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China is a challenge, and not a threat, to IndiaChandrashekhar Dasgupta

New Delhi has made it clear that it does not see China as a threat to India. The

official position reflects a correct assessment of our security environment. Chinaposes a challenge, not a threat, to India.

In assessing our security environment, it is essential to examine both the intentionsas well as the capabilities of neighbouring countries. If a country has hostile

intentions as well as a military capability to pursue those intentions, it should be

categorized as a threat to India. If it possesses the military capability of causing usmajor harm but does not harbour hostile intentions, it should be seen as posing a

challenge. Pakistan falls in the first category and China in the second.

The immediate focus of defence planning should obviously be on countries that posea threat, in the sense that it is essential that we should be prepared at any time to

respond to aggression from such countries. Challenges do not require the sameurgent response but they must be addressed in a long-term perspective. It is not

prudent to altogether ignore a neighbours military capabilities even though it does

not harbour hostile intentions. After all, intentions can change over time for a varietyof reasons. Moreover, a countrys intentions can change quite quickly while it takes arelatively long time to build up our response capabilities. For these reasons, it is

unwise to turn a blind eye to the military capabilities of our neighbours even whenthey do not pose a threat to us.

How does one assess Chinas current intentions? Our relations with China went

through a period of confrontation and conflict in the late Fifties and Sixties. Thereasons for these developments were complex and need not detain us here. Suffice it

to say that that when future historians are able to analyze these eventsdispassionately, they will probably conclude that each side misread the others

intentions. What is more germane to our present enquiry is the state of India-China

relations in recent decades.

The facts here are quite clear. Since the late Eighties, China has generally desistedfrom adopting a hostile attitude towards India. She has ceased to assist insurgent

groups operating in our north-eastern areas. The border areas have generally beentension-free after Rajiv Gandhis visit to China in December 1988. The 1993

agreement on maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the border areas is

functioning well, and this is also the case with the 1996 accord on confidence-building measures. Bilateral relations have progressed satisfactorily in all areas, most

notably in the commercial field. China has also desisted from adoptingconfrontational postures against other countries.

Thus, there are good reasons for concluding that China today does not entertain

hostile intentions and that it reciprocates our intention to resolve all issues throughpeaceful negotiation. The prospects of continued strengthening of India-China ties

are very good. To misperceive China as a threat and to base our defence plans onsuch a misperception would result in distorting our national priorities and in a

tragic diversion of scarce resources from urgent developmental tasks.

We have, of course, to take note of the fact that the Chinese armed forces areamong the most powerful in the world. They are the worlds biggest in numerical

terms, and their modernization campaign is making rapid progress. We should also

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note that Chinas deepest security concerns lie eastwards (in the Pacific Ocean area)and not southwards. At the top of Chinas immediate concerns is the possibility of a

declaration of independence by the Taiwan regime. Beijing has signalled itsdetermination to crush such a separatist move by force, if necessary. Other issues

that figure prominently in Chinas security perspectives are the American role in Asiaand the re-emergence of Japan as a political and military power. In no other part of

the globe is the military balance between major powers evolving as rapidly as in thewestern Pacific theatre. India figures in Chinas defence calculus but not as a toppriority.

The assessment that China is a challenge and not a threat does not mean that wecan afford to ignore Chinas military potential. As we noted earlier, intentions can

change over time. This can happen as a result of major policy changes in a countryor it can be triggered off by a substantial change in the balance of power in its

favour. Defence planning has to take into account not only likely contingencies buteven relatively unlikely ones (barring only the highly improbable category).

Modern China has witnessed several radical changes of domestic and foreign policies,

among which the Cultural Revolution was the most dramatic. At different times,

China has been an ally, and an adversary, of the erstwhile Soviet Union; at war withthe United States of America, and a quasi-ally of the US against the USSR; inconfrontation with both these powers, and on friendly terms with each of them. It is

true that Beijing has followed a more steady and consistent course in the post-Maoperiod, and one may hope that the new collegiate decision-making procedures will

reduce the chances of sudden twists and turns in the future. However, the risk of asudden change of course cannot be totally ruled out. For example, should there be a

breakdown of political stability, Chinas behaviour might become unpredictable.Political chaos in China is an unwelcome prospect not only for the Chinese but also

for their neighbours.

Intentions and policies can also change if there is a shift in the military balance of

such proportions that it provides unprecedented opportunities for a country toachieve its objectives at negligible cost. Natos expansion into eastern Europe

provides a recent example. During the Soviet era, not even the most ardent coldwarrior in Washington could dream of the incorporation into the western alliance of

major east European states, including even the Baltic republics of the former USSR.What was previously an unfeasible objective became easily achievable as a result of

the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Thus, we must ensure that the current gap in the military capabilities of China and

India does not become so wide as to imperil our defence or trigger off a change inChinese policy. The differential must not be allowed to exceed certain limits.

In assessing Chinese capabilities, it would be a mistake to confine our attention

exclusively to the size and equipment of its military forces. The spectacular growth ofChinas civilian infrastructure roads, railways, airports, civil air fleet, and

telecommunications together with the development of agriculture and industry inoutlying regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang, makes it possible for Beijing to rapidly

induct, deploy and maintain much larger force-levels than ever before, at any pointon its borders. The economic infrastructure is, in a sense, a military force multiplier.

Our response to the Chinese challenge has to be shaped accordingly. Development ofthe economic infrastructure, particularly in the North-east, must complement

modernization of our defence forces. Defence and development cannot be placed in

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separate watertight compartments.

In Chinese mythology, the dragon is a benign creature, very different from the fiercepredator of Western fables. Which type of dragon we find across our borders will

depend as much on us as on China. If we measure up to the economic and securitychallenge posed by Chinas rapid rise, we will find that the dragon has Chinese

characteristics.