quantitative easing and its effects on emerging market
TRANSCRIPT
Quantitative Easing and its Effects on Emerging Market Economy Currencies
A THESIS
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Economics and Business
The Colorado College
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
Bachelor of Arts
By
Alan Hurbi
May 2016
Quantitative Easing and its Effects on Emerging Market Economy Currencies
Alan Hurbi
May 2016
Economics
Abstract
This paper examines the effects of the Federal Reserve’s (Fed) quantitative easing (QE) program on emerging market currencies. Through the purchase of long-term securities, the Federal Reserve drove down long-term interest rates in the United States. As a result, capital flows into emerging market economies (EMEs) increased drastically. Investors in search of higher yields pulled money out of the U.S and invested heavily in emerging markets economies. The model in this paper incorporates the change in Fed balance sheet assets and EME country specific macroeconomic variables to determine if EME currencies appreciated because of quantitative easing. The time period covered is 2008 – 2014 and the countries of focus are Brazil, Mexico, Korea, South Africa, Turkey, and Indonesia. Data was collected from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Federal Reserve, and various central banks. This study could not determine with statistical significance that quantitative easing caused EME currencies to appreciate, but it did find certain macroeconomic variables played a statistically significant role in determining EME currency appreciation. KEYWORDS: (Quantitative easing, Federal Reserve, Emerging market economies, Currencies) JEL CODES: (E44, E43, G21)
ON MY HONOR, I HAVE NEITHER GIVEN NOR RECEIVED UNAUTHORIZED AID ON THIS THESIS
AlanHurbi_______________________________Signature
TABLEOFCONTENTSABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………………………………
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1INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………………. 1 2LITERATUREREVIEW……………………………………………………………………………... 52.1CapitalFlows....................................................................................................................... 52.2MacroeconomicVariables..............................................................................................
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3DATA……………………………………………………………………………………………………….4METHODOLOGY……………………………………………………………………………………….5RESULTS………………………………………………………………………………………………….6CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………………………7WORKSCITED…………………………………………………………………………………………..
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1
Introduction
The United States Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy to promote national
economic goals and to influence the cost and availability of money. Prior to the financial
crisis of 2008, the Federal Reserve mainly used the federal funds rate to implement
monetary policy. This is the interest rate at which very creditworthy depository
institutions can borrow and lend overnight funds to each other and is considered a
benchmark for all other interest rates in the U.S. economy. By setting new target federal
funds rates, the Federal Reserve signals its expectations for future economic conditions.
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) consists of twelve members from
different Federal Reserve banks and meets eight scheduled times per year to determine
monetary policy and assess risks to stable economic growth and long-run price stability.
During these meetings, the FOMC sets a target federal funds rate based on current
economic conditions then purchases or sells short-term treasury securities to reach the
target rate. Selling short-term securities raises interest rates and decreases the monetary
base. When interest rates are high, consumers have less disposable income and must cut
back on spending. This means fewer loans for banks and less income for businesses,
contracting the economy. Contrarily, buying short-term securities lowers interest rates.
In this scenario, borrowing money is cheap and consumers are more likely to make large
purchases such as houses or cars. In theory, the economy should expand and credit
should be easily accessible.
When financial markets collapsed in 2008, the Fed pursued expansionary
monetary policy to loosen credit conditions. The federal funds rate was cut from 5.25% in
August 2007 to .25% in December 2008 to increase the money supply in the U.S.
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economy. The fed funds rate was at its zero lower bound and the Federal Reserve had
exhausted its power to pursue conventional monetary policy. If the fed funds rate were
to become negative, lenders would rather hang onto cash then give to borrowers.
When facing turbulent financial conditions and an interest rate zero lower bound,
central banks can utilize unconventional monetary policy to stabilize the economy.
Quantitative easing (QE) is a monetary policy tool where central banks purchase long-
term securities with electronically created cash. This method allows central banks to
vastly increase the money supply without having to increase the monetary base. Under
QE, when a security is purchased by the central bank, the asset side of their balance sheet
increases and the seller of the security is expected to take the new money and make more
loans, increasing investment in the economy. The end goal is to lower long-term interest
rates by decreasing bond yields and increasing access to credit.
The United States held three rounds of quantitative easing between November
2008 and September 2014 called QE1, QE2, and QE3. The intended goal of U.S.
quantitative easing was to lower mortgage rates and take pressure off the average
homeowner. In QE 1, the Fed purchased $1.25 trillion in mortgage-backed securities and
$300 billion in 10 and 30-year treasury bonds. Thirty year mortgage rates responded by
falling under 5% (Ihrig and Meade, 2015). During QE2, the Fed purchased $600 billion
of long-term treasury bonds and mortgage rates declined to nearly 4%. In QE3, the Fed
tapered its $85 billion per month long term bond purchase program to $30 billion per
month, then ended the program. In all, the Fed spent $3.5 trillion on long-term bonds and
mortgage-backed securities.
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While the U.S. experienced stabilized growth and promising economic conditions,
investors pulled billions of dollars out of the bond market in search of higher yield
investments. The money that left the United States was invested in emerging market
economies (EMEs). The transfer of wealth from the U.S. to EMEs occurred through
three main channels. Chen et al. (2011) and Lavinge et al. (2014) provide a summary of
the three transmission channels, as noted below:
1.) The portfolio balance channel: Quantitative easing requires massive purchases
of long-term assets and mortgage-backed securities. The compressing of the term
premium lowers the yield of these assets and increases the demand for substitute assets.
Private investors turned to EMEs because, since the 2000’s, they experienced strong
growth, relatively stable socio-political environments, and higher yields.
2.) The signaling channel: By undertaking quantitative easing, the Federal
Reserve is committing to keeping interest rates low for a period longer than expected,
lowering the risk neutral component of bond yields. This creates larger interest rate
differentials between the U.S. and EME’s, causing capital flows into EMEs.
3.) The exchange rate channel: The appreciation of an EME currency against the
U.S dollar causes each dollar an EME earns to be worth more. Similarly, fluctuations in
exchange rates can create sizable gains or losses for emerging market economies firms
with large foreign currency assets or liabilities. A depreciation of the U.S. dollar occurs
when capital flows out of the U.S. and into emerging market economies. The U.S
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experiences a loss of purchasing power resulting in a decreased demand for foreign
produced goods and services. This effect is amplified in the smaller open economies that
exist in many EME countries.
This paper seeks to determine if the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing
program caused emerging market economy currencies to appreciate. While U.S. demand
for foreign goods decreased due to loss of purchasing power, the massive capital inflows
to EME’s may have offset this detrimental effect. Between 2000 and 2013 annual gross
capital inflows to developing countries grew by an order of magnitude to $1.8 trillion
annualized (Lim et al, 2014). Furthermore, from 2009 to 2013 cumulative gross financial
inflows to the developing world grew from $192 billion to $598 billion (Lim et al, 2014).
Most academics analyzing this topic utilize an event-study approach on the Federal
Reserve’s QE announcements and its effects on emerging market economy currencies.
Event-study analyses provide insight into how EMEs respond to the Fed’s monetary
policy, but they fail to assess the cumulative impact of quantitative easing on emerging
market economy currencies. This study will utilize data gathered from the Federal
Reserve Economic Database (FRED) to determine how EME exchange rates are affected
by long-term treasury note yields and various other country specific macro-economic
variables.
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Literature Review
Over the last fifteen years, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England, the European
Central Bank, and the Federal Reserve implemented quantitative easing to combat
financial crises (Fawley and Neely, 2013). While developed countries used QE as a
financial antidote, the global ramifications of unconventional monetary policy are less
understood. It is widely agreed that quantitative easing helped developed countries stem
the effects of the global financial crisis, but unconventional monetary policy’s interaction
with emerging market economies is more dynamic, volatile, and difficult to predict.
Capital Flows
The Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing program rerouted global financial flows
by injecting trillions of dollars in the U.S economy. Broner et al. (2014) analyzes the
behavior of international capital flows during the 2007 – 2008 financial crisis and finds in
comparison to net capital flow, gross capital flows are larger and more volatile. The IMF
(2011), through a panel data study, found loose monetary policy in developed countries
to be a crucial determinant of capital flows to EMEs. Regardless of the source, major
capital inflows into an economy result in an appreciation of the real exchange rate,
increased stock valuation, stronger economic growth, and accumulation of international
reserves (Reinhart et al, 1993). When capital outflows occur, the opposite effect occurs.
Investors interpret the increased capital flows to emerging market economies as a signal
of future stability, higher than normal yields, and declining risk. Unfortunately, the cause
of the capital flows can be ambiguous. Ahmed and Zlate (2013) found that new capital
flows to EMEs were determined by growth differentials, policy differentials, and global
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risk aversion. If higher than normal yields exist due to unfavorable conditions,
speculators can create financial bubbles to earn quick profits. Fratzscher (2011) noted
that emerging market economies experienced rapid growth followed by subsequent
economic downturns when speculative investors unexpectedly liquidated their emerging
market assets.
The declining long-term bond yields in the United States aided the flow of capital
to EMEs. Speculators continued investing without hesitation, and little was done by the
United States or EMEs to protect developing economies. Although unknown to the
public, QE1, QE2, and QE3 all had finite end dates. When the Federal Reserve
announced the final stage of QE3, EMEs experienced massive capital flight. In an event
study of five emerging market economies, Taoufik Bouraoui (2015) predicted that the
announcement of the tapering of QE3 generated “an increase in interest rates and bond
yields, plummeting stock markets, currency depreciation, and deterioration in the balance
of payments.”
Macroeconomic Variables
While EME’s leaders voiced concerns about the volatile influx of capital at the
beginning of quantitative easing, the tapering and eventual ending of the QE program had
larger economic implications. Academics have come to different conclusions about
whether country specific macroeconomic variables played a role in shielding EMEs from
capital flight. In a regression analysis, Eichengreen and Gupta (2014) examined bilateral
exchange rates between April and August 2013 and macroeconomic fundamentals such
as current account deficit, real GDP growth, inflation, and foreign reserves. They found
that macroeconomic fundamentals played a statistically insignificant role in determining
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exchange rate depreciation. Instead, the size and connectedness of the emerging market
determined exchange rate depreciation because investors were more easily able to
rebalance their portfolios.
In contrast, Aizenman et al (2014) used a fixed effects model to examine capital
flows to 26 EMEs and found that robust fundamentals such as current accounts surpluses,
high international reserves, and low external debt increased countries vulnerability to
volatile capital flows (Aizenman and Hutchinson, 2014). In a similar study, Mishra et al
(2014) studied the effect of quantitative easing on 21 EME’s exchange rates and found
that macroeconomic variables played a significant role in determining EME’s exposure to
volatile capital flows. In particular, countries with higher current account balances, lower
inflation, higher reserves, and better fiscal position experienced smaller currency
depreciation when quantitative easing was tapered. While the exact cause of volatile
capital flows and currency fluctuations in emerging markets is difficult to pinpoint,
academics agree that quantitative easing had significant effect on emerging market
economy currencies.
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Data
This study uses data from six emerging market economies including Brazil,
Korea, Mexico, South Africa, Turkey, and Indonesia. As noted in other studies, these six
countries became heavily dependent on foreign investment to finance growth. Because
of this, they experienced the largest currency fluctuations during quantitative easing.
The dependent variable in this study is the percent change in foreign exchange
rate (local currency/US$). The data are quarterly and cover the period from October 1,
2008 to December 31, 2014. These are the beginning and end dates for quantitative
easing. The independent variables considered are consumer price index, GDP growth,
reserves/GDP, current account/GDP, local interest rates, and the asset side of the Federal
Reserve balance sheet. Each variable has 144 observations creating a balanced panel data
set. Although only six emerging market economies are used in the study, many more
were considered but adequate data could not be found for all independent variables
leading to their omission. The six countries used produced reliable and trustworthy data
for the time period considered. In addition, all the countries use a floating exchange rate.
Free market forces in the foreign exchange market allow for a more unbiased analysis.
All of the data except current account/GDP was gathered from the Federal
Reserve FRED database. This database collects its own data and pulls data from the
IMF, World Bank, OECD, and various central banks. All variables are differenced to
represent percent changed and are lagged by one quarter. Differencing allows the data to
be compared across different units of measurement. The data was lagged by one quarter
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because the Federal Reserve’s actions take time to materialize in emerging market
economies.
Methodology
My model focuses on how emerging market currencies were affected by the Fed’s
decision to increase the asset side of their balance sheet through quantitative easing.
It was assumed that extraneous factors changed the socio-political environments of the
emerging market economies during the time period studied; therefore, to analyze the
balanced data set, a GLS random effects regression was used. To ensure this assumption
was correct, I ran both a fixed effects and random effects model and compared them. The
only difference was that in the fixed effect model the β-value on the CPI and EME
interest rate variable were negative instead of positive. Since neither of these variables
were statistically significant, I ran a Hausman test to determine which regression was a
better fit:
H0= random effects model appropriate.
H1= fixed effects model appropriate.
Since the Prob>chi2 = 0.9472, the null hypothesis was not rejected and a random
effects model was used. Also, the CHI(2)= .0001 further confirming a random effects
model.
I ran a GLS random effects model in STATA to analyze the effects of my
independent variables on my dependent variable. I looked at the results of the Wald test
to see if the null hypothesis: β1, β2, β3…..βk = 0 was to be rejected. My hypothesis was:
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H0= Increasing fed balance sheet leads to an appreciation of EME currency and negative β H1= Increasing fed balance sheet leads to a depreciation of EME currency and a positive β
Since the LR chi2 =45.46 which was greater than the critical value, I reject my
null hypothesis.
(1) LOCAL_CURRENCY/US$=β0+ β1(CPI) + β2(GDPGROWTH)+β3(RESERVE_GDP) + β4(CRTACT_GDP)+ β5(EME_INTEREST)+β6(FED_ASSETS)
The dependent variable is a measure of the local currency to one U.S. dollar. The
goal of this model is to analyze what variables either insulated or exposed emerging
market economy currencies to exchange rate fluctuations.
The variable CPI measures raw headline inflation. It is calculated by measuring
the change in cost of a fixed basket of goods over a predetermined time period. Since
real GDP growth rate corrects for inflation, CPI is used to account for any currency that
experienced inflation or deflation. Shangil et al (2015), Rai and Suchanek (2014), and
Dalhaus and Vasishtha (2014) used this variable in their analyses. This study anticipates
the β-value to be positive. As an EME currency experiences inflation, the less valuable
the EME currency will be on the foreign exchange market. If deflation is present, the
EME currency will become more valuable on the foreign exchange market.
The variable GDPGROWTH is stated in U.S. dollars and measures the economic
productivity of an emerging market economy. A strong GDP growth rate is correlated
with small exchange rate depreciation. Lim et al (2014), Rai and Suchanek (2014), and
Shagil et al (2015) used this explanatory variable. This study anticipates the
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GDPGROWTH variable to have a negative β-value. As an economy grows, its currency
will become stronger, and the EME currency will appreciate against the U.S. dollar.
The variable RESERVES_GDP accounts for the amount of foreign reserves,
minus gold, that a central bank holds as a portion of GDP. This study anticipates that the
RESERVES_GDP variable will have a negative β-value because higher foreign reserves
increase confidence in the monetary system and exchange rate policies of a government.
A central government with abundant reserves can intervene in the foreign exchange
market to stabilize their currency. Aizenman et al (2014) and Mishra et al (2014) used
this variable in their analysis. This study anticipates that the RESERVES_GDP variable
will have a negative β-value.
The variable CURRENTACCT_GDP measures the trade surplus or deficit of a
country as a percentage of GDP. The currency exchange rate has a significant effect on
the trade balance via the current account. An overvalued currency makes exports less
competitive and imports cheaper, widening the current account deficit or lowering the
surplus. An undervalued currency makes imports more expensive and boosts the export
industry, lowering the current account deficit or strengthening the surplus. While a case
can be made for either a positive or negative β-value, this study anticipates the β-value to
be negative because an increase in exports stimulates the EME economy, appreciating the
currency. Aizenman et al (2014), Eichengreen and Gupta (2013), Mishra et al (2014), and
Rai and Suchanek (2014) used this variable in their analysis.
The variable EME_INTEREST measures the difference between the emerging
market overnight bank loan rate and the federal funds rate. This statistic helps explain
how capital moved from the U.S. to emerging markets. As the Fed kept the federal funds
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rate low, investors moved capital to emerging markets in search of higher yields, leading
this study to anticipate a positive β-value. Eichengreen and Gupta (2013) and Dalhaus
and Vasishtha (2014) used this variable in their analysis.
The variable FED_ASSETS measures the asset side of the Federal Reserves
balance sheet during quantitative easing. During the six years of quantitative easing, the
Federal Reserve ballooned its assets by $3.4 trillion. This variable is a proxy for the
lowering of long-term interest rates in the United States. This is an extremely important
variable for the study and I anticipate the β-value to be negative. As the Fed lowered
interest rates, emerging market economies experienced currency appreciation.
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Results
Table I – Descriptive statistics of random GLS regression
FX Coef Std. error
z P>|z| (95% Conf. Interval)
CPI 0.0438313 .4232916 0.10 .918 -.785805 0.8734976
GDPGROWTH -.8614765 .3022950 -2.85 .004 -1.453964 -.2689892
RESERVE_GDP -7.578239 1.257521 -6.03 0.00 -10.04293 -5.113543
CURRENTACCT_ GDP
-.0171317 .3188047 -0.05 .957 -.6419775 6.0771410
EME_INTEREST .00677580 .1409231 0.05 .962 -.2694284 .28298
FED_ASSETS -14.55514 9.997279 -1.46 .145 -34.14944 5.03917
_cons .02058560 .0101012 2.04 .042 .0007876 .0403835
Sigma_u 0 Sigma_e 0.4485697
rho 0 R-sq: within =.2399 Observations = 144
between =.6356 Wald chi2(6) = 45.46 overall =.2491 Prob>chi2 = 0.000
Since the FED_ASSETS variable was statistically insignificant with a P value =
.145, the amount of long-term securities purchased by the Federal Reserve does not
determine how much an emerging market currency appreciated. The FED_ASSETS β =
-14.55514, this implies that the emerging market economy currencies appreciated when
the Federal Reserve purchased long-term securities, but due to low statistical
significance, the amount of EME currency appreciation cannot be determined.
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Figure I – % change EME currency to 1 US dollar
As figure I depicts, all of the emerging market currencies in the sample size
experienced a 1-2% percent appreciation during the first stage of quantitative easing
(QE1). From 2008 – 2014, or QE1 to QE3, the currencies experienced relatively similar
depreciation patterns. There was not a linear trend to currency exchange rates; therefore,
the model could not produce a statistically significant linear fit. After the initial EME
currency appreciation of QE1, EME currencies slowly depreciated. Regardless,
throughout the course of the Federal Reserve quantitative easing program, emerging
market currencies did experience an overall appreciation.
There were two independent variables in the model that were statistically
significant and predicted the amount of appreciation an emerging market economy
currency experienced. The first variable, GDPGROWTH, predicted with 95%
confidence that a 1 unit increase in GDP growth led to .86 currency appreciation. This
relationship agrees with existing literature on the subject. Countries that used the influx
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
210/1/08
3/1/09
8/1/09
1/1/10
6/1/10
11/1/10
4/1/11
9/1/11
2/1/12
7/1/12
12/1/12
5/1/13
10/1/13
3/1/14
8/1/14
Indonesia
Turkey
SouthAfrica
Mexico
Korea
Brazil
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of foreign capital to grow and expand their economies were less affected by capital flight
that occurred when quantitative easing ended.
Table 2 - Cumulative Growth from 2008 - 2014
Country Brazil Korea Mexico South Africa
Turkey Indonesia
FX appreciation
52.12% 6.90% 34.72% 43.77% 68.94% 32.68%
GDP Growth
-2.02% -.59% .75% .79% 1.43% -.39%
The chart above depicts the overall EME currency change and GDP growth from
2008 to 2014. With the exception of Brazil, larger GDP growth was associated with a
larger currency appreciation and smaller GDP growth was associated with smaller
currency appreciation. Turkey experienced a 68.94% currency appreciation and a
cumulative GDP growth rate of 1.43%. Korea, Mexico, and South Africa had the
smallest currency appreciations and experienced negative GDP growth. Without steady
GDP growth, it is expected that these countries would not experience a large currency
appreciation.
The second variable that predicted with statistical significance how much a
country’s currency would appreciate over the course of quantitative easing was
RESERVE_GDP. This variable measures what amount of foreign reserves a country
holds in relation to its overall GDP. The model predicts with 99% confidence that a 1
unit increase in reserves/GDP will appreciate an emerging market currency by 7.57. As
an emerging market government holds more foreign currency in their banks, foreign
dollars will become less desirable, appreciating the emerging market currency.
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Table 3 - Cumulative Growth from 2008 - 2014
Country Brazil Korea Mexico South Africa
Turkey Indonesia
FX appreciation 52.12% 6.90% 34.72% 43.77% 68.94% 32.68%
Reserves/GDP 4.46% 3.88% 4.18% 1.42% 1.19% 1.15%
Table 3 depicts the cumulative appreciation of each country’s currency and the
cumulative change in reserves/GDP. In this scenario, Brazil experienced the largest
influx of foreign reserves and the largest exchange rate appreciation. Although Brazil
had small GDP growth during quantitative easing, it’s stockpiling of foreign reserves led
to a larger currency appreciation. Turkey’s reserves/GDP did not increase much over
quantitative easing, but its currency appreciation can be explained by their large
economic growth.
The model had three statistically insignificant variables, which were CPI,
CURRENCTACCOUNT_GDP, and EME_INTEREST. Current academic research on
this subject is divided on whether macroeconomic variables play a significant role in
determining currency appreciation. This analysis contradicts Lim et al (2014) and
Eichengreen and Gupta (2014). These researchers found CPI, emerging market interest
rates, and current account/GDP to play a statistically significant role in determining
emerging market currency appreciation. This study has similar findings to Mishra et al.
(2014) and Eizenman et al (2014). Their panel data analysis finds that both GDP growth
and reserve/GDP are significant variables. Larger GDP growth and high reserves
increase a country’s currency appreciation. It is widely agreed that the Federal Reserve’s
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large scale purchasing of long-term securities caused massive capital inflow into
emerging markets, this study was unable to statically pinpoint the effect this had on
currency exchange rates.
Conclusion
This study provides interesting results pertaining to the relationship between the
Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing and emerging market economy currencies. Similar
to previous literature, the effect of macroeconomic variables on emerging market
currencies played a significant role in determining currency appreciation. While only
GDP growth and reserves/GDP were statistically significant, this is not unexpected.
Other academic literature found contradicting results on the importance of
macroeconomic variables in determining EME currency changes. This study focused on
six countries over the entire span of quantitative easing. Other literature analyzed
specific QE time periods, typically QE1, QE2, QE3, or QE tapering. Furthermore, other
studies used anywhere from 5 – 80 emerging market economies. This can explain the
incongruence between this study’s results and other literature.
During quantitative easing the Federal Reserve was not always transparent with
time frames and quantity of long-term securities to be purchased. As such, capital flows
changed drastically over the time period considered. During QE 1, emerging market
economies experienced massive inflows, but QE 3 and QE tapering caused large capital
outflows. This explains why the Federal Reserve’s purchasing of long-term securities
could not predict EME currency appreciation. While the Fed continued to purchase
securities throughout the duration of QE, this in no way determined the behavior of
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investors. Instead, the start and end dates of QE played the largest role in explaining
investor behavior and capital flows, which determined exchange rates.
One aspect that this study did not cover was whether emerging market economies
pursued foreign exchange intervention or other monetary policies to combat the capital
inflows caused by quantitative easing. While monetary policies pursued by EMEs would
have been built into the exchange rate data, it was not directly studied or controlled for.
In further studies, this would be an interesting topic to cover. Since financial turmoil in
the developed world is a global phenomenon, analyzing what effect EME monetary
policy had on exchange rates could provide excellent policy advice for future crises.
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