q. bren - giovanni pico della mirandola on the conflict of philosophy and rhetoric

7/29/2019 Q. Bren - Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola on the Conflict of Philosophy and Rhetoric

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Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola on the Conflict of Philosophy and RhetoricAuthor(s): Quirinus BreenReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Jun., 1952), pp. 384-412Published by: University of Pennsylvania PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2707604 .

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DOCUMENTGIOVANNI PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA ON THE CONFLICT

OF PHILOSOPHYAND RHETORICBY QUIRINUSREEN

In Aprilof 1485 ErmalaoBarbarowrote to Pico 1a letter in whichhe sharply criticizesthe scholastic philosophersas being rude, dull,uncultured,barbarians. He did not deny them genius and learning,though his concession s grudging. But he categoricallydenies themimmortalityas authors,for it is a shiningand elegant, at least a pureand chaste style, which confers immortal reputation on an author.He did not doubt but they dealt with good subject matter; but thiswould not save their reputations,unless indeed bad poets should behonoredas Homersand Virgilsbecausethey had the same matter ofsong. Barbaro'scriticismtakes up about a third of his letter-a factwhich he had apparentlyforgotten when he wrote his long reply toPico. In this reply he complains that Pico has pounced on somethingshe had said,in a merecornerof his letter, about contemporarybarbarianphilosophers. It is, however,quite possiblethat he had notconsideredhis criticismof the scholasticsan importantpart of his let-ter, and that the heavierburdenof it was a criticismof Pico. Whilecomplimentinghim effusively Barbarodrops remarkswhich betraydissatisfactionwith his style. The attack upon the scholasticsmayhave been a mere elaborationof remarkson the importanceof Greekletters; it may also have been intendedas a way of holdingup a mir-ror for Pico to seehimselfas he will be if he is not careful. I am moreinclinedto favor the latter view. Thus the letter would declarethescholasticsas passe-despite their matter-because they did not pro-duce a literature in classical form; and Pico is warned that he isheadedfor oblivionfor a similarreason.This wouldaccountfor the natureof Pico's famousletter of June,1485. On the one hand, its style is in the best literary tradition; it

1 Translationof the letters of BarbaroandPico on pp. 391-412. OnBarbarocf.ArnoldoFerriguto,AlmoroBarbaro(Venice,1922); ThomasStickney,De HermolaiBarbarivita atqueingenio(Paris, 1913); on Pico see E. Garin,GiovanniPico dellaMirandola: Vita e Dottrina (Florence, 1937); E. Anagnin,Giovanni Pico dellaMirandola:Sincretismoreligioso-filosoficoBari, 1937); L. Dorez and Thuasne,Picde la Mirandoleen France (Paris, 1897); Avery Dulles, PrincepsConcordiae:PicodellaMirandolaand the ScholasticTradition(Cambridge,Mass., 1941); P. Kibre,TheLibraryof Pico dellaMirandola(New York, 1936).384


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MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY VS. RHETORIC 385shines with phrases,metaphors,apt historical and literary illustra-tions; it is warmthroughoutwith sustained eloquence. This docu-ment won the unboundedpraiseof Politian,2who said it was dashedoff in a few morninghours, by Barbaroand later by Melancthon.3Pico has been spokenof as a vain man; andit wereno marvelhad hebeen somewhatconceited;for such were his achievements n classicallearningthat he was a recognizederudite when barely past twenty.The gorgeousstyle of the letter may well have been Pico's answeronce for all that in humanistic attainments he couldequal if not sur-pass the best of his contemporaries. On the otherhand,Pico defendsthe scholasticsas philosophersand as immortals. He says that for sixyearsof his life he has been engrossed n the studyof Thomas,Scotus,Albert,and Averroes. If these arenot immortalsall his lucubrationshave been for nothing. The defenseis made with such passionas tolead one to think of it as an apologia pro vita sua. Towardsthe endhe attempts to climbdownfromhis lofty perchby sayingthat he haswritten somewhatsportively,as it were,playinga dialecticalgamelikethat of Glaucondefending njusticenot fromconvictionbut to stimu-late Socrates o the praiseof its opposite. I take this to have been anafter-thought, eeling perhaps hat he oughtnot to have talkedat thetop of his voice to a friend. The letter truly voices his opinionon thesubjectof the relationof philosophyto eloquence. It is true that hestates he has given up studyof the barbariansor that of Greek itera-ture, and to an extent that represented he facts; but the followingyear (1486) we findhim at work on his nine hundred"Conclusiones,"whose preface contains these words: "In the detail of these theses,insteadof adhering o the rulesof classicelegance,he [Pico] has pur-posely adoptedthe manner and diction of the most celebratedParis-ian disputants,the same being in most generaluse amongstthe phi-losophersof our times."4 Ferrigutoqueries f Pico's later mannerofpraisingErmolao (in the Prefaceto the Apologia) may indicate thathe considered his letter of 1485 a work of juvenile audacity.5Whetheror not Pico changedhis view is of little momentin the pres-ent discussion;for the letter's line of argumentis as important andinterestingas is the positionitself which it defends.

2 Cf. W. Greswell,Memoirsof Politian,Picus of Mirandola, tc. (London, 1805),211.3CorpusReformatorum,X, 687f.4Greswell,op. cit., 229.5A. Ferriguto,op. cit., 321 and note 1. The quotation rom Pico is interesting-and handsome-but not decisive.


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386 QUIRINUS BREENPico nowhereintimates that there is no place for rhetoric. Thesuspicion hat he mightbe a foe of rhetoricas such is answeredby therhetoricalcharacterof the letter. He holds, however, that rhetoric

(or eloquence,as he morecommonlyspeaksof it) must be kept clearlydistinct and separate from philosophy; to join the two is wicked(nefas). It has occasionedmuch astonishment that so brilliant ayoung man shouldbe so paradoxicalas to defend such a thesis withsuch rhetoricalelegance. Pico might answer,however, that in thestrict sense of the term he was here not philosophizingbut writingabout philosophyfor the benefit of rhetoricians. Just so a physicistdescribingphysics to laymen in that science would perforcehave touse termsknown to his readers,and if he wouldpersuadethem of hissubject'simportancehe must resort to devices which the technicianhas evertendedto scornin the popularizer. I do not doubtbut someparadoxremains. This need not diminish the validity of the argu-ments for the divorceof philosophyfrom rhetoric. Here are some ofthe points he makes: 6First, Pico distinguishesbetween the subject-matterof rhetoricand philosophy. The formerdealswith words,the latter with things(res). Second, he methodof rhetoricdiffers rom that of philosophy.The oratoraffectsverbal ornaments;he must persuade,and to suc-ceedin it he must stoop to deception. The philosopher's ole businessis in knowing (cognoscenda) and demonstrationof truth. Third,rhetoricand philosophyare therefore ncompatible. Fourth,he dep-recatesthe rhetorician's mphasison expression n languageas such;he intimates the existenceof a realm of knowledgein which a mancan contemplate wordlessly. Finally, his doctrine of man shinesthrough. Philosophersare more completeas humans. For while heis not cultured(non est humanus)who is alien to polite literature,hethat is destituteof philosophy s less than a man (non est homo).Barbaroreplied with two letters.7 In the first, a brief note, hevoices his deep regardfor Pico, and also announcesthat a more de-tailed letter is to follow. This firstletter breathesannoyancebecausePico's attack had become public property,but he tries to keep hisgood humor by jesting about a barbarousman (a pun on his ownname) defendingeloquence,while an eloquentman (Pico) is defend-ing its want.Somewhat later came Barbaro's elaborate answer. He againmakes a point of the paradoxof Pico's eloquencein defendingtheThe main burdenof the argument s carriedby a fictionalrepresentativeofscholasticism. 7See pp. 402-412,below.


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MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY VS. RHETORIC 387barbarians,but now addsthat Pico had been insincere n his defense.Pico is said to have intended to showthe barbarians o be defenselesswithout eloquence-a treacherousdevice, and utterly futile becausethe defendantscannot appreciatehis dazzlingcomposition.While Pico had created a fictionalrepresentativeof Scholasticismto plead his case, Barbarohas (so he says) a living barbarian romPadua make the main reply. This Paduan is equally suspiciousofPico'smotives and method. He expectshim, if victorious,to attrib-ute his victory to his eloquence. What chancehas he in this courtwherejudgeandwitnessarethe sameman?Barbaro'sPaduanis in my opinion somethingof a ventriloquist'sdummy. The Paduangives up too easily; he praisesPico for sayingphilosophydealswith things (res) and needsno ornament,but imme-diately grants the reasonablenessof the very opposite. He says theoratorsdo not depreciatephilosophersbut want eloquentones,on thetheorythat two goodsare betterthan one. Whento this he posestwoalternatives,the oratorscoverhim with confusion.He arguesthe question whether oratorsmust deceive. He saysnot, for oratorypertainsto civil affairsand to things natural,moral,and divine. In the latter there need never be any lying; in civil af-fairs it is permissible,but even here the rule is not that oratorsalwayslie or that all orators ie. His elaborationof this and similarquestionsby meansof analysisof Pico'srhetorical yllogismssharpens he para-doxof Pico'smethod. The copiousquotationsfromCiceroare to thepoint, though they hardly fit the Paduan. His distinction betweenthe philosopheras contemplatorand as man of affairsstrikes at theroot of the debate and might well have been elaborated. In climaxhe thrusts against classical, genteel Pico's apparent hatred for theliberalarts.Too muchof an argument s made againstwordsbeing objectsofarbitrarychoice. Pico had made little more of this than to say thatif language s a matterof this kindit is of little momentwhetherit isclassicalor not. But he had also offeredanotheralternative,to wit,that words are grounded n the nature of things. If this be so, theyare appropriately udgedby philosophers. Of this alternative Bar-baromakesnothing.Finally, however, Barbaro'sPaduan says he has not granted asinglepoint. If he is defendedat all, let it not be by eloquence;buthe says in the same breaththat the case might be arguedalong thelines of acceptedcommonplacesappropriate hereto. Then he bowsto the authorityof Plato and Aristotle,mastersof both rhetoricand


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388 QUIRINUS BREENphilosophy. But he endsby demandingdefenseby his own kind whohave no eloquence.Barbarothen dismisses him, calling him that ape-like Paduan.He endswith a few moredartsthrustwith a hand glovedin jokes.The reply was cleverbut it missedsome goodpoints on which tojoin the issue. This may have been felt by Melancthon (1558) whoeither did not know it or sought to improve upon it in a letter en-titled: Responseto Pico in behalf of E. Barbaro." In generalthepositions of Pico had not been shaken:

1. Philosophy and rhetoric have each their respective subject-matters. The formerpertainsto things as they appearto the intelli-genceor understandingand not immediatelyto action, the latter per-tains to things in an aspect underwhich they are to be acted upon,be it in a deliberativeassembly,in a court, or as the objects of ap-provalor disapproval n occasionaladdresses.2. Philosophy uses its own peculiar method. The Paduan saysthat as a philosopherhe wants conclusiveproof (apodixis), and iscontent to leave everythingelse to the orators. But immediatelyhebecomes doubtful whether apodixis can be attained. Who will de-cide?he asks. He does not doubt that truth is knowable,but (likea Pyrrhonist) no longer has a sure way of knowing the way. Thisseemsto representBarbaro'sown position. Pico, on the other hand,took his stand in the tradition of Aristotle and scholasticismthattruth canbe knownand that there is a methodof knowingit, part ofthat method being logic. Barbaro's etter has not shaken this con-tention. Pico argued in effect that there is a distinction betweenphilosophyas a searchfor truth by its own methodologyand philos-ophyas a rhetorical opic or commonplace. Barbaro'sproofthat Picohad used false premisesin some of his rhetoricalsyllogismshas notupset this distinction. True, it is paradoxical,but it seems just tointerpretit as a hyperbolicdefenseof the distinctionas such.3. Pico defended he Latin of the scholastics or philosophicalandscientificpurposes. Zielinski9 tells of Germancriticismdenouncinghumanisticrhetoricas the curse of Germany. He says "a famousphilosopherhad defendedthe position that scholastic Latin, beingpithier and preciser,should be preferredto the Ciceronian-human-istic." He does not name this philosopher,but the descriptionfitsPico. Howeverthis may be, the fact remainsthat Pico had in mind

8See note 3.9Th. Zielinski,Cicero m Wandelder Jahrhunderte Leipzigand Berlin, 1912),179f.


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MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY VS. RHETORIC 389the contrast between the rhetorical style of humanism (clearness,agreeableness, persuasiveness for the general reader) and the delib-erately non-rhetorical style of most scholastics (fidelity to the subjectonly, technical terms). Barbaro had said that the scholastics had pro-duced no specimens of the latter. In this he exaggerates, which hevirtually confesses. Still Pico's thesis is not overthrown, viz., that thescholastic style has proved itself to be a style worthy of philosophy.4. As to a doctrine of man he seems to hold that it is proper to behumanus; i.e., to be a humanist, not a barbarian; but one must alsobe homo, that is, a complete human being. If the former is attainedby polite letters, the latter is achieved through philosophy. I trust itis not overstraining his meaning to say that he implies a criticism ofscholasticism in creating his very eloquent barbarian spokesman, asone who is somewhat more eloquent than his fellows. All in all, how-ever, he does not equate humanus with homo; the latter is more im-portant than the former. He seems to imply the possibility of beinghomo without humanus (in the Renaissance sense at least); but hewas esthete enough not to like it altogether.Neither Pico nor Barbaro had come to full clarity on questions ofstyle. Undoubtedly Pico loved fine literature, and appreciated thegood literary taste for which Petrarch and others had contended. Hisletter itself proves that he knew how to compose in the best literarytradition. But he makes uncritical use of Plato's banishment ofpoets; and he treats Lucretius with utter lack of sympathy. He isalso too thin-skinned about the "grammaticasters " who crow overtheir etymological discoveries. After all we owe to their kind ourlexicons and grammars; their work was on its level as truly a craft orspecialty-and as severable from considerations of literary taste-aswas the work of the scholastic logician. In their way they were asconcerned with truth as were the scholastics; truth for them pertainedto what is classical Latin; for the latter truth pertained to philosophy.The disputants might have done well to have recognized this clearly.Pico gives the impression of thinking that wisdom or philosophicaltruth should lack charm or elegance. In this he is quite mistaken.But of course Barbaro was mistaken in demanding that philosophymust perfect itself through rhetorical discourse. Barbaro was wrongbecause wisdom has often been expressed without elegance, as say, inAristotle's Metaphysics; sometimes it cannot be expressed in words atall but only in symbols which may be quite abstract. He was doublywrong in thinking that rhetorical discourse is the most charming andelegant, that it is truly literary art. As I take it, Pico would havedone better to attack the rhetorician's claim to being an artist, of pro-


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390 QUIRINUS BREEN

ducing the most elegant, the most charmingkind of discourse. Hemaybe an artist,as Erasmussometimeswas; but he neednot be. Forliterature s a productof imagination:through maginationthe writerhas conceivedof some aspect of the meaningof things; and throughimaginationhe conceivesphrasesand figuresso as to touch and, ifpossible,delightmen. By this test Pico's letter is a workof art, whileBarbaro's,hough"humanistic,"s not. Pico has reflectedvery muchmoredeeplyon the meaningof things; his imaginationcan soarwon-derfully; his writinghas charmand exquisiteelegance. Yet it is re-markablethat he does not praisethe eloquenceof Plato. His refer-ence to Scripture s interestingin that his illustration from it is thelanguageof the Law,whichis flaming,stinging, etc.; thereis no men-tion of Isaiah'smagnificentmetaphorsorof the delightful parablesofChrist. All this points to unclearthinking on the problemof style.Neverthelesshe is headedin a good direction,as artists often are.The subject of the Pico-Barbaro etters is the style appropriatetophilosophers. Pico is correct n his belief that wisdom s the truepur-suit of philosophy,and he was correct n holdingthat the scholasticssoughtcertainknowledge hroughcontemplationand logic. Pico be-lieved the scholasticsto have been right. This belief of Pico had abroadercontext. Pletho, an inauguratorof Fifteenth Century Pla-tonic studiesin Italy, had taught that some of Plato's doctrineshadcomeorallyfrom Zoroasterby way of Pythagoras.10Ficino took overthis idea and elaborated t. Pico developedit as a principlearticu-lated in his studies of all availablereligionsand philosophies.11Hesaw in all of them the spirit of truth, the Logos. It was therefore, nhis view, truly unspeakable o requirethat philosophybe tied to anyone languageor kind of expression. Rhetoricaldiscourseas a vehicleof philosophyto him seemedas such objectionable;but even had itnot been objectionable, t would have seemedfrivolous to requireitfor philosophy,seeing there had been other effective ways of trans-mitting truth. The referenceto Pythagoras says in effect that, asPico sees it, the main tradition of philosophy is suspicious of thepowerof wordsto carrythe whole freight of wisdom. Wisdomis apossession;it can be communicated,but only to other wise men,

forwhomrhetoricalarrangement,nvention,and agreeablenessare worsethan useless.

10J. W. Taylor, GeorgiusGemistiusPletho's Criticismof Plato and Aristotle(Menasha,Wis., 1921), 27f.11E. Garin, op. cit., 57ff.; P. O. Kristeller,The Philosophyof MarsilioFicino(New York, 1943), 15, 25ff.


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MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY VS. RHETORIC 391Pico's references to the nature of philosophic discourse seem tofavor two kinds: first, the lively, quick, fervid style of Scripture, and

second, that of the disputation. He considered both to answer the re-quirements of philosophy: the former because philosophy is wisdom,to be addressed only to the potentially wise; the second because phi-losophy is the art of invalidating the false and affirming the true.The former represents Pico's understanding of philosophy as Platowould have it; the latter represents his understanding of the inheri-tance of Aristotle. To recognize both aspects was one of the pathstoward reconciling Plato and Aristotle.l2

University of Oregon.12 The battle over the literary style appropriate to philosophy was not new, norhas it ever ended. Many humanists demanded that philosophical style be rhetori-

cally clear and agreeable. It stands to reason that they should want Aristotle'sauthority for this. Georg Voigt, Die Wiederbelebung des classischen Alterthums(Berlin, 1893), II, 161-72, has shown that Bruni made his famous translation underthe impression that Aristotle's works were rhetorically eloquent. Much reliancewas put on Cicero's assurance that the language of Aristotle was a "gold-bearingriver." It was not known that Cicero had probably not studied our Aristoteliancanon (save the Topica), but works of Aristotle now lost. Cf. G. Grote, Aristotle(London, 1872), 43f. Petrarch's ignorance of this is illustrated by citations in P. O.Kristeller, Un codice Padovano di Aristotele postillato da Francesco e ErmolaoBarbaro. II Manoscritto Plimpton 17 della Columbia University Library a NewYork, Leo S. Olschki, Editore (Firenze, 1948), 164. There was also the belief thatGreece, land of the Muses, could scarcely have produced inelegant things. Along-side this desire to recapture the alleged elegance of Aristotle went the desire to showthat the scholastics had by their bad latinity and ignorance of Greek corrupted Aris-totle's clear and agreeable prose. Bruni had spoken of "endowing Aristotle withgood Latin." Such also was Barbaro's attempt; he had hoped to translate all ofAristotle, and had in fact completed the Rhetoric (Ferriguto, op. cit., 1llff.). WhileBarbaro undoubtedly wanted Aristotle to be on the side of a " better " philosophicalstyle, he also made an effort to broaden knowledge of the commentators. Hence toAverroes and other medievals he added Themistius. In this paper his part in thewarfare about style is stressed. The sixteenth century saw a number of scholarschampioning the same cause. Among them was Melanchthon, especially notablebeing his Reply to Pico. There was also Nizolius, whose defense of rhetorical philo-sophical style early influenced Leibniz. Cf. Bruno Tillmann, Leibniz' Verhdltnis zurRenaissance im allgemeinen und zu Nizolius im besonderen (Bonn, 1912); alsoR. Honigswald, Denker der italienischen Renaissance: Gestalten und Probleme(Basel, 1938), 41-47, "Marius Nizolius." See also Leibniz's "Dissertatio de stilophilosophico Nizolii" in God. Guil. Leibnitii Opera Philosophica, ed. J. E. Erdmann(Berlin, 1840), 55-71. Incidentally, Leibniz (XXIII) puts Pico among those whobattled in behalf of philosophical eloquence. Furthermore, he says that whileBarbaro inveighed with great sharpness against the scholastics, Pico sought to softentheir vices, which by a not improper piety he tried to cover rather than defend.Leibniz's requirement of claritas as basic for philosophy is by him (XVIII-XXV)considered to be identical with that of the humanists who warred against the scho-lastic " corrupters " of it.


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392 QUIRINUS BREENThe Correspondencef G. Pico della Mirandola and ErmolaoBarbaro

concerning he Relation of Philosophy and RhetoricErmolaoBarbaro1to GiovanniPico della Mirandola:I certainlycannot but seem to you a barbarianand ingrate; for I havedelayedto thankyou who so often and in connectionwith so many subjectswrite and say, and also think, complimentary hings about me. Your let-ters showthat you know me thoroughly. Every letter of yours which hascome hither [i.e., Venice], after I becameknown to you gives me distin-guishedand respectfulmention. But mark how highly I value your attes-tation of my worth,whetheryou give it as a professionalopinionor fromaninclinationof goodwill: I who am, for the rest,unassuming, should rathersay shy and diffident-I seem to be somethingbecauseyou praise me, be-causeyou approvemy works,becausein my Themistius,according o whatyou write about it, you often pause as in a most delightful lodging-place.Why is it that in your letters I so often see myself? Why? Do youthink I can find anything pleasanterthan to descry you no soonernotingthan imitatingsome clauseor periphraseor figureof speechof mine? And,aside from the fact that in writingto many persons,you apparentlydo thiswithout simulationor purpose,I have many reasonsto believethat you did

it out of friendship. To be sure,I couldnot see why you shouldspoil thatflowingand flowerystyle of yours,why you shouldresortto me who creepalongthe groundfollowinga poor and overtenuous hread of discourse. Ineveraspire,I do not inspire,I do not elaborate,I do not elevate, I do notabase: all of this is contraryto and incompatiblewith my naturalabilities.Take away altogethermy habits of hard work and diligence,and nothingisleft of me, save when you or a few of your likes commendme or when Inotice that you are pleasedwith my works even to the point of imitatingthem.0, Pico, what a distinguishedand clearly divine genius is yours! Forwhilethe thingsyou writeare the best you expressand imitatethe wordsofotherswhich are the worst, in orderthat they may seem to be your own,that is, the best. I think it is a greater hingto lower oneself andto descendthanto strive for what is lofty: while the onemay be the morevirtuous,theother is certainlythe more laboriousand difficult. Even so, whetheryouconsidermy worksworthyof the laborof imitating,or whetheryou occupyyourselfthus to obligeme-in eithercase I owe very much to you. I shall1V. Branca(Editor),ErmolaoBarbaro:Epistolae,Orationes, t Carmina(Flor-ence, 1943), Vol. I, Ep. LXVIII, pp. 84-87. W. P. Greswell,Memoirsof AngelusPolitianus,JoannesPicus of Mirandula,etc., SecondEdition (London,1805), hastranslatedpartsof this correspondence, large part in fact of Pico's famousletter.My translation s entirelynew and complete. The readerof Greswell'sversionwilldetecthereand therea borrowing romhim. I owe much to ProfessorPaul OskarKristeller'skind help on the problemsof translation. The errors remainingareminealone.


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MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY VS. RHETORIC 393some time requite you: I would not say when I shall be able to (for I nevershall be able) but then when you or your relatives shall consider me able.Indeed, such is the goodness and humanity of your entire family, that yougenerally impute a kindness where no kindness was. However that be, Iwill do according to my wont if I leave the manner and time of requitementto you; thus in the straightening of accounts every paralogism and impos-ture will come from you alone and not from me.What you have written to Scytha 2 concerning the method of your stud-ies pleased us very much. I congratulated this age for having a man of suchlearning that there is almost nothing he does not know, and of such painsthat he seemed to have learned absolutely nothing.3 I envision you as onewho are now or will soon be an outstanding poet, a most eminent orator. Iconsider you a philosopher, formerly an Aristotelian, now also become aPlatonist. As to Greek letters, which were your only possible deficiency andwithout which you would amount to nothing, I see you have not onlylearned but swallowed them; and that with such ease and speed that you donot remember ever having been ignorant of Greek, nor can you persuadeanybody else of it; no less gladly than truly do I make the same declarationabout my friend Hieronymus Donatus. I might spur you on to become asfully familiar with the Greek as you are with the Latin; but you do not needgoads and, by Hercules, they waste words who undertake to advise menmore accomplished than themselves. One thing I know that you know: dur-ing many centuries there has not stood out a memorable work in good Latindone by anyone who lacked Greek letters.Nor indeed do I count among the Latin authors those Germans and Teu-tons who were not really alive in their life-time, much less will they live nowthey are dead; or if they live, they live in torture and reproach: why, it iscommon to have them called dull, rude, uncultured, barbarians. Who wouldnot rather be non-existent than have such a reputation? One must admit ofcourse that they said something of use; they were strong in natural endow-ment, in learning, in a lot of good things. That which I can deny of themI do not deny altogether; however, that which procures for an author im-mortal reputation is a shining and elegant style, at least pure and chaste,such as, if you will, is evident in the Christian writers, both Greek andLatin. Unless one thinks painters, coppersmiths, sculptors, and other artistsare to be praised for the sole reason that the material with which they workis expensive and precious; or unless one thinks that, if Choerilus and Maev-ius had had the same matter of song as Homer and Virgil, the critics such asAristarchus then by the consent of all grammarians ought to have put theinfirst in the ranks of the poets. Is it not truer that, whatever their matter,Choerilus and Maevius will always be Choerilus and Maevius, and that

2Jo. Bapt. Scytha (Scita) of Feltre, a poet and friend of Pico and of severalother scholars. See L. Dorez, "Lettres inedites de Jean Pic de la Mirandole,"Giornale toricodellaletteratura talianaXXV (1895), 356.3 " Tanta cura,ut nihil omnino scire videatur,"suggestsan ironicintention.


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394 QUIRINUS BREENChoeriluswould never have written the Iliad or Maevius the Aeneid any-more than Choerilus he Aeneidor Maevius the Iliad? Well, when I writeabout ridiculous ellows,do I not have something o joke about? But per-hapsI have said far too muchaboutthose tramps. I returnto my subject.You now embraceGreekletters not as a student but as a professor,andyour glory is that aboutno one canthat well-wornsaying be moretruly re-peatedthan yourself: throughoutall the artsmany students exceltheirpro-fessors;or as a Greekverseputs it morepithily: manystudents arestrongerthan theirprofessors.I have beenwantingto know your opinionabout the FlorentinePlato,4but decency forbids the boldness of ever asking what you think of him.Give himmy best regards. It is kind of you to urgeuponme the booksandopinionsof Plato. Plato I hold in my hands,and hold him I always shall,beingsufficientlyalluredby him on my own while also havingyour faithfuland friendlyadvice. We have the word of Simpliciusfor it that "no oneshouldhold forth aboutAristotle,who dissociatesPlato fromAristotle,as ifthey conflicted." But can Plato agreewith Aristotleto one who does notknowthe books andtreatisesof both? Of those manuscripts ou desireandwhich we have here I will have copies made for you at once. Farewell.(April5, 1485. Venice.) Greetings o Poliziano.

(In June, 1485,Pico repliedwith his famousletter:) 5GiovanniPico della Mirandolato his friend ErmolaoBarbaro,Greet-ings:For my part, dear Ermolao,it is impossible o hide what I think aboutyou, nor can I fail to sense what I ought in one in whom all things arefound, as it were, so many individual excellencies. But would that mymind's capacity were such as to think of you accordingto your merits;wouldtherewere the powerof speechto expresssome time what I alwaysthink. I know that my thoughtaboutyou remainsan infinitudebelowtheheightsof your learning. Even you may know that my wordsfall shortofmy thoughts,that words may fail the mind as much as the mind fail ofmatter. Neverthelessyou believeme to be so bold as to hopeto be able toimitate you whose greatnessI cannot assess. Everybody can admireyou,but just as few can imitate so no one can censureyou. And would thatmine were the felicity so to write as to body forth even partially my dearfriendErmolao. To speak of nothingelse, there is that style of yours, to

which you are devoted even to a fault; it is marveloushow it affects anddelights me; it is so learned, grave, orderly, cultured, thoroughlyrefined,full of invention, in which nothing is common,nothing vulgar, nothingtrivial in either wordsor sentences. I and our friendPoliziano often readwhatever letters we have of you, either to others or to ourselves; alwaysdo the more recent ones so vie with the earlier,and as we readnew delights4Ficino.5 I have usedthe text found in CorpusReformatorum,X, 678-87.


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MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY VS. RHETORIC 395bloom so inexhaustibly, that in our perpetual exclamations there is no inter-val to catch our breath. But it is marvelous how persuasive you are andhow you impel the reader's mind to whatever you wish.

While all your letters thus impress me, your last one did so particu-larly-the one in which you sail into those barbaric philosophers; who, yousay, are commonly held to be dull, rude, uncultured; who in their lifetimewere not really alive, and much less will live now they are dead; and werethey now living would live in torture and reproach. Accordingly I am aHercules enraged; I am so ashamed and disgusted with my studies-forI have spent six years on those barbarians-that I wish nothing morestrongly than that I had not strained myself so laboriously in so much adoabout nothing. What I am saying is that I have lost in Thomas, JohnScotus, Albert, and Averroes the best years of my life, so many sleeplessnights, which I could have used to become something in fine letters. Thethought has been running through my head, so as to console me, that ifsome of those barbarians were now to come back to life they might perhapshave some defense to make, and being experts in argument they might takeup their cause with some show of reason. At length it occurs to one ofthem-one of the slightly more eloquent ones-to champion his barbarismas little like a barbarian as possible. He perhaps might do it in this way:

"We have lived as famous men, Ermolao, and we shall live in times tocome, not in the schools of grammarians and pedagogues, but in the circlesof philosophers, in gatherings of sages, where they busy themselves anddispute, not about the mother of Andromache, not about the children ofNiobe, and such light nothings, but about the reasons of things human anddivine. In meditating on, inquiring into, and unravelling these subjects wehave been so subtle, acute and sharp that perchance we seem to have beensometimes over-solicitous and captious and too careful in the search fortruth. Besides, if in these things anyone should accuse us of dullness andheaviness, let whoever he be come with us and find out for himself that thebarbarians have had the god of eloquence not on the tongue but in theheart, that if eloquence they lacked they did not lack wisdom; (let him findout) that eloquence should not have been joined to wisdom; only their notbeing joined perhaps is free from fault, so that it were wicked to have joinedthem. Who will not condemn synthetic beauty, or rouge, in a reputablemaiden? Who would not curse it in a Vestal? So great is the conflictbetween the office of the orator and the philosopher that there can be noconflicting greater than theirs. For what else is the task of the rhetor thanto lie, to entrap, to circumvent, to practise sleight-of-hand? For, as yousay, it is your business to be able at will to turn black into white, whiteinto black; to be able to elevate, degrade, enlarge, and reduce, by speaking,whatsoever you will; at length you do this to the things themselves bymagical arts as it were, for by the powers of eloquence you build them upin such a way that they change to whatever face and costume you please;so that they are not what their own nature but what your will made them;


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396 QUIRINUS BREENof course hey may not actually becomewhat you willed,but if they shouldnot it may neverthelessappearso to your audience. All this is nothingatall but sheer mendacity,sheer imposture,sheer trickery; for its nature iseitherto enlarge by additionor to reduceby subtraction,and putting fortha false harmonyof words like so many masks and likenessesit dupesthelisteners'minds by insincerities. Will there be any affinitybetween thisand the philosopher,whose entire endeavor is concerned with knowing(cognoscenda) he truth and demonstratingt to others?"Addthat no one will have any confidencen us were we to affect vocalsplendorsand enticingmanners;we would as it were have too little confi-dence in our subjectmatter (res) and would not be on solid ground,werewe to seek by such coquetriesto inducemen to accept our opinion. Onereads the sacred stories, written rustically rather than elegantly, for pre-cisely the reasonthat in every subjectconcernedwith true knowingnothingis moreunseemlyand detrimental han all that elaboratedsort of discourse.The latter belongs to questions raised in forums,not to questions aboutnatural and celestial things. It belongsto those whose business is not inthe academybut ratherin that commonwealthwherethingsdoneandthingssaid areweighed n a publicscale underthe eye of onewhoto whomflowersweigh muchmorethan fruits. You are not unaware of that, are you? Isthere not a common hread runningthroughit all? Well-spokennesss anelegant thing; we admit it. It is full of allurementand pleasure;but inphilosopherst is neitheran ornamentor a grace. Whowould not approvea delicatestep, cunning hands, playful eyes in an actor and dancer? In afellow-citizen, n a philosopher,who would not disapprove,censure,abomi-nate them? Shouldwe see a young girl of flippetymanners,even snippety,we will praise,we will kiss her. The samein a matronwe will condemnandprosecute. Not we, therefore,but they are empty-headedwho carryon likeBacchantesbeforea Vestal, who dishonor he dignity of philosophicalsub-jects by stylistic finery,as it were dishonoringchastity by low comedy. Infact, what Synesiussaid abouta youth can fittinglybe said about a speech:A speech with long locks is always wanton. Whereforewe prefer oursshaggy, globose,troubled,ratherthan with pretty tresses with their marksor at least suggestionof immodesty. For the rest, the robe of Athena wasnot properlyan objectof display; on the contrary, ts profaneuse was dis-tinctly kept separatefromher sacredrites."And let whateverelse I say be of no account,this one thing is mostthoroughly rue: Nothing is moreforeignto the way of life of a philosopher,in whateverrespect,than a taste for luxury, or for arroganceof any sort.Socrateswas wont to say that Sicyonianshoeswerecomfortable,and suitedto the feet, but werenot fit for Socrates. Not at all identicalis the mannerof the gentlemanand of the philosopher, et us say in eating or speaking.The philosopheruses these only by necessity, the gentlemanuses them forgracious iving besides;if the latter neglectedthis he were not a gentleman,and if the formerwere to affect it he were no philosopher. If Pythagoras


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MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY VS. RHETORIC 397could have lived without food, he would have abstained even from cab-bages; if he could have expressed his meaning by looks, or by any meansshort of the labor of speech, he would not have spoken at all-so far washe from polishing and adorning language. Or again, let us be cautionedagainst the writer who, fond of an artificial complexion, lets his reader enjoynothing else; he never sees the real thing, nor the vital flush which we haveoften perceived beneath the whiting of a powdered face. We have seen, Iam saying, in all writers of this sort the practice of busying the reader fromthe start with a various cadence and harmony, for the very reason thatinside they are empty and hollow. Had a philosopher done this, Musoniuswill exclaim that it is not a philosopher speaking but a flute-player piping.The very fact that we have not done what to have done were a defect ought,therefore, not to be held against us as a defect. We search after the whatof writing, we do not search after the how-that the style be without flourishand without flower. We do not want our style delightful, adorned, andgraceful; we want it useful, grave, something to be respected; we wouldhave it attain majesty through rudeness (horror) rather than charm throughdelicateness (mollitudo). We do not expect the applause of the theaterbecause a rounded or a rythmical period has caressed the ear, because thiswere piquant, or that nice. But we expect the silence which comes ratherfrom astonishment on the part of the few who are looking very deeply intosomething; either something dug from the inner depths of nature, or some-thing brought to men from the throne of Jove; or, further, something sothoroughly defended that there were no room for refutation. Let themtherefore admire us as sharp in searching, thorough in exploring, accurate inobservation, in making a judgment serious, thorough in making a synthesis,facile in analysis. Let them admire our style's brevity, pregnant with sub-ject matters many and great. Let them admire how in everyday expres-sions we put the farthest reaches of our ideas, full of question, full of solu-tions; how skillful we are, how well-equipped to destroy ambiguities, todissolve difficulties, to unravel what is involved, by mind-bending syllo-gisms to weaken the false and confirm the true." By these marks, Ermolao, we have till now preserved our memory fromoblivion and, we do not doubt, will preserve it hereafter. What if, as yousay, we are commonly held to be dull, rude, uncultured? To us this is aglory, and is no cause for contempt. For the many we have not written,but for you and your likes. We are not unlike the ancients who by theirriddles and by the masks of their fables made uninitiates shun the mys-teries; and we have been wont by fright to drive them from our feasts,which they could not but pollute with their even more repulsive make-up ofwords. Those who wish to conceal treasure not intended for sequestrationare wont to cover it with refuse or rubbish, so that only those passers-bymay take it who are considered worthy of such a gift. A like endeavor,to wit, that of philosophers to hide their business were fitting for people whonot only do not appreciate but also do not even understand them. It can-not possibly be fitting for a philosophical writing to have something theatri-


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398 QUIRINUS BREENcal, applause-provoking, r popular,preciselybecause such would give theappearanceof currying he favor of the multitude."Yet I shall indicatethe formof our discourse. It is the same as thatof the Sileni of our Alcibiades. Amongthem were likenesses of a shaggyface, loathsomeand disgusting;but within full of gems,a rare and preciousthing, if you lookedwithin you perceived somethingdivine. But, you willsay, modernears do not tolerate here irregular,there disconnected,andalways unharmonious onstructions; hey do not tolerate a barbarousno-menclaturewhosevery sound almostmakesone shudder. Ah, delicateone,when you approachflutists and citharists,be all ears; when you approachphilosophers, all yourself away fromthe senses,return to your own self inthe innermostparts of the soul and the hiding-placeof the mind. Adoptthose ears of Tyaneusby which,whenhe was in rapture,he would hear notearthly Marsyas but celestial Apollo composeon a divine cither a cosmicmelodyin ineffablemodes. If with a philosopher's aryou shall have tastedwords,their sweetnesswill seem the envy of Nestor."But we may be indulgingfar too much these vaulting fancies; it is asimplefact that the revulsion fromthe less tasteful style of a most subtlydisputing philosophercomesnot so much from a delicate stomachas frombeingunaccustomedo philosophical are. So it is were one to take offenseat Socratesfor instructing n mannerswhile either his shoe were untied orhis toga hanging unevenly, and were one to go into a tantrum over acrookedcut of a finger-nail. Cicerodoes not desireeloquence n a philoso-pher,but that he be adequatein his subjectmatterand teaching. Being aslearnedas he was polishedhe knew it is more importantfor us to set inorderthe mind than delivery; to be carefullest what strays be reason,notspeech (rationon oratio); that we attain to the wordas thought,not to theword as expression.6It is praiseworthy o have the Muses in the soul, andnot on the lips; for anything in the soul may, when uttered, be renderedfeebler either by anger or strong desire. Moreover,let there not be anymannerof discord n that true harmonythroughwhichman is governedasit were by rhythm. Since Plato understoodthat by their theatricals thepoets often disruptthis harmony,he excludedall poets from his Republic;he left it to be governedby philosophers,who for certainwouldin their turnbe soon condemned o exile shouldthey have imitatedthe poets by luxuri-ance of discourse."Lucretiuswill urgeto the contrary,that althoughthe commendationsof philosophydo not as such need charmingdiscourse,yet its presentationoughtto be such as to conceal the austerity of its subjectmatter. Just sowormwooddrives out sickness,but it is mixedwith sweets so as to deludethe unsuspectingchild into swallowing it. Perhaps, Lucretius,you willhave to do it this way if your writings are intended for children; yourwritingsat any rate will have to be sweetened f they are intendedfor the

6 0 Xoyos 'ev 8&aOeeaes contrastedwith 6 Aoyos ev 7rpoc


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MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY VS. RHETORIC 399multitude,for your potionsare not only wormwoodbut purestpoison. Buta far differentmethoddo we pursuewho,as we said before,do not endeavorto enticethe multitudebut to frightenthem off; and besides,we do not givethem wormwoodbut nectarto drink. But Lactantius will assert that thetruth is well enoughestablished o influencemorestronglythe mind of evenaged hearers when it is arrayedin its native force and at the same timeadornedwith the lights of eloquence. Well, Firmian [Lactantius],had youconcernedyourselfas muchwiththe holy scripturesas you havewith imagi-nary disputations, you might not have said this and, besides, you mightperhapshave establishedour case as effectivelyas you brokedownthat ofthe opponents. Pray, tell what is moremoving,morepersuasive han read-ing the holy scriptures? The wordsof the Law do not move and persuadebut compel, stir up, convey force; they are rough and rustic, but alive,breathing,flaming,stinging,penetratingdown to the depths of the spirit,transformingwith marvelouspowerthe whole man. Alcibiadessaid thatPericles'carefullyelaboratedspeechesdid not move him at all; but Socra-tes' bare and simple words, even when they were foolish, enrapturedhim,entrancedhim,andthat willy-nilly he performedwhateverSocratesordered.But why do I waste words on so manifest a case? If the heareris not afool, what else may he expect from coloredlanguage but treachery? Bythree thingswill he be best persuaded:the life of the speaker,the truth ofhis matter,and sobernessof discourse. Thesethings, Lactantius,win a phi-losopher'sconfidence; hat is, if he has been a good man, if truth-loving,ifdesirousof that kind of discoursewhichissues,not fromthe Muses'pleasantgroves,but from the horrendouscave in which Heracleitussaid the truthlies hidden."But someonewill say: Come,my friend,let us examinethese proposi-tions withoutcontentiousness. Wisdom is something o be reverenced; t issomething n itself divine. It needs no addedadornment;but what odiumwould attach to addingit? Who would deny that what is in itself fittingwouldbecomemorefittingby adornment?"I, my friend,I denythis with respectto manythings. Therearemanythings whose splendor you would dim and not brightenby adding some-thing to them. In fact, they are so much at their best in their natural con-dition that they cannot be changedin any respect without becomingin-ferior. Unless you first plaster, you cannot put paint on the walls of amarble house; in either case you would diminish its dignity and beauty.Not otherwiseis it with wisdom and philosophers'eachings; they are notbrightenedbut obscuredby word-painting. What more shall I say? It isnot a commonplacehat goodfeaturesare by paint disfigured? In general,whateverof beauty we may keep putting on, it hides what it covers: forthe overlay shows only the overlay itself. Wherefore, f what beforehadbeen foreignto the thing is now conspicuous,t will have causeda loss, nota gain. For this reasonalonephilosophypresentsherselfeverywheren fullview, wholly visible; she eagerly invites cross-questioning,or from what-


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400 QUIRINUS BREENever side it may please to come she knows how to maintain herself. Shouldyou wish but a part of her, by so much you would diminish her glory; shewants to keep herself clean and pure; whatever you were to add would giveher a taint, render her impure, make her something else. Like a mathemati-cal point, she is indivisible and unsharable. Wherefore, let there be noplaying with tropes and words or luxuriating in excesses, such as wantoningin figures or attempting bold inventions; in a matter so serious, so crucial,it were disgraceful to lessen, add, or change." But you will say, come, we grant you that your discourse ought not beornate; nevertheless, though you make no pretensions about the matter,your discourse certainly is at least in Latin; so that while you do not useflowery words you do explain things in Latin words. I do not require yourdiscourse to be elegant, but I do not want it filthy, I do not want it per-fumed, yet not of bad smell either; not exquisite and not neglected either;it should not please, but not offend either."It is well; now in fact you are weakening in our favor. But both ofus should know what is that good Latin, which you say is the only debt phi-losophers owe but fail to pay when it comes to using it in speech. For ex-ample, instead of ' a sole hominem produci 'our colleagues will say ' causarihominem.' Forthwith you shout: That is not Latin; and so far you areright. More right you are when you say: It is not the Roman way ofspeaking. But you are wrong when you say: Therefore it is not correct.An Arabian and an Egyptian will say the same thing, but not in Latin; butstill they will speak correctly. For the names of things are establishedeither by arbitrary convention (arbitrium) or by nature. It may happenthat a society of men agree on a word's meaning; if so, for each thing thatword is among them the right one to use for the meaning agreed on. Thatbeing the case, what will prohibit those philosophers you call barbariansfrom agreeing together on a common norm of speaking? And let it enjoywith them the same respect as does the Roman among you. There is nosense in saying that the one standard is wrong and yours right, if this busi-ness of name-making is altogether arbitrary. What of it, if you do not wishto dignify our standard by calling it Roman? You may call it French,British, Spanish, or even what the vulgar are accustomed to call Parisian.When they speak to us they will for many things be laughed at and to agreat extent will not be understood. The same will happen to you whenyou speak to them. Remember the saying: Anacharsis commits a solecismamong the Athenians, the Athenians do so among the Scythians." But if the rightness of names depends on the nature of things, is it therhetorician we ought to consult about this rightness, or is it the philosopherwho alone contemplates and explores the nature of everything? And per-haps while the ears reject the names as harsh, reason accepts them as morecognate to the things.7 But why introduce these innovations and use a

7Forteque aures respuunt utpote asperula,acceptat ratio utpote rebus cog-natiora.


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MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY VS. RHETORIC 401non-Latin language, although they were born among Latins? The simplefact is, Ermolao, they could not have done it; for while in the heavens theywere reading the laws of destiny, the order of the universe, and in the ele-ments the vicissitudes of birth and death, the potencies of simple and thecomposition of mixed substances; they could not at the same time, I say,mark with exactness the peculiarities, rules, and proprieties of the Romanlanguage in Cicero, in Pliny, in Apuleius. Their inquiry concerned what isaccepted, what is rejected in nature; meanwhile they are not concerned withwhat is accepted or rejected by the Romans." But for the moment I will consider your position as the stronger, andgrant you that eloquence and wisdom may be closely connected. It is thephilosophers who have separated wisdom from eloquence; and the his-torians, rhetoricians, and poets who have separated eloquence from wisdom,which in Philostratus' opinion is regrettable. You have no doubt whateverbut the latter will survive in great renown, the former only in torture andreproach. But be careful: Cicero prefers sagacity though halting in speechto stupid loquacity. In the case of money, we do not ask how it was mintedbut what is its material. There is no one but prefers pure gold bearing aTeutonic stamp to counterfeit with a Roman symbol on it. They are wrongwho separate good sense (cor) from language (lingua) yet why are they solacking in sense about language? Are not words, as Cato says, merely thevocabularies of the dead? We can live without a tongue, though not con-veniently; but we cannot live at all without a heart. He is not cultured(humanus) who were alien to polite letters; he is not a man (homo) whowere destitute of philosophy. The most inarticulate wisdom can be of use.Unwise eloquence, like a sword in a madman's hand, cannot but be mostdangerous." You will counter that therefore statues are praised for their material,not their workmanship; that had Choerilus sung the same themes as Homer,and Maevius those of Virgil, the ones as well as the others should be rankedequally among the poets. Do you not see the irrelevance of the compari-son? We also make that very point: judge a thing by its appearance, notby its matter. For a thing is what it is by its appearance. But one is theappearance marking a philosopher, another is that marking a poet. LetLucretius write about nature, about God, about providence; let anyone ofus write about the same subjects;-in fact let John Scotus write about themin verse, so as to make him the more awkward. Lucretius will say that theprinciples of things are atoms and the void, that God is corporeal and igno-rant of our affairs, that everything comes about blindly, by a chance com-bination of bits of matter: but he will say these things in good Latin,elegantly. John Scotus will say that what constitutes nature is to be deter-mined by its matter and form, that God is a mind distinct from nature,knowing all things, governing all things; and yet the fact that he sees every-thing even down to the least does not disturb his tranquility, but rather asthe saying has it: he descends without stepping down.8 But Scotus will say

8KaTovra jl Ka' t .aC L'rLOV'T7) KaTL'eVat.


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402 QUIRINUS BREENthese things without taste, crudely, in non-Latin words. I ask if any woulddoubt that Scotus philosophizes better than that other man who speaksmore elegantly. But just see how they differ! The one has a tastelessmouth (os insipidum), the other a foolish head (mens insipiens), the onedoes not know the decrees of the grammarians, nor (I may say) of thepoets; the other does not know the decrees of God and of nature. The onewho is most inarticulate in speech senses those things which cannot bepraised enough in speech; the other, most voluble in eloquent language,utters blasphemies."Well, dear Ermolao, the above is perhaps what those philosophers mightpresent in defense of their barbarism; if they got subtle, their argumentsmight be a lot better. I do not fully agree with their opinions, nor do Ithink their case will set on fire a candid and liberal mind. But I have givenfreely of myself in this matter, as in something of ill-repute; so that, likethose who praise the quartan fever, I might test my abilities. My specialaim was like that of Plato's Glaucon, who praised injustice, not seriously,but to goad Socrates to the praise of justice. Likewise, so that I may hearyou defend eloquence I have attacked it rather violently, for a little whileeven over the protest of my feelings and natural disposition. Had I thoughtthe Barbarians right in their neglect of eloquence I should not almost whollyhave left off studying them; I should not a short time ago have taken upGreek letters and your never sufficiently praised " Themistius."However, let me freely express my feeling: Certain grammaticastersturn my stomach, who when they have made a couple of etymological dis-coveries become such show-offs, so tout themselves, so boastfully strutaround, that as compared with themselves they would have philosophersesteemed as nothing. They say, We do not want these philosophies ofyours. Well, small wonder. Neither do dogs care for Falernian.Let me close my letter with this last remark: if those Barbarians haveearned any honor and reputation only for their knowledge of things; it isnot easy to say what rank, what praises are yours to boast, who amongphilosophers are the most eloquent, among the eloquent the most philo-sophical. Florence, June 3, 1485.

(Barbaro replied with two letters, the first a brief, the second a longone.)Ermolao Barbaro to Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: 9But thou, Minerva, why dost thou stir up bitterness? Yet what a ridicu-lous thing it is: a barbarous man defends eloquence, while you, an eloquentman, defend its want. Still, I have long been in doubt about replying, forI feared we might become the gossip of ignoramuses who would take [ourconversation] not as what it is but as that which it is not, namely, grudgeand discord. Though I should not make reply, there are many disagreeableaspects of the matter, especially the fact of my knowing your attack has9V. Branca,op. cit., Ep. LXXX, Vol. I, pp. 100-101.


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MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY VS. RHETORIC 403wandered into the hands of a good many people. Of course, if this hap-pened with your consent or knowledge, I cannot but approve because youhave approved; but if it was without your consent, I do not see how I cankeep silent. Accordingly I have in this matter preserved moderation: no-body will read my answer before you read it, and it will not be publishedbefore you agree and write me to that effect.10 Never do I cease, nevershall I cease to say, yet never can I be satisfied enough in saying how muchI esteem, how much I admire you. I am uneasy about giving you offense,not only because I love you too much but especially because in the heat ofdisputation many inconsiderate things slip out. Would that this did nothappen to me! Eloquence itself, which I defend, is not worth such a price.Farewell. Venice.

Ermolao Barbaro to Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: 1I have been expecting you to pay usury on the letters you get from me,

particularly on the most recent ones. But such is your liberality that youreckoned your payment at a rate beyond what the law allows and exces-sively high. You have not written a letter, but pretty near a volume. Aswas fitting, I have been unbelievably delighted in seeing how you, extremelybusy as you are, take pleasure in reading my letters with such care that youdo not skip over and leave unexplored even the smallest and slightest de-tails in them. This I readily noticed in your last letter; for in a certaincorner of my writing, as it were in connection with something else and bybrief mention only, I had slashed into our modern barbarian philosophers.Though you also have turned against them and declined further intercoursewith them, you have taken my words as an occasion of reviving the old con-tention and controversy between us and them concerning the kind of dis-course appropriate to philosophers. The bulk of this dispute already hasgrown to many thousands of lines. And now you have sent me an opus,both elegant, polished, thoroughly wrought; it was completed so rapidlythat, did I not keep in mind the thoroughly proved gifts of your genius, Ishould have believed you had prepared your case before this so as to haveit ready for the earliest suitable occasion.But for me this turns out to be an event the gayer and jollier, becauseyou-the most finished, the most cultured (humanissimus) of men, the bestof Latinists-you defend the barbarians against Barbaro; consequently yougive yourself the appearance of an enemy who champions the enemy, of anally standing against an ally, of yourself opposing yourself. This gives methe most exquisite pleasure, because under the guise of defending you utterlykill off those you defend. First, because the foes of eloquence cannot main-tain their cause save by eloquent men; in this respect they are like slaves,like women, like brutes. A second reason is that, if they cannot escape by

10 This short letter was either intended as an announcement f the longerone,or it may not have beensent off.11 V. Branca, op. cit., Ep. LXXXI, Vol. I, pp. 101-109.


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404 QUIRINUS BREENthe help of you as protector, of you as champion, of you as advocate, theycould not make a further struggle or even turn a foot. In line with this Iam informed by friends of mine in Padua that your defense-which isalready being given the title of Concerning Scythians and Teutons, in otherwords, Laudation of Typhon and the Furies-has mightily annoyed the ma-jority of those you defend, while in other groups your deed is differentlyinterpreted. So at least in our circles, with whom you quarrel in word butagree at heart, the thing you did is to everybody most gratifying, becausewe understand where you are leading and what you mean. One thing saysLeukon, another Leukon's son. For the rest we should call you a deserter,if your writing expresses your true sentiments. Allow me this jest: if youare not a deserter, you must be a double-dealer; you are carrying water onboth shoulders when by your method of defense you break down the caseyou have taken up. It does not matter by what method you betray thebarbarians, your clients. But what more cunning scheme could you havehit upon than to try by the highest eloquence to defend the accused whoconfess themselves injurious to eloquence? You have used methods which,so to say, your clients may very easily expose, provided someone of thatcrowd can understand the things you have said;-things with so greatsplendor endowed, with so many lights, so many ornaments caressing theeyes of approachers! Add the many tantalizing little sentences, the manyexamples and historical allusions of far-found learning-all like so manyflowerets! It is absolutely an ocean of good things; hearing which, some ofyour clients-who are a little less like asses, I have been wanting to saybereft of the Muses (atoovot)--can barely move their ears; the rest of themfly out of hearing, they spew out, they abjure them.One of these 12 (I am inventing nothing, Pico; it is an utterly ridiculoustrue story that I tell), some one in the gymnasium of Padua spoke to me;he is a forward and arrogant fellow, of the sort almost all are who hate andsneer at the more humane letters. Said he:"This Pico-I take him to be a grammarian-but whoever he is, for aman with a small foot he wears big shoes. Indeed, what need is there forso many rhetoricians? Or have they come to drinking healths to thefrogs? " Seriphian frogs, for example? " I said.13 Is anyone," he wenton, "so stupid and senseless as not to understand that this extraordinarychampion is in a sly game with someone else, some impious professor ofgrammar? He affects me as much as a mourner at the tomb of a step-mother; I take no stock in the man. It turns out that I cannot follow himin either beginning or middle or end of his tune; by Hercules, he might as

12 Barbaro has a contemporary barbarian carry the argument,-the counterpartof Pico's.13 In the margin (1) of this letter as preserved in the Codex of Lucca are foundthe words " Ranae seriphiae dicuntur esse mutae." These marginal notes are givenin Branca, op. cit., I, 110-16; see ibid., p. LXVII for Branca's remark that theyreveal the forma mentis of Barbaro. Marginal notes will hereafter be indicated

by M.


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MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY VS. RHETORIC 405well be defending us in Greek or Egyptian, for he is absolutely orating tothe sea-shores. But picture to yourself his defense to be faithful: if we arebeaten it will be black, but it will be blackest if we win: to wit, in the futurewe will be said to have been saved not by our own right but by the powersof eloquence, to which we are and always want to be most hostile. Whatgreater annoyance, in fact, can befall a freeman than to owe life and safetyto one whom he wishes to suffer disgrace and ruin? And if this unexpectedand great champion of ours is beaten, he will in reality be considered beatenby reason and truth, since they say he cannot be beaten in eloquence: butif he wins, which I execrate, this glory will instantly belong to his likes, andhe will attribute his victory to his eloquence. I prefer not to be defendedto being defended at such peril: to me this kind of man is to be mistrusted,as a dog loving a rabbit. Unseasonable benevolence, I do not know whatpoet 14 said it, does not differ from hostility. Now who ever in such a waydefended a man that only the prosecutor understands what is said? Or whoever permitted his case to be handled thus that one who will give adversesentence was elected to serve as judge and arbitrator? Thus there could beno occasion for even challenging [the judge], so that we should be in a farworse condition than work-people, than tenants of shops and slave-dealersand hawkers.

" But I hear he uses examples, stories, yarns, and proofs from the poets:to be sure, I do not understand what he has written in our behalf. But ifthis is correct, to what a pass have we wretches come! Has our cause beenreduced to the point where we maintain our rights by yarns and fables?Most certainly there is a place for hypothetical syllogisms, for inductionsand enthymemes. And why not? I am a philosopher, I want conclusiveproof (apodixis), the rest I leave to the orators. But you say that every-thing cannot be shown by apodixis,15 that sometimes there is occasion forprobability. Therefore the matter is called back to uncertainty: Manyprobabilities against us, likewise many in our favor.

14 M (2) names Euripides.15 M (3) has this representation:

a&roScets evidensprobationon indiget per se pollens philosophiacultu quodest

The Margin has many of these double crescents, once a triple one. Other figuresare isosceles triangles, upright and inverted.Information pertaining to these representations is available in C. Prantl, Ge-schichte der Logik im Abendlande (Leipzig, 1927), II, 283. Economy makes itinexpedient to put in these notes all the figures. However, I have found them tointerest historians of logic; therefore I will at least indicate the kind of figures usedin the margin.


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406 QUIRINUS BREEN"Who will decide? Picturethe thing said by that fellow, that philoso-phy accordswith things (res), and does not at all need the ostentation ofwords: this I certainly believe to be the sum of all things which may be

said in our behalf. The contrary s held by those who say that philosophyoughtto be approached eligiouslysince it is a gift divine,holy, and associ-ated with religion;it is not to be handled with unwashedhands but clean,even well-caredfor, and with speechthat is pure, not base and muddied.Eitherof these views is provable,the former:thingswhichstandupontheirown feet do not need crutches,as well as the latter: a noble and excellentsubjectoughtnot to be approachedwith low languagenor fouled,contami-nated, defiled with wordsof base origin. This is perhapsthe moreaccepta-ble, not becausephilosophy16without the choice of beautiful and shiningwords ceases to be the highest good; but because philosophy is like thedivine beingswho have no need of human treasuresyet wish to be rever-encedand givenpresents. That is why philosophynot only permitsherselfto be adornedbut even loves it, they say, and labors at it. Nothing is moreperfect and completethan God; yet nowhere are there more gold, moresilver, moremarble,more expensive cloths, morejewels to be seen than intemples and on altars. Hence, they say, it cannot be permittedto honorthe gods, yet forbidden o honorphilosophy."You see, also oratorshave been acquaintedwith the locus of contra-dictionsand contraries,andthey very frequentlyuse it. This locusconsistsof a doublenegative 7proposition; hey claim that of all propositions t isthe most importuning(instantissimus)and the most incisive (acerrimus).But why this proposition should be vrepawroaTcK, why the language shouldbe importuningand incisive,18of all that they teach nothing but send usback to Ciceroand Aristotlewhom we have never and will never look up onthese things. Now not eventhey esteem the philosophersbelowmen of elo-quence:they aretoo modest for that; but they prefereloquentphilosophers

to such as are devoid of eloquence,and for the very reason that a man ismoregifted whenpossessing wo goodsthan one. Indeed,this conclusion19is said to be drawnfromthe whole; a thing Themistiusteachesthem,whomthey boast to have translated from Greek into Latin; well, say they, thewhole is a matter of quantity, and they regardquantity sometimesas ofnumber,sometimesas of measure."Now on this I often crossswordswith professorsof grammarand likewretches,and my usual response s with the argumentof two alternatives:16M (4) Primum epicheremapro philosophiseloquentibuscontra barbaros.Double crescent.17M (5) v7rEpa7roaTmKc, id est superabdicativa: sic enim argumentum a repug-nantibusfirmatur,ut inquit Cicero (Topica XII, 53: IV, 21; cf. Prantl, op. cit., I,444).18M (6) SpeLavAoyose quo in Sophisticis(Soph.Elench.33, 5).19M (7) Secundum picheremapro eloquentibusphilosophis. Doublecrescent.


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MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY VS. RHETORIC 407(a) either eloquence is not a good or it is a good, (b) that for the rest it hasnothing to do with philosophy, in any case no more than with the art of acobbler, a statuary, or a bronze-worker; thereupon they proceed with themost prolonged and immoderate laughter to pick up each of the alternativepropositions and rebut and resolve them in the following manner. They be-gin 20by contending that all philosophy is a good, that furthermore almostall the peripatetics hold rhetoric to be a part of philosophy. To Aristotlerhetoric was a species of social science (civilis scientia) which [civilis sci-entia], they say, he called interpellatio; conceived generaliter this pertainsto the first syllogistic figure only, conceived particulariter it pertains to thelast figure and no other."I do not know whether this or the contrary is true; nor can I findwhere Aristotle said it. But the argument a genere is well enough under-stood, although-and whether Aristotle might or might not say these por-tentous things-we ourselves do not care; inasmuch as almost all the booksof this philosopher are obscure we neglect them, while they [sc. rhetorici]say they constantly are busy in the study of them. Therefore, as men whoeat solid steaks of beef and pork we readily allow delicate and idle men tomake away with what to us are pomenta. We keep away from this contestover Aristotle as from a precipice, though in other respects we are steadfastand unafraid."We are further made sport of with respect to the second alternative,21in this manner: if philosophy does not at all pertain to rhetoric, neither doesanimal to man. But animal does pertain to man; who does not see that?To rhetoric therefore philosophy does pertain, be it as to a part or as to aform and species: this they also demonstrate more extensively. I answeredthat it [rhetoric] is the part of that philosophy that we call practical, andthat it does not belong to philosophy as theory. That, they say, is what wehave been trying to express to you: you want philosophers cut in two, half-perfect, mutilated. You have granted that rhetoric is part of philosophy,and yet you hold it to be foul and unseemly that the philosopher hold onto rhetoric, without which no one will ever be a perfect and complete philos-opher: for whatever might be wanting in something it cannot be perfect andconsummate. Otherwise, if all philosophy pertains to the perfection of ourmind,22and if rhetoric does not so pertain to it, then a syllogism of the sec-ond figure would result, which is deceptive, that some philosophy is notphilosophy: they say this argument was first called ex contrapositis by Aris-totle. But if the mind is perfected by eloquence, what ill-will is it to con-tend that the same person should not be both a philosopher and eloquent?"All this they as it were top off with their crowning argument, to wit,the authority and example of the ancients,23Plato and Aristotle, whose doc-

20 M (8) Contraprimamsolutionem. Double crescent.21 M (9) Contrasolutionem ecundam.22 M (10) Syllogismus x contrapositis. Uprighttriangle.23 M (11) Epicheremaertiumpro philosophis legantibus.


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408 QUIRINUS BREENtrines and opinions we profess, who (say they) were men of such surpassingeloquence that there is nothing more charming, more pure, more distin-guished than their discourse. Accordingly, to say that philosophy conflictswith eloquence because the orator's business is but to deceive and lie 24 isclear calumny, savors not at all of the peripatetic and appears to ignore thatthere is a difference between an orator and a sophist, a difference whichAristotle made in his Topics and Rhetoric, they say. Demosthenes em-ployed falsehood when he denied he had sent delegates at the same time toking Philip in behalf of peace and against Philip to the allies in behalf ofthe league. But to argue from a story of Demosthenes or of anyone elsethat this conclusion must be strictly held as a universal rule, that all oratorslie,26is to miss the mark doubly: on the one hand, because they do not knowthat one cannot base a conclusion on individual propositions, and on theother because they think that by the third figure a universal conclusion canbe reached. Neither, so they say, do they perceive that syllogisms 'fromsigns,' according to the third as well as the second figure, seemed to Aristotleweak and loose, or that which also Fabius Quintilian noted: if it is permis-sible to lie in civil affairs is it perhaps also permissible in things belongingto nature, in moral affairs, in things divine? For the rules of civil discourseand those of philosophical discourse are different.

"Equally spirited twitting comes from those who say that the discourseof a philosopher 26must not be soft and delicate (mollem et delicatam), asif there were anyone who would demand in a philosopher what in an oratorwould not even be tolerated. But just as discourse which is excessivelyloose and broken, so discourse which is stiff, dirty, muddy, and foul dimin-ishes the dignity and majesty of philosophy. They approve a tenor andstyle of speaking which holds to the mean: they want it Attic, not Asiatic,not Germanic, as they want their food. The Cynic's food displeases, so doesthe Persian: the latter is extravagant, the former foul. A frugal mealpleases. The same holds for discourse. Therefore,27 those ought to belaughed at as lying about a well-known fact who say that the coarse-haired,stiff, bristling style which philosophers now use is full of a certain reverenceand majesty.28"Now here I am compelled to speak the truth (for even in a defenderand advocate we do not suffer a bold falsehood): if our speech is not foul,I do not see what kind of speaking can be foul; or at least if our speech hasthis rudeness and majesty, that of artisans and rustics will have the samequalities. We ourselves do not really speak more elegantly than laborersand common folk; thus we would speak the vernacular better than the

24 M (12) Hic incipiuntargumentabarbarephilosophantiumt solutionesad eanostrae. Ad primum. Uprighttriangle.25M (13) presentsan invertedtriangleto show that nothingcan be concludedfrom the proposition hat Demosthenes ied and was an orator.26M (14) Ad secundum. Upright triangle.27M (15) Ad tertium. 28M (16) Double crescent.


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MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY VS. RHETORIC 409Latin. Do farmers, priests and pedagogues, notaries and hack-lawyers(formularii) speak otherwise than we? Yet who ever detected in their talkaught of sanctity and majesty?" There are those 29 who just as intemperately endeavor, contrary totheir own interest, to use a bit of evidence in Cicero who writes: 'And yetif a philosopher affects eloquence I should not hold him in contempt; if hedoes not have it I should not importune him.' 30 And indeed the best of ora-tors, who wanted to refute the doctrine of Epicurus, could not have repliedotherwise to Lucius Torquatus, who had said as follows: 'But I think thatlike our Triarius you will be less charmed by him [Epicurus] because hehas neglected those ornaments of discourse found in Plato, Aristotle, andTheophrastus. For I can hardly be brought to the point of assuming thatthe things he observed should to you appear not to be true.' Then Cicerosaid. 'See how mistaken you are, Torquatus: the discourse of that philoso-pher does not offend me, for it represents in words what he wants to say andsays clearly what he wants me to understand. And yet if a philosopheraffects eloquence I should not hold him in contempt; if he does not have itI should not importune him. I am not so well satisfied with his doctrine.'They argue that he did not say this as his true opinion but as an argumentad hominem: for in disputation many things are not so much said as one'sreal opinions as for the sake of either charming or pleasing or instructing;for the rest there are in Cicero many passages where this is shown. First,in the same book of De Finibus: 31 'But I take it some shun Latin worksbecause they happen upon uncouth and boorish books which taken from badGreek are worse when translated in Latin: I raise no objection against theseif only they have no intention of reading on the same subjects in Greekworks. Who would not read really good things done in choice language withdignity and ornament?' Elsewhere to the same effect: 32 ' Philosophy, whichwe must brighten and enliven, has till this era been in the doldrums and hasnot enjoyed the light of Latin letters. ... At this task we ought to workhard, the more so seeing that right now many books are spoken of as Latinbut are written rashly by men who are certainly very fine but not particu-larly polished. It can happen that a man who is a good thinker cannot ex-press his ideas in polished language; but if he writes out his ideas withoutbeing able to organize or explain them accurately or by any delight attractthe reader, he is man who intemperately abuses both leisure and letters.And consequently that kind read their own books to their own kind; andnobody touches those books except the men who want the same license ofwriting accorded to themselves.' A thousand other passages exhibit this,such as the one where Cicero admonishes to avoid the novelty of an in-appropriate work as well as the one in which he contends that felicity inspeaking must not be neglected. 'I rather would not use the forms speciebusand specierum, unless it can be said in Latin.' 33

29 M (17) Ad quartum. 30 M (18) Cicero,De Finibus (I, 5, 14 sq.).31 De FinibusI, 3, 8. 32 M (21) In Tusculanisquaestionibus.33 M (22) Cicero n Topicis (7, 30).


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410 QUIRINUS BREEN" Ho there, whoever you are, where is your promise of help? 34 Is this adefense or a betrayal, to reveal us to a witness who would slay us? Did

you know what he was going to say? Then it was perfidy. Did you notknow it? Then it was rash to cite an opponent's witness who would haveauthority not only to argue [against you] but also to make a confession [onyour behalf]. Who but an orator would have made such an error.35 But,of course, a word is an arbitrary symbol, not produced by nature but as itwere by an understanding or agreement among men. Nobody denies this.We speak of a cap and a cloak, yet no one puts a cloak around his feet orwraps his body in a cap.36 Everything does not depend for correctness uponone's good pleasure. Maecenas in trousers up to his mouth as if he were aSarmatian, could sit on the judge's bench, because it was an arbitrary thing,but there was nobody who did not criticize him. As we must ask and learnabout shoes from cobblers and about clothes from shop-keepers, so we mustfind out about a method of speaking from orators. What is there so arbi-trary as laws, as rights, as ceremonies? Yet who would suffer them to bemade over or changed according to the desires of a philosopher, no matterhow outstanding or how near to God? This is particularly so for us whospeak of a contemplator only and keep separate from him the practicalknowledge without which, so they say, a man as man is not a philosopher,but a monster." Therefore their first rhetorical syllogism (aggressio) 37 consists of bothsyllogism and prosyllogism,38 with true propositions and false assumptions,according to the first figure; or it consists of a single syllogism, using thesecond figure; as they desire to be taught by the rules of the Analytics, andthey say this is altogether a paralogism of the kind called per aliquid etsimpliciter: for example, as on the one hand to assume 39that not some butall eloquent men lie because some do, so on the other hand to assign thisvice to eloquence and not to man as man. By means of the second figurethey say there results the following sophism, of which one assertion is thor-oughly false: 40 the discourse of an eloquent man cannot but be soft anddainty (mollis et delicatus). Whoever says this is ignorant of either of twothings, that is, either what softness in discourse means or how many formsof speech there are. The snare he falls into here consists either in wordsthat differ but slightly: for example, when that which is spoken 'ornately'or ' elegantly,' seems to be spoken 'softly' or 'effeminately '; this may becalled metalepsis, which is the eighth topic in the second book of the [Aris-totle's] Topics, which is appropriate for declarative, as stated first by Ciceroand later by Quintilian.4 Or the snare consists in what they call vitiumconsequentis: let us grant (they say) that soft and dainty discourse pertains

84M (23) Dilemmaton. 35M (24) Ad quintum. 36M (25) Doublecrescent.37M (26) Repetitiorationumadversarii:n quo quaeque arumpeccarevideatur.38 M (27) A triplecrescent. 39M (28) An uprighttriangle.40M (29) Ad secundum. Uprighttriangle.41Cicero,Topica,XXI, 79, 30; Quintilian, nstitutioOratoria, II, V, 7.


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MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY VS. RHETORIC 411wholly to orators and eloquent men, yet it is not valid, conversely, thatwhatever discourse the orator uses must always be soft and dainty.42 Thefallacies described above, to wit, the one committed per aliquid et simplici-ter as well as the one in the case of words that differ but slightly carry withthem as a kind of error also the loose syllogism (epicherema), as if all meanand rude discourse carries majesty before it, or as if there were no differ-ence between rude and mean discourse. But a man who says things likethat appears not to understand what is majesty in speech, what is highness,gravity, dignity, sanctity, sharpness, meanness, rudeness. Of rules concern-ing these subjects the books of Aristotle, Theophrastus, Dionysius, Cicero,Quintilian, and more recently Hermogenes, Alexander Minutianus are full.43They say that the same ruin and desolation comes from the final trickresulting from the arbitrariness of introducing words, as if there were nodistinction between arbitrariness and that which one is permitted to do." Consequently they [sc. rhetors] declare all this a crafty sort of argu-ment, smelling not at all of dialectical skill; 44its bad deductions from non-essentials and consequents are as like as possible to the reasonings of Par-menides and Melissus: with this difference, however, that in the more stupidof those arguments there is antistrophe where there is anastrophe-in fact,45this is the sore point of these who incur faults and fallacies of inference.They [the rhetors] say that those rhetorical syllogisms (epicheremata) ofours which may be urged against themselves are a tissue of most impudentpropositions, seeing they take into account neither anastrophe nor anti-strophe. So when Pico says that an orator lies 46 it is called false on everycount, for it is not manifest that all orators lie, nor that everybody who liesmust be an orator. When he says,47 'The discourse of an orator is soft anddainty': it is called false in every part, for there is neither regression (Quin-tilian IX, 3, 35) nor transposition (nec commeat), that is,48 there is neitherantistrophe nor anastrophe. When he says, 'Rude and mean discourse isfull of majesty,' it is called wholly false because 49 it is neither invertible(nec revertitur: Quint. VIII, 6, 65) nor convertible (nec convertitur: Quint.IX, 1, 33 sq., X, 1, 29). When he says, 'Acts of free will are identical withpermissible acts,' it is called false in every part,50for all things permissibleare not all acts of free will, nor does it necessarily follow that acts of freewill are permissible." These are their words, perhaps not true, but certainly probable; yet Ihave not admitted my defeat at once. In fact it is our custom in debate al-ways to stand firm, never to give an inch, never to yield, always to havesome safe ground or hiding place from which not even Aristotle himself,

42 M (30) Ad tertium. A doublecrescent.43 M (31) Ad ultimum. Double crescent.44 M (32) Alia repetitiorationumadversarii: n quo peccentomnis n universum,id est in uno. 45M (33) Uprighttriangle. 46M (34) Doublecrescent.47M (35) Uprighttriangle. 48 M (36) Double crescent.49M (37) Double crescent. 50M (38) Double crescent.


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412 QUIRINUS BREENwere he to come back to life, couldtear us away; yet also for this they be-rate us, calling it boorishnessand impudencebornfromour very contemptof polite letters. A remarkable hing it is that to professorsof the liberalarts it is not enough o lack noble letters but they must hate them andmakeall kinds of attacksuponthem; so that none are morehostile to the liberalstudies than those wanting to be known as doctorsof the liberal arts. 0droll ambition of somepeople,who would boast of the name but scorn thething!"So then,he [the Paduan] said, "Here is the sumtotal: eitherthey havea clear and compellingcase for us, or they do not. If

q. bren - giovanni pico della mirandola on the conflict of philosophy and rhetoric

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