rationality - lecture 11robotics.stanford.edu/~epacuit/classes/rationality/rat-lec11.pdf ·...
TRANSCRIPT
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RationalityLecture 11
Eric Pacuit
Center for Logic and Philosophy of ScienceTilburg University
ai.stanford.edu/∼[email protected]
May 2, 2011
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Equilibrium Selection Problem
Bob
Ann
U D C
D 1,1 0,0 U
C 0,0 1,1 U
Assurance Game
What should/will Ann (Bob) do?
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Equilibrium Selection Problem
Bob
Ann
U D C
D 1,1 0,0 U
C 0,0 1,1 U
Assurance Game
What should/will Ann (Bob) do?
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 2/43
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Equilibrium Selection Problem
Bob
Ann
U D C
D 3,3 0,0 U
C 0,0 1,1 U
Assurance Game
What should/will Ann (Bob) do?
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Footballer Example
A and B are players in the same football team. A has the ball, butan opposing player is converging on him. He can pass the ball toB, who has a chance to shoot. There are two directions in which Acan move the ball, left and right, and correspondingly, twodirections in which B can run to intercept the pass. If both chooseleft there is a 10% chance that a goal will be scored. If they bothchoose right, there is a 11% change. Otherwise, the chance iszero. There is no time for communication; the two players mustact simultaneously.
What should they do?
R. Sugden. The Logic of Team Reasoning. Philosophical Explorations (6)3, pgs.165 - 181 (2003).
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Footballer Example
l r
l 10,10 00,00
r 00,00 11,11A
B
A: What should I do? r if the probability of B choosing r is > 1021
and l if the probability of B choosing l is > 1121
(symmetric reasoning for B)
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Footballer Example
l r
l 10,10 0,0
r 0,0 11,11A
B
A: What should I do? r if the probability of B choosing r is > 1021
and l if the probability of B choosing l is > 1121
(symmetric reasoning for B)
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Footballer Example
l r
l 10,10 0,0
r 0,0 11,11A
B
A: What should I do? r if the probability of B choosing r is > 1021
and l if the probability of B choosing l is > 1121
(symmetric reasoning for B)
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 4/43
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Footballer Example
l r
l 10,10 0,0
r 0,0 11,11A
B
A: What should I do? r if the probability of B choosing r is > 1021
and l if the probability of B choosing l is > 1121
(symmetric reasoning for B)
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 4/43
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Footballer Example
l r
l 10,10 0,0
r 0,0 11,11A
B
A: What should we do? Team Reasoning: why should this“mode of reasoning” be endorsed?
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Rationality in Interaction
What does it mean to be rational when the outcome of one’saction depends upon the actions of other people and everyone istrying to guess what the others will do?
In social interaction, rationality has to be enriched with furtherassumptions about individuals’ mutual knowledge and beliefs,but these assumptions are not without consequence.
C. Bicchieri. Rationality and Game Theory. Chapter 10 in [HR].
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Rationality in Interaction
What does it mean to be rational when the outcome of one’saction depends upon the actions of other people and everyone istrying to guess what the others will do?
In social interaction, rationality has to be enriched with furtherassumptions about individuals’ mutual knowledge and beliefs,but these assumptions are not without consequence.
C. Bicchieri. Rationality and Game Theory. Chapter 10 in [HR].
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Example: Common Knowledge
Suppose there are two friends Ann and Bob are on a bus separatedby a crowd.
Before the bus comes to the next stop a mutual friendfrom outside the bus yells “get off at the next stop to get adrink?”.
Say Ann is standing near the front door and Bob near the backdoor. When the bus comes to a stop, will they get off?
D. Lewis. Convention. 1969.
M. Chwe. Rational Ritual. 2001.
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 6/43
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Example: Common Knowledge
Suppose there are two friends Ann and Bob are on a bus separatedby a crowd. Before the bus comes to the next stop a mutual friendfrom outside the bus yells “get off at the next stop to get adrink?”.
Say Ann is standing near the front door and Bob near the backdoor. When the bus comes to a stop, will they get off?
D. Lewis. Convention. 1969.
M. Chwe. Rational Ritual. 2001.
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 6/43
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Example: Common Knowledge
Suppose there are two friends Ann and Bob are on a bus separatedby a crowd. Before the bus comes to the next stop a mutual friendfrom outside the bus yells “get off at the next stop to get adrink?”.
Say Ann is standing near the front door and Bob near the backdoor.
When the bus comes to a stop, will they get off?
D. Lewis. Convention. 1969.
M. Chwe. Rational Ritual. 2001.
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 6/43
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Example: Common Knowledge
Suppose there are two friends Ann and Bob are on a bus separatedby a crowd. Before the bus comes to the next stop a mutual friendfrom outside the bus yells “get off at the next stop to get adrink?”.
Say Ann is standing near the front door and Bob near the backdoor. When the bus comes to a stop, will they get off?
D. Lewis. Convention. 1969.
M. Chwe. Rational Ritual. 2001.
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 6/43
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Example: Common Knowledge
Suppose there are two friends Ann and Bob are on a bus separatedby a crowd. Before the bus comes to the next stop a mutual friendfrom outside the bus yells “get off at the next stop to get adrink?”.
Say Ann is standing near the front door and Bob near the backdoor. When the bus comes to a stop, will they get off?
D. Lewis. Convention. 1969.
M. Chwe. Rational Ritual. 2001.
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 6/43
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“Common Knowledge” is informally described as what any foolwould know, given a certain situation: It encompasses what isrelevant, agreed upon, established by precedent, assumed, beingattended to, salient, or in the conversational record.
It is not Common Knowledge who “defined” Common Knowledge!
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“Common Knowledge” is informally described as what any foolwould know, given a certain situation: It encompasses what isrelevant, agreed upon, established by precedent, assumed, beingattended to, salient, or in the conversational record.
It is not Common Knowledge who “defined” Common Knowledge!
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 7/43
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The first formal definition of common knowledge?M. Friedell. On the Structure of Shared Awareness. Behavioral Science (1969).
R. Aumann. Agreeing to Disagree. Annals of Statistics (1976).
The first rigorous analysis of common knowledgeD. Lewis. Convention, A Philosophical Study. 1969.
Fixed-point definition: γ := i and j know that (ϕ and γ)G. Harman. Review of Linguistic Behavior. Language (1977).
J. Barwise. Three views of Common Knowledge. TARK (1987).
Shared situation: There is a shared situation s such that (1) sentails ϕ, (2) s entails everyone knows ϕ, plus other conditionsH. Clark and C. Marshall. Definite Reference and Mutual Knowledge. 1981.
M. Gilbert. On Social Facts. Princeton University Press (1989).
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The first formal definition of common knowledge?M. Friedell. On the Structure of Shared Awareness. Behavioral Science (1969).
R. Aumann. Agreeing to Disagree. Annals of Statistics (1976).
The first rigorous analysis of common knowledgeD. Lewis. Convention, A Philosophical Study. 1969.
Fixed-point definition: γ := i and j know that (ϕ and γ)G. Harman. Review of Linguistic Behavior. Language (1977).
J. Barwise. Three views of Common Knowledge. TARK (1987).
Shared situation: There is a shared situation s such that (1) sentails ϕ, (2) s entails everyone knows ϕ, plus other conditionsH. Clark and C. Marshall. Definite Reference and Mutual Knowledge. 1981.
M. Gilbert. On Social Facts. Princeton University Press (1989).
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The first formal definition of common knowledge?M. Friedell. On the Structure of Shared Awareness. Behavioral Science (1969).
R. Aumann. Agreeing to Disagree. Annals of Statistics (1976).
The first rigorous analysis of common knowledgeD. Lewis. Convention, A Philosophical Study. 1969.
Fixed-point definition: γ := i and j know that (ϕ and γ)G. Harman. Review of Linguistic Behavior. Language (1977).
J. Barwise. Three views of Common Knowledge. TARK (1987).
Shared situation: There is a shared situation s such that (1) sentails ϕ, (2) s entails everyone knows ϕ, plus other conditionsH. Clark and C. Marshall. Definite Reference and Mutual Knowledge. 1981.
M. Gilbert. On Social Facts. Princeton University Press (1989).
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The first formal definition of common knowledge?M. Friedell. On the Structure of Shared Awareness. Behavioral Science (1969).
R. Aumann. Agreeing to Disagree. Annals of Statistics (1976).
The first rigorous analysis of common knowledgeD. Lewis. Convention, A Philosophical Study. 1969.
Fixed-point definition: γ := i and j know that (ϕ and γ)G. Harman. Review of Linguistic Behavior. Language (1977).
J. Barwise. Three views of Common Knowledge. TARK (1987).
Shared situation: There is a shared situation s such that (1) sentails ϕ, (2) s entails everyone knows ϕ, plus other conditionsH. Clark and C. Marshall. Definite Reference and Mutual Knowledge. 1981.
M. Gilbert. On Social Facts. Princeton University Press (1989).
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P. Vanderschraaf and G. Sillari. “Common Knowledge”, The Stanford Encyclo-pedia of Philosophy (2009).http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/common-knowledge/.
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The “Standard” Account
E
W
R. Aumann. Agreeing to Disagree. Annals of Statistics (1976).
R. Fagin, J. Halpern, Y. Moses and M. Vardi. Reasoning aboutKnowledge. MIT Press, 1995.
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The “Standard” Account
E
W
W is a set of states or worlds.
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The “Standard” Account
E
W
An event/proposition is any (definable) subset E ⊆W
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The “Standard” Account
E
W
At each state, agents are assigned a set of states theyconsider possible (according to their information).The information may be (in)correct, partitional, ....
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The “Standard” Account
E
W
Knowledge Function: Ki : ℘(W ) → ℘(W ) whereKi (E ) = {w | Ri (w) ⊆ E}
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The “Standard” Account
E
W
w
w ∈ KA(E ) and w 6∈ KB(E )
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The “Standard” Account
E
W
w
The model also describes the agents’ higher-orderknowledge/beliefs
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The “Standard” Account
E
W
w
Everyone Knows: K (E ) =⋂
i∈A Ki (E ), K 0(E ) = E ,Km(E ) = K (Km−1(E ))
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The “Standard” Account
E
W
w
Common Knowledge: C : ℘(W )→ ℘(W ) with
C (E ) =⋂m≥0
Km(E )
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The “Standard” Account
E
W
w
w ∈ K (E ) w 6∈ C (E )
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The “Standard” Account
E
W
w
w ∈ C (E )
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Fact. For all i ∈ A and E ⊆W , KiC (E ) = C (E ).
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Fact. For all i ∈ A and E ⊆W , KiC (E ) = C (E ).
Suppose you are told “Ann and Bob are going together,”’and respond “sure, that’s common knowledge.” Whatyou mean is not only that everyone knows this, but alsothat the announcement is pointless, occasions nosurprise, reveals nothing new; in effect, that the situationafter the announcement does not differ from that before....the event “Ann and Bob are going together” — call itE — is common knowledge if and only if some event —call it F — happened that entails E and also entails allplayers’ knowing F (like all players met Ann and Bob atan intimate party). (Aumann, pg. 271, footnote 8)
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Fact. For all i ∈ A and E ⊆W , KiC (E ) = C (E ).
An event F is self-evident if Ki (F ) = F for all i ∈ A.
Fact. An event E is commonly known iff some self-evident eventthat entails E obtains.
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Fact. For all i ∈ A and E ⊆W , KiC (E ) = C (E ).
An event F is self-evident if Ki (F ) = F for all i ∈ A.
Fact. An event E is commonly known iff some self-evident eventthat entails E obtains.
Fact. w ∈ C (E ) if every finite path starting at w ends in a statein E
The following axiomatize common knowledge:
I C (ϕ→ ψ)→ (Cϕ→ Cψ)
I Cϕ→ (ϕ ∧ ECϕ) (Fixed-Point)
I C (ϕ→ Eϕ)→ (ϕ→ Cϕ) (Induction)
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An Example
Two players Ann and Bob are told that the following will happen.Some positive integer n will be chosen and one of n, n + 1 will bewritten on Ann’s forehead, the other on Bob’s. Each will be ableto see the other’s forehead, but not his/her own.
Suppose the number are (2,3).
Do the agents know there numbers are less than 1000?
Is it common knowledge that their numbers are less than 1000?
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 11/43
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An Example
Two players Ann and Bob are told that the following will happen.Some positive integer n will be chosen and one of n, n + 1 will bewritten on Ann’s forehead, the other on Bob’s. Each will be ableto see the other’s forehead, but not his/her own.
Suppose the number are (2,3).
Do the agents know there numbers are less than 1000?
Is it common knowledge that their numbers are less than 1000?
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 11/43
![Page 42: Rationality - Lecture 11robotics.stanford.edu/~epacuit/classes/rationality/rat-lec11.pdf · Rationality Lecture 11 Eric Pacuit Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg University](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051810/60177303ce0d4a5e326fab48/html5/thumbnails/42.jpg)
An Example
Two players Ann and Bob are told that the following will happen.Some positive integer n will be chosen and one of n, n + 1 will bewritten on Ann’s forehead, the other on Bob’s. Each will be ableto see the other’s forehead, but not his/her own.
Suppose the number are (2,3).
Do the agents know there numbers are less than 1000?
Is it common knowledge that their numbers are less than 1000?
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 11/43
![Page 43: Rationality - Lecture 11robotics.stanford.edu/~epacuit/classes/rationality/rat-lec11.pdf · Rationality Lecture 11 Eric Pacuit Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg University](https://reader034.vdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051810/60177303ce0d4a5e326fab48/html5/thumbnails/43.jpg)
An Example
Two players Ann and Bob are told that the following will happen.Some positive integer n will be chosen and one of n, n + 1 will bewritten on Ann’s forehead, the other on Bob’s. Each will be ableto see the other’s forehead, but not his/her own.
Suppose the number are (2,3).
Do the agents know there numbers are less than 1000?
Is it common knowledge that their numbers are less than 1000?
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 11/43
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(0,1) (2,1)
(2,3) (4,3)
(4,5) (6,5)
(6,7)
A
B
A
B
A
B
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Some Issues
I What does a group know/believe/accept? vs. what can agroup (come to) know/believe/accept?
C. List. Group knowledge and group rationality: a judgment aggregation per-spective. Episteme (2008).
I Other “group informational attitudes”: distributed knowledge,common belief, . . .
I Common knowledge/belief of rationality
I Where does common knowledge come from?
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Some Issues
I What does a group know/believe/accept? vs. what can agroup (come to) know/believe/accept?
C. List. Group knowledge and group rationality: a judgment aggregation per-spective. Episteme (2008).
I Other “group informational attitudes”: distributed knowledge,common belief, . . .
I Common knowledge/belief of rationality
I Where does common knowledge come from?
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 13/43
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Some Issues
I What does a group know/believe/accept? vs. what can agroup (come to) know/believe/accept?
C. List. Group knowledge and group rationality: a judgment aggregation per-spective. Episteme (2008).
I Other “group informational attitudes”: distributed knowledge,common belief, . . .
I Common knowledge/belief of rationality
I Where does common knowledge come from?
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 13/43
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Some Issues
I What does a group know/believe/accept? vs. what can agroup (come to) know/believe/accept?
C. List. Group knowledge and group rationality: a judgment aggregation per-spective. Episteme (2008).
I Other “group informational attitudes”: distributed knowledge,common belief, . . .
I Common knowledge/belief of rationality
I Where does common knowledge come from?
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 13/43
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Some Issues
I What does a group know/believe/accept? vs. what can agroup (come to) know/believe/accept?
C. List. Group knowledge and group rationality: a judgment aggregation per-spective. Episteme (2008).
I Other “group informational attitudes”: distributed knowledge,common belief, . . .
I Common knowledge/belief of rationality
I Where does common knowledge come from?
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 13/43
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Some Issues
I What does a group know/believe/accept? vs. what can agroup (come to) know/believe/accept?
C. List. Group knowledge and group rationality: a judgment aggregation per-spective. Episteme (2008).
I Other “group informational attitudes”: distributed knowledge,common belief, . . .
I Common knowledge/belief of rationality
I Where does common knowledge come from?
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Key Assumptions
CK1 The structure of the game, including players’ strategy sets andpayoff functions, is common knowledge among the players.
CK2 The players are rational (i.e., they are expected utilitymaximizers) and this is common knowledge.
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Common Knowledge of Rationality: Iterated Removal ofStrictly Dominated Strategies
Bob
AnnU L R
U 1,2 0,1 U
D 0,1 1,0 U
There is no prior such that R is rational for Bob.
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Common Knowledge of Rationality: Iterated Removal ofStrictly Dominated Strategies
Bob
AnnU L R
U 1,2 0,1 U
D 0,1 1,0 U
There is no prior such that R is rational for Bob.
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Common Knowledge of Rationality: Iterated Removal ofStrictly Dominated Strategies
Bob
AnnU L R
U 1,2 0,1 U
D 0,1 1,0 U
If Ann knows this, then she does not consider R a option for Bob
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Common Knowledge of Rationality: Iterated Removal ofStrictly Dominated Strategies
Bob
AnnU L R
U 1,2 0,1 U
D 0,1 1,0 U
So, U is the only rational choice.
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Common knowledge of rationality (players will not choose strictlydominated actions) leads to a process of iterated removal ofstrictly dominated strategies.
What about weak dominance?
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Common knowledge of rationality (players will not choose strictlydominated actions) leads to a process of iterated removal ofstrictly dominated strategies.
What about weak dominance?
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Weak Dominance
A
B
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Weak Dominance
A
B
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Weak Dominance
A
B
> = > = =
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Iterated Admissibility
L R
U 1,1 0,1
D 0,2 1,0
Suppose rationality incorporates weak dominance (i.e.,admissibility or cautiousness).
1. Both Row and Column should use a full-support probabilitymeasure
2. But if Row thinks that Column is rational then should shenot assign probability 1 to L?
The condition that the players incorporate admissibility into theirrationality calculations seems to conflict with the condition thatthe players think the other players are rational (there is a tensionbetween admissibility and strategic reasoning)
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 18/43
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Iterated Admissibility
L R
U 1,1 0,1
D 0,2 1,0
Suppose rationality incorporates weak dominance (i.e.,admissibility or cautiousness).
1. Both Row and Column should use a full-support probabilitymeasure
2. But if Row thinks that Column is rational then should shenot assign probability 1 to L?
The condition that the players incorporate admissibility into theirrationality calculations seems to conflict with the condition thatthe players think the other players are rational (there is a tensionbetween admissibility and strategic reasoning)
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 18/43
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Iterated Admissibility
L R
U 1,1 0,1
D 0,2 1,0
Suppose rationality incorporates weak dominance (i.e.,admissibility or cautiousness).
1. Both Row and Column should use a full-support probabilitymeasure
2. But if Row thinks that Column is rational then should shenot assign probability 1 to L?
The condition that the players incorporate admissibility into theirrationality calculations seems to conflict with the condition thatthe players think the other players are rational (there is a tensionbetween admissibility and strategic reasoning)
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 18/43
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Iterated Admissibility
L R
U 1,1 0,1
D 0,2 1,0
Suppose rationality incorporates weak dominance (i.e.,admissibility or cautiousness).
1. Both Row and Column should use a full-support probabilitymeasure
2. But if Row thinks that Column is rational then should shenot assign probability 1 to L?
The condition that the players incorporate admissibility into theirrationality calculations seems to conflict with the condition thatthe players think the other players are rational (there is a tensionbetween admissibility and strategic reasoning)
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 18/43
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Iterated Removal of Weakly Dominated Strategies
Bob
Ann
T L R
T 1,1 1,0 U
B 1,0 0,1 U
T weakly dominates B
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Iterated Removal of Weakly Dominated Strategies
Bob
Ann
T L R
T 1,1 1,0 U
B 1,0 0,1 U
T weakly dominates B
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Iterated Removal of Weakly Dominated Strategies
Bob
Ann
T L R
T 1,1 1,0 U
B 1,0 0,1 U
Then L strictly dominates R.
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Iterated Removal of Weakly Dominated Strategies
Bob
Ann
T L R
T 1,1 1,0 U
B 1,0 0,1 U
The IA set
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Iterated Removal of Weakly Dominated Strategies
Bob
Ann
T L R
T 1,1 1,0 U
B 1,0 0,1 U
But, now what is the reason for not playing B?
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Backwards Induction
Invented by Zermelo, Backwards Induction is an iterative algorithmfor “solving” and extensive game.
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(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) A
(3, 1) (4, 4)
B B
A
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(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) A
(3, 1) (4, 4)
B B
A
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(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) (4, 4)
(3, 1) (4, 4)
B B
A
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(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) (4, 4)
(3, 1) (4, 4)
B B
A
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(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) (4, 4)
(3, 1) (4, 4)
(2, 3) B
A
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(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) (4, 4)
(3, 1) (4, 4)
(2, 3) B
A
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(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) (4, 4)
(3, 1) (4, 4)
(2, 3) (1, 5)
A
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(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) (4, 4)
(3, 1) (4, 4)
(2, 3) (1, 5)
A
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(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) (4, 4)
(3, 1) (4, 4)
(2, 3) (1, 5)
(2, 3)
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(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) A
(3, 1) (4, 4)
B B
A
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(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) A
(3, 1) (4, 4)
B B
A
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BI Puzzle
A B A
(2,1) (1,6) (7,5)
(6,6)R1 r R2
D1 d D2
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BI Puzzle
A B A
(2,1) (1,6) (7,5)
(6,6)R1 r R2
D1 d D2
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BI Puzzle
A B (7,5)
(2,1) (1,6) (7,5)
(6,6)R1 r
D1 d
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BI Puzzle
A B (7,5)
(2,1) (1,6) (7,5)
(6,6)R1 r
D1 d
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BI Puzzle
A (1,6) (7,5)
(2,1) (1,6) (7,5)
(6,6)R1
D1
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BI Puzzle
A (1,6) (7,5)
(2,1) (1,6) (7,5)
(6,6)R1
D1
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BI Puzzle
A (1,6) (7,5)
(2,1) (1,6) (7,5)
(6,6)
D1
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BI Puzzle
A B A
(2,1) (1,6) (7,5)
(6,6)R1 r R2
D1 d D2
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But what if...
A B A
(2,1) (1,6) (7,5)
(6,6)R1 r R2
D1 d D2
I Are the players irrational?
I What argument leads to the BI solution?
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But what if...
A B A
(2,1) (1,6) (7,5)
(6,6)R1 r R2
D1 d D2
I Are the players irrational?
I What argument leads to the BI solution?
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 23/43
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Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
C D
C 3,3 0,4D 4,0 1,1
What about “tit-for-tat”?
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Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
C D
C 3,3 0,4D 4,0 1,1
What about “tit-for-tat”?
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Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
C DC 3,3 0,4D 4,0 1,1
C DC 3,3 0,4D 4,0 1,1
C DC 3,3 0,4D 4,0 1,1
C DC 3,3 0,4D 4,0 1,1
· · ·
What about “tit-for-tat”?
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 24/43
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Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
C DC 3,3 0,4D 4,0 1,1
C DC 3,3 0,4D 4,0 1,1
C DC 3,3 0,4D 4,0 1,1
C DC 3,3 0,4D 4,0 1,1
· · ·
What about “tit-for-tat”?
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 24/43
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Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
C DC 3,3 0,4D 4,0 1,1
C DC 3,3 0,4D 4,0 1,1
C DC 3,3 0,4D 4,0 1,1
C DC 3,3 0,4D 4,0 1,1
· · ·
What about “tit-for-tat”?
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 24/43
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Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
C DC 3,3 0,4D 4,0 1,1
C DC 3,3 0,4D 4,0 1,1
C DC 3,3 0,4D 4,0 1,1
C DC 3,3 0,4D 4,0 1,1
· · ·
What about “tit-for-tat”?
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 24/43
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Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
C DC 3,3 0,4D 4,0 1,1
C DC 3,3 0,4D 4,0 1,1
C DC 3,3 0,4D 4,0 1,1
C DC 3,3 0,4D 4,0 1,1
· · ·
What about “tit-for-tat”?
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 24/43
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Is anything missing in these models?
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Formally, a game is described by its strategy sets and payofffunctions.
But in real life, may other parameters are relevant; thereis a lot more going on. Situations that substantively are vastlydifferent may nevertheless correspond to precisely the samestrategic game. For example, in a parliamentary democracy withthree parties, the winning coalitions are the same whether theparties hold a third of the seats, or, say, 49%, 39%, and 12%respectively. But the political situations are quite different. Thedifference lies in the attitudes of the players, in their expectationsabout each other, in custom, and in history, though the rules ofthe game do not distinguish between the two situations.
R. Aumann and J. H. Dreze. Rational Expectation in Games. American Eco-nomic Review (2008).
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Formally, a game is described by its strategy sets and payofffunctions. But in real life, may other parameters are relevant; thereis a lot more going on. Situations that substantively are vastlydifferent may nevertheless correspond to precisely the samestrategic game.
For example, in a parliamentary democracy withthree parties, the winning coalitions are the same whether theparties hold a third of the seats, or, say, 49%, 39%, and 12%respectively. But the political situations are quite different. Thedifference lies in the attitudes of the players, in their expectationsabout each other, in custom, and in history, though the rules ofthe game do not distinguish between the two situations.
R. Aumann and J. H. Dreze. Rational Expectation in Games. American Eco-nomic Review (2008).
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 26/43
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Formally, a game is described by its strategy sets and payofffunctions. But in real life, may other parameters are relevant; thereis a lot more going on. Situations that substantively are vastlydifferent may nevertheless correspond to precisely the samestrategic game. For example, in a parliamentary democracy withthree parties, the winning coalitions are the same whether theparties hold a third of the seats, or, say, 49%, 39%, and 12%respectively.
But the political situations are quite different. Thedifference lies in the attitudes of the players, in their expectationsabout each other, in custom, and in history, though the rules ofthe game do not distinguish between the two situations.
R. Aumann and J. H. Dreze. Rational Expectation in Games. American Eco-nomic Review (2008).
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 26/43
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Formally, a game is described by its strategy sets and payofffunctions. But in real life, may other parameters are relevant; thereis a lot more going on. Situations that substantively are vastlydifferent may nevertheless correspond to precisely the samestrategic game. For example, in a parliamentary democracy withthree parties, the winning coalitions are the same whether theparties hold a third of the seats, or, say, 49%, 39%, and 12%respectively. But the political situations are quite different.
Thedifference lies in the attitudes of the players, in their expectationsabout each other, in custom, and in history, though the rules ofthe game do not distinguish between the two situations.
R. Aumann and J. H. Dreze. Rational Expectation in Games. American Eco-nomic Review (2008).
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 26/43
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Formally, a game is described by its strategy sets and payofffunctions. But in real life, may other parameters are relevant; thereis a lot more going on. Situations that substantively are vastlydifferent may nevertheless correspond to precisely the samestrategic game. For example, in a parliamentary democracy withthree parties, the winning coalitions are the same whether theparties hold a third of the seats, or, say, 49%, 39%, and 12%respectively. But the political situations are quite different. Thedifference lies in the attitudes of the players, in their expectationsabout each other, in custom, and in history, though the rules ofthe game do not distinguish between the two situations.
R. Aumann and J. H. Dreze. Rational Expectation in Games. American Eco-nomic Review (2008).
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Two questions
I What should the players do in a game-theoretic situation andwhat should they expect? (Assuming everyone is rational andrecognize each other’s rationality)
I What are the assumptions about rationality and the players’knowledge/beliefs underlying the various solution concepts?Why would the agents’ follow a particular solution concept?
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Writing a paper together
Problem of Cooperation.
C D
C 3,3 0,4
D 4,0 1,1
Intuitively, we solve these problem by working together.This is the question of collective agency.
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Writing a paper together
Problem of Cooperation.
C D
C 3,3 0,4
D 4,0 1,1
Intuitively, we solve these problem by working together.This is the question of collective agency.
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 28/43
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Writing a paper together
Problem of Coordination.
C D
C 3,3 0,0
D 0,0 1,1
Intuitively, we solve these problem by working together.This is the question of collective agency.
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 28/43
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Writing a paper together
Problem of Coordination.
C D
C 3,3 0,0
D 0,0 1,1
Intuitively, we solve these problem by working together.This is the question of collective agency.
Eric Pacuit: Rationality (Lecture 11) 28/43
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R. Cubitt and R. Sugden. Common Knowledge, Salience and Convention: AReconstruction of David Lewis’ Game Theory. Economics and Philosophy, 19,pgs. 175-210 , 2003..
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Reason to Believe
Biϕ: “i believes ϕ”
vs. Ri (ϕ): “i has a reason to believe ϕ”
I “Although it is an essential part of Lewis’ theory that humanbeings are to some degree rational, he does not want to makethe strong rationality assumptions of conventional decisiontheory or game theory.” (CS, pg. 184).
I Anyone who accept the rules of arithmetic has a reason tobelieve 618× 377 = 232, 986, but most of us do not hold havefirm beliefs about this.
I Definition: Ri (ϕ) means ϕ is true within some logic ofreasoning that is endorsed by (that is, accepted as anormative standard by) person i ...ϕ must be either regardedas self-evident or derivable by rules of inference (deductive orinductive)
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Reason to Believe
Biϕ: “i believes ϕ” vs. Ri (ϕ): “i has a reason to believe ϕ”
I “Although it is an essential part of Lewis’ theory that humanbeings are to some degree rational, he does not want to makethe strong rationality assumptions of conventional decisiontheory or game theory.” (CS, pg. 184).
I Anyone who accept the rules of arithmetic has a reason tobelieve 618× 377 = 232, 986, but most of us do not hold havefirm beliefs about this.
I Definition: Ri (ϕ) means ϕ is true within some logic ofreasoning that is endorsed by (that is, accepted as anormative standard by) person i ...ϕ must be either regardedas self-evident or derivable by rules of inference (deductive orinductive)
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Reason to Believe
Biϕ: “i believes ϕ” vs. Ri (ϕ): “i has a reason to believe ϕ”
I “Although it is an essential part of Lewis’ theory that humanbeings are to some degree rational, he does not want to makethe strong rationality assumptions of conventional decisiontheory or game theory.” (CS, pg. 184).
I Anyone who accept the rules of arithmetic has a reason tobelieve 618× 377 = 232, 986, but most of us do not hold havefirm beliefs about this.
I Definition: Ri (ϕ) means ϕ is true within some logic ofreasoning that is endorsed by (that is, accepted as anormative standard by) person i ...ϕ must be either regardedas self-evident or derivable by rules of inference (deductive orinductive)
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Reason to Believe
Biϕ: “i believes ϕ” vs. Ri (ϕ): “i has a reason to believe ϕ”
I “Although it is an essential part of Lewis’ theory that humanbeings are to some degree rational, he does not want to makethe strong rationality assumptions of conventional decisiontheory or game theory.” (CS, pg. 184).
I Anyone who accept the rules of arithmetic has a reason tobelieve 618× 377 = 232, 986, but most of us do not hold havefirm beliefs about this.
I Definition: Ri (ϕ) means ϕ is true within some logic ofreasoning that is endorsed by (that is, accepted as anormative standard by) person i ...ϕ must be either regardedas self-evident or derivable by rules of inference (deductive orinductive)
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Reason to Believe
Biϕ: “i believes ϕ” vs. Ri (ϕ): “i has a reason to believe ϕ”
I “Although it is an essential part of Lewis’ theory that humanbeings are to some degree rational, he does not want to makethe strong rationality assumptions of conventional decisiontheory or game theory.” (CS, pg. 184).
I Anyone who accept the rules of arithmetic has a reason tobelieve 618× 377 = 232, 986, but most of us do not hold havefirm beliefs about this.
I Definition: Ri (ϕ) means ϕ is true within some logic ofreasoning that is endorsed by (that is, accepted as anormative standard by) person i ...ϕ must be either regardedas self-evident or derivable by rules of inference (deductive orinductive)
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A indicates to i that ϕ
A is a “state of affairs”
A indi ϕ: i ’s reason to believe that A holds provides i ’s reason forbelieving that ϕ is true.
(A1)For all i , for all A, for all ϕ: [Ri (A holds) ∧ (A indi ϕ)]⇒ Ri (ϕ)
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Some Properties
I [(A holds) entails (A′ holds)]⇒ A indi (A′ holds)
I [(A indi ϕ) ∧ (A indiψ)]⇒ A indi (ϕ ∧ ψ)
I [(A indi [A′ holds]) ∧ (A′ indix)]⇒ A indiϕ
I [(A indiϕ) ∧ (ϕ entails ψ)]⇒ A indiψ
I [(A indi Rj [A′ holds]) ∧ Ri (A′ indjϕ)]⇒ A indiRj(ϕ)
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Some Properties
I [(A holds) entails (A′ holds)]⇒ A indi (A′ holds)
I [(A indi ϕ) ∧ (A indiψ)]⇒ A indi (ϕ ∧ ψ)
I [(A indi [A′ holds]) ∧ (A′ indix)]⇒ A indiϕ
I [(A indiϕ) ∧ (ϕ entails ψ)]⇒ A indiψ
I [(A indi Rj [A′ holds]) ∧ Ri (A′ indjϕ)]⇒ A indiRj(ϕ)
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Some Properties
I [(A holds) entails (A′ holds)]⇒ A indi (A′ holds)
I [(A indi ϕ) ∧ (A indiψ)]⇒ A indi (ϕ ∧ ψ)
I [(A indi [A′ holds]) ∧ (A′ indix)]⇒ A indiϕ
I [(A indiϕ) ∧ (ϕ entails ψ)]⇒ A indiψ
I [(A indi Rj [A′ holds]) ∧ Ri (A′ indjϕ)]⇒ A indiRj(ϕ)
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Some Properties
I [(A holds) entails (A′ holds)]⇒ A indi (A′ holds)
I [(A indi ϕ) ∧ (A indiψ)]⇒ A indi (ϕ ∧ ψ)
I [(A indi [A′ holds]) ∧ (A′ indix)]⇒ A indiϕ
I [(A indiϕ) ∧ (ϕ entails ψ)]⇒ A indiψ
I [(A indi Rj [A′ holds]) ∧ Ri (A′ indjϕ)]⇒ A indiRj(ϕ)
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Some Properties
I [(A holds) entails (A′ holds)]⇒ A indi (A′ holds)
I [(A indi ϕ) ∧ (A indiψ)]⇒ A indi (ϕ ∧ ψ)
I [(A indi [A′ holds]) ∧ (A′ indix)]⇒ A indiϕ
I [(A indiϕ) ∧ (ϕ entails ψ)]⇒ A indiψ
I [(A indi Rj [A′ holds]) ∧ Ri (A′ indjϕ)]⇒ A indiRj(ϕ)
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Some Properties
I [(A holds) entails (A′ holds)]⇒ A indi (A′ holds)
I [(A indi ϕ) ∧ (A indiψ)]⇒ A indi (ϕ ∧ ψ)
I [(A indi [A′ holds]) ∧ (A′ indix)]⇒ A indiϕ
I [(A indiϕ) ∧ (ϕ entails ψ)]⇒ A indiψ
I [(A indi Rj [A′ holds]) ∧ Ri (A′ indjϕ)]⇒ A indiRj(ϕ)
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Reflexive Common Indicator
I A holds ⇒ Ri (A holds)
I A indi Rj(A holds)
I A indi ϕ
I (A indi ψ)⇒ Ri [A indj ψ]
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Reflexive Common Indicator
I A holds ⇒ Ri (A holds)
I A indi Rj(A holds)
I A indi ϕ
I (A indi ψ)⇒ Ri [A indj ψ]
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Reflexive Common Indicator
I A holds ⇒ Ri (A holds)
I A indi Rj(A holds)
I A indi ϕ
I (A indi ψ)⇒ Ri [A indj ψ]
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Reflexive Common Indicator
I A holds ⇒ Ri (A holds)
I A indi Rj(A holds)
I A indi ϕ
I (A indi ψ)⇒ Ri [A indj ψ]
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Reflexive Common Indicator
I A holds ⇒ Ri (A holds)
I A indi Rj(A holds)
I A indi ϕ
I (A indi ψ)⇒ Ri [A indj ψ]
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Let RG (ϕ): Riϕ,Rjϕ, . . ., Ri (Rjϕ), Rj(Ri (ϕ)), . . .iterated reason to believe ϕ.
Theorem. (Lewis) For all states of affairs A, for all propositions ϕ,and for all groups G : if A holds, and if A is a reflexive commonindicator in G that ϕ, then RG (ϕ) is true.
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Let RG (ϕ): Riϕ,Rjϕ, . . ., Ri (Rjϕ), Rj(Ri (ϕ)), . . .iterated reason to believe ϕ.
Theorem. (Lewis) For all states of affairs A, for all propositions ϕ,and for all groups G : if A holds, and if A is a reflexive commonindicator in G that ϕ, then RG (ϕ) is true.
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Lewis and Aumann
Lewis common knowledge that ϕ implies the iterated definition ofcommon knowledge (“Aumann common knowledge”)
, but theconverse is not generally true....
Example. Suppose there is an agent i 6∈ G that is authoritative foreach member of G . So, for j ∈ G , “i states to j that ϕ is true”indicates to j that ϕ. Suppose that separately and privately toeach member of G , i states that ϕ and RG (ϕ) are true.Then, wehave R iϕ and Ri (RG (ϕ)) for each i ∈ G . But there is no commonindicator that ϕ is true. The agents j ∈ G may have no reason tobelieve that everyone heard the statement from i or that all agentsin G treat i as authoritative.
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Lewis and Aumann
Lewis common knowledge that ϕ implies the iterated definition ofcommon knowledge (“Aumann common knowledge”), but theconverse is not generally true....
Example. Suppose there is an agent i 6∈ G that is authoritative foreach member of G . So, for j ∈ G , “i states to j that ϕ is true”indicates to j that ϕ. Suppose that separately and privately toeach member of G , i states that ϕ and RG (ϕ) are true.Then, wehave R iϕ and Ri (RG (ϕ)) for each i ∈ G . But there is no commonindicator that ϕ is true. The agents j ∈ G may have no reason tobelieve that everyone heard the statement from i or that all agentsin G treat i as authoritative.
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Lewis and Aumann
Lewis common knowledge that ϕ implies the iterated definition ofcommon knowledge (“Aumann common knowledge”), but theconverse is not generally true....
Example. Suppose there is an agent i 6∈ G that is authoritative foreach member of G .
So, for j ∈ G , “i states to j that ϕ is true”indicates to j that ϕ. Suppose that separately and privately toeach member of G , i states that ϕ and RG (ϕ) are true.Then, wehave R iϕ and Ri (RG (ϕ)) for each i ∈ G . But there is no commonindicator that ϕ is true. The agents j ∈ G may have no reason tobelieve that everyone heard the statement from i or that all agentsin G treat i as authoritative.
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Lewis and Aumann
Lewis common knowledge that ϕ implies the iterated definition ofcommon knowledge (“Aumann common knowledge”), but theconverse is not generally true....
Example. Suppose there is an agent i 6∈ G that is authoritative foreach member of G . So, for j ∈ G , “i states to j that ϕ is true”indicates to j that ϕ.
Suppose that separately and privately toeach member of G , i states that ϕ and RG (ϕ) are true.Then, wehave R iϕ and Ri (RG (ϕ)) for each i ∈ G . But there is no commonindicator that ϕ is true. The agents j ∈ G may have no reason tobelieve that everyone heard the statement from i or that all agentsin G treat i as authoritative.
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Lewis and Aumann
Lewis common knowledge that ϕ implies the iterated definition ofcommon knowledge (“Aumann common knowledge”), but theconverse is not generally true....
Example. Suppose there is an agent i 6∈ G that is authoritative foreach member of G . So, for j ∈ G , “i states to j that ϕ is true”indicates to j that ϕ. Suppose that separately and privately toeach member of G , i states that ϕ and RG (ϕ) are true.
Then, wehave R iϕ and Ri (RG (ϕ)) for each i ∈ G . But there is no commonindicator that ϕ is true. The agents j ∈ G may have no reason tobelieve that everyone heard the statement from i or that all agentsin G treat i as authoritative.
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Lewis and Aumann
Lewis common knowledge that ϕ implies the iterated definition ofcommon knowledge (“Aumann common knowledge”), but theconverse is not generally true....
Example. Suppose there is an agent i 6∈ G that is authoritative foreach member of G . So, for j ∈ G , “i states to j that ϕ is true”indicates to j that ϕ. Suppose that separately and privately toeach member of G , i states that ϕ and RG (ϕ) are true.Then, wehave R iϕ and Ri (RG (ϕ)) for each i ∈ G .
But there is no commonindicator that ϕ is true. The agents j ∈ G may have no reason tobelieve that everyone heard the statement from i or that all agentsin G treat i as authoritative.
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Lewis and Aumann
Lewis common knowledge that ϕ implies the iterated definition ofcommon knowledge (“Aumann common knowledge”), but theconverse is not generally true....
Example. Suppose there is an agent i 6∈ G that is authoritative foreach member of G . So, for j ∈ G , “i states to j that ϕ is true”indicates to j that ϕ. Suppose that separately and privately toeach member of G , i states that ϕ and RG (ϕ) are true.Then, wehave R iϕ and Ri (RG (ϕ)) for each i ∈ G . But there is no commonindicator that ϕ is true.
The agents j ∈ G may have no reason tobelieve that everyone heard the statement from i or that all agentsin G treat i as authoritative.
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Lewis and Aumann
Lewis common knowledge that ϕ implies the iterated definition ofcommon knowledge (“Aumann common knowledge”), but theconverse is not generally true....
Example. Suppose there is an agent i 6∈ G that is authoritative foreach member of G . So, for j ∈ G , “i states to j that ϕ is true”indicates to j that ϕ. Suppose that separately and privately toeach member of G , i states that ϕ and RG (ϕ) are true.Then, wehave R iϕ and Ri (RG (ϕ)) for each i ∈ G . But there is no commonindicator that ϕ is true. The agents j ∈ G may have no reason tobelieve that everyone heard the statement from i or that all agentsin G treat i as authoritative.
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How does this help?
l r
l 10,10 0,0
r 0,0 11,11A
B
A: What should we do? Team Reasoning: why should this“mode of reasoning” be endorsed?
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Reason to Believe Logic
Ri (ϕ): “agent i has reason to believe ϕ”
this is interpreted as ϕfollows from rules (deductive, inductive, norm of practical reason)endorsed by agent i .
Inference rules associated with the Reason-to-believe logic:inf (R) : ϕ,ψ → χ
Assume each person’s logic at least contains propositional logic:inf (R) : ϕ1, . . . ϕn,¬(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn ∧ ¬ψ)→ ψ
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Reason to Believe Logic
Ri (ϕ): “agent i has reason to believe ϕ” this is interpreted as ϕfollows from rules (deductive, inductive, norm of practical reason)endorsed by agent i .
Inference rules associated with the Reason-to-believe logic:inf (R) : ϕ,ψ → χ
Assume each person’s logic at least contains propositional logic:inf (R) : ϕ1, . . . ϕn,¬(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn ∧ ¬ψ)→ ψ
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Reason to Believe Logic
Ri (ϕ): “agent i has reason to believe ϕ” this is interpreted as ϕfollows from rules (deductive, inductive, norm of practical reason)endorsed by agent i .
Inference rules associated with the Reason-to-believe logic:inf (R) : ϕ,ψ → χ
Assume each person’s logic at least contains propositional logic:inf (R) : ϕ1, . . . ϕn,¬(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn ∧ ¬ψ)→ ψ
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Reason to Believe Logic
Ri (ϕ): “agent i has reason to believe ϕ” this is interpreted as ϕfollows from rules (deductive, inductive, norm of practical reason)endorsed by agent i .
Inference rules associated with the Reason-to-believe logic:inf (R) : ϕ,ψ → χ
Assume each person’s logic at least contains propositional logic:inf (R) : ϕ1, . . . ϕn,¬(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn ∧ ¬ψ)→ ψ
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Subject of the PropositionAgent i is the subject of the proposition ϕi if ϕi makes anassertion about a current or future act of is will
:
I a prediction about what i will choose in a future decision problem;
I a deontic statement about what i ought to choose;
I assert that i endorses some inference rule; or
I assert that i has reason to believe some proposition
Ri (ϕi ) vs. Rj(ϕi ): Suppose i reliable takes a bus every Monday.The other commuters may all make the inductive inference that iwill take the bus next Monday (Mi ). In fact, we may assume thatthis is a common mode of reasoning, so everyone reliably makesthe inference that i will catch the bus next Monday. So, Rj(Mi ),RiRj(Mi ), but i should still be free to choose whether he wants totake the bus on Monday, so ¬Ri (Mi ) and ¬Rj(Ri (Mi )), etc.
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Subject of the PropositionAgent i is the subject of the proposition ϕi if ϕi makes anassertion about a current or future act of is will:
I a prediction about what i will choose in a future decision problem;
I a deontic statement about what i ought to choose;
I assert that i endorses some inference rule; or
I assert that i has reason to believe some proposition
Ri (ϕi ) vs. Rj(ϕi ): Suppose i reliable takes a bus every Monday.The other commuters may all make the inductive inference that iwill take the bus next Monday (Mi ). In fact, we may assume thatthis is a common mode of reasoning, so everyone reliably makesthe inference that i will catch the bus next Monday. So, Rj(Mi ),RiRj(Mi ), but i should still be free to choose whether he wants totake the bus on Monday, so ¬Ri (Mi ) and ¬Rj(Ri (Mi )), etc.
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Subject of the PropositionAgent i is the subject of the proposition ϕi if ϕi makes anassertion about a current or future act of is will:
I a prediction about what i will choose in a future decision problem;
I a deontic statement about what i ought to choose;
I assert that i endorses some inference rule; or
I assert that i has reason to believe some proposition
Ri (ϕi ) vs. Rj(ϕi ): Suppose i reliable takes a bus every Monday.
The other commuters may all make the inductive inference that iwill take the bus next Monday (Mi ). In fact, we may assume thatthis is a common mode of reasoning, so everyone reliably makesthe inference that i will catch the bus next Monday. So, Rj(Mi ),RiRj(Mi ), but i should still be free to choose whether he wants totake the bus on Monday, so ¬Ri (Mi ) and ¬Rj(Ri (Mi )), etc.
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Subject of the PropositionAgent i is the subject of the proposition ϕi if ϕi makes anassertion about a current or future act of is will:
I a prediction about what i will choose in a future decision problem;
I a deontic statement about what i ought to choose;
I assert that i endorses some inference rule; or
I assert that i has reason to believe some proposition
Ri (ϕi ) vs. Rj(ϕi ): Suppose i reliable takes a bus every Monday.The other commuters may all make the inductive inference that iwill take the bus next Monday (Mi ).
In fact, we may assume thatthis is a common mode of reasoning, so everyone reliably makesthe inference that i will catch the bus next Monday. So, Rj(Mi ),RiRj(Mi ), but i should still be free to choose whether he wants totake the bus on Monday, so ¬Ri (Mi ) and ¬Rj(Ri (Mi )), etc.
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Subject of the PropositionAgent i is the subject of the proposition ϕi if ϕi makes anassertion about a current or future act of is will:
I a prediction about what i will choose in a future decision problem;
I a deontic statement about what i ought to choose;
I assert that i endorses some inference rule; or
I assert that i has reason to believe some proposition
Ri (ϕi ) vs. Rj(ϕi ): Suppose i reliable takes a bus every Monday.The other commuters may all make the inductive inference that iwill take the bus next Monday (Mi ). In fact, we may assume thatthis is a common mode of reasoning, so everyone reliably makesthe inference that i will catch the bus next Monday.
So, Rj(Mi ),RiRj(Mi ), but i should still be free to choose whether he wants totake the bus on Monday, so ¬Ri (Mi ) and ¬Rj(Ri (Mi )), etc.
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Subject of the PropositionAgent i is the subject of the proposition ϕi if ϕi makes anassertion about a current or future act of is will:
I a prediction about what i will choose in a future decision problem;
I a deontic statement about what i ought to choose;
I assert that i endorses some inference rule; or
I assert that i has reason to believe some proposition
Ri (ϕi ) vs. Rj(ϕi ): Suppose i reliable takes a bus every Monday.The other commuters may all make the inductive inference that iwill take the bus next Monday (Mi ). In fact, we may assume thatthis is a common mode of reasoning, so everyone reliably makesthe inference that i will catch the bus next Monday. So, Rj(Mi ),RiRj(Mi )
, but i should still be free to choose whether he wants totake the bus on Monday, so ¬Ri (Mi ) and ¬Rj(Ri (Mi )), etc.
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Subject of the PropositionAgent i is the subject of the proposition ϕi if ϕi makes anassertion about a current or future act of is will:
I a prediction about what i will choose in a future decision problem;
I a deontic statement about what i ought to choose;
I assert that i endorses some inference rule; or
I assert that i has reason to believe some proposition
Ri (ϕi ) vs. Rj(ϕi ): Suppose i reliable takes a bus every Monday.The other commuters may all make the inductive inference that iwill take the bus next Monday (Mi ). In fact, we may assume thatthis is a common mode of reasoning, so everyone reliably makesthe inference that i will catch the bus next Monday. So, Rj(Mi ),RiRj(Mi ), but i should still be free to choose whether he wants totake the bus on Monday, so ¬Ri (Mi ) and ¬Rj(Ri (Mi )), etc.
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Common Reason to Believe
Awareness of Common Reason: for all i ∈ G and all propositions ϕ,
RG (ϕ)⇒ Ri [RG (ϕ)]
Authority of Common Reason: for all i ∈ G and all propositions ϕfor which i is not the subject
inf (Ri ) : RG (ϕ)→ ϕ
Common Attribution of Common Reason: for all i ∈ G , for allpropositions ϕ for which i is not the subject
inf (RG ) : ϕ→ Ri (ϕ)
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Common Reason to Believe
Awareness of Common Reason: for all i ∈ G and all propositions ϕ,
RG (ϕ)⇒ Ri [RG (ϕ)]
Authority of Common Reason: for all i ∈ G and all propositions ϕfor which i is not the subject
inf (Ri ) : RG (ϕ)→ ϕ
Common Attribution of Common Reason: for all i ∈ G , for allpropositions ϕ for which i is not the subject
inf (RG ) : ϕ→ Ri (ϕ)
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Common Reason to Believe
Awareness of Common Reason: for all i ∈ G and all propositions ϕ,
RG (ϕ)⇒ Ri [RG (ϕ)]
Authority of Common Reason: for all i ∈ G and all propositions ϕfor which i is not the subject
inf (Ri ) : RG (ϕ)→ ϕ
Common Attribution of Common Reason: for all i ∈ G , for allpropositions ϕ for which i is not the subject
inf (RG ) : ϕ→ Ri (ϕ)
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Common Reason to Believe to Common Belief
Theorem The three previous properties can generate any hierarchyof belief (i has reason to believe that j has reason to believe that...that ϕ) for any ϕ with RG (ϕ).
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Team Maximising
inf (Ri ) : RN [opt(v ,N, sN)],RN [ each i ∈ N endorses team maximising with respect to N and v ],RN [ each member of N acts on reasons ] → ought(i , si )
Ri [ought(i , si )]: i has reason to choose si
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Team Maximising
inf (Ri ) : RN [opt(v ,N, sN)],RN [ each i ∈ N endorses team maximising with respect to N and v ],RN [ each member of N acts on reasons ] → ought(i , si )
Ri [ought(i , si )]: i has reason to choose si
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Team Maximising
inf (Ri ) : RN [opt(v ,N, sN)],RN [ each i ∈ N endorses team maximising with respect to N and v ],RN [ each member of N acts on reasons ] → ought(i , si )
i acts on reasons if for all si , Ri [ought(i , si )]⇒ choice(i , si )
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Team Maximising
inf (Ri ) : RN [opt(v ,N, sN)],RN [ each i ∈ N endorses team maximising with respect to N and v ],RN [ each member of N acts on reasons ] → ought(i , si )
opt(v ,N, sN): sN is maximal for the group N w.r.t. v
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Team Maximising
inf (Ri ) : RN [opt(v ,N, sN)],RN [ each i ∈ N endorses team maximising with respect to N and v ],RN [ each member of N acts on reasons ] → ought(i , si )
Recursive definition: i ’s endorsement of the rule depends on ihaving a reason to believe everyone else endorses the rule...
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Individual vs. collective agency
Different contexts of agency
I Individual decision making and individual action againstnature.
• Ex: Gambling.
I Individual decision making in interaction.
• Ex: Playing chess.
I Collective decision making.
• Ex: Carrying the piano.
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Individual vs. collective agency
Different contexts of agencyI Individual decision making and individual action against
nature.• Ex: Gambling.
I Individual decision making in interaction.
• Ex: Playing chess.
I Collective decision making.
• Ex: Carrying the piano.
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Individual vs. collective agency
Different contexts of agency
I Individual decision making and individual action againstnature.
• Ex: Gambling.
I Individual decision making in interaction.
• Ex: Playing chess.
I Collective decision making.
• Ex: Carrying the piano.
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Individual vs. collective agency
Different contexts of agency
I Individual decision making and individual action againstnature.
• Ex: Gambling.
I Individual decision making in interaction.
• Ex: Playing chess.
I Collective decision making.
• Ex: Carrying the piano.
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Individual vs. collective agency
Different contexts of agency
I Individual decision making and individual action againstnature.
• Ex: Gambling.
I Individual decision making in interaction.
• Ex: Playing chess.
I Collective decision making.
• Ex: Carrying the piano.
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Individual vs. collective agency
Next: Social Choice Theory and Group Preferences
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