quantum cryptography 101

52
Quantum Cryptography Omar Shehab Department of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering University of Maryland, Baltimore County Baltimore, Maryland 21250 [email protected] September 21, 2012

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Guest lecture by Omar Shehab for the Information Assurance course by Dr. Alan Sherman in fall 2012.

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Page 1: Quantum Cryptography 101

Quantum Cryptography

Omar Shehab

Department of Computer Science and Electrical EngineeringUniversity of Maryland, Baltimore County

Baltimore, Maryland 21250

[email protected]

September 21, 2012

Page 2: Quantum Cryptography 101

Curiosity

We start with following questions:

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Page 3: Quantum Cryptography 101

Curiosity (contd.)

How strong are the classical cryptographic schemes?

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Page 4: Quantum Cryptography 101

Curiosity (contd.)

Is it possible to break them quickly?

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Page 5: Quantum Cryptography 101

Let’s take an example

RSA (Rivest et al. [1978]) is a standard classical cryptographicscheme.

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Page 6: Quantum Cryptography 101

Here is the situation

Alice wants to send a message to Bob.

Both of them are worried about Eve who is notoriously tryingto intercept the message.

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Page 7: Quantum Cryptography 101

Proposed solution

Alice decides a secret key and encrypts her message with thatkey.

The encrypted message is sent to Bob over public channel.

Alice sends the key to Bob over a secure channel.

Bob decrypts the message with the key.

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Page 8: Quantum Cryptography 101

Issue with the solution

How to find a secure channel to transfer the key?

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Page 9: Quantum Cryptography 101

It is a good idea?

What if Alice decides another secret sub-key to encrypt the originalkey and send it over the public channel?

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Page 10: Quantum Cryptography 101

Let’s see!

Another sub-sub-key to encrypt the sub-key and anothersub-sub-sub-key to secure the sub-sub-key and so on...

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Page 11: Quantum Cryptography 101

It never stops!

Catch-22 (Lomonaco [1998])!

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Page 12: Quantum Cryptography 101

Now what?

Let us redefine ’secret’ !

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Page 13: Quantum Cryptography 101

’Secret’

A secret is secret if it is always secret!A secret is secret is it is computationally unbreakable (Lomonaco[1998])!

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Page 14: Quantum Cryptography 101

Computationally secret!!!

Here comes RSA!

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Page 15: Quantum Cryptography 101

Assumptions in RSA

The assumption is that the problem of factoring large number isnot in P, NP-complete, and co-NP-complete (Rivest et al. [1978]).

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Page 16: Quantum Cryptography 101

How confident?

So far true for classical computers.

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Page 17: Quantum Cryptography 101

Are we safe then?

There are other issues.

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Page 18: Quantum Cryptography 101

An issue with public key cryptography

Eavesdropping cannot be detected in classical public keycryptographic solutions (Lomonaco [1998]).

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Page 19: Quantum Cryptography 101

New in the town

Quantum Cryptography!!!

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Page 20: Quantum Cryptography 101

Quantum Cryptography

We need quantum computers.

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Page 21: Quantum Cryptography 101

No more ’bits’

Qubits replace bits. Logic one and zero are no longer the scalers 1and 0. They are expressed by orthonormal pairs of vectors living inHilbert space (a special type of vector space) (Lomonaco [1998]).

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Page 22: Quantum Cryptography 101

What are those orthonormal pairs of vectors?

They are called basis sets.

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Page 23: Quantum Cryptography 101

Basis sets

They can be chosen in a number of ways.

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Page 24: Quantum Cryptography 101

Basis sets: Example 1

Let the set be S+.

S+ ≡{(

10

),

(01

)}

These vectors are orthonormal to each other.

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Page 25: Quantum Cryptography 101

Basis sets: Example 2

Let the set be SX .

SX ≡{

1√2

(−11

), 1√

2

(11

)}

These vectors are orthonormal to each other.

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Page 26: Quantum Cryptography 101

Qubits

What may Qubits look like in real world?

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Page 27: Quantum Cryptography 101

Qubits (contd.)

Spin of an electron (12or −12)

Polarization of a photon (horizontal or vertical, right circularor left circular, 45◦clockwiseorcounter − clockwise etc.)

and many other . . .

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Page 28: Quantum Cryptography 101

Logical impression

Using S+,

Logic 1 ≡(

01

), Logic 0 ≡

(10

)or vice versa.

Using SX ,

Logic 1 ≡ 1√2

(−11

), Logic 0 ≡ 1√

2

(11

)or vice versa.

Omar Shehab (UMBC) Quantum Cryptography September 21, 2012 28 / 52

Page 29: Quantum Cryptography 101

Features

Qubits have following features:

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Page 30: Quantum Cryptography 101

Qubits: Feature 1

Qubits cannot be copied (Wootters and Zurek [1982]). If someonetries to copy a qubit, the information gets destroyed. So, theproblem of eavesdropping detection is solved.

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Page 31: Quantum Cryptography 101

Qubits: Feature 2

Qubits can be in two opposite states at the same time. Forexample, a qubit can be both logic 1 and logic 0 at the same time.

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Page 32: Quantum Cryptography 101

Qubits: Feature 2 (contd.)

If a qubit is in state 1√2

(11

), it is both in logic 1 and logic 0 with

equal probability.

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Page 33: Quantum Cryptography 101

Qubits: Feature 3

To read the information of a qubit, we need to measure it. Inquantum world, results of measurement are always probabilistic.So, we end up with information with specific amount of probabilityassociated to it.

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Page 34: Quantum Cryptography 101

Feature 3: Example

If we want to read (measure) an arbitrary qubit using S+, we will

get

(01

)with some probability and ≡

(10

)with the

complementary amount of probability.

If we read the same qubit using SX , we will get 1√2

(−11

)with

some probability and 1√2

(11

)with the complementary amount of

probability.

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Page 35: Quantum Cryptography 101

A note about basis set

While working with quantum information, you can encode yourmessage with any basis set whenever you want. So, while sending amessage, a part of the message can be encoded using the basis setSX and rest of the message can be encoded using the basis set S+.

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Page 36: Quantum Cryptography 101

Message with mixed basis sets

Bit index 1 2 3 4

Logical impression 1 0 1 0

Qubits

(01

)1√2

(11

)1√2

(−11

) (10

)Basis set S+ SX SX S+

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Page 37: Quantum Cryptography 101

Back to Alice!

We recommend Alice and Bob to buy quantum computers.

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Page 38: Quantum Cryptography 101

Alice’s secret key

Alice wants to send a secret key consisting random bits.Say, she wants to send a 12-bit key. Alice flips a coin for each bitand sets the bit to 1 for head and 0 for tail. For one instance, letthe logical impression of the message be,0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.

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Page 39: Quantum Cryptography 101

Alice’s secret key (contd.)

So far, Alice has decided only the logical version of the secret key.She is yet to decide the basis on which she will encode thecorresponding qubits.

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Page 40: Quantum Cryptography 101

Alice’s secret key (contd.)

Alice chooses the basis sets in random too. For each bit, if it ishead, the basis set is S+ otherwise SX .

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Page 41: Quantum Cryptography 101

Alice’s secret key (contd.)

The situation may be as in the following table.

Ind

ex

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Sec

ret

key

0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0

Bas

isse

t

S+ S+ SX S+ S+ S+ SX S+ SX SX SX S+

Qu

bit (

10

)(01

)(− 1√2

1√2

)(10

)(10

)(10

)(− 1√2

1√2

)(10

)(− 1√2

1√2

)(1√21√2

)(1√21√2

)(10

)

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Page 42: Quantum Cryptography 101

Bob receives and measures the key

Ind

ex

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Bas

isse

t

SX S+ SX SX S+ SX S+ S+ SX SX SX S+

Res

ult

0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0

Ori

gin

alke

y

0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0

Rea

lb

asis

S+ S+ SX S+ S+ S+ SX S+ SX SX SX S+

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Page 43: Quantum Cryptography 101

Message at Bob’s end

Bob will guess right basis 50% of the time. For those correct basissets, the results of measurement will be exactly what Alice sent.For the rest of the message, Bob will have wrong data.

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Page 44: Quantum Cryptography 101

Confirmation of basis with Alice

Bob informs Alice the basis he has used for each bit through publicchannel. Whenever, there is a basis mismatch, they discard thecorresponding bit. Here is the scenario,

Ind

ex

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Alic

e

S+ S+ SX S+ S+ S+ SX S+ SX SX SX S+

Bob

SX S+ SX SX S+ SX S+ S+ SX SX SX S+

Mat

ch

X X X X X X X X

Key

1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0

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Page 45: Quantum Cryptography 101

Eavesdropping

To intercept the message, Eve needs to measure the qubits justlike Bob does. She cannot copy and forward the original messageto Bob due to the no-cloning theorem. So, Eve can also guess only50% of the information correctly. To hide her existence, Eve needsto resend the data to Bob. Any measurement collapses thequantum superposition of the qubits. So, Bob only receives theresult of measurements, not the original qubits.

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Page 46: Quantum Cryptography 101

Bob measures Eve’s

When Bob measures the message coming from Eve, there isanother layer of applying wrong random bases, which decreases theprobability of getting the original message by more than 50%. Bobneeds a way to detect the eavesdropping.

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Page 47: Quantum Cryptography 101

Detection

Bob shares half of the remaining bits with Alice over publicchannel. If there is only a tiny percentage of mismatch (due tonoise), they can safely assume that Eve hasn’t listened to theircommunication. Here is the scenario,

Ind

ex

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Key

1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0

Exc

han

ge

X X X X

Sec

ret

1 1 0 1

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Page 48: Quantum Cryptography 101

Detection (contd.)

With 12-bit secret key, after measurement and intrusion detection,4 bits are still secret. So, if Alice wants a 100-bit secret key, shemay safely start with a 300-bit key.

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Page 49: Quantum Cryptography 101

Meet BB

This scheme is called the BB84 Quantum Key Exchange protocol.

Figure: Charles H. Bennett

Figure: Gilles Brassard

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Page 50: Quantum Cryptography 101

2012 Nobel Prize?

Thomson Reuters Predicts 2012 Nobel prize in physics may go tothese two people.

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Page 51: Quantum Cryptography 101

Bibliography I

Samuel J. Lomonaco. A quick glance at quantum cryptography. 1998.

R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman. A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems.Communications of the ACM, 21:120–126, 1978.

W. K. Wootters and W. H. Zurek. A single quantum cannot be cloned. volume 299, pages 802–803, 1982.

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Page 52: Quantum Cryptography 101

Questions?

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