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S.G. 126/2 (FINAL)10 April 1951

COPY NO. 37

STANDING GROUP

DECISION ON S.G. 126/2 A Report by the Intelligence Committee

onINTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR SHAPE

Note by the Secretaries

1. On 9 April 1951 the Standing Group amended S.G. 126/2

and approved the paper as amended. The approved paper was trans­mitted to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe on 10 April. The revised paragraphs 4 c (8) to (11), published as an Addendum to S.G. 126/2 (FINAL), were transmitted separately and marked for limited distribution.

2. Holders of S.G. 126/2 dated 31 March 1951 are requested to destroy the paper by burning, substituting this amended copy therefor.

3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of S.G. 126/2.

NO LONGER EFFECTIVE

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DOCUMENT DESTRUCTION MEMO. #9*? c . H. DONNELLYgfjûc s t f i u * ** E. B. W. CARDIFF

P. L. de MONTJAMONT * " Ï M S M - T 3 0 - 9 6 Secretaries ÄPer Authority.................................................. ^

/ A .G.. i jJ il D —By ... Date ....... dOOwhJU KcuJSSIRCATION memo. § /

’ ,! Per Authority_____________________»

M A T A I IMP! A Q a P n t a j f e z z â #NAiU UuuiiwvJil ILJ c? ? llMSCMrM.EQb--.

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Pages 1-31. incl.

REPORT BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE to the

STANDING GROUP on

INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR "SHAPE"i» I i. I ■■ I : «.'1■ | ir i n ..... .

References: ji. S.G. 13O b. S.G. 128

THE PROBLEM1. To provide immediate intelligence guidance from the

Standing Group to SHAPE, on an interim basis.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION2. The Intelligence Committee has anticipated that SHAPE

will desire guidance from the Standing Group at the earliest practicable moment. While expecting that a considerable period of time will be required to prepare and secure approval of a formal intelligence estimate for forwarding to SHAPE, the Committee has prepared an interim estimate based on intelligence already at hand (Enclosure /Appendix and Annex hereto/).

CONCLUSION3. That the Appendix and Annex constitute interim intelli­

gence guidance to SHAPE.

RECOMMENDATION4. That the Appendix and Annex be forwarded to SHAPE as

interim intelligence guidance, pending the preparation of a fully coordinated intelligence estimate.

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AN INTERIM INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE Prepared by

THE STANDING GROUP for

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS IN EUROPE

THE PROBLEM1. To prepare an intelligence estimate, based on intelli­

gence immediately available to the Standing Group, for the interim guidance of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe pending the preparation of a fully coordinated estimate.

FACTS AFFECTING THE PRQBIEM2. The estimate (Annex hereto) has been prepared by the

Standing Group on the basis of intelligence immediately available in the files of the Standing Group Intelligence Committee in Washington. The selection of material to be included, and the adjustments necessary to bring the three National versions together in an agreed wording, have been done after referenceto the three National Staffs. It is emphasized that this is interim guidance and does not in all respects reflect opinions of National agencies of Standing Group nations.

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ANNEX

BASIC INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE FOR THE STANDING GROUP

1. The Soviet Objective and Possible Approaches Thereto.The ultimate objective of Soviet policy is the establishment of commnnism , directed from Moscow, throughout the world. The Soviet leaders will appreciate that this objective can only be attained through the collapse of the main bastions of democratic power.Among their immediate aims to this end, not listed in any orderof priority, appear to be:

a. preventing West German rearmament,b . eliminating West German association with the

Western Powers,£, disrupting the alliance between the Western European

Powers and the United States to the end that Western Europe will be neutralized,

d. eliminating the Western Powers from continental Asia and probably Japan,

£. liquidating the Tito regime in Yugoslavia, and f,. eliminating Western influence in the Middle East.

They have at hand, and are employing, many means nnd weapons short of all-out open war, and it is quite probable that they would prefer to achieve their objective by these or similar means. But they are adamant in their determination, and will not hesitate directly to attack the NATO conntries by armed force at such time as it appears profitable for them to do so.

2. Warning of the Outbreak of War. The state of prepared­ness and the dispositions of the Soviet and satellite armed forces are such that they could initiate open war at any time without fur­ther warning. As the NATO forces become stronger the Soviets might decide that further specific preparations on their own part were necessary, but these could readily be accomplished without definite

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M ATf\ | !aal h P P P a ^ U f. Vi r i \ v ’ Vi %jLiiw U « S i

indication of ultimate Intent or positive disclosure of a time schedule. Although NATO mobilization is currently in progress, it is "without definitive beginning or end. Therefore, no con­ventional or formal Mobilization Day can be envisaged, and for planning purposes M-day and. D-day must be considered the same.

3 * Political Alignmentsa. The Soviet Bloc

(1) In addition to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Bloc vill consist of the followings Poland., East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania,Communist China and Outer Mongolia.

(2) So long as the present Yugoslav regime remains in power, the Soviet Union •will have to employ force if it

■ wants to make use of Yugoslav territory. The Tito regime in Yugoslavia is fully aware of the Soviet aim to replace their government with one subservient to Moscow, and is steadily, though cautiously, improving Yugoslav relations with the Western governments.

(3) In the event of war, the position of Albania will depend in large part on the fortunes of Yugoslavia and Greece.b. The Western Bloc

(1) The Western Bloc will comprise the United States, United Kingdom, France, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Canada, Italy and Portugal (Allies under the North Atlantic Treaty) together with Australia,New Zealand, the Union of South Africa and Ceylon.

(2) Iraq, The Philippines, Japan and the American Republics will favor the Allied countries and some of them will bs in active alliance.

pfes-.-,-S.G. 126/2

Annex

r o î î i P l a a a a niw Uiswüiyui! iky

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(3) Under the Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1939 (effective until October 1954), the United Kingdom and France are obliged to assist Turkey if she is attacked, but Turkey is not obliged to assist her allies in a war against the Soviet Union, Though the Turks "will fight rather than submit' to any major Soviet demands, they will not necessarily join the Western Powers in war.

(4) In the case of Groece, the government will be entirely sympathetic with and may be expected to fall in with Western plans as far as they are capable.

(5 ) Western Germany, Iran, Austria and Indo-China will be sympathetic to the Allied cause, but their geographic position and other considerations may prevent them from making available their resources and territories.

(6} India and Pakistan, while sympathetic to the Allies, may attempt a non-belligerent statris .

(7 ) The Irish Republic, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, Afghanistan, Siam, Indonesia, Burma and Finland y*"1! initially probably be neutral, but the first four, at least, and particularly Switzerland and Sweden, will probably resist any attack by the Soviet Union. Israel will also endeavor to remain neutral, but if attacked by the Soviet Union, will resist and may be persuaded to assist the Western Powers.

(8) The positions of other countries in the event of war, some of them of great significance, are not possible of prediction at this time. They will depend on individual interpretations of p«-1 -ai.cal, economic and strategic conditions at the time, and on estimations of the value of existing treaties.

- 2 Annex

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( i / y O ü a L w a n d )

Jl-. The Enemy Situationa. The Soviet Government

(1) Basic Policy. The Soviet Government considers the role of the Soviet Union, in the pursuit of the ulti­mate communist objective, to be that of providing a secure base and powerful support for all the various ramifications and manifestations of the international communist effort.At the same time, the Soviet Government considers it essen­tial to protect and improve the immediate power positionof the USSR as a state in a world system of states. It will, therefore, employ all available means to guard its own security, the preservation of which is considered necessary for the attainment of ultimate objectives. Until such time, therefore, as the Soviet Government feels that the USSR is in a position to wage all-out war successfully, it Is highly unlikely that it will embark on a course of action deliberately intended to produce such a, result. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government has resorted to actions that carry with them risk of the nnintentional precipita­tion of war.

(2) State of Readiness. The present action in Korea indicates that the Bjfemlin considers its over-all state of readiness sufficient to justify the taking of considerable risk of provoking general war. It is apparent that the policy of pressing home local superiority of satellite forces is no longer considered inconsistent with the basic policy stated in subparagraph (l) above. It Is safe to sa.y that Soviet policy is steadil.y growing more bold, with the attendant risk of provoking Western retaliation on a full scale. But there is insufficient information to justify a prediction as to just WHBN, or WrIS'ïKgR} the USSR will, deliberately initiate an all-out armed attack on tbe NA'fO Powers. ATA i P 'aa-

i # m J i/iaa;,,!' - 6 -

: -JAnnex

s7crri£ô/2

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(3) Stability. Soviet political strength lies in her enforced ideology, an advantage accruing to a totali- tarisn regime, where direction is centralized and public opinion rigidly controlled. In addition, the USSR has a weapon of direct value in the' commnnist organization, directed from Moscow, in all Sparts of the world. Her abundant manpower, the vast expanse of her territory in one land mass, the variety and quantity of her natural resources,, and her state of economic preparedness together give the Soviet Union immense strength. The government of the Soviet Union would likely remain stable in the event of war, at least until major military reverses were in­flicted on her.b. The Satellite Governments. The satellite governments,

being completely under the domination and control of the Soviet Union for the foreseeable future, are nnlikely to pursue any objectives or political aims which are in nny way in conflic-t with those of the Soviet Uhion. They will faithfully • adjust their policies to follow the deviations of current Soviet policy nnd will submit their conntries as tools of Soviet action. It is significnnt, however, that their stability, nnder great strain, would be less secure than that of the Soviet Government.

c_. Logistic and Economic Factors(l) Commnnications

(a) Railroads. At present about ninety per cent of all inland freight traffic in the Soviet Union is carried by rail. The railroad system is barely able to meet current economic requirements nnd has little surplus capacity to meet the added demands of a war.It is nnlikely that the rate of railway development can do more than keep up with that of planned industrial

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expansion. War needs, including the movement and supply of military formations, could, however, be met by eliminating all traffic not directly supporting the •war by bringing into use the reserves of railway equip­ment held for the purpose. The broad gauge of Soviet railways necessitates transshipment of railway freights at or nesj? the frontiers of the Soviet Union. In peace­time, this transshipment is a factor for disturbance and delay in the railroad system transport of the Eastern Powers. In case of war, this factor would not, in itself, seriously affect the Soviet Union ability to maintain her forces in other conntries; but the transshipment points are specially important, and if they were neutralized the rail traffic between East and West would be seriously compromised.

(b) Motor Transport. Motor transport in the Soviet Union is designed mainly for short hauls from factories and farms to nearby rail, waterway or air terminals. Though motor transport facilities will be constantly improved, the system will afford little relief to the already overburdened railway network in a major war in the next few years.

(c) Civil Air Transport. Civil air routes are of considerable importance to Soviet economy. Efforts are being made further to increase the volume of air traffic especially where lack of land communications in Siberia and Central Asia make air transportation essential.

(d) Inland Waterways. It is estimated that inland water transport at present handles about eight per cent of the total inland freight. No appreciable increase is expected in the relative volume of freight

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carried by the inlnnd waterways despite efforts to ^

increase river fleet tonnage, to encourage the water ScBf transport of goods in bulk and to increase the efficiency with which loading and unloading are carried out.

(e) Coastal Shipping. As the territories of the Soviet Union are developed, the importnnce of coastal shipping routes as a necessary adjnnct to the inland waterways, railways and air transport is growing.Baltic coastal shipping strongly reinforces supply lines across northern Europe, Considerable relinnce is placed on the Black Sea tnnker fleet to transportoil from the Caucasus and Rumania to Soviet ports on the North Black Sea coast. The principal Importnnce of the Soviet merchant fleet is for coastal nnd inland sea trnnsport. It is not engaged in overseas traffic to anything like the extent of the merchnnt fleets of other maritime nations.(2 ) The Economic Position. In 1951 all branches of

the Soviet economy (including agriculture) which affect the Soviet Union's capacity to wage war will be stronger than at the beginning of World Wap II.

The raw materials position is, with a few excep­tions, satisfactory and in cases where indigenous supplies are inadequate (e.g., natural rubber, tin, molybdenum, industrial diamonds) strategic reserves ape already con­sidered to be enough to enable production at war rates to be maintained for one or two years. It is known that these reserves are steadily being increased, but it is not practicable to offer a precise estimate as to when the Soviet Government will consider itself to be no longer critically short of nny of the m ore Importnnt strategic materials.

va \iWy to'Wü P,-P:P

It is not feasible to, assess precisely in figures?) the output of military equipment by the Soviets and their satellites during the past years? but it is estimated that this output has been, and is, sufficient to maintain on one hand the corps of battle and, on the other hand, important stocks of military equipment— particularly for their gronnd forces— which are readily available.

Nevertheless, the Soviet economy has certain weaknesses in fields which closely concern her capacity to make war. The supplies of petroleum products, electronic equipment and precision instruments, among other things, are considered not to be fully satisfactory when related to estimated war require­ments.

The transportation system is barely adequate for the needs of the economy (but see subparagraph (l) (a) just above).

It is probable that during the next Five Year Plan, which should be completed at the end of 1955, the Soviet Union's degree of economic preparedness for a war with the Western Allies will progressively increase. While this might conceivably make the Soviets more willing than now to risk a major war, the Soviet leaders are aware that, barring an economic collapse in the Western World, the economic strength of the USSR compared with that of the Western World cannot be measurably improved in the

S.G. 126/210 -

la P a ‘i'S a/a a a s

Annex

a

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short period of five years. It must also be evident to the Soviet leaders that the present move among the North Atlantic Treaty countries for gearing parts of their industries to production of armaments will lead to a decrease of the great preponderance of Soviet military strength which it now holds by virtue of its present holdings of war equipment. Therefore, consideration of the known factors in the present situation indicates that from the point of view of output and stockpiles of war materiel, the relative position, not taking into account the actual present superiority of the Western Powers in atomic weapons, indicates a greater Soviet advantage in the Short Term.Even when atomic weapons and their prospective development and production are taken into account, the relative position of the Western Powers as regards output and stockpiles of war materiel will improve as time goes on.

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NATO UNCLASSIFIEDd. Scientific Factors. Although Soviet scientific

knowledge and particularly scientific development is sur­passed by that of the Western Powers, extreme efforts have been made by the Soviets, both through espionage and through the employment of scientists, -whether under duress or volnn- tarlly, on all classes of research and development projects, ■whether economic or military.

e. Military Factors(l) Soviet Gronnd Forces

(a) Strength. It is estimated that the Soviet Army during the next few years will maintain its present general size and composition with at least2.500.000 troops (excluding those of internal securityforces), organized into about 175 line divisions,comprising :

105 rifle divisions (approximately fiftyper cent of which have motor transport, the re­mainder employing horse transport)

35 mechanized divisions25 tank divisions10 cavalry divisions

In addition, it is estimated 40 artilleryand antiaircraft artillery divisions are available.

(b) Deployment. The present disposition of the 175 line divisions is as shown In the Tab hereto.

(c) Organizationa Three basic types of divisions exist in

the Soviet Army. Each of the rifle, tank and mechanized divisions has a total over-all strength of 11,OOO -14.000 men. Reorganization of rifle divisions is in progress. The new formations have four times more transport, their artillery is strengthened, and en organic mixed tank and self-propelled artillery regiment

- 12 - Annex

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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NATO UNCLASSIFI(about 65 armored fighting vehicles) has been added. It is believed that approximately fifty per cent of the rifle divisions have so far been reorganized.

ii. The tank division presents no special anomalies of organization and mission. It con­tains 250 tanks and about 80 self-propelled guns.

iii. The mechanized division has about 208

tanks and 63 self-propelled guns. It contains an Infantry element about twice as large as that of the tank division.(d) Airborne Forces. (See paragraph (3 ) (h) below)

(2 ) Soviet Naval Forces (a) Strength

i. Annual production of naval vessels and their allocation to the various Soviet fleets cannot be assessed accurately, but the trend is toward continued expansion. Cruisers and submarines are being stressed in the present programs. Ocean­going submarines will have improved underwater performance. Furthermore, the Soviet Union will be capable of adding large numbers of coastal submarines, minor combatant, and small auxiliary vessels to their present naval strength. Present disposition of ships in the Baltic, Arctic and Black Sea areas is as follows:

ships

Old battleships Monitors C ruisers Destroyers Submarines (Ocean) Submarines (Coastal)Midget submarines and Coastal craft

BALTIC AND ARCTIC117

721OO*54

Large numbers

BLACK SEA

7201536

Large numbers

* This includes 25 obsolescent craft under long refit and ex-G erman submar ine s.

S.G. 126/2 NAT03ÜNCLÂS

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NATO UNCLASSIFIL ^ii. It is expected that the over-all personq§€^J

strength of the Soviet Navy ■Hill remain approxi­mately the same as at present, -which-is estimated to Le 600,000 and 85,000 personnel in the Naval Aviation. This total includes coast defense, marine and base personnel as well as those assigned to the forces afloat.(b) Employment. The Soviet concept for the

employment of fleets calls primarily for the protection of the vital -water approaches to the Soviet Union.Fleets -will also be employed to support seaborne opera­tions, to secure local control of definitely limited sea areas nnd to protect the seaward flanks of the Soviet Army. The, numerically strong submarine arm presents a definite threat to Allied sea communications as does the capacity of the Soviet Union for large- scale mining operations. Apart from having the use of two or three catapult ships, the Naval Aviation is entirely lnnd based. It enn be used in direct support in a seaborne assault of the ground forces. A con­siderable degree of coordination between the Naval Aviation and submarine and surface forces must be expected.(3) Soviet Air Forces

(a) The Soviet Air Forces comprise four separate combat forces, the Air Force of the Soviet Army, the Naval Aviation, the Fighter Aviation of the Air Defense, nnd the Long Rnnge Aviation. In addition, the semi­military Civil Air Fleet is nn important adjnnct to these forces. The total establishment (authorized strength) is estimated at 20,OOO aircraft. It is esti­mated that the over-all size of the Air Forces -will remain about the same for the next few years, but the striking power will increase as greater numbers of the H higher performnnce aircraft, with which the Air Forces are now being equipped, enter service

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(b) The Air Force of the Soviet Army has an establishment of about 5,800 fighters, 2,800 ground attack, 2,800 bombers. Jet aircraft have appeared among the fighters in considerable numbers, and aa?e increasing. It i3 estimated that by 1953-54 the majority of fighters and over half the total of light bombers may be jets. The Air Force of the Soviet Army is composed of 15 tactical air armies, and a numberof transport regiments.

(c) The Naval Aviation. The "Soviet Naval Aviation is organized into the air forces of the various fleets and has an establishment of approximately 3,OOO aircraft. By 1953-54, the Soviet Naval Aviation is expected to have jet fighters and light bombers in operational quantities.

(d) The Fighter Aviation of the Air Defense is the air arm of the Antiaircraft Defense Force, -which also includes antiaircraft artillery units and early ■warning systems. It has an establishment of about 1,800 fighters. This force appears to have priority on the assignment of jet aircraft, and it is estimated that possibly as early as mid-1952 and certainly by 1954all of its fighters -will be jets.

(e) The Long Range Aviation. This branch of the Air Force is organized into three air armies under centralized control and has en establishment of about 1,725 aircraft: 1,500 bombers, 125 transport, and 100 fighters. TU-4's (Soviet type B-29) have appeared and it is estimated that possibly as early as mid-1952 and almost certainly by 1954 approximately 1,200 of the 1,500 bombers of this force may be TU-4's. By the later date some improved conventional types possessing greater range capabilities than the present TU-4, and a number of medium jet bombers, may have appeared.

S.G. 126/2

NATO UNCLASSIF- 15 - Annex

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(f) The Civil Air Fleet. In' addition to the Air Forces discussed above, there is a semi-military air organization, the Civil Air Fleet. The Civil Air Fleet is employing 1,500 medium transports on scheduled and nonscheduled operations. A large number of these could be made available for military purposes. There may be an additional 1,000 medium transports in reserve which might be made available as crews can be provided to operate them. Although it is known that some four- engine transport aircraft have been built, there is no information concerning the operational use of these aircraft in the Civil Air Fleet, but limited numbers may be available. Navigation aids, and other aviation facilities will be gradually improved.

(g) Deployment. The Fighter Aviation of the Air Defense may be expected to be deployed in the vicinity of the more important strategic targets within the USSR nnd along the more likely routes of approach thereto.The extreme mobility of the Long Range Aviation makes its deployment to a great degree dependent on its^current mission, and therefore a matter of day-to-day intellï gence rather than a subject of a basic estimate, although it is significant to note that fields capable of hnndling. long-rnnge types of aircraft exist in various appropriate areas around the Soviet periphery and are being in­creased in number. The mobility of the Air Forceof the Soviet Army, the Naval Aviation and the Civil Air Fleet is such that their deployment is Influenced by the availability of operating fields. The follow­ing table Is an estimate of Soviet military aviation deployment in Eastern Europe and Western USSR:

S.G. 126/216 - Annex

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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Lt. Bomber Ftr Atk. Bomber (LEA) Trans. Recon. Total

AIR FORCE OP THE SOVIET ARMY1st Tactical Air Army

2nd Tactical Air Army

4th Tactical Air Army

13th Tactical Air Army

l4th Tactical Air Army

15th Tactical Air Army

24th Tactical Air Army

250 BOO

25O.

250 120

3OO 120

250 27O

400 l4O

90O 26O

250

8O

White Sea Mili­tary District IOO 50

210

440

250

150

20

40

40

4o

40

60

4o

4o

60

60

590

540

460

480

770

1O40

1510

360

FIGHTER AVIATION QF AIR DEFENSENorthern Fighter Defense 3OO 3OO

LONG RANGE AVIATION

1st Long-Range Air Army 1OO

2nd Long-Range Air Army 50

500

400

600

45 0

NAVAL AVIATION4th Baltic Fleet

8th Baltic Fleet

Northern Seas F le.et

TOTAL

250 80

150 30

150 _303700 1400

150

28O

120 19 OO

4o 50

30

40900 1OO 500

570

490

3408500

S.G. 126/2- 17 Annex

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(h) Airlift Capacity. The total number of medium trans­ports including those1 from the Civil Air Fleet, which initially might be made available for military operations, is estimated to bd 1,000 aircraft. This number could be increased by possibly 400 for a vital operation. The current capacity for a single lift, Without gliders, at a combat radius of 525 nautical miles, wçuld be probably less than four airborne brigades, and-for a vital operation five airborne brigades (approximately) (4,200 men per brigade). This air­lift will be increased as four-engine transports are brought into service, and as availability of trained crews permits withdrawal of transport aircraft from the reserve. It is considered that the Soviets will be capable of planning and executing airborne operations on a large scale and that they might have available approximately 100,000 airborne troops organized into brigades or divisions or both. They are likely to be well trained, well.equipped and well led. The availa­bility of airlift as discussed above is considered the limiting factor in Soviet airborne operations.(4) The Satellite Armed Forces

(a) Gronnd Forces. It is estimated that the European Satellites have about 62 divisions (not including security forces and the 32 Yugoslav and 3 Finnish divisions) (as shown in the Tab hereto). It Is expected that the satellites will have sufficient effective combat divisions to make a contribu­tion to the Soviet offensive power. The morale of the European satellite forces is fair to good., and while they are poorly equipped, they are nndergoing reorganization and re-equipment along Soviet lines. In the event of war, they may be expected to fight with varying degrees of enthusiasm and effectiveness. The satellite armies will be more effective if employed against traditional enemies. Therefore, it is probable that the employment cf the European satellite armies will be limited to campaigns in the Balkan area, and to such details as labor, internal security, and occupation of

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overrun countries. Satellite forces in the Far East are numerous and have been demonstrated to be effective.

(bj Naval Force's. These forces are negligible.The main naval contribution of the satellites -will be in the form of bases.

(c) Air Forces. It Is regarded unlikely that the lew air potential of the European Satellite countries •will increase significantly in the next fev years.(5) Mobilization Potential

(a) Mobilization potential of the Soviet Union is based upon universal conscription and Is capable of expanding the armed forces rapidly either on a secret or open mobilization order. To carry out this plan, perma­nent military, political and civil mobilization staffs and installations are maintained. The Soviet mobiliza­tion plan is capable of supporting whatever size effort on the part of the armed forces that may be décided for the Western European campaign.

(b) Ground Forces. The standing army Is suffi­ciently large to bring rapidly to war strength a sizable striking force, as soon as possible (planned for accom­plishment by M / 5 days) and to expand or activate re­maining units required to reach a mobilization strength of about 320 divisions by M / 30 days. After M / 30 days it is estimated that the Soviets will be able to form divisions at a rate of 25 per month. This mobilization potential exceeds the estimated requirements for ground forces expansion, and in view of the effect on industry and agriculture the total number of divisions is unlikely to exceed 4OO.

(c) Naval Forces. Since the Soviet Navy maintains only 0 feï ships in reserve, mobilization of the Navy would not be a major problem. The personnel strength at M / 30 days could be increased to a total of about ^8OO,OOO {excluding Naval Aviation). ^

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(d) Air Forces. It is estimated that the Soviet Air Forces could, by M / 30 days, mobilize to a strength of 800,000 personnel and could by M / 90 days bring the present strength to its full establishment of approxi­mately 20,OOO aircraft.

(e) Satellites. While the European Satellite countries have a very considerable pool of mnnpower, it .is not anticipated that their mobilisation would be pushed beyond probably 20 additional divisions. Of these, the greater number, probably 7 each, would be from Hungary and Rumania.(6) Combat Efficiency. Since the termination of

World War II, the Soviet Union has been conducting & program of reorganization nnd training. As a result, she now has a military machine 'Which is, unit for unit, more powerful and efficient, than that which defeated the Germans on the Eastern Front. In contrast to that of the Western Powers, it is controlled in its entirety by a unified commnnd nnda single staff system. It is believed that the presently mobilized Soviet forces, and particularly those now deployed in the peripheral areas, represent the peak of combat efficiency to be expected, except as new weapons or equip­ment may be added.

The combat efficiency of the satellite ground forces may be expected to improve to a considerable degree but such improvement is not likely, at least In the early stages of a war, to affect their employment as estimated in paragraph (4) (a) above.

(7) Tactics and Techniques . The Soviet Union maybe expected to employ the fami.liar tactics of using large masses of men supported by heavy concentrations of armor nnd artillery, together with the greatest possible tactical

S.G. 126/2- 20 - Annex

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air support in an offensive, with a disregard for personnel casualties. Soviet training has assured proficiency in monntain warfare and warfare nnder Arctic conditions.

%

Distributed separately as an Addendum:

(8) Weapons of Mass Destruction

(9) Guided Weapons

(10) Antiaircraft Rockets

(11) Electronics

f. International Commnnism

(l) In pursuit of the commnnist objective, the Soviets are applying measures commonly summed up in the term "cold war" such as political and economic warfare, military action by proxy, threats of force, propaganda, sabotage, subversion and Fifth Column activities. These

S.G. 126/2

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methods can be expected to continue and be developed to the highest degree possible. These methods are peculiarly well.adapted to the mission of the Soviet Union of ^developing world communism dominated by the Kremlin.

(2) In the event of war, it must be expected that the national communist organizations, with support from the Soviet Union, would make an effort to conduct guerrilla activities in rear areas and to cooperate with Soviet armed forces, particularly raiding or airborne forces. The scale of such efforts and the degree of success that might be expected would be dependent on the adequacy of Allied conntermeasures.

5. Military Courses in the Event of Wara. Major Considerations

(l) In determining their initial strategy, the Soviet leaders will be influenced by the following major factors:

(a) The initial numerical superiority of their own gronnd forces, the Initial strength of their air forces and their possession of weapons of mass des­truction,

(b) The present Allied superiority in the capability of delivering weapons of mass destruction.

(c) The Allied weakness in forces to conduct land warfare.

(d) The naval strength of the Western Powers.(e) The importance of denying to the Allies a

base in either Western Europe or in the Middle East, which, if retained, would permit the eventual exploitation of the superior long-term war potential of the Western Powers.

(f) The dependence of Western Powers upon sea

conation*. NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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(g) Control of the Mediterranean by the Western Powers, which would present a threat to the southern flank of Soviet armies in Europe and also to the Black Sea.

(h) The strength and attitude of Western Germany, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and Iran.

(i) Requirements In the Far Fast, depending upon involvements in that area.

(j) The degree of strength, firmness and nnity of the NATO conntries.(2) It follows from these factors that the Soviet

Union must attempt to deny to the Western Powers any base areas from which the Soviet Union could be threatened.The principal means of achieving this would be by tine occupation of these areas by the Soviet army. It also follows that a strategic defense of the Soviet Union is necessary In order to minimize the magnitude and intensity of Western attacks. The Soviet leaders may realize that the Western Powers are determined to prevent separate areas from being overrnn one by one| should the Soviets so estimate, they may very well decide to lannch a full- scale offensive in a number of areas simultaneously.

(3) The strategic advantages accruing to the Soviet Union from the possession of the atomic bomb include both the threat of its use and their capability to use it. At such time as the Soviets have accumulated what, in their opinion, is a sufficient stockpile of atomic weapons, they may consider themselves in a position to attack the United States directly. In determining its strategy the Soviet Union will be influenced by the factors outlined in paragraph 5 a (1) above, its over­all strategic scheme and its desire to Cripple NATO

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( ) The increasing Soviet long-range air capabilities against NATO regions diminishes neither the vital importance of Western Europe to Soviet aims nor the threat of attack . to this area,b. . Probable Campaigns

(1) The Soviet leaders will wish to complete the campaign against Western Europe as early as possible. They may attempt a psychological neutralisation of Western Europe by threat of atomic attack prior to or in conjunction with a land campaign. The Soviet Union will combine a heavy aerial bombardment, Including atomic attack, minelaying and submarine operations against the British Isles with their drive in Western Europe. A successful campaign against Western Europe would permit the Sovietsto prepare to launch an invasion against the United Kingdom and/or Spain.

(2) The Soviet leaders will appreciate that the Near and Middle East oil resources are a valuable part of the Allied war potential. Moreover, they will appreciate that their own oil areas In the Caucasus and Rumania, as well as a large part of their industries, would be sus­ceptible to attack from air bases in the Near and Middle East. A campaign in this area, if successful, would give the Soviet Union very great strategic gains in comparison with the effort expended. Offensives against Turkey, and possibly Greece and Yugoslavia, would form part of a campaign in the Near and Middle East.

(3) A successful campaign in Italy, Sicily and Yugoslavia would protect the flanks of forces operating in Western Europe and the Balkans and would provide important sea and air bases for attacks on Allied lines

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(4) A campaign against Scandinavia -would have the objective of securing complete control of the Baltic to provide naval and air bases for operations against trade routes and Allied bases in the North Atlantic, to add depth to the air defense of the Soviet Union, and to deny the use of air and naval bases to the Allied Powe ^ Acquisition of the valuable strategic Industry of Sweden might be a factor for consideration In determining whether Sweden would be attacked or by-passed in a Scandinavian campaign.

(5) Control of the Iberian Peninsula would provide the most certain means of severing Allied sea lines of communications into the Mediterranean. In addition, while providing a base for the Soviet Union, It would also deny one to the Allies. On the other hand, complete occupation of Spain and Portugal would be a difficult task and Spanish forces deployed along the Pyrenees would form some deterrent, particularly to an army operating at the end of lengthy communications. The decision to nndertake an Iberian campaign might depend on the progress of the war in other areas, and on the Soviet decision to attempt or not to attempt an invasion of the United Kingdom.

(6) It is estimated that the Soviet Union will not consider it necessary to attack and occupy Switzerland.She will realize that the Swiss would resist and that operations against them would be difficult and lengthy.She will be confident that, as in the past, Swiss neutrality will not favor either side. The commnnications through Switzerland are not necessary to the Soviet forces nor would the Swiss industry make a significant addition to . the Soviet gains as the result of the occupation of Europe.

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purely preventive nature and would be nnlikely unless the Soviet Union were convinced of Allied intention of using bases in these conntries. Owing to logistical difficulties of land attack, military measures would probably be limited to air attacks on those bases being used by the Allies.These attacks, however, could only be delivered by the Long Range Aviation,at the expense of high priority opera­tions elsewhere.

(8) The Soviet Union is likely to utilize forces in the Far East to attempt to take or neutralize U.S. advnnce bases and to contain as large nn Allied force as possible in the Far East theater. Bases in this theater might be used on occasion by the Long Rnnge Aviation for bombing operations and for airborne attacks against Alaska.

(9) In coordination with military action in Europe, the Soviet Union would nndertake attacks against key targets in North America with the objectives of disrupting

. the war effort of Canada and the United States, during theinitial stages of mobilization.. In addition, in view of the dependence of the Allies on sea commnnications, the Soviet Union would attack Allied shipping nnd ports through­out the world wherever possible.

(10) Commnnists nnd their sympathizers throughout the world would conduct sabotage and subversive activities against Allied interests.

(11) In the event of their decision to wage war, the Soviet plan would probably include the following operations:

(a) Subversive activity nnd sabotage againstAllied interests in all parts of the world.

(b) A sea and air offensive against Allied seacommnnications.

NATO UNCLASSIFIED %

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(c) A campaign against Western Europe, -which -will remain their primary land objective.

(d) A campaign against Scandinavia.(e) An aerial bombardment against the. British

Isles and air attack against Allied bases.(f) A campaign against Yugoslavia and Italy.(g) Campaigns against the Near and Middle East.(h) Attacks against key targets in Canada, the

United States and Alaska.(i) Campaigns -with limited objectives in the

Par East.(j) If possible, a campaign to overrun the

Iberian Pehinsula and secure the Straits of Gibraltar.(k) Chinese Communist forces may undertake

additional campaigns against neighboring countries in Southeast Asia .

c. Capabilities(1) It is believed that the Soviet Union -would have

sufficient armed forces to launch all the campaigns listed above and still have adequate reserves. However, in order to attack Western Europe and the Balkans simultaneously,a redeployment of the Soviet forces to the Balkan area is a prerequisite.

(2) In the three land areas of most immediate and direct concern to the NATO countries, it is estimated that the Soviets would probably use the forces indicated below.

(a) Western Europe, to include Denmark and southern Norway-Sweden. In case of surprise attack by forces presently deployed, 25-30 divisions. In a deliberate resort to -war, 50-60 divisions. In either case, a build-up to 75-90 divisions. Support by 65

air regiments from present deployment, or by 100 air regiments if redeployment takes place before hostilities Build-up to 120 air regiments shortly after D-day. g

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(t>) Hortnern fllorway-siegen, six ûivisions. ïïav&l nnd air support as required.

(c) Northern Italy. No surprise attack from present deployments. After redeployment, 15-20 divi­sions supported by 15 air regiments.(3) Initial action against the United Kingdom should

Le expected in the form of strong aerial attacks (including atomic weapons) against land objectives, and air, submarine nnd mining attacks against United Kingdom ports nnd shipping.

(4) Submarine attacks against shipping in the Atlantic north of the equator should be expected.

(5) The Soviets have the capability of launching air attacks with atomic bombs against the Western Hemisphere.

6. Major Political nnd Psychological Factors of Soviet Weaknessa. Over-centralized Authority and Control. While the

Soviet governmental structure offers great advnntages so long as it stnnds and functions smoothly, its extreme centraliza­tion leaves little coordinated strength once the top echelon fails. Action impairing the effectiveness of or nndermining confidence in the structure or system of centralized control would have far reaching results.

b. Peoples(l) The Soviet population consists of several etnnic

groups such as those of the Ukraine, Caucasus, Central Asia and the Baltic States, amongst ■which a latent national­ism nnd hostility to Great Russinn domination have in vary­ing degrees persisted. The Soviet Government, however, through its efficient end ruthless police organization, would be able to keep dissident tendencies amongst these groups in check, at least during the initial stages of a ■war. As war progressed, however, with its inevitable

- 28 - Annex§.G. 126/2

WTO UN

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attendant hardshi ps, restrictions, and load of rigid controls, subversive Influences might he able to manifest themselves in the form of active interference with the Soviet war effort. This possibility may be enhanced if the Western Powers were able to ensure dissident elements, including populations of s atellite-states, their freedom and liberation a f te r the conclusion of a successful war.The Soviet population remember yell the privations and sufferings of the last war; but, despite this fact, it must be expected that they would support their government in the event of a new war. If, however, as hostilities progressed there were to be news of serious Soviet reverses in battle, then latent dissatisfaction with the regime might come more into the open and, depending on the degree of dislocation in the country, take the f orm of local sabotage of the Soviet war effort.

(2) The Satellite States. The satellite states, being completely under the domination and control of the Soviet Union for the foreseeable future, are unlikely to pursue nny objectives or political aims which are in any way in conflict with the Soviet Union. It is signi ficant, however, that within the satellite states, a large percentage of people bitterly resent t he domination and hardships imposed upon them. In the event of war, however, it is imlikely that this resentment would give rise to effective resistnnce in the early stages of hostilities, but a spirit of non-cooperation and passive resistance to their com­munist leaders could be expected with a resultant diminution of economic and military effectiveness. If properly guided and supported by the Allies, the nationalistic elements in satellite states would be able to provide effective sabotage and resistance against the Soviet war effort.

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c_. Militar y Weaknesses. The principal military short­comings of the Soviet Union 'Hill be the weakness of surface fleets, -with their lack of strategic mobility, and the fact that the Long Range Aviation will have had little combat experience. Certain items of electronic and fire control equipment will continue to be in short supply. The mobility of the Soviet military machine will be jeopardised by the inadequate transportation facilities within the Soviet Union on which it must depend. In addition, resistance movements, although probably ineffective in the initial stages of a world war, would constitute an ever-increasing threat as they developed, to Soviet lines of communication in occupied areas, necessitating the allocation of field forces to guarding lines of communication.

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T A B

DISPOSITION OF SOVIET AND EUROPEAN SATELLITE DIVISIONS

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!CtILF

-VV ' *1 r fv-'* K| ; ^ V JTîutti v-* 'i Äoiw- f t ;

» e V V. « W v H -43 N Y.P /.^2 .-fC ^ ;

E M G L 1 S H CHANS-,

3 Bulgorion

jos-ps-28 mabcb-5)

DEPLOYMENTOF / ° f

SOVIET & EUROPEAN aS A TE LL ITE LIN E D IV ISIONS------------•-----------

175 Soviet Djvs.Tofo/s asofJan.195162 Satellite Divs.■ ■: •- J-"

5/ Divisions of which 35 are y in the Far East to ' include East Siberiafl \ A

TAB T T f f l 1 1 F iaa™ iM‘ EUROPE

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ADDENDUM TO S.G. 126/2(8) Weapons of Mass Destruction

(a) Atomic Bombs. At the present time it is not feasible to attempt an accurate estimate of Soviet atomic capabilities.It must, however, be assumed that they now have a modest stock­pile of atomic bombs and that within the next few years this stockpile will grow to formidable proportions.

(b) Biological Warfare. The Soviet Union appears to have given some attention to the possible use of biological warfare agents for sabotage activities, and it is capable at nny time of producing a variety of agents in sufficient quanities for such purposes. Should it be the Soviet intention, and should the necessary priorities have been given, it is estimat ed that the Soviet Union would be capable of initiating the mass pro­duction of certain bacterial agents by 1952 at the latest. If viral agents are included in the Soviet program, they couldbe produced with no greater difficulty than would be experienced by the Western Powers. The Soviet Union would be capable at any time of mass producing toxic substances derived from the higher plants, as well as substances of the "selective" weed­killer type for use in crop destruction. There is no firm knowledge of Soviet biological warfare weapons development| but it would be prudent to assume that the Soviet Union is at any time as capable as the West is of producing weapons of com­parable performance.

(c) Chemical Warfare. The Soviet Union is now capable of large scale employment of standard chemical warfare agents.In the case of the nerve gases, the most reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the available evidence is that the Soviet Union may have in quantity production at least once of them by about 1951« It is considered that the Soviet Union is not likely to meet any insuperable difficulty in devising reason-

\V ;ably efficient means for disseminc^jja^ chemical warfare agents.

REGRADED # /

i W M M l W B B B f f Per »uttorit

a«..

(s:i

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(d) Antibiotics. For treatment of casualties resulting from atomic, biological nnd chemical warfare, nntihiotics are of first importance. At the present time, nntihiotics research and production are not as advanced in the Soviet Union as in the West, Soviet nntihiotics production capacity is on the increase, but there is no reliable information as to when it may reach a figure which would be commensurate with the casualties to be expected if the Western Powers employ weapons of mass destruction against Soviet population centers.

(9) Guided Weapons. Soviet missiles that may be enconntered in quantity up to 195^ will most likely be variations of the German types discussed below:

(a) Surface-to-Surfacei. Large scale production of V-l can be

attained at any time the Soviet Union considers it to be required, ■

li. Improved V-l models (with high subsonic speeds but with rnnge and accuracy substantially unchanged) could also be in production by 1951*

H i . An improved A-4 (V-2) wi th rnnge about 3OO miles could be in pilot production by 1952, its accuracy at this range being about the same as the G-errann missile at 200 miles.

. iv. Should the Soviet Union have decidedto reproduce the standard German A~4 (V-2), this could by now be in mass production, but as an alternative to production of the improved version.

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(b ) Surf ace-to-Airi_. It seems probable that the Soviet Union,

appreciating the importance of air defense, will have pr essed on -with the development of a super­sonic guided missile on similar lines to Wasser­fall. It is thought that this -will not be developed satisfactorily before the end of 1952. By the end of 195^) assuming no serious difficulties, the missile might be developed for service use with pilot production completed.

ii. German type subsonic missiles could be available to the Soviet Union for limited use as early as 1951- However, such missiles would be relatively ineffective against modern bombers.(c) Air-to-Surface and Air-to-Air. The Soviet Union may have in production by the present time the HS 293 and Fritz X. It may be within its capabilities to develop an effective supersonic air-to-air missile by 195^ but no knowledge of Soviet activities in this respect is available.

(10) Antiaircraft Rockets. The Soviet Union is capable now of producing improved versions of the German Taifun­type supersonic antiaircraft rockets which were designed to be effective against aircraft at altitudes up to at least 50,000 feet. Although there is little factual evidence that such production has commenced, the weapon is a logical choice for the Soviet Union, because of ease of manufacture, operational mobility, end minimized electronic requirements. Operationally significant quantities could be available for employment about one year after the doc is Ion to manufacture this weapon had been made. The effectiveness of Taifun would be reduced about 50 per cent if radar directors could be jammed. It is believed that the ground radar at present available to the Soviet Union is vulnerableto jamming.

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e s s e n t i a l b o t h e e f f e c t l v c n o s s o f a l l m o d e r n w e a p o n s s y s t e m s .

T h e s t a t e o f d e v e l o p m e n t , q u a l i t y o f m a s s p r o d u c t i o n , a n d

m a i n t e n a n c e o f e l e c t r o n i c e q u i p m e n t m a y ' W e l l b e t h e

l i m i t i n g f a c t o r s I n t h e e f f e c f c i v e n s s o f S o v i e t w e a p o n s .

T h e p a r t i c u l a r a s p e c t s a r e a s f o l l o w s :

(a) Coranunicatlons. It is considered tho.t Soviet ground-to-ground telecommunications are capable of meeting the essential requirements imposed Toy -war. There is, however, some doubt as to whether Soviet ground-to-air communications would, within the next few jears, be sufficiently developed to ensure effective fighter aircraft control.

(b) Aircraft Warning and Tracking Network. The Soviet Union has established aircraft warning and track­ing networks in certain areas, utilizing early warning radar, ground observers, weather stations and tele­communication facilities, and it is to be expectedthat these will be extended and coordinated. While the radar equipment in use o.t the present tine is vulnerable to jamming, other deficiencies in design and quantity -will probably be minimized by effective coordination of radar networks through the télécommuni­cations system.

(c) Ground Control Interception (GCI ). It is not known whether the Soviet Union has developed native equipment capable of the precision control needed to effect high altitude high speed interception. However, since the Soviet Union is known to have a good apprecia­tion of the use of ground control interception, and since it was furnished with tho- U.S. SCR 527 under lend lease, it is reasonable to assume that the Soviet Union has developed GCI radar of similar capabilities, ^hlchmight be introduced in limited quantities in 1951, an£££j could be In large scale production prior to 195^-

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(d) Airborne Interception. There is no positive intelligence of production by the Soviet Union of air­borne interception equipment. The potentialities of this equipment have been •well known to it for many years, and since British, American and Gorman equipment have been in Soviet hands for nore than five years, it should be within Soviet capabilities to nalce it avail­able to the Soviet Air Force, although there is no evidence of this. A tail warning set (Ton-2) vas pro­duced by the Soviet Union during World War II end U.K. and U.S. sets were also supplied to that country. There is as yet no evidence of the general adoption of this equipment, though this is 'Mithin Soviet capabilities.It is to be expected that Soviet equipments will be more readily subject to jamming than the corresponding Western equipments, at any given time.

(e) Antiaircraft Fire Control Radar and Directors. The Soviet Union received British nnd .American automatic gun laying radar and directors, and also acquired Germnn equipment during World War II. The U.S. equipment was of the mo'st advanced design at that time, and is still considered good. While it is believed that the latter might be too complex for early large-scale production, there is some evidence that the Soviet Union nay he producing radar equipment based on the U.S. SCR 5^5* There is no information on directors. In any case, in vie'w of the importance of air defense, the Soviet Union is almost certainly developing automatic gun laying radar and directors and at least limited quantities should be available by 195 1* It should be noted that this equipment could be used not only with conventional antiaircraft guns but also with unguided antiaircraft rockets. In addition, in 195^, the Soviet Union could have limited numbers of specialized radar sets and directors to support its surface-to-air guided missileprogram

S.G. 126/2

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S.G. 126/2

Ü U 1 U l i iy b s if I e D(f ) Electronic Counter-measures

1. Jamming of Radio Communications. At the present tine the Soviet Union Is engaged in ex­tensive jamming of radio communications . This jamming has been confined largely to broadcasts • by the Voice of America and the British Broadcast­ing Cooperation, hut the experience and facilities ■would ho equally effective in jamming radio com­munications in general. It is believed that the Soviet Union will have capabilities for extensive jamming of radio communications at frequencies at least as high as "VHB1 by 1951-,

id. Jamming of Radar. The Soviet Union has used "-window" in the past. This and similar re­flection devices will almost certainly be en­countered in the future, -In addition, electronic jamming -will probably be encountered at all fre­quencies up to the ljOOOmc range by 1951 and up to the 3,000mc range in 195*1-. However, It is believed that the Soviet Union is not capable of jamming BTO (Bombing Through Overcast) radar -which operates at frequencies in excess of 3,OOOmc.(g) Proximity Fuzes. The availability of radio

type proximity fuzes for ground and antiaircraft artillery will depend on the ability of the Soviet Union to overcome the problems of production. Based on definite evidence of a high rate of rejects in valves, it is doubtful that efficient fuzes will be available to the Soviet Union in significant quantities before 195^. However, because of less exacting engineering requirementsj it is believed that the Soviet Union is capable of producing operational quantities of proximity fuzes for such guided missiles as may be produced

pa a a a p spmppp p abefore that date. i\!Ä!l I J »’iff .IWilU U ä w L n w y ü tU

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i ■!a fi aâ'r r :F\m i ™ ï i ' y L h Q ù ï

(b) Infrar ed. During World War II the Germans carrie out extensive research and development in the field of infrared and produced a large amonnt of equipment, including night driving nnd firing devices. These devices nnd qualified Germnn personnel became available to the Soviet Union. In view of the great advantages of night.viewing and firing devices, it must be assumed that the Soviet Union will exploit the potentialities of infrared.

It is estimated that the Soviets lack the capability of simultaneous mass production of all of these types of weapons be- casue of technological limitations.

S.G. 126/2■ P ; " ; j a -V.j .,j \J i j - \-y : J n i j j u

Addendum