pursuing enhanced strategic stability through russia...

P U R S U I N G E N H A N C E DS T R A T E G I C S T A B I L I T YT H R O U G H R U S S I A - U . S .D I A L O G U E

RECOMMENDATIONS BY RUSSIA-U.S. WORKING GROUP

REPORTED BY ADLAN MARGOEVMay 2019

P I R C E N T E R

P U R S U I N G E N H A N C E DS T R A T E G I C S T A B I L I T YT H R O U G H R U S S I A - U . S .D I A L O G U E

P I R C E N T E R

RECOMMENDATIONS BY RUSSIA-U.S. WORKING GROUP

REPORTED BY ADLAN MARGOEV

May 2019

PIR Center is an independent non-governmental organization in Russiawhich carries out research, as well as educational, public awareness andpublishing activities, and provides consulting services. In 2019, PIR Center is celebrating its 25th anniversary. From the time ofits founding in April 1994 to this day, the priority areas of the Center'sresearch studies remain international security, arms control andnonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. PIR Center is in consultative status with the UN Economic and SocialCouncil (ECOSOC) since 2010. More information is available at www.pircenter.org.

PIR Center | Pursuing Enhanced Strategic Stability Through Russia-U.S. Dialogue 4

CONTENTS

Foreword Executive Summary I. Strategic stability is being hit with a double blow II. Russia and the United States are reverting to strategiccompetition III. Russian and U.S. approaches to strategic stability need tobe harmonized with each other IV. Perceived threats may set off a new arms race V. Russia and the United States need to preserve armscontrol VI. Nuclear risk reduction remains the saving grace for theworld VII. Protection of critical infrastructure from cyber threatsmay prevent a military conflict VIII. Enhancing strategic stability requires urgent steps Notes Working Group Members

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FOREWORD

In 2017, PIR Center (Moscow,Russia), in partnership with theJames Martin Center forNonproliferation Studies (Monterey,the United States), established aworking group of leading expertsfrom Russia and the United States topromote a constructive dialoguebetween the two countries on armscontrol, a reduction of risksstemming from nuclearmodernization, crisis management,and a future framework of strategicstability. This report summarizesrecommendations by members of theWorking Group, as well as by otherexperts who participated indiscussions held by PIR Center in2017-2018. The report was preparedby PIR Center’s Russia and NuclearNonproliferation Program DirectorAdlan Margoev, who bears soleresponsibility for its content.

Chaired by Dr. Vladimir Orlov,Founder of the PIR Center, and Prof.William Potter, Director of the CNS,the Working Group held two sessionsin 2017 and 2018 with the supportof the Carnegie Corporation of NewYork. Its members were not asked tomake or agree to therecommendations, nor have theybeen asked to endorse this report. Policy memos written by WorkingGroup members, as well as othermaterials produced as part of theproject, are available atwww.russia-us.pircenter.org.

Members of the WorkingGroup believe thepublication of this reportis especially important inthe context of theunravelling of the INFTreaty. Urgent steps tosalvage the treaty-basedarms control regime aredeemed overdue.


EXECUTIVESUMMARY

Strategic stability is being hit witha double blow. Rapid technologicalprogress indulges those whobelieve that nuclear war can bewon, with deteriorating politicalrelations increasing the probabilityof a conflict between Russia andthe United States. The Russiansand the Americans no longer fearnuclear war the way theirpredecessors did, so there is littleacknowledgement in Washingtonand Moscow of the need to joinefforts to avoid a nuclear war. Russia and the United States arereverting to strategic competition.While Washington’s attention hasbeen primarily focused on nuclear-arming regional challengers,Moscow has been suspecting it oftrying to gain strategic superiority.In order to address this perceivedchallenge, it launched a largemodernization program and

developed new strategic weapons.Moscow’s response is troubling tothe United States in its ambition,and the United States now acceptsthe more adversarial nature of itsrelations with Russia. Russian and the U.S. approaches tostrategic stability need to beharmonized with each other. Fullagreement in this field is beyond thetwo capitals. They are expected toemphasize the respective nationalapproaches to preserve strategicstability rather than develop sharedones. An updated conceptualframework for strategic stabilityshould rest on four principles:deterrence stability, crisis stability,a shared assessment of nucleardangers, and a renewal of habits ofcooperation in the field ofnonproliferation. Perceived threats may set off a newarms race. Threat perception plays agreater role in the U.S. and Russianstrategic policies than their actualoffensive and defensive capabilities.


The two countries should try toconvey and explain the purpose oftheir modernization plans to eachother, as well as focus theirattention on adopting restrictionson the development of weaponsystems threatening thesurvivability of each other’sstrategic forces and command,control, communications andintelligence assets. Russia and the United States needto preserve arms control. The NewSTART extension talks should beginwithout delay. The United Statesand the Russian Federation havethe most to lose in this scenario ofan unbridled quantitative andqualitative nuclear arms race. Freshapproaches to expanding thegeographic reach of nuclear armscontrol should also be explored. Nuclear risk reduction remains thesaving grace for the world. Theexisting mechanisms are barelyadequate for the current state ofbilateral relationship andtechnological advancements. TheU.S. and Russian leaders have toreassure each other that a limitedwar is not part of their militarydoctrines or plans. Protection of critical infrastructurefrom cyber threats may prevent a

military conflict. The risk of acyberattack leading to a militaryescalation that could furthertrigger a nuclear attack hasbecome real. The escalation ladderfrom cyber to nuclear attacksremains ambiguous as each sidedefines the thresholds forproportionate reciprocal measuresbased on its own criteria. Russiaand the United States must find away to work together on protectingtheir critical infrastructure anddeveloping norms of responsiblebehavior in cyberspace. Enhancing strategic stabilityrequires urgent steps. Theseinclude the resumption of strategicstability talks and establishing apanel consisting of civilian andmilitary officials and the nextgeneration of specialistsrepresenting political andtechnical fields of expertise toconduct a joint assessment ofnuclear dangers. The panel wouldalso serve as an informal platformfor the exchange of opinionsbetween Russian and U.S.parliamentarians. It would help toraise public awareness on nucleardangers by engaging the media,and facilitate joint analytical workinvolving U.S. and Russianspecialists working in the field ofstrategic stability.


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I. STRATEGIC STABILITYIS BEING HIT WITH ADOUBLE BLOW

In the 1960s, when the UnitedStates and the Soviet Unionrealized that it was impossible towin a nuclear war, the idea ofmutually assured destruction,among other factors, laid theground for arms controlnegotiations. In the two decadesthat followed, technologicaladvancements incentivized theU.S. leadership to seekcapabilities to win a nuclear war,but the Soviet Union wouldalways manage to restore thebalance on higher quantitativeand qualitative levels. By the end of the Cold War, theconfrontation between the twonations had come to an end, andthey developed a new pattern ofstrategic relationship in whichboth technical and politicalincentives for a nuclear conflictwere eliminated. The concept of“strategic stability” was designed

to replace an amorphous andsubjective notion of “equality andequal security.” In the joint U.S.-Soviet statement of June 1990, itwas defined as a state of strategicrelations that was “removingincentives for a nuclear firststrike.” This was to be achievedthrough a mutually acceptablerelationship between strategicoffensive and defensive arms, byreducing the numbers of warheadson strategic delivery vehicles, andby prioritizing highly survivablesystems. The current combination oftechnical and political factorsinfluencing the U.S.-Russianstrategic relationship is veryworrying.


In a sense, the situationappears even worse thanduring the Cold War.

Second, the Russians and theAmericans no longer fear nuclearwar the way their predecessors did,so there is little acknowledgementin Washington and Moscow of needto join efforts to avoid a nuclearwar. This situation allows thewarmongering hawks in the twocapitals to make a case for moreassertive policies and against anyrestrictions, including arms control.


First, rapid technologicalprogress indulges those whobelieve that a nuclear war canbe won, with the deterioratingpolitical relations increasingthe probability of a conflictbetween Russia and theUnited States.

I. STRATEGIC STABILITY IS BEING HIT WITH A DOUBLE BLOW

II. RUSSIA AND THE UNITEDSTATES ARE REVERTING TOSTRATEGIC COMPETITION

The focus of U.S. strategic policy isshifting back from deterringregional challengers to pursuingstrategic competition with otherglobal powers. With the end of theCold War, “rogue states” replacedthe Soviet Union on the U.S. radaras key sources of threat to thesecurity of the United States andits allies. In order to have moreleeway to address these threats, itmade a decision to withdraw fromthe Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)Treaty and pursued to developnational and regional ballisticmissile defense systems. Moscow, who believed the ABMTreaty served as a “cornerstone ofstrategic stability,” interpreted theU.S. actions as an attempt toachieve strategic superiority. As aresponse, it started implementing

a modernization program andlaunched production of newstrategic weapons. Washingtonperceived it as a challenge to itsnational security and a startingpoint for a resumption of a great-power competition. An unending cycle of complainingand explaining is even moreheated, now involving publicdisputes in the media. The paststrategic relationship includedsustained, high-level efforts byWashington and Moscow to assureeach other of their continuedcommitment to strategic stabilityand to demonstrate that theircapabilities were in line with theirstated intentions. Theseassurances were – and still are –being met with deep skepticismand pushback. The cycle of


complaining and explaining isunbroken to this day and yieldslittle result, while mutualsuspicion continues to grow. The United States and Russia aredeveloping concepts forintegrating the multiple tools ofdeterrence (hard and soft power,kinetic and non-kinetic, nuclearand non-nuclear) to support theirnational objectives. Over thepast decade, thinking has shiftedfrom the traditional divisionbetween conventional andnuclear means of deterrence to anew landscape, where thechallenges of integratingmultiple tools are beingexplored. The leadership of the twocountries is now engaged in a

discussion of how to redress theemerging strategic imbalance. Thisdiscussion touches increasingly onquestions related to long-termcompetition, with each sideseeking to shift this competitiononto terms favorable to itself.


II. RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES ARE REVERTING TO STRATEGIC COMPETITION

The underlying question iswhether mutual vulnerabilityremains the right organizingconcept for U.S.-Russiancompetition, or whether thetwo nations will pursuedominance in all thespheres, includingcyberspace and the outerspace.

III. RUSSIAN AND U.S.APPROACHES TO STRATEGICSTABILITY NEED TO BEHARMONIZED WITH EACHOTHER

While the strategic landscape hasbeen changing over the past threedecades, the United States andRussia have diverged in theirvision of strategic stability.Against the backdrop ofdisintegration of arms controltreaties such as the ABM Treatyand now the INF Treaty, there hasbeen a lack of in-depth dialogueon the impact of new weaponsystems and technologies onstrategic stability. Even newtreaties in this field have beennegotiated on the basis of theexisting templates, without takingthese new developments intoaccount. Ideally, Russia and the UnitedStates could discuss such issues as:· military doctrines, including theuncertainties surrounding the

Trump Administration’s NPR andthe Russian military doctrine;· the nuclear modernization plansof both sides;· the strategic implications ofregional and homeland missiledefenses and the value of a missiledefense transparency arrangement;· the implications of possiblefuture conventional prompt globalstrike systems, includinghypersonic glide vehicles;· the role of non-strategic nuclearweapons;· possible confidence-buildingmeasures in the cyber and spacedomains;· the challenges posed by ballisticand cruise missiles deployed bythird states;· prospects for involving thirdparties in arms control orstabilizing measures.[2]


HOW DOES THE UNITEDSTATES DEFINE STRATEGICSTABILITY?

There is no official U.S. definition of strategic stability. In the 2018 U.S.Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), strategic stability is mentioned six timeswithout an elaborate definition. Neither is such a definition provided inthe 2010 NPR, although the document discusses this issue morethoroughly. In 2016, the U.S. Department of State requested its InternationalSecurity Advisory Board (ISAB) to prepare a report on a multilateralframework for strategic stability, which was released to a broad audiencein an abridged version. The views expressed in the report did notrepresent official positions or policies of the U.S. Government; however,they reflect the understanding of strategic stability among the USexperts whose advice was solicited by the U.S. Government: “During the Cold War, strategic stability was a well-understood termused to describe the strategic nuclear relationship between the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union. The concept had two principle components:· The absence of incentives for either side to believe it would benefitfrom initiating war in a crisis (crisis stability). This included ensuringthat neither side believed it would gain an advantage by being the firstto use nuclear weapons, or that the other side was capable of a strikethat would eliminate its nuclear retaliatory capacity (first-strikestability).· The absence of any reason to believe that building additional ordifferent strategic forces by either side would alter this situation (armsrace stability). Since the end of the Cold War, the term “strategic stability” has beenused in many different ways by many different authors. Some use it inthe Cold War sense, while others broaden it to be almost a synonym for“national security policy” or even a general improvement in theinternational environment in which the use of force is virtually ruledout. We propose that, for present purposes, bilateral strategic stabilityshould be defined essentially by using the Cold War definition, with theunderstanding that in the modern world all nuclear weapons should beregarded as strategic. As shorthand for this concept, we often use theterm “reducing the risk of nuclear war.”[3]


HOW DOES THE RUSSIANFEDERATION DEFINESTRATEGIC STABILITY?

As for the Russian Federation, its updated understanding of strategicstability was introduced in a Joint Statement on Strengthening GlobalStrategic Stability signed by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin andChina’s Chairman Xi Jinping in 2016. According to that statement, Russianow defines strategic stability not only as predictability and parity inoffensive nuclear capabilities, but also as “a state of internationalrelations characterized by the following factors: · In the political sphere: - strict observance by all States and associations of States of the principles and norms of international law and provisions of the UN Charter governing the use of force and the adoption of coercive measures; - respect for the legitimate interests of all States and peoples in addressing current international and regional issues, and - inadmissibility of interference in the political life of other States; · In the military sphere: - retention by all States of their military capabilities at the minimum level necessary for national security needs; - deliberate restraint from taking steps in the field of military construction, forming and enlarging military-political alliances that could be perceived by other members of the international community as a threat to their national security and would force them to take retaliatory measures aimed at restoring the balance; - resolution of differences through a positive and constructive dialogue and strengthening of mutual trust and cooperation.”[4] The political part of this definition has little to do with arms control,and if we were to use such a broad definition of stability, then stabilityitself would become almost unachievable. To enable further progress inarms control, specialists will have to develop a narrow yet up-to-datedefinition of strategic stability based on technical parameters.


However, the grand project –reaching full agreement as to whatconstitutes threats to stability andadopting a jointly agreed plan onhow to manage them – is beyondthe leaders of the two countries.[5] An updated conceptual frameworkfor strategic stability should reston four principles – those arerooted in Cold War legacies butneed to be adapted, revisited, andbroadened in light of the changingstrategic capabilities and threats: 1. Mutual assurance that neithercountry can dramatically degradethe other country’s strategic

capabilities – now to include notjust nuclear capabilities as in theCold War but also space and cyberassets – we can call this“deterrence stability”; 2. A mutual commitment to preventa future U.S.-Russian militarycrisis, and in the event of such acrisis, a commitment to avoidpolitical-military actions thatwould heighten the risk of anescalation to open military (and,possibly, nuclear) conflict – wecall this “crisis stability”; 3. A shared assessment of nucleardangers , including (mostimportantly) a reaffirmation of the1985 U.S.-Soviet statement that anuclear war – any nuclear war –cannot be won and must never befought;[6] 4. A mutual readiness to takeadvantage of opportunities torenew habits of cooperationbetween Washington and Moscow,not least in cooperating to protectthe Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty.[7]


III. RUSSIAN AND U.S. APPROACHES TO STRATEGIC STABILITY NEED RECONCILIATION

Given the adversarialcharacter of the bilateralrelationship, they areexpected to emphasizerespective nationalapproaches to preservingstrategic stability rather thandevelop shared ones.

IV. PERCEIVED THREATS MAYSET OFF A NEW ARMS RACE

As is the case with ourunderstanding of strategicstability, U.S. and Russian expertsare broadly in accord on thedefinitions and implications ofnuclear weapons modernization forstrategic stability. Where theydisagree is which actions – andwhose actions – are underminingstability and may trigger a newarms race. If the ability to inflictunacceptable damage in responseto first strike by the opponent isguaranteed, then the ongoing U.S.and Russian nuclear modernizationprograms will have limited impacton strategic stability.[8]Nonetheless, certain elements ofthese programs could improve firststrike capability to an extent thatit might become an acceptableoption for any leader. The reportedcapability of the Russian SarmatICBM to reach targets via the

“southern route” and the precisioncapability of B61-12 nucleargravity bomb in the United Statescause mutual concern.[9] Missile defense systems lookequally disturbing, while in factthey cannot currently degrade theU.S. or Russian deterrentcapabilities. The interceptors arefew, and they cannot reliablyintercept incoming missiles,especially the advanced onesdesigned to penetrate missiledefenses. The problem with missile defenseis the lack of predictability withregard to its future: the RussianFederation, while deploying itsown S-500 missile defense system,is concerned that the United Statescould eventually deploy morecapable interceptors in largenumbers, which would create astrong imbalance.


Threat perception evidently plays agreater role in the two countries’strategic policies than their actualoffensive and defensivecapabilities. In the same vein, augmentingdefensive systems to reduce eachparty’s vulnerability to third statesand non-state actors could bebased on their agreement on a

mutually acceptable relationshipbetween strategic offensive anddefensive arms. Russia and the United Statesshould focus their attention onadopting restrictions on thedevelopment of weapon systemsthreatening the survivability ofeach other’s strategic forces andcommand, control, communicationsand intelligence (C3I) assets.[10] Although the nuclear weaponsstates are relying on digitaltechnologies to improve the safetyof their arsenals, their military areincreasingly interested in physicaltesting.


IV. PERCEIVED THREATS MAY SET OFF A NEW ARMS RACE

The United States and Russiashould try to convey andexplain the purpose of theirmodernization plans to eachother. If the leaders of the twonations could convince eachother, as well as other NPTMember States, that they aresolely improving safety,security, and survivability oftheir nuclear weapons, thenthe negative impact of suchmodernization would beminimal.

It is also important not toallow the resumption ofnuclear testing. As long asthe CTBT exists and nucleartesting moratorium isobserved, modernization ofnuclear warheads will remainlimited.

V. RUSSIA AND THE UNITEDSTATES NEED TO PRESERVEARMS CONTROL

Current conditions for bilateralarms control are hardlyadvantageous – arms control is onlife support, and the atmospherearound it is fueled by politicaldisagreements and mutualaccusations regarding compliance.Lack of trust, political fightsbetween the U.S. Congress and theU.S. President, bipartisanconsensus in Congress on theRussia policy, as well as littleappetite in Washington (and, tosome experts, in Moscow) for armscontrol will remain a formidableobstacle to comprehensive armscontrol dialogue between Russiaand the United States for years tocome. In the near term, given howdifficult it is to overcome some oftoday's serious challenges to theU.S.-Russian relationship, theobjectives should be modest: topreserve the existing arms control

agreements and other stabilizingarrangements.[11] Even if prospects currently look badfor further formal agreements, anextension would provide a measureof stability and predictability, atleast in the near term, and give bothsides an opportunity to consider thenext steps. Absent arms control, modernizationplans on both sides will riskstepping on a path to becomingexcessive and unaffordable. Thereasonably stable status quo willcollapse, and a complex,


The two countries shouldstart the New STARTextension talks without anyfurther delay. The two sidesshould agree to an earlyextension.

multiplayer arms race willconsume massive resources andgreatly increase the risk of nuclearwar. There will be neitherquantitative limitations on thenuclear arsenals, nor thetransparency and predictabilityneeded to assess the developmentof the other nation’s nucleararsenals and understand itsmotivations. The United States andthe Russian Federation have themost to lose in this scenario of anunbridled quantitative andqualitative nuclear arms race.

While it is still possible tonegotiate a bilateral follow-onto the New START Treaty afterits expiration in 2021 or 2026,fresh approaches to expandingthe geographic reach of nucleararms control should be explored. Engaging other nuclear weaponstates in the process of nucleararms limitation and reductionshould be based on theappropriate estimation of theirforces, as well as a cleardefinition of the principles,objects and verification methodsof such arms control agreements.


V. RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES NEED TO PRESERVE ARMS CONTROL

In future arms controlnegotiations, although thelikelihood of further nuclearreductions looks remote, theUnited States and Russia couldshift their focus from numbersand ranges to categories ofnuclear and conventionalweapons in order to restrict oreliminate the more destabilizingones, as well as the ones thattreaten strategic C3I systems.

No other country has suchrich experience in verifyingnuclear arms controlagreements as Russia andthe United States.Undoubtedly, U.S. andRussian experts could applythat wealth of experience todeveloping a strongverification system.

VI. NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTIONREMAINS THE SAVING GRACEFOR THE WORLD

Russia and the United Statesshould consider how best tostabilize the current tensesituation and reduce the risks ofmiscalculation and inadvertentoutbreak of conflict. Regrettably, the status of theconflict prevention, management,and de-escalation protocolsestablished by the two countries inthe previous decades can only bedescribed as barely adequate forthe current state of bilateralrelationship and technologicaladvancements. The system that was built duringthe Cold War and further improvedin the 1990s is partiallydismantled or technologicallyoutdated. Its evolution sloweddown to a stop during the firstdecade of this century, and thenduring the current decade it beganto break down.[12]

The relevant de-conflictionmechanisms and institutions arealmost non-existent today. Regularthematic, issue-area consultationshave stopped. The military-to-military programs have mostlybeen halted, both between


On the technical side,communications continue tolag behind the progress inthe developments of militaryand non-military means ofwar. The parties might haveinsufficient time tounderstand the nature of adangerous event andestablish contact with eachother. The emergence ofhypersonic weapons willaggravate that challengeeven further.

the United States and Russia andbetween Russia and the NATOstates. If a crisis, unintendedconfrontation, or a misinterpretedaction takes place, the twocountries will need to spendconsiderable time to arrange ameeting or create an ad hocmechanism to resolve thesituation. While the U.S. and NATOintentions in curtailing regularconsultations, including military-to-military, are understandable,that decision cannot be describedas helpful: today, the chances ofan unintended conflict and rapidescalation appear greater thanever since the early 1960s. The primary purpose of verificationand confidence-building regimes isan exchange of data on activitiesthat the other side might see as aprelude to an attack or the attackitself. Unfortunately, these are notfully adequate, either. Theinstruments available under theVienna Document fail to fullysupport that task – the Open SkiesTreaty application needs to beexpanded rather than curtailed.Russia, for its part, expressesconcerns about an increase in thenumbers of U.S. troops deployed inEastern Europe, and especiallyabout the deployment of heavyequipment close to its borders.

In theory, restoringcommunications systems andconsultation mechanisms betweenthe states would not be hard. TheSyrian deconfliction mechanismbetween the U.S. and the Russianmilitary is a single but so far verysuccessful example of how themilitary can maintain a robustcommunication channel that isfunctioning in the interests of bothnations’ security. Unfortunately, the domesticconditions, particularly in theUnited States, do not favor anysuch contacts. While Syria hasbeen a hotspot for a few years, theBaltic Sea and the Black Searemain two regions of potentialconfrontation between Russia andthe United States. A resumption of regular meetingsbetween the military and thediplomats of the two countries,including heads of the StateDepartment, the Department of


VI. NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REMAINS THE SAVING GRACE FOR THE WORLD

However, maintaining militarychannels is not enough in thenuclear domain – nuclear de-escalation requires havingequally functional politicalchannels.

Defense, the Ministry of ForeignAffairs and the Ministry of Defense,would be a politically challengingyet valuable step towardsimproving the U.S.-Russia securitydialogue. This could later developinto broader consultations andmechanisms of dialogue among theinterested actors on both sides. The idea that any use of nuclearweapons, however limited, willlead to a full nuclear exchange hasserved as the basis for deterrencefor decades, effectively preventingthe United States and Russia frommaking use of their nucleararsenals. However, the 2018 U.S.NPR holds that Russia is preparedto use nuclear weapons to paralyzethe United States and NATO at anearly stage of a conventional warand thereby end such conflict onfavorable terms. This made theauthors of the Nuclear PostureReview argue the need tomanufacture lower-yield nuclear

weapons that would allegedlydiscourage Russia from pursuingthe so-called “escalate-to-de-escalate” strategy.


VI. NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REMAINS THE SAVING GRACE FOR THE WORLD

Although Russian officials,including the president’soffice, have repeatedly deniedthat this strategy is part of theRussian military doctrine, theU.S. leadership remainsunconvinced. The situationgives raise to major concernsas these “tailored nuclearoptions” and related regionalplanning are blurring the onceclear line between nuclearand conventional weapons,thereby lowering thethreshold for nuclearweapons use.

VII. PROTECTION OF CRITICALINFRASTRUCTURE FROM CYBERTHREATS MAY PREVENT AMILITARY CONFLICTWhen addressing cyber threats tonational security, one has todistinguish between, a) intrusionsinto information systems that leadto malfunctioning of criticalinfrastructure, and b) informationcampaigns. These threats aredifferent in their nature but theyboth have a negative impact onstrategic stability. The risk of a cyberattack leading toa military escalation that couldfurther trigger a nuclear attackbecame explicit with the adoptionof the 2018 U.S. NPR, which reads:“The United States would onlyconsider the employment ofnuclear weapons in extremecircumstances to defend the vitalinterests of the United States, itsallies, and partners. Extreme circumstances couldinclude significant non-nuclearstrategic attacks. Significant

non-nuclear strategic attacksinclude, but are not limited to,attacks on the U.S., allied, orpartner civilian population orinfrastructure, and attacks on U.S.or allied nuclear forces, theircommand and control, or warningand attack assessmentcapabilities.”[13] The escalation ladder from cyberto nuclear attacks remainsambiguous as each side defines thethresholds for proportionatereciprocal measures based on itsown criteria.


On the one hand, clearthresholds would increasepredictability and preventescalation; on the other hand,knowledge of the opponent’sthresholds would help one actjust below those thresholdswith impunity.

Preserving this ambiguitymaintains a greater deterrencecapability because the opponent isthereby forced to take into accountthe risk of triggering a greaterconflict. This issue becomes even morecomplicated given that thirdparties may also have thecapability to provoke a cyberconflict between Russia and theUnited States. A government or anon-state actor could put the twocountries on the brink of an armedconflict by attacking criticalinfrastructure of either of themand framing the other side for theattack.[14] There are ways to both preventand mitigate such an escalation.Prevention includes updatingInternet protocols, networkisolation, and the use ofencryption. Private companies alsoprovide software for protection ofcritical infrastructure.Transparency and confidence-building measures may help to

prevent a conflict from escalating.These measures are beingdeveloped in the UN frameworkand further promoted by the OSCE. The development of norms ofresponsible conduct in cyberspaceis also under way. The UnitedStates and Russia once pioneeredin this field by concluding the firstbilateral agreement but halted itsimplementation after the Ukrainiancrisis of 2014. In July 2017, after President Trumpand President Putin met for thefirst time, the two governmentsannounced the establishment of abilateral working group on cybersecurity. Some experts argued forgiving this idea a chance, whileothers perceived the allegedRussian cyber interference as anobstacle to reviving the bilateralworking group; they believed thatno new agreements were possiblebetween Moscow and Washingtonin this field.


VII. PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FROM CYBER THREATS MAY PREVENTA MILITARY CONFLICT

A thorough attributionprocess would take time,while in the event of a majorattack the leadership of thevictim country would be undera lot of pressure to react asquickly as possible.

Many experts believe the twocountries must find a way towork together on nuclearissues, no matter how severetheir disagreements in otherareas are. The cyber domainis hardly different in thatrespect.

WHAT CYBEROPERATIONS MAYCONSTITUTE A USEOF FORCE?

There is some clarity regarding the thresholds on the U.S. side since thepublication of the 2015 Law of War Manual, which says: “If cyberoperations cause effects that, if caused by traditional physical means,would be regarded as a use of force under jus ad bellum, then such cyberoperations would likely also be regarded as a use of force. Suchoperations may include cyber operations that: (1) trigger a nuclear plant meltdown; (2) open a dam above a populated area, causing destruction; or (3) disable air traffic control services, resulting in airplane crashes. Similarly, cyber operations that cripple a military’s logistics systems, andthus its ability to conduct and sustain military operations, might also beconsidered a use of force under jus ad bellum."[15]


Without constructive dialogue oncyber issues between the UnitedStates and Russia, the world will

most likely fail to agree on anynorms of responsible state conductin cyber space.

VII. PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FROM CYBER THREATS MAY PREVENTA MILITARY CONFLICT

VIII. ENHANCINGSTRATEGIC STABILITYREQUIRES URGENT STEPS

For the above-mentionedrecommendations to beimplemented, an urgentresumption of strategic stabilitytalks is necessary at the officiallevel. It is of great importance thatno preconditions be set regardingthe inclusion of any topics on theagenda of these talks. TheDepartment of Defense and theMinistry of Defense must beactively involved, along with theState Department and the Ministryof Foreign Affairs. In parallel to these talks, a panelconsisting of both retired top-levelcivilian and military officials andthe next generation of specialistsrepresenting various political andtechnical fields of expertise couldbe created to conduct ajoint assessment of nucleardangers, develop a sharedunderstanding of strategic

stability, and report back to theleadership of the two countries. Although Russian parliamentariansalready favor dialogue with theirU.S. counterparts, the Russianexpert community should supportthis endeavor and provide aninformal platform for exchange of


Since many in the U.S.Congress are reluctant toengage in arms control effortswith Russia, it is important toincrease awareness amongCongressional staffers onissues pertaining to armscontrol and nuclear riskreduction. Similar work mustbe conducted in Russia – withthe Deputies of the StateDuma and Senators of theFederation Council.


opinions between the twocountries’ parliamentarians. To help the leadership of the twocountries work out the relevantmeasures, the U.S. and Russianexpert communities should fosterdomestic support for nuclear riskreduction through raising publicawareness on nuclear dangers viamedia and education activities.

Joint analytical work on thefollowing topics could be valuable: · making the case for an extensionof New START to arms controlskeptics in both countries;· a joint response to the Treaty onthe Prohibition of NuclearWeapons ahead of the 2020 NPTReview Conference;· understanding the risk of missileproliferation across the globe;· understanding the strategicstability implications of the pursuitof dominance in cyberspace andthe outer space, and· shaping Asia’s nuclear future.

VIII. ENHANCING STRATEGIC STABILITY REQUIRES URGENT STEPS

It is hard to expect the U.S.and Russian governments tocooperate at this time, butthink tanks must do so.

NOTES1. “Soviet-United States Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and SpaceArms and Further Enhancing Strategic Stability,” June 1, 1990 //http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18541 2. Yuri Nazarkin. Arms Control Agenda Remains Valid Until Next U.S.-Russia Summit.PIR Center, 2018 // http://www.pircenter.org/en/articles/2175-6405079 3. The Nature of Multilateral Strategic Stability. International Security Advisory Board(ISAB), U.S. Department of State. April 27, 2016 //https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/257667.pdf 4. This definition, available officially in the Russian language, was introduced in a JointStatement on Strengthening Global Strategic Stability signed by Russia’s PresidentVladimir Putin and China’s Chairman Xi Jinping on June 25, 2016 // Cit. by:http://www.pircenter.org/en/news/7004-1563423 5. Some participants of the Working Group see the following topics as potentially moreproductive for bilateral discussion: · worrying developments in the others’ military posture; · the impact on crisis and arms race stability of competition in cyberspace and the outer space; · arms race strategies (avoid, manage, or win?), and arms control strategies (fix,abandon, or replace?). 6. Joint Soviet-United States Statement on the Summit Meeting in Geneva. November21, 1985. The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration: Ronald ReaganPresidential Library & Museum //https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/112185a 7. Lewis Dunn. Hard, But Necessary: Upholding Four Principles of Strategic Stability.PIR Center, 2018 // http://www.pircenter.org/en/articles/2160-3306282 8. Thomas Countryman. Trump and Putin Have to Talk About De-Escalation and Cyber-Interference. PIR Center, 2018 // http://www.pircenter.org/en/articles/2172-1773184 9. Nikolai Sokov. Modernization of Nuclear Weapons: How it Influences StrategicStability. PIR Center, 2018 // http://www.pircenter.org/en/articles/2184-7054883 10. Alexei Arbatov. Updating the Concept of Strategic Stability. PIR Center, 2018 //http://www.pircenter.org/en/articles/2161-3926809 11. Robert Einhorn. Even Faced with Challenges, Arms Control Can Once Again ImproveU.S.-Russian Relationship. PIR Center, 2018 //http://www.pircenter.org/en/articles/2174-5894667 12. Nikolai Sokov. De-Escalation and Crisis Management in U.S.-Russian Relations. PIRCenter, 2018 // http://www.pircenter.org/en/articles/2186-2573373 13. Nuclear Posture Review. U.S. Department of Defense, 2018. P. 21 //https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF 14. Elena Chernenko. Cyber Space: a New Battlefield Between the US and Russia or aNew Area of Cooperation? PIR Center, 2018 //http://www.pircenter.org/en/articles/2170-2149667 15. Law of War Manual. U.S. Department of Defense. June 2015. P. 999 //https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/law-of-war-manual-june-2015.pdf


WORKING GROUP MEMBERS

Chairs of the Working Group Dr. Vladimir Orlov , Founder, PIR Center; Professor, MGIMO University; Head, Center for Global Trends and International Organizations, Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Federation Prof. William Potter , Director, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies; Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferaiton Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey Members of the Working Group 1. Dr. Alexei Arbatov , Head of the Center for International Security, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations; Member of the Advisory Board, PIR Center; 2. Ms. Alexandra Bell , Senior Policy Director, Center for Arms Control & Nonproliferation; 3. Ms. Sarah Bidgood , Senior Research Associate and Project Manager, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies; 4. Gen. Evgeny Buzhinskiy , Chairman of the Executive Board, PIR Center; 5. Dr. Elena Chernenko , Deputy Head of the Foreign Desk, Kommersant Publishing House; Member of the Executive Board, PIR Center; 6. Hon. Thomas Countryman , Chair of the Board, Arms Control Association; 7. Mr. Alexander Deineko , Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Geneva; 8. Mr. Oleg Demidov , Consultant, PIR Center; 9. Hon. Lewis Dunn , Independent Consultant; 10. Hon. Robert Einhorn , Senior Fellow, the Brookings Institution; 11. Mr. Evgeny Grigorenko , Head of Public Affairs, Europe, Kaspersky Lab; 12. Mr. Vladimir Leontiev , Deputy Director of the Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; 13. Dr. Andrei Malov , Member of the Advisory Board, PIR Center; 14. Mr. Adlan Margoev , “Russia and Nuclear Nonproliferation” Program Director, PIR Center; 15. Dr. George Moore , Scientist-in-Residence, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies; 16. Amb. Yuri Nazarkin , Professor, Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations; Member of Centre Russe d’Etudes Politiques, Geneve;


WORKING GROUP MEMBERS

17. Dr. Brad Roberts , Director of the Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; 18. Dr. Vladimir Rybachenkov , Independent Researcher; Member of the Advisory Board, PIR Center; 19. Dr. Ivan Safranchuk , Associate Professor, MGIMO University; Member of the Advisory Board, PIR Center; 20. Dr. Nikolai Sokov , Senior Fellow, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies; 21. Gen. Vyacheslav Trubnikov , Board Member, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations; Member of the Executive Board, PIR Center; 22. Hon. Andrew Weber , Independent Consultant; 23. Dr. Heather Williams , Lecturer, Defense Studies Department and Fellow, Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS), King's College London; 24. Mr. Albert Zulkharneev , Director, PIR Center.


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