CHAPTER-IV

TERRORISM IN JAMMU & KASHMIR

“There is no limit to how complicated things can get, on account of one thing always

leading to another”

E. B. White

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4.0 Introduction

“Certain problems get more tangled with the passage of time”

(Nayar, 2003)

Annals of history prove terrorism solves no problem in the world. Not

understanding this fully, certain emotionally charged individuals persist in the use of

terrorism to achieve their goals. Though they have not achieved the goals, it becomes

the duty of the researchers to look into the issue and expose the reality so that future

generations they learn the lessons that terrorism serves no purpose except

destructions. Understanding terrorism itself is a complex phenomenon. It is necessary

to understand the processes that have made terror a mutant of war by itself (Singh,

2000). This is quite true of this study as well, since terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir

is the results of various incidents that took place before and after independence of

India.

Figure 4.1. Major Components in Terrorism Studies

Source: Hayden, 2007.

Most thinkers, historically, are in favor of violence as a response to conflict, or

at least some conflict (Hastings, 2004) as a result of which violence continues to grow

without any hindrance. Terrorism being a complex problem extends over a long

Complexity

Time Scale

Epistemology

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period and requires a thorough knowledge of its root causes. Accordingly, the above

model shown in Figure 4.1 is adopted by the researcher to provide a holistic view on

how the complex problem of terrorism came into existence over the years affecting

the State of Jammu and Kashmir in general and Kashmir Valley in particular.

4.1 Accession of Jammu and Kashmir

“Meanwhile, we have given our word to the people of Kashmir to protect them against the invader and we shall keep our pledge”

(Sharma & Bakshi, 1995a)

Accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India could be well understood if the

situation of pre and post accession were examined in detail. In order to pursue a

holistic approach about the complete history, the unique role played by the individuals

and circumstances has to be looked into carefully. Though Jammu and Kashmir had

political and cultural connection with India right from the olden days, with the advent

of Islam in 14th century, people of the region adopted teachings of Islam and this

resulted in creation of an unique cultural identity of Kashmir called “Kashmiriyat”.

Such a cultural identity is very difficult to find in any part of the world where people

of different religions lived in peace and mutual cooperation.

4.1.1 Gurdaspur during Partition Period

Inadequate understanding of the issues often played havoc in history. The

situation leading to the accession of Jammu and Kashmir is not an exemption this.

Partition of India in 1947 though, accepted as a fact of history, the circumstances need

to be understood clearly or else it will leave a psychological hurt feeling in the minds

of the people. This is quite evident from the allotment of Gurdaspur to India by Sir

Cyril Radcliffe, the Chairman of the Boundary Commission. Geographically,

Gurdaspur provides the land route to Chamba, Dharamsala, Kulu, Manali, Lahul and

Spiti. Apart from this, Babri Doab Canal flows through this district before entering

the district of Amritsar and Ferozpur. Moreover, this is the only source of water for

the Sarovar Lake surrounding the Golden Temple which is an important sacred

Gurudwara for Shikhs. The Population of Gurdaspur during the time of partition

comprises of 51.14 % Muslims. So Muslim league leaders were sure that Gurdaspur

would be attached to Pakistan. Owing to its geographical importance and religious

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connection, Gurdaspur was attached to India. This was totally focused as a conspiracy

by the people who played a vital role in sending invaders to Jammu and Kashmir.

They made the common people of Pakistan to believe Muslim majority district of

Gurdaspur is attached intentionally with India thereby opening a direct land route to

Jammu and Kashmir which will enable Indians to interfere in Kashmir affairs.

Pakistan people believed this as a conspiracy by Mountbatten and Sir Cyril Radcliffe.

4.1.2 British Interest in Jammu and Kashmir

British role cannot be hidden though there are several reasons behind the

accession of Jammu and Kashmir in the Indian union by the Maharaja of Jammu and

Kashmir. The then ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, Gulab Singh extended his frontiers

beyond the Himalayan regions by conquering Ladakh and Baltistan. In 1846, Gulab

Singh acquired Gilgit and in 1889, part of the territory bordering Afghanistan and

Russia namely Gilgit Agency came under British control. This acquisition came in

handy to prevent Russian expansion in these regions. Maharaja retained sovereignty

over Gilgit Agency and full control of the remaining parts of Gilgit namely Gilgit

Wazarat. Later, during Maharaja Hari Singh’s period steps were initiated to abolish

Gilgit Agency. In the mean time Hari Singh’s administrative machinery was forced to

withdraw from this region after handing over the control to British on lease for a

period of 60 years. This lease was terminated in June 1947 as the British decided to

give independence. Lt. Col. Roger Bacon handed over the charge to Brigadier

Ghansara Singh and became the political agent of Khyber region the epi centre of

tribal dealings. The Gilgit Scouts raised to watch the border with Afghanistan, Russia

and China was taken over by Major William Brown, a young officer who supported

Pakistan’s cause. He helped in influencing the Gilgit support in favour of Pakistan.

Later in 1993, he was awarded with the highest award of Pakistan.

British had special interest in Kashmir affairs as they are very much interested

in establishing a separate kingdom which will function under their ambit and through

which they can keep a strict watch on Russia, China, India, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Placed with such geo strategic importance, natural beauty and mineral wealth, Jammu

and Kashmir remained the bone of contention perpetually.

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4.1.3 Political Developments in Jammu and Kashmir

People of Jammu and Kashmir were much annoyed by the rule of Maharaja

Hari Singh and they were waiting for a change. Educated in other places, people of

Jammu and Kashmir started to think on modern lines for the upliftment of their own

people. When Mahatma Gandhi’s non – cooperation movement was in full swing in

India, people of Jammu and Kashmir also learned to raise the voice against the unjust

rule. The aspirations of the people were thoroughly understood by the British and

they supported the Jammu and Kashmir as they had some doubt about the loyalty of

the Maharaja towards the British. Thousands of people staged violent demonstration

outside the court on 13th July 1931. Police firing was ordered to bring the situation

under control in which 21 people lost their life. This particular incident created the

gap between the people and the ruler. Utilising this situation British exerted pressure

on Maharaja.

In 1934, leaders of all communities openly supported the idea of having a

united organisation to seek freedom from the autocratic rule of Maharaja. In 1939,

Muslim Conference was transformed into the National Conference and in 1944 it

passed a resolution for the establishment of a socialistic pattern of society and a

democratic Government. The National Conference started ‘Quit Kashmir’ in 1946.

Jawaharlal Nehru supported the cause and visited the State and Mahatma Gandhi also

visited the State in August 1947. People of all communities looked to the National

Conference with confidence for accession of the state to India or Pakistan whereas,

the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir want to remain as independent state.

Indian Independence Act passed on 17th June 1947 confirmed on 15th August

1947 the British would relinquish their authority in India and India will become an

Independent Nation. Government of India Act 1935 and Indian Independence Act of

1947 both created provision for the state to accede to the domain of India or Pakistan

by an Instrument of Accession executed by the ruler and thereafter will become

integral part of India or Pakistan. Apart from this, the ruler of a princely state can also

enter into a standstill agreement with either or both the independent dominions with

regards to customs, transit and communication, posts and telegraphs for a brief period.

The congress policy favoured people of every state should decide their own

destiny but the Muslim League supported that ruler of the concerned state has full

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rights to decide which side the state has to join and people must follow it This being

the situation, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir delayed his decision as he wanted

Jammu and Kashmir to be an Independent State. His indecisiveness allowed precious

time to run out. To avoid troubles in breakdown of the communication from Pakistan

and to earn profit by exports to the Indian markets, Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir

decided to have a standstill agreement with both India and Pakistan.

During the partition of India and Pakistan, the Pandits of Kashmir Valley were

supportive of National Conference, Shi’a Muslims in Kargil district had cultural

gravitation towards Afghanistan and in Poonch and regions of Muzzafarabad people

were in favour of Muslim Conference (Hewitt, 2003). It all shows the difference of

opinions of people inside the Kashmir Valley, creating a complex political situation

difficult for anyone to handle with ease.

Pakistan confirmed the standstill agreement related to the maintenance and

facilitation of communications, supplies, post and telegraphs in Jammu and Kashmir.

India insisted that an authorised person on behalf of the State must visit Delhi for

negotiating the standstill agreement, but unfortunately Jammu and Kashmir was

invaded by the Pakistan before such agreement was signed. This invasion by Pakistan

sealed the fate of Jammu and Kashmir from remaining as an independent nation.

4.1.4 Pakistan’s Interest in Kashmir

Though, Pakistan confirmed standstill agreement, it started creating trouble by

blocking economic activities, disturbing communication links, and forcing undue

hardship on the common people of Jammu and Kashmir by disturbing peace, safety

and security by indirectly supporting the raiders. It tried to forcibly accede Jammu and

Kashmir to Pakistan in September 1947 with impunity (Chopra, 1988).

During the surcharged situation at the time of partition, Pakistan tried to make

Jammu and Kashmir as part of Pakistan by sending invaders. This move of the

Pakistan had left the ruler with no other alternative except to accede it to India. The

raider’s invasion was sudden and swift; their morale was high as they received arms

and ammunition from Pakistan authorities. In Poonch area, 4000 rifles were issued to

trigger a revolt by large number of demobilized Muslim soldiers who served in Indian

Army during World War II (Chibber, 2004). It exposed the involvement of Pakistan

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authorities in annexing Jammu and Kashmir by force to Pakistan. Further, the Tribal

invasion into the territory of Jammu and Kashmir was launched in October 1947 with

the intention to loot non-Muslims and annex Jammu and Kashmir. Nearly 19, 000

raiders had been reinforced in the Uri area and 15, 000 raiders were operating against

western and south – western borders of the State (Statement made in the Constituent

Assembly (Legislative), 5 March, 1948, as quoted in Sharma & Bakshi, 1995b). This

clearly exhibits the support extended by the Pakistan without which such a mass

movement of raiders was impossible. Terrorism, incitement of the local population

and disruption of the civil administration have all formed part in offensive strategies

in the past (Brown, 2000a) which explain the attitude of Pakistan right from the

beginning.

4.1.5 Accession and Creation of Cease - Fire Line

Prime Minister of the State Mehr Chand Mahajan with the support of Sheikh

Abdullah persuaded the Prime Minister of India to send the Indian Army to save the

State from invaders. On 26th October 1947, The Maharaja executed the Instrument of

Accession and it was finally accepted by the Government of India and thus

eventually, Jammu and Kashmir was acceded to India.

Troops were moved into Jammu and Kashmir by Indian Air Force, with the

sole mission of providing safety and security to the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

Pitched battles were fought by the troops against invaders. People of Jammu and

Kashmir supported the Indian Army widely as they understood the intentions of

Pakistani invaders aimed at creating problems and looting their belongings. Inspite of

harsh climatic condition and hilly terrain soldiers of India braved their life, performed

their duties leaving indelible mark in the pages of History of Independent India. The

area included the entire domain of the Maharaja of J&K as at the time of accession

(Brown et al., 2000b) Indian troops fought a long war to bring every inch of the land

under control. Pakistani invaders were rooted back from many places, and complaint

was made to the United Nations. The United Nation Organisation consequently

passed a resolution on 13th August 1948 which postulated ceasefire, pull out of

Pakistan from the State and leaving to the people of Jammu and Kashmir the decision

regarding the future of the state.

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Politically, the Kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir was not an integral part of

British India at the time of partition. Maharaja had the full power to decide future of

the State. Sheikh Abdullah favoured Maharaja’s decision to accede to India because

he thought that people would have better opportunities to shape their own destiny

towards independence. The ceasefire came into existence on 1st of January of 1949,

but Pakistan refused to pull out from the State created Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.

India got the accession ratified for the area under its control by the Constituent

Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir. India made it clear that Jammu and Kashmir is an

integral part of India and Pakistan has to vacate Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. Pakistan

claims that the majority of the people are Muslims and so they must be given the

rights of self determination by plebiscite to choose between India and Pakistan.

4.2 Post Accession Scenario of Jammu and Kashmir

“… we have to proceed cautiously and with patience and at the same time firmness in so far as our principles are concerned”

(Jawaharlal Nehru, as quoted in Sharma & Bakshi, 1995c)

Post accession period of Jammu and Kashmir is very crucial as many

resolutions passed by the UNSC (United Nation Security Council) turned

unsuccessful in solving the Kashmir issue in a peaceful manner. Both India and

Pakistan firmly supported their respective point of view. Pakistan’s refusal to

withdraw its forces from Jammu and Kashmir made the, resolution inoperative and

ineffective. On 9th December 1949 the UNCIP (United Nation Commission of India

and Pakistan) accepted its failure in solving the problem. In its final report and

recommended for the appointment of a single mediator in the place of the

commission.

Based on the above recommendations, steps were initiated in the said direction

but, India and Pakistan rejected Mc Naughton proposals. On 12th April 1950 Mr.

Owen Dixon was appointed but he too failed in demilitarization of Kashmir and this

led to the appointment of another mediator Frank P. Graham. During Graham’s tenure

in office for two years, many landmark events took place in Kashmir. Convening of

Kashmir’s Constituent Assembly in 1951 is an important one. Though, his hard work

reduced the friction between India and Pakistan, five reports and two Security Council

resolutions passed during his period were turned down as major demands of both the

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sides were not fulfilled, making Graham’s mission also a failure. However his

suggestion of bilateral Indo – Pak negotiations kept the hope alive in the years that

followed.

Bilateral talks for settling the Kashmir issue started in summer of 1953.

Though progress was visible in all fronts dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah on 09th August

1953, made the atmosphere grim. In February 1954, Kashmir’s Constituent Assembly

unanimously ratified the State’s accession to India. During Bakshi’s, regime the State

made tremendous progress in every sphere (Panagariya, 2000a). That showed the

interest of people in leading a peaceful and happy life without violence. Around this

time Pakistan began to realise that their dream of Kashmir is fading away and tried its

level best to turn the tables against India. Pakistan in order to gain the support of the

west joined the Western Military Alliances to put indirect pressure on India. This

further complicated the problem which in the later years formed the basis for the arms

race in the region. Change of Government in Pakistan in 1956 and decision of its

Prime Minister Choudhri Mohammad Ali to resume the struggle for Kashmir at the

United Nations all combined together and made the bilateral talks between India and

Pakistan a failure during 1950’s.

In 1957, Pakistan through its Foreign Minister Feroze Khan Noon, challenged

Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly’s ratification and blamed it as an illegal

act. Further, he also demanded the induction of UN force into Kashmir was strongly

opposed by India. India made it very clear that the Constitution of Kashmir under

Article III ratified Kashmir accession and it has become an integral part of the Union

of India. In the absence of any progress in reconciliation on India – Pakistan stand

over Kashmir, it was decided to reappoint Frank. P. Graham for the second time to

implement UN resolution on Kashmir. After discussing with India and Pakistan,

Graham submitted his report on March 1958 with recommendation for Prime

Minister’s level conference of both the nations on Kashmir and induction of U.N.

troops on Pakistan side of Kashmir. This too was rejected and till 1962, UN did not

take up Kashmir issue again.

In 1958, Ayub Khan became the President of Pakistan and met Prime Minister

of India twice in 1960 and discussed the Kashmir issue. Though, signing of Canal

Water Treaty between the two nations gave hope to settle the Kashmir issue,

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ironically no progress was made. Pakistan pressurized to take up Kashmir issues once

again at the UN Security Council as a result of which resumption of bilateral talks

were recommended once again. This time the Soviet Union vetoed the resolution.

Sino–India war of 1962 exposed the India’s defence preparedness. Pakistan

extended its support for China created pressure on India. USA and UK took initiative

and convinced both India and Pakistan in November 1962 for conducting ministerial

level talks over Kashmir. On 27th December 1962, Indo–Pak talk on Kashmir started

in Rawalpindi. Pakistan revealed its joint communiqué with China on the borders

between Pakistan and Sinkiang. Pakistan unilaterally ceded a part of the State to

China in 1963 (Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, 2004). This

received a strong condemnation from the Indian side. However, Pakistan defended the

agreement and once again challenged India’s stand over Kashmir accession. Once

again on 18th May 1964 the UNSC passed a resolution to solve Kashmir dispute

through mutual negotiations between India and Pakistan.

The custodians of Holy Hair of Prophet Mohammad preserved in Hazratbal

Mosque since 1700 A.D, reported that the Holy Relic was missing. This disturbed the

peace in the Kashmir Valley. Thousands of people gathered in the streets and

demonstrated against the sacrilege. Police firing killed three people in the process of

bringing the situation under control. Later Intelligence Bureau found Pakistan along

with the help of some in Kashmir managed the removal of Holy Relic intentionally to

aggregate tension in Kashmir Valley. On 5th January 1964, the recovery of Holy Relic

was announced and the situation came under control. Thus, another attempt made by

Pakistan to provoke people of Kashmir to rise in revolt against India failed exposing

the true colours of Pakistan. The demise of Jawaharlal Nehru on 27th May 1964

created a political vacuum.

Tracing the contours from the post accession period of Kashmir till 1964, one

can see the hard stand of both the countries over Kashmir issue. Though chances

appeared for a peaceful settlement, Pakistan’s rigid posture disturbed a lot and made it

a more complicated issue. Pages of the history of Kashmir are not only filled with

failed talks between India and Pakistan, but also with wars between the two nations

over the issue.

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4.3 1965 Indo–Pak War

“From whatever angle we look, it becomes clear that the 1965 Indo – Pak war was a major and in sense a decisive attempt by Pakistan to grab Kashmir”

(Chopra,1990).

Lal Bahadur Shastri became Prime Minister of India and around that time the

morale of India was not very high. Failure of rains, followed by poor harvest

throughout India, difficult economic conditions, the language problem in Tamil Nadu,

humiliating defeat in the China war, lack of support for India from other nations - all

added together. Press and leaders of Pakistan used the situation well. Support for

Pakistan from the US and the new ties with China increased the morale of Pakistan

rulers and its military leaders. They underestimated the capabilities of Indian Army.

General Ayub Khan, the President of Pakistan thought this period as a golden chance

to fight against India and snatch Kashmir away from India.

Underestimation of Indian Army capabilities encouraged Pakistan authorities

to cross the border in Rann of Kutch on 9th April 1965 and occupied the Indian posts

of Kanjarkot, Sardar, Wayabat, and etc., in few days. Soon the Indian Army waiting

for a chance to wipe out the humiliating defeat in China war geared up fully to face

the situation. Indian Army quickly moved to the West Pakistan border along with its

men and material, to avoid border skirmishes into a full fledged war. The Prime

Minister of England intervened and cease fire was declared on 30th June, 1965 as a

result of which both the countries armies had to withdraw to previous positions.

Initial success in the Rann of Kutch areas left General Ayub Khan fully

impressed about his Army capabilities and further underestimated Indian Army.

Operation Gibraltar was initiated by Pakistan, to create problem in Jammu and

Kashmir. On 5th August 1965, about three to five thousands of Pakistani soldiers

disguised as Kashmiris crossed the Cease Fire Line and entered the Kashmir Valley.

In 1965, mercenaries were carefully chosen, trained, armed, organized and were

supported not only by a strong military regime in Rawalpindi but also by the POK

Government (Brown et al., 2000c). The operation was well planned with a obvious

intention to create disturbance in Kashmir once again. On reaching Kashmir they

thought that Kashmiri people will rise against India and it can be liberated from India.

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Though thousands of Pakistan soldiers reached Kashmir Valley, they didn’t receive

any support from the common people. Moreover Indian Army gave a very fitting

reply by killing thousands of Pakistan soldiers and arresting several hundreds of them.

People of Kashmir voluntarily helped the Indian Army in identifying the infiltrators

and once again the Pakistan dream of liberating Kashmir failed.

Failing to achieve Kashmir through Operation Gibraltar, Pakistan on1st

September 1965 decided to launch a full fledged attack on Kashmir. To surround the

Indian Troops in Western part of Jammu and Kashmir State, to capture Akhnoor on

the river Chenab, and to cut the road links between Jammu to Rajaori, Poonch they

launched a well thought strategy. Pakistan heavily depended on the Tanks supplied by

the US in this attack. The situation became serious to India, as geography and

logistics were in favour of Pakistan. Facing the initial losses and understanding the

design of Pakistan, India Army decided to move its forces into Lahore and Sailkot

sectors. Pakistan on seeing this unexpected move by the Indian Army started pulling

back bulk of the forces from the Chennab sector. Thus their advance in the Chennab

sector came to an abrupt end. Otherwise India would have faced a serious loss in this

sector.

Many major strategic military establishments were made redundant by the

Indian Army in Lahore sector. Battles fought in the Khemkaran sector increased the

troop’s morale further in this war. Indian Army capabilities were fully understood by

the whole world especially General Ayub Khan who depended heavily on American

‘Patton tank’ which was considered as unbreakable by the opponent. In Sailkot sector

Pakistan lost 243 tanks in various battles and 200 square miles of territory in this

region came under the control of Indian Forces. Indian troops moved in Rajasthan -

Sind borders and occupied Dali. The 22 days war of 1965 came to an end on 22nd

September 1965 as UN backed by the US and USSR obtained a cease fire. Though the

war was not decisive, it exhibited the caliber of the Indian Armed Forces to the whole

world.

Tashkent agreement was signed between India and Pakistan by which both the

countries agreed to withdraw their forces to the position held by them on 5th August

1965. People in India felt, India lost at the negotiation table though the Army won in

the battle field. This was conveyed to Lal Bahadur Shastri at Taskent. Unfortunately

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Lal Bahadur Shastri breathed his last breath at the morning hours in Taskent on 12th

January 1966.

Though, India emerged successfully after some initial losses, it thoroughly

understood the designs of Pakistan and its strategy in winning Kashmir. Pro Pakistani

elements were much demoralized by the outcome of 1965 war and Tashkent

agreement. Thus a well planned attempt by the military experts of Pakistan failed

once again in capturing Kashmir.

4.4 Post 1965 War Period

“In effect, what distinctions had earlier existed between the war for Kashmir and the war against India were melting away”

(Swami, 2007a)

Tashkent agreement gave hope to solve the Kashmir problem. But as time

lapsed, the hopes began to evaporate. Rann of Kutch boundary dispute between India

and Pakistan came to an end by the Indo-Pak Western Boundary Case Tribunal,

meeting in Geneva in 1968. Later this demarcation became a serious issue between

India and Pakistan. Chinese nuclear test on 16th October 1964, and 1965 Indo Pak war

pushed India to take decision in favour of nuclear weapons. Slowly and steadily

India’s idea of becoming nuclear power gained support from within.

Modernisation of the Indian Armed Forces took place at a rapid speed. In

1968, the Prime Minister of India ordered for the creation of new formation to deal

external espionage as a result of which RAW came into existence. Sheikh Abdullah

who was arrested on the eve of the 1965 war for his flirtation with the Chinese was

released in 1968. In a convention held in 1968, a resolution was passed that any

solution to the problem of Kashmir must keep in mind the interests of all regions of

the State. This came as a major jolt to Sheikh Abdullah. With the end of the Second

All Kashmir State People’s Convention in June 1970, Sheikh Abdullah dropped his

emphasis on holding a plebiscite. Indian Defence modernisation programe Initiated by

the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was well underway and India became superior to

Pakistan in terms of strength and capabilities.

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4.5 1971 Indo–Pak War

“India’s strategy of conducting the war was par – excellence. The same, however, cannot be said of our performance at the negotiating table”

(Panagariya, 2000b)

The disposition of Pakistan during 1970’s towards Kashmir has changed as it

was more worried about the developments in East Pakistan. Though, right from the

independence they had hard times in managing the affairs in East Pakistan in view of

its location, Pakistan’s decision to use Urdu as the official language in 1948 in East

Pakistan had further compounded the hardships. Gradually they began to think that

their eastern counterparts are ‘anti - Pakistani conspirators infiltrated by Hindus’. The

demand for restructuring of federal relations Awami League in 1966, demand for

separate milita, currency, and steps to remove economic inequality widened the gap

between the two Pakistans.

The Awami League headed by Mujibur Rehman won the elections and

demanded the incorporation of six point resolution in the new constitution. This was

not liked by Yahya Khan. Mujibur Rehman soon proclaimed that he was taking

charge of administration of East Pakistan. On 26th March 1971, Yahya Khan ordered

the operation searchlight in which 30,000 people were killed. About 17,000 soldiers

and millions of civilian refugees crossed Indian borders and took refuge in India in the

following months. Pakistan army was engaged in crushing the movement with heavy

hand. In the process, thousands of people of the Hindu community in East Pakistan

migrated from East Pakistan towards India.

After the resounding victory in general elections held in January 1971, the

Prime Minister of India Smt. Indira Gandhi took the refugees issue seriously as India

had to spend Rs 7 Corer per day on refugees. Appeals made to the international

communities added pressure on Pakistan to ensure safe return of refugees to their

homes. Meanwhile the treaty of friendship for 20 years India signed with USSR in

August 1971, further boosted the morale of India. Ordering the Armed Forces of India

to stay on high alert, delegations were sent to 70 countries all over the world. The

Prime Minister of India visited UK, France, Germany and USA to explain the

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problem of the sub- continent. War became imminent as the diplomatic efforts have

failed to exert pressure on Pakistan.

In October 1971, Pakistan planned to trigger the war against India and was

preparing itself for that. As such, on December 3rd Pakistan attacked the Indian Air

Force bases at Srinagar, Amritsar, Ambala, Awanthipur, Pathankot, Uttarlai, Agra,

and Jodhpur. At night around 22 hrs, Indian Prime Minister announced that India and

Pakistan were at war and immediately Indian Armed Forces initiated action. On 4th

December 1971, before sunrise Indian Air Force gave a suitable reply by destroying

almost all of Pakistan’s major Air Force bases, vital installations and established Air

power superiority over Pakistan. Indian Navy was pressed in service and substantial

damage of the naval base at Karachi almost paralysed Pakistan’s Navy. Indian Army

moved into Pakistan territory with ease and captured major Pakistan bases.

General Nazi Commander of East Pakistan Forces surrendered on evening of

16th December 1971, in Dacca to Lt. General, J. S. Aurora, Commander of Indian

troops in East Pakistan. General Yahya Khan accepted the cease fire on Western front

and with it the 13 day Indo Pak war of 1971 came to an end. Around the same time,

the US President suspended the U. S aid to India and ordered the US aircraft carrier

‘Enterprise’ along with 7th Fleet to Bay of Bengal to frighten India. With the USSR

support for India, the situation became favourable for India. Not satisfied with this,

US made a futile attempt at U.N.S.C to declare India as an aggressor. Interestingly

China also supported the US move. Throughout the proceeding in the Security

Council, the USSR and the East European nations unreservedly supported India and

the cause of liberation of the people of East Pakistan.

Later, Shimla Agreement was signed by the two leaders of India and Pakistan

on 3rd July 1972which provided ways for settling the difference by peaceful means

through bilateral discussions, withdrawal of forces to the earlier positions, accepted

the CFL (Cease Fire Line) in Jammu and Kashmir to be called as LOC (Line of

Control) and the agreement shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the

recognised position of either side.

With the end of this war Pakistan understood its short comings in the war

strategies, capabilities and decided to adopt unconventional tactics to weaken India.

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Though, India won the war, it lost a golden opportunity to settle the long outstanding

Kashmir issue.

4.6 Post 1971 War Period

“…the two-decade-long tussle on differing viewpoints on Kashmiri identity finally ended and paved the way for reconciliation between Kashmir and the Indian State.”

(Behera, 2000)

Amidst Indo–Pak war in 1971, the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir

expired on 13th December 1971 and the process of integration of Kashmir with India

came to a grinding halt. Syed Mir Quashim became the Chief Minister of the state.

‘Kashmir Accord’ was signed on 24th February 197. The very next day, Syed Mir

Quashim resigned and Sheikh Abdullah was sworn in as Chief Minister of the State.

Till March 1977 Sheikh Abdullah took decisions on his own. Finally in 1977, the

Congress party decided to withdraw the support and staked its claim to form the

Government in Jammu and Kashmir as a majority party in the Assembly. Sheikh

Abdullah recommended the dissolution of the Assembly and the Governor did the

same.

Fresh elections were held for the State in June 1977 in which National

Conference swept the polls and once again Sheikh Abdullah became the Chief

Minister of the State. On assuming the office, cases against the Al-Fath activities were

withdrawn. Mirza Afzal Beg was dismissed from the Cabinet in September 1978 and

expelled from the National Conference to everyone’s surprise. The Kashmir Grant of

Resettlement Bill 1982, enabling people who crossed over to Pakistan Azad Kashmir

can return and settle in Kashmir was passed by the Assembly.

On 21st August 1981 Sheikh Abdullah nominated his son Dr. Farooq Abdullah.

Though Sheikh Abdullah failed to realise his dream of becoming ‘the sultan of

Kashmir’ no doubt he was widely regarded as ‘lion of Kashmir’ by many scholars as

he kept the masses spell bound by his personality and oratorical skills.

Dr. Farooq Abdullah became the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir on 8th

September 1982 and passed the Resettlement Bill. Election was held in the state in

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1983 and once again Dr. Farooq Abdullah became the Chief Minister with a landslide

victory in elections. He joined hands with pro Pakistan elements and trouble erupted

in the Kashmir Valley once again. Incidents of bomb blasts and insults to the Indian

National Flag occurred at various places. Thus, pro Pakistan elements were slowly

gaining space in the Kashmir Valley.

Jagmohan was appointed as the Governor of the State in April 1984. A few

political developments took place in quick succession thereafter. In May 1984, G. M

Shah organised National Conference convention and elected Begum Kalidha Shah,

Wife of G. M Shah as President of the National Conference. Congress joined hands

with G.M Shah and the later claimed the majority and insisted that the Governor

should invite him to form the Government. Governor called the Chief Minister Dr.

Farooq Abdullah and explained the developments and sought the resignation of his

Government. Dr Farooq Abdullah requested the Governor to convene the Assembly

so that he could prove his majority in the Assembly.

4.7 Siachen Imbroglio 1984

“It also translated into a burning desire to take Kashmir”

(Chadha, 2005)

Siachen Glacier is the world’s highest battle field where the army faces two

enemies – one the army of Pakistan and the other, hostile climatic conditions, almost

all a life threat to the soldiers. Though it is a wasteland it is in a strategic location

which a nation can’t afford to neglect. During the partition period, the Boundary

Commission didn’t mark the line separating India and Pakistan beyond the point NJ

9842. Though it remained a neglected area prior to 1980s, Pakistan along with

China’s support claimed the right over Siachen Glaciers. Pakistan, therefore, made a

futile attempt in September - October 1983 to capture this area.

Loosing Aksa Chin area to China war made India to take a firm step in the

Saichen Glacier. After the victory of 1971 war against Pakistan, India was very keen

not to give an opportunity for Pakistan Army to win over India even psychologically.

Purchase of high altitude equipments in large quantities from foreign countries and

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heavy movements of troops in Skardu range by Pakistan forced India to initiate steps

in the right direction and to establish control over Saichen Glacier.

After a thorough planning by the Military experts in 1983 Indian Army

established Logistics base for future operations. Steadily and tactically India moved

the required man power to keep Pakistan away from this region. Pakistan on finding

Indian troops in this region made a futile attempt on 25th April by opening fire with

the help of machine guns and other modern weapons. Indian forces countered it

successfully. Till to date Indian troops have been highly alert in this region amidst

severe cold, exhibiting their courage and resolve in this world’s highest battle field to

prevent Pakistan’s advancement.

4.8 1984–1988 Period

“A new generation of Kashmiris had now emerged in the state who were far more politically conscious”

(Ganguly, 2002)

G. M Shah assumed office in the first week of July 1984 and was haunted by

troubles right from the beginning due to coalition politics. The Sheikh’s family and

the Governor were against him. However he managed the affairs till 7th March 1988.

Government of India imposed the Governor’s rule in the State. The Governor of the

State began to act swiftly and initiated several projects for the development of Jammu

and Ladakh region. His efforts achievements are visible even today in Mata Vaishno

Devi Temple at Jammu and in some areas of Ladakh.

Prime Minister of India Smt. Indira Gandhi was assassinated in October 1984

and Rajiv Gandhi assumed the office, who signed an accord with Dr. Farooq

Abdullah. President’s rule was lifted and National Conference Government with the

support from Congress was installed in November 1986. Dr. Farooq Abdullah became

the Chief Minister of the State. Fresh elections were held in Jammu and Kashmir. The

coalition partners of Congress (I) and National Conference swept the polls and Dr.

Farooq Abdullah assumed the office as Chief Minister again in March 1987.

A yearlong military exercise ‘Operation Brasstrack’ was conducted in 1986-87

to test the military readiness on a large scale by Chief of the Army Staff, General K.

Sundarji. In reply to this, Pakistan moved its armored division close to the borders.

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Pakistan blamed India for planning attack on its nuclear facilities. U.S extended its

support in case of any such attack. Pakistan’s nuclear capability came to light in the

process. To put off the situation India decided to withdraw the troops from the borders

in Feb-March 1987. India’s decision of withdrawal of forces was viewed by many as

a consequence of Pakistan’s nuclear capability.

4.9 Operation Topac

“A low level insurgency against the regime so that it is under siege but does not collapse as would not yet want central rule imposed by Delhi”

(Zia-Ul- Haq as quoted in Syed, 2002)

Zia-Ul-Haq, the ablest Military General who ruled Pakistan for 11 years,

regarded widely as ‘Master of Manipulation’, took humiliating defeat of the Pakistan

Army in 1971 Indo Pak war very seriously. Immediately after assuming power in

Pakistan in 1977, he extended financial and moral support to Jmaat-e-Islami to run

schools teaching fundamentalist Islamic education under the cover of religious

education. Fully understanding the conventional war capabilities of India, he decided

to counter India through proxy war. Just a few months before his death, he called for a

top level meeting in April 1988, attended by selected Corps Commanders and ISI

officers where he briefed ‘Operation Topac’ plans to take revenge on India. Without

losing Pakistan’s military power and expenditure, he laid a strong foundation that

ignited terrorism in Kashmir Valley. His plan became very successful in alienating

people of Kashmir and Indian security forces. Those people who stood by the side of

Indian Armed Forces in the fight against Pakistan’s intruders and regular forces in

1947, 1965 and in 1971 wars were suitably motivated by exploiting their weaknesses,

and by instigating the religious sentiments to wage a proxy war designed and

implemented by Pakistan. Weapons soon started pouring into India and youth were

attracted to join the training camps organised across the borders in the Azad Kashmir.

Firings by subversive groups with sophisticated weapons slowly started and became a

regular feature in Jammu and Kashmir. The Governments - both Central and State

understood that a few terrorist groups has become active in the soil of Kashmir with

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the help of Pakistan’s ISI, and started flexing their strength against the interest of the

State.

Thus, various factors right from the period prior to accession of Jammu and

Kashmir to India, inability of Pakistan in winning India in conventional wars along

with other domestic political problems made the situation conducive for Pakistan to

design a proxy war against India in a terrain difficult to operate easily. ‘Operation

Topac’, the brain child of Zia–Ul–Haq turned the common people in the valley

against Indian security forces. Though, Kashmiris and Indian forces suffered,

Pakistan’s moral support to the terrorist groups operating in the Kashmir Valley made

the problem more complex. The major terror incidents that created much impact in the

minds of the people are as follows.

4.10 1989–1993: The Spurt of Terrorism

“Terrorism is self- generative. It compels a response from us, which, in turn, creates more terrorists”

(Jaini 2008)

The apparent victory of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan with the backing of the

US and Saudi Arabia increased the morale of Pakistan’s ISI to adopt a suitable

formula in Jammu and Kashmir. The terrorism in Punjab tied the Indian security

forces to Punjab. Moreover, nuclear capabilities of Pakistan created strains forcing to

avoid the retaliation. Both the above reasons went in favour of Pakistan to initiate

proxy war in India by increasing the terror activities in the state of Jammu and

Kashmir where the geographical features were very suitable for them.

The general elections in India were held in November 1989. V.P.Singh

became the Prime Minister of India on December 2nd and on 8th December Union

Home Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed’s daughter Rubaiya was kidnapped from

Srinagar by the JKLF terrorists. It created panic and ultimately she was set free on

13th December 1989, in return to Government’s release of five hardcore terrorists

from the Indian Jail. Consequently, the morale of the followers of terrorism principles

increased enormously in a short time attracting youth from varied backgrounds to

resort to terrorism as an effective tool to make the Government listen to their

demands. Soon about 40 terror organisations were found operating in Kashmir Valley

which enjoyed support of people. The number of terror incidents also increased

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rapidly. Pakistan’s involvement in providing training and helping terrorists crossing

the borders into Kashmir became a great cause of concern for India.

Jagmohan was appointed the Governor of the State for the second time by the

Government of India. The Chief Minister of the State Dr. Farooq Abdullah tendered

his resignation of his Cabinet on Jagmohan’s appointment as the Governor of the

State. Government imposed president’s rule and placed the assembly in a state of

suspended animation. On 19th January 1990, the Governor of the State dissolved the

Assembly, though done within the constitutional right it was viewed as an act of

injustice. Terrorists opened fire at paramilitary forces, and planned in a big way to

disturb the Republic Day. The Director General of Police conducted a massive search

operation on 19th and 20th January 1990, which irritated the public. The situation was

exploited by the terror organisations further. To avoid unwanted incidents during

Republic Day celebration much care was taken. Additional reinforcements of security

forces and placing the Army units in troubled spots turned the situation under control.

On 25th January 1991, terrorists gunned down four Indian Air Force personnel. To

prevent any further damage, curfew was imposed. Though, Republic Day passed

without any incident, law and order in the Kashmir Valley was disturbed. Whenever

security forces and terrorists were engaged in firing, innocent people, those who are

the bystanders were worst affected.

The strongest terror organisation JKLF decided to celebrate 11th February as

‘Maqbool Butt Day’. In the same month Doordarshan Director and an Intelligence

Bureau officer were killed brutally sending shockwaves throughout India. Security

lapses were identified. Deployment of additional security forces was the only option

to control the situation. Terrorism continued to flourish. Eliminating the terrorists

became a difficult task for the security forces and restoring normalcy seems a difficult

task. JKLF took undue advantage of the situation and took out large procession

demanding Liberation of Kashmir. Firing by the security forces on 1st March 1990 by

the security forces leading to the death of civilians turned the situation complex.

Inspite of the curfew, almost entire population demonstrated against the firing

incident and Hindu population was targeted. Thus, the exodus of the Hindu population

began and people left in large number towards Jammu and other safer places outside

Kashmir. The result of the terrorist activities funded and supported by Pakistan

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Occupied Kashmir and Pakistan has been that nearly 3. 70 lakh Hindus and Sikhs

migrated from the Valley (Singh, 2008).

With the situation getting worse by the day, the National Front Government

set- up an All Party Advisory Committee on Kashmir. On 8th March 1990 this

committee landed at Srinagar Airport and the Governor didn’t turn to invite the

Committee. The Committee cut short the programme and flew back to Delhi the next

day, without visiting Jammu. On 11th March 1990, George Fernandes was appointed

Minister in Charge for Kashmir Affairs. Though strong measures were adopted the

terror organisations continued arson, kidnapping, and brutal killings. On 21st May

1990, Mirwaiz Moulvi Mohammad Farooq, the highest religious dignatory in

Kashmir was gunned down by terrorists and the entire Valley was shocked. Though a

curfew was imposed and security forces were placed on high alert. Firing by the

security forces resulted in killing of 70 people and hundreds were injured turning the

situation more volatile. On 6th July 1990, under Section 3 of Armed Forces [J &K]

Special Powers Act, area within 20 Kms belt along the LoC in the districts of Rajouri

and Poonch of Jammu division and 6 districts, namely Srinagar, Budgam, Anantnag,

Pulwama, Baramulla, and Kupwara of the valley were placed as ‘disturbed’.

Abductions and killings of prominent personalities continued. Damages to the

Government and private property increased due to terrorism activities .The law and

order situation worsened steadily in the state. Continuous outbreak of terror incidents

created severe threat to India’s composite culture and national integrity. Army and

Para-military forces were moved into the state to bring the situation under control. It

was estimated about 15, 000 to 20, 000 persons trained in POK/ Pakistan camps were

present in Kashmir Valley. For safeguarding the assets, vital economic infrastructure

and for preventing mass casuality of terror attack security forces were deployed

almost in all places. Deadly weapons and dangerous explosives were recovered during

constant search operations. Army needed more legal powers to carry out their duty in

an efficient manner. Providing more powers to the security forces to overcome the

situation became unavoidable in countering terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.

Accordingly, Government on understanding this provided the extra edge to the

security forces by introducing AFSPA (Armed Forces Special Powers Act). But,

eventually every terror incident widened the gap between the people and security

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forces further. Growing amidst terror activities younger generation has nothing to

look at except misery, security forces and the sounds of gun fire around them.

During October-November 1993, a group of armed youths entered the

Hazratbal Shrine with an intention to protect the Holy relic carried away by rumors

that Security Forces are planning to occupy the Shrine. A mere misperception

between intentions created much panic throughout Jammu and Kashmir. People came

out in large number and demanded withdrawal of Security Forces. To control the

protest and to bring the situation under control, Security Forces opened fire which

resulted in killing of some protesters. This particular incident added fuel to the fire

and later the situation became more serious as terror activities occurred more

frequently than earlier. Armed youth were persuaded to surrender thus 33 days siege

at Hazratbal Shrine came to an end without any damage to the Shrine. Though, ended

in a peaceful manner it exhibited a lack of understanding among the Kashmiri people

on the real intention of the presence of security forces.

Pressure exerted by the counter terrorism strategy pushed terrorist to the wall.

In order to overcome the pressure, terror organisations stretched their area of

operation beyond Kashmir Valley. The JKLF based its struggle on slogans of Azadi.

However by 1993, the JKLF had taken serious loses. It tried to find safe sanctuaries in

the remote areas of Doda and Kishtwar to survive. (Bakshi, 2008). Terrorists stuck in

Doda, and in Udhampur district falling in the ambit of Jammu Division. The vast

mountainous tract of these two districts provided natural shelter to terrorist. With

improvement in security, terror organisation felt that they are losing the ground. To

maintain cohesiveness Pro Pakistan elements grouped themselves under the umbrella

‘Kul Jamaat Conference’ also called the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) in

1993.

Thus, during initial stages of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, the intensity of

the terrorism activities created more damage to private and public property which

could be seen in Table 4.1. People suffered huge losses. However, the methods

adopted by the Security Forces in countering terrorism resulted in safety and security

of common people apart from recovery of deadly weapons as shown in Table 4.2

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Table 4.1. Destruction to Properties During 1989–1993 in J & K.

YEAR Government Buildings

Education Buildings

Private Houses

Bridges Shops

1989 191 172 427 16 - 1990 501 129 1242 172 202 1991 45 24 819 24 83 1992 65 57 2312 28 200 1993 98 46 1110 34 400 Total 900 428 5910 274 885

Source: Annual Report 2003-04, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India.

Table 4.2. Arms/Explosives Recovered During 1990–1993 in J & K.

YEAR AK

Rifles & Pistols

Rocket Launchers

UMG Explosives Grenades Rockets

1990 1991 108 77 231 2502 296 1991 3169 29 130 274 1784 286 1992 4260 62 164 285 2391 245 1993 3130 36 142 2950 4363 135 Total 12550 235 443 3740 11040 962

Source: Annual Report 2003-04, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India.

4.11 Transition Stage 1994–1998

“… Anti- and counterterrorism policies and measures instituted in response to terrorism forced the terrorists to move away from one set of tactics and toward another”

(Quillen, 2008)

Understanding India’s response and Army’s strategy in combating terrorism

Pakistan’s ISI reviewed its strategy. They began to suspect JKLF, as this the

organisation which was considered as the strongest of all organisations earlier period

is interested in independent Kashmir which is exactly opposite to that of Pakistan’s

intention. Pakistan was obsessed with the idea of bringing Kashmir under their

control. Towards this objective, they supported terror groups such as Hizabul

Mujahideen, Hizb-e-Islami, Allah Tigers, Al Umar, Harkat-Ul-Ansar, etc. From 1993-

94, a full- fledged proxy war was launched against India, mainly fought by mercenaries

originating and operating from Pakistan (Bammi, 2007a). These groups mainly consisted

of militants mainly from Pakistan, POK, Afghanistan, and from some other Islamic

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countries. Bomb explosion in March 1994 at Badami Bagh Cantonment in Srinagar and

assassination of Mirwaiz of South Kashmir Qazi Nissar Ahmad in June 1994 are the major

incidents coupled with many other terror incidents. Around the same time Government of

India created Department of Jammu and Kashmir Affairs on 1st November 1994

exclusively to address the specific issues empowering to deal with constitutional

provisions of Jammu and Kashmir.

Pakistan pursued another strategy to escalate pressure on India by forming

Kashmir Liberation Cell and conducting anti India propaganda. They concentrated

much on hard targets than on soft targets. Targeting security posts at crowded places

such as markets and busy bazaars, attacking the patrol parties became routine. Their

main intention was to create panic among security forces so that they will react or

retaliate the attack in which innocent people would hurt which would in turn propel

anger in the general public. Ugly acts of terrorism left irreparable damage in the mind

of all people irrespective of their religion and faith. One such incident happened in

1995. On 8th March Indian Security Forces laid siege as they received information

that foreign terrorists are hiding inside Charar-e-Sharief. The siege continued despite

efforts to make the terrorist to surrender. On 10th May the most revered holy place

was burned to ground and the terrorists managed to escape to Pakistan. Though, many

terror incidents broke out in 1995 causing death, destructions and adding misery to the

common people, abduction of foreign tourists and killing them later became a matter

of serious concern.

Indian counter terrorism planners proved more intelligent. They increased the

check posts, carried out checks vigorously and kept moving constantly in small

groups. This was not expected by the terrorists and they were unable to carry their

objectives beyond certain limit. Foreign terrorist on losing ground against security

forces and in order to divert India’s attention away from Kashmir, Pakistan’s ISI

started to target other Indian cities. Terrorist groups though, found difficulties in

carrying out their brutal killing, isolated incidents did occur now and then. In 1996

also they created much panic in the minds of the people, this time by killing 16

innocent citizens at Barshalla in Doda District. New establishments such as RR

battalions were inducted in large numbers in order to further strengthen the security

forces. Pakistan’s effort of achieving Kashmir Valley through foreign terrorist groups

proved futile because of effective counter terrorism strategy. Mean while, people

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reconciled to the presence of Indian security forces and reasons behind their presence

in Jammu and Kashmir. The general public began to drift away from supporting

terrorism and helped the security forces by providing information about terror

hideouts and in identifying terrorists. Government also took necessary steps in 1996

to resume political process in the state. Elections for Jammu and Kashmir Assembly

were planned and conducted. Though terrorist organisations directed people to

boycott the elections, 53.93 percent of voters casted their vote, exhibiting their faith in

democracy.

Security Forces maintained a tight security to control the incidents, with

tourist arrival in the Kashmir Valley increasing for first time after 1989, exhibited a

positive sign. With situation remarkably going in favour of India, Pakistan ISI had

secret plan to put India in trouble by surprise attacks.

‘Operation Sadhbhavna’ an important initiative was launched by the Indian

Army in 1998 with an objective to win the hearts of the people. Quality education,

Women empowerment, Community and Infrastructure development, Health,

Educational and Motivational tours are some of the steps carried out through this

Operation Sadhbhavna. Apart from this, basic needs of the common people such as

water supply schemes, electrification, and animal husbandry are also carried out.

Vocational training in courses like welding, spray painting, catering, computer

technology, tailoring, weaving and bottling teachers training are imparted to local

youth for self reliance. 30 Army Goodwill schools are run by Army in Kashmir

Valley under this ‘Operation Sadhbhavna’. Since its initiation in 1998 a total of Rs.

320 crore have been spent. Few armies in the world can boast such a long and

peaceful operation in which hearts not territories are won (Gupta, 2010). This

approach indicates the soft nature and the responsible role of Indian Army in dealing

with terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. Through such operation, people understood

the real intentions of the Indian Army. ‘Operation Sadhbhavna’ no doubt helped

common people to see and understand the security forces intentions and objectives.

Thus, during the transition stage the JKLF was sidelined and the foreign

terrorist group dominated the scene. These groups proved heartless as they never

minded to cause death, destruction to the properties of the Government and common

people as shown in Table 4.3. Well planned strategies of the Indian security forces

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contained the damage to a larger extent made the situation difficult for the foreign

terrorist. Recovery of arms and explosives continued as mentioned in the Table 4.4.

Situation though deteriorated in the year 1994 - 95, efforts by the security forces

turned the situation under control paving the way for the election to the State after a

long gap.

Table 4.3. Destruction to Properties During 1994-1998 in J & K.

Year Government

Building Educational

Building Bridges Hospitals

Private Houses

Shops

1994 172 119 16 4 666 162 1995 127 133 2 2 1814 402 1996 52 68 5 3 602 161 1997 13 11 1 1 437 67 1998 13 15 2 - 273 66 Total 377 346 26 10 3792 858

Source: Annual Report 2003-04, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India.

Table 4.4. Arms/Explosives Recovered During 1994–1998 in J & K

Year AK Rifles & Pistols

UMG Rocket

Launchers RDX

in Kgs. Explosives IED Grenades Rockets

1994 3136 127 31 - 1342 126 2603 395 1995 3020 67 36 - 1484 811 2870 170 1996 3202 84 43 166 2381 245 3949 378 1997 2749 64 81 342 6448 1033 5124 479 1998 2104 71 140 769 2992 514 5883 375 Total 14211 413 331 1277 14647 2729 20429 1797

Source: Annual Report 2003-04, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India

4.12 Regenerating Period: 1999-2003

Partition, independence, invasion of raiders, accession of Jammu and Kashmir

to India and 1947 war with Pakistan created Cease Fire Line (which later became

LoC). Though the matter was referred to the UNO by India, Pakistan refused to

withdraw their troops from Jammu and Kashmir as a result of which 40 percent of

Jammu and Kashmir continues to be under Pakistan control.‘ Instrument of Accession’

clearly states that the whole of Jammu and Kashmir is acceded to India but Pakistan

never accepted this and thus the problem of Kashmir became the bone of contention

between the two nations.

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India was forced to fight three wars with Pakistan in1947- 48, 1965 and third

in 1971. After the 1971 war, Pakistan did not provoke India to fight another open war.

In all wars against India, Pakistan learned one thing very clearly that they can never

win India in conventional war. Fully awake of this, they planned the proxy war very

carefully and created havoc in Jammu and Kashmir. Normal life was disturbed to a

maximum extent. Peace appeared in the soil of Jammu and Kashmir after 1989

period, and Pakistan was not able to digest this. Elections to the State Assembly and

return of normalcy followed by developmental activities, and reappearance of tourists

in large numbers in almost all destinations especially in Kashmir valley became an

eye sore to Pakistan. Pakistan made yet another attempt and intrude into Kargil.

4.12.1 Kargil Intrusion 1999

“…it hoped to draw international attention to the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir…and to revitalize the jihad India had succeeded in wearing down”

(Swami, 2007b)

With the change in political scenario after Lok- Sabha elections in January

1998, Atal Bihari Vajpayee became the new Prime Minister of India. India conducted

nuclear test in May 1998 and Pakistan too conducted. Pakistan’s nuclear test made

India to think twice before taking any serious step in preventing Pakistan from

extending their support to terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. In view of sensitive

nature of the situation, the Prime Minister of India took a bold step to increase the

contact between people of the two countries by proposing a bus service between New

Delhi and Lahore. The idea received irresistible response from people of both the

nation. Prime Minister of India, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee boarded the bus to Lahore

on 19th February 1999 and was given a warm welcome by Pakistan Prime Minister at

Wagah border. ‘Lahore Declaration’ was signed between both the nations. People of

both the nations felt they can use resources for better purposes than spending in for

wars. The move of the Indian Prime Minister was cherished globally. Situation in

Kashmir improved and people began to feel the comfort. Inflow of domestic tourists

towards the Valley increased. Restoration of peace in the Valley was not agreeable to

Pakistan and they began to formulate another conspiracy.

In the early March 1999 when the snow was still thick, Pakistan’s ISI

supported armed personnel scaled the high mountains in Kargil sector from Pakistan

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side with all modern weapons, ultra modern high altitude clothing and full

preparation. Well motivated by Pakistan’s ISI, they took risk of their life and started

occupying the mountain at heights of 16, 000 to 18,000 feet high which is impossible

without proper training for a prolonged period. The mission was planned by the

military experts in Pakistan who are well aware of India’s positions and its patrol

routines.

Unaware of Pakistan’s plan, India despatched patrol party when the snow

started melting. The patrol party came under heavy fire from the Pakistan’s intruders.

Initially, it was estimated only a few intruders were inside the Indian territory but,

aerial survey on 12th May confirmed the intrusion of a huge contingent. Pakistan’s

evil designs along with the cover fire provided by the Pakistan’s artillery from across

the border enabled the intruders to occupy the strategic Srinagar – Leh Highway, the

lifeline of Ladakh, connecting it with rest of India. With enemy strategically located

at a high altitude and severe cold climatic conditions. ‘Operation Vijay’ to clear the

heights of Kargil from the intruders, took place at lightning speed and the Indian

Army moved in 30, 000 troops. Initial losses were heavy as Indian was at low altitude

As such, Indian Air Force was pressed in service swiftly. Brave Air Warriors took

upon the challenge and proved their mettle with excellent operating skills, amazing

fire power from the Air Force and Indian Army started scaling the heights with ease

and started driving the enemy behind LoC. In the process the peak of Tololing was

captured and the dream of intruders to cut off Drass from rest of Kashmir Valley was

shattered.

4.12.2 Post Kargil Period

“Of course terrorist campaigns are not static in their nature. The terrorists ideologies may develop and alter over time and this may be reflected in the pattern of their attack.”

(Drake, 2008)

Pakistan’s attempt to create confusion in India through Kargil intrusion failed

miserably and Pakistan resorted to the usual blame game. Though, Pakistan tried its

best to project that intruders were not backed by them, an intrusion with such massive

strength, firepower, logistic support in a hilly terrain and in harsh weather condition is

highly impossible without the blessing of Pakistan Army and ISI. Serious differences

erupted between Pakistan Prime Minister and the then Army Chief who later

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overthrew the former and became the Chief Executive of Pakistan in October 1999.

With an Army General becoming the ruler of Pakistan, the morale of the terrorists

which was down during Kargil reached new heights. To pay off for the losses, once

again they started pushing terrorists the inside Indian borders through infiltration.

Soon after her defeat in Kargil, the ISI pushed in more foreign mercenaries including

Fidayeen, which changed the pattern of the militant attacks (Bammi, 2007b)

Post Kargil terror attacks were well planned and carefully executed in a

professional manner with added firepower. Changed terror attack tactics were learned

quickly by the Indian Security Forces. The hijack of IC 814 increased the terrorist’s

morale. Indian troops were put on alert to tackle any situation and the situation was

eventually brought under control.

Intelligence reports estimated foreign terrorists are planning to strike in areas

lying south of Pir Panjal in Doda, Udhampur, Rajouri, Poonch, and in Jammu districts

to keep Indian Security Forces on toes. When US President visited India in March

2000, terrorists massacred 35 Sikhs to show their strength. Security Forces carried

intense search operations and captured three missiles in Rajouri and 105 Kgs of RDX

from Srinagar in the month of April and killed 25 terrorist in mid September.

NICO (Non–Initiation of Combat Operation) was issued by the then Prime

Minister of India on 19th November 2000 by which Security Forces operating in

Jammu and Kashmir were ordered to stop offensive operations during the Holy month

of Ramzan from 26th November 2000. This move was welcomed by the people of

Jammu and Kashmir. Before NICO was implemented terrorist struck twice in Doda

district killing 10 people.

A futile attempt was made on January 14th January 2001 to kill Chief

Minister of Jammu and Kashmir State. NICO was extended upto end of May. Finally

on 23rd May 2001 NICO was withdrawn by the Government of India. During the

intervening period the terror groups which faced setback in year 2000, regrouped and

gained vigour and stability. Terrorists approach was known to Security Forces and

they adopted strategies accordingly. With talks between India and Pakistan failed

during 14 – 16 July 2001, terrorists carried out a few more attacks. State Government

vide its notification dated 10th August 2001 has declared whole of Jammu Division

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along with Srinagar, Budgam, Anantnag, Pulwama, Baramulla, and Kupwara as

‘disturbed’ under Section 3 of the Armed Forces (J&K) Special Power Act, 1990.

4.12.3 Attacks on J & K Legislative Assembly

Terrorists utilised each and every opportunity to revive terrorism in Jammu

and Kashmir. While World Trade Centre attack in September 2001in US was hardly

forgotten by the people, terrorist in Jammu and Kashmir stunned everyone by

attacking the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly at Srinagar in October 2001.

This attack received a lot of condemnation by people from all walks of life. People

publicly demanded for trans LoC retaliation. Government once again continued to

adopt restraint. The weakness of the international community in general, and

individual states in particular, in responding to terrorism has also contributed to the

rise in terrorism (Wilkinson, 1986) clearly shows the short comings in dealing with

terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.

4.12.4 Morale after attack on Indian Parliament

Pakistan’s indirect support often increases the morale of the terrorists who

dared to venture out of Jammu and Kashmir. Terrorist attacked the Indian Parliament-

the Heart of Democracy of India on 13th December 2001 when the session was in

progress. All the terrorists who tried to enter were countered by the security forces

and killed. Attack on Indian Parliament was condemned globally. India’s tolerance

for Pakistan’s continued support to cross border terrorism reached its threshold. The

Government felt it is very essential to initiate a strong action against Pakistan. On 16th

of December Indian Armed Forces were ordered to mobilise the forces towards

Pakistan border to built pressure on Pakistan.

4.12.5 Operation Parakram

“…the credibility of India’s coercive diplomacy and military superiority was seriously undermined”

(Kanwal, 2006a)

The Armed Forces geared up. Accepting the task with a desire to teach

Pakistan an unforgettable lesson Indian Armed Forces moved towards the border and

intimated that they are waiting for further orders from the Government. Pakistan also

moved troops in reply to India’s move.

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Though, snow covered areas gave army a disadvantage in conducting a strike

at areas along LoC in Jammu and Kashmir, the climate to conduct the operation was

favourable in plains of Punjab and Rajasthan. At this juncture, US and other Western

nation applied pressure on Pakistan to initiate responsible steps to avoid the full scale

war. With pressure increasing day by day the then Pakistan General on 12th January

2002 announced that Pakistan will not permit to use its territory as base for any terror

activities in future against India. India was not much satisfied by mere mouth service

but required a firm action. However, for the time being it maintained the pressure on

Pakistan by not ordering withdrawal of troops.

Once again people across the border planned to counter India through back

doors. This time they dared to attack the family quarters of the Indian Army Garrison

at Kaluchak near Jammu on 14th May 2002. In the morning hours of the fateful day,

terrorists initiated the attack which ended in killing the family members of the

Soldiers. This created a shock wave among the people of India. The whole world

raised their voice against this worst incident. Government of India restrained itself

not to attack Pakistan as their real intention is to start a war between two countries by

initiating such terror attacks in the Indian soil. The army continued to remain in the

borders.

Amidst vigil, the terrorists managed to strike at different places but the

intensity of the attacks were low. On July 13th 2002 terrorist killed 25 persons at

Kasimpura in Jammu District. There is no let up in terrorist acts (Malik, 2002)

indicating terrorists operating from within the Indian borders remain active. Finally

on 16th October 2002, India ordered for withdrawal of troops from the border and

thus, the ten month stand-off between India and Pakistan came to an end. Army’s role

should be well defined to avoid confusion. General Padmanabhan point of view at this

stage is worth mentioning. Army’s role should be well defined to avoid confusion

(General Padmanabhan as quoted in Kanwal, 2006b). India’s decision to move the

troops to border and not allowing them to carry on with the purpose of the movement

created confusion to all viewers.

4.12.6 Post Operation Parakram

Indian troop’s reduction from the border received mixed views. It was seen as

India’s weakness in dealing Pakistan and the terrorists once again became active in

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Jammu and Kashmir. They kept on targeting Indian troops and innocent civilians at

many places inside Jammu and Kashmir. Despite calls from various terror

organisations to boycott the polls for Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly

people, participated in large numbers in the polling process in September-October

2002 and demonstrated their confidence in democratic norms than on gun culture.

This was a major blow to those who are operating in clandestine manner and

supporting terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. Attacks on CRPF Camp and on Indian

Army convoy near Jawahar Tunnel in November surprised everyone. Terror attacks in

Raghunath temple in Jammu on 24th November 2002 killing 12 people and injuring

another 52 created much panic.

The new Government in Jammu and Kashmir immediately on assuming

office started to deliver its election promises. The ‘Healing Touch’ policy initiated by

the Government to bring back normalcy in the State was appreciated by everyone.

Measures taken to bring the migrated Kashmiri Pandits back to Kashmir Valley

received a tremendous welcome from people of all sections of the society irrespective

of religion. The then Prime Minister visited Srinagar and addressed a public rally and

promised further infrastructural development, measures for ending unemployment

problem, plans to resolve troubles through Insaaniyat (Humanism), Jamhooriyat

(Democracy), and Kashmiriyat (Kashmiri’s age old tradition).

Initiatives for further development lifted the morale of Jammu and Kashmir

people. Slowly the public mood was turning against the terror organisations. Tourists

started trickling in the streets of Kashmir Valley. Changed situation inside Kashmir

Valley increased the tourist arrival. The, response to Amarnath Yatra also increased

bringing back peace in Kashmir Valley. All these welcome changes turned out to be

an eye bore for the terrorists. Pressure from their masters outside the border increased

forcing the terrorists to carryout terror attacks in Jammu and Kashmir. To ruin the

good works initiated by the Government towards peace and normalcy terrorist in

order to prove their existence attacked and killed 24 innocent people at Nadimarg on

23rd March 2003 and several pilgrims on 21st July 2003. Pandits planning to return to

Kashmir Valley showed uncertainty especially after these incidents as they felt

insecure. Terrorists also planned to strike at various places outside Kashmir Valley.

The change of the situation once again made the Security top brasses to maintain strict

vigil as earlier to prevent outbreak of any terror incidents. Bomb blast at Parimpora

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fruit market near Srinagar killing 7 people and injuring 32 clearly exhibited terrorist’s

intention to disturb the economic activities of the State.

Realising the need for peace and development, the Hurriyat Conference came

forward for dialogue. Pakistan felt unhappy over this decision and initiated a split in

this organisation a bid to keep the pot boiling against India’s interests. Pakistan’s

support to terrorism was vividly visible to all and it also over the years became

epicenter of terror activities. Many countries started applying pressure on Pakistan.

Having been convinced that the situation is not favourable, the then Prime Minister of

Pakistan offered a ceasefire on the LoC with effect from mid night of 25th November,

2003. India too offered a series of measures to promote people to people contact with

Pakistan and offered to revive the bus link between Srinagar and Muzzafarabad. In the

process the Indian security Forces gained an upper hand in containing the terror

incidents. Some of the terrorist began to surrender. As terrorists surrendered and the

terror organisations which never gave up terrorism started targeting those who

surrendered and this created a new problem for those who surrender. Even when the

terrorist act itself does not succeed, it often advance the purposes of identity creation

(Byman, 2008)

Thus, the period extending from 1999 to 2003 witnessed many ups and down.

Kargil intrusion, hijack of IC 814 and Indian Government release of terrorist, attack

on Jammu and Kashmir Assembly, and attack on Indian Parliament, movement of

troops to the border all reveal the ugly face of terrorism and Indian Government’s

responsible strategies to eradicate terrorism from Jammu and Kashmir. Though,

disturbances due to terrorism continued, it was effectively reduced by the security

forces and the same is revealed from Table 4.5. Arms and other explosive materials

were recovered in large quantities as shown in Table 4.6 due to mounting up the

search operations and routine checks conducted by the security forces.

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Table 4.5. Destruction to Properties During 1999–2003 in J & K

Year Government

Building Educational

Building Bridges Hospitals

Private Houses

Shops

1999 7 9 2 - 284 6 2000 14 6 1 1 330 107 2001 30 16 2 - 419 77 2002 14 10 4 - 421 20 2003 6 5 2 - 259 9 Total 71 46 11 1 1713 219

Source: Annual Report 2003-04, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India.

Table 4.6. Arms / Explosives Recovered During 1999–2003 in J & K

Year AK

Rifles & Pistols

UMG Rocket

Launchers

RDX in

Kgs. Explosives IED Grenades Rockets

1999 1629 26 42 886 2182 466 4093 332 2000 1887 21 59 1508 1798 718 4807 555 2001 2016 10 39 2547 1009 450 4152 392 2002 1879 3 36 647 912 211 2701 138 2003 1784 8 30 1624 861 229 3733 144 Total 9195 68 206 7212 6762 2074 19486 1561 Source: Annual Report 2003-04, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India.

4.13 Descending Phase: 2004-2008

“The principles underlying violence and terror are old, but many recent applications are new”

(Kumar 2002)

Things started moving against in early 2004. Suicide Squad attacks at Jammu

Railway Station in January, Court Complex at Jammu, attacks at PIB (Press

Information Bureau) in 9th March etc., made the situation again complex. Attacks on

election rally at Uri in Baramulla killing 11 and injuring 58 people made Security

Forces to be more alert. IED blast killing 30 persons including 19 BSF Jawans at

lower Munda near Qazigund, grenade attack in front of Purnima hotel at Pahalgam in

June, IED blast at Sangom Bahthi in the Doda District killing 6 people on 2nd July,

attack on cricket stadium at Srinagar in November and IED blast killing 10 Security

Force persons at Naiyna Batpora Village in Pulwama District are some of the major

terror incidents which worsened the situation. Throughout these attacks terrorist

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targeted Village Defence Committee Members, Special Police Officers, and

Surrendered Terrorists.

Pro-active tackling of cross border terrorism by Security Forces played a vital

role in containing the number of terror incidents. In 2004, Security Forces managed to

neutralize many senior commanders from all major terrorist organisations.

Government initiated steps to talk to all those who leave the path of violence. Security

Forces took steps to avoid collectoral damage as far as possible thus creating a better

understanding with local population than before. People felt much happy as terror

incidents were reduced to a larger extent compared to earlier years. Terror incidents

appeared now and then but, the frequency and intensity remained low. Elections to the

Indian Parliament were conducted and Dr. Manmohan Singh became the Prime

Minister of India.

Attempts for cross border infiltration too reduced to a considerable extent due

to the installation of fence. A three member Committee was set up to examine the

Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) followed by Security Forces to make it more

people friendly. Government remained firmly to counter the challenge posed by

terrorism. Throughout 2006 infiltration was on a low key. Around this time terrorists

changed the tactics and choose soft targets such as minority communities, tourists,

and migrant labourers and attacked them. For instance the attack on commuters at

Pahalgam bus stand, in April 2006, abduction and killing of 13 people from Lalone

Gala forest area at Udhampur District, attack at Kulhand in May, attack on Youth

Congress rally in Srinagar. The attack near Srinagar Road Transport Corporation

(SRTC) in May, attack on tourist bus from Gujarat at Srinagar, granade attack on

tourist buses at Dal Gate in Srinagar on 31st May, attack on Regal Chowk, Abi Guzen

Lane and Tourist Reception Centre on 11th July, attack on SRTC bus in Gulmarg in

July were some such attacks on soft target during 2006.

A positive development during this time was that parents and relatives of

misguided youth approached the Indian Army seeking assistance in facilitating the

surrender of their wards. It explains the success of Army’s counter - terrorism policies

and strategies. Though terror attack was under control, still terrorists managed to

inflict fear in the minds of the general public. Sustained intelligence, coordinated

operations against terror outfits continued..Another notable initiative during 2006 was

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the launch of ‘Operation Aman’ by the CRPF. This move resulted in the decline of

attacks on security personnel. The move further demonstrated that sustained human

interactions will put an end to all existing problems however complicated they are.

Inspite of the occurrence of a few terror attacks now and then, the Government

is firmly committed and determined to pursue various tactical approaches to counter

the to counter challenge posed by the terrorists.

The Army’s strategy of ‘Iron fist in a velvet glove’ paid rich dividends. The

focus was mainly on destructing the terrorist infrastructure, recovery of arms and

ammunition by search operations without causing much inconvenience to the local

populace. Visits by the Prime Minister and the Union Home Minister were carried

mainly to carry forward the initiatives for finding a solution to the problems of the

State and to accelerate the peace and development process.

4.14 The Overview

On the whole, throughout the period in the last two decades, various strategies

of conflict resolution failed in solving the problem of Kashmir. Right from the

beginning of 1947, the strategies adopted by U.N.S.C through various resolutions

failed as they are not accepted by India and Pakistan due to one reason or the other.

Thus the first strategy in conflict resolution ‘Avoidance’ proved failure pushing the

conflict further.

The second one ‘Defusion’ too proved failure. The strategy was followed by

Pakistan by not withdrawing its forces after the formation of Cease-Fire Line in the

early period of the conflict; it too not paid Pakistan in expected manner as it was not

able to force India to arrive at a point of compromise. This strategy followed for a

very long time created dissatisfaction, anxiety about the future, decreased self-

esteem, and concern among people of Jammu and Kashmir. Thus, ‘Defusion’ strategy

of conflict management also failed in solving the Kashmir problem.

The third stage of conflict resolution strategy namely ‘confrontation’ was

adopted during years of 1965, 1971, 1984, and in1999. India though emerged

victorious in all these conflicts it always adopted a soft approach at negotiation table.

It did not force Pakistan to enter into a solution regarding Kashmir issue and India’s

policy of respecting the CFL and LoC as per the earlier accepted accords showed

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India’s maturity, which was, of course, misused by Pakistan. Thus, the third strategy

‘Confrontation’ also failed in solving the Kashmir issue.

It is evident that by the postures of Pakistan that it was not ready to lose

Kashmir at any cost but, it was unable to achieve it through open wars. As a result,

this aggravated the weaker side in the conflict to adopt terrorism as a weapon to fight

against the stronger side. The well planed strategy through ‘Operation Topac’ slowly

gained momentum and started creating problem. Without understanding the evil

design of the enemy and due to the fear generated among the public, the support

extended by some segments of the people made the enemy to exploit the situation to

their own advantage. The following Table 4.7 indicates very clearly the number of

terror incidents during the year 1989 to 2008.

Table 4.7. Number of Terror Incidents in J & K 1989–2008

Year Number of Terror Incidents

1989* 962 1990 4158 1991 3765 1992 4817 1993 5247 1994 5829 1995 5938 1996 5014 1997 3420 1998 2932 1999 3071 2000 3074 2001 4522 2002 4038 2003 3401 2004 2565 2005 1990 2006 1667 2007 1092 2008 708

Source: Data compiled from

*R. Soundararajan & P. Rajan (2006); Impact of Terrorism on J & K Tourism, Kalpaz Publication, Delhi, p. 167.

Annual Report 2003-04, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India Annual Report 2009-10, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India.

129

With the increase in terrorism activities, security forces strength also increased

to combat terrorism and to provide safety and security for the common people.

Ultimately the stronger side has to use more resources and face much loss as it has to

play a very decisive role in protecting the common people from the deadly acts of

terrorism and also eliminate the terrorism. Absence of non – military tool forced the

authorities to extend the stay of security forces. Though security forces adopted a very

cautious approach, the complexity of the problem often warranted rigorous plans to

control terrorism effectively.

As time passed by, it became difficult to arrive at an acceptable solution to all

the parties involved. Terrorism is simply a method of fighting. It terrorizes the public

because violence is centered on places where people feel safe (White, 2002). This

observation explains the reason why terrorism activities take place more frequently.

Terrorism creates insecurity, alienation, and adds psychological pressure on people of

India from visiting Kashmir Valley. When it continues to take place for a long time,

naturally it becomes a siege preventing people from entering Kashmir Valley and

thus, the dream of Zia-Ul-Haq’s ‘Operation Topac’ almost became visible. This can’t

be left unattended, as it may create serious problems in future and further widens the

gap between the societies.

In this connection, it is worth understanding Jawaharlal Nehru’s emphasis on

dealing problems. We have to take things as they are now and to deal with them as

such (Jawaharlal Nehru, as quoted in Sharma & Bakshi, 1995d) explaining the need to

make use of existing problem as such and finding an acceptable path to solve the

problem. As this research aims to analyse the impact of terrorism on tourism

measuring the impact of terrorism on tourism becomes essential. Thus, the following

chapter is designed exclusively to measure the impact of terrorism on tourism.

130

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