EVOLUTION, SOCIAL OR CULTURAL?

N 1940 I said in an address that Lewis Morgan in relation to society be- I lieved, not in evolution but in progress, which he conceived as the steady material and moral improvement of mankind from crude stone implements and sexual promiscuity to the steam engines and monogamous marriage of Rochester, N. Y. Professor White (American Anthropologist, Vol. 46, pp. 218, 228-30) objects to this statement. It is clear from the context that the meaning of my statement depended on a distinction between the theory of social evolu- tion and the theory of progress, and also a distinction between social evolution as the evolution of societies, and anything that may be called evolution in language or culture. Professor White does not discuss or even mention these distinctions. He maintains that Morgan was really a social evolutionist. Yet in a later paper (American Anthropologist, Vol. 47, No. 3, p. 339) he refers throughout to cultural evolution, and regards both Morgan and Tylor as adherents to a theory of evolution of culture. While I was concerned with mak- ing distinctions between different kinds of theory Professor White is concerned with the importance of attaching a certain label to Morgan.

The theory of human progress was developed in the eighteenth century and became exceedingly popular in the nineteenth. The idea of progress is the idea of what Hume in The Natural History o j Religion called the improvement of human society, from rude beginnings to a state of greater perfection. The idea of stages of progress was developed by Turgot and Condorcet and the distinc- tion between savagery and barbarism that Morgan used was current in the eighteenth century, for example in Adam Fergusons Essay on the History of Civil Society, of which my edition (the third) is dated 1768. To me it seems that Morgan was continuing and developing, with greatly increased ethno- graphical knowledge, the ideas of these and other writers on progress.

Professor White, as part of his argument, points out that Morgan occasion- ally uses the word evolution. This means nothing. At the end of the eight- eenth century Rivarol, speaking of Montesquieu, said I1 a admirablement saisi les grands phases de 1Cvolution sociale. The two passages of Ancient Society to which Professor White refers have nothing to do with the evolution of societies. They are: The gradual evolution of their (mankinds) mental and moral powers through experience, and Human intelligence, unconscious of design, evolved articulate language.

The theory of organic evolution was expounded by Lamarck in his inau- gural address to a course on zoology on 21 Floreal of year VII I of the Revolu- tion (1800). Ideas which contributed to the formulation, a t a later time, of a theory of the evolution of societies are to be found in the writings of Saint Simon, Comte and others. Such were Saint Simons idea of the coherence of

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RADCLIFFE-BROWN] EVOLUTION, SOCIAL OR CULTURAL? 79

institutions in a social system (already present in Montesquieu), his idea of organic and critical epochs in the history of a society, his idea that the

most salient feature of historical development is the continual extension of the principle of association, from family to city, to nation and super-national church. It would be surprising if none of these ideas had penetrated as far as Morgan, and Professor White shows that some of them had. But they do not suffice to make a general evolutionary theory.

The first explicit formulation of a theory of social evolution, that is, of the evolution of societies, was that of Herbert Spencer. He began with a theory of progress, as may be seen from his Social Statics of 1851. The theory of the evo- lution of societies was formulated in 1860 in his essay on The Social Organism and developed in his Principles of Sociology, the publication of which was be- gun in 1874. The essential points of Spencers theory are as follows:

(1) Social or super-organic evolution is a continuation of organic evolu- tion.

While recognizing the fact that the joint actions of parents in fostering their young foreshadow processes of a class beyond the simply organic; and while recognizing the fact that some of the products of these joint actions, such as nests, must be taken as foreshadowing products of the super-organic class; we may fitly regard Super-organic Evolution as commencing only when there arises something more than the combined efforts of parents. There can of course be no absolute separation. Tf there has been Evolution, that form of it here distinguished as super-organic must have arisen by insensible steps out of the organic. But we may conveniently mark it off as including all those processes and products which imply the co-ordinated actions of many indi- viduals-co-ordinated actions which achieve results exceeding in extent and complexity those achievable by individual actions. (p. 4)

(2) The essential characteristics of human social evolution are the growth of social aggregation (p. 481) and the advance of organization. (pp. 493, 504)

(3) The factors of social evolution in mankind are (a) extrinsic factors- the physical environment in the widest sense; (b) intrinsic factors-the bic- logically inherited human characteristics; (c) secondary or derived factors:- (i) progressive modification of the environment, inorganic and organic, which the actions of societies effect; (ii) the increasing size of the social aggregate, accompanied, generally, by increasing density; (iii) the reciprocal influence of the society and its units, the influence of the whole on the parts and the parts

l The term super-organic seems to have been misunderstood by Dr. Bidney (American Anthropolopist, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 293) or at least to be misused when he writes of the superor- ganicist view of the complete autonomy of the cultural process. The social life of my hive of bees is an example of Spencers super-organic. Would Dr. Bidney hold that the Spencerian concept of super-organic implies that my bees have a culture and that this culture or the process by which it has been developed in the course of evolution is completely autonomous?

* Quotations are from Priiuiples of Sociology, Vol. I, Appleton, New York, 1882.

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AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST [N. s.; 49, 1947 80

on the whole, actions and reactions between the society and each member of it; (iv) a further derivative factor of extreme importance-the action and reaction between a society and neighbouring societies; (v) that accumula- tion of super-organic products which we commonly distinguish as artificial but which, philosophically considered, are no less natural than others resulting from evolution-material appliances, language, knowledge, customs and laws, mythologies, theologies, cosmogonies, and the products we call aesthetic.

The accumulation of super-organic products of Spencers theoretical formulation is what is now meant by culture in one of its uses by anthro- pologists. He makes a distinction between the structures and functions which make up the organization and life of each society and certain associated developments which aid, and are aided by, social evolution-the develop- ments of language, knowledge, morals, aesthetics.

Back a t the beginning of the century I accepted the theory of social evolu- tion as a useful working hypothesis. In 1931, when I spoke of social evolution in my lectures in Chicago, one of the students pointed out to me that Boas and Lowie have proved that there is no such thing as social evolution. I found that this was a generally accepted view in the United States. But to my mind the arguments of Boas, Lowie, and other anti-[cultural]-evolutionists have no bearing a t all on the theory of social evolution. I n these circumstances it seems worth while to indicate a few of the points that should be considered in dealing with the theory as it stands a t present.

(1) An evolutionary process is essentially a combination of accident and law. An accident is a happening that cannot be foreseen or foretold (unless by supernatural means of divination).8 But a knowledge of natural laws enables us sometimes to foresee the results of an accident. A man may by accident fall from the top of a sky-scraper. A knowledge of natural law enables us to foresee that as a result his death is a t least highly probable.

From this it follows that an evolutionary process cannot be foreseen and cannot be entirely ex$Zained by law. The most complete knowledge of biolog- ical laws that could ever be obtained would not enable us to foresee that from the original five-toed ancestor of the horse there would be evolved the English race-horse and the English cart-horse of today. The most complete knowledge of laws of social change would not enable us to foretell what kind of social system will be found in Chicago two hundred years hence.

(2) The idea of progress is that of improvement, the betterment of human life. The idea of evolution is a neutral scientific concept and does not imply movement in a desirable direction.

(3) Social evolution, like organic evolution, is conceived as being essen-

(pp. 11-14)

a Of course an accident is caused in the sense in which causes are talked about in history or in a court of law.

RADCLIFFE-BROWN] EVOLUTION, SOCIAL OR CULTURAL? 81

tially a process of diversification. By it new and different forms of societies are produced. The evolutionist is interested in studying the processes of the diver- sification of societies. It is, I hope, evident that they cannot be explained by the diffusion of culture.

(4) Although the theory is that in human life taken as a whole there has been a process of evolution, it is recognized that what Spencer called retro- gression frequently occurs in particular instances (Spencer, o p . cit. p. 106).

( 5 ) For the theory of social evolution the processes called diffusion of culture or acculturation are only parts or aspects of what Spencer called a ifactor of extreme importance in social evolution, the action and reaction between a society and other societies with which it is, or comes to be, in contact or communication. I found many students and anthropologists in America who had been so thoroughly indoctrinated with the idea that the fact of the diffusion of culture refutes any theory of social evolution that i t was impossible or useless to discuss the subject. By some the authority (or the supposed auth- ority) of Boas in this matter was taken as final.

For the study of social evolution, what is a t least equally important with the diffusion of culture is the formation of new societies by migrations, conquests, etc., as for example the formation of the Roman Empire or of the United States of America. Acculturation is the result of a developing social process of increas- ing contacts and interactions.

(6 ) Spencers theory was that developments and changes in what is now called culture, in what he called the accumulation of super-organic products, are associated and connected with the process of social evolution. The nature of these associations and connections is a subject for study, which should fol- low on or a t least be accompanied by the study of social evolution. Here is Spencer again:

After these structures and functions which make up the organization and life of each society, have to be treated certain associated developments which aid, and are aided by, social evolution-the developments of language, knowledge, morals, aesthe- tics. . . . But now before trying to explain these most involved phenomena, we must learn by inspecting them the actual relations of co-existence and sequence in which they stand to one another. By comparing societies of different kinds, and societies in different stages, we must: ascertain what traits of size, structure, function, etc. are habitually associated. (pp. 460, 462)

Thus religion (or ritual and belief) can be regarded as a part of culture as that word is now used, or as a super-organic product. It has been one of my aims as an evolutionist to try to discover the interconnections between religion and the structure or constitution of societies, as in a recently published lecturc on Religion and Society.

The social anthropologist or the student of social evolution is engaged on the study of societies. Dr. Meggers (American Anthropologist, Vol. 48, No. 2,

82 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST [N. s., 49, 1947

p. 196), while admitting that the study of societies is not valueless,! asks why this should be done by anthropologists. She suggests that societies all over the world should be left to be studied by sociologists (by which I presume she means those who study or teach the subject called sociology in American colleges and universities), and that anthropologists should devote themselves entirely to a systematic study of culture as such. She thus exemplifies a very marked trend in American ethnology which she has not mentioned in her paper, the tendency to regard culture as something sui generis which is to be studied independently rather than as part of the study of human society. Some of the trends she does mention are reactions against this tendency.

This brings us to the crux of the argument. There is a study of human societies which seeks to apply to its subject-matter the methods of investiga- tion and reasoning of the natural sciences. It therefore proceeds by the system- atic comparative study of many diverse societies, with particular attention to those called primitive. Within this study there is place for a theory of social evolution. Religions, laws, arts, etc., and their developments and changes are considered in relation to societies, their constitution and their evolution. This study is called sociology by Spencer and by Durkheim. It is not what is com- monly called sociology in England or in the United States. In the British Isles it is called social anthropology and is a subject of study in several universi- ties, with professors of social anthropology a t Oxford and Cambridge. To carry on their work the social anthropologists make field studies of societies in Australia, Melanesia, Africa, etc. Dr. Meggers thinks we ought not to be called anthropologists.

In England we have recognized for a hundred years another kind of study which we call ethnology. By etymology it means the study of peoples, and peoples differ from or resemble one another in racial characters, in language and in culture. The Oxford Dictionary defines ethnology as the science which treats of races and peoples, their relations, their distinctive characteristics, etc. It is by its nature a geographical and historical study.

There is a third kind of study now recognized in America, spoken of as the science that deals with culture. It is therefore different from the study of socie- ties or the historical study of peoples. This study is sometimes called cultural anthropology, and Professor White offers us the name culturology or cul- turological science. It seems evident that a science of culture, as something separate and distinct from a science of society, has no concern with theories of social evolution. But Professor White thinks it ought to have a theory of the evolution of culture. We need an outline of the evolution of culture in its entirety. (American Anthropologist, Vol. 48, p. 90)

A science of culture is not the same thing as a science of societies. (Kroeber has said this.) A theory of the evolution of culture cannot be the same thing as a theory of social evolution. A theory of social evolution is not the same thing

as a theory of (or a belief in) progress. I expressed the opinion that what Mor- gan was writing about was human progress. Professor White says that he was really writing about the evolution of culture and the evolution of societies. I have no wish to argue about the label to be attached to Morgan. But I think Professor White might have given some consideration to the meaning of my statement in the context within which it was uttered.

ALL SOULS COLLEGE OXFORD, ENGLAND