Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

The Facts

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree

of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.

x x x x

Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was

consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12

In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendants prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding

itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a persons legal capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Nial v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48

I.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of

nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public

consequence such as birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage.71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouses right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the

personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

III.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry

may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry

under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminatedthe foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1wphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction

of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 142971 May 7, 2002

THE CITY OF CEBU, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES APOLONIO and BLASA DEDAMO, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

In its petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner City of Cebu assails the decision of 11 October 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. CV No. 592041 affirming the judgment of 7 May 1996 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-14632, a case for eminent domain, which fixed the valuation of the land subject thereof on the basis of the recommendation of the commissioners appointed by it.

The material operation facts are not disputed.

On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed in Civil Case No. CEB-14632 a complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner alleged therein that it needed the following parcels of land of respondents, to wit:

Lot No. 1527

Area------------------------------------------------ 1,146 square meters

Tax Declaration----------------------------------

03472

Title No. ------------------------------------------ 31833

Market value-------------------------------------

P240,660.00

Assessed Value---------------------------------- P72,200.00

Lot No. 1528

Area------------------------------------------------ 793 square meters

Area sought to be expropriated ----------------

478 square meters

Tax Declaration -----------------------------------

03450

Title No. --------------------------------------------

31832

Market value for the whole lot ------------------

P1,666,530.00

Market value of the Area to be expropriated --

P100,380.00

Assessed Value ------------------------------------

P49,960.00

for a public purpose, i.e., for the construction of a public road which shall serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City. The lots are the most suitable site for the purpose. The total area sought to be expropriated is 1,624 square meters with an assessed value of P1,786.400. Petitioner deposited with the Philippine National Bank the amount of P51,156 representing 15% of the fair market value of the property to enable the petitioner to take immediate possession of the property pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160.2

Respondents, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because the purpose for which their property was to be expropriated was not for a public purpose but for benefit of a single private entity, the Cebu Holdings, Inc. Petitioner could simply buy directly from them the property at its fair market value if it wanted to, just like what it did with the neighboring lots. Besides, the price offered was very low in light of the consideration of P20,000 per square meter, more or less, which petitioner paid to the neighboring lots. Finally, respondents alleged that they have no other land in Cebu City.

A pre-trial was thereafter had.

On 23 August 1994, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. The motion was granted by the trial court on 21 September 1994.3

On 14 December 1994, the parties executed and submitted to the trial court an Agreement4 wherein they declared that they have partially settled the case and in consideration thereof they agreed:

1. That the SECOND PARTY hereby conforms to the intention to [sic] the FIRST PARTY in expropriating their parcels of land in the above-cited case as for public purpose and for the benefit of the general public;

2. That the SECOND PARTY agrees to part with the ownership of the subject parcels of land in favor of the FIRST PARTY provided the latter will pay just compensation for the same in the amount determined by the court after due notice and hearing;

3. That in the meantime the SECOND PARTY agrees to receive the amount of ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (1,786,400.00) as provisional payment for the subject parcels of land, without prejudice to the final valuation as maybe determined by the court;

4. That the FIRST PARTY in the light of the issuance of the Writ of Possession Order dated September 21, 1994 issued by the Honorable Court, agreed to take possession over that portion of the lot sought to be expropriated where the house of the SECOND PARTY was located only after fifteen (15) days upon the receipt of the SECOND PARTY of the amount of P1,786,400.00;

5. That the SECOND PARTY upon receipt of the aforesaid provisional amount, shall turn over to the FIRST PARTY the title of the lot and within the lapse of the fifteen (15) days grace period will voluntarily demolish their house and the other structure that may be located thereon at their own expense;

6. That the FIRST PARTY and the SECOND PARTY jointly petition the Honorable Court to render judgment in said Civil Case No. CEB-14632 in accordance with this AGREEMENT;

7. That the judgment sought to be rendered under this agreement shall be followed by a supplemental judgment fixing the just compensation for the property of the SECOND PARTY after the Commissioners appointed by this Honorable Court to determine the same shall have rendered their report and approved by the court.

Pursuant to said agreement, the trial court appointed three commissioners to determine the just compensation of the lots sought to be expropriated. The commissioners were Palermo M. Lugo, who was nominated by petitioner and who was designated as Chairman; Alfredo Cisneros, who was nominated by respondents; and Herbert E. Buot, who was designated by the trial court. The parties agreed to their appointment.

Thereafter, the commissioners submitted their report, which contained their respective assessments of and recommendation as to the valuation of the property.1wphi1.nt

On the basis of the commissioners' report and after due deliberation thereon, the trial court rendered its decision on 7 May 1996,5 the decretal portion o which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in accordance with the report of the commissioners.

Plaintiff is directed to pay Spouses Apolonio S. Dedamo and Blasa Dedamo the sum of pesos: TWENTY FOUR MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED SIXTY-FIVE THOUSAND AND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY (P24,865.930.00) representing the compensation mentioned in the Complaint.

Plaintiff and defendants are directed to pay the following commissioner's fee;

1. To Palermo Lugo - P21,000.00

2. To Herbert Buot - P19,000.00

3. To Alfredo Cisneros - P19,000.00

Without pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the commissioners' report was inaccurate since it included an area which was not subject to expropriation. More specifically, it contended that Lot No. 1528 contains 793 square meters but the actual area to be expropriated is only 478 square meters. The remaining 315 square meters is the subject of a separate expropriation proceeding in Civil Case No. CEB-8348, then pending before Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.

On 16 August 1996, the commissioners submitted an amended assessment for the 478 square meters of Lot No. 1528 and fixed it at P12,824.10 per square meter, or in the amount of P20,826,339.50. The assessment was approved as the just compensation thereof by the trial court in its Order of 27 December 1996.6 Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the decision was amended to reflect the new valuation.

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 59204. Petitioner alleged that the lower court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. The just compensation should be based on the prevailing market price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.

The petitioner did not convince the Court of Appeals. In its decision of 11 October 1999,7 the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

Still unsatisfied, petitioner filed with us the petition for review in the case at bar. It raises the sole issue of whether just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. It asserts that it should be, which in this case should be 17 September 1993 and not at the time the property was actually taken in 1994, pursuant to the decision in "National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals."8

In their Comment, respondents maintain that the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the decision of the trial court because (1) the trial court decided the case on the basis of the agreement of the parties that just compensation shall be fixed by commissioners appointed by the court; (2) petitioner did not interpose any serious objection to the commissioners' report of 12 August 1996 fixing the just compensation of the 1,624-square meter lot at P20,826,339.50; hence, it was estopped from attacking the report on which the decision was based; and (3) the determined just compensation fixed is even lower than the actual value of the property at the time of the actual taking in 1994.

Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is the Government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose.9 However, the Government must pay the owner thereof just compensation as consideration therefor.

In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for the determination of just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking. The Section reads as follows:

SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted:Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals.10 We did not categorically rule in that case that just compensation should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. We explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings."

Also, the trial court followed the then governing procedural law on the matter, which was Section 5 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which provided as follows:

SEC. 5. Ascertainment of compensation. Upon the entry of the order of condemnation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within which their report is to be filed with the court.

More than anything else, the parties, by a solemn document freely and voluntarily agreed upon by them, agreed to be bound by the report of the commission and approved by the trial court. The agreement is a contract between the parties. It has the force of law between them and

should be complied with in good faith. Article 1159 and 1315 of the Civil Code explicitly provides:

Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.

Art. 1315. Contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that moment the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.

Furthermore, during the hearing on 22 November 1996, petitioner did not interpose a serious objection.11 It is therefore too late for petitioner to question the valuation now without violating the principle of equitable estoppel. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.12 Records show that petitioner consented to conform with the valuation recommended by the commissioners. It cannot detract from its agreement now and assail correctness of the commissioners' assessment.1wphi1.nt

Finally, while Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that just compensation shall be determined at the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation,13 such law cannot prevail over R.A. 7160, which is a substantive law.14

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed judgment on the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59204, the petition in this case is hereby DENIED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 203241 July 10, 2013

RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, PETITIONER, vs. FEDERICO A. SERRA, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order assails the 16 February 20122 and 26 July 20123 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 (RTC Makati).

The Facts

Respondent Federico A. Serra (Serra) is the owner of a 374 square meter parcel of land located along Quezon Street, Masbate, Masbate. On 20 May 1975, Serra and petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy, wherein Serra agreed to lease his land to RCBC for 25 years. Serra further granted RCBC the option to buy the land and improvement (property) within 10 years from the signing of the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy.

On 4 September 1984, RCBC informed Serra of its decision to exercise its option to buy the property. However, Serra replied that he was no longer interested in selling the property. On 14 March 1985, RCBC filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against Serra (Specific Performance case) in the RTC Makati. The RTC Makati initially dismissed the complaint. However, in an Order dated 5 January 1989, the RTC Makati reversed itself and ordered Serra to execute and deliver the proper deed of sale in favor of RCBC.4

Serra appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On 18 May 1989, Serra donated the property to his mother, Leonida Ablao (Ablao). On 20 April 1992, Ablao sold the property to Hermanito Liok (Liok). A new land title was issued in favor of Liok. Thus, RCBC filed a Complaint for Nullification

of Deed of Donation and Deed of Sale with Reconveyance and Damages against Liok, Ablao and Serra (Annulment case) before the RTC of Masbate City (RTC Masbate).

Meanwhile, the CA, and later the Supreme Court, affirmed the order of the RTC Makati in the Specific Performance case. In a Decision dated 4 January 1994, this Court declared that the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy was valid, effective, and enforceable. On 15 April 1994, the decision in the Specific Performance case became final and executory upon entry of judgment.5

On 22 October 2001, the RTC Masbate ruled in favor of RCBC, declaring the donation in favor of Ablao and the subsequent sale to Liok null and void.6 In a Decision dated 28 September 2007, the CA affirmed the RTC Masbate decision. The CA held that the donation to Ablao was simulated and was done solely to evade Serras obligation to RCBC. Since Ablao had no right to transfer the property and Liok was not a buyer in good faith, the subsequent sale to Liok was likewise null and void.

Thus, Liok filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 182478, while Serra and Ablao filed a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 182664, before this Court. In separate Resolutions dated 30 June 2008 and 22 October 2008, which became final and executory on 27 August 20087 and 3 March 2009,8 respectively, this Court found neither reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion on the CAs part.

On 25 August 2011, RCBC moved for the execution of the decision in the Specific Performance case. RCBC alleged that it was legally impossible to ask for the execution of the decision prior to the annulment of the fraudulent transfers made by Serra. Thus, the period to execute by motion was suspended during the pendency of the Annulment case. On 22 September 2011, Serra filed his comment and opposition to the motion. Serra insisted that the motion for execution was already barred by prescription and laches, and that RCBC was at fault for failing to register as lien in the original title the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy.

In an Order dated 16 February 2012, the RTC Makati denied RCBCs motion for execution. The RTC Makati opined that "[RCBC] should have asked for the execution of the deed of sale and have the same registered with the Registry of Deeds, so that even if [Serra] sold or transferred the subject property to any person the principle of caveat emptor would set in."9

In an Order dated 26 July 2012, the RTC Makati denied RCBCs motion for reconsideration. Thus, RCBC filed this petition.

In a Resolution dated 3 December 2012, this Court granted RCBCs Temporary Restraining Order against the implementation of the questioned Orders upon RCBCs filing of a bond.

The Issue

RCBC raises this sole issue for resolution:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER RCBC IS BARRED FROM HAVING ITS 05 JANUARY 1989 DECISION EXECUTED THROUGH MOTION, CONSIDERING THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OBTAINING IN THIS CASE, RCBC WAS UNLAWFULLY PREVENTED BY THE RESPONDENT FROM ENFORCING THE SAID DECISION.10

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has merit.

The Rules of Court provide that a final and executory judgment may be executed by motion within five years from the date of its entry or by an action after the lapse of five years and before prescription sets in.11 This Court, however, allows exceptions when execution may be made by motion even after the lapse of five years. These exceptions have one common denominator: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment obligor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.12

In Camacho v. Court of Appeals,13 we held that where the delays were occasioned by the judgment debtors own initiatives and for her advantage as well as beyond the judgment creditors control, the five-year period allowed for enforcement of the judgment by motion is deemed to have been effectively interrupted or suspended.

In the present case, there is no dispute that RCBC seeks to enforce the decision which became final and executory on 15 April 1994. This decision orders Serra to execute and deliver the proper deed of sale in favor of RCBC. However, to evade his obligation to RCBC, Serra transferred the property to his mother Ablao, who then transferred it to Liok. Serras action prompted RCBC to file the Annulment case. Clearly, the delay in the execution of the decision was caused by Serra for his own advantage. Thus, the pendency of the Annulment case effectively suspended the five-year period to enforce through a motion the decision in the Specific Performance case. Since the decision in the Annulment case attained finality on 3 March 2009 and RCBCs motion for execution was filed on 25 August 2011, RCBCs motion is deemed filed within the five-year period for enforcement of a decision through a motion.

This Court has reiterated that the purpose of prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments is to prevent parties from sleeping on their rights.14 Far from sleeping on its rights, RCBC has pursued persistently its action against Serra in accordance with law. On the other hand, Serra has continued to evade his obligation by raising issues of technicality. While strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice.15

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City dated 16 February 2012 and 26 July 2012. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 3 December 2012 is made permanent. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City is DIRECTED to issue the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 10054 for the enforcement of the decision therein. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Perez, Mendoza,* and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 198680 July 8, 2013

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEALOSA, PETITIONERS, vs. GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.

R E S O L U T I O N

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 59 (RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising a pure question of law. In particular, petitioners assail the July 27, 20112 and August 31, 20113 Orders of the RTC, dismissing Civil Case No. T-2246 for lack of cause of action.

The Facts

On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins,4 filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdalenos collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.8

In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport.9 Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is

not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdalenos lawful heirs.10

The RTC Ruling

On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order,11 finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration,12 this did not mean that they could already be considered as the decedents compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdalenos son and hence, his compulsory heir through the documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport.13

The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on August 31, 2011 due to the counsels failure to state the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was issued.14

Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246,15 sought direct recourse to the Court through the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTCs dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.16 It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.19

As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latters favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if

admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedents lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are the decedents lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property.1wphi1 This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon,23 or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.24

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it.25 Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudiosos heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 is hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any subsequent proceeding to determine the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights concomitant therewith.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez, and Mendoza,* JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004

MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner, vs. RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 which dismissed the petitioners petition under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to annul the Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15 in Special Proceedings No. NC-662 nullifying the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent Rodolfo S. Ancheta, and of the resolution of the appellate court denying the motion for reconsideration of the said resolution.

This case arose from the following facts:

After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the respondent resided in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. They had eight children during their coverture, whose names and dates of births are as follows:

a. ANA MARIE B . ANCHETA born October 6, 1959

b. RODOLFO B. ANCHETA, JR. born March 7, 1961

c. VENANCIO MARIANO B. ANCHETA born May 18, 1962

d. GERARDO B. ANCHETA born April 8, 1963

e. KATHRINA B. ANCHETA born October 29, 1965

f. ANTONIO B. ANCHETA born March 6, 1967

g. NATASHA MARTINA B. ANCHETA - born August 2, 1968

h. FRITZIE YOLANDA B. ANCHETA born November 19, 19703

On December 6, 1992, the respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned the petitioner and their children. On January 25, 1994, petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 40, against the respondent for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and judicial separation of property with a plea for support and support pendente lite. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-3735. At that time, the petitioner was renting a house at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila.4

On April 20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement5 where some of the conjugal properties were adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children, including the following:

b. A parcel of land (adjoining the two lots covered by TCT Nos. 120082 and TCT No. 120083-Cavite) located at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, registered in the name of the family Ancheta. Biofood Corporation under TCT No. 310882, together with the resort Munting Paraiso, Training Center, four-storey building, pavilion, swimming pool and all improvements. All of the shares of stocks of Ancheta Biofoods Corporation were distributed one-third (1/3) to the petitioner and the eight children one-twelfth (1/12) each.6

The court rendered judgment based on the said compromise agreement. Conformably thereto, the respondent vacated, on June 1, 1994, the resort Munting Paraiso and all the buildings and improvements thereon. The petitioner, with the knowledge of the respondent, thenceforth resided in the said property.

In the meantime, the respondent intended to marry again. On June 5, 1995, he filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-662. Although the respondent knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort Munting Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila, "where she may be served with summons."7 The clerk of court issued summons to the petitioner at the address stated in the petition.8 The sheriff served the summons and a copy of the petition by substituted service on June 6, 1995 on the petitioners son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.9

On June 21, 1995, Sheriff Jose R. Salvadora, Jr. submitted a Return of Service to the court stating that the summons and a copy of the petition were served on the petitioner through her son Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III on June 6, 1995:

RETURN OF SERVICE

This is to certify that the summons together with the copy of the complaint and its annexes was received by the herein defendant thru his son Venancio M.B. Ancheta [III] as evidenced by the signature appearing on the summons. Service was made on June 6, 1995.

June 21, 1995, Naic, Cavite.

(Sgd.) JOSE R. SALVADORA, JR. Sheriff10

The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. On June 22, 1995, the respondent filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendant as in Default" setting it for hearing on June 27, 1995 at 8:30 a.m. During the hearing on the said date, there was no appearance for the petitioner. The public prosecutor appeared for the State and offered no objection to the motion of the respondent who appeared with counsel. The trial court granted the motion and declared the petitioner in default, and allowed the respondent to adduce evidence ex-parte. The respondent testified in his behalf and adduced documentary evidence. On July 7, 1995, the trial court issued an Order granting the petition and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio.11 The clerk of court issued a Certificate of Finality of the Order of the court on July 16, 1996.12

On February 14, 1998, Valentines Day, the respondent and Teresita H. Rodil were married in civil rights before the municipal mayor of Indang, Cavite.13

On July 7, 2000, the petitioner filed a verified petition against the respondent with the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the annulment of the order of the RTC of Cavite in Special Proceedings No. NC-662. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.

59550. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondent committed gross misrepresentations by making it appear in his petition in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 that she was a resident of No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila, when in truth and in fact, the respondent knew very well that she was residing at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. According to the petitioner, the respondent did so to deprive her of her right to be heard in the said case, and ultimately secure a favorable judgment without any opposition thereto. The petitioner also alleged that the respondent caused the service of the petition and summons on her by substituted service through her married son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, a resident of Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, where the respondent was a resident. Furthermore, Venancio M.B. Ancheta III failed to deliver to her the copy of the petition and summons. Thus, according to the petitioner, the order of the trial court in favor of the respondent was null and void (1) for lack of jurisdiction over her person; and (2) due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the respondent. She further contended that there was no factual basis for the trial courts finding that she was suffering from psychological incapacity. Finally, the petitioner averred that she learned of the Order of the RTC only on January 11, 2000. Appended to the petition, inter alia, were the affidavits of the petitioner and of Venancio M.B. Ancheta III.

The petitioner prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor, thus:

WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays this Honorable Court to render Judgment granting the Petition.

1. Declaring null and void the Order dated June 7, 1995 (of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Naic, Cavite).

2. Ordering respondent to pay petitioner

a. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;

b. P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;

c. P200,000.00 as attorneys fees plus P7,500.00 per diem for every hearing;

d. P100,000.00 as litigation expenses;

e. Costs of suit.14

On July 13, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition on the following ground:

We cannot give due course to the present petition in default or in the absence of any clear and specific averment by petitioner that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner. Neither is there any averment or allegation that the present petition is based only on the

grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Nor yet that, on the assumption that extrinsic fraud can be a valid ground therefor, that it was not availed of, or could not have been availed of, in a motion for new trial, or petition for relief.15

The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said resolution, appending thereto an amended petition in which she alleged, inter alia, that:

4. This petition is based purely on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

5. This petition has not prescribed; it was filed within the four-year period after discovery of the extrinsic fraud.

6. The ground of extrinsic fraud has not been availed of, or could not have been availed of in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.

7. The ground of lack of jurisdiction is not barred by laches and/or estoppel.

8. The ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies were no longer available through no fault of petitioner; neither has she ever availed of the said remedies. This petition is the only available remedy to her.16

The petitioner also alleged therein that the order of the trial court nullifying her and the respondents marriage was null and void for the court a quos failure to order the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether there was collusion between the parties, and to order the Solicitor General to appear for the State.

On September 27, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying the said motion.

The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court alleging that the CA erred as follows:

1. In failing to take into consideration the kind of Order which was sought to be annulled.

2. In finding that the Petition was procedurally flawed.

3. In not finding that the Petition substantially complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court.

4. In failing to comply with Section 5, Rule 47, Rules of Court.

5. In not even considering/resolving Petitioners Motion to Admit the Amended Petition; and in not admitting the Amended Petition.

6. In failing to apply the Rules of Procedure with liberality.17

The petition is meritorious.

An original action in the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to annul a judgment or final order or resolution in civil actions of the RTC may be based on two grounds: (a) extrinsic fraud; or (b) lack of jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic fraud, the remedy is subject to a condition precedent, namely, the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.18 The petitioner must allege in the petition that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court are no longer available through no fault of hers; otherwise, the petition will be dismissed. If the petitioner fails to avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or relief from judgment through her own fault or negligence before filing her petition with the Court of Appeals, she cannot resort to the remedy under Rule 47 of the Rules; otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or negligence.19

It is not enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies were no longer available through no fault of her own. The petitioner must also explain and justify her failure to avail of such remedies. The safeguard was incorporated in the rule precisely to avoid abuse of the remedy.20 Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must be limits thereto. Once a litigants rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to sue anew. The prevailing party should not be vexed by subsequent suits.21

In this case, the petitioner failed to allege in her petition in the CA that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, and petition for relief, were no longer available through no fault of her own. She merely alleged therein that she received the assailed order of the trial court on January 11, 2000. The petitioners amended petition did not cure the fatal defect in her original petition, because although she admitted therein that she did not avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or petition for relief from judgment, she did not explain why she failed to do so.

We, however, rule that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the original petition and denying admission of the amended petition. This is so because apparently, the Court of Appeals failed to take note from the material allegations of the petition, that the petition was based not only on extrinsic fraud but also on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, on her claim that the summons and the copy of the complaint in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 were not served on her. While the original petition and amended petition did not state a cause of action for the nullification of the assailed order on the ground of extrinsic fraud, we rule, however, that it states a sufficient cause of action for the nullification of the assailed order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the person of the petitioner, notwithstanding the absence of any allegation therein that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration, or appeal are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.

In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked,22 unless barred by laches.23

In this case, the original petition and the amended petition in the Court of Appeals, in light of the material averments therein, were based not only on extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of the petitioner because of the failure of the sheriff to serve on her the summons and a copy of the complaint. She claimed that the summons and complaint were served on her son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, who, however, failed to give her the said summons and complaint.

Even a cursory reading of the material averments of the original petition and its annexes will show that it is, prima facie meritorious; hence, it should have been given due course by the Court of Appeals.

In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon,24 we held that jurisdiction is acquired by a trial court over the person of the defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. The service of summons and the complaint on the defendant is to inform him that a case has been filed against him and, thus, enable him to defend himself. He is, thus, put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner. Without such service in the absence of a valid waiver renders the judgment of the court null and void.25 Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the court on the person of the defendant even if he knows of the case against him unless he is validly served with summons.26

Summons and complaint may be served on the defendant either by handing a copy thereof to him in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to her.27 However, if there is impossibility of prompt service of the summons personally on the defendant despite diligent efforts to find him, service of the summons may be effected by substituted service as provided in Section 7, Rule 14 of the said Rules:

SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies of defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.28

In Miranda v. Court of Appeals,29 we held that the modes of service should be strictly followed in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Thus, it is

only when a defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that substituted service may be made by stating the efforts made to find him and personally serve on him the summons and complaint and the fact that such effort failed.30 This statement should be made in the proof of service to be accomplished and filed in court by the sheriff. This is necessary because substituted service is a derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that substituted service of summons is a method extraordinary in character; hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances categorized by statutes.31

As gleaned from the petition and the amended petition in the CA and the annexes thereof, the summons in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 was issued on June 6, 1995.32 On the same day, the summons was served on and received by Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III,33 the petitioners son. When the return of summons was submitted to the court by the sheriff on June 21, 1995, no statement was made on the impossibility of locating the defendant therein within a reasonable time, or that any effort was made by the sheriff to locate the defendant. There was no mention therein that Venancio Mariano Ancheta III was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, where the petitioner (defendant therein) was allegedly residing. It turned out that Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III had been residing at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, and that his father merely showed him the summons and the complaint and was made to affix his signature on the face of the summons; he was not furnished with a copy of the said summons and complaint.

4. From the time my father started staying at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, I have been residing on the adjoining land consisting of two (2) lots later apportioned to my father as his share of the conjugal partnership. Since then, I have been residing therein up to the present.

5. On June 6, 1995, at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite (at my residence situated on my fathers lot), my father came to see me and then asked me to sign and I did sign papers which he (my father) and the Sheriff did not allow me to read. Apparently, these papers are for the Summons to my mother in the case for annulment of marriage filed by my father against her. I was not given any copy of the Summons and/or copy of the complaint/petition.34

We, thus, rule that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in dismissing the original petition of the petitioner and the amended petition for annulment of the assailed order grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

The action in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court does not involve the merits of the final order of the trial court. However, we cannot but express alarm at what transpired in the court a quo as shown by the records. The records show that for the petitioners failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court granted the motion of the respondent herein to declare her in default. The public prosecutor condoned the acts of the trial court when he interposed no objection to the motion of the respondent. The trial court forthwith received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of

protest from the public prosecutor. The actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family Code, which reads:

Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.35

The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides:

Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation. If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion bet