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Review Article

Putin’s Russia and the ‘New Cold War’:

Interpreting Myth and Reality

DAVID J. GALBREATH

Roger E. Kanet (ed.), Russia: Re-emerging Great Power. Houndmills: Palgrave

Macmillan, 2007, xiiþ 229 pp., £50.00 h/b.

Michael Korinman & John Laughland (eds), Russia: A New Cold War? London:

Vallentine Mitchell Academic Publishers, 2008, viiiþ 396 pp., £19.95 p/b.

Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces both Russia and the

West. London: Bloomsbury, 2008, ixþ 342 pp., £18.99 p/b.

Dmitri V. Trenin, Getting Russia Right. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, 2007, xviþ 127 pp., £11.99.

READERS OF THIS JOURNAL WILL HAVE HEARD MANY TIMES THAT the collapse of the

Soviet Union sent shockwaves around the world and changed the international system

as we knew it. Perhaps less mentioned is the impact that it had on the people and

politics of Russia. Boris Yel’tsin’s presidencies were characterised by domestic misrule

and kleptomania while internationally the great ‘Bear’ became inefficient and

ineffective. Out of the shadows came a man that fundamentally changed Russia

domestically and reasserted the country internationally. Vladimir Putin, riding on high

levels of domestic discontent and energy prices, began to reshape Russian domestic

and foreign policies. The books reviewed herein analyse the impact of this new Russia,

Putin’s Russia, on global politics. The contributors to Roger E. Kanet’s edited

collection focus on Russia as a re-emerging ‘great power’. Kanet and his contributors

set the context for Michael Korinman and John Laughland’s edited book and Edward

Lucas’s book on the possibility and propensity of a ‘New Cold War’. Finally, Dmitri

V. Trenin argues in his book that Russia is on the cusp of joining the West not re-

opposing it. Together, these books explore the myths and realities of Putin’s Russia

and the ‘New Cold War’.

EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES

Vol. 60, No. 9, November 2008, 1623–1630

ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/08/091623-08 ª 2008 University of Glasgow

DOI: 10.1080/09668130802362367

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A resurging Russia?

Arguably, the Russian Federation is at its most influential since the collapse of the

Soviet Union. Russia’s re-emergence as a ‘great power’ in world politics is illustrated

in Kanet’s edited collection, which charts the change in Russian foreign and security

policy since Putin’s rise to presidential power in 1999. Kanet sets the context of the

study in his introduction. He argues that Russian foreign policy since the end of the

Soviet Union has lacked a central strategic logic, ranging from counter-productive to

innocuous. The near simultaneous financial crisis and rise in world energy prices has

had a significant impact on Russian foreign policy in two ways. Firstly, the crisis

finally discredited any lingering notion that liberal economic reforms, propagated by

the West, were right for Russia. Put simply, the West was causing more harm than

good. Secondly, the rise in world energy prices brought home a second realisation: the

West was no longer needed. Thus, rather than imitate ‘great power’ world politics,

Russia would be able to re-establish itself on the centre stage. Kanet and his

contributors look at how the Russian Federation has made this geo-strategic turn-

around in such a relatively short time. Kanet argues that a ‘great power’ logic has

underpinned Russian foreign policy under Putin. The contributors illustrate this in

their wide-ranging analyses of Putin’s foreign and security policy as well as Russia’s

changing relationship with the ‘near’ and ‘far’.

The book begins with a look at Russia’s changing strategy under Putin. Ingmar

Oldberg focuses on the rhetorical claims of ‘great power’ status at home and abroad

by the political leadership. Oldberg links the rise of ‘great power’ rhetoric to both

Russia’s economic strength and to the formulation and consolidation of Russian state

patriotism. Combined with the centralisation of political powers within the hands of

the president, Russia has a greater potential since the end of the Cold War to be a

‘great power’. Nikita A. Lomagin builds on Oldberg’s analysis with an examination of

Russia’s new security identity since Putin’s rise to power. The author finds that while

Russia’s security identity has moved back into the realm of realpolitik, Russian

officials have also focused on a great deal of soft security issues, such as terrorism,

changing demographics and economic security. Lomagin argues that the Russian

Federation seeks to promote various security identities such as ‘great power’ or

‘regional hegemon’. At the same time, this varied approach to security illustrates the

continued search for a consolidated security identity. Vladimir Rukavishnikov further

discusses the practical implications of these competing security discourses. According

to Rukavishnikov, ‘the task [for President Putin] was to dispel the real security threats,

both immediate and longer term, and to recommend possible paths and methods for

countering them’ (p. 55). The author highlights three changing dynamics of world

politics with which the Yel’tsin administration did not come to grips. These were the

rise of international terrorism, the US’s willingness to forgo multilateral decision-

making structures, and changes in the ‘near abroad’ following the so-called ‘coloured

revolutions’ as well as NATO enlargement. All three authors show the marked

difference in security outlook that arrived with the rise of Putin to power.

The next section of the book focuses on Russia’s relationship with the post-Soviet

region, although not the Baltic states. Graeme P. Herd looks at Russia’s relationship

with Moldova’s breakaway region of Transdniestria. Herd argues that Russia’s

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policies towards the breakaway regions in both Moldova and Georgia are part of a

renewed effort to reassert power in the former Soviet region. In his chapter, Herd

illustrates how the Kremlin has changed its dual policy of protecting the territorial

integrity of Moldova while protecting the status of the ‘frozen conflict’ for a policy of

more aggressive support for the Transdniestrian regime. Bertil Nygren continues on

this issue in his chapter on Russia’s relationship with Georgia and its breakaway

regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Nygren highlights the change in tactics used

by the Kremlin. Namely, Nygren shows how Putin changed from the tactic of

threatening further military intervention to the ‘power of the purse’ (as reflected in gas

prices and trade wars). However, more recent activities in Abkhazia in particular

illustrate how military strategy is creeping back into the Russian–Georgian relation-

ship. Along similar lines, Susanne Nies analyses the changing dynamics of the three

en/exclaves of Kaliningrad, Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhchivan. Her argument is

that en/exclaves are litmus tests for styles of regional governance and diplomacy. The

chapter illustrates how these regions are more susceptible to ‘hard and soft security

threats than other territories’ (p. 127).

Finally, the book looks at Russia’s changing relationship with the other two ‘great

powers’: China and the US. John Berryman looks at the Russia–China relationship in

the context of the ‘new’ Central Asia. Particular attention is given to China’s emerging

role in the region as a competitor to Russia’s attempts to be a regional hegemon.

Berryman concludes that the competition between Russia and China in Central Asia

has been made less by the ramifications of the successful and failed ‘coloured

revolutions’. Secondly, Kanet and Larisa Homarac contribute a chapter on the role of

the US in Central Asia. They describe the US’s interest in the region as predicated on a

focus on political stability and the prosecution of the ‘war on terror’. The co-authors

argue that the former causes far more friction between Moscow and Washington than

does the latter. Finally, and in relation to this, Robert O. Freedman examines Russia’s

role with regards to Iran and the nuclear question. Freedman highlights how Russia

has used the Iranian dilemma as a way to chart an independent position vis-a-vis US

and EU positions. This final substantive chapter characterises the challenges to

Russia’s attempts to re-emerge as a ‘great power’, by charting the gains and losses in

Moscow’s attempts to affect events in Tehran.

Altogether, Kanet produces a well-structured and generally well-written book on

Russia’s changing relations with the world following Putin’s rise to power. There are

several highlights to the book, but Graeme Herd’s contribution is particularly well-

researched and written. While the book works together well, the lack of a discussion of

Russia’s relations with the Baltic states, at the regional level, and with the EU, at the

global level, leaves a considerable gap in the analysis. Nevertheless, Kanet’s edited

collection is perhaps the most well-developed analysis in this selection.

Thus far, we have discussed Russia as a ‘re-emerging great power’ and as a ‘regional

hegemon’. Michael Korinman and John Laughland go one step further in their vast

edited collection to discuss Russia in terms of ‘empire’. In his opening editorial,

Korinman asks whether Russia is headed towards a ‘fifth empire’ (p. ix). He argues,

‘this latest ‘‘empire’’ still has to establish itself after a second ‘‘time of troubles’’ (1991–

1999) but the prospect of it cannot be entirely ruled out’ (p. ix). The point of the edited

book is to chart and question Russia’s prospective transformation. In order to address

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these points, Korinman and Laughland bring together over 30 authors from various

fields of expertise, found predominately in non-Anglo-Saxon academia, in an unusual

mix of short essays and scholarly articles with an interview, editorial and book review.

All of this is to answer one central question: whether we are entering ‘a New Cold

War’.

The book is vast in its scope and in its proliferation of contributors and thus to

review the book in a similar manner to the Kanet book would be unjust to Korinman

and Laughland’s collection. Rather than following the book’s format, let us instead

address the local, regional and international issues, that are addressed in the book.

Locally, how are circumstances within Russia? Gerard-Francois Dumont writes on

Russia’s falling population levels and the possible impacts on geo-politics in the

region. Dumont argues that its decreasing demographics will prevent Russia from

regaining its ‘super-power’ status, while other states like China, India and Brazil are

on the ascendency. In an exceptionally well-written piece, Oliver Crone looks at the

state of the military in Russia. He finds that following a long period of resistance to

reform in the military, there has been a growing acceptance of reform and of

redevelopment. For Crone, Russian military development characterises the worsening

relations with the ‘West’ following George W. Bush’s election to the presidency.

Thirdly, Emil Pain looks at the discourses of nationalism and imperialism in

contemporary Russia. Pain argues that the greatest threat to Russian ‘imperialism’ is a

growing movement of ethnic nationalism.

Regionally, the book looks at two significant issues: energy politics and territorial

integrity. Crone contributes once again with a chapter on the ‘Nordstream’ project in

the Baltic Sea, linking Russia and Germany by gas pipeline. The chapter looks at the

environmental and geo-political arguments that are being mobilised against the

pipeline. He argues that it is one of the greatest threats to EU cohesion. Viatcheslav

Avioutskii offers two chapters on the status of Russia’s relations with its south-western

neighbours. The chapters illustrate how Russia’s relations have changed from

ideologically driven to economic in nature. For instance, Avioutskii illustrates how

Gazprom’s movements in the former Soviet space not only complement government

policy but also help direct it. Secondly, at the regional level, several contributors look

at the impact of Kosovo’s independence on politics in the region, with an eye to

Russia’s role in the ‘frozen conflicts’. Natalia Narochnitskaya looks at not only how

the Kosovo precedent may change secessionist enclaves in the former Soviet Union,

but also how the breakaway region of Transdniestria may shape the outcome

of Kosovo. Florence Mardirossian looks at the lesser known Georgian region of

Javakheti, home to many Armenians. The author highlights the volatile status of

politics in the Caucasus, but fails to enquire into the lack of Russian leadership as an

insurer of regional stability.

At the international level, the contributors focus primarily on Russia’s relationship

with the US and China. Fyodor Lukyanov investigates Russia’s changing relationship

with the US. He concentrates on the impact of the Soviet collapse on US foreign policy

since the end of the Cold War, and argues that policy-makers in Washington suffer

from ‘fear and complacency’ to the sacrifice of ‘global security’ (p. 37). Alexander

Grushko and Alexander Karavayev look in separate chapters at the impact of the

planned US missile defence shield on relations between Moscow and Washington.

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While Grushko focuses on the disrupting effects on the US–Russian relationship,

Karavayev examines the proposals of a joint-administered missile defence shield. In

terms of the China–Russia relationship, Yike Zhang investigates from the Chinese

perspective. Zhang argues that the Chinese relationship with Russia is driven largely

by strategic interests, which at times complement Moscow while at other times they

confront Russian interest, for example in Central Asia.

As an edited collection, the book brings together a wide range of expertise to

analyse contemporary Russia and its relations at the local, regional and international

levels. However, in terms of addressing the central question of whether there will be a

‘New Cold War’, the collection lacks a focused response. Many of the chapters are too

small to go into much detail and there is the constant question for the reader: where is

the value-added in this contribution? Nevertheless, the collection does offer several

important items. Firstly, as stated, the book does approach contemporary Russia in a

holistic manner. Secondly, the contributors often come from French and Russian

universities with the occasional outside scholar. French voices, more so than Russian,

are often less heard in Anglo-Saxon Central and East European Studies. Finally,

several of the chapters are important contributions, such as the two chapters by Oliver

Crone. In general, the book does not bring the reader close to answering the question

of a ‘New Cold War’, but instead gives us a mixed account of contemporary Russia.

A ‘New Cold War’?

Whereas Korinman and Laughland begin with the ‘New Cold War’ query and fail to

fully engage with it, Edward Lucas’s book, The New Cold War, lays out a concise

argument supporting the thesis and gives a thorough account of how Russia has come

to this point. Perhaps more importantly, Lucas describes a Russia that is out to harm

or at least ‘menace’ the West. As the Central and Eastern Europe correspondent for

The Economist, readers may know Lucas for his constant critique of the Putin

administration and its impact on Europe and the West. While perhaps few know better

the ins and outs of politics in the Russian Federation, it should be noted that Lucas is

a journalist and not an academic. Responding to the death of a fellow journalist, the

author sets out to illustrate how Russia has changed to threaten the West. He lays out

the tactics of the Kremlin and highlights the very weaknesses in the West that

encourage Russia’s slide into ‘facade democracy’. Importantly, Lucas is not putting

forward a ‘back to the future’ thesis. Rather, he argues that the world is entering into a

new form of contention with Russia on one side and the West on the other. At the

same time, like Western cohesion in the Cold War, the West must make an effort to

counter-balance Russia’s growing influence, this time economic rather than

ideological.

The book begins with an examination of Putin and his rise to power. He describes

Yel’tsin as hapless and hopeless, and as creating a situation in which the security

services arose to take control of Russia and its assets. Lucas shows how over three-

quarters of the top administrative positions are held by former security service

(intelligence and military) personnel. He argues that while the Soviet Union only

gave the security services limited power, the collapse of the Soviet system and

the subsequent reform gave ‘the savviest people in the former Soviet Union—the

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ex-spooks—a chance to beat the West at its own game: capitalism’ (p. 28). Yet did we

see capitalism arise from the ashes of state socialism? In fact, the ‘ex-spooks’ were (or

are) good at being kleptocrats in a vast kleptocracy. Perhaps this is a small point,

because it works with Lucas’ larger argument anyway. But what makes kleptocracy

close to democratic capitalism is the amount of power that sits outside government

office. Lucas argues that the FSB, the post-Soviet descendant of the KGB ‘has retained

the outward appearance of political pluralism, in a way that still fools outsiders and

wishful thinkers’ (p. 29). While few have been fooled by the nature of the changes in

Russia since Putin’s rise to power, there are more difficult discussions of whether or

not Russia needs a period of stability and centralisation after years of turbulence. The

author argues that any attempt at liberal reform under Putin (and more than likely his

successor) is a ‘sinister pretence’ (p. 73). In his third chapter, Lucas describes the

Kremlin’s use of state power to intervene in the economy and punish any who oppose,

such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky, as well as their ability to create a sense of political

pluralism without any substance. Politically, the Russian administration is hostile to

any alternatives: not a sign of a healthy democracy.

Secondly, Lucas focuses on the role that money has played in bringing about the

‘New Cold War’. His central economic point is thus that while we have created

institutions which constrain us to certain rules of the global market, Russian officials

are unwilling to play by the same rules of the game. On top of this, Lucas argues that

the Russian market is simply too good to pass by. Western businesses see significant

economic advantages in dealing with Russia despite the decline of political pluralism,

the increasing intervention of the state, and constant reform of the rules for doing

business (such as tax regimes and property law). Lucas argues that this situation is the

driving force behind the ‘New Cold War’. Not only is the West not bothered by

Russia’s changes, it is keen to make money from them. Yet, herein lies a contradiction

in many Western politicians’ reasons for supporting the Putin regime. On the one

hand, some politicians were willing to deal with Putin because he brought stability to

Russia after years of ‘troubles’, but on the other hand, Western businesses have not

been concerned with stability and have invested in Russia despite its instability.

Finally, Lucas concentrates on the changes in Russia’s foreign policy. He asks the

question, is Russia ‘sabre-rattling or selling sabres’? (p. 245). Russia has been

aggravated by the planned US missile defence shield. The US government has argued

that it is not meant to defend against or provoke Russia. There seems to be little to

suggest it could with only 10 planned interceptors and a very significant Arctic cap left

unprotected. Lucas points out that the greatest threat to Russia is the medium-range

missiles held by many of its key allies, such as North Korea, Iran and China. Russia’s

relationship with its European near-neighbours also raises questions about Moscow’s

intentions in the region. Little progress has come of Russia’s involvement in the

‘frozen conflicts’, while events in Abkhazia seem to be ‘thawing’ with unforeseen

consequences. Combined with its political and economic transformations, Russia’s

new foreign policy lends credence to the ‘New Cold War’ thesis.

So, where do we go from here? Lucas argues that the West does have an opportunity

both to prevent Russia from being a menace and to help Russia become a positive

member of the international community. Firstly, Western politicians have to be aware

of the realities behind the Putin revolution. Secondly, the West has to be more

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responsible when it trades with Russia. This means making sure that Russia plays by

the same rules of the game. For example, Russia is still waiting to access the World

Trade Organization. Finally, the West needs to work together to support the positive

signs of change in Russia. Without this, the West (and Russia) may face an even

greater problem in the future. Overall, Lucas’s account is well-written, concise and

evocative. The book adds colour to what many academics know already to be the case

in Russia. Together with his articles in The Economist, Lucas is nearly always

categorically critical of Russia. This book is no different. What it lacks in optimism

can be found in our last book.

Where Lucas sees a downward spiral towards a re-emerging Russian superpower

that is both nationalist and imperialist, Dmitri V. Trenin sees the possibility for liberal

political and economic change. In his book, Getting Russia Right, Trenin makes the

argument that commentators on Russia do themselves (and Russia) no favours by

over-imagining the decrepit state of Russia’s political and economic status. At the

same time, he also recognises the challenges in contemporary Russia. Both he and

Lucas see Russia at a crossroads, but while Lucas sees a turn to the worse, Trenin

spares a pause for thought that Russia (and its people) may go in a different direction.

He asks the following questions: ‘Is it really going in the wrong direction, sliding back

ever faster and becoming a threat-in-waiting, or is it moving along and even forward in

a familiar pattern two steps forward, one-and-a-half steps back? Or is it something

else, something non-linear?’ (pp. 4–5). His argument rests on two points. Firstly,

Russia is a big country. Not only is it large, but there is more to Russia than just the

president and his coterie. In fact, he argues, much of Russia is a land of ‘capitalism

and private interest’ that can reshape it. The second point is that we should not

confuse reconfiguration with decline. He states: ‘Russia is coming back, but not as an

archaic empire. It is becoming a qualitatively new actor . . .’ and argues that Russia is

not some kind of ‘other’ but instead is ‘becoming Western’ (p. 6).

The book that follows attempts to substantiate this argument. Firstly, Trenin

investigates how Russia reached this point. In his analysis of the Russian government

since Putin’s rise to power, Trenin holds no punches. He argues that the current

government is ‘czarist’ in nature. Not only does it control access to political power

outright, but it also has a near monopoly of official information. Furthermore, the

oligarchs have been pushed aside by key figures within the presidency, such as,

formerly, Dmitry Medvedev. Within this context, this is where Trenin agrees largely

with Lucas’s findings. While Lucas sets a case for what the West can do to change

matters, Trenin focuses on what Russians can do (or are doing) to change Russia. For

Trenin, salvation lies in capitalism. He argues that three things will move Russia

forward: money, private property and a consumer society. Beyond this he argues that

Russia is not ruled by Moscow in totality, but rather there is room in the periphery to

change, evolve and develop. Trenin finds that Russian openness to the outside world

and to the West in particular, has never been better; that the Soviet control over body

and soul does not have a place in modern day Russia. In essence, Russia is a changing

society and this must have an impact on politics (eventually).

Again, similar to Lucas, Trenin argues that the outside world and the West in

particular are vital for Russia’s transformation—except that Trenin sees this

relationship between Russia and the ‘rest’ as reflexive. He argues that ‘. . . Russia’s

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attitude toward the West (and vice versa) often determined the country’s view of itself

and its role and mission in the world’ (p. 51). Trenin exhibits how Russia has become

disappointed with the West. He argues that firstly, the Soviet Union (or more precisely

the Soviet threat) created the West. When the Soviet Union ended, Russians believed

in the myth that the country was ‘returning’ to the West. Yet, neither the West nor the

Russian Federation was committed to making this metaphorically ring true. Thus,

while the West is disappointed with the lack of progress in Russia, Russia too is

disappointed in the lack of interest from the West.

Alternatively, Trenin puts forward the notion that rather than being opposed to the

West, Russia is part of a ‘New West’. In essence, Trenin calls for a paradigm shift in

the thinking on Russia. The world does not need, he argues, an alliance of

democracies: ‘The selection process will inevitably be awkward, the result inconsistent,

and the impact divisive . . . The truly winning and forward-looking formula is not the

spread of democracy but the expansion of the West’ (p. 103). This means extending

those institutions that represent the West, such as the G-8, to include many of the

rising world powers. Overall, Trenin’s optimism as it contrasts against Lucas’s

pessimism is refreshing. Yet, as easily as Lucas passes over any signs of progress,

Trenin is even worse about ignoring the worrying signs of the current state of Russian

domestic and international politics. In general, both Lucas and Trenin are right:

Russia matters. Both books are brilliantly written to reinforce this point.

The books reviewed split in many different ways, but perhaps most importantly,

they differ between the academic-analytical style and the argumentative-persuasive

style. Kanet and his contributors offer us a near-complete analysis of Russia’s

relations with the outside world following Putin’s rise to power. Korinman and

Laughland barrage us with a plethora of analyses, both in format and perspective,

which summarise the challenges to contemporary Russia. In contrast, Lucas and

Trenin offer us two arguments as to why Russia matters. Where Lucas finds Russia on

a road to resurrecting the Soviet Empire, Trenin argues that the new Russia is not

opposing the West, but becoming it. Altogether, the books describe a Russia that is at

a crossroads, with a path of ‘menace’ and a path of ‘salvation’ before it. Russia will

most likely take a path between the two. In other words, the world has not entered a

‘New Cold War’, but it has not ruled it out either.

University of Aberdeen

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