re-orienting us-iran negotiations into the us's favor
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A paper describing the lack of US-Iran negotiations and why the US needs to change its Iran policy quickly, as Iran has been strengthening its negotiating position for the last two decades.TRANSCRIPT
TO: Professor William Habeeb
FROM: Ben Turner
CLASS: MSFS-623: International Negotiation
SUBJECT: Re-Orienting American Negotiation Strategy with Iran
I. Introduction
The negotiations between the United States and Iran since the Islamic
Revolution in 1979 can be characterized plainly by an utter lack of official
negotiation. Ever since the American-backed Shah was deposed in Iran and
replaced by the ayatollahs, Iran and the US have talked primarily through
backchannels, less-than-high-level diplomats, and through popular media.
With the new American president, Barack Obama, has come
unprecedented movement from the American camp towards changing the
tone of American relations towards Iran. While Iran has initially reacted
with extreme suspicion and skepticism, the argument that the environment
is ripe for negotiation can be made. Both nations have many common goals,
such as regional and Iraq security, economic reconciliation, and avoidance
of all-out war. Iran is gaining leverage through its nuclear program and
through increasing its regional influence, making it prudent for the United
States to negotiate with Iran sooner rather than later.
With so much to talk about, and at a good time to start negotiating,
the main problem the two countries will have is establishing a common
agenda -- finding Zartman's and Berman's "formula" for their two very
different Best Alternatives To a Non-Agreement (BATNAs) remain a looming
obstacle for anything beyond pre-negotiation (or Zartman's and Berman's
"diagnosis" stage) and unfortunately such BATNAs are well-engrained into
both countries' popular mentalities.1
1 Hopmann, Terrence. "The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts", University of South Carolina Press, 1996, pp. 77-85. Also: Habeeb, William. "Power and Tactics in International Negotiation", Johns
Page 1 of 20
What potential actions can the US take against Iran with a new
Obama Administration? What are the levers which would most compel Iran
to act favorably to American invocations for new agreement?
II. Background
Both Iran and the US have a long history of grievances against each
other. After Iran underwent the Islamic Revolution, it overthrew the Shah
who was receiving American backing and then approved of student-led
capture of the American embassy in Tehran, famously referring to it as "a
den of spies".2 Since that time, Iran has always been deeply upset by the
US meddling in its affairs whether it actually was or not. Saddam Hussein,
Iran's Iraqi neighbor, saw the Islamic Revolution as an opportunity to strike
-- one of his many miscalculations that led to many peoples' lives lost and an
eventual stalemate between Iran and Iraq. The US took Hussein's side in
the war, threatened by the Revolution in Iran, furthering distrust between
the US and Iran. Later, progressive Iranian leaders would have major
trouble consolidating gains in decreasing anti-American sentiment and
opening up to the US because of this long, sordid history.
By the time President George W. Bush had absorbed the humiliation
of the 9/11 attacks and labeled Iran as part of an axis of evil, Iran's
progressive movement was completely derailed -- in fact it would become a
theme that American actions would always find harsh Iranian reactions.
Bush's further incursion into Iraq, deposing Hussein, while at the same time
being unable to solve a North Korea in pursuit of nuclear weapons, led Iran
to believe that its security was in grave danger from a neoconservative
theoretical movement in the American political establishment and that
Hopkins, 1988, pp. 29-33.
2 PBS Frontline. "American Experience: Jimmy Carter". http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/carter/sfeature/sf_hostage.html
Page 2 of 20
recent historical precedence (North Korea) would prove the threat of
nuclear arms to be Iran's most pragmatic strategy for national security.
Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush have used sanctions upon Iran
to contain it as it has adopted this new nuclear strategy. While this has hurt
Iran economically, it has also played into the hardliners' hands: along with
the US halting any negotiations with Iran, sanctions have helped the Iranian
hawks point out to the people that Iran is under siege from the US and must
seek to protect itself through nuclear nationalism. Robert Baer, a former
CIA officer and author of the 2009 book "The Devil We Know", about Iran's
imperial ambitions, says, "Effective sanctioning of Iran is a dream. Iran’s
regime is still standing after thirty years of sanctions—still able to buy
anything it wants from China and Russia. Some of America’s closest allies,
such as Turkey and Japan, trade with Iran as if there were no sanctions at
all."3
From American hawks such as John Bolton to official statements from
Iran's governing councils, everyone is in agreement that Iran wants to
ensure its capacity to build nuclear weapons, whether it actually builds one
or not. At the end of President Bush's tenure, he changed his stance on Iran
somewhat so that the US would support Europe's attempts to negotiate with
Iran, but this has led to nowhere, probably because the terms up for debate
are different for the Europeans (international security) and for the Iranians
(regional security and security against Americans), and because the US
needs to be involved in negotiations as the dominant security hegemon.
This establishes the main players in this process as Iran and the US -- no
one else has enough influence or power to affect either nation in its
ambitions with the other.
On the Europeans' attempts at negotiations with Iran:
3 Baer, Robert. "The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower", Crown, 2008. Kindle version, highlight location 4032-34.
Page 3 of 20
"The European talks went nowhere, and six months after the
U.S. concessions, the Iranians accelerated their nuclear program by
starting to enrich uranium. On the last day of May 2006, under
pressure from European allies to open talks with Tehran, the U.S.
offered to join the Europeans at the negotiating table — but only if
Iran first agreed to suspend its program of uranium enrichment. And,
hoping to press the Iranians to comply, Washington spent the next
two years trying in vain to forge a consensus in the U.N. Security
Council for meaningful sanctions. Last week, Rice announced that she
had agreed to send Burns despite Iran's firm refusal to stop enriching
uranium."4
In 2003, the US invaded Iraq and has since stayed, occupying it with
over 130,000 American troops. A resulting insurgency and Shi'ite/Sunni
sectarian violence has destabilized the entire country. This event perhaps
more than any other has made negotiation talks ripe -- for Iran, failure in
Iraq means massive destabilization despite a great Shi'ite Reawakening.
Iran is also deeply unsettled having American troops both to its west and to
its east. For the US, it needs Iran's help to bring stability back to Iran's
neighbors Afghanistan and Iraq, and the US also faces a greatly worsening
BATNA, which Iran is well-aware of.
III. BATNAs and Goals
Terrence Hopmann describes the goal of negotiation as hoping "to
achieve mutually beneficial outcomes that will at least serve the basic
interests of all parties affected by a particular decision".5 The key is that
both side's primary goals are addressed within the negotiation's agenda.
But for the last decade, the US and Iran have not had mutually compatible
BATNAs. The US's BATNA is that it can block Iran from having the capacity
4 Calabresi, Massimo. "U.S. and Iran: A One-Sided Negotiation", Time Magazine, 21 Jul 08.
5 Hopmann, p. 27.Page 4 of 20
to build nuclear weapons while using the United Nations Security Council
and Non-Proliferation Treaty as legalistic ways to slow Iran down. Iran has
already celebrated its nuclear program is unstoppable and as a pillar of its
international policy, and has stalled in discussions and European
negotiations while continuing its work on its program. Says Ray Takeyh of
the Council for Foreign Relations, "It's been a slow-motion capitulation
since 2005. There's no other way of interpreting it."6
The US speaks of Iran shutting down its enrichment program as part
of a pre-condition for larger negotiations. George Friedman, founder of
Stratfor (a geopolitical strategy thinktank), remarks:
"From the Iranian point of view, the United States has made
two fundamental demands of Iran. The first is that Iran halt its
military nuclear program. The second, a much broader demand, is
that Iran stop engaging in what the United States calls terrorism. This
ranges from support for Hezbollah to support for Shiite factions in
Iraq. In return, the United States is prepared to call for a suspension
of sanctions against Iran. ... For Tehran, however, the suspension of
sanctions is much too small a price to pay for major strategic
concessions. First, the sanctions don’t work very well. Sanctions only
work when most powers are prepared to comply with them. Neither
the Russians nor the Chinese are prepared to systematically comply
with sanctions, so there is little that Iran can afford that it can’t get.
Iran’s problem is that it cannot afford much. Its economy is in
shambles due more to internal problems than to sanctions. Therefore,
in the Iranian point of view, the United States is asking for strategic
concessions, yet offering very little in return."7
6 Calabresi, Time Magazine.
7 Friedman, George. "Iran's View of Obama", Stratfor Global Intelligence, 23 Mar 09. http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090323_obamas_new_year_greeting_and_view_iran
Page 5 of 20
Tehran for its part seeks international recognition of its place as at
least a regional power, but even greater than that, an emerging
superpower. Iran's words to the US through public letters from
Ahmadinejad to Bush and Obama do not talk of uranium enrichment but
instead of humiliation, recognition, and imperialism. In Ahmadinejad's own
words:
"The people of many countries are angry about the attacks on
their cultural foundations and the disintegration of families. They are
equally dismayed with the fading of care and compassion. The people
of the world have no faith in international organizations, because their
rights are not advocated by these organizations. ... We increasingly
see that people around the world are flocking towards a main focal
point -- that is the Almighty God. Undoubtedly through faith in God
and the teachings of the prophets, the people will conquer their
problems. My question for you is: 'Do you not want to join them?'"8
Essentially Ahmadinejad, running as a populist hardliner, is making a
liberalist claim that the US's policies, particularly in the Muslim world,
bring oppression and corruption. While Ahmadinejad certainly has little
power in setting Iranian policy, his words echo the Iranian grievancies that
without a halt to US aggression against Iran, there can be no concessions
from the Iranian side.
More recently, Obama sent a message to the Iranian Republic (a key
distinction for it recognized the regime) on the Persian holy day of Nowruz.
His video was heralded by the west as a new opening for change in tone.
The response from the Ayatollah Khatami was dismissive: "The Iranian
nation is the same nation that put all options of Bush under the table and
8 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud. "Ahmadinejad's Letter to Bush", WashingtonPost.com, 09 May 06. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/09/AR2006050900878.html
Page 6 of 20
into the history’s dustbin. ... Obama is now toeing Bush’s line regarding
Iran."9
Baer lists six interests that Iran wants to discuss with the US:
"Based on their actions and what they’ve told Western officials,
they seem to have six core interests: Internal security. Iran is 89
percent Shia and 9 percent Sunni. The Sunnis are a small minority,
but Iran still looks at them, as well as the Kurds in Iran, as its Achilles’
heel. ... Iraq. Iran is there to stay. Nothing short of a regime collapse
in Tehran will change that. Empire aside, Iran does have a vital
interest in putting an end to the chaos in Iraq. ... Energy. Iran wants a
better price for its oil, modern technology to more efficiently lift it,
and alternative energy sources for the day it runs out of oil. This
would include nuclear power plants. ... An Iranian empire. Short of
drastic action, Iran won’t cede its dominion in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria,
the Gulf, and Gaza. Iran will insist on dominion in the Gulf after the
United States leaves. It will hold itself out as the protectors of the
Shia as well as the Palestinians. ... Control of Mecca. Iran wants
control of Mecca. For 1300 years, the Shia have been second-class
Muslims. With Iran’s newfound military predominance, there’s no
longer any reason to accept the status quo. It’s unclear what precisely
Iran’s mullahs will demand, but it will probably be co-administering
both Mecca and Medina along with Saudi Arabia. ...
Recognition/equality. At the bottom of it all, the Iranians want to be
treated fairly. Iran wants to be recognized for what it is: a stable
country that has lived within the same borders for thousands of years,
the most powerful country in the Gulf, OPEC’s second-largest
producer, a regional economic power, and a major influence in
Islam."10
9 Johnson, Bridget. "Tough-talking Iran demands 'change' from Obama", TheHill.com, 02 May 09. http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/iran-talks-tough-while-demanding-change-from-obama-2009-05-02.html
10 Baer, Kindle version, highlight location 3902-3932.Page 7 of 20
The US is hung up on nuclear proliferation and also on Ahmadinejad's
infamous comments about Israel's existence, which seem to be primarily a
distraction from the key issues. The US is also hung up on Iran being a
terrorist state, having just released a new intelligence report saying Iran is
the most active state sponsor of terrorism. But as Baer put it, "Americans
have missed Iran’s critical transition, its metamorphosis from a Shia
rebellion and a terrorist state to a classic military power."11 This gets into
the fact that Iran has been adding to and improving its BATNA, which will
be discussed later.
So for now, the BATNAs are incompatible and the negotiation agenda
does not match. This must change in order for there to be further
movement.
IV. Power
The US has largely ignored Iran diplomatically, applied economic
sanctions not universally supported by other key international players, and
has rattled its saber by moving naval vessels such as the aircraft carrier
USS Nimitz into the Persian Gulf. It has relied on European negotiations
and has accepted Iranian help fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan after the
9/11 attacks. But the US has given little; nor should it necessarily need to,
given that the US is by far the largest and most influential military and
security power in the world, particularly in the Middle East. Regionally, the
US has a lot of sway with Iran's near neighbors, such as Saudi, Israel, Iraq,
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Egypt.
Such power, defined by William Habeeb as "the way in which A uses
resources in process with B so as to bring preferred outcomes in
relationship with B"12, has been quantified as "aggregate structural power":
11 Baer, Kindle version, highlight location 1249-50.
12 Habeeb, p. 15.Page 8 of 20
Pp = (C+E+M) x (S + W)
where Pp is perceived power, C is critical mass (population size + territory),
E is economic capability, M is military capability, S is strategic purpose, and
W is will to pursue national strategy.13
The US has large amounts of all these inputs, except perhaps W when
it comes to the Middle East. However, what it is lacking most is specific to
the Middle East and not represented in this equation: regional relevance.
And this is where Iran has an advantage. Iran's issue-specific power
has been growing in the Middle East while the US has allowed actors to
move against it by doing nothing. The US holds influence but only
superficially with clientelistic governments willing to allow it. Iran has won
over the south of Iraq, the Shi'ite majority, and has infiltrated senior levels
of the Iraqi government. Iran has also supported the successful Hezbollah
model in Lebanon and is actively interested in Hamas in the Palestine, to
ward off Israeli attacks. Iran is appealing to the Shi'ite groups in the Gulf
countries, winning them away from the Saudis who mistreat them. Iran,
culturally and religiously, has far more relevance in the Middle East than
the US ever could have.
Iran has all but won Iraq and knows that this has not been without
significant damage to the US:
"Iran senses that with Iraq failing, it’s on an equal footing with
the United States in the Gulf. Along with that, there’s a growing
confidence in Tehran today that the United States will finally have to
come around to recognizing Iran’s true stature in the world as the
only important player in the Middle East—a superpower, even. Iran is
confident that America will have to accept the inevitable, that we’ve
13 Habeeb referencing Cline, p. 19.Page 9 of 20
been wasting our time with the Gulf Arabs, and that we have to come
to terms with Iran."14
Indeed, Baer continues to say that he is disappointed with American
handling of Iran and Iraq:
"But in fact, the one certainty about the Iraq War is that the
United States will see Iran’s imperial ambitions played out more
clearly there than in Tehran. If it’s in Iran’s interests to have chaos in
Iraq, then chaos there will be. If Iran intends to draw the United
States into a quagmire, a quagmire is what we’ll get. Our war with
Iran will be fought in Iraq, through proxies, on the periphery of Iran’s
empire. How could we have missed this so badly?"15
Iran has been building its conventional military capability: the Strait
of Hormuz, an important bottleneck where much of the world's oil is
shipped through, is rumored to be defended now with Silkworm missiles
hidden along Iran's coastline, as a threat against any foreign attack. Baer
says that "[w]hat’s particularly odd about Iran’s advancement in
conventional military tactics is that the West has largely ignored it,
choosing instead to focus almost obsessively on whether Iran is developing
nuclear weapons. It’s more evidence that we are miscalculating the nature
of the Iranian threat."16 Iran has been exporting explosively formed
penetrators to Iraq, anti-tank arms to Lebanon, and small arms everywhere.
Iran knows that the security community is reluctant to strike it, and
has been improving its defenses silently while continuing its nuclear
enrichment program publicly. It has vastly improved its BATNA, and Iraq
has provided it with a huge opportunity to swing issue-specific power to
bear against the US's aggregate structural power. As Vali Nasr, author of
14 Baer, Kindle version, highlight location 499-503.
15 Baer, Kindle version, highlight location 321-324.
16 Baer, Kindle version, highlight location 1746-1748.Page 10 of 20
"The Shia Revival" put it, ""The wars of 2001 and 2003 have fundamentally
changed the Middle East to Iran's advantage," he says. "The dam that was
containing Iran has been broken."17
V. Culture and Personality
William Zartman claims that culture "is every bit as relevant as
breakfast, and to much the same extent"18, as the traditions and customs of
the diplomatic community override those of each side's cultures. However,
negotiations between the US and Iran are considerably unique: both
parties do not regularly meet each other, and if they do it's with very
specific, cold instructions. There is no formal ambassadorial contact
between the two nations. The entire relationship is defined almost
completely by culture, whether it be media culture or national security
culture or street culture. So, what are the cultural backdrops within this
relationship?
The United States has chosen not to engage Iran actively, making few
serious overtures at overcoming past differences. Much of this has to do
with the excellent job Iran did at vilifying itself in the western media and by
establishing itself for decades to come as the major nation of state-
sponsored terror. President Bush's "axis of evil" policy and aggressive use
of hegemonic military power as advocated by the neo-conservatives put Iran
on a hit list of countries unwilling to participate in the international
experiment of democratization. Bush as a singular individual exemplified
American personality towards Iran, indicating disbelief in Iran's meddling
regional affairs, shock at its nuclear ambitions to become part of the
nuclear "club", and intransigent towards negotiation.
17 PBS Frontline. "Showdown with Iran", 23 Oct 07. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/showdown/etc/synopsis.html
18 Zartman, William. "Culture and Negotiation", United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, SAGE, 2003, p. 17.
Page 11 of 20
Iran thinks of the US as having no culture, whereas its own culture is
rich in history and predisposed by fate to allow for Persian superpower
status -- it is expanding its influence and must improve its security for
potential showdowns against Turkey and Saudi. Iran's senior leadership
was forged from the Islamic Revolution, which managed to expel US
influence from Iran. The leaders use this nationalist and Shi'ite superiority
when their popularity flags or when they need support for policies. Anti-
Americanism is regular in weekly Muslim speeches.
Iranians have never forgotten that they used to control much of the
Middle East, and they see themselves as laying the building blocks for re-
emerging as a world power. Iranians do not forget the perceived injustices
committed against them in the past; thusly, it has become a point of pride
for Iranians to show immediate reaction to every American move.
Iranian leaders respond enthusiastically to American presidents'
missives. US detainment of Iranian operatives in Iraq led to an outbreak of
Shi'ite militia violence and a harsh outcry from the Iranian government.
Ahmadinejad's being voted in could have been seen as a nationalist reaction
to increasingly hostile American rhetoric. Is it possible that the Iranians are
so deeply obsessed with American behavior? "You will not find a single
instance in which a country has inflicted harm on us and we have left it
without a response. So if the United States makes such a mistake, they
should know that we will definitely respond. And we don't make idle
threats," Mohammad Jafari, head of the Iranian National Security Council.
Ahmadinejad is not seen as someone who has much power within the
Iranian system or who speaks for Iran's core policy issues. Yet he is who
the Americans and the media vilify. Meanwhile, the Supreme Leader and
his Council, working through an opaque system but with fairly democratic
voting procedures, steer the Iranian boat much more wisely, and in fair
Page 12 of 20
estimation, in a way more conducive with American foreign policy.
Ahmadinejad is up for re-election in June of 2009. If he is voted out and
replaced with someone less of a firebrand, this may improve relations with
the US since the US and its media are so obsessed with flippant Iranian
comments about Israel and criticism of American policy.
Obama realizes Ahmadinejad's relative insignificance as an actor to
try negotiation with:
"Today, Obama rebuked the Iranian leader, saying his remarks
were harmful to Iran's standing in the world as well as to U.S.-Iranian
relations. He also said that he has found many of the Ahmadinejad's
statements to be "appalling and objectionable", but implied the
possibility of improving relations with Iran via Supreme Leader
Khameni."19
Meanwhile, Barack Obama has been voted into the White House in
the US and has received global support for his measured, intellectual
approach to policy-making. While Iran (and the Middle East as a whole) has
been skeptical of Obama's choices for foreign policy experts (Hillary Clinton
at State, an Iran containment hawk in Dennis Ross), it must surely
understand that it has an opportunity to make major inroads with Obama
that it could not with Bush. Obama for his part is eager to improve the US's
footing on its Iran policy after perceiving it as languishing under Bush.
Obama is more likely to see Iran within the context of larger issues that are
not necessarily specific to America's interests, meaning that an agreement
where "all these issues are linked" (Habeeb's high probability test of
whether negotiations will succeed) is far more imaginable. In short, Obama
could have the capability to understand what Iran wants, whereas Bush did
not.
19 Connolly, Katie. "Obama Calls Ahmadinejad's Speech 'Harmful'", Newsweek blog, "The Gaggle", 21 Apr 09. http://blog.newsweek.com/blogs/thegaggle/archive/2009/04/21/obama-calls-ahmadinejad-s-speech-harmful.aspx
Page 13 of 20
VI. Strategy and Tactics
Iran knows that the longer it waits, the more its negotiating position
improves. It is winning influence in the Middle East, coming closer to being
able to build a nuclear weapon, is creating a buffer state in Iraq, has the
power to bleed the US with insurgency in Iraq and Israel in Lebanon and
the Palestine, and it is too large for international movement to be taken
against it, even by Israel. It is not clear whether the US realizes this sorry
state of affairs yet, since urgency has not been taken to change the game
back into the US's favor.
Iran also knows that the US has labeled itself as a promoter of liberal
values and human rights, and that the US feels weakened by its incursions
into Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore Iran attempts to take a moral high
road, promoting eradication of poverty and oppression, hoping it will
resonate with the European and American populaces. Iran has been using
the media actively to push the US into unsavory political positions.
The US has remained fairly passive in its strategy and tactics, acting
through the UNSC and passing messages through European ambassadors
(such as the fax the US received from progressive Iranians promoting a
"Grand Bargain", which Bush ignored). The US military has sought to
actively engage Iranian proxies in Iraq, going so far once as to make a raid
on Mohammad Jafari, a senior commander in the Iranian Quds Force and
deputy of the National Security Council in Iran, when he was rumored to
have been in Iraq. But any actions the military has taken against Iranians
has been met with release orders and apologies from the American
government, to maintain a tense stalemate between the two countries in the
proxy state of Iraq.
The US has been fairly unsuccessful in leveraging world opinion
against Iran in any meaningful way -- Iran is not likely to be cowed by
Page 14 of 20
international sentiment decrying its hunger for nuclear capability. And yet
the US keeps trying. A passage in an Arabic News article puts it bluntly:
"The new package proposed to Iran says in part "Formal
negotiations can start as soon as Iran's enrichment-related and
reprocessing activities are suspended." Since Iran has indicated that
it would not accept such a position, such package can be considered
as dead on arrival in light of Iran's strong position on this issue, even
though Iranian officials did not hurry to declare so. Also, it is not clear
why such a package would have been proposed to Iran knowing the
package's fate other than to possibly give Iran the illusion that it is
benefiting from this process of negotiation, when such a process may
only be allowing the slow but certain imposition of more official
sanctions on Iran whether thru the UN Security Council or by the 5+1
member countries."20
VII. What the Americans Should Do
It is more difficult to paint a rosy picture for the Americans than it is
for the Iranians. The Iranians have been far more involved in regional
affairs, despite American occupations of two Muslim nations, because of
their regional relevance and a Shi'ite re-emergence as a result of Iraq's
borders opening up.
But the US is running out of time. Not in terms of whether it can stop
Iran from getting nuclear weapons (it couldn't, at least without great cost),
but in terms of the US being able to maintain leverage to affect Iran's core
interests. Containment has too many holes and not enough allies to
maintain it, and it also runs against a populace that is, while increasingly
progressive, also fervently nationalistic. Outright attack has been shown by
Iran's strategy and tactics to be untenable (and Robert Gates said as much
20 "Iran - Europe negotiation package on the nuclear issue", ArabicNews.com, 16 Jul 08. http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/080616/2008061613.html
Page 15 of 20
himself: "The United States could go to war with Iran, but the outcome is
uncertain. As President Bush’s secretary of defense, Robert Gates, said in a
2008 New York Times interview, taking on Iran is not an option."21
First of all, what the US should do is leave Afghanistan and Iraq
completely. Iran has benefited from American provision of Iraq security --
Iran can use its militias and connections to foment or reduce chaos when
needed, while it allows Maliki to consolidate power for the Shi'ites in the
Iraqi government. The US leaving Iraq would tear away the veil of secrecy
Iran enjoys in Iraq, and it would force Iran, with a long border with Iraq, to
have to provide security for the fledgling defective democracy itself. An
alternate option Robert Baer proposes is, "Why not allow the Iranians to
take direct control of the parts of Iraq they already control through proxies?
This would be more efficient, and there would be less violence. Let the
Iranians take direct responsibility for the cities of Najaf, Karbala, and Basra,
which would force Iran to be more cautious and less the spoiler."22
Baer continues:
"All of a sudden, it would be Iran deciding whether it wanted to
be directly responsible for keeping a lid on the anarchy, and whether
it wanted to send in its own troops and start killing Iraqis. A direct
Iranian role in Iraq would involve Iranians killing Sunni and even
Shia, turning the conflict into a civil war. Everything Iran achieved in
Lebanon, turning the Shia and the Sunni against Israel and the United
States, would be lost. The Iranians would suddenly be the occupiers,
and as such would absorb the full political impact of running a foreign
country. They’d no longer be able to hide behind their proxies. It is
21 Baer, Kindle version, highlight location 3986-3988.
22 Baer, Kindle version, highlight location 4017-4019.Page 16 of 20
unlikely Iran would do well as pure colonial power, burdened by the
inevitable blame that comes with occupation."23
Second, as part of a larger strategy, the US should curtail its ties with
Israel, Saudi, and Egypt while maintaining that national integrity will be
preserved by military force (a mistake not conveyed to Saddam Hussein
regarding Kuwait, leading to his invading it). This will reduce much of the
impetus for anti-Americanism and anti-occupation within the Middle East
region. The US will have to complement this with fulfilling its energy needs
through investment in green power. But this will also show that the US is
taking on a neutral, security-seeking role in the region -- no one would
doubt the US's seriousness for negotiation if it disengaged from countries
seen as having too much influence over the US. But from an American point
of view it is also shoring up American strengths and allowing it the
flexibility to re-focus its security needs as needed.
Third, the US should drop sanctions upon Iran, which do not work and
further anti-American sentiment within Iran.
After that point, the US should offer full negotiations with Iran. Iran
will be desperately seeking to figure out a new balance for its security on
both its western and eastern flanks, and will not enjoy being able to rally
anti-American support on Yowm Al-Juma'a (Friday) in the mosques. A
further commitment by the US towards human rights and internal security
would defuse much of the rhetoric from Iran before it could even respond.
The US enjoys aggregate structural power and should thus seek to
change the macro-environment towards its own ends. This trumps Iran's
issue specific power. The US will have taken initiative in the pre-
negotiation or diagnostic stage of the negotiations, putting Iran on the
defensive after having perceived itself as having the upper-hand for so long.
23 Baer, Kindle version, highlight location 1477-1482.Page 17 of 20
This also sets the stage for the formula stage of potential negotiations.
The US should openly concede Iran's capability to build a nuclear weapon
(but deter it from stockpiling them), and its right to enrich fuel for energy.
The US will not need to bait Iran with economic incentives anymore, but it
will be able to place the burden of responsibility of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty upon a now nuclear Iran. Meanwhile, Iran will get the status it has
always sought, and realize that what it hoped to gain wasn't as great as
what it actually got.
By the time the detail stage of the negotiations comes, Iran will pretty
much require economic cooperation to save its long-sagging economy, and
it will need to find regional agreements to provide security for a radically
changed Middle East. If Iran wants to be a regional power, then it will have
to deal with the burden of it. Iran even may be willing to negotiate in
exchange for American partnership against Sunni insurgents in Iraq and the
Taliban in Afghanistan.
VIII. Conclusion: Recognizing Ripeness
The time and macro-environment is ripe (as Richard Haas defines it24)
for US-Iran negotiations. Not only has Iraq changed the Middle East
situation, but it has the potential to change it dramatically again. At the
same time, the US has elected a measured president and Iran is having
presidential elections shortly. With Iran's impending nuclear coming-out
party, the ante is increased and the US must take the lead to prevent other
regional interests from increasing their own defensive postures. Not only
all that, but also, as Habeeb says, "The actors may also recognize that
24 Haas, Richard. "Conflicts Unending", Yale University Press, 1990.Page 18 of 20
changes have occurred in the nature of their relationship. The actors may
perceive that relative power positions have changed: 'The former upper
hand slips, or the former underdog improves his position.'"25 Iran is now
much stronger relatively than it was before -- this affects the US's ability to
deter or influence it.
In terms of what to look for, it is required that the US change its
assumptions about what Iran wants, while seeing Iran as part of a larger
regional puzzle. For Iran, it might need to prepare for unpredictability and
movement from the Americans, since right now it dismisses all American
actions as being predictable and out of touch.
However, these are big steps to take and much of the foreign policy
community's worldview when it comes to the US and Iran is deeply rooted.
At the end of the day, both sides will need to realize that "[w]ithout the will
to reach an agreement, there will be none,"26 and so part of the challenge
will be convincing the citizenry within each country that something
productive, a non-zero-sum agreement, can be reached. Otherwise, the
negotiations so obvious within the framework of this paper will never have
an opportunity to take place.
Says George Friedman, Stratfor founder:
"U.S.-Iranian negotiations are always opaque because they are
ideologically difficult to justify by both sides. For Iran, the United
States is the Great Satan. For the United States, Iran is part of the
Axis of Evil. It is difficult for Iran to talk to the devil or for the United
States to negotiate with evil. Therefore, U.S.-Iranian discussions
always take place in a strange way. The public rhetoric between the
countries is always poisonous. If you simply looked at what each
country says about the other, you would assume that no discussions
25 Habeeb, p. 29.
26 Zartman, William and Berman, Maureen. "The Practical Negotiator", Yale, 1982, p. 66.Page 19 of 20
are possible. But if you treat the public rhetoric as simply designed to
manage domestic public opinion, and then note the shifts in policy
outside of the rhetorical context, a more complex picture emerges.
Public and private talks have taken place, and more are planned. If
you go beyond the talks to actions, things become even more
interesting. ... We have discussed this before, but it is important to
understand the strategic interests of the two countries at this point to
understand what is going on. Ever since the birth of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Iraq has been the buffer between the Iranians and
the Arabian Peninsula. The United States expected to create a viable
pro-American government quickly after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and
therefore expected that Iraq would continue to serve as a buffer. That
did not happen for a number of reasons, and therefore the strategic
situation has evolved."27
With so many sticking points between the two countries, what it might
take most of all is two leaders willing to put their reputations on the line
and to sell their plans. It seems that Obama is willing to do this, but who
will represent Iran? Will it be the toothless president (who might be
beneficial towards movement, depending on who wins the June elections),
or will the Supreme Council decide to take a chance?
27 Friedman, George. " The U.S.-Iranian Negotiations: Beyond the Rhetoric", Stratfor Global Intelligence, 12 Feb 08. http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/u_s_iranian_negotiations_beyond_rhetoric
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