DP ASSURANCE A VALUE ADDED PROCESS

March 2016

OBJECTIVE OF DP ASSURANCE • Success = Incident Free Operations = Predictable outcomes • An Incident = An Unacceptable Outcome and consequences

• Minimize the potential of a loss of position leading to unacceptable consequences.

• Real Examples:

Coring Vessel operating open water

Probability of LOP High Consequences of LOP were acceptable Consequence manifested Predictable outcome which was acceptable (ALARP)

PSV with cross connections operating close proximity

Cross connections in DP system couldn’t be mitigated Mitigation: Drift off condition Consequence manifested Predictable outcome which was acceptable (ALARP)

IFO

DP ASSURANCE AS A VALUE ADDED PROCESS • Is one element of an objective based Integrated Risk

Management approach to achieving predictable outcomes.

• Intergrates risks, mitigations and consequences….

• …and value is extracted when the appropriate mitigations and barriers are implemented to achieve: No harm to people

No harm to the environment

Predictable Outcomes / Incident free operations

Risks drive Consequences

Consequences need Mitigations

Risks

Consequences

Mitigations

DP ASSURANCE SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED AS … • A compliance based approach. • A prescriptive standard.

• A one size fits all process. • Categorical in its implementation.

Risks

Consequences Mitigations

Value

ROADMAP TO ACHIEVING INCIDENT FREE DP OPERATIONS

Conduct Risk Assessment

Develop Mitigations Implement

Monitor & Feedback

DEVELOPING THE RISK PROFILE

• Starts with 2 questions:

1. “What are the consequences if I lose position during (insert activity)?” 2. “Are those consequences acceptable if they manifest?”

If yes, proceed with activity. If no, develop & implement mitigations till risk profile acceptable.

• Understanding impacts & consequences will focus our mitigation efforts.

ELEMENTS OF A RISK PROFILE

Objective

Category of Vessel

Situational Specific

Well specific(as applicable)

Industrial Mission Specific

• No Harm to: • People • Environment • Reputation

• Drilling rigs (jack up, anchored semi-submersible, DP vessels), • Liftboats, • Barges, • Offshore Supply Vessels (DP 1, DP2, DP3), • Built for purpose and modified-fit for purpose WI vessel, • Inspection Maintenance & Repair (IMR) Vessels

• Open Water • Close Proximity

• Subsea assets • Production platforms • Other vessels

• Deep water • Shallow water • Hydrocarbon Zone • Non hydrocarbon zone

• Exploration Drilling/ Development Drilling • Well Intervention • Heavy Lift • Subsea Installation • Pipelay • Flotelling

Developing Mitigations

Top Event

Loss of Vessel Integrity

Loss of Station Keeping

Des

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Barr

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Threats

Developing Mitigations

Who has a role?

Operational

Design

People

Process

• Shipyards • Class Societies • Vessel Owners • End User*

• Lease Operators • Vessel Operators • Regulators • Best Industry Practices

• Lease Operators • Vessel Operators • Industry Guidance

• Vessel Owners • DPO Certifiers • Flag State

Barrier Thinking Design Considerations

Robust Design − Design philosophy for DP is redundancy

− Design with 7 Pillars in mind

− Do not ignore reliability

− Integrity in all configurations (CAM/ TAM)

− Design to test • Statutory requirements

• Basis of confidence

− A systems approach to achieve highest post

failure capability • Align all systems to redundancy concept

− 2 power supplies on a triple redundant

system

− A 3 way split compromised by a 2 way split

auxiliary system

Source: MTS DP Vessel Design Philosophy Document - Part I

Training Certificates of Compliance are OK but there is room for improvement.

Additional focus on developing competency in key focus areas critical to station keeping.

Enable delivery capability by effective decision support tools (quality ASOG’s).

MTS MDAT Tool delivers competency roadmap.

Barrier Thinking People Considerations

Source: MTS DP MDAT Doc.

Barrier Thinking Process Considerations

Effective processes in place − Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP’s)

− Permit To Work (PTW)

− Management of Change (MoC)

− Positioning Standby

− Executable contingency plans

Source: www.gateinc.com

Barrier Thinking Operational Considerations

Focus on mitigating risks associated with Industrial Mission of the vessel.

Critical Activity Mode vs. Task Appropriate Mode

Establishment of Operational Criteria − Residual capability following a WCF

Special attention to vessel Modes & Features

− Heavy lift mode

− External force compensation

− Track Follow

Don’t forget SIMOPs planning − Status of other vessels in area

− Communications plan

− Escape routes

WSOG Template

Critical Activity Mode (CAM) Every vessel has a CAM configuration

that provides the highest degree of station keeping integrity.

Goes beyond open vs. closed bus ties. − Controls in place for IRM, reinstating

critical equipment. − Establishes post WCF capability. − Establishes requirements for PRS’s.

When CAM may be appropriate: − A low tolerance for unintended position

changes. − A long termination time. − Involves vessel operations within 500

meter zone of another asset.

Source: MTS DP TECHOP ODP_12_(O)

Task Appropriate Mode (TAM)

Is a risk based mode.

Strives to offer station keeping integrity

and fault tolerance.

TAM is intended to address issues brought

about by continuously operating in CAM,

such as: − Increased equipment runtime.

− Increased fuel consumption (and

emissions).

− In ability to conduct maintenance on DP

systems.

Source: MTS DP TECHOP ODP_12_(O)

Summary DP Assurance…

• can and should be a value delivering process

• Enables achieving objectives of:

No harm to people

No harm to the environment

Predictable Outcomes / Incident free operations

• Enables achieving mission objectives cost effectively.

Houston Office 16360 Park Ten Place Suite 206 Houston, TX 77084

New Orleans Office 830 Union Street Suite 400 New Orleans, LA 70112

www.gateinc.com