QUEEN’SINTERNATIONALOBSERVER

A LETTER FROM THE EDITOREmerson Murray

Dear Reader,

Welcome to Volume Eleven of the Queen’s International Observer. Since 2003, the maga-zine has o!ered a global perspective to students at Queen’s University. "is fall, an entirely new team of sta! writers and editors will take the reins of the magazine. We look forward to a year of providing readers with thought-provoking analysis and quality research on international politics.

Our #rst issue, “"e Summer in Review,” aims to provide an alternative look at key po-litical events from summer 2014, and expose those that deserve greater attention. Corey Goldberg interprets the electoral victory of a Hindu nationalist party in India, while Dylan Edmonds analyzes the power dynamics behind the BRICS’ New Development Bank. Assistant Editor Holly Kallmeyer discusses both the need for a peaceful resolution to the South Sudanese civil war and the potential for Kurdish independence amid Iraq’s Islamist insurgency. Meanwhile, Assistant Editor Hayley McNorton examines the tense relationship between Sinhalese Buddhists and Muslims in Sri Lanka. As editor-in-chief, I investigate the motivations behind "ailand’s most recent coup d’état.

"e QIO is excited to display the work of a number of external contributors. Darren Henry-Noel explains the recent escalation of violence between Israel and Gaza. In global health, Lindsay Ruiter sheds light on maternal and sexual health initiatives in Pakistan’s Sindh province. Nirali Patel, President of the Queen’s International A!airs Association, chronicles the ongoing Blackwater Trial and the role of private military companies in mod-ern combat.

"e “Summer in Review” is merely a glimpse of the creative ideas and diverse insights that the incoming team has to o!er. If you share a passion for international a!airs, consider writing for the QIO. External submissions are always welcome, and the magazine is hiring additional sta! writers this September. Until our next release, we hope the “Summer in Review” leaves you wanting to learn more.

Sincerely,

Emerson Murray, Editor-in-Chief Vol.11Holly Kallmeyer and Hayley McNorton, Assistant Editors Vol. 11

1 SUMMER IN REVIEW

2 SUMMER IN REVIEW

TABLE OF CONTENTS

3. SOUTH SUDANESE CIVIL WAR5. ISRAEL-GAZA CONFLICT7. SRI LANKAN RIOTS9. IS & THE KURDS10. INDIAN ELECTIONS11. THAI COUP D’ÉTAT13. BRICS BANK15. BLACKWATER TRIAL17. SEX-ED IN PAKISTAN

3

5

7

9

1011

17

Emerson MurrayEditor-in-Chief

Hayley McNortonAssistant Editor

Holly KallmeyerAssistant Editor

Raine StoreyLayout Editor

THE TEAM

Dylan Edmonds Staff Writer

Kanivanan ChinniahStaff Writer

Corey Goldberg Staff Writer

CONTACT US

The views expressed by the authors of the QIO are XLIMV�S[R�ERH�HS�RSX�RIGIWWEVMP]�VI¾IGX�XLSWI�SJ�XLI�Queen’s International Affairs Association (QIAA) or its members.

CONTACT@QUEENSOBSERVER.ORGWWW.QUEENSOBSERVER.ORG

LIKE US ON FACEBOOK!

his July, the world’s youngest state marked its third birthday amid an ongoing civil war that has claimed the lives of over ten thousand people and caused over 1.1 million to $ee their homes. "e creation of South Sudan in 2011 was supposed to bring an end to its citizens’ su!ering a%er a 22 year long civil war between the Republic of Sudan’s government forc-es and southern-based rebels, howev-

er the inter-communal violence that began last December in South Sudan itself and escalated in recent months has only exacerbated their plight. "is summer, negotiations between the warring parties in South Sudan became even more urgent as the war interfered with the region’s planting season and food distribution, leading to a famine that could a!ect over three million people. Currently, the warring

sides are deadlocked while mediators desperately try to bring the parties to a durable consensus on a peace deal. In December 2013, President Salva Kiir accused Riek Machar, his for-mer Vice President, of plotting a coup d’état. A power struggle that had began in July of that year when Kiir kicked Machar and his allies out of their gov-ernment posts re-emerged between the two men and their respective fac-

NEGOTIATING PEACE INSOUTH SUDAN

by Holly Kallmeyer, Assistant Editor

3 SUMMER IN REVIEW

// ETHNIC & RELIGIOUS CONFLICT

T

“South Sudan 022” by Steve Evans via Flickr. Licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0.

by the two parties broke down with-in #ve days of signing. More recently, Machar’s representatives refused to attend the #rst days of IGAD’s second round of negotiations in early August. "e question of who will have executive power a%er the civil war is driving much of Kiir and Machar’s re-sistance to negotiation; each is afraid of being marginalized in a new South Sudanese government. To resolve this, IGAD mediators are consider-ing o!ering both Kiir and Machar high-level and visible involvement in the implementation of parts of the peace agreement, such as security sec-tor reform or economic restructuring, in exchange for participation in ne-gotiations. Another arrangement on the table would be to grant one party more control over the peace talks in exchange for a promise to not run in future presidential elections. Either of these options could be useful, but the high-level IGAD peace process needs support from other actors to ensure a durable peace agreement is reached. While IGAD is attempting to resolve the dispute between se-nior-level members of Kiir and Mach-ar’s factions, there is a growing need to address mid-level commanders in their armed forces. In many civil wars, mid-level commanders act as “spoilers”, undermining progress in peace talks because they have much to lose in terms of personal pow-er if a peace agreement is reached.

tions. "e feud took on an ethnic di-mension when government security forces massacred members of Mach-ar’s ethnic group in Juba, the coun-ty’s capital, killing an estimated 300 citizens. Reprisal attacks that have been ongoing since December have had devastating consequenc-es for civilians of each ethnicity. "e primary cleavage in this civil war is between Kiir’s ethnic group, the Dinka, and Machar’s, the Nuer. "e Sudanese People’s Liber-ation Army (SPLA, the government forces), which was multi-ethnic before December, saw massive desertions early this year of Nuer troops. "ese Nuer troops defected from the SPLA to #ght for Machar in the White Army, a poorly organized militia. In recent months both the White Army and the SPLA, and a variety of smaller militias, have thrown the country into chaos.

But the cycle of intercommu-nal violence in South Sudan is not in-tractable. Ethnic polarization and con-$ict between the Nuer and the Dinka is a relatively recent phenomenon. Ongoing negotiations between Kiir and Machar are being mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an east African multilateral organization, but the ne-gotiations face severe challenges. "e #rst hurdle is reaching a formal peace agreement between Kiir and Machar. "e di&cultly of this was on display in June, when a cease#re announced

4 SUMMER IN REVIEW

As a result, they have an incentive to disrupt cease#res and pressure their leaders to resist negotiations. In South Sudan, internation-al actors are well-suited to deal with the challenges presented by mid-lev-el commanders. For example, many mid-level members of the SPLA and White Army have dual citizenship in western countries and hold assets abroad. To create an incentive for co-operation, targeted sanctions (such as travel bans and asset freezes) can be imposed for failure to abide by the terms of the June cease#re. Sanc-tions would require strong action by the international community, ei-ther through states like the U.S. and U.K. imposing their own sanctions or through action at the level of the U.N. Security Council. While some bemoan the tendency of the U.N. to act slowly in times of crisis, the U.N. Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), has actually begun to have an e!ect on reducing the con$ict in South Sudan, particularly through its e!orts to en-sure compliance with the June cease-#re. Continued e!orts to neutralize the warring parties on the ground combined with harsh punishments for failure to abide by the cease#re would reduce the ability of mid-lev-el commanders to exert disruptive power over the peace process. IGAD’s peace talks would greatly bene#t from more external support along these lines by the international community. Like the previous civil war against the predominantly Arab gov-ernment in Sudan, South Sudan’s cur-rent con$ict revolves around ethnic-ity. "is time, however, regional and international actors are working hard to bring South Sudan back to a state of peace. For their part, the people of South Sudan desperately need a peace agreement to be reached to begin the process of reconciliation and, even-tually, to have life return to normal.

...many mid-level members of the SPLA and White Army have

dual citizenship in western countries and

hold assets abroad.

"e #rst hurdle is reaching a formal peace agreement between Kiir and

Machar.

ETHNIC & RELIGIOUS CONFLICT //

hose who do not learn from his-tory are doomed to repeat it. While brief, this adage applies broadly to the arena of foreign relations. For the second time in two years, Hamas has launched a massive rocket bombard-ment of Israel, in an attempt to achieve Palestinian freedom that has invited a hasty response from the government of Benjamin Netanyahu. "is time, Israel has responded with a ground o!ensive of signi#cant proportions alongside its air campaign, a decision criticized for both its military redun-dancy and political brinkmanship, with President Barack Obama warn-ing Israel that ‘the US and our friends and allies are deeply concerned about the risks of further escalation and the loss of more innocent life”. By exam-ining, however, the domestic and re-gional context of the crisis, each sides’ actions become more understand-able. From afar, it is easy to criticize each side for lacking foresight, but for those on both sides who experi-ence the horrors of the con$ict dai-ly, the desire for a quick and decisive

end to the con$ict is unsurprising. Israel’s decision to invade Gaza on foot was lauded by the hard-line conservatives of Netanyahu’s own right-wing coalition, while his appar-ent reluctance at #rst to sanction a ground o!ensive earned him criticism from high-ranking Israeli politicians, including the Israeli Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman. Lieberman ar-gued that ‘all hesitation works against us . . . We have to end this con$ict with the IDF in control of all of Gaza. "ere is no other way”. What seemed like a disproportionate response to many spectators was a question of survival or death for many Israelis, particular-ly those in coastal cities that saw the heaviest rocket bombardments. "ere was also a belief that decisive action against Hamas would send a clear message to other extremist groups, such as Hezbollah and the Al-Nusra Front, that Israel was able and willing to protect itself. A full ground o!en-sive was considered the only solu-tion to the constant threat of rockets and terrorist attacks that Israel faced

daily from an unyielding enemy. "e goal of this policy was to break Pales-tinian faith in Hamas. Moreover, the Israeli government blamed Hamas for the increase of civilian casualties, accusing them of using the images of young corpses to evoke sympa-thy from the international audience. Hamas, of course, was by no means innocent of this accusation, and it seemed that the organization hoped the rising civilian casualties would be enough to put signi#cant international pressure on Israel to cease its military operations. Isra-el, however, could be accused of the same, as the heroic glori#cation of slain soldiers fuelled domestic public resentment of Hamas. Previous en-gagements showed that Israeli policy-makers relied more on military opera-tions to achieve political goals, which were mainly to destroy Palestinian civilian infrastructure and discredit Hamas as a political actor. Meanwhile, Hamas will undoubtedly lose credi-bility among Palestinians for refusing to negotiate and opting for a military

5 SUMMER IN REVIEW

by Darren Henry-Noel, History 15’T

// ETHNIC & RELIGIOUS CONFLICT

UNDERSTANDING THE ISRAEL-GAZA CONFLICT

secure their position. Furthermore, Hamas had lost the support of its key regional backers, Syria and Iran, for supporting the Syrian uprising over their traditional ally Bashar al-Assad. "e regional turmoil that engulfed the Middle East meant that countries who might otherwise have applied pres-sure on the UN to undertake a more active role in defusing the crisis were too busy dealing with internal unrest to signi#cantly counterbalance Israel. "e greatest tragedy to emerge from this is that the recent escalation of violence will only con-vince both sides to entrench them-selves further apart. With an inter-national audience overwhelmed by political crises and the Middle East wracked by chaos, the political situa-tion seemed ripe for Israel to strike a #nishing blow to an enemy. But when both sides saw themselves as inno-cent victims, there was no room for negotiation, only for absolute victory.

nority, and that previous negotiations were merely a stalling tactic used by Israel until all Palestinian hopes of achieving statehood were crushed. "e international stage this summer - otherwise cluttered with sectarian violence, civil strife, and ae-rial #ascoes - created a lack of polit-ical capacity among states that might ordinarily have pursued a more active role in mitigating the violence. Egypt, a frequent mediator between Hamas and Israel, had just seen a coup oust an elected Muslim Brotherhood gov-ernment and replace it with a military dictatorship nearly identical to the one expelled almost four years ago. Given the need to stamp out Brother-hood protests in Egypt, it was unlikely that Egypt would protest a renewed Israeli o!ensive against Hamas, it-self a Muslim Brotherhood o!shoot, or push for any sort of cease#re. "e so-called ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings in-spired such fear among the dictatorial regimes in the Middle East that they willingly backed Israel so that the Americans would, in turn, help them

con$ict while being outmatched. "e question of ‘why’ a ground o!ensive was launched then became a question of ‘why now’. "e periodic exchanges of rocket #re and airstrikes preluded a greater con$ict – one that Israeli society welcomed, having gradually shi%ed to the right. With the exception of Arab-Israeli cit-izens and a few members of the le%-wing Israeli political parties, the bulk of Israeli society has been united be-hind the invasion as a result of Hamas’ relentless targeting of common areas of investment, such as Tel Aviv and Ben-Gurion Airport. While the world of realpolitik and foreign a!airs so of-ten overlooks the human factor, the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teens, followed by the killing of a Pal-estinian youth, were undoubtedly cen-tral to escalating the crisis. To Israelis, it was a vindication of the warnings of their leaders that only decisive action could lead to a future without Hamas. For Hamas, it ful#lled their warnings that a Jewish state would never toler-ate the presence of a Palestinian mi-

6

“Destroyed ambulance in the City of Shijaiyah in the Gaza Strip” by Boris Niehaus via Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0.

SUMMER IN REVIEW

7

“.EQM�9P�%PJEV²�F]�1]WXvG�ZME�;MOMQIHME�'SQQSRW��0MGIRWIH�YRHIV�''�&=�7%������1SHM½IH�JVSQ�3VMKMREP�

SUMMER IN REVIEW

dhists. An exemplary case is the treat-ment of Gnansara "ero. Although there is veri#ed video evidence that Gnansara "ero blatantly threatened the lives of others at the rally before the riots, he was not arrested. One questions that if a Muslim or Tam-il extremist group threatened the lives of and incited violence against Sinhala Buddhists, whether they would also be treated the same way. As journalist Kalana Sen-aratne emphasized, Sri Lanka is a state that has the legal, military and judicial resources to supress any organiza-tion it deems to be illegal. However, the Rajapaksa government continues to not only allow the BBS to exist as a legal entity, but it also continues to put the organization on equal stand-ing with other religious stakeholders. One possible explanation for the gov-ernment`s inaction is that although the BBS is extremist, it does not pose a threat to the government or to Sinha-la Buddhism as a whole. "erefore, it has no urgent cause to ban the group. Additionally, rumors circulated that the government, speci#cally Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, was supporting the group and its goals. Although these accusations were de-nied, the lack of action against the group leads to questions surround-ing the government`s impartiality. While the complexities of the anti-Muslim riots of June can be discussed in more depth, an ini-tial conclusion is apparent: despite the diversity of ethnic and religious groups in Sri Lanka, they are not all treated equally. Without meaningful change, the marginalization of mi-nority ethnic and religious groups will continue to reinforce the idea that they are outsiders in their own country. For the citizens of Sri Lan-ka to live as equals, their govern-ment should #rst treat them equally.

dead and numerous people injured. A%er the violence ended, many questioned the e!ectiveness of the government’s response. When the riots initially broke out, the local po-lice and a special task force were sent in to impose curfew on the a!ected areas. However, following the riots, many residents of Aluthgama and Be-ruwala insisted that the curfew did not stop the violence because the police and special task force either stood by or responded late to distress calls. Be-cause of this, many of those who were physically injured or whose property was damaged accused the govern-ment forces of prejudice, as they failed to halt the violence that they believed was targeted speci#cally at Muslims. Although President Rajapak-sa continues to claim that Sri Lanka is a multicultural society that treats all of its citizens as equals, regard-less of their religion or ethnicity, ac-cusations of the contrary persist. In Sri Lanka’s constitution, there is ev-idence that the government favours Sinhala Buddhism over other ethnic and religious groups in the country. Although the constitution states that no person shall be discriminated on the grounds of their race, religion, language, caste, sex, political opin-ion, or place of birth, it also states that the government pledges to fos-ter and protect Buddhism, and gives it the “foremost place” in Sri Lankan society. "e result is that although the Rajapaksa government may claim to represent all of its citizens, regardless of their religion, it still has a bias to-wards certain religions. Consequently the structure of Sri Lankan society, as dictated by its constitution, gives credence to those who say the gov-ernment has failed to treat its various ethnic and religious groups equally. "e result of giving Bud-dhism the “foremost place” in Sri Lan-ka is that the government is reluctant to take action against extremist Bud-

n 2009, the Sri Lankan gov-ernment won the Civil War against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Following the victory, President Ma-hinda Rajapaksa declared that all Sri Lankan citizens could “now live as equals in this free country.” Five years have passed since the Presi-dent made that statement, yet Sri Lanka still struggles with equality and unity between its religious and ethnic groups. "is summer, ten-sions between these groups peaked when anti-Muslim broke out in June. On June 15, the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS), an organization known for its nationalist and extremist pro-motion of Sinhala Buddhism, held a rally in Aluthgama. At the rally, sev-eral BBS leaders preached the dan-gers of other ethnic minorities to the Sinhala Buddhist race, and argued that Sinhala Buddhism was a superior ethnic and religious tradition. Gener-al Secretary Galagoda Atte Gnansara "ero went as far to say that “…if a single Marakkalaya [Muslim] or some other paraya [alien] touches a sin-gle Sinhalese…..it will be their end.” "e thousands of supporters present at the rally enthusiastically agreed with these sentiments, and echoed their support as they marched to-wards the nearby city of Dharga Town. According to the o&cial ac-count given by Ambassador Ravi-natha Aryasinha at the 26th session of the UN Human Rights Council, stones were thrown at BBS support-ers as they proceeded through Dhar-ga Town. In reaction, violence broke out between BBS supporters and local citizens, which escalated into riots that spread to the town of Beruwa-la. As the violence persisted, Muslim businesses, homes and communities were targeted by radical Sinhala Bud-dhists, resulting in more then one case of buildings either being looted or set on #re. "e riots lasted approx-imately 48 hours, leaving 4 people

8

by Hayley McNorton, Assistant EditorI

ETHNIC & RELIGIOUS CONFLICT //

RESPONDING TO ALUTHGAMA

SUMMER IN REVIEW

KURDISTAN RISING hile the Islamic State’s (IS) brutal insurgency has dominated media coverage this summer on the future of Iraq, there is another group that challenges the coun-try’s unity. "e Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), a semi-autonomous region of Iraq, will be a decisive player in the Iraqi federation’s survival. "e KRG’s response to the war against IS has demonstrated the Kurds’ potential for greater in$uence in the region, and perhaps signals their intention to secede. "e KRG’s strength has given hope to the 30 million Kurds of the Middle East, 24 mil-lion of whom live outside Iraq, that their calls for an in-dependent Kurdish state will #nally be answered. Iraq’s Kurds may have the capacity to secede, but whether their politicians will pursue independence remains to be seen. "e Kurds’ military capabilities in the face of IS are impressive in comparison to Iraq’s national army. When Iraqi soldiers $ed their posts at Kirkuk in June, the peshmerga (the KRG’s army) showed competence and solidarity by securing the oil-rich city. Whereas de-fections from the Iraqi army have skyrocketed, the pesh-merga have been able to retain and even recruit troops. Currently, peshmerga forces are maintaining a 600 mile frontier against IS. In Sinjar, Kurdish forces were criti-cized for failing to protect the Yazidi population (a Kurd-ish minority who were targeted in IS’s attack on Sinjar), as pershmerga troops withdrew from the town in ad-vance of IS’s attack. "eir retreat, however, was due to a lack of ammunition rather than a military command is-sue. Moreover, Kurdish rebels on the Syrian side of Mount Sinjar were crucial players in the safe evacuation of the Yazidis before the U.S. airli%ed supplies to the mountains. "e peshmerga’s primary weakness in its #ght against IS lies in its outdated military equipment. "e IS forces have much stronger conventional arms than the Kurdish forces, which partly enabled IS’s to take both Sinjar and Mosul. However, incoming international mil-itary aid to the Kurdish forces will substantially help in #ghting against IS. Early e!ects of this aid are already ap-parent: just days a%er President Obama announced the U.S.’s assistance to the peshmerga in the form of air at-tacks and weapons, the peshmerga were able to re-take Mosul from IS. While the peshmerga may not be able to eliminate the IS insurgency altogether, with exter-nal support it will likely be able to keep the KRG secure. Some have interpreted the peshmerga’s strength as a signal that Iraqi Kurdistan is position-ing itself to secede from Iraq, ful#lling a long-held de-sire for independence. Indeed, the notion that Iraq will

continue to exist in any form in the coming years is debateable. However, the head of the KRG, Masoud Bar-zani, has been skillfully manoeuvering for both outcomes. In early July, Barzani announced plans for an in-dependence referendum to be held in the KRG and told Al Jazeera that “[the Kurds] will no longer accept other people deciding our fate. We will be the ones deciding our own fu-ture.” At the same time, Barzani was a prominent #gure in the negotiations that led to the nomination of Haider al-Aba-di to succeed Nouri Maliki as Iraq’s prime minister, which may indicate an intention to stay in the federation of Iraq. Reasons for the KRG to remain a part of Iraq are largely economic. While Kurdistan’s oil reserves are vast, secession would limit their pro#tability. In Kirkuk, the largest oil reserve near Kurdistan, a complicated ar-rangement of pro#t-sharing prohibits the KRG from unilaterally exporting oil. Moreover, American com-panies are currently barred from purchasing oil direct-ly from Kurdish suppliers as part of the U.S’s commit-ment to a uni#ed Iraq. As an incentive to remain part of the federation, in Iraq’s constitution the KRG is entitled to 17% of all national oil revenue, which could be a sub-stantial #gure considering Iraq’s potential oil output. On the other hand, regional conditions for Kurdish secession have not been better since the end of WWI. Syrian Kurdish militias positioned along the KRG’s border, many of which are associated with the PKK (a Turkish-Kurdish rebel militia with a history of separatist ambitions), are si-multaneously holding their defences against Islamist insur-gents and Syrian government forces while providing basic government functions. Iran, which had previously opposed Kurdish secession because of its own Kurdish minority, has reached out to Iraqi Kurds in an e!ort to form a Shiite-Kurd-ish alliance. Most notably, Turkey, which has the region’s largest Kurdish population and only recently ended a de-cades-long #ght with its own Kurdish rebels, showed signs this summer of welcoming an independent Iraqi Kurdis-tan. At the beginning of the summer, Turkey signed an oil deal with the KRG in an attempt to break its reliance on Russian energy sources. When asked about the prospect of an independent Kurdistan, a Turkish government spokes-person said that it would not be something Turkey would #ght, signalling a major shi% in Turkish foreign policy. "e borders of Iraq have not been this frag-ile in decades. While IS has presented a signi#-cant threat to those borders, the deciding factor in Iraq’s survival may be the political will of the Kurds.

9

by Holly Kallmeyer, Assistant EditorW

// ETHNIC & RELIGIOUS CONFLICT

SUMMER IN REVIEW

10

his past summer saw a political revitalization in India with the 2014 general elections. It was a remarkable event in the history of Indian democracy, as the 814 million eligible voters exceeded those of the previous election by 100 million. With a su!ering economy and rampant corruption, Indians demanded a change a%er ten “lost” years under the Singh government. "is election granted their wishes, re-vealing a transformation in the Indian political climate. Narendra Modi, former Chief Minister (CM) of Gujarat, was elected Prime Minister of India with a land-slide vote for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Defeating the United Progressive Alliance, a coalition led by the his-torically predominant Indian National Congress (INC), the BJP was the #rst political party to win an outright majority by itself in the Indian parliament since 1984. "e BJP’s electoral success was largely the re-sult of Modi’s own popularity throughout India, which stemmed from multiple factors. Modi was seen as a man of the people: born into a disadvantaged caste, he worked his way up from being the “chai boy” in his local railway station to a Prime Ministerial candidate. Modi’s prom-inence within the BJP and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sanghc (RSS), a nationalist paramilitary group, gained him a reputation for supporting Hindu nationalism, win-ning over a massive and unwavering Hindu base. Fur-thermore, Modi was known for his intolerance towards corruption, a topic of prime importance in the election. "e main factor in Modi’s popularity, howev-er, was the general perception that he had the strongest economic vision for India among all the candidates. Be-ginning a%er his #rst term as CM of Gujarat, Modi shi%-

ed his political focus from Hindutava (Hindu national-ism) to economic development, promising to enact the “Gujarat model” nationwide during his electoral cam-paign. His accomplishments in Gujarat–increasing the GDP and opening a Tata Nano manufacturing plant, to name two–led many Indians, particularly those with-in the growing middle class, to see him as the leader who would strengthen a su!ering national economy. While Modi was known for his sound economic policy, his political record remains controversial, and his critics have put forth two closely related concerns. "e #rst deals with the status of India’s religious minorities under Hindu nationalist governance. Historically, the treatment of religious minorities by Hindu Nationalist Governments has been poor, with the destruction of the Babri Masjid Mosque in 1992 and the Gujarat riots in 2002 as examples. "e second concern involves Modi’s alleged role in the Gujarat riots. In 2002, an attack by Muslim insur-gents killed 58 Hindus on a train in Ghodra. "e state plunged into chaos, resulting in the deaths of approxi-mately 2000 people, the majority of whom were Muslim. A%er the riots, Modi’s government underwent heavy scru-tiny and faced allegations of involvement in the killings. Former BJP minister Maya Kodnani was notably con-victed of distributing arms and inciting a mob of 15,000. Modi himself was subject to an investigation under a Su-preme Court order that lasted almost a decade, but the court eventually ruled that there was no valid case against him. His critics, however, viewed the decision as a farce. Modi and other top o&cials made question-able decisions a%er the train attack. For example, vic-tims’ corpses were transferred uncovered to the city of Ahmadabad, inspiring anger in many Muslims. Modi, refusing to apologize, said “hang me if I’m guilty.” Nonetheless, the results of last May’s election sug-gest that most voters view Modi’s association with the Guja-rat riots as a mere stain on his political record. Considering his politics in aggregate, an overwhelming number of people voted for him, including many Muslims and former critics. "is conclusion suggests a frightening reali-ty with regard to India’s political climate: there is a gen-eral eagerness in India to overlook exclusionary reli-gious ideology in favour of pursuing economic growth. While the repercussions of this election remain to be seen, the changing political landscape makes India worth watching. Perhaps Modi will prove to be the lead-er the country needs, or perhaps history will repeat itself.

INDIA VOTES 2014by Corey Goldberg, Commerce 15’

Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India

DEMOCRACY & DEMOCRATIZATION //

T“2EVIRHVE�(�1SHM²�F]�REVIRHVEQSHMSJ½GMEP�ZME�*PMGOV��''�&=�����

SUMMER IN REVIEW

emocracy in "ailand is frag-ile. Last May, "ailand’s military seized power from a caretaker government a%er six months of political chaos that led to 28 deaths, over 700 injuries, and the impeachment of a prime minister.

"e National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), a military junta, took the reins on "ailand’s political a!airs. In the name of democratic reform, the regime granted itself sweeping power, tightened public censorship, and arbitrarily detained hundreds.

How was democratic re-form without democracy valid? According to the NCPO, "ai democ-racy had turned into a “parliamen-tary dictatorship”: corrupt populists had won the vote of rural masses with empty promises and welfare schemes, going on to use democra-

cy as a vehicle for greed and tyranny. "e military was thus obliged to seize power and #x democracy to prevent them from winning future elections.

In reality, an elite network–"ailand’s royalists–felt that democracy had compromised the power and pres-tige of the throne. Changing political tides had taken the popular vote out of their favour. A military coup would thus enable the royalists to bring de-mocracy within comfortable limits.

A Decade of Crisis

"e electoral success of "aksin Shi-nawatra, a telecommunications ty-coon and former Prime Minister, began the royalists’ unease with de-mocracy. He entered "ai politics in the wake of the Asian #nancial crisis when IMF reforms lowered public

con#dence in the right-wing Dem-ocrat government. A political rook-ie, "aksin portrayed himself as an energetic and decisive businessman with a concern for the rural poor. He was elected PM in 2001 and re-elect-ed, by a landslide majority, in 2005.

Amid accusations of corruption and abuse of power, a military coup re-moved "aksin from o&ce in 2006. To avoid a supreme court convic-tion for con$ict-of-interest over his wife’s purchase of state land, "aksin $ed "ailand on self-imposed ex-ile in 2008 and lives abroad to this day. Nonetheless, "aksin’s populist policies, such as a!ordable health-care and economic stimulus, earned him loyal support across "ailand’s largely agrarian and lower-income Northeast. As a result, "aksin’s po-litical proxies have won every election since his ousting. Most recently, Yin-gluck Shinawatra–"aksin’s sister–led the Pheu "ai (“For "ais”) Party to win an outright majority in 2011.

"e past decade of political tur-moil revolved around "aksin and his proxies. His main support came from the United Front for Democ-racy Against Dictatorship (UDD), known as the “Red Shirts,” and the rural segments of Northeast "ai-land. His opponents were royalists, conservatives, the military, and the upper and middle class segments of Bangkok and the South. "ey a&liat-ed with the Democrat Party and the People’s Democratic Reform Commit-tee (PDRC), an umbrella group that encompassed the “Yellow Shirt” Peo-ple’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD).

"e round of unrest that led to the most recent coup began in Novem-ber 2013 when PM Yingluck and the Pheu "ai passed a general amnesty bill that would enable "aksin’s re-turn to "ailand without trial, inciting PDRC protests. In May, the Consti-tutional Court ordered Yingluck to step down for abuse of power while

THAILAND: DEMOCRATIC REFORM WITHOUTDEMOCRACY?

by Emerson Murray, Editor-in-Chief

11 SUMMER IN REVIEW

Thaksin and Yingluck Shinawatra, Former Prime Ministers of Thailand

D

// DEMOCRACY & DEMOCRATIZATION

“Yingluck Shinawatra - World Economic Forum Meeting 2012” by World Economic Forum via Flickr.0MGIRWIH�YRHIV�''�&=�7%������1SHM½IH�JVSQ�3VMKMREP�

“Thaksin DOD 20050915” by DoD photo by Helene C. Stikkel - http://www.defenselink.mil/photos/newsphoto.aspx?newsphotoid=7105. Licensed under Public domain

"e NCPO also called for an “attitude adjustment” that re$ected royalist rhetoric: to disagree with the removal of "aksin and his sister, regardless of its undemocratic nature, was to dis-tance oneself from the "ai nation. Since May, the NCPO has arbitrarily detained over 300 people–journalists, activists, academics, and politicians–for criticizing the regime, violating lèse majesté, or disobeying martial law. Af-ter a summer of authoritarian rule, the future of "ai democracy is uncertain.

A Movement Unchained

Without the rule of law, public consul-tation, or freedom of expression, the NCPO’s promise to reform democra-cy is disingenuous. "aksin and Yin-gluck Shinawatra were the only leaders in "ai history to govern by popular mandate, which threatened the mon-archy’s political grasp. Frustrated with democracy, the royalists cast "aksin as a national enemy, his support as a tyranny of the majority, and them-selves as rescuers of the Kingdom.

"aksin was indeed authoritari-an: he passed broad censorship and emergency laws, $outed the advice of human rights organizations, and oversaw a “War on Drugs” that led to 2,800 extra-judicial killings. He succeeded at the polls, however, be-cause he engaged the rural poor that Bangkok had long overlooked.

Loyal support of "aksin and his o!-shoots signalled a political reawaken-ing among "ais, which neither roy-alists nor the NCPO will stop. Some Red Shirts have nonetheless realized "aksin’s shortcomings and have gone beyond seeking his return to "ai-land. "e movement’s newly adopted symbols–"e Hunger Games salute, the playing of La Marseillaise, and the reading of 1984–suggest a broader con-cern for democracy and social justice.

ample, they accused "aksin of “khai chat” (“selling out the country”) when he sold his telecommunications #rm to the Singapore government in 2006, claiming that he allowed Singapore to spy on "ailand. "aksin, according to the royalists, was willing to give the Kingdom away to foreign rivals out of greed. He was therefore a (construct-ed) threat to "ai nationhood, which warranted military intervention.

A Democracy with Limits

"e latest cycle of unrest saw "ai democracy come into question. A%er a decade of populist leadership, roy-alists declared it ruined by "aksin. Tyranny of the majority was behind the electoral wins of the Shinawatras, who bought the vote of naïve and uneducated farmers–or the “khwai daeng” (“Red Bu!alos”), in royalist terms. "e PDRC and the military thus argued that an appointed council was needed to reform democracy and protect "ailand from "aksin’s greed.

"ese arguments surfaced last Febru-ary when Yingluck asked the King to dissolve parliament and call for gener-al elections, reacting to protests against the amnesty bill. With predictions of another Pheu "ai victory, the PDRC boycotted the elections and blocked polling stations across the South, lead-ing the Constitutional Court to void the results and leave "ailand with a caretaker government. Before anoth-er election could be held, the mili-tary took reform into its own hands.

"is summer witnessed a regime con-cerned with restraining democracy rather than repairing it. In July, the NCPO appointed a National Legis-lative Assembly of which more than half the members were from the secu-rity forces. "e NCPO also passed an interim constitution that granted itself sweeping powers and legal immunity. Neither the rule of law nor public repre-sentation appears to be part of the NC-PO’s process for democratic change.

an anti-corruption commission im-peached her over a failed rice sub-sidy scheme. As rallies by the UDD and PDRC ensued and heightened prospects of civil war, the military intervened with a bloodless coup.

The Monarchy and a Constructed Threat

"aksin Shinawatra and his proxies faced opposition because they came into con$ict with "ailand’s monar-chy: an age-old institution that contin-ues to assert power behind the scenes. King Bhumibol Adulyadej has histor-ically intervened in political crises, endorsed regimes, and steered public opinion through media appearanc-es. According to Duncan McCargo, a scholar of contemporary "ai poli-tics, the King operated through “net-works” of proxies across bodies such as the military and the Privy Council. While in o&ce, "aksin revamped the "ai bureaucracy to replace the King’s networks with those of his cro-nies, sparking a royalist retaliation.

"e royal endorsement of last May’s coup was an example of the King’s po-litical role. Immensely popular among "ais, he remains a key source of le-gitimacy as the result of a Cold War project. To unify "ais against com-munism, the dictator Sarit "anarat created a new persona for the King. "e image of a virtuous leader, respon-sible for providing moral guidance and caring for the rural masses through development work, deeply engrained itself in "ailand’s collective memory. Meanwhile, strict lèse majesté laws have prevented critical discussion on the King’s place in "ai democracy.

"aksin’s royalist opponents used the King’s moral image to legitimate their cause. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, a scholar of Southeast Asian studies, argued that because the King was integral to "ailand’s national iden-tity, the royalists framed "aksin as a threat to national security. For ex-

12 SUMMER IN REVIEW

DEMOCRACY & DEMOCRATIZATION //

uly 1st of this year marked the 70th anniversary of the Bretton Woods Conference, which pursued economic stability in the #rst half of the twentieth century through policies on international trade and currency rates. More recently, the institutional o!spring of the Bretton Woods Con-ference, the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have faced criticism for push-ing an outdated neoliberal econom-ic model. Recent e!orts to revamp the aging lending regime have fallen woefully short, as Belgium has more IMF votes than Brazil and China has less clout then the Benelux countries. On July 15, the leading emerg-ing countries–Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS)–announced the New Development Bank (NDB). Although the creation of the BRICS’ #rst institution signals a greater opportunity to advance

their economic agenda, competition between the participant countries could stall any progress made so far. As its name suggests, the NDB aims to “mobiliz[e] resourc-es for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging and developing coun-tries.” Details on the bank’s structure and functions remain uno&cial, but its main components were announced in Fortaleza, Brazil. "e NDB will call Shanghai home, its #rst presi-dent will be Indian, and its Board of Governors will be comprised of Rus-sians. Most importantly, the bank will hold $100 billion USD in authorized capital in the reserves of participant countries, while dividing $50 billion in subscribed capital equally among each. Although $100 billion of cap-ital is substantial, one must keep in mind the NDB’s western competitor’s pockets run much deeper: the IMF

alone has $1 trillion at its disposal. Aside from the relations between each of the 5 countries, the BRICS is little more than an acronym. To be successful in of-fering a new economic model, the NDB’s inter-organizational rela-tions must promote cooperation. Questions of potential con-$ict among the BRICS have already surfaced in the media. Herein lies the BRICS’ paradox: by grouping together and initiating closer relations to count-er the traditional Great Powers, the BRICS’ own con$icting interests and goals become more apparent. Take the example of India and China, two major players in the BRICS. "ere are some in India who fear that China will be the #rst among equals within the bank. "e bank’s preliminary details have outlined voting rights, which are important for cooperation, but what about India’s failed pitch to house the

13 SUMMER IN REVIEW

RETHINKING THE BRICS BANK

// GREAT POWERS

J by Dylan Edmonds, Political Studies 17’

Dilma Rousse!President of Brazil

Vladimir PutinPresident of Russia

Narendra ModiPrime Minister of India

Xi JinpingPresident of China

Jacob ZumaPresident of South Africa

“Dilma Rousseff ” by Agência Brasil via Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under CC-BY-3.0-br. ±:PEHMQMV�4YXMR�¯�����²�F]�6YWWMER�4VIWMHIRXMEP�4VIWW�ERH�-RJSVQEXMSR�3J½GI�ZME�;MOMQIHME�'SQQSRW��0MGIRWIH�YRHIV�''�&=�������±2EVIRHVE�(�1SHM²�F]�REVIRHVEQSHMSJ½GMEP�ZME�*PMGOV��''�&=����� “Xi Jinping October 2013” by Antilong via Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0. “South Africa – Jacob Zuma” by the Commonwealth via Flickr. Licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0.

candidate from an emerging country, which was Mexico. By failing to set na-tional interests aside, China and Brazil compromised the BRICS’ solidarity. "ere is no doubt that the NDB will have many challenges to overcome well before the institution even begins to lend. "e world has become no less complicated since the IMF and WB entered the economic fray some 70 years ago. One point, however, is unambiguously clear: de-spite potential con$ict among the BRICS, the political will for an alter-native to western IFIs in the Global South is showing. We can only look to the future to see if this will is un-stable, or solid, much like real bricks.

there where power and power politics runs the roost. Let India not lose sight of this.” While fearing Chinese expan-sion, India is also weary of countering its rival’s growth and inadvertently supporting American dominance. As a whole, the BRICS are plagued with a long history of distrust and con$ict among their members. For example, the Russo-Chinese ri-valry occurred back when both coun-tries were under communist rule. To a certain extent, history still can still play a role in the level of distrust with-in the BRICS and many see an orga-nization that is still su!ering from historical grievances and chronically narrow national interests. Recently, when choosing a new leader for the IMF a%er the departure of Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the BRICS were unable to stand in solidarity: China and Bra-zil withheld support from the only

NDB’s headquarters in New Delhi? Oliver Stuenkel, a professor of Interna-tional Relations at the Getulio Vargas Foundation and a #rm believer in the BRICS’ capacity to diminish neoliber-al hegemony, voices concerns over the group’s rivalries, stating, “"e fact that the agreement about the location of the bank’s headquarters was reached only hours before the signing ceremo-ny underlines that it will take consid-erable e!ort to manage intra-BRICS rivalries.” Is this an example of India taking the back seat to China in the NDB’s inter-workings? All questions aside, there is a prospect of future con-$ict between the BRICS countries over which national interests will play out. Echoing these concerns, one writer from FirstPost, an Indian News Agency, wrote, “India should not fall into the trap of bleary eyed and mushy rhetoric. It’s a Hobbesian jungle out

14 SUMMER IN REVIEW

GREAT POWERS //

2014 BRICS Summit in Fortaleza

“:-�'�TYPE�HS�&VMGW²�F]�&PSK�HS�4PEREPXS�ZME�*PMGOV��0MGIRWIH�YRHIV�''�&=�2'�7%������

he use of private soldiers dates back centuries, ranging from colonial privateers to the Nubians. At present, they operate as part of private military companies (PMCs), undertaking secu-rity-related tasks outside the scope of government forces. PMCs became the focus of public attention seven years ago with a shoot-out at Nisour Square in Baghdad that killed Iraqi civilians. Since June of this year, #ve personnel from Blackwater, an American PMC, have been on trial for charges related to the incident. Although the trial is still underway, it is one of the #rst in-stances where a PMC has faced legal recourse for its activities abroad. "e trial highlights a need to more close-ly scrutinize PMCs, recognizing that their role in the warzone is here to stay. Blackwater was founded by Erik Prince, a former businessman and Navy SEAL o&cer, in 1997 and based in North Carolina, operating within a wide market of other mili-tary contractors. On 16 September 2007, Blackwater personnel allegedly shot and killed twenty Iraqi civilians and injured twenty others in Nisour Square, Baghdad. Although the inci-dent enraged the Iraqi government, it was unable to act since Blackwater employees fell under US military juris-diction and were immune to Iraqi law. In 2009, the US convicted #ve Blackwater personnel on counts of manslaughter, attempted manslaugh-ter, and weapons violations. A district judge dismissed the charges, because the case was built on sworn statements that the guards had given to the State

Department in exchange for legal im-munity. "e case was re-opened in April 2011 a%er the Obama adminis-tration appealed the dismissal, and the new trial began mid-June of this year. Jeremy Ridgeway, a former Blackwater guard involved in the Nisour Square incident, is the chief witness for the prosecution. Ridge-way initially denied that the guards were at fault, stating that they opened #re at Nisour Square because they were ambushed. In 2009, he for-mally rescinded his testimony and chose to testify against his colleagues in the current trial, pleading guilty to voluntary and attempted man-slaughter. If convicted, the Black-water personnel will be sentenced to a minimum of 30 years in prison. A%er the Nisour Square in-cident, Blackwater changed its name to XE Services and then Academi, which merged with its rival Triple Canopy and eventually became part of Constellis Holdings. Although the company’s brand changes served to distance itself from previous trage-dy, Iraqi and American o&cials will always remember what occurred. While the Blackwater trial is still in progress, PMCs remain pros-perous in the #eld of international se-curity. "ey emerged in the 1980s with the paradigm shi% to neoliberalism and e!orts under Reagan and "atch-er to o'oad government responsibil-ities to the private sector. Since then, states, multinational corporations, and non-governmental organizations have all hired PMCs for their various

needs. PMCs have operated on every continent (with the exception of Ant-arctica) and o!er a number of services including combat troops, logistical support, supplies, security services (bodyguards), and military operation-al advice. PMCs are typically hired to secure commercial interests and provide personnel to aid the govern-ment and army in reconstructing in-ternal and external infrastructures. While PMCs are beyond the jurisdiction of international law and therefore face fewer constraints than military actors, the placement of an unregulated actor in a war-zone creates tense situations for diplomats and soldiers. Blackwa-ter was the #rst major case in recent decades that saw the international community demand recourse for il-legal actions by military contractors. Regardless of the ongoing trial, PMCs will remain vital to inter-national security and combat zones abroad, but they deserve greater scru-tiny. Academi personnel are stationed around the world, most recently sus-pected of operating in Ukraine. It re-mains uncon#rmed, however, wheth-er the mysterious military contractors in Ukraine are actually American or just Russian propaganda. Dr. Nafeez Ahmed, a security expert from the Institute for Policy Research and De-velopment, hinted at the former when he said, “It’s certainly not beyond the realm of possibility–Academi have been deployed in all sorts of theaters.”

15 SUMMER IN REVIEW

by Nirali Patel, President of QIAA

THE NEW PRIVATE SOLDIER // EMERGING TRENDS

T

16 SUMMER IN REVIEW

THE NEW PRIVATE SOLDIERIt’s certainly not

beyond the realm of possibility–Academi

have been deployed in all sorts of theaters.

“”

EMERGING TRENDS //

“/'����W�EX�7YRWIX²�F]�7XYEVX�6EROMR�ZME�*PMGOV��0MGIRWIH�YRHIV�''�&=�2'������1SHM½IH�JVSQ�3VMKMREP�

reproduction is inadequate. A girl may learn that she should use a con-dom to avoid pregnancy, but many newly wed girls are unable to convince their husbands to adopt this practice. According to UN Statistics, Pakistan has a teenage pregnancy rate of 20.3 per 1000 births. A lack of knowledge about sex and reproduction may par-tially account for this statistic, but simply informing women about these topics is unlikely to change it by any signi#cant amount. To reduce teen-age pregnancies and related compli-cations, there are larger structures to examine, such as the practice of child marriages that is still fairly com-mon in the rural and lower-income areas of Pakistan: 35.2% of married women between the ages of 25 and

pproximately one out of ev-ery three girls in Pakistan is married before she turns eighteen. Young marriages o%en result in adolescent pregnancies, which are known to pose a very high risk in terms of both ma-ternal and child health. According to USAID, approximately 70,000 girls die every year in Pakistan due to com-plications arising from adolescent childbirths and pregnancies. Howev-er, recent events in the Sindh prov-ince have provided women’s rights and health activists with a $icker of hope that change is on the horizon.

In February 2014, sex education class-es for girls of eight years or more began in Johi, a small village in the Sindh province of Pakistan. Over 600

girls have attended these classes that cover menstruation, sexual rights, and self-defense. "is is a radical initiative for the small community, as publically accessible information is so minimal that many girls reach menstruation without knowing what it is and are married without under-standing the mechanics of sex. "e goal of these classes is to reduce the number of sexual assault and rape cases and to inform girls about safe sex practices, contraception use, and when to seek medical care. If girls learn at a young age about reproduc-tive and sexual health, female health statistics in the region could improve.

Some argue, however, that simply teaching girls about sexual health and

17 SUMMER IN REVIEW

by Lindsay Ruiter, Kinesiology 15’

// GLOBAL HEALTH

A

IMPROVING MATERNAL AND SEXUAL HEALTH IN RURALPAKISTAN

±)HYGEXMSR�4VSKVEQW�¯�,EWLSS�*SYRHEXMSR²�F]�,EWLSS�*SYRHEXMSR�97%�¯�,SYWXSR��8<��0MGIRWIH�YRHIV�''�&=�7%������1SHM½IH�JVSQ�SVMKMREP�

49 were married before the age of 18.

In the Sindh province, a new law was passed this spring that prohibit-ed males and females from marrying until the age of eighteen, at the risk of three years imprisonment’ for the facilitators of marriages that violat-ed this law. "e previous law allowed girls of 16 years or more to marry with very small #nes for infractions. If fully implemented, this law could initiate positive change in the lives of many girls in Pakistan. "e current school drop-out rate is much higher for females vs males (56% vs 44%), because in many of Pakistan’s poor-er areas, it is more #nancially sound for parents to marry o! their daugh-ters early than to keep them in school.

A law that forbade marriage until the age of eighteen would enable girls to

18

receive a longer education and be-come more physically mature, lower-ing their risk of complications during pregnancy and childbirth. Education is bene#cial to female fertility and en-hances a woman’s “ability to make re-productive choices,” according to Te-resa Castro Martin from the Spanish Council for Scienti#c Research. Schol-ars who argue that policies must look beyond a direct approach to improv-ing health and focus instead on widen-ing access to education, such as Narjis Rizvi of Aga Khan University, support this form of upstream intervention.

Sex education classes, like the one in Johi, can potentially enhance wom-en’s and children’s health in Pakistan. "e classes may inform and empow-er girls by starting a public conver-sation about sexual health. Further interventions are needed, howev-

er, to address some of the upstream causes of many problems in women’s health. "e Sindh province is setting an example for creating change by re-stricting child marriages for both gen-ders with large #nes and jail time. By combining limits on child marriage with sex education classes, prospects for female health are brighter. Girls will be more informed and educat-ed while high-risk teenage pregnan-cies may be reduced. Although such progress remains unique to this area of Pakistan at present, it is a start to improving the quality of life and health status of women throughout.

GLOBAL HEALTH //

“A young girl pictured at a mobile health clinic in Sindh, Pakistan” by DFID – UKA Department for -RXIVREXMSREP�(IZIPSTQIRX�ZME�*PMGOV��0MGIRWIH�YRHIV�''�&=������1SHM½IH�JVSQ�SVMKMREP�

SUMMER IN REVIEW