On March 8, 2010, Judge Jennings ruled plaintiff’s filed les pendence was to be

vacated. Thereby, deciding plaintiff’s cause of action for relief is devoid of probable

cause. This determination is in effect that a reasonable suspicion, supported by

circumstances are sufficiently strong to justify a prudent and cautious person's belief that alleged

facts of grievance corresponding to ownership are probably not true.

The decision (exh ) said:

“The Notice of Lis Pendens dated December 10, 2008 filed by the plaintiff Delmo L.

Zanette . . . is hereby discharged pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes Section 52-

325b for the reason as presently pleaded in plaintiffs Substituted Revised Complaint

filed in this court on October 2, 2009 the plaintiff seeks only monetary damages and a

judicial, dissolutions of the above two Connecticut limited liability companies which

own’ those properties, which claims are exclusively limited to personal property and

cannot "affect real property", as that term is defined in Section 52-325 (b) of the

Connecticut General Statutes. . .See also Wheeler v. Polasek, 21 Conn. App. 32 (1990).

Essentially, Judge Jennings determined that plaintiff’s law suit does not correspond to a dispute

over the parties’ rights, interests and privileges to ownership of property. Even when the court

knew the outrageous unconscionable and one sided nature of the bargain contained in the May

27th agreement. Especially, with considering that defendants’ refer to the agreement as legally

justifying their claim of ownership. Instead of showing that they paid any money for the

conveyance; since they feel their influence of the court should enforce their ownership in

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substation of the fact that they not only did not pay any money, but looted the assets and equity

of the property for over a million dollars, to then loot plaintiff’s valuable personal property.

This is where instead of our courts protecting the rights of an innocent, vulnerable.

Yet, Judge Jennings in accordance to 52-325b, decided upon the consideration of the facts before

him, that probable cause to sustain the validity of the claim was not established . . . This is on the

basis of an amended complaint by plaintiff’s attorney that was not signed or known by plaintiff,

but was articulated by plaintiff’s attorney Mark Katz who exercised total control.

Since Katz signed the pleadings in substitution of plaintiff’s determination and even did not

provide him with any copies of the legal papers. Insomuch as Katz’s isolation of plaintiff from

determining his legal agenda conformed to his malicious activities of working to further the

agenda of the opposition. Simultaneously Katz intentionally sabotaged plaintiff’s ability to

prevail in court. Such as where the prior complaint Katz composed stating the cause of action

was fraud was substituted

Judge Jennings determined plaintiff’s action lacked ‘probable cause’ to the negative application

of 52-325b (2) Burden of proof at hearing. Order of court:

“52-325b (2) order such notice of lis pendens discharged of record if (A) probable cause

to sustain the validity of the plaintiff's claim is not established or (B) in an action that

alleges an illegal, invalid or defective transfer of an interest in real property, the initial

illegal, invalid or defective transfer of an interest in real property occurred sixty years or

more prior to the commencement of the action.

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However, it raises serious questions as to why Judge Jennings ruled without expressing interest

to view the instruments corresponding to the recording of title. Since, damages sought due to the

breech of the agreement and the adjudicated dissolution of the LLC’s unequivocally corresponds

to affect the sale of the properties. control the property have a direct bearing on parties control

the sale and the distribution of the equity. Correspond to the rights of parties corresponding

The relief sought was § 34-207 ‘Judicial dissolution’ of the LLCs would have a direct bearing of

interest of ownership since the formation of the LLCs was the factor of appropriating 50%

ownership. This was in good faith by plaintiff without any consideration whatsoever. Thus the

action of the dissolution of the LLC’s on the basis of defendants’ bad faith and unfair dealings

would revert back to the status quo where plaintiff was the sole owner of the properties.

§ 34-208. “Winding up of the business and affairs” of the LLC’s on the basis of defendants

improper conduct. Whereby, the statue provides outside of: “(2) settle and close the business of

the limited liability company;” but “(3) dispose of and transfer the property of the limited

liability company; (4) discharge the liabilities of the limited liability company; and (5) distribute

to the members any remaining assets of the limited liability company.

This action provided in 34-208 clearly affect the sale and distribution of the equity created from

the sale. Thus, it is beyond belief as to what Judge Jennings was going by to make such a

determination that the litigation does not affect the disputed properties. In fact the case law

referred to his decision could not even be read into ditmus to be considered applicable to this

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matter, e.g: Wheeler v. Polasek, 21 Conn. App. 32 (1990) contained no dispute on the matter of

the established mutual ownership of the same property. Instead the cause of action stated:

“This action was brought by the plaintiff for an accounting of partnership assets, breach

of fiduciary duty, damages for management fees and damages for misrepresentation

under the Connecticut Uniform Securities Act, the Securities Act of 1933, and the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”

The courts rightfully found that the action did not affect the mutually owned property. Since

Wheeler’s complaint was against the partnership itself and based on violations to the Uniform

Partnership Act, as found in General Statutes § 34-39. Thus for judge Jennings to refer to this

case as to what he based his decision upon makes no legal sense and establishes his ruling was an

arbitrary and capricious decision of a partisan nature.

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