseruitquechoris,9SiccoeloproculexulagitLudovicus,atillumSanctorumnumerocredulaRomacolit.’545VonHoningen‐Huene,BeiträgezurGeschichte, 125‐195;MatthiasSenn,PetrusValkenier:ErsterniederländischerGesandter in Zürich und Mahner der Eidgenossenschaft (Zürich: Niederländisches General‐Konsulat, 1990), 1‐15;HeinzpeterStucki, ‘PieterValkenierinZürich,’inLabertdeLangeandGerhardSchwinge(eds.),PieterValkenierunddasSchicksalderWaldenserum1700(Heidelberg/Ubstadt‐Weiher/Basel:Regionalkultur,2004),123‐140;Bokhorst,Nederlands‐ZwitserseBetrekkingen, 28,103;ThomasMaissen,‘PetrusValkeniersrepublikanischeSendung’;ThomasMaissen, ‘”Par un pur motief de religion et en qualité de Republicain.” Der außenpolitischeRepublikanismus derNiederlandeund seineAufnahme inderEidgenossenschaft (ca.1670‐1710)’, in: Luise Schorn‐Schütte (ed.),AspektederpolitischenKommunikationimEuropades16.und17.Jahrhunderts:PolitischeTheologie–ResPublica‐Verständnis–konsensgestützteHerrschaft,HistorischeZeitschrift.Beihefte,39 (München:OldenbourgWissenschaftsverlag,2004),233‐282.546Petrus,Valkenier,DesHoch‐Edlen,GestrengenHerrn,HerrnPetriValkeniers(…)MündlichgeführteKlageUberdievielfältigeFrantzösicheContraventionsdeβmitderEydgnoβschafthabendeBundsundüberdenstätigenMiβbrauchderEydgnöβsischen Völkerwiderdie samtlichHoheAllierten,SamtderdaraufbegehrtergebührenderRemedur (Baden,1691); Translated into DutchKlagte van den heer Petrus Valkenier, extraordinaris envoyé van (…) op den 8Maart

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1693ValkeniersignedseveraltreatieswithZürich,GraubündenandsecrettreatieswithBern.In

May the first troopswere recruited by the StatesGeneral. By the end of 1695, Valkenier had

recruited four regiments, two from Bern, one from Zürich, and one from Graubünden.

Eventually, 9,000 Swiss soldierswere stationed in theDutchRepublic in 1698, and a varying

number of 20,000 to 25,000 soldiers during the War of Spanish Succession. Notably, their

contributiontothelatterwarwasmoredecisivethantotheNineYears’War(1688‐1697).547

In the Swiss historiography Valkenier is additionally praised for his efforts for the

Waldensian refugees from Piedmont, whom the Duke of Savoy had banned after signing an

individualpeacewithLouisXIVin1696.548In1698‐1701Valkenierlobbiedactivelyforthemin

theHolyRomanEmpire,inparticularattheLandgraveErnstLudwigvonHessen‐Darmstadtand

Duke Eberhard Ludwig von Württemberg. It took Valkenier only a few months to obtain

preferableprivilegesforthereligiousrefugeesfromtheLandgrave,theDukeandothersouthern

Hessianprinces,probablyattractedbytheenforcementofanalliancewiththeDutchRepublic.

De Lange points to Valkenier’s numerous portrayals of theWaldensian communities as ‘our’

coloniesinhiscorrespondencetotheGrandPensionaryofHolland,AntonieHeinsius.549

AbouthislifeinZürichlittleisknown.AccordingtoBokhorst,his‘deepdevoutnessand

his strict ecclesiastical life’ connected him to a group a powerful priests and professors of

theologyinZürich.HiseffortsfortheWaldensianbroughthimhighesteem.Concomitantly,his

reputationwiththeCatholiccantonswasbad.550Althoughhecarriedcredentialsforallcantons,

Valkenier focusedmostly on the Protestant authorities.Moreover, the States General granted

him the secret taskof organising apro‐Dutch lobbyamongst themagistratesof Zürich,Basel,

BernSchaffhausenandotherProtestant cities. In1704 theStatesGeneral calledhimback.He

spentthelastyearsofhislifeinTheHague,wherehediedon15July1712andwasburiedinthe

GreatChurch.551

5.1.2TheCrisisofOrderandthe‘YearofDisaster’,1672.

                                                                                                                                                                                          mondelinggedaan.OverdeveelvuldigeFranschecontraventiendesverbondsdatzymethetloffel:eedgenoodschapzijnhebbende...Beneffensaanwysingederremedienwelkedaeropverzochtworden,(Amsterdam,1691),1‐12.547Bokhorst,Nederlands‐ZwitserseBetrekkingen,77‐101.548 See for instanceVonHoningen‐Huene,BeiträgezurGeschichte;TheoKiefner‚‘DieWaldenserauf ihremWegausdemVal Clusondurchdie Schweiz nachDeutschland1532‐1820/30,‘ inEndgültignachDeutschland1690‐1820/30(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995); De Lange en Schwinge (eds.), Pieter Valkenier und das Schicksal derWaldenser um 1700; De Lange points to the exclusively German literature about this subject. De Lange, ‘PieterValkenier’,93.549DeLange,‘PieterValkenier’,92‐93.550ThiswasnotleastbecauseofhismediationbetweentheHolyRomanEmpireandZürichescapinganimperialbanon wheat in 1689. The Emperor issued this ban after France used Swiss troops in battles against him. Bokhorst,Nederlands‐ZwitserseBetrekkingen,29‐30.551DeLange,‘PieterValkenier,’96.

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From the late sixteenth to the endof the seventeenth century incessantwarfare, confessional

strife,civilwars,andcoerciveprincelypoliticsgaverisetoaperceivedcrisisoftheruleoflaw;it

becameincreasinglydetachedfromrevealedreligion.552Asaresult,theruleoflawsurvivedasa

basic normative issue despite the breakdown of the major religious foundations it had in

confessionalChristianity.

The‘crisisoforder’,asJustinChampionargues,culminatedinbreakdownofregimesinthe

1640s and1650s. InEngland the killingofKingCharles I andArchbishopLaud ruptured and

even subverted basic assumptions about hierarchy, discipline and order, about social and

political legitimacy. Champion writes: ‘After 1660 the cultural and political instrument for

reconstructingorderwerecontinuallycontested.Themostdifficultandcomplexprocedurefor

re‐establishing and “neutralising” power involved bringing conscience back into deference to

authority:thiscanbemostimaginativelyconceptualizedintheformoftherelationshipbetween

church and state, and that between priest and people.’553 Anticlericalism intensified in the

second half of the seventeenth century, attacks on the churchmoved frompurely theological

premises towards arguments posed in more political (still religious) terms, as the mid‐

seventeenth century witnessed the coinage of ‘priestcraft’ for which Hobbes laid the

groundwork. The term became the utmost manifestation of anticlericalism in the 1690s and

1700s.554 In the Dutch Republic during the last decades of the seventeenth century, authors

abhorred the alleged medieval heritage of ‘priestcraft’ (clerical meddling in secular affair’s),

scorned ‘fanaticism’ (theologians, who brought their doctrinal conflicts to the political

authoritiesandpublic,suchasintheArminiantroublesof1618),andcondemned‘superstition’

(quarrels about extremely precise interpretations of faith orworship considered to endanger

the very foundations of faith, e.g. the Voetian rigidity).555 The nature of priesthood and

ecclesiastical power remained central to the political debates of the late seventeenth century.

Attempts to reconstruct order consequently involved arguments on true religion based on

understandings of sacerdotal nature of the church, or notions of true religion as still the

foundationofmoralityandthesocialcementofsocietywithoutthenecessaryinvolvementofthe

                                                            552 Michael Stolleis, ‘The Legitimation of Law through God, Tradition, Will, Nature and Constitution’, in LorraineDastonandMichaelStolleis(eds.),NaturalLawandLawsofNatureinEarlyModernEuropeJurisprudence,Theology,MoralandNaturalPhilosophy(Farnham:Ashgate,2008),45‐55.553 Justin Champion, "Religion's Safe, with Priestcraft is theWar": Augustan Anticlericalism and the Legacy of theEnglishRevolution,1660‐1720’,TheEuropeanLegacy5:4(2000),547‐561,‘crisisoforder’onp.548‐549:‘Giventhatearlymodernunderstandingsofconfessionalnatureofthestateinsistedthatreligiousorthodoxywasthepremiseofcivil citizenship,and thatconsequentlypoliticswas infusedwithChristianmeaning, thenstrugglesover thepower,significanceandnatureofreligiousinstitutionswerenotmarginaltopoliticalconflict,butinmostcasesconstitutivetotit.’554Champion,"Religion'sSafe,withPriestcraftistheWar",549.555JokeSpaan,GraphicSatireandReligiousChange:TheDutchRepublic1676‐1707(Leiden:Brill,2011),199.Spaansalsomentions ‘enthusiasm’ as one of the threewhichwere seen as ‘false religions’ by ‘enlightenedobservers: ‘theattempttooverturnpublicorderandestablishtheruleofsaints,aspartofadivinelyordainedmission,wastheonetheyabhorredthemost.’aswitnessedintheEnglishCivilWar.

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confessional churches.556 It is within this broad framework of concern that reactions to the

brutalandsurprisingFrenchinvasionoftheRepubliccanbeplaced.

In March 1672 Louis XIV declared war on the Dutch Republic,557 followed by an English

attackonaDutchconvoy in theChannel.Via theFrenchallied territories,of thebishopricsof

MünsterandCologne,Louis’stroopsattackedtheRepublicfromtheeastattheendofMay1672;

andby theendof JuneLouisXIVandhisalliesoccupied theprovincesofUtrecht,Gelderland,

Overijssel.William III’s small armyhad retreatedbehind the ‘Hollandwater line’, the flooded

zone spanning from the Zuyder Zee to the Rhine. The rapidity of the invasion, subsequent

massivelootingintheconqueredareas,andtherevoltsinHollandandZeelandof1672marked

the beginning of anti‐French foreign policy for the ensuing forty years. The United Provinces

fought threewarsagainstLouisXIV: theFranco‐DutchWar (1672‐1678), theNineYears’War

(1688‐1697)andtheWaroftheSpanishSuccession(1701‐1714).AfterexperiencingtheFrench

forcein1672,Dutchforeignpolicyshiftedfromoneprimarilybasedondefensivealliancesand

active neutrality towards an offensive policy under William III strengthening the army,

diplomatic network, and setting up offensive treaties and propaganda campaigns directed

againstLouisXIV.558

InFebruary1672,WilliamIIIwasappointedcaptaingeneral foroneseasononly.559De

WittorganisedtheDutchdefence.However,theRepublic’squickdownfall,andthesubsequent

risingopinioninfavourofOrangeledtotherestorationbyZeelandandHollandoftheprinceof

Orangeintheofficesofstadholderandcaptaingeneral.CornelisdeWittwasarrestedandwhile

Johan visited his brother in prison, they both were taken by an angry crowd (including

burghers) and lynched.560 William’s power grew rapidly. He was granted the authority to

appoint urban magistrates (although traditional ‘Orangist’ cities as Leiden and Haarlem

                                                            556Champion,"Religion'sSafe,withPriestcraftistheWar",547‐561;JokeSpaans,“Hieroglyfen.Deverbeeldingvandegodsdienst,” in Henk van Nierop, ed., Romeyn de Hooghe. De verbeelding van de Gouden Eeuw (Amsterdam:Waanders,2008),48‐57.557LouisXIVwasdeterminedtodiminishthepowerofthesmallmaritimeDutchRepublic,repelledbyitsdiplomaticschemesduringandaftertheWaroftheDevolution.ThehistorianPaulSonnino,however,stressesthatLouisXIV’s‘mostimmediateobjective(…)wastheacquisitionoftheSpanishLowCountries,buttheTripleAlliancestillstoodinhis way, and Louis’ only option was (…) to seek to enlist Charles II of England in a war against the Dutch.’ PaulSonnino,‘Plusroyalistequelepape:LouisXIV’sReligiousPolicyandhisGuerredeHollande’,inDavidOnnekink(ed.),WarandReligionafterWestphalia,1648‐1723(Farnham:Ashgate,2016),17‐24,p.21.558Althoughafter1667thepolicyofactiveneutralitycouldnolongerberetained.SimonGroenveld, ‘WilliamIIIasStadholder:PrinceorMinister?’, inEstherMeijersandDavidOnnekink,RedefiningWilliam: the impactof theKing‐Stadholderininternationalcontext(Aldershot:Ashgate,2007),17‐37,p.25‐26;WoutTroost,'TorestoreandpreservethelibertyofEurope':WilliamIII'sideasonforeignpolicy’,inDavidOnnekinkandGijsRommelse(eds.),IdeologyandforeignpolicyinearlymodernEurope(Farnham:Ashgate,2011),283‐303.559TheprovinceofHolland, ledbyDeWitt factionpromotedthedictatorshipadtempus,orDeWitt’sownterm‘adexpeditionem’opposedtotheotherprovinces.Thefearforthedurationofthepowersofthestadholderappearedtherealissue.Onthisissuere‐appearinginanti‐Wlliamnitepropagandaduringthestandingarmydebatesofthe1690sinEngland, see Charles‐Édouard Levillain, ‘Cromwell Revidivus?William II asMilitaryDictator:Myth andReality’, inEstherMeijersandDavidOnnekink,RedefiningWilliamIII:theimpactoftheKing‐Stadholdetininternationalcontext(Aldershot:Ashgate,2006),159‐176.560 See in particularMichel Reinders,PrintedPandemonium:PopularPrint andPolitics in theNetherlands1650‐72(Leiden:Brill,2013).

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opposed)andreceivedtheextraordinarypowerofdismissalfromofficeintimeofnecessity.And

heexercisedthesepowers:inHollandhechanged130ofthe460regents,installinghispartisans

or regentswho had advocated the Orangist cause during the tumultuous period. He set up a

networkof clients throughout theprovincespromotinghis supporters inhighoffices.Healso

sidestepped thenomination lists for urbanofficesmadeby themagistrates. In foreign affairs,

likewise,theprincestartedtoassumepower,asWilliamcreatedhisowndiplomaticnetworkof

agents alongside the traditional one. Through both networks, William set up a diplomatic

offensivesponsoringalliancesagainstLouisXIV,inwhichcontextwemayinterpretValkenier’s

diplomaticappointment.In1674theprincewasappointedhereditarystadholderbytheStates

ofHolland,ZeelandandUtrecht,notleastduetotherecentpurgesoftheassemblies,ashefor

instance took over power in Utrecht after the withdrawal of French troops in 1674. Simon

Groenved concludes: ‘Thus William, unlike his predecessors, systematically integrated his

privatecourtandthegovernmentalmachineryofthestate.(…)[H]eextendedthelimitsofhis

powers,onthebasisofwhathehimselfregardedastheurgencyofthemoment.’561

Nonetheless,warfareagainstLouisdemandedvastlandforcesandhighinvestments.The

Union’stroopsexplodedfrom32,5000menintherelativepeacefulyearof1670to93,5000in

theFranco‐DutchWar,upto102,000intheNineYears’War,and119,000menduringtheWar

of theSpanishSuccession.Yet, theFrenchtroopsweresignificantly larger:280,000duringthe

firstwaragainsttheDutchrepublicand420,000intheNineYears’War.TheprovinceofHolland

had to find 10million guilders in 1670, but four years later they had to pay 21million. The

regentsimposednewtaxesandraisedexistingones.However,thesenewresourcescouldnotfill

thegrowingbudgetgapsandthegovernmenthadtoborrowsubstantialamountsofmoney.In

1713thedebtoftheprovinceofHollandwas310millionand70percentofrevenuetaxeswas

usedtocoverinterest.ThewarsagainstLouisXIVhadseverefinancialconsequencesforDutch

societyatlarge:tradeandmanufacturingsuffered,andunemploymentandpovertyincreasedin

thecities.Contemporariesrelatedthearisingcivilupheavalstoincreasingtaxburdens.562

The direct stimulus for the publication of ‘t Verwerd Europa was the planned peace

negotiationsbetweenFranceand theDutchRepublicand itsallies, including theSpanishKing

andtheEmperor,inthespringof1675.InJune1672theEmperorhadalreadycometotheaidof

theDutchRepublicandinOctober1673theSpanishmonarchyjoinedthewarontheDutchside.

Moreover,inthebeginningof1674theEnglishKingCharlesIIwasforcedtopulloutofthewar

by his parliament, in March 1674 the peace of Westminster was signed and in April 1674

MünsterandColognelikewiseconcludedpeacewiththeDutchRepublic.Inthecourseof1674

LouisXIVhadtoretreatfromDutchsoil.Yet,StadholderWilliamIIIcontinuedtopursueallied                                                            561SimonGroenveld,‘WilliamIIIasStadholder:PrinceorMinister?’,quotationfrom23,37.562 Donald Haks, Vaderland en vrede, 1672‐1713: publiciteit over de Nederlandse Republiek in oorlog (Hilversum:Verloren,2013),9‐10.

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warfare.Hearguedthatthefragilesouthernboardersshouldbesecuredfirst.563Themajorityof

the States General, however, favoured peace with France due to the costs of war. Even the

staunchest Orangists of 1672 questioned the prince’s costly bellicose foreign policy, which

revealedthefragilityoffactionalallegianceunderpressureofa(perceived)crisis.Itwasopenly

discussedwhoprofited from thewar. The cities of Amsterdam and Leiden not only favoured

peace,butalsoopposedtheplannedappointmentofWilliamIIIasDukeofGelre,sochallenging

hispower.564ThepointofpublicationofValkenier’sbookwastoshoreupWilliam’spositionby

influencingopinioninfavourofagrandscalecoalitionwaragainstFrancewithallitsbudgetary

implications.

Inthecourseoftheseventeenthcenturyauthorsreflectedontheoreticalsolutionstothe

crisis of order. To examine the nature of the political realm authors increasingly began to

employ historical analysis; history served to determine natural law and the specific laws

belongingtoapolity,ortopredictbehaviourofpoliticalactorsasininterestanalyses.Moreover,

thegrowingpracticeof communal and territorial lawsundermined the invocationofGodand

differentiated notions of legality.565 At different levels of formality writers in the late 17th

century were concerned with a crisis of order, more or less systematically focussing on

conceptions of a rule of law. As we saw in the introduction, Samuel Pufendorf is the most

significantatthemostsustainedlevelofphilosophicalcoherencewithhislaunderedversionof

Hobbes’sargumentsinDecive.Hisargumentwasrootedinhisempiricallybasedanalysisofthe

specific interests of European dynastic agglomerates, which was founded on the origins,

character and changing circumstances of its societies, claiming that it was the natural law

obligation of the ruler (particularly security) to ascertain the ‘true’ interest of state.As Lisola

and Valkenier before him, he assessed the predatory nature of the French kingdom: densely

populated,warlike, passionate people, and robbery by conquest.However, in such aworld of

change and conflict, the Christian moral duty of men towards their fellowmen remained the

basis of security within societies.566 In a number of respects both his works and those of

Valkenier’s professor at FranekerUniversity,UlricusHuber (1636‐1649) overlap thematically

with ‘t Verwerd Europa567 and therefore we will outline Huber’s work before turning to the

                                                            563 Charles‐ÉdouardLevillain, ‘William III’smilitary andpolitical career inNeo‐Roman context, 1672‐1702’, inTheHistoricalJournal48:2(2005),321‐350,p.333referencetoaletterfromGabrielSylviustoArlingtonof6April1674.564EventuallyWilliamhadtoacceptthatin1678theDutchRepublic,ledbyAmsterdamandLeiden,signedaseparatepeacewith France; Peter Rietbergen, ‘Persuasie enMeditatie: de Republiek en de Vrede vanNijmegen (1678)’, inSimonGroenveld,MauritsEbbenandRaymondFagel (eds.),TussenMunsterenAken.DeNederlandseRepubliekalsgrotemogendheid (1648‐1748) (Maastricht: Shaker Publishing, 2005), 21‐30, p. 25‐26; SimonGroenveld,Evidentefactiën Evidente factien in den staet: Sociaal‐politieke verhoudingen in de 17e‐eeuwse Republiek der VerenigdeNederlanden(Hilversum:UitgeverijVerloren,1990),213‐245;Price,HollandandtheDutchRepublic,159.565Stolleis,‘TheLegitimationofLaw’,46.566VonFriedeburg,Luther’sLegacy,322‐324;Seidler,‘Introduction’,ix‐xl.567Meinecke,Machiavellism:TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,287‐288;Seidler,‘Introduction’,xvii.

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work’s immediate context of the pamphlet wars of the 1670s concerning the future of the

Republic.

AnotherauthortryingtoreconstructorderwasUlricusHuber.568Kossmannclaimsthat

Huber took the ‘middleground’,mixing ‘Aristotelianism’with ‘Cartesianism’ intoaphilosophia

novantiqua, argued in his magnum opus De jure Civitatis Libri Tres (1673) and taught at

Franeker University.569 He believed that Grotius’ law of nature (to which he added divine

inspiration) could be combined with Hobbes’s sovereignty theory, but he rejected Hobbes’

method of hypothesis by stressing historical empiricism to explain the establishment of

government.HemixedtheperspectivesfromAlthusiusoninalienablepopularsovereigntywith

Hobbes’ideasofinalienableandabsolutesovereigntyofthestate;Huberfoundmanyhistorical

examplestoinvalidatebothsuchgeneraltheoriesand,moreover,hecouldfindnonewhereina

multitudeof individualsgaveuptheirsovereignty individually.However,heattributedcertain

inalienable rights to peoplewhen joined in a political society: freedomof conscience and the

protection of life and property. Huber claimed that sovereigntywas absolute, indivisible and

inalienable, but sovereignty could be restricted by a constitution, since some rights could be

partlysharedwithrepresentativeassemblies.Besides,rightsofthesovereigncouldbebreached,

when necessity required it in accordance to the well‐being of the people. Huber pleaded for

constitutionalaristocracyasmostefficientandmoststablebecause it temperedarbitraryrule

by a prince or by a (anarchic) multitude. Instead of stressing human self‐interest, Huber

emphasisedthesubjectionofgovernmenttonormssetbyGod.570

Ofmoreimmediateandfocussedimportancefor‘tVerwerdEuropawasthebodyofmore

occasional pamphlets generated by the crises of 1672. Regardless of whether their explicit

concern was with a rule of law, the breach of norms and rules was presupposed in their

                                                            568ErnstH.Kossmann,‘DeDissertationesPoliticaevanUlricHuber’inTheodoorWeevers,P.K.King,andP.F.Vincent(eds.) European context: studies in the history and literature of the Netherlands presented to TheodoorWeevers(Cambridge: The Modern Humanities Research Association, 1971), 164‐177; Kossmann, Politieke theorie in hetzeventiende‐eeuwse Nederland (Amsterdam: Noord‐Hollandsche uitgevers maatschappij, 1960), 59‐102; E.H.Kossmann,‘Somelate17th‐centurywritingsonRaisond’Etat’,inRomanSchnur(ed.),Staaträso:StudienzurGechichteeinespolitischenBegriffs(Berlin:Duncker&Humblot,1975),497‐504.569Huberbelievedhimselftobethefirstwhoseparatedthepolitica fromiuspublicumuniversaleastworelatedbutdistinct sciences. The politica was, in his opinion, a system of principles of utility, advising what was useful ornecessaryfortherulertodo,whereasuniversalpubliclawwasasciencesearchingfortherightsoftherulerandthesubjects,teachingtherulerwhathehadtherighttodo.Huberclaimedcontemporariesincorrectlyblendedlawandpolitica, suchasHobbeshaddone.Kossmann,Politiekdenken, 59‐60,85;UlricusHuber,De jureCivitatisLibriTres(1673;re‐edition1684;definitiveform1694).570ErnstH.Kossmann, ‘DeDissertationesPoliticaevanUlricHuber’inT.Weevers,P.K.King,andP.F.Vincent(eds.)Europeancontext:studiesinthehistoryandliteratureoftheNetherlandspresentedtoTheodoorWeevers(Cambridge:TheModernHumanitiesResearchAssociation,1971),164‐177;Kossmann,Politieketheorie,59‐102;E.H.Kossmann,‘Somelate17th‐centurywritingsonRaisond’Etat’,497‐504;TheoJ.Veen,Rechtennut.StudiënnaaraanleidingvanUlrikHuber(1636‐1694)(Zwolle:TjeenkWillink,1976),160‐201;HansErichBödeker,‘Debatingtherespublicamixta:GermanandDutchPoliticalDiscourses1700’, inMartinvanGelderenandQuentinSkinner(eds.),Republicanism:AShared European Heritage. Volume I, Republicanism and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),219‐246,p.241‐245.

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preoccupationwith the need to save their society from the arbitrary, tyrannical and despotic

powerofFranceaswellaspower‐hungryregentsorOrangeplunderprinces.

During 1672 therewas a flood of pamphlets calling for the re‐instalment of theHouse of

Orange and blaming the brothers De Witt for the disastrous events swept over the Dutch

Republic. Authors legitimised their claims in terms of being ‘true patriots’ defending the

‘freedom’ and ‘fatherland’. Inhabitants werewell informed on the course of the war through

newspapers,newsprintsand journals; and throughdaysofprayer,processionsand festivities,

theregentsattemptedtoinfluenceopinion,whilstcitizensattemptedtoaswell,bydebatingthe

licitscopeoftheregents’officesandthesignificanceofthemurdersofthebrothersDeWitt.571

TheYearofDisasterfuelledpublicationsusingthepopularidiomofinterest.Itappears

thatin1672agreaterattentionwaspaidtothegeneralaffairsofEuropeinordertodissectthe

‘true’Dutchinterestofstate.NumerouspamphletsscrutinisedthepositionoftheDutchRepublic

in the chaos of European warfare and promised to unveil the ‘true’ motives of all regimes

involved.To thisend,authors frequentlyemployed thevocabularyof ‘interest’.These interest

analyses ordered the intertwined foreign and domestic events, pleaded a specific direction in

foreignpolicyand,nottotheleast,ininternalpolitics.Theywereusuallyfashionedintoashort

andseeminglyobjectiveoverviewof interestsofEuropeanregimes in the traditionofRohan’s

interest analysis or conveyed through a ‘praetje’ [pamphlet in the form of a fictive dialogue]

between persona representing, for instance, the rival provinces Zeeland and Holland, or

oligarchicregentsandopposingcitizens.Afurtheruseoftheidiomwastoprove,ortorefuteDe

laCourt’sdeliberationsonHolland’s interestof stateand toblame theDeWitt regime for the

condition of the country.572 Valkenier most probably borrowed his title from the short tract

                                                            571SeeinparticularMichelReinders,PrintedPandemonium:PopularPrintandPolitics intheNetherlands1650‐1672(Brill: Leiden 2013); Ingmar Vroomen, Taal van de Republiek. Het gebruik van vaderlandretoriek in Nederlandsepamfletten,1618‐1672 (PhDdissertation,ErasmusUniversityRotterdam,2012);Haks,Vaderlandenvrede;RoelandHarms,Pamflettenenpubliekeopinie.Massamediaindezeventiendeeeuw(Amsterdam:AmsterdamUniversityPress,2011).572See for instanceConsideratienoverdenTegenwoordigenToestantvanhetVereenigdeNederland,GestelddooreenLiefhebber van ’t Vaderland, Tot encouragement van sijne Lands‐genooten, in desen bekommerlijken Tijd. (1672);d’OntledingvanEuroop.Ditisteseggen,DespreukenvanalledeVrijeVorstenenVorstendommenvanEuroop.Overdengeheymentoestandertegenwoordiogesaken(1672);AdolphusvanWolfshagen,DeSchoolederPrincen,EninterestdervoornaemstePotentatendesWerelts.(Cologne:HermanusAlbedeuyt,1673);VerhaelvanStaet‐Saken(…)Seeckeroverd’InterestenvandeStaetvanEngelandt(…)(Amsterdam:JanRieuvertsz.andPieterArentsz.,1673);HollandsInterest,GestelttegensdatvanJandeWit;VoorgevallentusschenHans,Raads‐Heer,EnArent,eenBorger.Waerinvanwoorttotwoort verhaelt wert fijn perpetueel Edict of eeuwighdurende Wet. (Amsterdam, 1672); Discoursen over denTegenwoordigen Interest van het Landt. Tusschen een Zeeu, Hollander en Raedsheer. (Amsterdam, 1672); HetTegenwoordige Interest der Vereenigde Provincien. Nevens Verscheyde Aanmerckingen op de tegenwoordige, enConjecturen op de toekomende Standt van zaaken in europe: voornaamlijck betreffende deze Republijke. Door eenliefhebbervandeGereformeerdeReligie,en’twelvarendezerLanden(Amsterdam,1673),translationfromtheEnglishoriginal[JosephHill],TheinterestoftheseUnitedProvinces.BeingadefenceoftheZeelanderchoice.Byawellwisherofthereformedreligion,and thewellfareof thesecountries(Middelburg:ThomasBerry,1672);DenGrootenenWittenDuyvel (1672) subtitled ‘BetterFrench thanPrince, IncorrectHolland’s Interest’, which stated on page 13: ‘I shiverremembering that I was handed a little book a few years ago (in which the entire interest of our state was soincorrectly drawn up, and for the execution of this interest everything has been so wrongly constructed) which,insteadofpraisingthevirtuesofourpraiseworthyandneverenoughcelebratedPrinceofOrange,waswrittenwithadamned Devilish pen (...) and printed and published by the authority of the State.’ Johan deWitt regime and his

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Euroop vol Verwerring (1673) [Europe full of Confusion]. Instead of presenting the specific

‘interests’ of the different rulers of Europe, this author speaks of their ‘secret passions’, a

vocabularyalignedwiththeterminologyofreasonofstate,butheusesthesametropes,which

were already present in Rohan’s and to a larger extent in Lisola’s treatise: ‘Secret passions’/

‘motives forprincelypoliticalactions’; ‘Betrayal’of treatiesbyprinces; ‘Pretextsofstrivingfor

PeaceandUnity’withinEurope’; ‘Pretext’of the ‘well‐being’of theprinces’ownprincipalities;

French ‘Staetszucht’ [lust for ‘state’/dominion/conquest]; ‘oogmerck’ [objective, which

Valkenier describes as ‘Interest’]; ‘Dissection of Europe’. The author claimed that Henry IV’s

bloodrunstoLouisXIV’sveinsmakinghimaspireuniversaldominion;‘thekingwhoalreadyin

histhoughtshadswalloweduptheSupreme‐commandovertheentireChristianworld’.573

In the years before and after 1672, a substantial part of the Dutch pamphlets was

Orangist,whichhadsuccessfullymonopolisedtheidiomof fatherlandandtheassociationwith

theReformedChurch.IntheOrganistpamphletsthestadholderwaspresentedastheonlyDutch

candidatetofightoffforeignaggressionandtobreakdowntheregentoligarchy,ontowhichthe

imageof the former Spanishoppressorwasoften transposed; hewould restoreorder, liberty

and unity; and under his command the military forces would rise from the ashes.574 These

argumentswere not particularly novel, but nowOrangist pamphleteers had to dealwith two

difficulties: temperthecivildisorderwhilesimultaneously justifythe forcedbreakdownof the

DeWittregime.Tothisendauthorsemployedhistoricalanalogiesbetween1672andeventsof

theDutchRevolt(e.g.thecitizens’capturesofBrillandFlushingin1572),explainedtheevilof

the DeWitt regime through historicalwritings, as Valkenier did, and stressed the distinction

between thepopulus andplebs, andWilliam III and theplebs.575 Little scopewas afforded for

defencesofastadholderlessregime.576William’sextensionofpowerthroughwarfare,however,

provoked opposition in provincial and urban assemblies, and also amongst previously loyal

                                                                                                                                                                                          helpers, notably Pieter de Groot as ‘an atheist, a French Slave’ degenerated the Dutch Republic, consequentlyfacilitatingtheFrenchinvasion:‘Hashenotunderthepretextoflibertybroughtusthegreatestslaveryoftheworld?’Idem,p.14,12.573EuroopvolVerwerring,WaerintesienzijnDeheimelijkstedriftenvanalledePotentateninChristenrijk(1673),4.TheauthorofthispamphletverybrieflystatesthemotivesofthevariousEuropeanrulers(writteninthefirstpersonfromtheKingofSwedenonwards):DutchRepublic,Triplealliance,KingofSweden,KingofEngland,KingofFrance,Emperor, King of Poland, King of Denmark, King of Portugal, Prince of Braganza [Portugal], the Prince‐Elector ofBrandenburg, theDuke of Saxony, theKnight Grémonville, theAlliance in the Palatinate, the Prince‐Electors andPrinces of theEmpire;Valkeniermeant by ‘verwerd’ confused as to sayEuropewasperturbedby the FrenchwarpoliticsandalltherulerswerecaughtinthenetFrenchhasthrownoverEurope.Andasheonpage68writes:‘Thepretext, that France always pretends,why it involves itself in the conflicts of Foreign Potentates, is the Peace andUnity,andbythisbaitandbymanydiversionsandembellishedperformances[France]seekstoentanglethefightingparties in aweb,well‐knowing, thatnothing sounds sweeter andmorepleasant in the ears, because they listen to[thatsound]more,thanPeaceandUnity.’574 Vroomen,Taal vandeRepubliek; Jill Stern, ‘The rhetoric of popularOrangism, 1650‐72’,HistoricalResearch77(2004),202‐224.575Stern,‘TherhetoricofpopularOrangism’,202‐224.576Reinders,‘Burghers,Orangistsand“GoodGovernment”,p.322:‘Fromthe956uniqueDutchpamphletspublishedin1672,only12wereaimedagainstWilliamofOrange,while160pamphletsattackedagroupofregentsidentifiableas“adherentsoftheTrueFreedom’’.’;Price,HollandandtheDutchRepublic,166.

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Orangists.577ResistanceroseagainstOrange’sbellicoseforeignpolicy,mountingwarcosts;and

voices were heard in favour of peace that would enhance commerce and lower taxes. In the

spiritofDelaCourt,attackswerewrittenonthearbitraryruleoftheprinceofOrangeallegedly

usurpingthesovereigntyoftheindividualStatesandcoercingoppositionwithhispersonalarmy

forces.578Discussionsof theextentof freedomof conscienceremainedan inherentpartof the

debates,especiallysinceafter1672OrangistswithintheReformedChurchdisplayedagrowing

fear and intolerance; the Voetian faction reclaimed centre stage, called for stricter reformed

mannersinsocietyandlaunchedattacksonCartesiansandCoeccians.579However,inlightofthe

civildisturbancesof1672mostpamphleteerssharedoneconcern:thedangerofmobrule.580

The image of the new enemy, Louis XIV’s France, was painted in full colours, often

through critical current‐affairs commentaries. In the famous news print Spiegel der Fransche

Tirannie (1673) [Mirror of the French Tyranny], the engraver and pamphleteer Romeyn de

Hooghe transferred the old image of Spanish Black Legend to the reportedly excessive and

violent actions of French soldiers in the plundering of the villages of Swammerdam and

Bodegraven. It was followed up by the internationally successful pamphlet Advis fidelle aux

veritablesHollandoiswritten by the diplomat and news agent, Abraham deWicquefort, who,

through a (seemingly) factual report of the events, sketched the image of an age‐old French

rapacious lust forpowerandconquest. Inaprintof1674,DeHoogheexplainedthehistoryof

‘Dutchtransformations’from1668to1674.Asinhisotherwork,theFrenchthreatisthecrucial

problem,faithintheprinceofOrangeandobediencetogovernmentistheanswer;evencopying

FrenchcultureiscondemnedasthecauseofthedegenerationofDutchsociety.581

                                                            577Groenveld,‘WilliamIIIasStadholder:PrinceorMinister?’,25,37.578Price,HollandandtheDutchRepublic,174;Levillain,‘WilliamIII’sMilitaryandPoliticalCareer’,327‐329.Levillaincitesonp.328thepamphletSomethingsconcerningtheprinceofOrangeworthyofgreatreflection[nogivendateofpublication,butprobablywritten in themid‐1670s]; ‘theprince isveryabsoluteanddoeswhathepleases (…) theStatesarenowbutleshuissiersduprince(…)heintendstomodelanarmyafterhisownway,givingemploymenttostrangers, daily rejecting the native subjects.’; for examples of mid‐1670s pamphlets about the planned peacenegotiationsreadDewettelijckeverantwoordingederHollanders,ofteeenVerhaelvan’tgepasseerdevandenJare1624tot desen tijdt toe. Doorgaens aengewesen werdende de trouloose Handeling van Vranckryck, die sy ontrent deopgherechteTractaten hebben gehoudenMet een klaar vertoogh,wat ontrent, voor endeno deVrede‐Handeling totCeulen isgepasseert,etc. (Amsterdam:CyprianusvanderGracht, 1674);ExtractuytdeResolutienvande (…)StatenGeneraal (…)Raeckendehet subjectvandeVredehandelinge (TheHague: J.Scheltus, 1675);RedenenenMiddelen totbevorderingvand’algemeneVrede,engemeneWelstant,daar indooreenonpartijdigpersoon,dietotdegemenerustgenegenis,aangewezenworddoorwelkemiddelenmentoten(…)vrede(…)zoukonnegeraken.UithetFranschvertaalt.(Amsterdam:Pt.Arentsz.,1675);HannibalnochinonseLanden,ofteConsideratienoverd’onmogelijckheytdesVredes,omme in dese tegewoord. Constitutie van tyden een vaste en bestendige Vredemet den Koning van Vranckrijck tebekomen.(Cologne:Pt.deVrede,1675).579Stern, ‘TherhetoricofpopularOrangism’,151;An interestingpamphleteer is JohannesRothé,a self‐proclaimedprophet and leader of a FifthMonarchistmovement in theDutch Republic,who fiercely accused the clergy of theestablishedChurchandattackedtheprinceofOrangeandthepeople’sidolatryofhimascausesforthedelayofthemillennial reign. JanRothé,Refutatie,ofWederlegginge vandeBrief,geschreen, vandePrins vanOrangeopden18Maert1675,aende Staten vanZeelant; [JanRothé],HetBedrogh, en verkeert voorneemen vandePrins vanOrangeontdeckt(Antwerpen,1675).580Levillain,‘WilliamIII’sMilitaryandPoliticalCareer’,292.581[AbrahamWicquefort], Advis fidelle aux veritables Hollandois. Touchant ce qui s’est passé dans les villages deBodegraven & Swammerdam (The Hague, 1673). Haks, Vaderland en Vrede, 21‐57. Haks demonstrates that thereportedviolentactionsexecutedbytheFrenchwerenotfarfromthehistoricalreality.Thetitleisadeliberateturn

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PortrayalsofaFrenchpredatorymonarchywerealsohighlightedbytheidiomofreason

ofstate.Wecanfindsomeinstancesofthisbefore1672.InthechapteronLisolawepointedto

anti‐Frenchpamphletsofthe1640s,whicharguablyintroducedtheidiomofreasonofstatetoa

largescaleaudienceintheDutchRepublicandentailedsomeelementsofthis image,as inthe

famousMunsterVrede‐Praetjeof1646.582AndinthechapteronDelaCourtwedealtwithDen

tegenwoordigeninterestderChristenprincenof1662thatroughlysketchedanimageofaFrench

predatorymonarchy through an European interest analysis.583 In his 1669‐revised version of

InterestvanHolland,DelaCourtevenrecalledhisrejectionofalliance‐policyandpleadedforan

coalitionbetween the rulersofEuropeagainstFrenchexpansionismbyanalysing the ‘general

and true political foundations andmaxims of all countries (..)whichmost Peoples of Europe,

suchas theSpaniards, ItaliansandFrench,call Interest.’584Before1672theFrench threatwas

notexpectedtosuchadisastrousextentoftenarguingthattheEnglishwouldnotparticipatein

Louis’s campaigns;585 but after the disastrous events pamphleteers vigorously attempted to

unravelthemysteriesandmaximsofFrancethroughitspurportedlyevilhistoryoftreacherous

politics,breachesof lawand treaties,anddesire foruniversaldominion–themeswhichLisola

had orated diligently and entertainingly inBouclier.586 Moreover, Lisola’s use of the idiom of

reason of state in indicating the household rule of a conquest‐driven French monarchy ‐its

barbaric,cruelandunchristiannature,evenmoreevil thanthedespoticorientalregimes‐was

reiteratedinseveralDutchpamphlets.

AgoodexampleistheFranscheMachiavelof1675.Theauthordissectedthenatureofthe

monarchybystatingthe ‘HundredFrench‐PoliticalState‐Rules, inwhichtheFrenchState‐and

War‐Maxims and Practices will be unveiled to everyone’.587 After 1672 Machiavelli was

                                                                                                                                                                                          fromthequintessentialBalkLegendpamphletDenspieghelderSpaenschertyrannye inWestIndien[…](Amsterdam1596)thatwasaDutchadaptionofLasCasas’reportoftheSpanishatrocitiesintheAmerica’s.ThepublicationofthisDutch pamphlet led to numerous sequels that focused solely on Spanish violence in the Low Countries, as theSpaensche triannije (1621). Marijke Meijer Dress, ‘De beeldvorming Nederland‐Spanje voor en na de Vrede vanMunster’, in De Zeventiende eeuw 13:1 (1997), 163‐172; Romeyn de Hooghe, Schouburgh der Nederlandseveranderingen,geopent in ses tooneelen,WaeropdeWisselbeurtendesVereendigdeStaetsDoordenFransenOorloggebrouwen, inHistorieleSinnebeelden (Amsterdam,1674):Nottosaythatacolourfulanti‐FrenchenemyimagewassolelyemployedbyOrangistpamphleteers;intensivediplomacyforpeacesettlementcouldalsobeastrategytoholdLouis’sexpansionistpoliciesincheck.Levillain,‘William’sIIImilitaryandpoliticalcareer’,334‐335.582Munsters Vrede‐Praetje. Vol alderhande Opinien/ off d’AlgemeeneWel‐vaert deser Landen in Oorlogh off Vredebestaat.Deliberantdum fingerenesciunt (1646);Blom, ‘Oorlog, handel en staatsbelang in het politiekdenken rond1648’,89‐96.583DentegenwoordigeninterestderChristenprincen(Enkhuizen:DirkKlaer‐Oogh,1662).584AanwysingederheilsamepolitikengrondenenmaximenvanderepublikeHollandenWest‐Vriesland,1.585MurkvanderBijl,‘PieterdelaCourtendepolitiekewerkelijkheid’,inHansW.BlomandIdoW.Wildenberg(eds.),PieterdelaCourtinzijntijd.Aspectenvaneenveelzijdigpublicist(AmsterdamandMaarssen:APA‐HollandUniversityPress,1986),65‐91,p.83‐85.586SeeforinstanceFranciscusRidderus,HistorischenFrans‐Man.InbysondereFranscheGeschiedenissenGepastopdeonderdrucktestaetvanonslieveVaderlandt(Rotterdam,1674).587DeFranscheMachiavel,ofHondertFransch‐PolitiqueStaets‐Regelen,WaerinDeFranscheStaets‐enKrijgs‐MaximenenPraktykenaeneenyderopentlijkvoorgesteltworden.(Utrecht:IuriaenPoolsum,1675).

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perceivedastheevilmindbehindLouisXIV’sexpansionism.588ItbeginswithAubery’sclaimsfor

Louis’s supreme authority over otherEuropean rulers that displayed, in the author’s opinion,

the ‘French lust fordominion’. Europe should fear Spain or theTurksno longer, but only the

Frenchstroveforthe‘fifthMonarchy’.TheFrenchCrownsetuphissystemofrulebymeansof

sixmethods:1)removingexternal,and2)internalobstacles;3)offeringmoney(e.g.bribery);4)

preparing the war campaigns (e.g. diplomacy, propaganda) 5) constructing pretexts (e.g.

religion,protectorofpeace,reclaimingproperty),6)organisingalargearmy.589Heliststheparts

ofsocietiessubjectedbytheCrown,tobeappropriatedtotheFrenchreasonofstatetoestablish

universal dominion: theology, privilegesof subjects (‘like knives toChildren,which the father

maytakeaway,withoutaccountingfortothechild’),590smallsovereignties,andtheParlementof

Paris.Furthermore,theyoungnobilityoughttobeentertainedabroadinpeacetimetorelease

their diabolic nature, the nobility should be suppressed, and the subjects impoverished by

‘taxation and heavy extortions’.591 If the latter produced not enoughmoney, Louis XIVwould

usurpthecommerce,alsoabroad,tobecome ‘Masterovertheworld’andsqueezeouthisown

treasurers.592TheFrenchmonarchyfeltnotboundbyanytreaties,divinelaws,thelawofnature,

and ius gentium. By divide‐and‐conquer methods they ‘confused’ foreign rulers, such as by

bribery,diplomacy,conceit,secrettreaties,tosecurethepromotionoftheFrenchinterests.High

clergymenweresentasrepresentativestoareaswheretheFrenchweredistrusted.TheFrench

Crownextractedmoneythroughitsmanufacturingandclothingfashion,whichwasalsoameans

tocorruptthenatureofforeignsocieties).

More importantly, France had established a ‘new Law of War’ based on ‘inhumane

bloodshed, Killings, Cruelties and Destructions.’593 France ‘stirred neighbours in quiet peace’

(imagealsoseen inLisola’sandRohan’sworks),usedseeminglypeacefulpretexts,dispatched

largetroopsattheborderstoexhausttheforcesofitsneighboursandthenlaunchedasurprise

attack as the Ottomans likewise established their empire. In 1667 the pretext of reclaiming

rightful property embodied in fact ‘Robberies and Murders.’594 The royal commander

implementeda‘newFrenchWar‐Tyranny’toextortmoneyfromconqueredcitiesinthreeways.

Afirstmethodwastothreatenwithpillaging,extortmoneyfromtherichinreturnfortheirlives

and properties and otherwise take them hostage in a manner worthy to Turks and Tartars,

Second,theywouldimprisontheopposingsoldiersforcingthemtositintheirowndirtandeat

                                                            588Althoughreferringtohimbecamelesscontroversialthaninthefirsthalfoftheseventeenthcentury.EcoHaitsmaMulier, Het Nederlandse gezicht van Machiavelli. Twee en een halve eeuw interpretatie 1550‐1800 (Hilversum:UitgeverijVerloren,1989),10‐11.589DeFranscheMachiavel,3‐8.590DeFranscheMachiavel,6.591DeFranscheMachiavel,6.592DeFranscheMachiavel,6‐7.593DeFranscheMachiavel,15,594DeFranscheMachiavel,16.

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pestsandliceuntilthesoldierspayadoubleransom.Thelastmethodwastolockupthewomen

anddemandaransombythreateningtohandthemovertothelowestmilitaryrankstoberaped

andeventuallytobesold,‘whicharesuchgruesomeviolations,thateventheTurks,Tartars,and

Pirates have never used in their sales.’595 This new ‘Reason ofWar’ is closely linked to the

‘FrenchReasonofState:andwhichbotharesomiraculousandpeculiar,thattheyarenotvalid

according to the old Pagan theses and the general welfare; but contrary to God, Justice, our

conscience,humanityandprobity.’596Heconcluded: ‘Toconductsimilarhorrible inhumanities,

allthesavagePaganandBarbarianPeoples,Turks,andTartarsshouldattendschoolwiththese

French.’597

The author of this pamphlet reiterated the themesmentionedbyLisola, fashioned the

imageoftheFrenchpredatorymonarchyintermsofmaxims,asRohanhaddidtodescribethe

interest of European rulers, which De la Court in turn defined as interest. This shows the

flexibility of the idiomof reasonof state, and secondly its descriptive andnormative use; the

author rejected ‘reason of state’ as the basis of the new French ‘War–Tyranny’, while

simultaneouslydescribedsuchathreatintermsofreasonofstate.Moreover, itunderlinesthe

polemical functionof reasonof state, oftenaccompaniedwith implicit accusationsmixing fact

withfiction.Besidestheidiomofreasonofstatetheauthor’suseoftyranny,or‘War‐Tyranny’is

worthmentioning. ItentailedthecruelpracticesoftheFrenchmonarchy(morecruelthanthe

Ottomandespots),thenoveltyofLouis’smonarchy(aMachiavelliannewprincipalityasRohan

alsodescribedSpainunderPhilipII),anditsreasonofstate,whichimpliedtheoverthrowofthe

ruleoflawandtotalsubjectionofallsubjectsandconqueredpeoples,robthemoftheirliberties,

livesandlivelihoods.AlthoughtheaccusationsimplythoseofanAristoteliandespoticrule,the

term ‘despot’ isnotused,while itappears that tyrannyserved theauthor’sgoalsnotentirely,

since he felt the need to complement this tyranny with the terms ‘war’ and ‘new’. It may

strongly alludes to the recently coined term ‘war despotism’, but his use speaks for itself; an

arbitrary household rule, a combination of despotic and tyrannical rulewith an emphasis on

necessarywarfare,conquesttocoercemuchneededmoneytofinancethewarmachine.Whatis

more,itsignifiestheslipperylanguageoftyrannyintheseventeenthcenturyasdiscussedinthe

chapter on Rohan, who used ‘new monarchy’ to signify an unrestricted tyrannical control,

modelled on a Machiavellian rapacious lust for conquest. As in a later Dutch pamphlet

Suchtingenvanhet slafeachtigheVrankryk (1689) [Desires of slavishFrance],which furthered

                                                            595DeFranscheMachiavel,19.596DeFranscheMachiavel,19.597DeFranscheMachiavel,20.

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Frenchcritiquesof‘wardespotism’ofthe1640s,theFrenchauthorusednotthetermdespotic

toindicateaFrenchwar‐drivenhouseholdrule,buthewrote:‘theutmostTyranny’.598

5.1.3Lisola’slegacy:universalmonarchy,balanceofpowerandreligion

From the Franco‐DutchWar (1672‐1678) onwards Lisola’s anti‐French arguments echoed in

numerous pamphlets throughout Europe. In the initial phase of the war the anti‐French

pamphletproductionreacheditsfirstpeakintheHolyRomanEmpire.MartinWredehasshown

the recurrent themes in theanti‐Frenchpamphletsproduced in theEmpire:Frenchbreachof

law,Frenchwarcrimes,‘GermanLiberty’,‘Frenchtyranny’andtheimpendingFrenchuniversal

monarchy.Francebecamea‘Reichsfeind’[enemyoftheEmpire],evena‘Erbfeind’[archenemy],

andLouisdegeneratedfromthe‘Allerchristliche’[mostChristianking]tothe‘Antichrist’,anda

‘Kreuzzugeswider die Franken’ [crusade against the French]wasdesired as the ‘Substitution

derTürkendurchdieFranzosen’[substitutionoftheTurksbytheFrench]hadallegedlytaken

place.599Adifferencewithlateranti‐Frenchpamphlets,isthatinanti‐Frenchwritingsbeforethe

escalationoftheFranco‐DutchWar,Louisfacedmockeryandcriticismaswellassomegainin

respectandcredit.EvenLisolashowedrespectfortheenergyandvigourofLouis,accordingto

Wrede,althoughweshouldviewthislargelyinlightofhissenseofirony.600

As has been stated earlier, the historian Levillain has stressed Lisola’s fundamental

influence on anti‐French, anti‐Catholic and anti‐Stuart propaganda in England and the Dutch

Republic, and, consequently, his contribution to the political turn of the English parliament

againstFranceandtheAnglo‐Dutchallianceof1677.OneoftheintellectualbrokersofLisola’s

ideas in the Dutch Republic was the diplomat and member of Amsterdam’s city council,

CoenraadvanBeuningen.VanBeuningenwasknownasa fierceopponentofLouis’sclaims to

theSpanishNetherlands.Duringthe1670shewassentonseveralmissionswhereheenjoyed

the company of Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby (a prominent anti‐French and anti‐Catholic

politician)andDenzilHolles,whopublishedalettertoVanBeuningenof1676arguingashared                                                            598DeFranscheMachiavel,21‐25:‘theGovernmentofFranceisrisentotheextentofTyranny,thattheRulerregardseverythingashisownproperty.HedrawsupTaxes,ashepleases,withoutconsultingthePeople,theGrandees,theEstates,northeParlements.(…)astheMohammedanRulersofTurkey,ofPersia,andtheGreatMongolians(…)havingan absolute power over the Nobility, over the Members of the Judiciary, and over all the People (…) since theministriesofRichelieuandMazarin isFrance loadedwithheavyimposts.But itexhaustedthekingdom,althoughitwasunrightfully,inalessermannerthannow[underColbertwho]madeaReformationofFinances,andhasexecutedwithallstrictness:(...)butnotreducetheimpostsonthePeoplebuttoenhanceit(…).TheNoblemanhasnolongercredittoestablishareductionoftaxationforhisParochy,histenantspayalreadysomuch,andmorethantheother.(...)[Colbert]hasenlargedtherevenuesoftheKingdomtotheutmostextent.(…)Itisinthiswaythattheimpostswillbefurtheredandextracted,andifthisisnottheutmostTyranny,thanIconfessIdonotunderstandanythingaboutit.’;De FranscheMachiavel, 31: ‘Thesemountains ofmoneywere spent to one purpose only: to erect the ‘generalMonarchy.’599Wrede,DasReichundseineFeinde,333.600Wrede,DasReichundseineFeinde,48‐49,325‐327,330,332‐333,337,378‐380.

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Anglo‐Dutch Protestant interest against France. According to French diplomatic sources, Van

Beuningen was obstructing De Witt’s appeasing tactics to the French in foreign affairs.601

Haitsma Mulier suggests that Valkenier got acquainted with Lisola in The Hague in 1672‐

1673.602After theFrench invasion, the anti‐French argumentofBouclier developed intomore

viciousanddirectattacksonLouis’s rule inDutchpamphlets,aswewill see in theanalysisof

Valkenier’swork.TheinfluenceofBouclierinEnglandwasmostprobablyenhancedbyhisown

diplomatic missions to London. Levillain reasons Bouclier ‘set the standard for anti‐French

propaganda in post‐1667 England’, for example an English pamphlet of 1668 titled A Free

ConferencetouchingthePresentStateofEngland inordertotheDesignsofFrance, inwhichthe

author promoted an alliance with Spain instead of with France and the legitimacy of the

renunciationofMariaTheresareferringtoBouclier.Levillainconcludesthatundertheeffectof

Dutch propaganda following the invasion of 1672, Lisola’s ideas about French universal

monarchytransferredintoaProtestanttaleandpermeatedAnglo‐Dutchpoliticalculture.603

During Louis XIV’s reign, Bosbach observed multiple variances in the definitions of

‘universalmonarchy’, traditional oneswere re‐used, such as the desire for achieving the fifth

empire, but also new elements added to, or replaced older ones, such as the claim that the

FrenchKingwouldestablishauniversalmonarchybasedonpoliticalandmilitarypower,rather

than founded on the dignity and spiritual authority of the Empire. New elements were

integrated,suchasLouis’sdesigntosubjectEuropethroughthemisuseoftheclaimedofficeof

arbiterofwarandpeace;and throughuseof themetaphorof thebalanceofpoweras ‘anew

ideal forEuropeanpoliticsandthusassumedFrenchuniversalmonarchybecamethenegative

equivalenttothatidea’.604

Moreover,inthesecondhalfoftheseventeenthcenturyreligionremainedanimportant

rationale in works on foreign policy debating the impending universal monarchy, also those

expressedinreasonofstatevocabularyandincludedorwereadjustedtocommercialfactors.605

Tony Claydon has stressed that late‐seventeenth century English propaganda supporting

William III’s warfare against Louis XIV entailed amultifacetedmix of three discourses (even                                                            601TheFrenchministerof foreignaffairs,HuguesdeLionne,warned thenewambassador to the StatesGeneral in1669ofthedangerouseffectVanBeuningen’santi‐Frenchwordshad.Levillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,6.602HaitsmaMulier,‘DiePolitisch‐historischenIdeenvonPetrusValkenier’,118.603Levillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,6‐7,11,quotedfromp.8.604Bosbach,‘TheEuropeandebateonuniversalmonarch’,84,quotedfromp.97.605For instance, Louis XIV’s Frenchmonarchywas accused of desiring universal dominion of trade, as in interestanalyses by Marchamont Nedham and Slingsby Bethel in the late 1670s. From Steve Pincus, ‘From holy cause toeconomic interest: the transformationof reasonof state thinking in seventeenth‐centuryEngland’, inHouston andPincus (eds.),ANationTransformed.Englandafter theRestoration (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001),272‐298, p. 293; Marchamont Nedham,The pacquet‐BoatAdvice (1678) and Slingsby Bethel, The present State ofChirstendomeandtheInterestofEngland,WitharegardtoFrance(1677).Fromthe1650sonwards,Englishdebateson foreignaffairs identifiedtwonewcontenders foruniversalmonarchy,theFrenchortheDutch.After theFrenchinvasion in theDutchRepublic of 1672, the division in English political culturemorphed into a fierce anti‐Frenchstandpoint, except for the court ofCharles II andhis successor James II. The ‘revolution’of 1688hadarguably ‘anintendedconsequence’:waragainstFrance.StevePincus,‘TheMakingofaGreatPower?UniversalMonarchy,PoliticalEconomy,andtheTransformationofEnglishPoliticalCulture’,TheEuropeanLegacy5:4(2000),531‐545,p.535.

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though seemingly technically incompatible): Protestant rhetoric (crusade against Louis, the

popish Antichrist); the theme of Louis’s drive towards a universal monarchy; and, far more

prominently,Louis’sthreatto‘Christendom’,aspirituallyyetnotspecificallydefinedunity.The

latterplacedLouisoutsideofEuropeanChristianorderandoftenimpliedcomparisonswiththe

Ottomansystemofrule,cruel,antichristianandbarbaric,a themeunderlinedbyreferencesto

theearlymodernFranco‐Ottomanalliances.Louiswasevendeemedbymanywritersmorecruel

thantheOttomans,anaccusationthatcouldleadtopositiveevaluationsoftheOttomanruleas

beinghumaneandtolerant.SincetheTurksstoodatthegatesofViennain1683andLouisdid

nothelptheHabsburgsbutinsteadaidedtheHungarian,alliesoftheOttomans,thiscomparison

functionedasavivid imageforWilliamitepropaganda.606 Inaddition, theterm ‘Europe’ finally

established itself in the struggle against Louis XIV.607 From the 1670s, anti‐Stuart and later

Williamitepamphletsjustifiedanti‐Frenchpoliciesinnameofthe‘LibertiesofEurope’oftenin

conjunction with the rationale of the freedom of commerce, the Protestant religion, the

‘interests’and‘balanceofEurope’.Europebecameassociatedwithideasofabalancedsystemof

‘states’, religious tolerance and expanding commerce. Helmut Schmidt believes Lisola lay the

foundations of these new political overtones of ‘Europe’ by addressing the threat of Louis

strivingforauniversalmonarchytoEurope’sliberty,religionandcommerce.608

Withintheselateseventeenth‐centurydebatesthenotionofbalanceofpoweremerged

as a vital justification. Richard Devetak has argued that contrary to what modern ‘liberal

internationalisttheory’perceives,thebalanceofpowerdiscourseinEnglishwritingsconstituted

an‘orderingpracticeinmaintaininglibertyandfightingtyranny’;thisdiscoursecentredonthe

protectionofthe‘libertiesofEurope’,i.e.theEuropeanlegalorderbasedontherightofregimes

toself‐governundertheruleoflaw,againstallegedlyarbitraryandabsolutepower.609Through

interest analysis of thepresent affairs ofEurope, thebalanceof powerdiscourse increasingly

assessedthelevelofthreatto‘libertiesofEurope’(ratherthansolelytoEngland),exemplifiedby

SlingsbyBethel’spioneeringwritingsofthe1670sand1680s.Bethel’searliestworkThePresent

                                                            606TonyClaydon,‘Protestantism,UniversalMonarchyandChristendominWilliam’sWarPropaganda1689‐1697,inEsther Mijers en David Onnekink, RedefiningWilliam: the impact of the King‐Stadholder in international context(Aldershot:Ashgate,2007),125‐142.607 ‘Europe’was already usedwith various connotations in thewars against the Ottomans from the late fifteenthcenturyonwards.SeethecollectionofessaysinHeinzDuchhardtandAndreasKunz(eds.)EuropäischeGeschichtealshistoriographischerProblem(Mainz:PhilippvonZabern,1997).608HelmutDanSchmidt,‘TheEstablishmentof“Europe”asaPoliticalExpression’,TheHistoricalJournal9:2(1966),172‐178.OnLisolaandhisBouclierSchmidtwritesonp.173: ‘ThepublicationoftheBuckler(…)inFrench,GermanandEnglish in thatyearhad thepurposeof changing thatviewof the international scene. (…) [Lisola]alleged that[France]wasplanning the establishmentof aCatholicUniversalMonarchy andbecominga threat to the libertyofEurope,toreligion,andcommerce.HethusforgedanassociationwhichlinkedEuropewiththeconceptofreligiousliberty,balanceofpower,andexpandingcommerce,ideasthatcommendedthemselvesatoncetomenlikeArlingtonandSirWilliamTemple.’609Devetak,“Thefearofuniversalmonarchy”,122.

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InterestofEngland stated (1671)demonstrates this.610Moreover,Bethel’s textexemplifies the

dominantthemeintheseanalyses:thefearofFrenchdesignsofuniversalmonarchythreatening

the individual and collective interests of European regimes.611 As David Armitage states: ‘the

TreatyofUtrecht (..)enshrined thebalanceofpoweras thecentral regulatingprincipleof the

international order, in opposition to the threat of universalmonarchy from a power such as

LouisXIV’sFrance.Reasonofstateafter1713thereforemadepreventiveaggressionjustifiable

in defence of the balance against aspiring universalmonarch.’612 In this sense, the analysis of

interestdevelopedintoapossibleinstrumenttoreconstructtheEuropeanorder.

ThefunctionoftheidiomofreasonofstateandtheportrayaloftheFrenchmonarchyin

Valkenier’s‘tVerwerdEuropawillbeanalysedagainstthebackdropofthepamphletsfuelledby

the French invasion of 1672 about the role ofOrange in theDutch constitutional framework,

French(war‐)tyranny,(French)reasonofstate/interestofstate,universalmonarchy,balanceof

powerandreligion.Furthermore,wewilllookintoValkenier’sargumentsfromtheperspective

oftheearlieranalysesofRohan’s,DelaCourt’sandLisola’swritings,especiallytheirportrayals

of predatory monarchy (including arguments on tyranny, absolute rule, rule of conquest,

Ottomanrule,warfinances,householdruleandslavery)andwilltakeintoaccountitsimmediate

contextofpublication:theplannedpeacenegotiations,andtherisingresistanceagainstWilliam

III’sbellicoseforeignpolicyandmountingwarcostsinthemid‐1670s.Thelargercontextisthe

perceived seventeenth‐century crisis of order that seemed threatened by confessional strife,

intensified Europeanwarfare, andwar‐tyranny, all embodied by Louis XIV. Valkenier tried to

restoreorder.

5.2‘tVerwerdEuropa:theruleoflawandreasonofstate

In his preface Valkenier claimed that ‘t Verwerd Europa filled the void in Dutch historical

literatureaboutthecontemporarycomplexandunstableEuropeanpowerconstellation,because

peoplecould‘onlyreadthefewHistoricalStories,whichuptonowhaveseenthelightofdayin

                                                            610Devetak,“Thefearofuniversalmonarchy”,128:‘AstheForeignInterestofaNationlookoutward(…)soitisintheInterestof theKingandKingdomofEngland, tomakeuseof theadvantagesof [the] strength [of the ‘PrincesandStates’ofEurope]andsituationgivesthem,inweighingtheimperialpowersofChristendome,keepingthebalance,byaddingto,ordiminishingfromanyofthem,asbestsitswithJustice,andtheirownInterests.’611Devetak, “The fearofuniversalmonarchy”,131,quotes therealsoBethel,ThePresent InterestofEnglandStated(1671); ‘than to design anuniversalMonarchy,which consequentlymakes it the common Interest of all EuropeanPrincesandStates(astheyvaluetheirownsafety)tounite,forthekeepingofhimwithinboundsandlimits’.612DavidArmitage,‘EdmundBurkeandReasonofState’,JournaloftheHistoryofIdeas61:4(2000),617‐634,p.630.

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the German and French language.’613Valkenier turned to his readers and stated thatwithout

properly investigating the histories of the ‘unheard Changes in Europe and the strange

RevolutionsinourUnitedNetherland,whichwehaveexperienced,stillareexperiencing,andonly

Godknowswhentheyeventuallywillend,’latergenerationswouldfindthecurrenteventshardto

believe.HeechoedthesameintroductoryphrasesofrulersfallenasleepbyLisolaandRohanby

asking:

‘whowouldbelieve, thatmostof thePotentatesofEuropewerebarelyawoken in

extreme danger by murder‐trumpets from her slumber‐illness and improvidence,

whereintheyliedsmothered?Yesthatsomehadhastenedtheirowndownfall,thata

FrenchmanhadconfusedallofEuropeandbyhismoney,trickeryandviolencehad

bannedalluprightnessandsincerityatalmosteveryCourt;thataNation[theDutch]

raisedtoheavenbyhervaliantandincomparablebravery,andthatwasmagnificent

fortheentireworld,within50dayscouldhavelostmore,thanithadgainedwiththe

highestpraisein80.yearsbysword’.614

Valkenier accounted forhis interest analysisofEuropesince ‘now thewholeofChristendom is

tornby ruinousFactions,and sincemanyArcanaDominationisorCabinet‐Secreetenhavebeen

discovered,yetonlywithgreatdifficultyanddangercantheybeinvestigatedastheyhavebeenso

cunninglyconcealed.’615Besides,Valkenierfeltobligedtodefend‘asaMilesTogatustheHonour

ofourandothernations(…)byPenagainstthesuperbFrenchandotherEnvious[men]’.616

Inordertoexplainthe‘confusedstateofEurope’andinparticulartheUnitedProvinces

in thebeginningof the1670s,hedividedhis1000pluspagebook into threeparts.Thiswork

maybeseenastheapotheosisofthestreamofpamphletsunleashedbytheFrenchinvasionof

1672;itcombinedmostofthedominantthemesandelementsofthepamphletliterature,suchas

a historical analysis of the failure of De Witt and the triumph of Louis XIV, an taxation of

European interests, a reconstruction of the affairs of 1672 substantiated with numerous

documentsandfirst‐handreports.HisfirstpartconsistedofaninterestanalysisonaEuropean

levelintroducedbyatheorisationoftheinterestofstate.Thesecondpartdealtwith‘theFrench

Designs, Maxims, Schemes at all the Courts of Christendom, its State, Advantages, Wealth,

ProceduresandWarPreparationsagainsttheNetherlands;aswellastheConstitution,Alliances

                                                            613Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,AandenLeser.HeprobablyreferredtoWicquefort’streatiseanddefinitelyreferredtoLisola’sBouclierd'Estat.614 Valkenier, ‘t Verwerd Europa, Aan den Leser; Rohan, A Treatise of the Interest of the Princes and States ofChristendome,9‐10;[Lisola],TheBuckler,Preface.615Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,AandenLeser.616Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,AandenLeser.

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andWarPreparationsoftheUnitedProvinces.’617InthispartthetwoantagonistsofValkenier’s

storywerepresented:theFrenchmonarchyandthestadholderlessregimeofJohandeWitt.The

lastpartentailedachronologicalaccountofwaractionsexecutedbyall thebelligerents inthe

Republicduring1672andtheciviluprisingsinthecitiesoftheun‐invadedprovincesofZeeland

and Holland. Nonetheless, he also described the war between the Ottoman Empire and the

Polish‐Lithuania Commonwealth (1672‐1676) and the Second Genoese‐SavoyardWar (1672–

1673),whichservedasfurtherexamplesofFrenchscheminginEurope.618

FirstwewilldiscussValkenier’sreflectionsoninterestofstatethroughhisexplanation

of the five foundationsofpolitical government,which shedsa lightonhowheenvisaged civil

order shouldbeorganisedandhowLouisXIX’smonarchyand theDeWitt‐regime threatened

this order. Then his image of France as a predatory monarchy will be analysed and finally

Valkenier’s interest analysis of Europe, especially of the Dutch Republic, will be taken into

account.

5.2.1FivePillarsofeveryPoliticalState

TheframeworkofValkenier’sfirstpartof‘tVerwerdEuropaismadeupbyhisdeliberationson

‘interestofstate’;‘whichthecontemporarypolitiquescallRatioStatus,theoldIusDominationis

& Arcana Imperii, the Italians Ragione di Stato and the French Raison d’Estat’.619 Valkenier

referredto(andcopiedfrom)Rohan’sDel’interest:

‘OfthisInterestacertainverywiseandexperiencedmilitaryofficerattemptedto

say; that it rulesover thePrinces, alike theyover their Subjects;Andhowmuch

higher a Prince is above it, so much greater becomes the knowledge of State

demanded of him as of all his other issues. A Prince can be deceived, and his

councillors can be misguided, the true Interest can never deceive or be false;

because as much as the Interest is wrongly observed, so much will the State

decreaseorincrease.’620

                                                            617Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,[titlepage].618Theselatterpolitico‐societalconsequencesconcerningthePolish‐OttomanWardescribedValkenieronpage869of‘tVerwerdEuropa.619Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,24.620Valkenier, ‘tVerwerdEuropa,24:‘VanditInterestpleegseekerseerwijsenervarenVeld‐Overstenteseggen;dathet regeert overdePrincen, gelijkdieoverhareOnderdanen;Enhoeveelhooger eenPrinsbovenhaar is, so veelgrooterkennisvanStaatwordinhemvereyst,alsvanalsijneanderesaaken.KaneenPrinsaltemetbedrogen,ensijneRaads‐luydenverleytwarden,hetwaareInterestkannoytmissenofbedriegen;wantvoorsoveelhetInterestwelofqualijkwordwaargenomen,voorsoveelneemtdenStaatdaardoorafofaan.’

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Contrary to Rohan, Valkenier exclaimed that the French monarchy had never been the true

defenderofthelibertyofEuropeandhadevenbecomeEurope’sgreatestenemyinrecentyears.

Furthermore,hestressedtheimportanceofempiricalhistoricalanalysisinaccountsofinterest,

since ‘all Rulers of Empires and Lands have been subjected to constant change and therefore

they(…)expand,grow,reduce,age,die,anddisappear(…),andiftheywouldseethemselvesin

theMirrorofoldHistories,theywouldnotrecognisethemselvesatall.’621Therefore,therulers

shouldnavigate‘thecommonShip’throughthesestormywatersadjustingitscourseaccording

totheobstaclesitencountersandindirectionofitstrueInterest,andtheyshouldnotfollowthe

stoicswhowouldadvisetonotdeviatefromitscourseforasecond.Inlinewithreasonofstate

authors, Valkenier wrote that interest of state excels all ‘Civil, Public and Fundamental laws’

when‘thewell‐beingoftheStatedemandssuch’,because‘necessityknowsnolaws.’Otherwise,

astrictfollowingofthelawsintimesofsheerdangerwould,asTacitusalsohadargued,leadto

thedestructionoftheselawsand,consequently,thestate.622

ThoughValkenieremphasisedthatallpoliticalactionsweresteeredbyinterestofstate,

he felt the need to explain it further unlike Rohan, De la Court and Lisola. TheDutch lawyer

openedhistreatisewiththereasonofstateadagethattheobjectiveorinterestofevery‘Political

State’wasamatterofmaintenanceandexpansion.623 In this sense, ‘state’ referred toapolity.

Valkenier asserted that the maintenance of every ‘State’ against external as well as internal

injustice and violence was based on the law of nature. Every method (violent or gentle) to

achieve this end (self‐defence)was legitimate. The augmentation or territorial expansion of a

politywasonlyacceptablewhenlegitimatemeanswereused,whichdidnotgoagainsttherights

ofanotherpolity.Accordingtotheauthor, ‘trueinterestofstate’couldbeattainedbyacorrect

examination and use of the five ‘common and true State‐Maxims and Foundations’: religion,

justice,polity,armyandfinances.Thesewerethefive‘pillarsofeverypoliticalstate’anddecay

ofanyofthesepillarswouldleadtoitsruin.624Moreover,‘true’interestofstatewasrestrictedby

four conditions: protection of religion, faithfulness to alliances, honesty, and impeccable

benevolent administration of justice. De la Court had summarised his analysis of Holland’s

interest inmuch thesameterms; ‘Hereby Ipridemyself that I saidenoughofHolland’sPolity,

Religion,Finances,MilitaryandJustice’,625yetwithoutstructuringhisanalysisintermsofthese

variables.

                                                            621Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,25‐26.622Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,1‐25;Condren,‘TheUsesofTyranny’,11‐12.623Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,1.624Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,1.625 V.D.H., Interest vanHolland, 88; A century later (1763) Adam Smith scrutinised the same variables, excludingreligion, in hisLectureson Justice,Police,RevenueandArms.Delivered in theUniversityofGlasgowbyAdamSmith,reportedbyastudentin1763.,editedandwithanintroductionbyEdwinCannan(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1869).

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Itwascommonplacetobindgovernmenttoreligion,morality,legality.Itwasexemplified

by writers like Claude de Seysell in positing the bridles of monarchy: religion, justice and

polity.626Others,suchasBoteroandClapmariuslinkedcrucialvirtuestotheofficeofrule;andit

wasconventional toassociatea justifiable reasonof statewithdivineornatural law.627Lisola

likewisehadboundapursuitofinterestofstatetolegality,amixtureofnaturallaw,iusgentium

and divine laws.628 However, as we will see, Valkenier envisaged the position of religion

explicitly without any involvement of confessional theology and stressed the primary

importanceofprotectionofproperty,privilegesandpersons.Withtheuntowardcollapseofthe

Dutch Republic in mind, Valkenier deemed an army and its necessary finances as the most

crucialpillars.

Tobeclear,argumentsof reasonof state inherentlyconsidered theroomof legitimate

manoeuvrefortheruler,albeitthattheselimitsaredeliberatelybeingbendedorstretched.The

interestofstatewasbasedonthespecificcharacteristicsandcircumstancesofthesocietiesof

therespectiveruler;everycountryhadaninterestofstatethat in itselfwasneither legitimate

nor illegitimate.Thenormativenatureof interestofstateentailed the taxationofa trueoran

untrue interest,whichwasused to signify the failedpoliciesof a rulerorhis evil advisors. In

Valkenier’scase,DeWittwasattackedfornotfollowingthetrueinterestoftheRepublic.France,

however,was amaster in itsmanagement of reasonof state, aswewill see below. Valkenier

usedthefivepillarsandfourconditionsofgovernancetore‐establishasenseoforderinaworld

ofchangeandconflict.Consequently,thisgavehimthemunitiontoattackFrenchwarpolicies,

notablyLouis’sexpansionism.

‘Religion’wasthefirstpillarandprovisionofinterestofstate,‘asimmediatelybeholding

theDivine’.629Hedevotedmostspacetoexplainingthefunctionofreligioninapoliticalstateand

therelationbetweenreligionandreasonofstate.Yettheattempttoreconcileadefenceofthe

Dutchreformedfaithwithahighleveloffreedomofconscienceandanattackonecclesiastical

interference in political affairs, proved problematic. His solution was to distinguish an inner

fromanouterreligion.Thefirstresidedinthesoulofmankindandwassharedbyallpeoples

accordingtothelawofnature.Thelatterconsistedofthedifferentconfessions,or‘customs’of

                                                            626RebeccaBoone,War,domination,andthe"MonarchyofFrance":ClaudedeSeysselandthelanguageofpoliticsintheRenaissance(Leiden:Brill,2007),19.ReligionentailedtheCatholicChurch,thepoliceembodiedthefundamentallawsoftherealmandjusticereferredtothedivisionbetweenthetreeestatesandtheparlements.627Boteroalsoemployedthemetaphorofgovernmentrestingoncertain‘pillars’,e.g.thetwopillarsof‘prudence’and‘valour’. Because princes are solely ruled by interest, the firstmaxims of prudencewas, Botero claimed, that theyought to be approached by other rulers on the basis of interest alone, instead of trust, friendship or other bonds.QuentinSkinnner,TheFoundationsofModernPoliticalThought:Volume1,TheRenaissance (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1978),34,41;HarroHopfl,‘Orthodyandreasonofstate’,236‐237.628Valkenier, ‘tVerwerdEuropa, 20: ‘ThePoliticalGovernmentwill not be sufficient, tomaintainReligion, and theadministrationofJustice,unlessitusestwonecessaryandinevitablemeans,astheArmyandFinances.’629Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,2.

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religion, written down in different holy texts.630 In matters of interest of state, the natural

religionpredominated.

BelievinginandservingGod,werethetwofundamentalanduniversalaspectsofnatural

religion.Tomaintainandexpand‘aState’,itwasnecessarythatpeopledidnotonlybelievethere

was a God, but that they believed God as ‘the Supreme Cause’ ruled all human affairs. Inner

religionpromotedcivilorder: ‘Becauseeverythingstems fromtheServiceandFearofGod(...)

manygoodsuccessesinaStatedependonit’.631Whenconfrontedbyatrulymightyenemy,then

menwouldrelyontheinnerreligion,thatinformedexternalreligiouspractices,suchasprayer

days, irrespective of denominational difference. What unified a people was not doctrinal

difference but the internal religion they all shared.632 After listing the four main confessions

(pagan, Jewish,ChristianandIslamic)andnamingtheonesworshippedintheDutchRepublic,

heclaimedthatnaturalreligion,or‘PietywasnotonlythefoundationofallVirtues,bitlikewise

ofallDominionsandStates.’633Thehighestvirtuewasjustice;justicewasaproductofpietyand

restrictedtheactionsofprinceswhenobtainingtheirinterest.Moreover,itorderedcivilsociety;

menwereforcedbypietyinto‘Subjectiontotheirprinces;Obediencetotheirparents;Lovefor

their neighbours; and the Justice towards all.’634 Valkenier raged against Boccalini, who, he

claimed,saidthat

‘theinterestofstateisonlyarightofaPrince,andit is inconflictwithallDivineand

HumanLaws.HowcouldmancallsuchInterestaReasonofState(RatiosStatus)sinceit

conflictswithallReason,andalwaysthreatenstoruintheState?WhyPopePiusdeV.,

rightly labelled it Reason of the Devil, or Ratio Diaboli, arisen from Tyranny and

Arbitrary.’635

In this hyperbole Valkenier rejected the popular refutation of reason of state, as contrary to

religion,moralityandlegality.Buthewentfurther,linkingittodivinelawasrevealedbyinner

religion.

                                                            630Valkenier divided the outer religion into four religions. Firstly, he described pagan religions in Lapland, India,China, Japan, America and Africa. The Indians practiced their beliefs by the spiritual words, written down in theVedan. Secondly, he described the Jewish faith that was scattered over Europe and repressed by so manygovernments according to Valkenier. Thirdly, he treated the Christian faith, which was spread over Europe andsplinteredintomanydifferentformsofreligions.TheChristian’sholytextsconsistedoftheOldandnewTestaments.Finally,ValkenierspokeoftheMohammedanreligionthatwaspractisedinAsia,Europe,andAfricaandhaditsKoranasholybook.631Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,3.632Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,3;AsalsothehistorianDonaldHaksunderlinesthatinyearsofwarfaretheamountofprayerdaysweresubstantiallyhigher than inpeace time,althoughthepeakyears in theby theEsattesGeneralorganisedprayesdaysentailedyearsofmilitarysuccess,1675and1676.DonaldHaks,VaderlandenVrede,74.633Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,5.634Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,5.635Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,5

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Externalreligion,however,wasanothermatter.Confessionalreligionswerenotsomuch

political instruments to bring forth social unity and obedience, but rather hazards to society.

Conflictingreligiousviews,interpretedbyquarrellingtheologiansandclergymen,couldleadto

severesocietalconflicts,civilwarsandevengrandscaleexternalwarfare.Valkenier’suseofthe

distinction between an inner and outer religion entailed not only a conventional appeal to

piety,636 but, more importantly, an increasingly heard plea against religious ‘fanaticism’ and

‘superstition’generatingchaosandbloodshed.Inthe1620sHugoGrotiuslikewisestressedthe

existenceofnaturalreligionasasetofuniversallyvalidnormsindependentofrevealedreligion

torestoreorderinaworldfracturedbyconfessionalstrifeandwarfare.637SimilarlytoValkenier,

Lucius Antistius Constans employed an explicit distinction between internal and external

religion inthecontroversialDe IureEcclesiasticorum (1665)byarguing(in linewithreformed

tradition) for the authority of magistrates in religious and ecclesiastical matters. Constans

enlargedittothepointthatonlyGodcouldjudgeifone’sexternalreligioncorrespondswiththe

truereligion.Sinceouterreligionwasapublicaffair,Godawardedthemagistracywiththesole

powertodecideinthesematters,andmoreover,toconstrainpriestcraft.638

Regarding theouter religion.Valkenierwrote: ‘everyPolitical state is forced touphold

onespecificFormofReligionaboveotherstoavoidthedangerof innovation.’Heclaimedthat

not only Polybius, but also the politques had recognised this, but (wrongly) stressed the

exception to the rule: ‘the famous Machiavelli, who despised ever Religion, but nevertheless

wantsthatallreligionshouldbeaccepted.’639ValkenierbelievedtheDutchReformedreligionto

be‘thesoulofthisState,theFundament,whereuponthisProsperousRepublicisbuilt,andthe

eternalassociationbywhichtheRespectiveProvinceswillremainunifiedwitheachotherina

State‐wiseGovernment.’640Consequently, the reformedreligionought tobemaintainedas the

main religion within the United Provinces. But immediately Valkenier pointed to the

impossibilityofchoosingonemainreligioninapolity,anissuefoughtoverby‘theTheologians

and the Politijken; the first fight for [confessions] of their own; the latter conceive such

indifferently.’Theproductoftheseconflictsistheexistenceof ‘aninfinitenumberofGodsand

Ceremonies.’641

                                                            636ErnestinevanderWall, ‘The religious context of theEarlyDutchEnlightenment:Moral religionand society’, inWiepvanBunge(ed.),TheEarlyDutchEnlightenment1650‐1750(Leiden:Brill,2003),39‐57.637 Henk Nellen, ‘Hugo Grotius on religion as a motive for waging war’, in Robert von Friedeburg and MathiasSchmoeckel (eds.),Recht,KonfessionundVerfassung im17. Jahrhundert.West‐undmitteleuropäischeEntwicklungenHistorischeForschungen105(Berlin:Duncker&Humblot,2015),261‐268.638 A pseudonym that is attributed to Spinoza, De la Court, Meyer, or Van Velthuysen. Henri Krop, “The GeneralFreedom,whichAllMenEnjoy” inaConfessionalState.TheParadoxicalLanguageofPolitics in theDutchRepublic(1700‐1750)’, in JohnChristianLaursenandMaria JoseVillaverde (eds.),ParadoxesofReligiousToleration inEarlyModernPoliticalThought(Plymouth:LexingtonBooks,2012),67‐90,p.74‐75.639Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,6.640Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,6.641Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,6.

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Consequently,Valkenieraskedhimselfwhether ‘aPoliticalStatemayandought to tolerate

and tomaintain theFreedom ofall these, or ofonealone?’642 Polities could benefit greatly by

securingreligioustoleration,becauseitwouldstimulateimmigrationandconsequentlywealth.

ValkenierobservedHollandandtheOttomanEmpireashavensfor‘FreedomofConscienceand

Religion’.TheOttomanEmpiregreatlyprofitedfromtheJewishrefugeeswiththeirknowledge

ofmanycraftsandtradeofweaponry;andtheOttomanemperorsridiculedtheChristianKings

whopersecutedsuchanumerouspeople.643InHollandtheCatholicfaithwastoleratedandother

religionsenjoyedrelativefreedomofconscience,whichproducedgreatcommercialprosperity.

HecalledtheprovinceofHolland:‘theInnofallsortsofRefugees’.644IfHollandhadmaintained

the Reformed faith as itsmain religion, it would have been subjected to the great powers of

Europe. In line with many reason of state authors, such as Botero and Lipsius, Valkenier

concluded that, though itwas preferable for a government tomaintain onemain religion for

preventingreligiousdivisionsinsociety,violentlyrepressingreligiousfactionsledtocivilwars

andotherunwanteddisorderswithinsociety,e.g.theDutchRevoltagainstHabsburgs‐Spain.645

However, in accordance with De la Court, he argued that diversity of religion and a relative

freedomofreligionledtoprosperityandpoliticalstability.

Valkenier’s religion argument climaxed in his fierce criticism of the political ambitions of

clergymen.Hewarnedrulersnottobeseducedby‘SuperstitionofReligion’foritwouldleadto

‘the ruin of the State’ and ‘those who tried to persuade [the rulers, do] not have the right

knowledge to conform theReligion to the true InterestofState’.646 He exclaimed: ‘It is highly

regrettablethatatmanyCourtssuchWar‐Priestsarestilllistenedtoandpraised,whennothing

hadbeenlearntfromsomanysadexamplesofdisastereveninlivingmemory.Havenotbythe

machineriesofClergymen,bythepretextofReligion,Crown‐baring‐Heads,BornPrinces,andso

manyinfiniteHighLawfulRegentsdiedacrueldeath?Hasitnotrepeatedlycausedveryheavy

andbloodyWarsandruinedLands,Cities,Peoples,andStates?’647

Thefourthprescriptionandsecondpillarofa‘PoliticalState’was‘Justice’bywhichismeant

a universal virtue, its benevolent administration by judges to regulate legal issues between

citizensand itsproperdistributionbetweengovernmentandsubjects.AccordingtoValkenier,                                                            642Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,6‐7.643Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,8.644Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,7.645Höpfl,‘ReasonofState’,1114.646Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,9.647Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,9:“Tistenhoogstentebeklaagen,datsodaanigcWar‐GeestelykeinveeleHovennochsoveelgehoorencreditvinden,nademaaldiebehoordengeleerttezijndoorsoveeledroevigeexemplen,diejaselfsten deele noch ten tyde vanonse geheugenis zijn voorgevallen. Zijn niet door demachinatien derGeestelyken, oppretext van Religie, Kroon‐draagen.’ Examples of such superstition, using religion as a pretext for warfare, werenumerous according to Valkenier: the Dutch Revolt against Habsburg‐Spain, the Thirty Years War, the FrenchreligiousWars,theseveralwarsagainsttheOttomanEmpire,andtheEnglishCivilWar.Hepointedtohorribledeeds,executedinthenameofreligionbymanypeoples,e.g.thewildCanadiansbelievedthattheyofferthesickrelievebykillingthemimmediately,CarthagiansandMexicansscarifyinglivinganddeadpeopletoGod,butalso,ingeneral,byeverytyrant,whohadmadethepretextofreligionastheirhighestdesignsforrule.Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,9‐10.

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not safeguarding the rule of law resulted in the necessary downfall of polities. He reiterated

Aristotle’spraisefortheruleoflaw;‘Aristotlessaid,thatnoStatecanexistandcontinuetoexist,

whereno JusticeandLawsrule.BecausewhatGod is for theworld(…), that is Justiceandthe

Law in a City, without which neither House, nor City, nor State, norWorld could exist.’ In a

humanist fashion, Valkenier complemented this by referring to Augustin: ‘[who said,without

justice the world] would become a mere shelter and guesthouse of various worrisome sins;

Because whoever rejects Justice, rejects God likewise, because God is Justice himself, which

without he cannot rule.’648 The emphasis of his argumentwas on the abuse of justice, or the

abandonmentoftheruleoflawbymanycontemporaryEuropeanrulers,drawninthevortexof

European warfare. Law ought to be ‘executed with justice and equity, not by hate, envy,

ambitions,greed,andfriendship.’649Valkenierexclaimed:

‘Thisisthereason,whyMarsisalmosttheonlyArbiterandMediatorofallissuesand

differencesbetweenKingsandPeoples(…)andthatMighttodayismorethantheLaw

and Reason, which are of no worth in her [Might’s presence], (…) some French

Politiques dare to write, that a Prince must regulate all his actions in his Interest,

without regard to any laws or obligations,which the French pursue somasterly on

everyoccasion.’650

The French King, ministers and people play the leading parts in Valkenier’s account of the

misuseof thepillars of political government, of ruthless reasonof state politics. For instance,

throughout‘tVerwerdEuropa,CardinalRichelieuandMazarinwereValkenier’sprimeexamples

of ‘War‐Priests’:his term forclericalmeddling insecularaffairs, i.e. clerics incitingwarfare to

enhancetheirpoweratcourt.Thesecondregulation,faithfulnesstoalliances,playednopartin

the foreignpolicy of theFrenchmonarchy; ‘Buthow little this is practised and accomplished,

evenbytheonegloryingwithherTitlesofmost‐Christian,ProtectorofFaithandShepherdsof

theflock,willwepointoutinthethirdpart.’651EchoingLisola,Valkenierreferredsardonicallyto

thetitleofRexChristianissimusandLouis’sdouble‐dealingsunderthispretext,whichbecamea

crucialargumentinlateranti‐Frenchwritings.

                                                            648Valkenier, ‘tVerwerdEuropa, 13;Aristotle,Politics:Books IIIand IV, translatedwithan introductionbyRichardRobinsonandasupplementaryessaybyDavidKeyt(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995),BookIII,1287a‐1278b,p.58‐63.649Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,14.650Valkenier, ‘tVerwerdEuropa,14;‘Ditisdeoorfaak,waaromdatMarsbynaalleenArbiterenMediateurisvanallequestienendifterententusschenKoningenenVolkeren,gelijkHoratiuisvanAchillesfeyt:juranegatsibinata,nihilnonarrogatarmis,endatdeMachthedensdaagsmeerisalshetRechtenReden,dieinhaarselfsnietswaardigzijn,'tenzysy spreeken door de mond van het Canon, welker stemme mede brengt vrees en respect. So seggen en durvenschryveneenigeFransePolityken,dateenPrinsallesyneactienmoetreguleerennasijnInterest,sondereguardevaneenigewettenofobligatien,waarvanhoemeesterlijkdeFransehaarbyalleoccasienbedienen’.651Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,12.

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Concerning the third pillar, the polity, Valkenier discussed the traditional Aristotelian

distinctionofformsofgovernmentsandrelatedtheseformstothenatureofthesubjects,which

wasdividedintothreetypes:slavish,freedom‐lovingorsomewhatinbetween.Thepolityisthe

necessarypreconditionforcivilorderandinitsgovernmentstrivestoupholdthecommonwell‐

being,ashereferstotheCiceronianaxiomSalusPopulisupremalexesto.652NowhereinEurope

weremonarchies,inherentlybasedontheslavishnatureoftheirsubjects,tobefound;‘Exceptin

France,where the subjects as donkeys,willingly carry the burdens of anAll‐rulingHead, and

pride themselves in their blindness in obeying their King and honouring him as a God.’653

Furthermore,hedenouncedallmonarchiesas ‘absolutemonarchies’ (unlikeDe laCourt), and

condemnedabsoluterule inthesamemannerasDelaCourt,asahouseholdrulemodelledon

robberybyconquestandbasedontheslavishnatureofthepeople,butnowinlinewithLisola’s

argumentdirectedagainstBourbon‐France;

‘AndifsucharuleentailsaGenerousSovereign,experiencelearnsus,however,thatit

generally tilts towards Tyranny, and that its Subjects experience seldom happiness

butalwaysdisasterscausedbythepassionsoftheSovereign,whoforthesatisfaction

ofhisambition,handsoverhissubjects toPoverty, robs theirgoods,andputs their

childrentothesword,plunderstheircities,andleavesitall[unprotected]againsthis

Enemies.And if in thebest case, that theSovereign ispeace‐loving, evensoare the

subjectssuppressedbytheOfficersandFavourites,androbbedfromproperties,that

itisimpossibleforthemtonegotiatewithaliberalhand,whichistheonlycause(…)

thatcommerceisneverfullythrivingunderanabsoluteSovereign,tothecontraryit

seems, that Commercehas always resided, notwhere the Subjectswere slaves, but

weretheywerefreePeople’.654

Such a government, ‘where a Potentate absolutely rules, and the entire Majesty exclusively

possesses, isso imperfect,and inconflictwiththeRulesofNature’.655 Incontrast, ‘Aristocratic

andDemocraticGovernments’werethose‘whereRulerstogetherasStates[estates/assemblies],

andwherethePeopleself‐rule,andrelatetothenatureoftheNationsthatlovetheirfreedomas

itwasgold’.656

To underline his preoccupation with such a bellicose rule, he employed the neologism

‘stratocracy’ as an ‘Extraordinary’ governmental form ‘that is,MilitaryGovernment,when the

Upper‐Command lies with the Military, as in the times of the Romains after Nero, until the                                                            652Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,19.653Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,16654Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,16‐17.655Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,16.656Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,16.

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GovernmentofConstantiusMaximus, andwith theEnglishunderCromwell,who insteadof the

ParliamentshadanAssemblyofMilitaryOfficers,andthesamehappenstodaywiththeTurks,

whohavenoPoliticalRegents,butwhichgreatDominionisbeingruledbythemostprominent

Militaries’.657ItshouldbenotedthathedidnotusethisnotionforFrance;itsubstantiatedhis,as

we will see below, relatively positive assessment of the Turkish Empire compared to the

extremerapaciousnatureoftheFrenchmonarchy.Valkeniercopiedthisanalysisonstratocracy

from George Hornius, professor of history at the University of Leiden from 1653 until 1670.

Horniusdiscussed ‘stratocracy’ inapassageonthedifferent formsofgovernment,whereinhe

hadlistedexamplesofthistypeofrule,suchasancientRomeafterNeroandthecontemporary

OttomanEmpire.658

Valkenier’s argument for a mixed constitution or a ‘tempered form’ served to justify the

Orangist rule over the Union of Utrecht.Whereasmonarchies, aristocracies and democracies

degenerateintorespectivelytyranny,oligarchyandanarchy,amixedgovernmentbalancesthe

differentformssothatnonewilldegenerate.Bythismixedconstitution,stabilityforthestateis

secured and the common interest is served in the bestmanner as exemplified by Sparta, the

Roman Republic, the Venetian Republic, the English Monarchy together with the Houses of

CommonsandLords,andtheprovincesofHollandandZeeland.Forover800yearstheselatter

provinceswere ruledbyamixed constitution ‘inprosperity,which theStatesofHolland,by a

certainActdating16thOctober1587onlyascribethegoodConcord,LoveandReason,thathave

beenbetweenthePrincesorCountsandtheStatesofthesameCountry,etc.’659Thisisatractof

the States of Holland written by François Vrancken, which argued that the States General

represented the sovereignty and so the regents and theirs assemblies held supreme power

againstanykingorstadholder.660Valkenierunderlinedthenecessarypositionoftheprincesof

Orangewithintheharmonious‘mixedconstitution’betweentheCountsofHollandorPrincesof

Orange and the provincial assemblies of the United Provinces. Between 1587 and 1651 ‘this

praiseworthy Form of Government, under the Princes of Orange as Stadholders of United

Netherlands, continued, with such prosperity, that the entire world admired [the Dutch

Republic],andtookitasanexemplaryState’,wroteValkenier.Hefollowedthislineofargument

bystatingthatsincetheGreatAssemblyof1651,whererepresentativesoftheStatesofHolland,                                                            657Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,15.658Inturn,HorniuswasprobablyinfluencedbyBoxhorn,whoin1653employedthetermtodebunktheCromwellianregime as a historical anomaly. The termwas coinedbyFrench scholarClaude Salmasius, also living in Leiden, in1649.Salmasiususedthe ‘stratocracy’todepictthenewregimeaftertheexecutionofCharlesI. JaapNieuwstraten,‘Empire, Economy and the Dawn of the Enlightenment: Some Explorations into Seventeenth‐Century DutchIntellectualHistory’, inEvertSchoorl(ed.),TheEnlightenment:Political,EconomicandSocialAspects.SpecialissueofUnitedAcademicsJournalofSocialSciences3:15(2013),30‐47p.40.NieuwstratenreferstoHorniuscommentariesinMarcus ZueriusBoxhorn, Institutionespoliticae, II.1 262‐264, toBoxhorn,MetamorphosisAnglorum (1653) and toClauseSalminus,Defensioregia,(1649),36.659Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,19.660[FrançoisVrancken],Deductieoftecortevertooninghe(1587);MartinvanGelderen,TheDutchRevolt(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1993),199‐207.

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Zeeland,Utrecht,OverijsselandGelredecidednottoappointanewstadholderafterthedeathof

princeWillem IIofOrange in1650, ‘thegreatShipof theseNetherlands [was] jeopardisedby

suchadangerousconstitution,thatitseemedtostrandonblindcliffsoneveryoccasion.’661

The last two pillars of state, army and finances,were themost crucial pillars in practical

terms,asValkenierarguedand ‘as JuliusCaesaralwayssaid:(...)Thattherearetwothings,by

whichastatecanbeestablished,maintainedandexpanded,namely:SoldiersandMoney,which

areArmyandFinances.’662Fromapessimisticperspectiveonhumannature,Valkenierargued

that because ‘Justice has always been repressed, and thatAmbition andDesire have occupied

andpossessed thehumanmind’externaland internalwarshaveoccurred,and thereforemen

shouldalwaysprotectthemselvesagainstsuchevils.Internalconflictsweretobepreventedby

maintainingtheproperformofgovernment(mixedconstitution);otherwiseapolitywouldfall

intoacivilwarasseenintheurbanriotsinHollandin1672.Propermilitaryforcesandfinances

keptoutexternalfoes.

Thisargumentagainunderlinedthedisastrouswarpoliticsofthestadholderlessregimeand

the necessity of an Orange stadholderate. Valkenier argued along the lines of contemporary

Orangistpamphlets;notonlymaintainingastrongfleet,asthestadholderlessregimehaddone,

butalsostrongfortifications,ammunitionanddisciplinedlandforceswereneededtoprotectthe

UnitedProvinces against suchmighty land forces as thoseof LouisXIV.Moreover, a supreme

commander must lead the troops into battle. Valkenier praised the military successes of the

princesofOrangebydiscipliningthesoldiersduringtheRevoltandsuggestedthattheprincesof

OrangewerethemostadequatecandidatesforcommandingtheDutcharmy.Thestadholderless

regime’sforeignpolicyofdefensivealliancesfailedasshowcasedbythefirstandsecondAnglo‐

Dutch wars (1652‐1654; 1665‐1667), the Dano‐Swedish War (1658‐1660), and the French

‘piracies’ontheDutchAtlantictrade.Awell‐organisedfleetandlandarmyundertheruleofa

princeofOrangeoughttodefendtheUnitedProvincesagainstexternalthreats.663

Followingthisargument,ValkenierreferredtoCicero’sfamoussayingbyexclaimingthat

‘Money,wastheSinewsofWar,thatbytheLatePrinceWilliamIwascalledtheprincipalBuckle

oftheSuitofArmour.’664HepointedtotheSpartanrepublicthatraisednotaxesforwarfare,but

was based on a prosperous agriculture, where harvestswere equally distrusted amongst the

citizens.However,thecircumstancesfortheDutchRepublicdiffered; ‘Inthiswaypeoplecould

live in a wealthy Republic, if they had no fear for powerful neighbours.’665 Not only should

princes have rich subjects or a well‐supplied treasury, Valkenier emphasised that ‘Finances’

                                                            661Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,19.662Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,20.663Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,20‐21.664Valkenier, ‘tVerwerdEuropa,22; ‘Thesinewsofwarare infinitemoney,’, famouswordsbyCicerospoken inhisOrationesPhilippicae.’665Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,19,23.

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should be promoted in an honest and honourable way; a prince should not squeeze out the

meansofhissubjectsandshouldnotadministertheresourceseithermeanlyor lavishly.666He

did not explain this honourable and honest way, but throughout the entire book, Bourbon‐

France and the stadholderless regime served as prime examples of wicked, illegitimate

organisationsoffinances.

These five pillars entailed an attempt to restore order. He fiercely attacked priestcraft,

religious fanaticism, superstition, which was followed by a vision of true religion as social

cement of society without necessary involvement of confessional churches. The Christian

elementinthejustificationoflawswaserodedinthesensethatonlytheinnerreligionpromoted

justice as a universal virtue; the confessional churches played no part. The rule of law was

abandonedbyself‐interestedrulersandtheiradvisors,notablytheir‘war‐priests’,‘officers’and

‘favorites’, seeking personal glory and power. Especially by monarchies, which Valkenier

denouncedas‘absolute’,arbitraryhouseholdrulesdrivenbylustforconquest,forwarfareand

booty,robbingthesubjectsoftheirpropertiesandtreatingthemasslaves.Franceservedasan

example of a polity,whichpursued a ruthless reason of state; andwewill see belowhowhe

furthered thismodelof robberyby conquest inhisanalysisof theFrench interest.Due to the

perilousstateofEurope,regimes(monarchiesandrepublicansalike)hadtoorganisetheirarmy

andfinances,buthestressedthatthisshouldbedoneforsecurityreasonsonlyandwithregard

tothepropertyandprivilegesofthesubjects.

5.2.2FrenchInterestofStateandPredatoryMonarchy

After discussing the five pillars, Valkenier examined the interest of France, by a detailed

historicaldepictionoftheriseandcharacteristicsoftheFrenchmonarchy.Valkenierarguedthat

the Secret Council of the French king (referring to Louis’s restructuring of government after

Mazarin’s death in 1661),667 which assembled each morning, effectively controlled the five

pillarsof theFrench interest.Except for religion,whichwas carefullymanagedby theFrench

clergymen, the other four pillars were represented by the four French minsters installed by

Louis XIV: ‘Monsieur Tellier for Justice, Pompone for the Polity, Turenne for the Army and

MonsieurColbertfortheFinances.’668Consequently,theirinterestofstatewasperfectlytended

bythis intimategroupofstakeholders.Hisanti‐FrenchimageresembledtheworksofRomeyn

                                                            666Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,23‐24.667Collins,TheStateinEarlyModernFrance,110.668 Valkenier, ‘tVerwerdEuropa, 24: ‘Michel Le Tellier, Secretary of State ofWar (1603‐1685); Simon Arnauld dePomponne,SecreatryofStateofForeignAffairs(1618‐1699);HenridelTourd’Auvergne,MarshalofFrance(1611‐1675);Jean‐BaptisteColbert,MinisterofFinances(1619‐1683).’

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deHoogheandWicquefort,andDeFranscheMachiavelinthesenseoftherapacioustyrannyof

Louis’smonarchy,butitappearsthathismainfoundationswereLisola’sandRohan’sworks.

Valkenier claimed to demonstrate how the interest of state was subject to constant

changeandconsequentlydeterminetheriseandfallofpolitiesbymeansofahistoricalaccount

fromthetimeoftheFrankstoLouisXIV,althoughtheFrench,ashestated,themselvesglorified

theirpastasaconstanthistoryofpower. Thefirstfunctionofthisaccountwastoindicatethe

predatory nature of France. His historical account France functionedmoreover to undermine

Frenchclaims,on,forinstanceHabsburgpossessionoronitsallegedTrojanmythaswewillsee

below.FromtheFranksand theclaimedoriginsof theLexSalica, through the first christened

FrankishKingClodoveus(fromwhompurportedlythetitlemost‐Christiankingcamefrom),to

the successive dynastic houses ofMeroveus, Charlemagne, Capet andValois, he described the

historyoftheKingdomintermsofconquest,partitionofinheritedlandsamongstthesons,and

conflictsamongst theelites.669WhereasLisola claimed thatFrenchabsolute rulewasa recent

phenomenon of Louis XIV, Valkenier argued that in 1460 Louis XI made French kingship

‘absoluteandsovereign’670andconsequentlyestablishedcontemporaryFrance.671Heportrayed

LouisXIasaMachiavellianmonarch:‘theshrewdestandquickestofallFrenchkings,whoseart

ofdissimulationandsimulationwasnotinferiortothatoftheEmperorTiberius.’672Theauthor

warnedthereaderthatthepowerofthekingseemedtobedividedamongst,andexecutedby,

the church, parliaments, and provinces, but in fact the king commanded all. In Valkenier’s

opinion,thewarfarepoliticsoftheFrenchkingscontributedprofoundlytotheaccumulationof

landsfortheFrenchmonarchy,suchasLouisXI’swaragainstBurgundyandCharlesVIII’swar

againstHabsburgs‐Spain.Thecauseofthe‘150years’ofrivalrywasSpain’sdesireforthe‘fifth

monarchy’bytheiroverseasconquestsandprofitablemarriagepolicies;‘EmperorCharlesVand

KingFrancois turned almost entireEurope in a bloodbathwithout onedecisivewinner rising

fromthebattlefields.’673

InhisaccountoftheFrenchreligiouswarhecopiedRohan’sversionoftheWarsofthe

ThreeHenry’s, but changed the sequence and added some specificpart to stress the inherent

Machiavellian hazard of France. Valkenier, for instance, described in gruesome details the St.

Bartholomew’sDaymassacre,whereasRohan summarised the horrid events in one sentence.

Valkenierwrote about the ruthless politics of King Henry III and Duc de Guise; ‘When [King

HenryIII]foundoutthat[DeGuise]aimedforhisCrownandLife,heputonaLionandFoxskin,

underwhichheletDucdeGuisestabbedtodeathattheEstatesGeneralinBlois,andwhilehelay

                                                            669Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,28‐35.670Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,41.671ForthecontemporaryimageofLouisXIseeAdriannaBakos,ImagesofKingshipinEarlyModernFrance.LouisXIinPoliticalThought,1560‐1789(LondonandNewYork:Routledge,1997).672Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,40‐41.673Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,44

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theredeath,hestampedonhisface,asdeGuisehaddonetothemurderedAdmiralColignyinthe

year 1572.’ Yet, he shared Rohan’s praise for Henry IV, who restored order but was sadly

murdered by Jesuits leaving France again in chaos. The turbulent history of civil wars and

regicides in France ended after Louis XIII, on the advice of Cardinal Richelieu, took away the

privileges of the Protestants and eventually destroyed their power‐base at Rochelle in 1628.

ThismarkedthestartoftheFrenchstrivingtowardsauniversalmonarchy(whichLisoladated

from the start of Henry IV’s reign). He referred to French publications of 1666 and 1667

defendingits‘pretentionsto,notonly,theentireHolyRomanEmpirebuttoChristendom’,such

asAubery’streatise,andrejecteditsfundamentaljustificationoftheSalicLawbyclaimingthatit

entailed ‘apure fiction’, ‘aChimera’ (asLisolahaddone), that it conflictedwithallother laws,

andthattheoriginsofthedocumentwereunknown.674

He systematically explained France’s policies for obtaining universal monarchy; it

entailedtwomethods:toremovedomesticobstaclesand,second,toobtainallnecessarymeans

(money and interest management). Here we witness a much more specified and enhanced

account of Lisola’s French predatory monarchy. The first obstacle was the conflict between

CatholicsandProtestants,whichRichelieuhadsortedout successfully in the162os. Secondly,

theCrownhadtostripbaretheGrandeesoftheirpowerandproperty;

‘To prevent disputes amongst the noble houses, King Louis XIII and Louis XIV have

extractedthemeansandwealthofthemostpowerfulHousesofFrancebywhichthey

trytopursuewarfare,accordingtothelessonsoftheCardinalsRichelieuandMazarin;

tohisendtheyusemanymaxims(..)Thatthey[thehighnobility]alwayshavetoreside

neartheKingattheirownexpense,andservehimslavishly(…)Thattheyinorderto

expandthemagnificenceoftheKing,theymustmaintainverygreatandcostlysuitesof

Pages,Valets,Coaches,Outfitsetc.(..),buildexcellentPalacesandPleasurehouses (…),

theyhavetopayalmostalloftheirtributesandpaytheirrevenuesandincomeoftheir

estates to theTailles, and theyhave beenpressuredby every tax one could think of,

morethananyotherChristianNation.’675

He expounded Lisola’s argument of the make‐up of the French household rule that

effectivelysupportedtheruler’swarfareandwasfoundedonthebellicosenatureofFrenchmen;

‘Furthermore, theFrenchhave alwaysbeen agile andagitated, that they, similar to a

PerpetuumMobile,couldneverhavebeenstill,norpeaceful,butalsowere inclinedto

                                                            674Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,41‐55;Lisolaon‘ChimericalMonster’,TheBuckler,277.675Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,54‐55.

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Foreign andDomesticWars, to factions of families, and toDuels (…)And to prevent

thesedifficulties,theKingsfollowthelessonsofRichelieuthattheyhavetochangethe

Governorships frequently, andmaintain their Subjects in constant actions of foreign

Wars.’676

AlthoughbothauthorsreferredtoRohan’sDel’interest,Lisolaperceiveditastheevilblueprint

for France’s predatory monarchy. Valkenier, however, praised Rohan’s take on interest and

aimed his criticism directly and more vigorously towards Richelieu, Mazarin and Louis XIV,

which in the context of the disastrous events of 1672 iswell understood. Indeed, throughout

Europe anti‐French polemics became more colourfully, and the attacks on the French

governmentmoredirectly,aftertheFrenchinvasionintheDutchRepublic.677

Valkenier underlined the exploitation and suppression of the French population, as

Lisolahaddone,butelaboratedfurtheronhowtheFrenchCrowncollecteditsexcessivewealth

by increased and new taxes, confiscations, tithes and relentless exploitation of royal domains

(thesecondinstrumenttoacquireuniversaldominion);

‘The saleof variousandextremelyprofitablehonourableOfficesandDignitiesbrings

the Kingdom yearly almost as much as the entire income of a European Potentate,

consideringthatKingHenryIVinthelastyearsofhisreignmade70Millions,asl’Oiseau

tells in his Tract of theOffices, ;ib3.Cap:1.,which have been extremely augmented

underKingLouisXIV.’678

Furthermore,theFrenchCrownextractedmoneybythe‘extortionandsuppressionofthe

officers’,and,asLisolahadarguedlikewise,bytheproductionandsaleofFrenchfashion.

Valkenier evenviewed the latter asFrance’smost importantmethod,not least to stress

thepervertednatureofFrenchmen679;

‘theFrenchhavebytheirnatureandfrivolitiesblindedChristendom(exceptforSpain

andFriesland)withtheirnewFashionsandconstantchangesofclothing,andbrought

themthewrongopinionthatatruePatriot(...)wouldbeseenasaroughandobstinate

head,when he does not imitate those abominable foreign kind of clothing, butwore

downhisoldclothingthatwasfor2and3Yearsinfashion,andwasaccordingtothe

country’scustoms.’                                                            676Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,55.677Wrede,DasReichundseineFeinde,323‐33.678Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,58.679Ashelikewiseinhisaccountofthethirdpillar‘polity’comparedtheFrenchwiththedespoticAsianpeoplesandtheAfricanMoors‘whobylackofbravery,areeffeminateandweak’,Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,15.

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Richelieu hadmoreover, extensively promoted the manufacturing of numerous cloths, which

produced40millionFrenchguildersfortheCrown.Intotal,LouisXIVhadexpandedtheCrown’s

yearlyincomefrom8/9millionto80million.Heconcluded:‘Fromthis,wesee,howtheFrench

mislead other Nations and blind them, how they by the same recklessness, have become

enriched and armed. Because from this treasure France equips its terrifying Armies and Sea‐

fleetsagainstthose,fromwhomitextractsthattreasure’.680

After listing the thirteen ways to obtain resources, Valkenier enumerated the twelve

factors supporting the power of France compared to the rest of Europe. These involved

geographical, logisticalanddemographicalassets,whichproducedprosperityandincludedthe

benefitsofFrancenamedbyLisola.Thelastfactorwasthemostcrucial:

‘ThewillingslaveryoftheSubjects,whodarenottorefusetheKing’staxes,butas

Donkeys load themselves until they collapse, therefore the King is called by

EmperorMaximiliande I a King ofDonkeys, as theEmperor (…) can bring forth

nothingmorethantheGermanPrinces,Spainallowhimbythelaws;Francecando

whateverhepleases,andEnglandnothingmorethanwhichthePeoplepleases.’681

Apart from acquiring money, maintaining its interest in relation with other regimes was the

secondinstrumenttoobtainthenecessarybasisforwarfare.First,ValkenierreiteratedRohan’s

(andLisola’s)wordsinclaimingthat‘ChristendomcontainstwopowerfulKingdoms,Franceand

Spain,whichtogetherasaBalancedeliverWarandPeaceuponalltheotherStates.’AsRohan,he

reasonedthatEnglandfunctionedasthebalancer,butaddedthattheUnitedProvincesare‘the

Tongue, in order to balance the three Kingdoms.’ This was followed by a reverberation of

Lisola’s regulations/maxims of the French system of government to manage their interest;

‘regulations,whichwerelargelyexecutedwithoutanyregardtoDivineorHumanLawsinorder

tofulfilitsobjective,i.e.UniversalMonarchy.’682Promiseswerenotkept,akeycharacteristicof

theFrenchsincetheoriginoftheirexistence.TheFrenchconcealedtheirpoliticalhiddenagenda

with finewords,andreligiousand legalpretextsconstructedbyFrenchpoliticalphilosophers,

whowereonthepayrolloftheFrenchmonarchy.TheFrenchregimebuiltfortificationsalongits

borderstolaunchsurpriseattacks;andthey

‘[w]eaken neighbours by chiefly unlawful means, incite neighbouring countries

intoDiscordandWaragainsteachother,orinstigatedomesticTroubles,ordivide                                                            680Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,firstquotep.56‐57,secondquotep.60,allthethirteenmeansofextraction,55‐63.681Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,62‐63.682Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,65.

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[society] into Factions (…). It is inherent to the Antichrist to create discord and

disputesintheWorld,andiftheKinghastomakedowiththat,[he]shouldnotget

angry,whensomeonecallshimthefirstbornoftheAntichrist,insteadofthefirst‐

bornoftheChurch.’

Valkenieraddedanotherbasicprinciple,whichheseesastheprimaryFrenchprecept:theartof

‘Blackmailing’ and ‘Corruption’. This was executed chiefly by the cardinals Richelieu and

Mazarin,whomValkeniersardonicallycalled‘thetwoholyfathers’.Frenchmonarchspractised

ruthless interest‐politicsbasedon the adviceof these evil clerics.Bymeansof bribery, secret

correspondence,andother tricks, theyplayedoffEuropeancountriesagainsteachother.With

thisstrategytheFrenchmanagedtosabotagetheSpanishcourts,causedEnglishuprisingsand

thedownfallofthekingdomofPoland.HereValkenierreferredto‘thegoodpolicyoftheHigh‐

WiseandPrudentialBaronFranciscusdel’IsolaImperialEnvoy’whosavedthePolishcourtfrom

the French hazard.683 The last regulation of the French interest was the intimidation of his

neighbours(alsostatedbyLisola);‘TheFrenchKingalwayskeepsinhisserviceagreatamount

ofHorsemenandSoldiers,whombygivingnewPatentshegradually changes fromGarrisons,

andstrategicallymanoeuvresentireArmies,notonlytopreventhisownsubjectstorebel,butto

demonstrateitsgreatpowertorestoftheworldaswell,especiallytohisneighbourstoprovoke

constant torments, threats, and fear, so they have to choose to join France for their own

protectionortobeattacked.’684

Inthesecondpartofthebook,ValkenierdealtwiththeFrenchwarpreparationsagainst

the Low Countries. Francois I strove for universal monarchy by conquering successively the

smallpolitiesofMilan,NapelsandtheLowCountries;HenryIVdidthisthroughtheconquestof

Madrid, Louis XIII German princes; but Louis XIV, ‘whose ambition and desire for glory

surpassesnoone(..),hasmaintainedthatnoefficientwayexiststoobtainUniversalMonarchy

and[tobe]MasteroftheWorldthanbytheconquestoftheSeventeenUnitedProvinces.’685He

followed ‘the Lesson of Coligny’ that France needed foreign warfare to extract money and

preventdomestictroubles.686ThecomparisionwithAsiandespotismisalmostaxiomaticforthis

kindofargumentsincethesecondthirdoftheseventeenthcentury.687Thehouseholdrulewas

runonrobberybyconquest;allmembersfacilitateditsinterestundertheplundermonarch:the

(new)officersand favourites, thesoldiers, theWar‐Priests,and theslavishsubjects.Valkenier

comparedthecrazyfuryandsuddenretreatsoftheFrenchwiththatof‘BarbaricNationsasthe

                                                            683Valkenier, ‘tVerwerdEuropa, quoted fromp. 71, 64‐74.On pages 71, 142 and175Valkenier likewise refers toLisola’sLeBouclier.684Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,74.685Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,131.686Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,132.687VonFriedeburg,Luther’sLegacy,339‐345.

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Moors, Tartars, and all Asian and African peoples, which is the cause that France conquers

Countries without difficulty, but loses them as easily’, such as the successors of the great

conquerors ‘Atilla and Tamerlan’ could not maintain their vast captured empires.688 Besides,

LouisXIV,orthe‘FrenchHannibal’and‘Xerxes’689,wastrainedinthe‘LessonsofMachiavelli’to

become a supreme new prince, as Valkenier explained how the French cunninglymanaged a

diplomaticentrapmentof theDutchRepublicbefore the invasionof1672.690Louisbeganwith

thisschemeintheyear1664byincitingwarbetweenEnglandandtheUnitedProvinces(Second

Anglo‐Dutch War 1665‐1667).691 Through trickeries and offering money and weapons Louis

persuaded the other rulers to plot against the Dutch Republic. Valkenier concluded that the

Frenchplansofuniversalmonarchycouldbestoppedifeverypotentatewouldfollowhisadvice;

‘That they,within thecapacityofeachparty,shouldprevent, thatby thesuppressionof lesser

PrincesandStatestheFrenchgetelevatedtosuchaheightfromwhichtheycancrushtheothers

as by lightening.’He called out for a grand alliance of all European rulers against Louis XIV’s

France; ‘theyshould forma frontasoxesagainst theFrenchwolf.’Valkenierremarked that in

France’sbattlewithSpain,otherrulersfollowedFranceasdefencelessanimals.However,‘[o]ne

shouldputoutthefireinhisneighbour’shouse,becauseifthefireskipstohisownhouse,itis

toolate.’692

5.2.3InterestAnalysisofEurope

InadditiontoValkenier’shistoricalaccountoftheFrenchsystemofrule,hisexplanationofthe

general ‘ground rules’ and specific foundationsof the French interest,Valkenier furtheredhis

attackonFrancebyanalysingthespecificinterestsofthedifferentEuropeanrulersandthefew

republics. Other than Rohan and Lisola, Valkenier stated that interest of state consisted of

‘particular Regulations according to the specific Constitution of every State’ and ‘General

Regulations’.693 Every European ruler should manage well its foreign affairs, its secret

diplomacy, maintain societal unity, protect its subjects from external violence, and rule

according to the laws for the benefit of the people. These regulations echo the maxims of

Rohan.694ThedifferentinterestsoftheparticularEuropeanpolitieswereanalysedbymeansof

it recent history, the geographical position the relationswith other rulers, and the economic

                                                            688Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,267.689Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,189,343.690Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,148,158,725.691Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,137‐138.692Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,225‐226.693Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,75.694Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,74,75.

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situation. Valkenier pointed out the specific interest of the French king concerning each

particular polity. Consequently, the French hazard for Europe is highlighted. One by one he

describedtheinterestsofstatesasRohandid,althoughinmoredetail,dealinginturnwiththe

interestsofSpain,theHolyRomanEmpire,theItalianareas,England,Sweden,Denmark,Poland,

Hungary,theOldSwissConfederacyandtheinterestoftheDutchRepublic.695

Interestingly,Valkenier added three regimes toRohan’s list: thePortuguesemonarchy

that was restored through its revolt against Spain 1640‐1668, but also Muscovy and the

OttomanEmpire.Hisaccountsofthelatterwasremarkablypositive,especiallysincetheTurks

weregenerallyviewedasthepivotalexampleofdespoticrule.‘tVerwerdEuropawasoneofthe

earliest anti‐French treatises in which the allegedly cruel practices of Ottoman household

governmentswere sharply reduced in order tomagnify the French despotic image. Although

Muscovy did form a substantial threat to the northern European monarchies, the Ottoman

Empire could shiver Europe to its core during the second half of the seventeenth century,

culminating in the siege of Vienna in the 1680s. Valkenier viewed both regimes as absolute

governments,freedfromalllawsandfoundedontheslavishpopulation.‘Muscovyisruledbyits

TsarsoabsolutelyandfreefromallLawsasalmostnootherEmpireintheWorld,andtherefore

itsGrandeesandNobles,aswellasitsSubjectslivealifeofslavishservitudethatisatonewith

their nature.’696 The firstmaxim of the Tsar’s interest is to be honoured as a God to prevent

domesticrebellionandtoenforcestrictobediencetoitsorthodoxconfessionproducingabsolute

unity in society. Whereas Muscovy feared the Turks, Polish, Swedes, and in particular the

Tartars,theOttomanEmpirewasafraidofnoone.TheOttomanEmpirewasextremelywealthy

andwassecuredfrominternaldivisionandrevoltsbyitsstrictandunyieldingpoliticalmaxims

andfoundations;‘TheTurkishSultanisanabsoluteSovereign,andallofhissubjectsareequalas

slaves,whoseLive,GoodsandFortuneweresubjectedtohisPower,whichhecanclaimashe

pleasesandisfreetodisposeof.’697Thesultan’sauthorityrestedonfratricide(oldestsonofthe

sultankillsallhisbrothers),executionofthegrandeesbykeepingtheJanissariesandtheSpahi

(infantryandcavalryhouseholdtroopsofthesultan)engagedinwarfare,andbythepovertyof

the subjects.Yet, theOttomansenjoyed freedomof religion, lived soberly andmodestly,were

piousbelieversfearingGodandstrivingtoascendintoheaven,andbecausetheywereforbidden

to drink wine, they were not driven by disobedience and tumults, which made them stable

soldiers.698

                                                            695 Valkenier, ‘t Verwerd Europa, 75‐129. What is more, Valkenier discusses separately the interests of Sweden,Hungary,Poland,Denmark,andofthemostimportantItalianprinces,whileRohandiscussesthefirstfourundertheheadingoftheHolyRomanEmpire,andthelatterunder‘Italy’ingeneral,ofwhichheonlypaysexclusiveattentiontoVenice.Yet,RohantreatstheinterestofthePopeindividually.696Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,99.697Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,101.698Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,100‐105.

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After the French interest, Valkenier first analysed the Habsburg‐Spanish monarchy,

becauseaccordingtotheauthor,itsharedasimilarpoliticalgoalasFrance:theestablishmentof

a universal monarchy. Therefore, Valkenier claimed that the interest of Spain would always

conflict with the interest of France. As a result, the French monarchy fiercely opposed the

Spanishmonarchy.ValkeniercopiedmostofRohan’swritingontheinterestsofHabsburg‐Spain

andBourbon‐France.HedidnotliterallycopyRohan’sdepictionoftheSpanishinterest,buthe

copied the first ‘points’ and presented them in the same order. Yet, in his description of the

Spanishinterest,ValkeniercopiedalmostletterforletterapassagefromRohan’saccountofthe

Frenchinterest.ThispassagedescribedHenryIVasthefirstFrenchKingwhounderstoodthat

Franceshouldoppose theSpanish interestand thatFrancehad toshowto theCatholic rulers

that the venomhidden behind Spain’s pretext of protector of the Catholic faith, aswell as its

secret support to Protestants in their conflicts with Habsburg‐Spain.699 Valkenier, however,

observedthatSpainhadfailedthisfirstregulationinthelastdecade.Instead,Francehadtakenit

overbydeprivingcities, churches, andprivilegesof theFrenchProtestant subjects, aswell as

foreignProtestants, referring to the Frenchoffensive in theDutchRepublic. CombiningLisola

andRohan,ValkenierarguedthatSpain,aswellasFrancedesireduniversaldominion.

Furthermore, France surpassed Spain in its cunning diplomatic polices of gathering

informationontheaffairsin‘foreign’kingdoms,initsdeceitfulandpower‐hungrypoliticsduring

peacenegotiations, and in the compositionof itsmonarchy. Spain suffered from the scattered

landsofitsmonarchy,whichmadeitextremelydifficulttomaintaininternalconcord,something

Lisola also stressed. Valkenier pointed out that France already hadmade several attempts to

spreaddiscordbetween thedifferentelitesof theSpanish landsand theSpanishmonarch.He

                                                            699Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,75:‘SoheeftKoningHendrikdeIV.deeersteonderallenrechtaangeweesen,hoedathetInterestvanVrankrijkdaarinprincipalijkberust,dathetinallepoinctenSpanjensodirectmoettegengaan,dat,waarSpanjenJa,hetselveNeentoemoetseggen:Waaruytdanvolgt,datgelijkdeeersteregulvanSpanjesInterestaltijd voor desen is geweest de Protestanten ten uytersten te vervolgen, sichmet haare goederen te verryken, enonderpretextvanReligiedeCatholykeStaatenmethemdoent’samenspannen,datVrankrijkevensoin’treguardevanSpanjen,altijdvoorsijneersteRegulvanInterestheeftgehouden,dathet,aandeeenezijde,aanalleCatholykePotentatenmosttoonen,watquaatonderdienSpaanschendekmantelverburgenlag,eninsonderheytaandenPaus,hoesekerlijkdathij,nevensalleanderePotentaten,eenknechtvanSpanjensoudemoetenwerden;alsSpanjendoordeschattenderProtestantenverrijkt,deUniverseleMonarchiesoudeoprechten;EndathetaandeanderezijdedenProtestanteninallevoorvallentegenSpanjemoesteassisteeren,gelijkVrankrijkomsijninterestgetoontheeftaandeVereenigdeNederlanden,endeProtestantenin’tDuytseRijk.’;Rohan,Del’intérêt,170‐171:‘Maiscelanesuffisantpaspourtraverserlesprogresd'Espagne,l'interetdelaFranceestdeprendretoutlecontre‐pieddesmaximesquenousvenonsdevousdeduire.HenriIV,commeceluisurlequellasouplessedetouscesartificesaeteexerceejusquesaudernierpoint, lesayantmieuxreconnusqu'aucunautredevant luipour lesavoirplus eprouves,a lepremier etablipour le vrai interet de la Francede contre‐pointer celui d'Espagne en tous ses points.De sorte que si la premieremaximedel'interetd'Espagneestdepersecuter lesprotestantspours'accroıtrede leursdepouilles, lapremieredeceluideFranceestdefuirecomprendreauxcatholiqueslevenincachela‐dessous:surtoutdefairevoiralacourdeRome que les esperances qu'elle lui donne d'augmenter ses tresors par la ruine des protestants n'est que pouravancer son dessein a lamonarchie ou elle ne peut parvenir que le pape ne devienne son valet, l'autorite duqueln'eclatepointdavantagequequand lapuissancedesprincesetEtatschretiensestbalancee'etauxprincesetEtatsprotestants qu'encore qu'elle soit de diverse religion a la leur, elle aimerait plutot leur conversion que leurdestruction, les assurant que cela n'empecherapoint qu'ellene contribuedu sienpour leur conservationet ne lesassiste franchement contre tous ceux qui voudront troubler ou changer quelque chose en leurs Etats et en leurslibertes'.

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advised the Spanish monarchy to observe and secure the specific interests of the different

Spanishlands(herebyunderlingthesplinterednatureofearlymodern‘dynasticagglomerates’

andtheinherenttasktomanageallthosedifferentparts).Forinstance,toprotectNaples,Sicily,

and Sardinia, Spain should allywith theVatican andToscana. Allianceswith theHolyRoman

Emperor and theOld Swiss Confederacywere necessary to protectMilan andBurgundy. The

scattered composition of the Spanish monarchy was the greatest problem, which prevented

Spain from optimally looking after its interests. The lawyer stated that Habsburg‐Spain had

weakeneditselfbyincorporatingseveralItalianpolitiesandtheBurgundy‐Dutchprovincesinto

itsmonarchy.700

Besides the interest of Spain and France, Valkenier plundered Rohan’s account of the

interestofthePope,butsupplementeditbyarguingthatinhistimeFranceformeditsgreatest

threat.HealsocopiedRohan’sinterestanalysisoftheSwissandDutchpolitiesas‘thetwoarms

of the German Empire’.701 Haitsma Mulier sees in this Valkenier’s staunch defence for the

republican government in general,702 an evaluation which we should be careful to accept,

especiallywhentakingintoaccountthatthewordsweretakenfromRohan’swork,whowasby

no means a republican. As Lisola, Valkenier used Rohan’s interest analysis to turn it against

Louis’s monarchy, but, unlike Lisola, he also echoed Rohan’s negative account of Habsburg‐

Spain.703Rohan’selaborationson‘reasonofstate’anditsemploymentbyLisolaandValkenier

show how a rather similar ‘reason of state’ argumentation could result in totally different

outcomes. Valkenier’s practical goal was to block current plans for peace negotiations, to

maintain agrandEuropeanallianceagainstFranceandWilliam’smilitary leadership.Heused

Rohan’sandLisola’sargumentsto indicatethepredatorymonarchyofFrance,buthisanalysis

was farmore detailed and amplified, and the implications of such rulewere extremelymore

distressing.

5.2.4Dutchinterestofstate

ApartfromthelengthyanalysisoftheFrenchinterest,Valkenierdedicatedalotofpagestothe

interest of the Dutch Republic. His main objective was to defend the necessity of the

stadholderateandtorefutetheideaofHolland’sprovincialsovereignty,sofiercelyadvocatedby

Pieterde la Court.He constructed apolitical entity of theDutchUnitedProvinces,whichwas

basedontheUnionofUtrechtfrom1579.WithintheUnion,thesevendifferentprovincesshared                                                            700Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,75‐79.701Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,85andRohan,Del’intérêtdesprincesetlesEtatschrétienté,176;Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,106‐107andRohan,Del’intérêtdesprincesetlesEtatschrétienté,181.702HaitsmaMulier,‘DiePolitisch‐historischenIdeenvonPetrusValkenier’,119.703Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,44‐48andRohan,Del’intérêtdesprincesetlesEtatschrétienté,188‐190.

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theabsolutepowerandmaiestas,whichwascarefullybalancedby theStadholder.704The first

interest of the Republic was to maintain the Union of Utrecht, and to prevent factions and

conflicts between thedifferentprovinces.The stadholder served as the supreme arbitrator in

theinternalpowerstrugglesoftheRepublic.Valkenierwrote:

‘(..)andthereforeathirdneutralpersonisnecessary,aGovernororStadholder,who

displayshim,andtowhomtheygivePower,Authority,andCommandinordertocalm

andtomoderatetheirrespectivefightsanddifferences,andtoavoidalldisorderand

mobs’.705

Thesecondinterestconsistedofthestimulationandprotectionofmaritimecommerce.Inorder

tosafeguardthisinterest,therightofthe‘freeseas’shouldbeprotected,whilewarsshouldbe

prevented.706ValkenierarguedforthecommercialinterestoftheDutchRepublicalongthesame

linesasDelaCourt’sInterestvanHolland,foundingitsprosperityonfishery,manufacturingand

trade.Spain’sembargoofDutchcommercewithSpainproducedDutchcommercialprosperity;

the Dutch had to find their own foreign goods and establish trading companies. Unlike De la

Court,ValkenierviewedthetwobiggesttradecompaniesVOC(UnitedEastIndiaCompany)and

theWIC(DutchWestIndiaCompany)asthetwoessentialpillarsoftrade.Moreover,Valkenier

arguedthatDutchprosperitywasjeopardisedby‘jealousy’betweenprovincesandregents,and

byjealousyand‘desireforstate/dominion’[staatsucht]offoreignprincesandrulers,especially

France that threatened to take down the Dutch Republic as a second Cartago. The prince of

Orange as stadholder and captain general formed the fundamental protection of the Dutch

Republicagainstforeignaswellasinternalfoes.707

ValkenieremphasisedtheimportanceofthestadholderfortheDutchRepublicintimes

of war, aswell as ‘during peace time’. Thewellbeing, in political and economic terms, of the

wholeRepublic dependedon theneutral positionof the stadholder and thebalanceof power

between the provinces. Valkenier examined the history of the ‘factional government’ of the

1650sand1660s.AsDelaCourtdid,hetookthecrisisyearsof1618and1650tostatehiscase,

but instead legitimised the ‘interventions’ of the respective princes of Orange against the

factiousandoligarchicregents.Inthe1610stheDutchRepublicwasatitspeakduetoMaurice

ofOrange,whohad‘stabilisedthestate’,‘temperedgovernment’andbroughtforthtruemilitary

                                                            704Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,106.705Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,108.706Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,110.707 Valkenier,‘t Verwerd Europa, 124‐129; As De la Court, Valkeniermay also be interpretetd as an author in thetraditionof‘jealousyoftrade’scrutunisedbyIstvanHont,JealousyofTrade.InternationalCompetitionandtheNation‐State inHistoricalPerspective (Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversity Press, 2005);Hartman, Jan andWeststeijn, ‘AnEmpireofTrade:CommercialReasonofStateinSeventeenth‐CenturyHolland’, inSophusReinertandPernilleRøge(eds.),ThePoliticalEconomyofEmpireintheEarlyModernWorld(Basingstoke:PalgraveMacmillan,2013),11‐31.

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success. Yet, during this period of peace with Spain (1609‐1621), ‘some people pretended

insolently theunlimitedFreedom,bywhich themostevilpersonsamongst thepeople, if their

partiality and imaginary concepts had succeeded, would have discarded the people of their

Freedom.’708By‘unlimitedFreedom’Valkeniermeantfreedomofreligion,freedomofprovincial,

evenmunicipal,sovereigntyinpoliticaland,especially,militarymatters,andfreedomfromthe

authority of the House of Orange. By the imprisonment of certain regents in 1618 and the

execution of Oldenbarnevelt in 1619,Maurice restored order. After the peace treaty of 1648,

someregentsthought,yetagain,thattheDutchgovernmentneededno‘IllustriousPerson’and

thusbegantoobstructtheHouseofOrangebytakingawayits ‘PowerandAuthority’overthe

military.ValkenierslightlytoucheduponWilliamII’ssiegeofAmsterdamin1650,butexcused

the display of force and the imprisonment of eight members of the provincial assembly of

Hollandasasheernecessity.TheseHollandregentshadthreatenedtheinterestoftheRepublic

by the reduction of the army and severely limiting the power of the stadholder. The Year of

Disasterwas theresultofnotacting in the ‘true’ interestof theUnitedProvinces.Thepower‐

hungrystadholderlessregimeofJohandeWitt,supportedbypublicistssuchasDelaCourt,was

toblameforthedisastrousstateoftheDutchRepublicundertheinvadingarmiesofpredatory

KingLouisXIV.709

InthesecondpartofthebookValkenierattackedtheconfessionalpoliticsoftheDeWitt

regime. The regents had suppressed theReformed religion as themain religion of theUnited

Provincesandevensubjectedittotheirpoliticalrule.TheReligiouszealdegeneratedduringthe

1650sand1660s: ‘InsummatheybecamesoLibertineandFree‐Spirited, thattheyfollowedno

particularReligionwhatsoever’.710However,Valkenierstatedthat

‘theReformedTheologiansalsowerenotwithoutfault,sincethey[turned]againsteach

other by unnecessary and vicious Disputes, and by mutual Divisions and Factions,

whichtheyoftensoughtwithheavypassions,[they]deprivedtheChurchoftherespect

of its Enemies, and theAuthority and theRespect,which, previously, it had received

from thewholeworld. (…)Andas longas this remains, theChurchmustberestored

andmaintainedbygoodOrdersofthePoliticalgovernment.’711

ValkenierwantedtoexplainhowthegovernmentofDeWitthaderodedthepillarsofstateand

consequently ruined the state. The regents had a threefold programme to destroy the

stadholderate and establish a aristocracy: ‘to humiliate the House of Orange’, ‘to flatter                                                            708Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,112.709Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,112‐113.710Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,229;ValkenierdiscussedtheDutchpracticeofreligionunderDeWitt‐regimep.225‐230.711Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,228‐229.

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provinces and citieswith absolute sovereignty’, and ‘to caress theCommunitywith the sweet

name of Freedom claiming that they would enjoy more abundantly under a Aristocracy or

StatelyGovernment,thanwhentheyhadaStadholder.’712Hewrote: ‘TheCommunityisalways

ruledsincethetimeofCivilisbyaHeadunderthetitleofaCountorPrince,whowouldalways

besubjectedtottheLaws,MoralandSovereignPoweroftheState.’‘TheCommunity’hedefined

as: ‘thejointNationthatactuallyistheSovereignStateasCicero lib.3.DeRepublicateachesus

Respublicaestrespopuli,cumbene&justegeriturabunorege,siveapaucisoptimatibus,siveab

universopopulo.Thatis:TheRepublicbelongstothePeople,astheywillbeservedwellandwith

justice by a King, or by a few of the most distinguished, or the joint People.’713 However,

‘Freedom of the Community is not compatible when the sovereignty lies with the regents,

because when one falls the other falls as well,’ as was witnessed during the lethal chaos in

ZeelandandHollandin1672.714

The faction surrounding DeWitt had corrupted the legal system, coerced judges, and

installed theirpartisans in judicial,military andpoliticaloffices.Consequently, thearistocracy

slippedintoanoligarchy.Whentheoligarchicregentsfearedthattheirpropositionswouldnot

findthedesiredsupport,theyobstructedtheStatesGeneralwaitingfortheabsenceofpotential

opponentsandforthesubstantialpresenceoftheirownfactionmembers,‘whichappearedfrom

the granted privilege to the Book of De la Court.’715 The De Witt faction promoted and

worshippedsuch‘DefamatoriousLibels’,whichslanderedthereputationoftheHouseofOrange

and attributed to them ‘the most wicked absurdities and crimes.’716 Furthermore, they had

turnedtheRepublicintomultiplerepublics,burdenedthesubjectswithanunparalleledlevelof

taxation.Yet,theregentswereavariciouswithcertainnecessaryspendingasthemilitaryforces

and fortresses.EchoingRomeyndeHooghe’santi‐Frencharguments,Valkenierexclaimedthat

themagistrateshad indulgedthemselves inexcessive luxuries,copiedFrenchfashionsof food,

clothing and palaces as if theywere princes, led society into a general decay ofmorals, and,

consequently,lettheenemyin.717

Against internaldiscordaprinceofOrange intheofficeofstadholderoughttobalance

thefactiouspoliticaldynamicswithintheDutchRepublic.Againstexternalenemies,astrongand

largearmyandahealthyorganisationofwarfinancesshouldbemaintainedunderthesupreme

commandoftheprinceofOrangeintheofficeofcaptain‐general.Valkenierextolledthemilitary

qualitiesoftheprincesofOrange,whichthesuccessoftheRevoltagainstHabsburg‐Spainhad

                                                            712Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,234.713Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,234‐235714Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,249‐250.715Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,249.716Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,236.717Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,226‐266.

179

demonstratedsowell.718However,comparedtothe‘AbsoluteMonarchicGovernment’ofFrance,

the princes of Oranges were restricted by the constitutional arrangements of the Union of

Utrecht,which, aswe saw, he traced back in a Grotianmanner to the times of the Batavians.

Moreover,Valkenierpropagatedthe ‘Orangist’notionoftheconstitutionalrestrainingfunction

oftheUnionofUtrecht.HeaccusedthestadholderlessRegimeofattemptingtoacquireabsolute

sovereigntyfortheindividualprovinces.719

Such arguments were in line with Dutch debates on the true interest of the polity;

Valkenierargued foroffensivewarfare, strong land forcesunder thecommandofOrange,and

usedtheconventionalOrangistargumenttobackhisclaim.Yet,throughhisenhancedinterest

analysisanddetailedimageoftheFrenchpredatorymonarchy,hestressedthesheernecessity

for the small DutchRepublic to enforce themilitary and to pursue alliedwarfare in order to

survivethemilitarycompetitionbetweenthepowerfuldynasticagglomerates,especiallyFrench

expansionism. The year of 1672 had proven this once and for all. Valkenier intervened in

debates on William III’s enlarging his authority through the pursuit of warfare and planned

peace negotiations in themid‐1670s.He underlined the popular argument that to defend the

Dutch commerce wars should be prevented. Conversely, William III’s grand alliance against

Francewasamatterofsheersurvival;thecurrentwaragainstLouisXIVshouldbepursuedand

the position of Orange maintained. The success of the prince of Orange was based on his

authority,executedthroughthemilitaryandthepoliticalassemblies;hisauthorityharmonised

theconstitution,moderatedreligiousissues,andfacilitatedanimpeccablelegalsystem,astrong

army and a proper financial organisation, which formed the protection of property and

privilegesofDutchsubjectsagainsttheHollandregentoligarchy,but,moreimportantly,against

Frenchwar‐tyranny. In thisway, Valkenier propagatedprincelywar politics under a rule law

independentfromrevealedreligionandshieldedagainstthethreatofpredatorymonarchy.

Valkenierdealtwith twocontinuing issues:howtodiscredit theDeWittRegimeandpromote

the princely rule of Orange; and simultaneously discredit Louis XIV?He delegitimised the De

Witt regime by explicitly stating how they ruined the five pillars of state, but perceived that

Francewasageniusinthemanagementof its interest; itspillarswereput infullserviceof its

interest,i.e.universalmonarchy;itsreligionwaspoliticisedandFrenchpriestsfullyservedthe

Frenchwareffort,evenadvisedtheCrownhowtobecomeaMachiavelliannewprince;norule

oflawexistedastheKingcoulddoashepleasedwithoutconsentorconsultfromtheelites;he

ruledarbitrarily, absolute inaccordancewith theslavishnatureofhis subjects; financeswere

extortedfromitssubjectsaswellasconqueredpeoples;andthemilitaryforceswereabundant

                                                            718Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,23‐24.719Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,234.

180

in number and bellicose spirit. Though the French monarchy adequately pursued its true

interest (establishinguniversalmonarchy), it executed itwithout regard to the fourbridlesof

interest of state (the protection of religion, faithfulness to alliances, honesty, and impeccable

benevolent administration of justice). Through a historical analysis Valkenier determined its

maxims of universal monarchy and indicated the predatory nature of its society driven by

necessary warfare to supress its barbaric subjects and power‐hungry elites, as well as to

conquer other European polities. Rohan’s rapacious tyranny inversed by Lisola’s into a

household rule served as the basis of Valkenier’s expounded image of the French predatory

monarchy; De la Court’s account of the interest of Hollandwas deliberately reversed into an

common interest of the United Provinces, and its vicious attack on priestcraft and princely

interestwasreiteratedinValkenier’sattackonFrance.

Valkenierstated that interestof statesurpassedall laws (divine,natural andpositive).

However, he stressed that interest of state should be pursued for security reasons only; self‐

defence according to natural law and the expansion of one’s state should be executed with

legitimatemeanswithout explain howprecisely. So howwas he able to condemn the French

pursuitofinterest;istheFrenchinterestofstaterightful?Ateverystepofhisargumenthetried

tosolveanindividualproblembythrowinginargumentsfromallsortsofsources,whichledto

an incoherence, a lack of propositional consistency. His concern was not with a conceptual

reconstruction,butwiththedirethreatoftheFrenchpredatorymonarchy.TheFrenchinterest

ofstatestemmedfromitscircumstances,originsandnatureofitssociety.Inthissenseitwasa

descriptivenotion,buthealsowroteaboutFrance’sunrightfulclaimstoHabsburgpossessions,

France’sarbitraryrulethatwentagainstnaturallaw,andtheFrenchmaximsthatwerepursued

withoutregardtoanydivineorpositivelaws.Valkeniertendedtocollapseinterestintojustice,

not leastsinceheneededamarkof respectability forStadholderWilliamIIIofOrange,whose

princelyruleandthepursuitofwarfarehepresentedaslimitedandjust.Itappearsthatabove

reasonofstateasetofnormsexisted,God’smoralityindependentofconfessionalreligion.

Hisreasonofstateargumentationwashighlyderivative,forsomehistoriansunexciting

or too subjective, yet it underlined the polemical function of reason of state, its international

context, not least Rohan’s legacy, and the contemporary preoccupation with predatory

monarchyandthestruggletorestoreorder.

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Chapter6Conclusion

Thisresearchstemsfromtheneedforareassessmentoftheidiomofreasonofstate.Ithasbeen

perceived asmirroring an earlymodernprogrammeof state building, but since thenotion of

statebuildingasandeliberateorstrategicactivityhasbeenundermined,thequestionariseson

thereasonsfor itsextremelypopularity inpoliticalwritings fromthe1590sonwards,ortobe

more precise: what was the function of the popular vocabulary of reason of state in early

modernpoliticalwritings?Thisthesisfocusesonspecificappealstoareasonofstate;thatis,the

analysisofwhatwasclaimedtobe‘the(true)interestofstate’.Fromthe1630sonwardsauthors

complemented argumentson reasonof state ‐examinationsof theperson of the ruler andhis

political practices‐ with analyses of the nature of the societies that he ruled. Each chapter

considers an interest analysis of an author and scrutinizes the function of the vocabulary of

reasonofstatewithintherespectivesource:HenrideRohan’sDe l’interest(1638),Pieterdela

Court’sInterestvanHolland(1662),François‐PauldeLisola’sBouclierd’Estat(1667)andPetrus

Valkenier’s‘tVerwerdEuropa(1672).Everyindividualauthorintervenedinpoliticaldebateson

immediate issues ofwarfare, foreign policy,mounting taxation, and governmental debt. From

this emerges a shared preoccupation with the fear of predatory monarchy, which may be

consideredatraditionofspeculation,orasub‐genreofpoliticalthought.

Thebackgroundoftheriseoftheidiomofreasonofstateisthegrowingscaleofwarfare

andconfessionalstrifethatnotonlybroughtforthtransformationsinearlymodernrule,i.e.war‐

drivenanddebt‐riddenregimes,butalsoamounted toaperceivedcrisisof theruleof law,as

laws to be found in scripture, Roman law, local precedent, deeply rooted in Aristotelian and

confessional Christian notions. Reason of state was a highly suggestive term, as part of the

‘vocabularyoffashionablepoliticalcynicism’aboutthe‘true’motivesofrulerspromptedbythe

experiences of civil strife and continuous warfare. Its popularity sprung from its opacity; it

could,andwasmadetomeandifferentthingstodifferentpeople.Argumentsofreasonofstate

usuallyentailedpracticalcounselfortheruleronprudenceoftensummarisedin‘maxims’andin

itsmostnarrow,‘Machiavellian’understanding,authorsgaveadviceontheroomforlegitimate

manoeuvreinemergencycircumstancesbeyondtheboundsofnormallegal,moralandreligious

constraints. It was most often used in accusations against certain officeholders in terms of

neglecting or subverting the princely duties towards the divine and natural laws. Such

argumentscontributedtotheperceivedcrisisoftheruleoflaw.Thefashionableterm‘interest’

was used interchangeably offering an insight into themotivations of ruler and a rationale to

executequestionedpolitics.Fromthe1630sonwards,authors,suchasRohan,usedthetermto

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dissecttheoriginsandmake‐upoftheruler’ssocietiesofferingseeminglyobjectivecounselon

howmaintainandexpandthe‘state’(e.g.princelystatus,regime,polity,)inaworldofconstant

changeandconflict.ThechangingconfigurationsofEuropeandynasticagglomeratesencouraged

such attention. The specifics were derived from empirically‐based analysis, which enabled

writerstoemphasisethecurrentstateofaffairsandthedistinctionbetweenadomesticanda

foreigndomain.Suchcounselassumedthattherulerhadanobligationtopursue‘true’interest

ofstatefreedfromhispersonalinterest,virtues,passionsandrelations.Inpoliticaldebateson

thepursuitofwarfare,authorsemployedinterestanalysestopromoteaspecificofficeholderor

political faction that was purportedly the most able candidate to defend a certain course in

foreignpolicy,andsimultaneouslytoattacktheopposingfactionasdangerouslyunsuitablefor

the‘true’interestofstate;authorscouldaddressandcriticisetheconductofregimespressured

bythemilitarycompetitionandsubsequentmountinggovernmentaldebt,whilesimultaneously

demandingapositionwithinthesetransformedregimes.Interestanalysesweretakenonboard

in English civil war debates and Dutch debates during the stadholderless regime, offering

authors an opportunity for criticism in the name of achieving order, harmony, and the true

interestofthestate,arationaletocriticisetheconductoftheStuartmonarchorOrangeprince,

respectively,andtoreconstructorderbyarguingtheneedtoharmonisetheinterestsbetween

rulersandruledthatformedthe‘true’interestofstate.Fromthe1670sonwards,suchidiomsof

argumentweredirectedagainstLouisXIV’sexpansionisminordertodefendtheEuropeanlegal

order.

Historians have commended Rohan for a seemingly objective and rational interest

analysisonaEuropeanscale inDe l’interest (1638),butbehindhisallegedRealpolitik lies the

propagandistic functionof reasonof state;andasaHuguenot insearchofan importantoffice

underCardinalRichlieu,therewasaparticularneednottofantheflamesofreligiousdivisionin

France. The purpose was to galvanize the confessionally divided French into mobilisation

against Spain. This function is also witnessed in the way Rohan defined a national interest:

always in opposition to interests of other regimes.He defined the ‘true interest’ of France as

necessarilyanti‐Spanish(andsubsequentlypro‐Protestant).Thewholecasewasgivenurgency

by the way in which Spain’s geographic position, wealth and power was portrayed as being

directedtowardsthetotaldominationofChristendom.Itsinterestwasshapedbyfivemaximsor

methodsofgovernmenttoobtaina‘newmonarchy’,ofwhichaproclaimedzealforCatholicism

wasthemostnotableone.Itwasapredatorymonarchy,ruthless,dissemblingandonlyfeigning

religion. The imagewas verymuch a satiric reducio havingmost of the features of the Black

Legendwithoutitsdivisivesectarianism.TheapparentobjectivityofRohan’sunderstandingof

interestandreasonofstatemaybetheresultofoverlookingtwoaspectsofhisargumentthat

havebeenstressedhere:thesatiriccritiqueinvolvedinoutliningSpain’s‘true’interest;andthe

183

strategic displacement of confessional difference, something that should not be taken for

religiousindifference.

InthecontextoftheupsurgeofOrganismin1660‐1661fuelledbytheStuartrestoration,

theDutchmerchantPieterdelaCourtemployedaninterestanalysistodiminishthethreatofthe

reinstatementoftheyoungprinceWilliamofOrangeintheofficesofhisforefathers:stadholder

andcaptaingeneraloftheDutchmilitaryforces.InhisInterestvanHolland(1662)theidiomof

interestfunctionsasathreefoldmeanstoconstructanuncompromisinganti‐Orangistposition.

The mighty opponent of the House of Orange was the province of Holland. The historical,

economic,politicalfeaturesofHollandsuggestedthattheprovincehadnoneedfortheHouseof

Orange.Infact,theOrange‐dynastywasgoingtoruinHolland’ssplendour.Secondly,analliance

with Stuart‐Englandwas of no great value at all; by England’s commercial activities itwould

always seek warfare with Holland. Furthermore, the dynastic connections with the House of

OrangewouldbringHollandtoruin.Finally,itwasarguedthatthePrincesofOrangehadabused

theirofficestopromoteinternalstrifeintheRepublic,tosubjecttheinhabitantsofHolland,and

topursue theirowndynasticgloryandpassions inwarfareanda luxurious lifestyle.Whereas

Rohan’sdemonisedimageofSpainwasofarapacioustyranny,DelaCourtregardedtheHouse

ofOrangeasdespotic‐buttheresultwaseffectivelythesameinthatboththreatenedtocreatea

world of slaves. De la Court’s accusation of predatorymonarchy entailed, however, themore

systematicaspectofa rulewantingwar for reasonsof stabilizationofhis rulewithinhisown

lands.Orangeprincelyrulewasconstructedasahouseholdgovernment,robbingtheinhabitants

oftheirpropertiesandprivileges,enslavingthemall.Anditisincontrasttothedespoticruleof

Orange that De la Court specified the true interest of Holland, a harmonisation of specific

interests that combined and fostered trade with religious toleration. Rather than by‐passing

confessional difference De la Court emphasised that the interests of divisive priests in the

serviceofdespoticrulersthreatenedthetrueinterestsofHolland.

After the French invasion in the SpanishNetherlands in 1667, the trained lawyer and

imperial diplomat François‐Paul de Lisola attacked the Frenchmonarchy by skilfully refuting

LouisXIV’slegalclaimsontheselands,aswellasbypointingtothesourceofitsevil:reasonof

state,especiallythatproclaimedbyRohan.ByanironicinversionofRohan’smaximsofSpains’

and France’s interest, Lisola implicitly argued for the illegitimacy of French conduct, its

predatory nature from Henry IV onwards, feeding on its subjects and conquered peoples,

endangeringthe‘libertyofEurope’.Itwasnotthepeace‐lovingSpaniards,buttheFrenchwho

wererestlesswarlikesavages,andtheFrenchCrownlivedaccordingtoaMachiavellianruleof

conquest.WhereasRohanpointedtothepowerofHabsburg‐Spain,withpossessionsscattered

over the whole world, Lisola urged that Spain’s dispersed territories constituted a military

weakness at onewith its quiet and peaceable nature. Echoing De la Court’s argument, Lisola

184

addedasocialconstructionofpredatorymonarchy,onethatrequireswarfaretosuppressand

delude its subjects in order to extract resources to finance further warfare. Lisola treated

commerce as an instrument to further France’s belligerence and one hat also threatened the

morepeaceful commercialpracticesofEurope.Lisola’smotivewas topersuade theHabsburg

emperorandGermanprincestoaidHabsburg‐Spain,andarguedthisthroughappealstojustice

defendingtheEuropeanlegalorderagainstFrenchexpansionism.LikeRohan,Lisolarequireda

supraconfessional argument for this. Yet, whereas Rohan argued that Spain’s zeal for

Catholicismwasmerelyapretext,LisolacounteredthatjusticewasmerelyapretextforFrance’s

expansionarypolicies;Rohan’sDel’interestbecamepartofhisevidence.ForLisola,theChristian

Europeanorderwas fundamentally apolitical and spiritual entity, opposed to theunchristian

Frenchrule,unchristianas theTurkishhouseholdrule: itundermined theruleof law, robbed

foreign peoples and coerced and abused its subjects, with no consideration for justice

whatsoever.EuropewasusedinterchangeablywithChristendom;althoughLisolaemployedthe

firsttermsubstantiallymoreoften.Thenotionofbalanceofpowerdidnottakecentrestagein

Bouclier; it was only referred to in countering Rohan’s interest analysis of Spain’s desire to

conquest,anduniversalmonarchy.However,Lisoladidassociatethis imageexplicitlywiththe

threat of slavery for all of Europe. The work of a Catholic Habsburg apologist formed the

groundwork for laterEnglish andDutch anti‐Frenchwritings, oftenperceived as arising from

withinpurelyProtestantandcommercialcontextsofargument.Perhapsthefullerironyliesin

thefactthatLisola’sworkwasaninversionoftheHuguenotRohan’sinterestanalysistogether

withitsdemonisedimageofthepredatorymonarch.

In the context of the ‘Disaster Year’, 1672, wherein Louis’s troops and allied forces

rapidlycrushedtheDutchRepublicPetrusValkenieremployedananalysisofinteresttoaddress

Lisola’snewpredator:France.HeaccusedDe laCourtofmaliciouslyattacking thegoodname

and reputation of the princes of Orange, on the orders of De Witt, whose ‘libertine’ and

‘oligarchic’ government was to blame for the quick and disastrous downfall of the Dutch

Republic.However, in ‘tVerwerdEuropaValkenierdeliberatelymirroredDelaCourt’s interest

analysis to turn his arguments around in favour of a unitedRepublic under a strongmilitary

Orange‐princely rule. Furthermore he copiedwhole passages of Rohan’sDe l’interest to state

thatFrancehad takenover fromSpainas supreme threat toEurope.Accordingly,he inverted

Rohan’smaximsonSpain,andreiteratedLisola’simageoftheFrenchbellicosehouseholdrule,

but without Lisola’s ironic touch; perhaps his sense of revulsion was too great to allow any

illusionofdispassionateplay.His imageofFrancewas farmoredetailed thanLisola’sand the

hazardousimplicationsofitsrulewerestretchedtoamuchgreaterextent.Valkenier’sresponse

to the enormity of the threat from France was to put his faith in a prince as supreme

commander.ThisrequiredacompleterejectionofDelaCourt’sattacksontheHouseofOrange,

185

itsambitionsandthecorruptionsforwhichhehadhelditresponsible.Internalcorruptionwas

rathertheresponsibilityofwarpriestsandthelibertinesoftheRepublic.TheReformedChurch

wasneededas themain confession in in theDutchRepublic.Yet, in, as itwere, opposingone

princewith another, theproblemwashow to avoidbothbeingequallypredatory.Valkenier’s

solutionwastourgethatthePrinceofOrangeshould, forallhispower,beconstrainedbythe

constitution, and interest and reason of state ought to be in agreement with justice. His

argument reflects the genuine struggles of political thought in the 1650s‐1680s; a search for

alternativestocivilorderandtheEuropeanlegalorder,forstability.

Thesefourinterestanalysesdisplaythehighlypolemical functionof interestanalysis–

the exact method and type of argument was used and re‐used for different, even opposing

objectives.Aboveall,theyexhibitarelianceonanimageofthepredatorymonarchandalthough

thetargetofhostilitymayvary,eachimageofthemonarchispaintedwithRohanesquemaxims

andconcerted interest indominanceanddestruction, tyrannyanddespotism.The similarities

andthetextualcross‐referencesaresufficienttosuggestthatthesewritersmaybeconsidered

partofatraditionofspeculation,asub‐genreofpoliticalthought.Itrequiresconsiderablymore

study. Rohan, of course has receivedmuch attention, but not in Dutch thought, Lisola’s self‐

consciousappropriationandinversionofhisworkhasbeenlittlenoticed;anditisdifficulttosee

howfurtherexaminationwouldnotalsobreakdowntheunsatisfactoryisolationof,forexample,

Dutch fromEnglishpolitical thoughtor ‘absolutist’ reasonof state froma ‘republican’ counter

ideal.Thepredatorymonarchwasan internationalandEuropeanthreat. If itsometimes looks

like a creation of paranoia, it was widely shared and gave rise to powerful reflection and

resourcefulappropriationofremarkablyflexibleconceptualmaterials.

187

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SummaryThisthesisdealswiththeuseofthevocabularyofreasonofstatewithinthewritingsofHenriDuc de Rohan (1579‐1638), Pieter de la Court (1616‐1685), François‐Paul de Lisola (1613‐1674), andPetrusValkenier (1641‐1712).The riseof thishighlypopularvocabularyhas longbeen perceived as mirroring an early modern programme of state building, but sinceassumptionsunderlyingthetheoryofstatebuildinghavebeenundermined,reasonofstatemustbe reconsidered. The growing scale of early modern European conflict did not generateinstitutional bureaucratic states, but transformed polities into war‐driven and debt‐riddenregimesdependentonnewcollaborationswithvariouspowerbrokerstoorganisea(successful)participationintheEuropeanmilitarycompetition.Moreover,theintensificationofwarfareandconfessionalstrifeamountedtoaperceivedcrisisoftheruleoflaw,aslawsfoundinscripture,RomanLaw, local precedent, deeply rooted inAristotelian and confessionalChristiannotions.Thisthesisreassessestheidiomofreasonofstatewithinthecontextofthistransformation(andconsequentdebatesaboutmountingstatedebt,taxationandthereconfigurationofpower),andagainsttheintellectualbackgroundofauthorsstrugglingtorestorepoliticalandsocialorder.Itaskswhat the functionof reasonof state iswithineach respective source, analysedwithin itsspecific context(s) of crisis and contemporary usages of the idiom of reason of state. Thepurpose of this research is to explore changes in understandings of reason of state; not asabstractandcoherenttheoriesaboutmodernizationandasecularizedconceptionofpolitics,butasstronglypolemicalresponsestoverypracticalandimmediatepoliticalproblems,challengesandcrises,broughtforthbytheintensificationofearlymodernwarfare.

ReasonofstatebecameenvogueinEuropefromthe1590sonwards.InthelatefifteenthandearlysixteenthcenturiesItalianauthorsbegandiscussingthewaystomaintainthe‘state’ofthe ‘new princes’, e.g. the Medici, without relying on more traditional idioms of legitimationprovidedbyappealstocivicvirtue.Reasonofstatebecamepartofa‘vocabularyoffashionablepoliticalcynicism’aboutthe‘true’motivesofrulersspurredbytheexperiencesofthe(religious)wars. This vocabulary included popular aphorisms andmaxims, such as necessitas non habetlegem,andwascloselyassociatedwiththeterminologyof‘politics’, ‘statecraft’, ‘Machiavellism’,and ‘interest (of state)’. ‘Reason’ and ‘state’ could mean many different things (e.g.reasoning/the intellectual capacity to reason/ a rationale, and (princely) status/ condition ofsomething/ an office/a regime, respectively). It had a precarious identity and was a highlysuggestivetermofart;and,therefore,reasonofstateoughtnottobeseenasatheoryorconcept.Yet,exactly itsopacitywasthereasonfor itsearlymodernpopularity.Furthermore,reasonofstate was presented as relevant to the practice of politics (unlike the ‘mirror for princes’literature).Initsmostnarrow,Machiavellianunderstanding,reasonofstatediscussedtheroomfortherulertomanoeuvre,incasesofnecessity,beyondtheboundsofnormallegal,moral,andreligiousconstraints.

Thisthesisfocusesonthespecificterminologyof‘interest(ofstate)’,whichfromthelatesixteenthcenturyonwardsbecameamoreorlesssynonymousorassociativetermfor‘reasonofstate’ emphasising the justifiablenotionofprofit orutility.Rohanpopularised the term inhisfamousDel’interest(1638)thatbecametheblueprintforwritingsonthe‘trueinterestsofstates

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ofEurope’.Hecomplementedcriticalanalysisof themoralpersonof therulerandhispoliticswithcloseattentiontothenatureofthesocietiesheruled(e.g.thepresentgeographicalposition,political structures, religious make‐up, military prowess, and relations with other rulers), soaddingafurtherdimensiontointerestasreasonofstate.Thiscomplementationwasfoundedonthe growing importance of historical analysis, by means of which the international elementcouldbemoreclearlydistinguishedfromadomesticone.Whatismore,Rohandiminishedtheguidingimportanceoftheethicsofofficebyprimarilyfocusingontheruledsocieties.ThroughtheadaptivereferencetoandrelianceuponRohan’work,thisthesisarguesthatRohanprovidedavocabularyorganised intoawayof seeing thepoliticalworld thatwas itself stimulatedandconstrainedbyaperceivedcrisis,bothnationaland‘international’,secularaswellasreligious.Through the subsequent use of Rohan and the employment of his vocabulary of interest thisthesisshowstheingenuityofargumentunderdirectpressures.TheresultwasbothtoestablishRohanasanauthority,providingaseminalandpersuasively inescapable text thatshapedandconstrainedargument; andas resource foradaptation. Inall the casesarguedandcoheredbyreference toRohan, the stimulus to argumentwas a sense of immediate anddire threat, bestsummarised as a predatory monarchy, sometimes deemed despotic, sometimes tyrannical,usually arbitrary in its actions or anticipated conduct, sometimes all three, but alwaysendangering a fragile peace and a sense of acceptable political and social order. Such apostulatedorderwasoftentakenasinvolvingaruleoflaw,sometimesamoralregimeshieldedfromcorruption,sometimesaputativebalanceofpowerbetweencompetinginterests.

Historians have commended Rohan for a seemingly objective and rational interestanalysisonaEuropeanscaleinDel’interest(1638),buttheyhaveoverlookedthesatiriccritiqueinvolved in outlining Spain’s ‘true’ interest; and the strategic displacement of confessionaldifference, something that should not be taken for religious indifference. Hiswork should beassessed as belonging to a ‘genre of critical current‐affairs commentary’ emerging during theThirtyYears’War,inwhichasatiricemploymentofreasonofstate(satiricintermsofimplicitcriticism) was combined with reports on current affairs. Studied against the backdrop ofpressingfactionaldebatesinFranceoverthepursuitofwarfareintertwinedwithdebatesaboutmuchneededfinancialreformandtheissueofFrenchProtestantism,andRohan’sdireneedforaprestigious office as an exiled ex‐Huguenot leader, his use of reason of state shows thepropagandistic function of this vocabulary, first and foremost.Written on the eve of France’sdirect intervention in the Thirty Years’ War in 1635, the purpose was to galvanize theconfessionally divided French into mobilisation against Catholic Spain. He defined the ‘trueinterest of France’ as necessarily anti‐Spanish (and subsequently pro‐Protestant). The wholecasewasgivenurgencybythewayinwhichSpain’sgeographicposition,wealthandpowerwasportrayedasbeingdirectedtowardsthetotaldominationofChristendom.TheSpanishinterestwasshapedbyfivemaximsormethodsofgovernmenttoobtaina ‘newmonarchy’,ofwhichazealforCatholicismwasthemostnotableone.TheimagewasverymuchasatiricreduciohavingmostofthefeaturesoftheBlackLegendwithoutitsdivisivesectarianism.Spainwasapredatorymonarchy based on a rule of conquest, ruthless, dissembling and only feigning religion. TheseeminglyobjectiveandsupraconfessionalinterestanalysisenabledRohan,firstly,toimplicitlyaccuseSpainofpursuingunrestrictedanduniversal tyrannical control,while correspondinglysidesteppingreligiouspolemics;and,secondly,toenvisageapatrioticFrenchunityinwhichtheformerHuguenotrebelcouldre‐claimanoffice. TodiminishthethreatofanOrangerestorationintheearly‐1660s,theDutchmerchant,Pieter de la Court, vigorously attacked the Orange dynasty by identifying the interest of theplunder prince in his Interest van Holland (1662). The idiom of interest constructs an

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uncompromisinganti‐Orangistpositioninathreefoldway.Bycontributingtoitaninterest,DelaCourt made the province of Holland into the mighty opponent of the House of Orange. Thehistorical,economic,andpolitical featuresofHollandsuggestedthattheprovincehadnoneedfor the House of Orange. In fact, he claimed that the Orange dynasty was going to destroyHolland’s splendour. Secondly, an alliance with Stuart‐England was of no great value at all;England’s interest showed, especially through its commercial activities, that it would alwaysseekwarfarewithHolland.Furthermore, thedynasticconnectionsofStuartwith theHouseofOrangewouldbringHollandtoruin.Finally,itwasarguedthatthePrincesofOrangehadabusedtheir offices of stadholder and captain general. They had promoted internal strife in theRepublic, subjected the inhabitants of Holland, and solely pursued their own dynastic glory,passions for warfare and a luxurious lifestyle. His argument on the need to harmonise theinterests between rulers and ruled was at one with English civil war arguments on interest,whichwere grounded on Rohan’s idea that the princemay rule the people, but that interestruledtheprince.InterestvanHollandisbetterunderstoodasadistinctvariationonthethemesenunciated by Rohan, than as a quintessential example of Dutch ‘republicanism’ or ‘anti‐monarchism’.AlthoughDelaCourtpreferredarepublicanconstitutionfortheDutchRepublic,kingship in itself was legitimate and in other polities monarchy was simply acceptable. HemainlysuggestedanidealorderforHollandwheretheprivilegesandpropertiesofcitizenswereprotectedagainstraidsoftheplunderprinceandthepower‐hungrymembersofhishousehold(priests,soldiers,favourites)inordertopromoteeffectivelythefoundationofthetrueinterestof Holland: commerce. Compared to Rohan’s image of the rapacious tyranny of Spain, De laCourt’sallegationofpredatorymonarchyentailedthemoresystematicaspectofarulewantingwarforreasonsofstabilizationoftheruler’sauthoritywithinhislands.

In the context of the War of Devolution (1667‐1668) in which France invaded theSpanishNetherlands,François‐PauldeLisola,deliberatelyreversedRohan’sinterestanalysisofSpain andFrance inhis international bestsellerBouclier (1667). The imperial diplomat Lisolarequired a supraconfessional argument for persuading the Habsburg emperor and Germanprinces to aid Habsburg‐Spain in the battle against Louis XIV. Historians have stated thesignificance ofBouclier in rejuvenating the notion of universalmonarchy power by turning itagainst France and stressing the necessary maintenance of the European balance of powerresultinginasecularandmodernnotionofEurope;buttheyhaveoverlookedLisola’sreversionofDel’interest.LisolaattackedtheFrenchmonarchybyskilfullyrefutingLouisXIV’slegalclaimson theHabsburgspossessions, aswell asbypointing to the sourceof its evil: reasonof state,especiallythatproclaimedbyRohan.LisolaliterarycopiedargumentsofRohanandturnedthesewithagreat flair for ironyagainstFrance,presentingRohan’sworkas theblueprint forLouisXIV’suniversalmonarchy.Theresultiseffectively,perhapsself‐consciously,asatiricparodyofDe l’interest. Whereas Rohan argued that Spain’s zeal for Catholicism was merely a pretext,LisolacounteredthatlegalitywasmerelyapretextforFrance’sexpansionarypolicies;Rohan’sDe l’interestbecamepartofhisevidence.InamoresystematicmannerheassessedtheFrenchsystemofrule,notonlybasedonaruleofconquest,but,echoingDelaCourt’sargument,ontheslavish nature of its people and its inherent household rule, robbing the privileges andpropertiesofitssubjectsathomeandabroad,tofinancewarfareforuniversaldominion.Againstthe French predatory monarchy, the European legal order should be guarded by a mutualpursuitofreasonofstateandjustice.RecentscholarshiphasshownhowBouclier,theworkofaCatholic Habsburg apologist, formed the groundwork for later English and Dutch anti‐Frenchwritings,oftenperceivedasarising fromwithinpurelyProtestantandcommercial contextsofargument. Perhaps the fuller irony lies in the fact that Lisola’sworkwas an inversion of the

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HuguenotRohan’sinterestanalysistogetherwithitsdemonisedimageoftheSpanishpredatorymonarch.

PetrusValkenier’s ‘tVerwerdEuropa(1675)isaresponsetothe ‘YearofDisaster’in1672,inflictedupontheDutchRepublicbytheinvasionofLouisXIVthatresultedinmassivecivilriotsand the re‐installation of Orange. Hiswork has been (dis)credited as amere anti‐French andpro‐Orangist pamphlet, and his thought has been qualified as ‘Orange republicanism’ and anunoriginalemploymentofreasonofstate.Thesequalificationsshould,however,bere‐evaluated.Valkenier’suseandtransformationoftheargumentsofRohan,DelaCourtandLisolashowthehighlypolemicalfunctionofinterestanalysis–theexactmethodandtypeofargumentwasusedandre‐used fordifferent,evenopposingobjectives.ValkenieremployedthesameRohanesquemodusoperandiagainstwhathedeemedtheoligarchicdecadenceoftheDeWittregimeandtheruthlesspredatorymonarchyofFrance.HedeliberatelymirroredDelaCourt’sinterestanalysisto turnDe laCourt’sargumentsaround in favourofaunitedRepublicunderastrongmilitaryOrange‐princelyrule.Furthermore,ValkeniercopiedwholepassagesofRohan’sDe l’interesttostate that France had taken over from Spain as supreme threat to Europe. Accordingly, heinverted Rohan’s maxims on Spain, and reiterated Lisola’s image of the French bellicosehouseholdrule,butwithoutLisola’sironictouch;perhapshissenseofrevulsionwastoogreattoallowanyillusionofdispassionateplay.Whatismore,behindthepolitico‐historicalaccountof1672appears the feelingof thecrisisof theruleof lawandasearch forhowordershouldberestored.Consequently,‘tVerwerdEuropaexhibitsseveralpotentiallytensilethemes.Valkenierdefended the stronghold of the Dutch Reformed Church in society, and attacked the allegedatheismandlibertinismofthe‘politiques’,ashesawDeWitt;yethealsocriticisedtheologians,who purportedly divided society with their quarrels and incited princes and peoples intowarfare. Valkenier rejectedDe la Court’s full‐frontal attack onwar‐mongering princes, yet hecondemned plunder despots in a similar manner. He favoured an Orange princely rule withexpanded military and financial resources, yet within the constraints of the establishedrepublicanconstitution.Itwasoperatingwithinsuchanorder,protectingpersons,propertyandprivileges,whichstoppedaprincefrombecomingapredatorymonarch.

Forallthewritersdiscussedinthisthesis,theveryrealfearsofabreakdownofsocialandpolitical order, of there being no effective legal constraints, focussed on the threat of violentmilitary activity, a fear of catastrophic and exorbitantly expensive warfare. In all cases whatmatteredwasspecifyingandanalysingthedanger,thepredator.Whatitthreatenedcouldoftenberelativelyunspecific,evenopentothereadertoidentifyforhimself.ThisfocusontheevilsofapredatorymonarchywascentraltoRohan’swholeunderstandingofinterest—interestwasthemeansofcastinglightonitsdangers.ButhavingsetthetoneindemonisingHabsburg‐Spainwiththe concomitant imperative to France to stand opposed in its own true interest, Rohan’sperspective was complimented by a wealth of evidence. All the authors (Rohan, De la Court,LisolaandValkenier)exhibitarelianceonanimageofthepredatorymonarchandalthoughthetargetofhostilitymayvary,eachimageofthemonarchispaintedwithRohanesquemaximsandconcerted interest in dominance and destruction, tyranny and despotism. Regardless ofspecifics, the posited interest of the demonised predatory monarch provided a way ofredescribingawholesociety,somagnifyingthedangerstothethreatened.Thesimilaritiesandthetextualcross‐referencesaresufficienttosuggestthatthesewritersmaybeconsideredpartofatraditionofspeculation,orasub‐genreofpoliticalthought. Asthereferencesinthechaptersmakeclear,thesewerenotlonevoicesandsothegenrerequiresconsiderablymorework.

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SamenvattingDezethesisbehandelthetgebruikvandevocabulairevanstaatsraisonindewerkenvanHenriDuc de Rohan (1579‐1638), Pieter de la Court (1616‐1685), François‐Paul de Lisola (1613‐1674),enPetrusValkenier(1641‐1712).Deopkomstvanditzeerpopulairevocabulairewordtgezien als een literaire manifestatie van vroegmoderne processen van staatsvorming, maaraangeziendeonderliggendeaannamesvandetheorievanstaatsvormingondermijndzijn,moetstaatsraison worden herzien. De groeiende schaal van het vroegmoderne Europese conflictbracht namelijk geen geïnstitutionaliseerde en bureaucratische staten voort, maartransformeerdemonarchieënenrepublieken inregimesvoortgedrevendooroorlogenschuld,en afhankelijk van nieuwe samenwerkingsverbandenmet invloedrijke tussenpersonen om dedeelname aan de Europese militaire competitie te organiseren. De intensivering vanoorlogsvoering (en confessionele strijd) leidde tevens tot een crisis van de ‘rule of law’,gebaseerd op wetten gevonden in de Bijbel, Romeins Recht, lokale precedenten endiepgeworteld in Aristotelische en confessioneel Christelijke noties. Deze dissertatie re‐interpreteert het idioom van staatsraison in de context van deze transformatie (en inherentedebatten over stijgende overheidsschulden, belastingen, en de reorganisatie van macht), entegen de intellectuele achtergrond van auteurs, die worstelden met het vraagstuk hoe depolitiekeen socialeorde teherstellen.Bijdeze re‐interpretatie staatdevraag centraalwatdefunctie is van staatsraison in elke afzonderlijke bron. Deze vraag wordt geanalyseerd in despecifiekecontext(en)vancrisisenhettoenmaliggebruikvandevocabulairevanstaatsraison.Het doel van dit onderzoek is het exploreren van veranderingen in denkbeelden overstaatsraison.Dezewordennietbeschouwdalsabstracteencoherentemoderniseringstheorieënof een seculariserende notie van politiek, maar als sterk polemische antwoorden op zeerpraktische en acute politieke problemen, op uitdagingen en crises, voorgebracht door detoenamevanoorlogsvoeringinvroegmodernEuropa.

Staatsraison raakte indemode inEuropavanafde jaren1590. Inde latevijftiendeenvroege zestiendeeeuwbegonnen Italiaanseauteurs tediscussiërenoverdemanierenvanhetbehoudenvande‘staat’van‘nieuwevorsten’,zoalsdeMedici,zonderhierbijterugtevallenopmeer traditionele legitimeringsidiomen die de burgerlijke deugd centraal stellen. Staatsraisonwerdonderdeelvaneen‘vocabulairevanmodieuspolitiekcynisme’overde‘ware’motievenvanvorsten, voortgekomen uit de ervaringen van de vele (religieuze) oorlogen in Europa. Ditvocabulairebehelsdepopulaireaforismenenmaximes,zoalsnecessitasnonhabetlegem,enwasnauwverbondenmetdeterminologievan ‘politiek’, ‘staatskunde’,Machiavellisme’,en ‘interest(van staat)’. ‘Raison’ en ‘staat’ droegen vele betekenissen (e.g. beredeneren/de intellectuelecapaciteit on te redeneren/een grondgedachte en status/ conditie van iets/een ambt/eenregime, respectievelijk). Staatsraison had een kritieke identiteit en was vooral een zeersuggestieveterm.Daarommoethetnietwordenbeschouwdalseentheorieofeenvastomlijndconcept. De ambiguïteit van de term was de voornaamste reden voor de vroegmodernepopulariteit van staatsraison. Staatsraisonwerd daarnaast gepresenteerd al relevant voor depolitieke praktijk (in plaats van ‘vorstenspiegel’‐literatuur). In zijn meest nauwe,Machiavellistische betekenis behandelde staatsraison de ruimte voor de heerser om temanoeuvreren,intijdenvannood,overjuridische,moreleenreligieuzegrenzen.

Indezethesisligtdenadrukopdespecifieketerminologievan‘interest(vanstaat)’,datvanaf de late zestiende eeuw een ongeveer synonieme of associatieve term werd voor

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‘staatsraison’ en daarmee de notie van winst of utiliteit voor de heerser benadrukte. Rohanpopulariseerde de term in zijn beroemde De l’interest (1638), dat de blauwdruk werd voorwerken over de ‘ware interesten van staten van Europa’. Hij vulde kritische analyse van demorelepersoonvandevorstenzijnpolitiekaan,metnauwkeurigeaandachtvoordeaardvandemaatschappijenwaarover hij heerste (e.g. de huidige geografische positie, politiek structuren,religieuze opbouw,militaire kracht, en relatiesmet andere heersers).Opdezemanier voegdeRohaneenverderedimensietoeaaninterestalsstaatsraison.Dezenieuwefocuskwamvoortuiteen groeiend belang van historische analyse,waarmee het internationale domeinmakkelijkergescheiden kon worden van een intern domein. Daarnaast verminderde Rohan het leidendebelangvandeethiekomtrentambtendoorzichvooralterichtenopdebestuurdegebieden.DezethesisbeargumenteertaandehandvanaangepasteverwijzingennaarenhetvoortbouwenopRohanswerk,dathij eenvocabulaireverstrekte,die georganiseerdwasopeenmanieromdepolitieke wereld te kunnen begrijpen. Deze politieke wereld werd gestimuleerd en begrensddoor een beleefde crisis, zowel nationaal als internationaal, seculier als religieus. Door hetopeenvolgendegebruikvanDel’interestenhetgebruikvanRohansvocabulairevaninterest,laatdezethesisdevindingrijkheidzienvaneenargument,dieonderextremespanningenstaat.Hetresultaat was het vestigen van Rohans De l’interest als een autoriteit: een rudimentaire enonvermijdelijke tekst, die argumentatie vormde en beperkte, en als een bron diende voorverdereaanpassingen. Inalleonderzochtegevallenbestonddemotivatievanschrijvenuiteendirecte en onheilspellende dreiging, dat het beste kan worden samengevat met de term,predatorymonarchy.Somswerdhetgezienalsdespotisch,somstiranniek,meestalarbitrair inzijnactiesofverwachtegedrag,somsalledrie;maaraltijdwerdhetbegrepenalshetingevaarbrengenvaneenfragielevredeeneennotievanorde.Dezeordeomvatteeenideevande‘ruleoflaw’, i.e. een moreel regime beschermd tegen corruptie of een zogenaamd machtsevenwichttussenstrijdendeinteresten.

HistoricihebbenRohangeprezenomzijnogenschijnlijkobjectieveenrationeleinterest‐analyse van Europa. Wat zij echter over het hoofd hebben gezien is de satirische kritiek inRohans beschrijving van het Spaanse interest en zijn strategisch ontwijken van confessioneleverschillen. Dit laatste moet zeker niet worden beschouwd als een teken van religieuzeonverschilligheid.De l’interestmoetwordenbeoordeeldalsbehorendebijhet ‘genreofcriticalcurrent‐affairs commentary’, dat onstond gedurende de Dertigjarige Oorlog en waarin eensatirisch gebruik van staatsraison (satirisch in de vroegmoderne betekenis van implicietekritiek) werd gecombineerd met actualiteitsverslagen. Zijn gebruik van staatsraisondemonstreert allereerst de propagandistische functie van dit vocabulaire, vooral gezien decontexten waarin het geschreven is. Naast het feit dat Rohan dringend een prestigieus ambtnodighadnaderecentelijkgefaaldeHugenotenopstandenonderzijnleiding,intervenieerdehijindehevigedebatten in toenmaligFrankrijkoverhetnastrevenvanoorlogvoering,denodigefinanciëlehervormingenendekwestievanhetFransprotestantisme.HijschreefDel’interestopdevooravondvandeFransedirecte interventie indeDertigjarigeOorlog in1634metalsdoelhet confessioneel verdeeldeFrankrijk op te zwepen tot eenmobilisering tegenhet katholiekeSpanje.Hijdefinieerdehet‘wareinterestvanFrankrijk’alsnoodzakelijkanti‐Spaans(endusookpro‐protestants). De gehele kwestie verkreeg urgentie door de wijze waarop Spanjesgeografische positie, rijkdom, en macht werden afgebeeld. Spanje zou streven naar de totaleoverheersing van het Christendom. Het Spaanse interest werd gevormd door vijf ‘maximes’(overheidsmethoden)vanhetverkrijgenvaneen ‘nieuwemonarchie’,waarvaneenkatholiekegeloofsijverdemeestebelangrijkewas.Hetbeeldwaseensatirischereducio,diedemeestevandekenmerkenvandeZwarteLegendebevattezonderhetbijbehorende,verdelendesektarisme.

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De Spaanse monarchie was een predatory monarchy, gebaseerd op een heerschappij doorverovering, meedogenloos en misleidend, en slechts vroomheid veinzend. De zogenaamdeobjectieve en supraconfessionele interest‐analyse maakte het mogelijk voor Rohan om, teneerste, Spanje te beschuldigen van het nastreven van ongelimiteerde, tiranniekewereldheerschappij,entegelijkertijdreligieuzepolemiekentevermijden;en,tentweede,omeenpatriottische Franse eenheid te creëren waarin de voormalige Hugenoot‐rebel een ambt konher‐opeisen.

OmdedreigingvaneenOranje‐restauratieteverkleinenindevroegejaren1660,vieldeHollandse koopman, Pieter de la Court, de Oranje dynastie aan in zijn beruchte Interest vanHolland (1662). Dit deed hij door middel van het identificeren van het interest van deplunderprins.Het idioomvan interestwerddrievoudig ingezetomeensterkanti‐Orangistischargument te creëren. Door het toeschrijven van een interest aan de provincie van Holland,vervormde De la Court ‘Holland’ tot de machtige tegenstander van het Oranjehuis. Dehistorische, economische, en politieke kenmerken van Holland toonden dat de provincie deprinsvanOranjenietnodighad.Sterkernog,OranjezouHollandsweelderuïneren.Tentweede,het interest van Engelandwees uit dat een alliantiemet Stuart‐Engeland niet wenselijk was,want ter bescherming van zijn handel zou Engeland altijd oorlog met Holland nastreven.DaarnaastzoudendedynastiekerelatiesvanStuartmetOranjeHollandingrootgevaarbrengen.HetderdegebruikvaninterestkwamnaarvoreninDelaCourtsverklaringhoeinhetrecenteverledendeOranje‐prinsenhunambtenvanstadhouderenkapitein‐generaalhaddenmisbruiktominterneconflictenindeRepubliektestimuleren,deinwonersvanHollandteonderwerpen,enhunpersoonlijkedynastiekeglorie,enpassiesvooroorlogvoeringeneenluxelevensstijlnatestreven. De la Courts argument over de noodzaak van het harmoniseren van de interestentussenoverheidenonderdanenkwamgeheelovereenmet interest‐argumentenuitdeEngelseBurgeroorlog,dieophunbeurt gefundeerdwarenopRohans ideedatdeprins inderdaadhetvolkbestuurde,maardathetinterestdeprinsbestuurde.InterestvanHollandkanbeterwordengezienalseenvariantopde thema’sopgeschrevendoorRohan,danalseentypischvoorbeeldvan Nederlands ‘republikanisme’ of ‘anti‐monarchisme’. Ondanks dat De la Court hetrepublikeinse staatsbestel prefereerde voor de Nederlandse Republiek, beschouwde hijkoningschap als legitiem, en was monarchie in andere politieke eenheden simpelwegaanvaardbaar. Hij suggereerde een ideale orde voor Holland, waarin de privileges eneigendommenvanburgerswerdenbeschermdtegenstrooptochtenvandeplunderprinsendemachtswellustigeledenvanzijnhuishouden(priesters,soldaten,enfavorieten).OpdezemanierkondefunderingvanHollandswareinterest,namelijkhandel,gestimuleerdworden.Vergelekenmet Rohans beeldvorming over de roofzuchtige tirannie van Spanje, bevatten De la Courtsbeschuldigingenvanpredatorymonarchyeenmeersystematischaspectvaneenheerschappij,diegedrevenwerddoorhetstabiliserenvandevorstzijnautoriteitinzijneigengebieden.

In de context van de Devolutieoorlog (1667‐1668) waarin Frankrijk de SpaanseNederlandenbinnenviel,keerdeFrançois‐PauldeLisolaopzettelijkRohansinterest‐analysevanSpanjetegenFrankrijkinzijninternationalebestsellerBouclier(1667).DekeizerlijkediplomaatLisola had een supraconfessioneel argument nodig om de Habsburgse keizer en de Duitsevorsten te overtuigen Habsburg‐Spanje te helpen in de strijd tegen Lodewijk XIV. HistoricihebbenhetbelangonderstreeptvanditwerkvoordevernieuwingvandenotievanuniverselemonarchieenhetaanscherpenvandeideevaneenEuropeesmachtsevenwicht,datzouhebbengeresulteerdineenseculiereenmodernenotievanEuropa.ZijhebbenechterLisola’sombuigingvan De l’interest niet opgemerkt. Lisola viel de Franse monarchie aan door zowel behendigLodewijks juridische claims op deHabsburgse bezittingen teweerleggen, als door hetwijzen

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naardebronvanhetFransekwaad:staatsraison,voornamelijkdatgeneverkondigddoorRohan.LisolakopieerdeRohansargumentenwoordvoorwoordendraaidedezemetkundigeironieomtegen Frankrijk. Hij presenteerde daarbij Rohans werk als de blauwdruk voor Lodewijksuniverselemonarchie.Hetresultaatiseffectief,wellichtbewust,eensatirischeparodieopdeDel’interest. Rohan beargumenteerde dat Spanjes geloofsijver voor het katholicisme slechts eendekmantel was voor het Spaanse, tirannieke streven naar de wereldheerschappij. Lisola’srepliek was dat het Franse oogmerk van legaliteit slechts een pretext was voor de Franseroofzucht. Rohans De l’interest werd onderdeel van zijn bewijsvoering. Op een meersystematische wijze analyseerde Lisola het Franse overheidssysteem, die hij niet enkelverklaarde als een heerschappij door verovering, zoals Rohan had gedaan, maar als eenheerschappijvaneenmeesteroverzijnhuishouden,dievoortkwamuitdeslaafsenatuurvanhetFransevolk(eenweerspiegelingvanDelaCourtsargument).HetFranseoverheidssysteemwasgebaseerdophetrovenvandeprivilegeseneigendommenvanonderdanen,zowelinFrankrijkals daarbuiten, om zodoende verdere oorlogvoering te financieren en een universeleslavenheerschappij te vestigen. De Europese rechtsorde moest beschermd worden tegen deFransepredatorymonarchy.RecentonderzoeksteltdatBouclier,hetwerkvaneenkatholieke,Habsburgse apologist, de fundering vormde voor latere Engelse en Nederlandse anti‐Fransegeschriften,dievaakwordenbeschouwdalsvoortkomenduitpureprotestantseencommerciëlecontexten.Misschienhetmeest ironischehieraan ishet feitdatLisola’swerkeen inversiewasvandeHugenootRohansinterest‐analyse,metzijngedemoniseerdevoorstellingvandeSpaansepredatorymonarch.

PetrusValkeniers‘tVerwerdEuropa(1675)iseenantwoordophetRampjaarvan1672,waarin de Nederlandse Republiek werd aangevallen door Lodewijk XIV, wat resulteerde ingewelddadige,burgerlijkeoproerenenhetherstelvanhetOranje‐stadhouderschap.Zijnwerkisbeoordeeld als een zwaar gekleurd anti‐Frans pamflet, en zijn politiek denken als ‘Orangerepublicanism’eneenonorigineleuitingvanstaatsraison.Dezevisiesmoetenwordenherzien.ValkeniersgebruikentransformatievanRohans,DelaCourts,enLisola’stekstentonendezeerpolemische functie van interest‐analyse – de exacte methode en het type argument werdgebruikt en hergebruikt voor verschillende, zelfs tegenovergestelde doeleinden. ValkeniergebruiktedezelfdeRohanesquemodusoperanditegen,wathijbeschouwdeals,deoligarchischedecadentievanhetDeWitt‐regimeendemeedogenlozepredatorymonarchyvanFrankrijk.HijweerspiegeldebewustDelaCourtsinterest‐analyseomDelaCourtsargumentomtedraaienterverdediging van een verenigde Republiek onder leiding van de prins van Oranje. Bovendienkopieerde Valkenier gehele passages uit Rohans De l’interest om zodoende te stellen datFrankrijk het vroegere Spaanse streven naar universele monarchie had overgenomen. Hijdraaide Rohans maximes van Spanje om, en herhaalde Lisola’s beeld van de Franseslavenheerschappij, maar zonder Lisola’s ironische stijl. Wellicht was zijn walging voor deFransen te groot om elke illusie van speelse nonchalance te laten bestaan. Bovendienverschijnenachterhetpolitiek‐historischerelaasvan1671eengevoelvancrisisvanderuleoflaweneenzoektochtnaarhoeordehersteldmoetworden.In‘tVerwerdEuropawordendanookverschillendepotentieelcontrasterendethema’sbehandeld.ValkenierverdedigdededominantepositievandeNederlandsHervormdeKerkinRepubliek,enbestreedhetzogenaamdeatheïsmeen libertinisme van de ‘politiques’, zoals hij De Witt afschilderde. Tegelijkertijd echter,bekritiseerdehij theologen,diedemaatschappij zoudenverdelenmethunmeningsverschillenen debatten, en vorsten en volkeren zouden aanzetten tot oorlog. Valkenier verwierp De laCourtsbotteaanvalopoorlogszuchtigevorsten,maarookhijageerdetegenplunderprinsenenhunroofzuchtigehuishoudens,diehijbelichaamdzaginLodewijkXIVenzijnmonarchie.Voor

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deNederlandseRepubliekprefereerdeValkeniereenOranje‐heerschappij,dieberustmoestzijnop uitgebreide militaire en financiële middelen, maar wel beperkt moest worden door hetconstitutioneleraamwerkvandeRepubliek.Zijnidealeordebegafzichineengematigdgebiedtussen atheïsme en orthodoxie, en tussen oorlogvoering en roofzucht, en diende vooral debeschermingvandeonderdanen,hunbezitenprivileges.Dezeordezoudeontaardingvanprinsineenpredatorymonarchtegengaan.

Allebestudeerdeauteursvreesdeneenineenstortingvandesocialeenpolitiekorde,hetwegvallen van effectieve constitutionele beperkingen. Daarbij focusten zij zich op de dreigingvan gewelddadig militaire handelingen en een angst voor rampzalige en exorbitant dureoorlogvoering.Inallegevallendraaidehetomhetspecifiërenenanalyserenvanhetgevaar,depredator(roofdier).Wathetexactebedreigde,wasvaakrelatiefonduidelijkenvaakzelfsaandelezeromtebepalen.Deze focusopdegevarenvaneenpredatorymonarchystondcentraal inRohansgebruikvaninterest–interestwashetmiddelomzijngevarentebelichten.RohanzettedetoonmethetdemoniserenvanHabsburg‐Spanjeenhet inherenteadviesvoorFrankrijkomSpanje tegen te gaan, vanuit Frankrijks eigen interest. Rohans perspectief werdgecomplementeerd door een weelde aan bronnen. Alle schrijvers toonden een rotsvastvertrouwen in een beeld van de predatorymonarch. En alhoewel het vijandelijk doelwit konverschillen, tochwerdelkebeeldafgeschilderdmetRohanesquemaximesenovereenkomstigeinterestenvandominantieendestructie,tirannieendespotisme.Hetgeponeerdeinterestvandepredatory monarch verstrekte een manier om een gehele maatschappij te herschrijven enzodoende de gevaren te vergroten. De overeenkomsten en tekstuele kruisbestuivingen zijnvoldoendeomtesuggereren,datdezeschrijverskunnenwordenbeschouwdalsbehorendebijeentraditievanreflectieofeensub‐genrevanpolitiekdenken.Enzoalsdeveleverwijzingeninde hoofdstukken laten zien, stonden zij niet alleen hierin. Dit sub‐genre vereist daaromsubstantieelmeeronderzoek.

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CurriculumVitae

MarianneKlerkwasbornin1985inMiddelburg.ShestudiedhistoryattheErasmusUniversityRotterdamand in2010 shegraduatedcum laudeona studyof thepolitical thought ofPetrusValkenier, inparticularhisuseofthevocabularyofreasonofstate.AftergraduationMariannebecame a PhD candidate working on the NWO‐funded research project ‘Reason of state’ or‘reasonofprinces’?The‘newmonarchyanditsopponentsinFrance,GermanyandtheNetherlands,during the seventeenthcentury (2011‐2016).Marianne also lecturedon several courses in thehistorycurriculumatundergraduateandgraduatelevel.FromOctober2017shewillworkasapostdoctoralresearcherontheprojectofTheFiscalMilitarySystem,1580‐1850attheUniversityofOxford.

Publications

Klerk,M.B., “TheunheardChanges inEurope,and thestrangeRevolutionswhichhappened inourUnitedProvinces inour times”: reasonofstateandruleof law inPetrusValkenier’s ‘tVerwerd Europa (1675)’, Robert von Friedeburg and Matthias Schmoeckel (ed.), Recht,Konfession und Verfassung im 17. Jahrhundert.West‐ undmitteleuropäische Entwicklungen(Berlin:Duncker&Humblot,2015),285‐335.

ConferencePapersandInvitedTalks(aselection)

Klerk, M.B., ‘Reconstructing the Rule of Law and Reason of State in the Age of Louis XIV’, 14th International Congress for Eighteenth-Century Studies (Rotterdam, 27 July 2015).

Klerk, M.B., ‘Reason of state debates in the Dutch Republic: Pieter de la Court's Interest van Holland (1662) and Petrus Valkenier's 't Verwerd Europa (1675)’ at Confessional Paradigms for European Politics and Jurisprudence in the 17th Century? Althusius Gesellschaft (Rotterdam, 17 May 2013).

Klerk, M.B., ‘From the Anti-Spanish Black Legend to Anti-French Constitutionalism’, XIII Seminario Internacional de Historia "Vísperas de Sucesión. Europa y la Monarquía de Carlos II": (Madrid, 30 November 2012).

Klerk, M.B., ‘Anti-Monarchism in Pieter de la Court’s Interest van Holland (1662): Republican Ideals or Anti-Orangism?’, Research Seminar the Erasmus Center for Early Modern Studies (Rotterdam, 15 November 2012). Klerk, M.B., ‘Petrus Valkenier and Francois-Paul de Lisola: the menace of the French “New Monarchy”’, Oberseminar Frühen Neuzeit Justus-Liebig-Universität (Gießen, 4 July 2012).

Klerk, M.B., ‘Petrus Valkenier and 't Verwerd Europa (1675)’, Expert Meeting Fault line 1700, Early Enlightenment Conversations on Religion and the state (Rotterdam, 21 November 2011).

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AcknowledgementsBeingaPh.D.candidateiswonderfulforoneisgivenprecioustimetoreadandwrite,tospendthe day contemplating thoughts and sharing these with others, and the priceless freedom towork whenever, wherever. And sometimes it is hard, –hard to explain to outsiders what itinvolvesandsimplyjusthardtoundertakeandcomplete.Luckily,Ihavereceivedsupportandguidancefrommanypeopleoverthepastfewyears.

Firstand foremost, Iwould like toexpressmydeepgratitudetomysupervisorRobertvonFriedeburg,whosefirst‐yearcourseinspiredmetostudyearlymodernhistoryandwhohasguidedmeeversince.Thankyouforyoursupportandgivingmetheopportunitytogrowasaresearcher.IamalsogreatlyindebtedtoConalCondren,mysecondsupervisor,whointensivelyguidedmethroughthe lastphaseofwritingand finishingmythesis.Thankyouforyourtime,brilliantcomments,endlesssuggestionsandconstantencouragements.

Agreatnumberofpeoplehavehelpedmealongtheway.IespeciallywouldliketothankJan Waszink for his continuous guidance and companionship. And I am grateful to the kindsupport of Charles‐Édouard Levillain. I thank Paul Rahe andHarroHöpfl for their comments,criticismandsuggestionsattheclosingconferenceoftheresearchproject.AndIamgratefultotheNWOforfundingtheproject.RyanWalterkindlygavemethegreatbenefitofhisextensiveknowledgeoninterest.IwouldalsoliketoexpressmythankstotheHuizingaInstitutefortheirgraduate training program and organising the third‐year seminar, where Wyger Velemarefereedmy research. Moreover, I thank the teaching staff of the London Summer School inIntellectualHistory(2015)fortheirexcellentcoursesandcounsels.ThecommentsIreceivedattheErasmusCentreforEarlyModernStudieswerevaluablethankstotheextensiveknowledgeofitsmembers,inparticularWiepvanBunge,JaapvanNieuwstraten,HenkNellen,AdrievanderLaan,EddaFranckeandReginaBoot.IwanttoexpressmygratitudetoEvelienKoolhaasforherencouragements.AndIthankPeterWilsonforgivingmetheopportunitytofurtherpursuemyacademiccareerat theUniversityofOxford,whichhasmadethetimebetweenhanding inmythesisanddefendingitmuchmoreexciting.

In addition to research, I have taught undergraduate and graduate courseswith greatpleasure. My colleagues at the Erasmus University gave me valuable advice in teaching andhelped me to succeed, in particular Evelien Hazewinkel, Hein Klemann, Ben Wubs, TheresaOostvogels, Maarten van Dijck, Rudi Verburg, Karen Willemse, Dick van Lente, Brechje vanEekelen and Arianne Baggerman. While teaching, my students diverted (thankfully) myattentionfrommyresearchandbrightenedupmyday.

I amgrateful for the glorious companyofmyRotterdamPhD‐posse, including Ingmar,Dirk,Laurie,Tina,HildeS.,Marten,Theo,Annemieke,PieterB.,Pieterv/dH.,Robbert‐Jan,Susanand Geerte. Your expertise, fun and friendship guided me throughout my research. I owe aspecial thanks toNorah andMaryse for their endless support inmy last year, and also tomyfellow‘Schnurbarts’:HildeHarmsenandJesperSchaap.Icouldn’tthinkoftwopersonsbettertostand next tome duringmy defence.Moreover, I would like to thank David van der Linden,FrankDaudeijandLiekevanDeinsen, for thegreat timeswesharedwhilediscussing thepastandpresent.

I am also indebted to my friends outside academia. Tara, Wilma, Pauline, Lana, Lies,Megan,Marije,Kirsten,Revelino,JanPieterandSuzanne,youallhavemademydecade‐longstay

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in Rotterdam feel like home. Jeroen, the road to completingmy Ph.D. would have been a lotbumpierwithout your love and friendship. Tomy boys fromVlissingen in Rotterdam, Jowan,Johan, Sijmen and Erik, thanks for your camaraderie. And Louk, I am grateful for our fifteenyears ofbeing together andapart in love.Tomy life‐long friends,Cathalijn,Ellis, Isabelle andHester,thankyouforalwaysbeingthere,alsowhenIwasnot.Charlotte,youaremy‘sisterfromanothermister’.AndWendy,Icannotimaginemylifewithoutyourwarmandlovingfriendship.Alsobelongingtothisclanisthe ‘Singel157’household;I thankyou,Helge,Ruben,TesselandRover, from the bottom of my heart for making me part of your crazy family. You all havecontributedmoretothisthesisthanyouwilleverknow.

I owe my greatest gratitude to my parents. You have constantly supported andencouragedmethroughgoodandbadtimes.Youtaughtmetoread, towriteandtospeakmymind.Youbothhaveshownmethepowerofintegrityandperseverance.And,nottoforget,youtaughtmethetasteofgoodfood.Aboveall,yougavemeabigsister,Suzanne,whohasalwaysgotmybackagainstbulliesontheplaygroundandnightmaresingeneral–Suus,Iamgratefulforyourandyourfamily’s(WouterandEsmée)love.Dearmomanddad,itisbecauseofyouthatIamatthispointinmylife,thankyou.

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