quotation marks: demonstratives or demonstrations?

HOW INNOCENT IS MEREOLOGY? 13 I

account a priori, we might prefer it, is that it avoids the counter-intuitive thesis that there are regions to which no volume (not even zero or infinity) can be assigned.6

University of New England Armidale, NSW 2352, Australia

p [email protected]

References Armstrong, D. M. 1978. A Theory of Universals: Universals and Scientific Realism

Baxter, D. L. M. 1988. Identity in the loose and popular sense. Mind 97: 575-82. Forrest, P. 1996. From ontology to topology in the theory of regions. The Monist 79. Lewis, D. 1991. Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell. Mortensen, C. and G. Nerlich.1978. Physical topology. Journal of Philosophical Logic

Roeper, P. 1996. Region-based topology. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25. Tarski, A. 1956. Logic, Semantics a d Metamathematics: Papers from 1927 to 1938,

Whitehead, A. N. 1919. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles ofNatura1 Knowledge.

Volume 11. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

7 : 209-23.

trans. J. H. Woodger. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Many thanks to Peter Smith for some most useful comments.

Quotation marks: demonstratives or demonstrations? MARGA REIMER

1. Davidson’s demonstrative theory of quotation The publication of Donald Davidson’s 1979 paper ‘Quotation’ revolution- ized the way philosophers of language thought about quotation. Indeed, since the publication of that paper, much of the philosophical literature on quotation has been concerned largely with Davidson’s views on the matter.

The bulk of Davidson’s paper is concerned with undermining the then- current accounts of quotation. After arguing that none of these accounts

1 See, for example, Goldstein 1984, 1985; Buckner 1984, 1985; Van Brackel 1985; Richard 1986; Bennett 1988; Washington 1992; and Garcia-Carpintero 1994.

ANALYSIS 56.3, July 1996, pp. 131-141. 0 Marga Reirner

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will do, Davidson presents his own demonstrative account of the phenomenon, according to which,

the inscription inside [the quotation marks] does not refer to anything at all, nor is it part of any expression that does. Rather it is the quotation marks that do all the referring, and they help refer to a shape by pointing to something that has it. On the demonstrative theory, neither the quotation as a whole (quotes plus filling) nor the filling alone is, except by accident, a singular term. The singular term is the quotation marks ...( Davidson 1984: 90)

Thus, according to Davidson’s demonstrative account of quotation, in the following sentence:

(1) ‘Cat’ has three letters the quotation marks that embed the token expression ‘cat’ constitute a demonstrative expression that refers to a particular shape by pointing to something that has that shape, viz., the quotationally embedded token.

The novelty of Davidson’s view of quotation is evident when it is contrasted with the various views (criticized at length by Davidson) that predate it. There are three such views, which may be called the proper name theory, the identity theory, and the spelling theory. According to the proper name theory, which has been advocated by both Tarski (1956) and Quine (1961), it is the quotation as a whole (quotes plus filling) that does the referring, and it refers to the linguistic type, a token of which is embedded in the quotation marks. It is called the ‘proper name’ theory because, as Davidson (1984: 81-82) notes, the letters and spaces in the quoted material are viewed as mere accidents in the spelling of a longer word (viz., the quotation as a whole). Such letters and spaces are thus regarded as meaningless in isolation. A quotation mark name is therefore construed, as Tarski (1956) points out, as semantically on par with the proper name of a person. On any such view, the referring expression in (1) is the quotation as a whole, and what gets referred to is the linguistic type of which the embedded token is a token.

According to the identity theory, which was first put forth by Frege (1 892), quotationally embedded expressions refer to themselves. The role of quotation marks is to indicate how one is to interpret the expression within. The quotation marks constitute a linguistic environment within which expressions do something special: they refer to themselves. The theory is appropriately termed the ‘identity’ theory, as the reference of the quotationally embedded expression is claimed to be determined by the relation of identity. According to any such view, the referring expression in (1) is the quotationally embedded expression, and what gets referred to is that same expression.

’

QUOTATION MARKS: DEMONSTRATIVES OR DEMONSTRATIONS? I 3 3

Finally, according to the spelling theory, the referring expression is the quotation as a whole, and is to be analysed as a definite description. On one version of this theory, discussed by both Tarski (1956) and Quine (1961), quotations are analysed as collapsed descriptions, which describe expressions by their spelling. On such a view, the referring expression in (1) is the quotation as a whole, and is to be analysed as (roughly): the expression obtained by writing ‘c’ followed by ‘a’ followed by ‘t’. What gets referred to on such a view is thus a series of letters.

Davidson’s demonstrative theory of quotation has, over the years, received considerable support. Although several philosophers have chal- lenged Davidson’s claim that the entity referred to via the quotation marks is a shape (rather than a linguistic type), a number of philosophers have expressed sympathy with the core idea of Davidson’s proposal: that quotation marks are referring expressions that belong to the semantic category of demonstratives.2

2. A problem for Davidson’s theory Despite its comparative popularity, Corey Washington (1 992) has recently presented what looks to be a decisive argument against Davidson’s theory - an argument that also applies (as Washington notes) to both the proper name and spelling theories. The argument is that Davidson’s view is at odds with the fact that, in many cases of spoken quotation, quotation marks are absent. Thus, for example, a speaker might easily come out with an utterance of (l), without articulating the quotation marks (through finger dance quotes, an utterance of ‘quote unquote’, etc.). Any such utterance would surely be grammatical. This poses a problem for Davidson’s view, as that view claims that, in any case of quotation, the quotation marks constitute the referring expression. This would mean that a spoken utterance of (l), uttered without articulated quotation marks, would be ungrammatical, due to the absence of a grammatical subject (here, a demonstrative expression).

Washington (1992: 589-90) considers and then rejects the initially plausible suggestion that in such cases the quotation marks are implicit, in just the way that the grammatical subject of an utterance of (e.g.) ‘Leave!’ is implicit. He rejects it on the grounds that it is incompatible with contem- porary linguistic theories, which place tight restrictions on the contexts in which implicit elements may occur. Such restrictions exclude contexts of the sort in question. The predicate in (l), for instance, cannot license an empty element. Thus, the following construction:

(2) Has three letters

See, for example, Goldstein 1984,1985; Bennett 1988; and Garcia-Carpintero 1994.

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is simply not grammatical, as it is not interpretable as involving an implicit subject term.

Washington’s argument is far-reaching, as it shows that any view of quotation that regards the quotation marks as an essential part of the referring expression is mistaken. For any such view would be at odds with the well-formedness of spoken utterances of quotation that do not include articulated quotation marks. Since both the proper name theory and the spelling theory view quotation marks as an essential part of the referring expression, neither view can be correct. That leaves the identity theory, according to which the referring expression is the quotationally embedded expression.

In what follows I will develop and promote a version of the identity theory of quotation. I will attempt to effect this by introducing and then solving a series of puzzles associated with the phenomenon of quotation.

3. A puzzle (with solution) for the identity theory Suppose that some version of the identity theory is correct (as would seem to be the case if Washington’s argument is ~ o u n d ) . ~ In that case, we are faced with a puzzle. Although mistaken, Davidson’s demonstrative view of quotation does have some intuitive appeal. For in cases of quotation that do involve quotation marks, an element of demonstration does indeed appear to be present. As Davidson puts it, ‘quotation is a device for pointing to inscriptions’. (emphasis mine) Consider sentence (1) above. Here, it certainly looks as though the quotation marks embedding the inscription ‘cat’ are literally pointing to or (in other words) demonstrating that inscription. How are we to account for this intuition within the framework of an identity theory?

I think that the key to answering this question lies in recognizing the important difference between demonstratives - linguistic expressions characteristically accompanied by demonstrations, and demonstrations - devices of ostension (such as pointing) that serve to help fix the reference of demonstratives by ‘displaying’ the intended referent (or something related to it). Davidson’s theory makes the mistake of conflating demonstratives with demonstrations. This conflation is evident in his remark that,

For responses to Davidson’s arguments against the identity theory, see Washington (1992: 492-94) and Garcia-Carpintero (1994: 256-57). Also see section 4 of this paper. Although Garcia-Carpintero provides two responses to Washington’s argument against Davidson’s account, he concedes (1994: 264) that while one such response ‘seems difficult to swallow’, the other ‘leaves the Davidsonian in a worse position than the one occupied by the Fregean’.

QUOTATION MARKS: DEMONSTRATIVES OR DEMONSTRATIONS?

... it is the quotation marks that do all the referring, and they help refer to a shape by pointing to something that has it. (emphasis mine)

Puce Davidson, quotation marks are not referring expressions, a fortiori they are not demonstratives; rather, they are demonstrations, devices of ostension which serve to help fix the reference of a demonstrative expression. (In the case of quotation, the demonstrative expression would appear to be the quotationally embedded token. See section 5 below for more on this issue.) By interpreting quotation marks as ostensive devices, we preserve the intuition that, in cases like (l), quotation does indeed involve an element of demonstration: the quotation marks serve to demonstrate, to ‘point to’, the embedded token. Moreover, by treating quotation marks as demonstrations rather than as demonstratives, we are able to accommodate instances of quotation that employ devices other than quotation marks - such as italics. Consider the following sentence:

I 3 5

( 3 ) Cut has three letters. Here, we have a case in which an expression is quoted - not by means of quotation marks - but by means of italicization. But surely it would be absurd to suppose (consistently with Davidson’s view) that the italicization of (3)’s subject term is itself a demonstrative expre~sion!~ However, there is no absurdity in the view that the italicization of (3) ’s subject term functions as a device of demonstration: one that effectively serves to display the italicized expression.

Endorsing this ‘demonstration’ theory of quotation enables us to retain the identity theory, according to which the referring expression is the quotationally embedded (or italicized) expression.

Davidson’s insight was to recognize that quotation marks play some sort of demonstrative role in cases of quotation. His mistake was to suppose that this role was a dual role: that quotation marks serve not only as devices of demonstration, but also as referring expression^.^

4. A second puzzle (with solution) for the identity theory But the identity theory, so construed, gives rise to a problem, a problem noted by Davidson (1984: 85). For it certainly appears as though what gets

Washington (1992: 590) makes a similar point.

5 There may well be a sense in which quotation marks ‘refer’ to the token at which they point. However, in that sense of ‘refer’, a pointing gesture can be said to refer to what it is directed at. This will not help Davidson, however, since he wants to claim that quotation marks function as sentential constituents. But quotation marks are no more sentential constituents than are the pointing gestures that characteristically accompany utterances of demonstrative expressions.

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referred to in (1) is not the demonstrated token, but the linguistic type of which the token is a token.6 Thus, it is not quite accurate to say, as Frege (1892) did, that a quotationally embedded expression refers to itself. How is this to be accounted for? Well, consider other apparently similar cases. I point to a particular copy of Quine’s Word and Object and say,

(4) That was published in 1960. Here, although I am clearly demonstrating a particular token of Quine’s book, the referent of the demonstrative expression in the sentence I utter is (plausibly) not that particular token, but the type of which the token is a token. Here, we have a case of deferred reference: in demonstrating one thing I refer to another thing, where the latter is related in some way to the former (in this case, as a type to a token of that type). I would suggest that the same sort of thing is going on in (1) as well as in other cases of quotation involving quotation marks (or some alternative device for quotation, such as italicization). That is, the quotation marks (italicization, etc.) demonstrate a token, the linguistic type of which is secured as the referent of the referring expression, via the process of deferred reference. The only significant difference between cases like my utterance of (4) and cases of quotation involving quotation marks is that, in cases of the latter sort, the demonstrated token is also the referring expression. Thus, while the demonstrated token of Quine’s book does not itself refer to the corresponding book type, the demonstrated token of ‘cat’ in (1) does refer to the corresponding linguistic type.’

5. A third puzzle (with solution) for the proposed identity theory According to the proposed view, the identity theory (or rather a particular version of that theory) is basically correct. In cases of quotation, the referring expression is the quotationally embedded (or otherwise high- lighted) token, and the entity referred to is (at least generally) the linguistic type of which the embedded token is a token. The proposed view also regards quotation marks as devices of ostension that literally point to (or otherwise highlight) the embedded token which then refers, through a process of deferred reference, to the relevant linguistic type.

Although I believe that, a t least generally, the referent of a quotationally embedded token is the corresponding linguistic type, there do appear to be exceptions. For an example of such an exception, consider the Davidsonian analysis of sentence (1) that appears at the top of p. 132 of this essay. There, it seems as though an embedded token of ‘cat’ is used to refer - not to the corresponding linguistic type - but to the token of that type that appears in (1 ). For more on this issue, see Garcia-Carpintero (1994: 261). ’ Washington (1992: 605) makes a similar point, although he does not believe that

quotation involves genuine demonstration.

QUOTATION MARKS: DEMONSTRATIVES OR DEMONSTRATIONS? 13 7

An important question still remains: To what semantic category does the referring expression belong? To the category of proper names (as the proper name theory would have it)? To the category of definite descriptions (as the spelling theory would have it)? To the category of demonstratives (as Davidson’s theory would have it)? Or is Washington correct when he claims (1992: 586) that the semantic category of the referring expression is variable, as it is identical to the semantic category of the linguistic type referred to (which varies from one case of quotation to the next)?

Because the relationship between the referring expression and its referent is clearly not an arbitrary one, we can eliminate the view that the semantic category of the former is the category of proper names. It also seems unlikely that the category in question is to be identified with the category of definite descriptions. For what description is the referring expression supposed to abbreviate? The various candidates put forward by competing versions of the spelling theory all fail as, Davidson (1984: 85- 88) points out, to capture the intuition that quotations somehow ‘picture’ what they are about. And it cannot be that Washington is correct in supposing that the semantic category of the referring expression is that of the linguistic type referred to. For such a view would be unable to account for the well-formedness of a sentence like the following:

( 5 ) ‘Hit’ is a verb.

The referring expression in ( 5 ) , interpreted as a verb, would of course yield an ungrammatical construction. But (5) is perfectly grammatical. Perhaps, then, the semantic category of the referring expression is the category of demonstrative^.^>^ Such a view is, of course, consistent with the proposal that quotation marks function as devices of demonstration. For demonstratives are characteristically accompanied by demonstrations, the latter of which assist in securing the reference of the former.

Of course, it is also possible that the semantic category in question is sui generis. Howevec theoretical economy would demand that we not multiply semantic catego- ries beyond necessity. In arguing that quotationally used expressions function like demonstratives, I have attempted to show that there is no need to postulate an additional semantic category in order to accommodate such expressions.

Margaretta Slabey has drawn my attention to an apparent problem with the proposed demonstrative reading of quotationally embedded tokens. If such a view is combined with the plausible view that such tokens typically refer to their corresponding linguistic types, then it would seem to follow that they would refer (at least typically) to demonstratives. If that were the case, sentence (5) would come out false on the grounds that no demonstrative is a verb! In response to this concern, I would simply clarify my position by claiming that, the quotationally embedded token, which functions semantically as a demonstrative, refers (typically) to the linguistic type of which it is, on its non-quotational reading, a token.

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6. A fourth puzzle (with solution) for the proposed identity theory Now there admittedly ,appears to be a rather obvious difference between paradigm cases of demonstrative expressions such as ‘this’ and ‘that’ and quotationally embedded expressions. For while the former will presumably refer to whatever is specified by the context of utterance (where context is construed as including any accompanying acts of demonstration), it appears as though the reference of quotationally embedded tokens is restricted (at least generally) to the linguistic type of which they are a token. How is this apparent difference to be explained?

Let’s return to those cases of demonstrative reference that most closely resemble cases of quotation: cases of deferred reference in which a type is referred to by means of the demonstration of one of its tokens. When I point to a particular token of Quine’s Word and Object and say:

(4) That was published in 1960 the reference of the demonstrative expression is constrained by the context of utterance, which includes the demonstration. The constraints imposed by the demonstration are such that the referent of the demonstrative expression will be, if not the particular book that I have pointed to, then something somehow related to that book. Other features of the context (in particular, the predicate of the sentence uttered) would indicate the intended referent to be the book type of which the demonstrated token is a token (which is of course something related to that token). For it is likely that the hearer (assisted by various Gricean-type maxims) would interpret the speaker as saying that a particular book type - Quine’s Word and Object - was published in 1960.

Now in a case of quotation such as that provided by (1) ‘Cat’ has three letters

the quotation marks serve as a demonstration - a device of ostension that serves to assist in fixing the reference of the demonstrative expression - on the proposed view, the quotationally embedded token of ‘cat’. Since the quotation marks, the demonstration, are pointing directly at the token in question, the referent of the demonstrative would presumably be either: (i) the token pointed to, or (ii) something somehow related to that token -such as its corresponding linguistic type. The context of the utterance (which includes the predicate of the sentence uttered) would seem to indicate the latter, just as the context would indicate that, when I point to a token of Quine’s Word and Object and utter (4), it is my intention to refer to the type of which the demonstrated token is a token.

Thus, contrary to what might initially appear to be the case, the constraints imposed in cases of the reference of quotationally used expres-

QUOTATION MARKS: DEMONSTRATIVES OR DEMONSTRATIONS? 139

sions are similar to those imposed in standard cases of demonstrative reference.

7. Some final puzzles (with solutions) for the proposed view

One might wonder how the proposed view would handle cases of spoken quotation, where quotation marks are not typically present. In such cases, how is such a view to account for the fact that, in an utterance of (e.g.):

( 6 ) Cat has three letters the purportedly ‘demonstrative’ subject term manages to refer to something (its corresponding linguistic type), without there being any associated ‘demonstration’ to assist in fixing the reference of that term?

This question is easily answered once one recognizes that ostensive devices are not the only features of a context that can assist in securing the reference of a demonstrative expression. lo

There is no need, for instance, to actually point to a particular copy of Word and Object when I come out with my utterance of (4) - if, for instance, it is the only book on the bookshelf that my audience and I are currently viewing. The context, even without ostension, is sufficient to ‘demonstrate’ (to display) the book in question. And it seems quite plausible to suppose that, in cases of spoken quotation, something similar is going on: features of the context other than demonstrations effectively ‘demonstrate’ the uttered token, the latter of which is used, in a process of deferred reference, to refer to the corresponding linguistic type. There is thus no need for me to utter:

(7) Cat, quote unquote, has three letters thereby ‘demonstrating’ the uttered token of ‘cat’, if it is clear from the context that I am attempting to draw attention to (to ‘demonstrate’) that token, with the intention of using it (in an act of deferred reference) to refer to its corresponding linguistic type. That I am attempting to do just that is surely going to be clear from the context of utterance and, in particular, from the content of the predicate of the sentence I have uttered. For that predicate indicates that I am talking, not about the ‘usual’ reference of ‘cat’ (i.e., cats), but about the expression (type) itself, a token of which I have just uttered.’l I might also effectively ‘demonstrate’ the uttered token by (say) adding emphasis to its verbal expression. The fact that such ‘demonstrations’ (broadly construed) contribute to the determination of the

lo For an extended defence of this sort of view, see Wettstein (1984). l 1 Contrast an utterance of (6) with an utterance of ‘Cat roam the Catalina Mountains’.

In the latter case, the predicate would indicate that the speaker is talking about the ‘usual’ reference of ‘cat’ - i.e., cats.

140 MARGA REIMER

reference of quotationally used expressions is what unites such expressions with the more typical sorts of demonstrative expressions.

So, once again, it is clear that the reference of a quotationally used token is constrained by the same sorts of factors that constrain the reference of demonstratives in general.

There is a second puzzle, concerning cases of written quotation, that faces the proposed view. It’s the reverse of the problem Davidson’s account faced with respect to cases of spoken quotation. Recall that Davidson’s account was at odds with the fact that quotation marks were not required in cases of spoken quotation. The proposed view appears to be at odds with the fact that quotation marks (italics, etc.) are required in cases of written (though not spoken) quotation. How is the proposed view to accommodate this fact?

I believe that the key to answering this question lies in an appreciation of a general difference that exists between the contexts of spoken utterances and the contexts of written utterances. In general, the context of a spoken utterance is considerably richer in terms of interpretive cues than the context of the corresponding written utterance, for it might include considerably more in terms of such cues than linguistic context. It might include ostensive gestures, variations in emphasis or intonation, significant pauses, etc. Now spoken quotation was no doubt around before the advent of the device of quotation marks. And, because of the richness of context in the case of spoken quotation, there would be no need to make explicit the fact that a certain expression was being used quotationally. However, because the context of a written utterance is in general considerably more sparse than that of the corresponding spoken utterance, it is not difficult to understand the advantage of a device like quotation marks: device which serves to make absolutely clear that an expression is being used, not in its usual way, but quotationally. Indeed, the same basic points could be made about the various devices of punctuation - periods, question marks, commas, apostrophes, etc. For these latter are required in cases of written utterances though not in cases of spoken utterances. Washington, who views quotation marks as a device of punctuation, attributes this fact to ‘the more formal character’ of written (as opposed to spoken) expression (Washington 1992: 591.) But of course, written expression can be very causal and spoken expression can be very formal. As suggested above, I view the difference in question as being traceable to the comparative sparseness of the contexts of written (as opposed to spoken) utterances. The devices of punctuation, as well as those of quotation, are the natural result of an attempt to accommodate this difference between types of contexts. Such devices serve to make clear, in cases of written utterances, what the linguistic context might otherwise fail to make clear. That such

QUOTATION MARKS: DEMONSTRATIVES OR DEMONSTRATIONS? 14 I

devices are required (as opposed to merely optional) is no doubt the result of an attempt to ensure the clarity provided by such devices.

8. Concluding remarks If the arguments of the preceding sections are sound, then it would appear as though the correct view of quotation is one that combines the insights of Frege’s ‘identity’ theory with those of Davidson’s ‘demonstrative’ theory. While Frege was right in viewing the referring expression as the quotationally embedded expression, Davidson was right in thinking that the referring expression (which he wrongly identified with the quotation marks) was a demonstrative expression. These views are synthesized by regarding the quotation marks as demonstrations that point to the embedded token, which in turn refers, qua demonstrative, to its corresponding linguistic type.12

The University of Arizona Tucson, Arizona 85721, USA

[email protected]

References Bennett, J. 1988. Quotation. No& 22: 399-418. Buckner, D.K. 1984. Goldstein on quotation. Analysis 44: 189-90. Buckner, D.K. 1985. Reply to Van Brackel. Analysis 45: 215-17. Davidson, D. 1979. Quotation. Theory and Decision, 11: 27-40. Reprinted in his

Frege, G. 1892. On sense and reference. In Philosophical Writings, ed. M. Black and P.

Garcia-Carpintero, M. 1994. Ostensive signs: against the identity theory of quotation.

Goldstein, L. 1984. Quotation of types and other types of quotation. Analysis 44: 1-6. Goldstein, L. 1985. The title of this paper is ‘Quotation’. Analysis 45: 137-141. Quine, W.V. 1960. Word and Object. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press. Quine, W.V. 1961. From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Tarski, A. 1956. The concept of truth in formalized languages. In his Logic, Semantics,

Van Brackel, J. 1985. Buckner quoting Goldstein and Davidson on quotation. Analysis

Washington, C. 1992. The identity theory of quotation. Journal of Philosophy. 89:

Wettstein, H. 1984. How to bridge the gap between meaning and reference. Synthese

Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.

T. Geach. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962.

Journal of Philosophy 91: 253-64.

and Metamathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

45: 73-75.

5 82-605.

58: 63-84.

12 I would like to thank Peter Smith, Stephan McCaffery, David Truncellito, Margaretta Slabey, and an anonymous Analysis reviewer for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

quotation marks: demonstratives or demonstrations?

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