realism, culture, and practices of statecraft in the global south
TRANSCRIPT
Microsoft Word - GSCIS - Loleski.docxRealism, Culture,
and Practices of Statecraft in
the Global South
Steven Loleski
Since the end of the Cold War, a burgeoning literature on regional order has
attempted to explore the sources of regional peace and war. With a few important
exceptions, much work has attempted to apply the insights of mainstream international
relations (IR) to regions. Theories about the stability of international orders have been
refashioned and qualified to account for the imperfect anarchy at the regional level. Though
these theories prize themselves on claiming to explain so much with so little, it is important
to ask ourselves whether this becomes a virtue or vice as we move beyond the broad
contours of the international system. Realists have ceded some ground to pluralist
approaches in explaining the durability of peaceful transformations, drawing especially on
the European experience. For much of the global south, mired in conflict of facing the
prospect of it, realists maintain that this qualified theorizing captures the essential
dynamics at the regional level. States are thought to unproblmetically tailor their foreign
policies to the demands of the balance of power and failure to heed to power in some
regions can have disastrous consequences.
Though explanatory variables like the distribution of power, differential growth
rates, or state capacity clearly have some purchase at the regional level they only serve to
highlight the constraints and opportunities faced by states. They cannot explain state
motivation precisely because they exogenously assume it away. These theories are
ultimately indeterminate on the foreign policy goals and strategies states can pursue since
it is believed that outcomes will fall within expected ranges eventually. However, one must
not only explore the number of poles in a system but also the character of those poles. As
such, exploring the foreign policies of states can tell us a great deal about their interests,
the strategies they are likely to pursue to secure those interests, and consequently, the
prospects for regional order.
Not much mainstream IR theory has attempted to explicitly explore foreign policy
interests and strategies or had the global south in mind when doing so. I intend this paper
to be an exploratory foray into assessing the utility of neoclassical realism and practice
theory and how they can enrich our understanding of foreign policy in the global south.
Randall Schweller has claimed that neoclassical realism is “the only game in town for the
current and next generation of realists.”1 Also, given the recent “practice turn” in
international relations, it makes sense to explore the contributions of each approach.
Principally, I argue that neoclassical realism is a more useful framework for exploring a
state’s foreign policy interests and strategies than an approach solely concentrated on
practices. Building and extending early neoclassical realist work, I insist that it is
compatible to include cultural and ideational variables into an ostensibly realist analysis. It
is the level of external threat and opportunities that shapes the broad contours of a state’s
foreign policy but strategic culture intervenes to establish what goals a state should pursue
and the strategies considered for doing so. Practices can be studied alongside and at the
level of strategic culture to give a more comprehensive account of a state’s strategic
culture(s). In this regard, I do not view practices as a competing account but 1 Randall L. Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism,” in Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, ed. Colin Elman and M.F. Elman (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), p. 345.
complementary to fully grasp the elements of strategic culture. While the “practice turn”
has provided a necessary corrective in exposing the representational bias in IR scholarship,
it is important not to overstep the limits of practices at the expense of representational
knowledge. This paper will also discuss the prospects for foreign policy change and argue
that neoclassical realism presents a more comprehensive framework for understanding
change by discussing the links between strategic culture, learning, and foreign policy.
Practice theory seems to understand change in similar terms but it remains underspecified.
This paper begins by discussing the concept of foreign policy goals and strategies. It
will then consider the shortcomings of structural realism and constructivism before
moving on to discuss the contributions of practice theory. Following this, neoclassical
realism will be explored and I will demonstrate that strategic culture and practices can be
helpfully integrated into a neoclassical framework. Moreover, I will explain how foreign
policy change can be integrated into a neoclassical realist framework and how a focus
solely on practices cannot articulate a comprehensive theory of change. Finally, I will
discuss the realist credentials of such an explanation by emphasizing the classical in
neoclassical.
Foreign Policy Goals and Strategies Before discussing the various goals statues pursue, it is important to avoid
conceptual confusions and dwell on the relationship between ends and means.2 Separating
ends from means is a notoriously difficult endeavor. Is power an end in itself or a means to 2 For the purposes of this paper, I will use goals, interests, preferences, objectives, and ends interchangeably and as distinct from strategies, tactics, or policies.
some other end? Is survival an end or a means to the further attainment of others goals?
Foreign policy goals represent fundamental and deep-rooted interests states have whereas
strategies are the means to pursue those interests.3 Keeping in mind that conceptual lines
will always be blurred in some sense, it is possible to analytically separate these concepts
in a useful way. Traditional attempts to typify the ends of states as security, power, and
prestige or some variation thereof invariably raise more questions than they answer.
As a result, following Wolfers,4 I have chosen to distinguish the type of goals states
pursue ranging from narrow to expansive goals. Indeed, the problem becomes more
manageable once it is recognized that “governments conceive of these cherished values in
more or less moderate and in more or less ambitious and exacting terms.”5 Though goals
run the gamut, these can be recovered through an exploration of a state’s strategic culture;
it is analytically useful at this point to distinguish between narrow and expansive goals.
Narrow goals refer to goals pertaining to immediate, territorial integrity and security.
Expansive goals generally convey an “activist foreign policy that ranges from attention to
international events to increases in diplomatic legations to participation in great-power
diplomacy.”6 In adopting an inclusive definition of expansion, it rids expansion
(traditionally understood in purely territorial terms) of its great power connotation and
allows the expectation that a state of any rank can expand its political interests abroad. 3 I part company with Moravcsik who insists that preferences are “prior to specific interstate political interactions.” See Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization Vol. 51, No. 4 (1997), p. 519. 4 This is similar to Wolfers’ distinction between “possession” goals and “milieu” goals. See Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), pp. 73-77. 5 Ibid., p. 72. 6 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 5.
Principally, this would include growing regional assertiveness and adventurism, war
and/or crisis initiation,7 attempts at territorial aggrandizement,8 contestation and violation
of international norms, and the active pursuit of nuclear weapons.9
Power-based Explanations
In his writings, Waltz has explicitly maintained that “international politics is not
foreign policy” and it would be a mistake to confuse the two.10 International political or
systemic theory explains “why different units behave similarly.”11 By contrast, a theory of
foreign policy analyzes why “different units behave differently despite their similar
placement in a system.”12 A systemic theory assumes that each state develops their policies
and acts as a result of its own internal processes, but it recognizes that these policies are
constrained by the existence and interaction with other states.13 It then becomes possible
to explain why “a certain similarity of behavior is expected from similarly situated states.
The expected behavior is similar, not identical”14 Therefore, competition and socialization
7 T.V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 8 Mark W. Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm,” International Organization Vol. 55, No.2 (Spring 2001), pp. 15-50. 9 T.V. Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000. 10 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.), p. 121. 11 Ibid., p. 72. 12 Ibid.; Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, p. 14. 13 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 65. Jennifer Sterling-Folker suggests that incorporating domestic processes is consistent with systemic theories, see Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 41, No. 1 (March 1997), pp. 1-25; see also, Rathbun. 14 Ibid., p. 122.
are responsible for the striking “sameness” in international politics because of the
“disadvantages that arise from a failure to conform to successful practices.”15
Although state behavior is not identical, there is an assumption that behavior will
conform to expected outcomes. States that fail to adopt successful practices will “fall by the
wayside…thus the units that survive come to look like one another.”16 In an oft-quoted
passage, Waltz forcefully asserts that states “are free to do any fool thing they care to, but
they are likely to be rewarded for behavior that is responsive to structural pressures and
punished for behavior that is not.”17 For these reasons, a discernable similarity in the
behavior of states arises. From a structural perspective, it cannot explain why similarly
situated states would respond differently. To do so would almost seem moot for it is “not
possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states” because “results
achieved seldom correspond to the intentions of actors.”18 These are the “ironic
consequences” of state behavior because regardless of the internal dispositions and wants
of the state outcomes will fall within expected ranges.19 Structural theories, including
offensive realism, cannot explain the differences among states because of the sparse
assumptions made about state motives.
Although Waltz is not bothered too much by the motivations of states, it is
important to recognize that he makes assumptions about them nonetheless. Anarchy and
15 Ibid., p. 128. 16 Ibid., p. 77. 17 Kenneth Waltz, “Evaluating Theories,” American Political Science Review Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), p. 915. 18 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 65. 19 Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization Vol. 51, No. 4 (1997), p. 522.
the distribution of power loom large in Waltz’s writings as key explanatory variables but
“much of the work is being done by factors only implicit in the model.”20 In the interests of
theory construction, Waltz firstly and chiefly assumes that states are moved by the will to
survive.21 However, there remains an ambiguity the survival imperative which becomes all
the more acute with every attempt at precision. As Waltz contends, “the first concern of
states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system.”22 Clearly,
striving to maintain one’s position is not the same thing as the minimalist definition of
survival implied initially by Waltz. Indeed, attempts to uphold the status quo may endanger
one’s survival. A variety of policies can be pursued which seek to safeguard “survival” and
in so doing it leaves structural realism with “very little explanatory content.”23
More important are the implications of the survival-first imperative on the
formation of foreign policy goals. States in Waltz’s world are by nature cautious,
conservative, and “highly fearful.”24 As a result, states would be predisposed to adopt
modest foreign policy aims. Such a conceptualization implies a status-quo bias in structural
realism by depicting a “world of all cops and no robbers, that is, all security-seeking states
and no aggressors.”25 Without the presence of a revisionist states, there would be no cause
20 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 103. 21 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 91. 22 Ibid., p. 126. 23 Brooks, p. 451. 24 Ibid., p. 449. 25 Randall Schweller, “Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?” Security Studies Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), p. 91. Similar critiques have been leveled by critical theorists, as Robert Cox writes “there is a latent normative element which derives from the assumptions of neorealist theory: security within the postulated interstate system depends upon each of the major actors understanding this system in the same
for conflict. Indeed, a world of security-seekers would be remarkably peaceful.26 But the
structural realists are not beat so easily. They rely on the perennial problem of uncertainty
under anarchy to fuel security dilemmas. Therein lies the “tragedy” of international politics
where good intentions can lead to bad outcomes. “History shows no exact and necessary
correlation between the quality of motives and the quality of foreign policy.”27 For
Morgenthau, attempting to discern a statesman’s motives was a futile and ultimately
misleading endeavor. Notwithstanding some of the problems with discerning a state’s
intentions, it is not an insurmountable task. Wendt suggests that it may actually be easier to
discern the intentions of states than individuals.28 Inferences can be made based upon
public documents, practices, speeches, memoirs, and statements of key decision-makers.
Furthermore, history is often a reliable guide to understanding what a state wants or
values. Structural realists tend to overemphasize the uncertainty of intentions as a prime
mover of international conflict but the conflict of interests between states is “not only
apparent but real.”29
way.” See Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 212. 26 Andrew Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other,” Security Studies Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 114-54. 27 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 4th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1967), p. 6. 28 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 221-23. 29 Schweller, “Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?” p. 104.
Following the momentous changes at the end of the Cold War, many were
proclaiming the death of realism30 and wondering if any realists were still around.31 Upon
reflection, those proclamations seem to have been greatly exaggerated. Nevertheless, those
approaches that were relegated to the margins of the discipline during neorealism’s reign
began to flourish by asserting, “‘norms,’ ‘identities,’ and ‘culture’ matter.”32 There are a
variety of disparate social theories which affirm the importance of identity and culture, but
they are of like mind about the socially constructed nature of international politics. Two
foundational assumptions unite these approaches: (1) the structures of international
politics are primarily ideational and not strictly material; (2) and as such, these structures
define actors’ identities and interests, not just their behavior.33 Constructivism is not a
theory of international politics per se but more aptly characterized as an ontological
approach.34 As a result, it does not prescribe which units and structures to examine a priori
and these must be chosen and justified by the theorist. Strategic culture, for example, has
focused on domestic culture. Before discussing the strategic culture literature specifically,
30 Ethan B. Kapstein, “Is Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources of International Politics,” International Organization Vol. 49, No. 4 (Autumn 1995), pp. 751-74. For an argument which suggests that realism weathered the end of the Cold War, see Randall Schweller and William Wohlforth, “Power Test: Evaluating Realism In Response to the End of the Cold War,” Security Studies Vol. 9, No. 3 (Spring 2000), pp. 60-107. 31 Jeffrey W. Legro, and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” International Security Vol. 24, No. 1 (Fall 1999), pp. 5-55. 32 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 65. 33 Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 71-72; Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 34 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 4-8. Hence, Wendt’s lengthy discussion of foundational assumptions of his social theory; substantive theory concerns the latter half of his book.
it is necessary to comment on how the assumptions of constructivism differ from structural
realism and the implications of these differences.
An important bone of contention raised by constructivists is the relationship
between agents and structures or how the “agent-structure problem” is addressed.
Societies, be they of states or individuals, are composed of purposeful actors and the
relationships which structures interaction. The problem arises in how to conceptualize
units and the relationship among them. Despite Waltz’s ardent commitment against the
temptations of reductionism, Wendt argues that structural realism’s view of system
structure is committed to “ontological reductionism.”35 What this means is that structural
realism reduces the structure of the system to the properties of agents themselves. Waltz
affirms that systems are “individualist in origin, spontaneously generated, and
unintended.”36 Viewed in this way, a system can only act as a “constraining and disposing
force”37 on units and as a result, a system can only affect a state’s behavior not its
properties. This becomes intuitive if one recalls the individualist ontology adopted by
structural realism: a system cannot generate units if it is reduced to their properties in the
first place. In other words, structure simply affects the behavior of pregiven actors through
changing opportunities and constraints. For constructivists, the problem with structural
realism is that “it is not structural enough.”38 The exclusively constructivist contribution to
systemic theorizing is to show how structures can constitute state properties or identities
35 Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International Organization Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), p. 342. 36 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 91. 37 Ibid., p. 72. 38 Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” p. 72.
and interests. Normative structures not only regulate behavior but also define identities
and interests in the first place.39
The concern with how much impact structure have on agents naturally leads to a
consideration of what structure is made of. Though the debate between rationalists and
constructivists is often portrayed in zero-sum terms, there is “little difference…on the issue
of whether ideas ‘matter.’”40 The question is rather how ideas matter. Rationalists tend to
treat ideas as residual variables of secondary importance whereas constructivists give
more weight to ideas in shaping actor properties. Materialism conceives of power and
interest as constituted by “brute” material forces, which is to say things that exist
independently of ideas. To conceive of interests and ideas separately, constructivists argue,
is to stack the deck against ideational arguments. Material forces as such explain relatively
little because it is the meaning and content that ideas give to material forces which
matter.41 For instance, the United States interprets the nuclear weapons held by the United
Kingdom differently than those held by North Korea. Structure is not just about material
capabilities but also how those material forces are embedded in social relations matters.
Despite the promise of constructivism, some qualifications need to be made. Firstly,
the focus on ideas seems to be overstated in many respects. Hence, Wendt and other thin
constructivists ascribe an independent causal role for ostensibly material forces by
39 Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” p. 54. This reflects constructivism’s concern with both causal and constitutive questions, see Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 77-88. On systemic effects, Wendt suggests the Waltz’s materialist view of structure precludes him from discussing socialization in any meaningful sense, see Ibid., pp. 101-02. 40 James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View,” in Handbook of International Relations, eds. Walter Carlnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons (London: Sage 2002), p. 59. 41 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 94-98.
defending a “rump materialism” and claiming that interests are not ideas all the way
down.42 Further, Wendt adopts the state as a referent object with certain essentialist
properties.43 As a result of this corporate identity, states have certain presocial and
intrinsic needs and interests. Namely, all states have an interest to survive, exercise
autonomy, pursue economic well being, and the need to secure collective self-esteem.44
These interests, and especially the inclusion of the latter, go far in exploring the variety of
needs inherent in states. Wendt quickly cautions that these interests do not imply that
states are by nature egoists but rather this feature is historically contingent. In other
words, “states are not Realists by nature.”45 Wendt would find himself in good company
with classical realists who were quite aware and weary about the “weaknesses of intellect
and will which flesh is heir to, are bound to deflect foreign policies from their rational
course.”46 Nonetheless, Wendt touches upon social identity theory and ultimately
concludes that there are good reasons to believe that “all other things being equal, the
international system contains a bias toward ‘Realist’ thinking.”47 These conclusions all
point to a greater role for material forces than most constructivists are willing to admit or
begrudgingly admit. The question is how material and ideational variables fit together in
the formation of foreign policy interests.
42 Ibid, see chapter 3. 43 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 201-14. There is an uneasiness about this claim among some constructivists, see Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 13. 44 Ibid., pp. 233-37. 45 Ibid., p. 234. 46 Morgenthau, p. 7. 47 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 241.
Secondly, as mentioned before, because constructivism is a social theory it must
deal with the levels of analysis problem in international relations theory. Theo Farrell
draws a distinction between constructivists and culturalists where the former “see
international norms shaping the similarity in state form and action, regardless of the
material circumstances of states...” and the latter exploring the “impact of domestic norms
of state form and action, they invariably find norms producing difference in what states
do.”48 Wendt is primarily concerned with the nature and effects of the international system
on states; it is an unapologetic systemic theory. It is not interested in explaining state
identity and concedes that “state identities are also heavily influenced by domestic factors
that I do not address.”49
Putting Constructivism into Practice There was growing dissatisfaction that “constructivism has long ignored what states
and their agents do, while concentrating on what they say.”50 The promise of practice
theory was that it would provide a necessary corrective to the imbalance and bias of
representational thinking in the discipline. The “practice turn” in social theory “brings
knowledge to the foreground of analysis.”51 Obeying norms or facing consequences is a
reflective, deliberative process whereas practical knowing is self-evident and non-thinking.
48 Theo Farrell, “Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program,” International Studies Review Vol. 4, No. 1 (2002), p. 54, emphasis in original. 49 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 11. 50 Ted Hopf, “The Logic of Habit in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations Vol. 14, No. 4 (2010), p. 544. 51 Vincent Pouliot, International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 13.
The clearest exposition differs representational thinking from “In circumstance X, you
should do Y,” to practical thinking of “in circumstance X, action Y follows.”52 Drawing on
insights from Bourdieu, scholars have sought to ground the structure and agency problem
in and through the concept of practice. Bourdieu’s theory of practice comprises a number
of interrelated elements centered on the concepts of habitus and field. Although by no
means an exhaustive account, these concepts will be brought to bear on interests and
strategies. Habitus is defined as a “set of dispositions which incline agents to act and react
in certain ways. The dispositions generate practices, perceptions and attitudes which are
‘regular’ without being consciously co-ordinated or governed by any ‘rule.’”53 Firstly, the
habitus is historical in the sense that the past informs the future through a process of
“socialization, exposure, imitation and symbolic power relationships.”54 Secondly, those
learned dispositions are learned through action not conscious thought. It is inexplicable
because, unlike representational knowledge, it is corporeal knowledge “ingrained in the
body.”55 As such, practice theory “de-emphasizes what is going on in people’s heads -- what
they think -- to focus on what they do.”56 Finally, the habitus is both relational and
dispositional. That is, it structures social relations and disposes actors to certain courses of
action over others. The latter invariably raises the question of change in practices.
52 Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 12. 53 Quoted in Michael C. Williams, Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 25. 54 Pouliot, p. 31. 55 Williams, p. 26. 56 Ibid., p. 32.
Bourdieu also discusses the field as an interrelated concept in his theory of practice.
Basically, the habitus is ordered and is ordered by certain social fields and the interplay
between habitus and field produces action. A field is a “social configuration structured
along three main dimensions: relations of power, objects of struggle and taken-for-granted
rules.”57 Fields are characterized and structured by dominant actors who use resources
(however defined) in the struggle over issues and capital used in the social game. A field is
typically hierarchically structured and actors act from their positions by having an intuitive
“feel for the game” or a “sense of one’s place” and also a “sense of the other’s place.”58 As
expected from a theory about practical knowledge, actors act from their resources at hand
and as such “means regularly matter more than ends.”59 What of interests and strategies?
The interplay between habitus and field generate interests and strategies for actors.
Interests are not pregiven and timeless but are constituted based upon the context of the
field. The structure of the field means that “the universe of potential strategies (and indeed
of potential interests) of a given actor is circumscribed.”60 This structures social life and
gives it much of the regularity we ascribe to it.
The regularity of social life pronounced by practice theorists tends to make one
wonder about the possibility of change and transformation. If actors are bound by habitus
and unthinkingly reproduce practices, what are the prospects for change? Practice
theorists suggest that change is hard but not impossible through “awareness and
57 Pouliot, p. 33. 58 Williams, pp. 28-29. 59 Pouliot, p. 35. 60 Williams, p. 36.
learning.”61 Vincent Pouliot reaches the conclusion that “diplomacy is a normal though not
self-evident practice in NRC dealings” which suggest that “contemporary Russian-Altantic
diplomatic relations stop short of a security community.”62 Pouliot paints a picture of
practices that characterize and distinguish non-war communities from security
communities but does not discuss how transformations would occur. Indeed, practice
theory paints a very deterministic picture of social relations without comprehensively
discussing the conditions for change. Hopf readily admits that scholars of Bourdieu
conclude that “Bourdieu offers no endogenous account for change.”63 Like most theories of
international relations, practice theory remains bedeviled with the problem of accounting
for change.
Domestic Practices and Foreign Policy While much of the recent work done building upon practice theory has explored a
number of issue areas of world politics,64 very little has directly addressed foreign policy
making. Hopf’s exploration of Soviet and Russian identity stands as an early exception to
this trend by suggesting that “the most important mechanism for the reproduction of
identity is not the role and norm but rather habit and practice.”65 The logic of everyday
practice is used to define the realm of thinkability and possibility that paves the way for
interpretation and action. Hopf attempts to provide an endogenous understanding of
61 Williams, p. 26. 62 Pouliot, p. 234. 63 Hopf, “The Logic of Habit in International Relations,” p. 546. 64 Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, eds. International Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 65 Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics, p. 10.
interests through a recovery of identity which makes “threats and opportunities, enemies
and allies, intelligible, thinkable, and possible.”66 Hopf’s inductive recovery of identity
through wide textual and intertextual reading is impressive and illuminating. Despite the
impressive effort and progress made with identity reconstruction, there remain some
problems. Firstly, the distinction between practice and habit is often blurred and “remains
partly embroiled in an internalization [of norms] scheme.”67 The discourse on identity
partly obscures the exclusive focus on the day-to-day practical logics at work. Secondly,
and more importantly, Hopf overlooks the role of the external environment in shaping
identity at home. The realm of possibilities for foreign policy identities in 1955 and 1999
can be partly explained by changed international circumstances. This is not to suggest that
the external environment should be the principal explanatory variable in explaining foreign
policy but that it at the same time cannot be overlooked in a comprehensive understanding
of foreign policy.
If communities of practitioners understand practices as competent performances,
then domestic practices can play a role in the process of foreign policy-making. Foreign
policy practitioners can rely on their background knowledge to execute what constitutes
acceptable and competent foreign policy. Most neoclassical realist work has overlooked
practices and has instead focused its efforts on exploring the effects of domestic
institutions, procedures, and norms. While practices may be less durable, widespread, and
66 Ibid., p. 16. 67 Pouliot, p. 21.
limited than institutions, they can also shape the foreign policy process.68 Practicies are
envisioned as a mediating force on the bargaining between the state and society over
foreign policy. “Where institutions, procedures, and practices insulate the executive and
procedural norms stifle dissent,” Ripsman argues “the more autonomous national security
executives are freer to respond to systemic demands as structural realists would expect.”69
Conversely, more constraining institutions and practices would dispose the state to pay
greater attention to internal demands in constructing foreign policy.
Despite the promise of integrating practices into a neoclassical framework, it seems
that practices have been conceived as yet another constraint on state power. That is, it is
expected that states inhibited with constraining foreign policy decision-making practices
will thwart the state’s course by falling victim to capture by parochial domestic interests.
States with decision-making practices yielding to and insulating the foreign policy
executive from domestic groups are more able to unproblematically follow interests
dictated by the system. Indeed, Ripsman contends “differences in domestic decision-
making environments can also explain variations in state motivations.”70 However,
practices conceived in this way cannot tell us a great deal about state motivations but
rather, they can illuminate how foreign policy is enacted. It is essentially indeterminate on
the question of state interests because it defers to the system on what is expected of states.
&n
Steven Loleski
Since the end of the Cold War, a burgeoning literature on regional order has
attempted to explore the sources of regional peace and war. With a few important
exceptions, much work has attempted to apply the insights of mainstream international
relations (IR) to regions. Theories about the stability of international orders have been
refashioned and qualified to account for the imperfect anarchy at the regional level. Though
these theories prize themselves on claiming to explain so much with so little, it is important
to ask ourselves whether this becomes a virtue or vice as we move beyond the broad
contours of the international system. Realists have ceded some ground to pluralist
approaches in explaining the durability of peaceful transformations, drawing especially on
the European experience. For much of the global south, mired in conflict of facing the
prospect of it, realists maintain that this qualified theorizing captures the essential
dynamics at the regional level. States are thought to unproblmetically tailor their foreign
policies to the demands of the balance of power and failure to heed to power in some
regions can have disastrous consequences.
Though explanatory variables like the distribution of power, differential growth
rates, or state capacity clearly have some purchase at the regional level they only serve to
highlight the constraints and opportunities faced by states. They cannot explain state
motivation precisely because they exogenously assume it away. These theories are
ultimately indeterminate on the foreign policy goals and strategies states can pursue since
it is believed that outcomes will fall within expected ranges eventually. However, one must
not only explore the number of poles in a system but also the character of those poles. As
such, exploring the foreign policies of states can tell us a great deal about their interests,
the strategies they are likely to pursue to secure those interests, and consequently, the
prospects for regional order.
Not much mainstream IR theory has attempted to explicitly explore foreign policy
interests and strategies or had the global south in mind when doing so. I intend this paper
to be an exploratory foray into assessing the utility of neoclassical realism and practice
theory and how they can enrich our understanding of foreign policy in the global south.
Randall Schweller has claimed that neoclassical realism is “the only game in town for the
current and next generation of realists.”1 Also, given the recent “practice turn” in
international relations, it makes sense to explore the contributions of each approach.
Principally, I argue that neoclassical realism is a more useful framework for exploring a
state’s foreign policy interests and strategies than an approach solely concentrated on
practices. Building and extending early neoclassical realist work, I insist that it is
compatible to include cultural and ideational variables into an ostensibly realist analysis. It
is the level of external threat and opportunities that shapes the broad contours of a state’s
foreign policy but strategic culture intervenes to establish what goals a state should pursue
and the strategies considered for doing so. Practices can be studied alongside and at the
level of strategic culture to give a more comprehensive account of a state’s strategic
culture(s). In this regard, I do not view practices as a competing account but 1 Randall L. Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism,” in Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, ed. Colin Elman and M.F. Elman (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), p. 345.
complementary to fully grasp the elements of strategic culture. While the “practice turn”
has provided a necessary corrective in exposing the representational bias in IR scholarship,
it is important not to overstep the limits of practices at the expense of representational
knowledge. This paper will also discuss the prospects for foreign policy change and argue
that neoclassical realism presents a more comprehensive framework for understanding
change by discussing the links between strategic culture, learning, and foreign policy.
Practice theory seems to understand change in similar terms but it remains underspecified.
This paper begins by discussing the concept of foreign policy goals and strategies. It
will then consider the shortcomings of structural realism and constructivism before
moving on to discuss the contributions of practice theory. Following this, neoclassical
realism will be explored and I will demonstrate that strategic culture and practices can be
helpfully integrated into a neoclassical framework. Moreover, I will explain how foreign
policy change can be integrated into a neoclassical realist framework and how a focus
solely on practices cannot articulate a comprehensive theory of change. Finally, I will
discuss the realist credentials of such an explanation by emphasizing the classical in
neoclassical.
Foreign Policy Goals and Strategies Before discussing the various goals statues pursue, it is important to avoid
conceptual confusions and dwell on the relationship between ends and means.2 Separating
ends from means is a notoriously difficult endeavor. Is power an end in itself or a means to 2 For the purposes of this paper, I will use goals, interests, preferences, objectives, and ends interchangeably and as distinct from strategies, tactics, or policies.
some other end? Is survival an end or a means to the further attainment of others goals?
Foreign policy goals represent fundamental and deep-rooted interests states have whereas
strategies are the means to pursue those interests.3 Keeping in mind that conceptual lines
will always be blurred in some sense, it is possible to analytically separate these concepts
in a useful way. Traditional attempts to typify the ends of states as security, power, and
prestige or some variation thereof invariably raise more questions than they answer.
As a result, following Wolfers,4 I have chosen to distinguish the type of goals states
pursue ranging from narrow to expansive goals. Indeed, the problem becomes more
manageable once it is recognized that “governments conceive of these cherished values in
more or less moderate and in more or less ambitious and exacting terms.”5 Though goals
run the gamut, these can be recovered through an exploration of a state’s strategic culture;
it is analytically useful at this point to distinguish between narrow and expansive goals.
Narrow goals refer to goals pertaining to immediate, territorial integrity and security.
Expansive goals generally convey an “activist foreign policy that ranges from attention to
international events to increases in diplomatic legations to participation in great-power
diplomacy.”6 In adopting an inclusive definition of expansion, it rids expansion
(traditionally understood in purely territorial terms) of its great power connotation and
allows the expectation that a state of any rank can expand its political interests abroad. 3 I part company with Moravcsik who insists that preferences are “prior to specific interstate political interactions.” See Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization Vol. 51, No. 4 (1997), p. 519. 4 This is similar to Wolfers’ distinction between “possession” goals and “milieu” goals. See Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), pp. 73-77. 5 Ibid., p. 72. 6 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 5.
Principally, this would include growing regional assertiveness and adventurism, war
and/or crisis initiation,7 attempts at territorial aggrandizement,8 contestation and violation
of international norms, and the active pursuit of nuclear weapons.9
Power-based Explanations
In his writings, Waltz has explicitly maintained that “international politics is not
foreign policy” and it would be a mistake to confuse the two.10 International political or
systemic theory explains “why different units behave similarly.”11 By contrast, a theory of
foreign policy analyzes why “different units behave differently despite their similar
placement in a system.”12 A systemic theory assumes that each state develops their policies
and acts as a result of its own internal processes, but it recognizes that these policies are
constrained by the existence and interaction with other states.13 It then becomes possible
to explain why “a certain similarity of behavior is expected from similarly situated states.
The expected behavior is similar, not identical”14 Therefore, competition and socialization
7 T.V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 8 Mark W. Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm,” International Organization Vol. 55, No.2 (Spring 2001), pp. 15-50. 9 T.V. Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000. 10 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.), p. 121. 11 Ibid., p. 72. 12 Ibid.; Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, p. 14. 13 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 65. Jennifer Sterling-Folker suggests that incorporating domestic processes is consistent with systemic theories, see Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 41, No. 1 (March 1997), pp. 1-25; see also, Rathbun. 14 Ibid., p. 122.
are responsible for the striking “sameness” in international politics because of the
“disadvantages that arise from a failure to conform to successful practices.”15
Although state behavior is not identical, there is an assumption that behavior will
conform to expected outcomes. States that fail to adopt successful practices will “fall by the
wayside…thus the units that survive come to look like one another.”16 In an oft-quoted
passage, Waltz forcefully asserts that states “are free to do any fool thing they care to, but
they are likely to be rewarded for behavior that is responsive to structural pressures and
punished for behavior that is not.”17 For these reasons, a discernable similarity in the
behavior of states arises. From a structural perspective, it cannot explain why similarly
situated states would respond differently. To do so would almost seem moot for it is “not
possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states” because “results
achieved seldom correspond to the intentions of actors.”18 These are the “ironic
consequences” of state behavior because regardless of the internal dispositions and wants
of the state outcomes will fall within expected ranges.19 Structural theories, including
offensive realism, cannot explain the differences among states because of the sparse
assumptions made about state motives.
Although Waltz is not bothered too much by the motivations of states, it is
important to recognize that he makes assumptions about them nonetheless. Anarchy and
15 Ibid., p. 128. 16 Ibid., p. 77. 17 Kenneth Waltz, “Evaluating Theories,” American Political Science Review Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), p. 915. 18 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 65. 19 Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization Vol. 51, No. 4 (1997), p. 522.
the distribution of power loom large in Waltz’s writings as key explanatory variables but
“much of the work is being done by factors only implicit in the model.”20 In the interests of
theory construction, Waltz firstly and chiefly assumes that states are moved by the will to
survive.21 However, there remains an ambiguity the survival imperative which becomes all
the more acute with every attempt at precision. As Waltz contends, “the first concern of
states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system.”22 Clearly,
striving to maintain one’s position is not the same thing as the minimalist definition of
survival implied initially by Waltz. Indeed, attempts to uphold the status quo may endanger
one’s survival. A variety of policies can be pursued which seek to safeguard “survival” and
in so doing it leaves structural realism with “very little explanatory content.”23
More important are the implications of the survival-first imperative on the
formation of foreign policy goals. States in Waltz’s world are by nature cautious,
conservative, and “highly fearful.”24 As a result, states would be predisposed to adopt
modest foreign policy aims. Such a conceptualization implies a status-quo bias in structural
realism by depicting a “world of all cops and no robbers, that is, all security-seeking states
and no aggressors.”25 Without the presence of a revisionist states, there would be no cause
20 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 103. 21 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 91. 22 Ibid., p. 126. 23 Brooks, p. 451. 24 Ibid., p. 449. 25 Randall Schweller, “Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?” Security Studies Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), p. 91. Similar critiques have been leveled by critical theorists, as Robert Cox writes “there is a latent normative element which derives from the assumptions of neorealist theory: security within the postulated interstate system depends upon each of the major actors understanding this system in the same
for conflict. Indeed, a world of security-seekers would be remarkably peaceful.26 But the
structural realists are not beat so easily. They rely on the perennial problem of uncertainty
under anarchy to fuel security dilemmas. Therein lies the “tragedy” of international politics
where good intentions can lead to bad outcomes. “History shows no exact and necessary
correlation between the quality of motives and the quality of foreign policy.”27 For
Morgenthau, attempting to discern a statesman’s motives was a futile and ultimately
misleading endeavor. Notwithstanding some of the problems with discerning a state’s
intentions, it is not an insurmountable task. Wendt suggests that it may actually be easier to
discern the intentions of states than individuals.28 Inferences can be made based upon
public documents, practices, speeches, memoirs, and statements of key decision-makers.
Furthermore, history is often a reliable guide to understanding what a state wants or
values. Structural realists tend to overemphasize the uncertainty of intentions as a prime
mover of international conflict but the conflict of interests between states is “not only
apparent but real.”29
way.” See Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 212. 26 Andrew Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other,” Security Studies Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 114-54. 27 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 4th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1967), p. 6. 28 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 221-23. 29 Schweller, “Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?” p. 104.
Following the momentous changes at the end of the Cold War, many were
proclaiming the death of realism30 and wondering if any realists were still around.31 Upon
reflection, those proclamations seem to have been greatly exaggerated. Nevertheless, those
approaches that were relegated to the margins of the discipline during neorealism’s reign
began to flourish by asserting, “‘norms,’ ‘identities,’ and ‘culture’ matter.”32 There are a
variety of disparate social theories which affirm the importance of identity and culture, but
they are of like mind about the socially constructed nature of international politics. Two
foundational assumptions unite these approaches: (1) the structures of international
politics are primarily ideational and not strictly material; (2) and as such, these structures
define actors’ identities and interests, not just their behavior.33 Constructivism is not a
theory of international politics per se but more aptly characterized as an ontological
approach.34 As a result, it does not prescribe which units and structures to examine a priori
and these must be chosen and justified by the theorist. Strategic culture, for example, has
focused on domestic culture. Before discussing the strategic culture literature specifically,
30 Ethan B. Kapstein, “Is Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources of International Politics,” International Organization Vol. 49, No. 4 (Autumn 1995), pp. 751-74. For an argument which suggests that realism weathered the end of the Cold War, see Randall Schweller and William Wohlforth, “Power Test: Evaluating Realism In Response to the End of the Cold War,” Security Studies Vol. 9, No. 3 (Spring 2000), pp. 60-107. 31 Jeffrey W. Legro, and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” International Security Vol. 24, No. 1 (Fall 1999), pp. 5-55. 32 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 65. 33 Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 71-72; Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 34 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 4-8. Hence, Wendt’s lengthy discussion of foundational assumptions of his social theory; substantive theory concerns the latter half of his book.
it is necessary to comment on how the assumptions of constructivism differ from structural
realism and the implications of these differences.
An important bone of contention raised by constructivists is the relationship
between agents and structures or how the “agent-structure problem” is addressed.
Societies, be they of states or individuals, are composed of purposeful actors and the
relationships which structures interaction. The problem arises in how to conceptualize
units and the relationship among them. Despite Waltz’s ardent commitment against the
temptations of reductionism, Wendt argues that structural realism’s view of system
structure is committed to “ontological reductionism.”35 What this means is that structural
realism reduces the structure of the system to the properties of agents themselves. Waltz
affirms that systems are “individualist in origin, spontaneously generated, and
unintended.”36 Viewed in this way, a system can only act as a “constraining and disposing
force”37 on units and as a result, a system can only affect a state’s behavior not its
properties. This becomes intuitive if one recalls the individualist ontology adopted by
structural realism: a system cannot generate units if it is reduced to their properties in the
first place. In other words, structure simply affects the behavior of pregiven actors through
changing opportunities and constraints. For constructivists, the problem with structural
realism is that “it is not structural enough.”38 The exclusively constructivist contribution to
systemic theorizing is to show how structures can constitute state properties or identities
35 Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International Organization Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987), p. 342. 36 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 91. 37 Ibid., p. 72. 38 Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” p. 72.
and interests. Normative structures not only regulate behavior but also define identities
and interests in the first place.39
The concern with how much impact structure have on agents naturally leads to a
consideration of what structure is made of. Though the debate between rationalists and
constructivists is often portrayed in zero-sum terms, there is “little difference…on the issue
of whether ideas ‘matter.’”40 The question is rather how ideas matter. Rationalists tend to
treat ideas as residual variables of secondary importance whereas constructivists give
more weight to ideas in shaping actor properties. Materialism conceives of power and
interest as constituted by “brute” material forces, which is to say things that exist
independently of ideas. To conceive of interests and ideas separately, constructivists argue,
is to stack the deck against ideational arguments. Material forces as such explain relatively
little because it is the meaning and content that ideas give to material forces which
matter.41 For instance, the United States interprets the nuclear weapons held by the United
Kingdom differently than those held by North Korea. Structure is not just about material
capabilities but also how those material forces are embedded in social relations matters.
Despite the promise of constructivism, some qualifications need to be made. Firstly,
the focus on ideas seems to be overstated in many respects. Hence, Wendt and other thin
constructivists ascribe an independent causal role for ostensibly material forces by
39 Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” p. 54. This reflects constructivism’s concern with both causal and constitutive questions, see Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 77-88. On systemic effects, Wendt suggests the Waltz’s materialist view of structure precludes him from discussing socialization in any meaningful sense, see Ibid., pp. 101-02. 40 James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View,” in Handbook of International Relations, eds. Walter Carlnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons (London: Sage 2002), p. 59. 41 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 94-98.
defending a “rump materialism” and claiming that interests are not ideas all the way
down.42 Further, Wendt adopts the state as a referent object with certain essentialist
properties.43 As a result of this corporate identity, states have certain presocial and
intrinsic needs and interests. Namely, all states have an interest to survive, exercise
autonomy, pursue economic well being, and the need to secure collective self-esteem.44
These interests, and especially the inclusion of the latter, go far in exploring the variety of
needs inherent in states. Wendt quickly cautions that these interests do not imply that
states are by nature egoists but rather this feature is historically contingent. In other
words, “states are not Realists by nature.”45 Wendt would find himself in good company
with classical realists who were quite aware and weary about the “weaknesses of intellect
and will which flesh is heir to, are bound to deflect foreign policies from their rational
course.”46 Nonetheless, Wendt touches upon social identity theory and ultimately
concludes that there are good reasons to believe that “all other things being equal, the
international system contains a bias toward ‘Realist’ thinking.”47 These conclusions all
point to a greater role for material forces than most constructivists are willing to admit or
begrudgingly admit. The question is how material and ideational variables fit together in
the formation of foreign policy interests.
42 Ibid, see chapter 3. 43 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 201-14. There is an uneasiness about this claim among some constructivists, see Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 13. 44 Ibid., pp. 233-37. 45 Ibid., p. 234. 46 Morgenthau, p. 7. 47 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 241.
Secondly, as mentioned before, because constructivism is a social theory it must
deal with the levels of analysis problem in international relations theory. Theo Farrell
draws a distinction between constructivists and culturalists where the former “see
international norms shaping the similarity in state form and action, regardless of the
material circumstances of states...” and the latter exploring the “impact of domestic norms
of state form and action, they invariably find norms producing difference in what states
do.”48 Wendt is primarily concerned with the nature and effects of the international system
on states; it is an unapologetic systemic theory. It is not interested in explaining state
identity and concedes that “state identities are also heavily influenced by domestic factors
that I do not address.”49
Putting Constructivism into Practice There was growing dissatisfaction that “constructivism has long ignored what states
and their agents do, while concentrating on what they say.”50 The promise of practice
theory was that it would provide a necessary corrective to the imbalance and bias of
representational thinking in the discipline. The “practice turn” in social theory “brings
knowledge to the foreground of analysis.”51 Obeying norms or facing consequences is a
reflective, deliberative process whereas practical knowing is self-evident and non-thinking.
48 Theo Farrell, “Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program,” International Studies Review Vol. 4, No. 1 (2002), p. 54, emphasis in original. 49 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 11. 50 Ted Hopf, “The Logic of Habit in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations Vol. 14, No. 4 (2010), p. 544. 51 Vincent Pouliot, International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 13.
The clearest exposition differs representational thinking from “In circumstance X, you
should do Y,” to practical thinking of “in circumstance X, action Y follows.”52 Drawing on
insights from Bourdieu, scholars have sought to ground the structure and agency problem
in and through the concept of practice. Bourdieu’s theory of practice comprises a number
of interrelated elements centered on the concepts of habitus and field. Although by no
means an exhaustive account, these concepts will be brought to bear on interests and
strategies. Habitus is defined as a “set of dispositions which incline agents to act and react
in certain ways. The dispositions generate practices, perceptions and attitudes which are
‘regular’ without being consciously co-ordinated or governed by any ‘rule.’”53 Firstly, the
habitus is historical in the sense that the past informs the future through a process of
“socialization, exposure, imitation and symbolic power relationships.”54 Secondly, those
learned dispositions are learned through action not conscious thought. It is inexplicable
because, unlike representational knowledge, it is corporeal knowledge “ingrained in the
body.”55 As such, practice theory “de-emphasizes what is going on in people’s heads -- what
they think -- to focus on what they do.”56 Finally, the habitus is both relational and
dispositional. That is, it structures social relations and disposes actors to certain courses of
action over others. The latter invariably raises the question of change in practices.
52 Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 12. 53 Quoted in Michael C. Williams, Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 25. 54 Pouliot, p. 31. 55 Williams, p. 26. 56 Ibid., p. 32.
Bourdieu also discusses the field as an interrelated concept in his theory of practice.
Basically, the habitus is ordered and is ordered by certain social fields and the interplay
between habitus and field produces action. A field is a “social configuration structured
along three main dimensions: relations of power, objects of struggle and taken-for-granted
rules.”57 Fields are characterized and structured by dominant actors who use resources
(however defined) in the struggle over issues and capital used in the social game. A field is
typically hierarchically structured and actors act from their positions by having an intuitive
“feel for the game” or a “sense of one’s place” and also a “sense of the other’s place.”58 As
expected from a theory about practical knowledge, actors act from their resources at hand
and as such “means regularly matter more than ends.”59 What of interests and strategies?
The interplay between habitus and field generate interests and strategies for actors.
Interests are not pregiven and timeless but are constituted based upon the context of the
field. The structure of the field means that “the universe of potential strategies (and indeed
of potential interests) of a given actor is circumscribed.”60 This structures social life and
gives it much of the regularity we ascribe to it.
The regularity of social life pronounced by practice theorists tends to make one
wonder about the possibility of change and transformation. If actors are bound by habitus
and unthinkingly reproduce practices, what are the prospects for change? Practice
theorists suggest that change is hard but not impossible through “awareness and
57 Pouliot, p. 33. 58 Williams, pp. 28-29. 59 Pouliot, p. 35. 60 Williams, p. 36.
learning.”61 Vincent Pouliot reaches the conclusion that “diplomacy is a normal though not
self-evident practice in NRC dealings” which suggest that “contemporary Russian-Altantic
diplomatic relations stop short of a security community.”62 Pouliot paints a picture of
practices that characterize and distinguish non-war communities from security
communities but does not discuss how transformations would occur. Indeed, practice
theory paints a very deterministic picture of social relations without comprehensively
discussing the conditions for change. Hopf readily admits that scholars of Bourdieu
conclude that “Bourdieu offers no endogenous account for change.”63 Like most theories of
international relations, practice theory remains bedeviled with the problem of accounting
for change.
Domestic Practices and Foreign Policy While much of the recent work done building upon practice theory has explored a
number of issue areas of world politics,64 very little has directly addressed foreign policy
making. Hopf’s exploration of Soviet and Russian identity stands as an early exception to
this trend by suggesting that “the most important mechanism for the reproduction of
identity is not the role and norm but rather habit and practice.”65 The logic of everyday
practice is used to define the realm of thinkability and possibility that paves the way for
interpretation and action. Hopf attempts to provide an endogenous understanding of
61 Williams, p. 26. 62 Pouliot, p. 234. 63 Hopf, “The Logic of Habit in International Relations,” p. 546. 64 Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, eds. International Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 65 Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics, p. 10.
interests through a recovery of identity which makes “threats and opportunities, enemies
and allies, intelligible, thinkable, and possible.”66 Hopf’s inductive recovery of identity
through wide textual and intertextual reading is impressive and illuminating. Despite the
impressive effort and progress made with identity reconstruction, there remain some
problems. Firstly, the distinction between practice and habit is often blurred and “remains
partly embroiled in an internalization [of norms] scheme.”67 The discourse on identity
partly obscures the exclusive focus on the day-to-day practical logics at work. Secondly,
and more importantly, Hopf overlooks the role of the external environment in shaping
identity at home. The realm of possibilities for foreign policy identities in 1955 and 1999
can be partly explained by changed international circumstances. This is not to suggest that
the external environment should be the principal explanatory variable in explaining foreign
policy but that it at the same time cannot be overlooked in a comprehensive understanding
of foreign policy.
If communities of practitioners understand practices as competent performances,
then domestic practices can play a role in the process of foreign policy-making. Foreign
policy practitioners can rely on their background knowledge to execute what constitutes
acceptable and competent foreign policy. Most neoclassical realist work has overlooked
practices and has instead focused its efforts on exploring the effects of domestic
institutions, procedures, and norms. While practices may be less durable, widespread, and
66 Ibid., p. 16. 67 Pouliot, p. 21.
limited than institutions, they can also shape the foreign policy process.68 Practicies are
envisioned as a mediating force on the bargaining between the state and society over
foreign policy. “Where institutions, procedures, and practices insulate the executive and
procedural norms stifle dissent,” Ripsman argues “the more autonomous national security
executives are freer to respond to systemic demands as structural realists would expect.”69
Conversely, more constraining institutions and practices would dispose the state to pay
greater attention to internal demands in constructing foreign policy.
Despite the promise of integrating practices into a neoclassical framework, it seems
that practices have been conceived as yet another constraint on state power. That is, it is
expected that states inhibited with constraining foreign policy decision-making practices
will thwart the state’s course by falling victim to capture by parochial domestic interests.
States with decision-making practices yielding to and insulating the foreign policy
executive from domestic groups are more able to unproblematically follow interests
dictated by the system. Indeed, Ripsman contends “differences in domestic decision-
making environments can also explain variations in state motivations.”70 However,
practices conceived in this way cannot tell us a great deal about state motivations but
rather, they can illuminate how foreign policy is enacted. It is essentially indeterminate on
the question of state interests because it defers to the system on what is expected of states.
&n