publicizing bipartisan behavior · hacker (1995) notes that “advertising, speeches, and the...

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Publicizing Bipartisan Behavior


L a u r e n L e i s t - D a v i d C a r t e r - C a m i l l e I v y - O ’ D o n n e l l / L o u i s i a n a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y / M C 7 0 0 1 R e s e a r c h M e t h o d s F i n a l P r o j e c t

Leist . Carter . Ivy-O’Donnell


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Table of Contents Abstract………………………………………………………………….3

Introduction…………………………………...........................................4

Research Question…………………………………………………...….4

Literature Review……………………………………………………4-12

Theory & Hypothesis……………………………………………….12-14

a) Analytical Framework……………………………………..12-13

b) Hypothesis……………………………………………….……14

Data & Methods…………………………………………………….14-16

a) Measurement Operations…………………………………..14-16

b) Testing………………………………………………………...16

Conclusion………………………………………………………….16-19

Work Cited…………………………………………………………20-21

Appendices……………………………………………………………..22

Operationalized Chart……………………………………………23

Pre-Focus Group Questionnaire………………………………….24

Focus Group Consent Form……………………………………...25

Moderator Guide……………………………………………...26-27

Constituent Survey………………………………………..….28-32



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Abstract It is our goal to find why members of Congress publicize bipartisan behavior in certain political environments. We believe politicians in strongly polarized districts have more incentive to publicize bipartisan behavior. Mellow and Trubowitz’s (2005) bipartisan model will serve as our analytical framework. We will operationalize our dependent variable—publicizing bipartisan behavior—using candidate image, party affiliation, strategy, district composition, and incumbency. We will record a raw number count of how many times a member specifically mentions being bipartisan to test our hypothesis. Scholarship concerning publicized bipartisan behavior in polarized districts is limited, so our study will open the doors for political scientists to explore the youthful phenomenon.



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I. Introduction

There has been substantial research conducted concerning the conflicting nature of political

parties. These multiple studies explaining how partisanship has evolved through the twentieth

and twenty-first centuries include studies concerning who is more likely to engage in bipartisan

behavior. With increasing visibility, due to media involvement, more research is necessary

specifically detailing bipartisan promotion. Partisan behavior has increasingly, since the 1970’s,

proved to be normative in Congress (Han & Brady, 2007). The idea of cooperation or

bipartisanship is still present in the mind of many constituent members who are disgusted by the

increasing number of public arguments held between representatives (Sinclair, 2001). Our study

will require and ultimately provide an excavation of the existing literature, in an attempt to

understand the causes of publicizing bipartisan behavior.

A. Research Question Under what conditions do politicians publicize their bipartisan behavior?

B. Literature Review Bipartisanship

Bipartisanship, a “mechanism that enables Congress and the president to work together in

pursuit of common objectives” (McCormick and Wittkopf, 1990, p.1081), is the equivalent



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concept in analyzing relationships between members of Congress. “Bipartisans are thought to be

above the electoral strategizing and maneuvering we associate with partisans: bipartisans put

principle above electoral self-interest” (Trubowitz, 2005, p. 433). It is not just a mechanism for

passing legislation but also an image that portrays a sense of responsibility to the wellbeing of

the representative’s entire constituency.

Image is a vital facet in understanding bipartisanship because candidate image is directly

related to voter behavior (Hacker, 1995). Lilleker (2006) describes image as “central to the

professionalized and marketed political communication context of the current era” (p. 95). There

are many textual, verbal, and visual mechanisms for conveying a candidate’s image. Kenneth

Hacker (1995) notes that “advertising, speeches, and the printed word have been used throughout

American history to shape images of candidates” (p. 12). If image is “the outward representation

of a political leader, candidate or organization” (p. 95) as Lilleker (2006) suggests, bipartisanship

is a versatile way for a politician to convey a range of messages about their image. Despite a

generally positive connotation, political leaders remain hesitant to adopt bipartisanship as part of

their image.

While compromise may seem sensible, polarization trends have proved to be the

normative occurrence in contrast to bipartisan leanings, which have been documented from the

1950’s to the early 1970’s (Han & Brady, 2007) and during the current government structure.

With the perpetuation of polarization in the national party and the issue of pleasing the

constituency remaining prevalent, members of Congress began to sway in different directions

attempting to adjust. Some members have been documented to switch parties to please their

constituents, some attempted moderate legislation engagement, some disregarded the party



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platforms and others strategically retired. Cross-pressured legislators throughout the literature

were more likely to maintain the image of bipartisanship because they felt there was no other

option. Legislators, however, in a safe district did not feel these pressures and were able to adjust

to national party leanings without the loss of constituent approval. The process of delayed

electoral replacement ultimately was the key in maintaining bipartisan behavior. Once re-

elections were held, candidates with distinct party ideals ousted members with bipartisan

tendencies (Han & Brady, 2007).

Partisanship reemerged in the early 1970’s after the brief appearance after World War II.

Although there has recently been a strong movement to compromise to improve efficiency, due

to government shutdowns and standstills, that bipartisan action is not likely “consistent [,]

because the price the Democrats who support Republican initiatives pay will be high” (Sinclair,

2001, p. 82). The fear of “criticism from their fellow party members while seeking praise from

across the aisle” (Baum and Groeling, 2008, p. 158) and desire to push their agenda generally

deter members of Congress from engagement in bipartisan behavior.

Ferguson, Fowler, and Nichols (2008) argue that bipartisanship could have improved the

likelihood of successful health reform in 2009-2010. They suggest (1) to make health reform a

top legislative priority; (2) to be leaders, not partisans; and (3) to develop broad policy consensus

but leave the policy details to Congress.

This study is important to our research because it shows how partisan strategies are

problematic. It discusses some of the motives behind partisan behavior, which is directly relevant

to our research question. It also details how bipartisan politicians behave, and also the benefits of

doing so.



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The study does have some holes. One, it pertains only to health care reform. Politicians

can be less or more motivated to engage in bipartisan behavior when handing different issues.

Two, the study claims there are other American reasons for repeated failure, but does not

elaborate. If there are other reasons that cause failure—they must be stated. If they aren’t, their

suggestions have no merit, given other outside factors continue to hinder success. Three, the

study gives examples of partisanship, but does not clearly define it.

We will address the holes in the study by observing not one, but numerous instances

when politicians engage in partisan or bipartisan behavior. We will also give background

information about what past influences have helped our hurt bipartisanship. Finally, we will

clearly define partisanship at the beginning of our report for clarity.

Media and Bipartisanship

There is a foundational connection between media and bipartisanship. Without media,

members of Congress would not have the means to claim recognized credit for bipartisan

behavior. Furthermore, media effects may play an intricate role in determining when or if a

politician chooses to publicize bipartisan behavior. This connection is a core focus of our

research.

Current research asserts that “Congress is rewarded for positive media coverage” [(Parker

1977; Patterson and Calderia 1990) Ramirez 2001, p. 682] and the public inflicts the punishment

of lower approval ratings on members who display partisan negativity. From the tests a negative

relationship between approval ratings and partisan conflict can be deemed statistically

significant. Ramirez (2001) finds that “media coverage of Congress maintains both a short-term-



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and long-term positive relationship with approval” (p. 688). Partisan conflict has caused a lack of

approval in the institution of Congress.

However, we argue that these media effects are not uniform across the country.

Individual members from safe districts have no need to publicly display or engage in bipartisan

behavior; members of Congress will publicize bipartisan behavior according to the political

composition of their respective district, hoping to remain a viable representative. Fabiana

Scchetti (2008) in Political Representation discusses that representation maintains a

“relationship between a principle (representative) and an agent (represented), concerning an

object (interests, opinions, etc), and taking place in a particular setting (the political context)”(p.

2). The function of a representative is to remain apprised of governmental actions that may affect

their constituents and act on their behalf (Lilleker, 2006). Constituents, in these safe districts,

with strong political party alignment are documented as negatively receiving the information that

their representative engaged in bipartisan behavior (Harbridge and Malhotra, 2011). There is a

discernible importance of some bipartisan engagement for Congress to retain high approval

ratings but is not necessarily essential for a representative to maintain his or her Congressional

seat, when that is not how the constituency wants to be represented. Deborah Brooks (2006) was

able to add to the argument that negative behavior in Congress does not always lead to a

complete disenchantment of the constituents; their involvement in politics is not diminished.

Congressional members have been noted to previously allow the anticipation of voter turnout to

shape their policy behavior. However Brooks’ findings should lessen anxiety of bipartisan

bahvior, since negativity doesn’t decrease voter turnout.



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Baum and Groeling (2008) also contributed to the study of partisan media messages by

hypothesizing that messages from partisan speakers that appear to damage the speaker’s own

party will be perceived as more credible. Furthermore, they expected costly credibility to have a

stronger effect on public opinion than “cheap talk.” They focused on national security because it

tends to be an issue that Americans know little about and therefore depend on “elite cues” when

choosing a position.

The findings support their hypotheses and are useful for our study of Congressional

bipartisanism, even though they narrow their focus to presidential approval. The premise that

news media tend to give attention to internal disputes over bipartisan harmony is a key

observation. If re-election is a motivation for bipartisanism, politicians will want to use media to

work in their favor. The results from this study suggest that there are significantly positive

effects from a politician using costly credibility (i.e. agreeing with the other side or criticizing a

member of their own party). Therefore, media effects could be an incentive for engaging in

bipartisan behavior.

However, the use of a student population sample (specifically dependency on the UCLA

student sample) could weaken the validity of the findings. Using college students increases the

education level and narrows the age range of the sample. Furthermore, the low voter turnout

rates of college students indicate that this is not a target audience.

Issue is also an important determining factor in the relationship between media effects

and bipartisanship. “Research on agenda setting and priming has shown that candidates’ choices

to highlight certain issues and avoid others can shape the weights voters place on these issues,

and, hence, their vote decisions” (See Druckman, Jacobs, and Ostermeier 2004; Iyengar and



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Kinder 1987; Simon 2002). Framing theory plays a similar role in this discussion. Scholars

describe framing as an effect “in which salient attributes of a message…render particular

thoughts applicable, resulting in their activation and use in evaluations” (Price, Tewksbury, and

Powers, 1997, p. 481). Frames are important because “in elections, voters are asked to select

among competing constructions of reality” (Kenski, Hardy, and Jamieson, 2010, p. 7).

Publicizing bipartisan behavior is certainly a means of agenda setting, but it is also a potential

way to bridge the gap between competing constructs.

Valentino, Hutchings, and White (2002) examine how elites capitalize on pre-existing

linkages between issues and social groups to influence citizens’ political decisions. Specifically,

the researchers found racial cues in campaign communications may spark racial attitudes, which

can alter political decisions. However, factors besides race influence political choices. The

researchers examined how partisanship and global values such as individualism and

egalitarianism affect candidate preference. They found none of the cues they manipulated prime

individualism, egalitarianism or partisan identification. Also, the language and imagery of

government spending and taxation has become racially coded. Additionally, racial priming is

mediated by the accessibility of race in memory, not the importance of group representation.

Finally, counter stereotypic black cues suppress racial priming.

The study is not strictly devoted to bipartisanship or partisanship, but it does examine

how politicians behave to reach a desired outcome—which is what we plan to explore in regards

to partisanship. This is important because the public has a right to know what politicians do to

reach a desired goal. We will shed light on this behavior.



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The study leaves several questions unanswered. Further exploration is needed to

determine communication characteristics that drive automatic versus intentional priming effects.

Also, the study uses an educated and Democratic sample, so a clear generalization is not

possible. The study did not explain if using strategies to influence specific races to vote is

immoral. Black stereotypes were used, but the study did not make it clear if this was wrong or

not. Finally, their remedies—avoiding negative stereotypes and overemphasizes on radicalized

issues—are short-term fixes for a long-term problem.

We will address the holes in this literature by using a bipartisan sample. When only

democrats or only conservatives are used, it is difficult to make general statements about

phenomena. This is also true regarding the use of a student sample population as used by Baum

and Groeling. Additionally, instead of examining how politicians use racial cues to affect

political behavior, we will aim to find what causes politicians to behave in a bipartisan manner,

including a consideration of media effects.

Research Limitations:

The present literature does not fully address what it will take for a candidate to publicize

bipartisan behavior. By analyzing past campaigns we will be able to address the conditions under

which a politician will claim to be bipartisan. There are some issues however with current

measurement of approval that could be used to supplement the study of bipartisan behavior.

Ramirez (2001) states “measurement of congressional approval is difficult to obtain because

survey questions about public attitudes toward the legislative branch are asked irregularly” (p.

684). There is also not a documented measurement that can directly assess partisan conflict. A

large emphasis has been placed on political party alignment that there are many limitations on



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branching out. Partisanship does not always seem the most effective way to solve a problem. The

general public may seem to react negatively to conflict and demand bipartisanship until an issue

they are passionate about is questioned. True approval ratings are difficult to obtain because

some members may feel trapped and answer according to their party. It is also difficult to control

for every variable that a constituent may consider in their approval ratings. Although historical

patterns are important, there is a lack of literature that studies current characteristics and cases of

publicized bipartisan behavior.

II. Theory & Hypothesis A. Analytical Framework

Definitions influence the way we see things. They provide lenses to view phenomena

through. We must establish a clear definition of political party to fully understand bipartisanship.

For our purposes, we will use Herrnson’s (2009) definition, which defines political parties as

“enduring multilayered coalitions of individuals and groups that possess mutual goals and share

interlocking relationships.” Congressmen and Congresswomen who are bipartisan focus on

collaboration rather than political preferences. They put “principle above electoral self-interest”

(Trubowitz, 2005, p. 433). Thus a bipartisan member of Congress will set aside his or her

partisan biases and find mutual goals that are best for both political parties.

The goal of this project is to find why members of Congress publicize bipartisan behavior

in certain political environments. We will use Mellow and Trubowitz’s (2005) analytical

framework to find these answers. They argue that congressional bipartisanship is more likely to



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occur when Conservatives and Liberals are competitive nationally (not polarized), when the

national economy is growing, and when the federal government is divided between the parties.

National competition between Conservatives and Liberals increases the electoral payoff

lawmakers can expect from going bipartisan. In other words, when regions are not polarized,

members of Congress place emphasis on reaching center voters. (Mellow & Trubowitz, 2005, p.

434). Anthony Downs (1957) argued that competition for votes sends parties towards the center,

meaning toward the median voter. Conversely, if there is no competition from the other party in

a general election, there is no reason to reach for median voters. In short, when lawmakers need

votes, they are more likely to go bipartisan.

A booming economy makes it easier for lawmakers to reach across the aisle. A strong

economy usually engenders high approval ratings for those in office. This reduces the pressure

on lawmakers to define issues in strictly partisan terms. However, in tough economic times,

lawmakers are less concerned with appealing to swing voters and are more focused on rallying

their political bases (Mellow & Trubowitz, 2005, p. 437).

A divided federal government augments the power of moderates in Congress—presidents

must reach out to the party in control of Congress to get their agenda passed. However, when a

government is unified, a president can use partisan tactics without much penalty (Mellow &

Trubowitz, 2005, p. 437). Thus, bipartisanship is more likely when moderates have more

congressional power.

We have extensively reviewed bipartisan literature and found that few scholars examine

why members of congress publicize bipartisan behavior in polarized districts. Our study will

open doors for political scientists to research this unexplored phenomenon.



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B. Hypotheses

H1: Politicians in a strongly polarized district (X1) have more incentive to publicize bipartisan behavior (Y1).

III. Data & Methods

A. Measurement Operations In hopes of understanding why members of Congress publicize bipartisan behavior, we

will focus on members in a strongly polarized district and how often, when a specific issue is

constantly publicized, that politician publicizes his or her bipartisan behavior.

To test our hypotheses, we will operationalize our dependent variable—publicizing

bipartisan behavior—using candidate image, party affiliation, strategy, district composition, and

incumbency. The data sources we will use in our research of when a member will publicize their

bipartisan behavior will be the Congressional Record. We will assume this data is publicized

strategically since the record is accessible in the public domain.

The information from the Congressional Record will also be applied while examining our

independent variable (X1), or District Level Polarization. District Level Polarization can be

operationalized in our study as the vote margin between the democratic and republican candidate

in the district. We will be gathering the data specifically from the last presidential election.



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There are multiple control variables present in our study that must be considered. The first

control variable is amount of time the individual has spent in office, their Time in Office (X2)

can be operationalized as the number of years they have spent in office. Individuals who have

been in the office longer have a plethora of benefits. They may have more general knowledge on

when the most opportune moment is to publicize their bipartisan behavior. They may also have

the benefit of having a more savvy public relations staff at their disposal. This information can

be gathered from the Congressional Record. This leads us to our second control variable,

Incumbency (X3), which can be operationlized simply by a 0 to display that the member is an

incumbent and a 1 if they are new to the office (0= Incumbent 1=New Candidate). An incumbent

may have already developed a relationship with the media and may have a stronger relationship

with his/her constituency. This information can also be gathered from the congressional record.

The member’s party affiliation (X4) may be a determinant in if they publicize their bipartisan

behavior or not. This information can be gathered from the Almanac of American Politics. One

party or another could potentially care more about their image and have a greater tendency to

publicize their bipartisan behavior. Voting behavior (X5) can be operationalized as gathering the

measurement of ideological voting scores and then turning them into a range (ADA or Nominate

scores). A member's voting behavior can be analyzed from the information available in the

Congressional Record. Finally it is essential to control for if the member is a House or Senate

member (X6). This information can also be gathered from the Congressional Record available

through the Library of Congress. This information is crucial because a Senator may have a

greater opportunity to publicize bipartisan behavior because they serve a bigger geographical

area. This may also make it more difficult for them to publicize their behavior because the



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geographical area they serve may have vastly different opinions on bipartisan behavior. All of

these must be considered when moving forward with the research.

[Operationalized Chart in Appendices]

B. Testing

To test our hypothesis we will record a raw number count of how many times a member

specifically mentions being bipartisan (publicizing bipartisan behavior). We measure the vote

margin between the democratic and republican candidate at the district level to determine

polarization. We will use an OLS regression as our statistical analysis to examine the

correlations between the dependent and independent variable.

IV. Conclusion

We expect to find that few members of Congress in politically polarized districts are

more likely to publicize bipartisanship, whether it is through the media, through speeches and

press conferences, or through other forms of dissemination. Since few scholars have focused on

publicizing bipartisan behavior in polarized districts, our findings will open the doors for other

scholars to investigate the fairly unexplored phenomenon. Our findings will not only widen

academic knowledge. When a politician’s opponent preaches bipartisanship, he or she can

point out that their opponent’s rhetoric is for political purposes and not for collaboration. Also,

our findings will broaden the public’s knowledge about bipartisanship and politician behavior.



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Hopefully, this will engender the public to elect more competent incumbents. Communication

professionals, policy makers and political practitioners will all be able to use our compilation

of research and our ultimate results to improve strategies within the field. Political practitioners

and policy makers will be able to directly apply our results when attempting to reach across

party lines. By highlighting specific situations and facilitating open conversations about

benefits and consequences of this bipartisan behavior, future practitioners can statistically

determine when these actions may prove to be a huge benefit for their overall campaign.

Communication professionals can interpret methods of prior bipartisan publication and avoid

irrevocable error in scenarios where the district composition may really not demand it. In future

studies we can expand to a more quantitative approach that would provide practitioners with

specific data to promote or hinder bipartisan behavior. Although highly unlikely, for future

study, a direct case study of interactions between political parties on the floor, would be

extremely beneficial in garnering a further understanding of partisan conflict. Measuring their

partisan responses compared to their bipartisan behavior would certainly add a new layer to the

literature. The more scholars and the general public know about bipartisan behavior and

political motives, the more equipped they will be to make sound, intelligent political decisions.

Our political expectations will increase and our political representatives will ameliorate.

For future research Media Involvement (X2), can be operationalized as the amount of

coverage a certain issue will garner from the media. The data source for this variable can be

news content gathered from news databases. In future studies primary information, pertaining to

the terms in our hypotheses, can be acquired through a quantitative survey and a qualitative focus

group. To determine the selection of the representatives questioned while conducting the focus



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group the researcher will conduct research on prior campaigns, voting records and news content

to determine which members aligned the majority of the time, with their members. The research

will extend to a minimum of three years past the initial focus group and survey, to gather

information on constituents’ feelings.

In order to study what motivates members of Congress to publicize bipartisan behavior

the researcher will conduct a focus group with ten former members of Congress. Using a focus

group format, the researcher will have more flexibility to obtain lengthy and complex

information that would otherwise not be readily available. We have chosen to use former

members of Congress for the study so that they will be more willing to openly discuss their

motivational factors. The group will be comprised of five Republicans and five Democrats.

Because we are interested in polarized districts, the researcher will purposely not include

Independents in the study.

[See focus group outline, questions and pre-survey attached in Appendices]

To avoid the limitation of “measurement of congressional approval [being] difficult to

obtain because survey questions about public attitudes toward the legislative branch are asked

irregularly” (p. 684), that Ramirez (2001) suggests, a survey should be created and conducted

annually in respective districts. The survey will be conducted over the telephone and 1,000

members from each district will be selected at random with the only control for advancement

into the questionnaire being that the individual be of voting age. The sample size location will

reflect the aforementioned focus group. Each member present in the focus group’s constituency

will be the target of the survey. There will be ten members questioned in the focus group and all



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ten districts will be considered in the survey distribution. The survey will poll 10,000

constituents of voting age.

[See survey attached in Appendices]

In the future all member campaign advertisements, press releases, website archives and

information pertaining to the member and their partisan/bipartisan behavior from news databases

should be analyzed. Researchers can then determine how a member's publicity efforts help or

hinder them while in office. The responses gathered from the survey code and the focus group

responses should also be analyzed in conjunction with other resources.



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IV. Works Cited Congressional Record 113th Congress. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?n=Record Barone, M., McCutcheon, C., Trende, S., & Kraushaar, J. (2013). Almanac of American Politics. (1 ed.). University of Chicago Press. Baum, M., & Groeling, T. (2009). Shot by the Messenger: Partisan Cues and Public Opinion Regarding National Security and War. Political Behavior , 31(2), 157-186. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40213343 Brooks, D. (2006). The Resilient Voter: Moving toward Closure in the Debate over Negative Campaigning and Turnout. The Journal of Politics, 68(3), 684-696. Retrieved from http://jstor.org/stable/4639890 Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper and Rowe. Hacker, K. L. (1995). Candidate images in presidential elections. Westport, Conn.: Praeger. Han, H., & Brady, D. (2007). A Delayed Return to Historical Norms: Congressional Party Polarization After The Second World War. British Journal of Political Science, 37(3), 505-531. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4497305. Harbridge, L., & Malhotra, N. (2011). Electoral incentives and partisan conflict in congress: Evidence from survey experiments. American Journal of Political Science , 55(3), 494- 510. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/23024933. Hernnson, P. (2009). The roles of party organizations, party-connected committees, and party allies in elections. The Journal of Politics, 71, 1207-1224. Kenski, K., Hardy, B. W., & Jamieson, K. H. (2010). The Obama victory: How Media, Money, and Message Shaped the 2008 Election. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lilleker, D. (2006). “Key concepts in political communication” London, England : Sage Publications LTD. Retrieved from http://books.google.com/books/about/Key_Concepts_in_Political_Communication.html?i d=hNhP6MUJgfkC.



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McCormick, J. M., & Wittkopf, E. R. (1990). Bipartisanship, partisanship, and ideology in congressional-executive foreign policy relations 1947-1988. The Journal of Politics, 52(4), 1077-1100. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2131683 Mellow, N., & Trubowitz, P. (2005). Going bipartisan: Politics by other means. Political Science Quarterly, 120, 433-453. Price, V., Tewksbury, D., & Powers, E. (1997). Switching Trains Of Thought: The Impact Of News Frames On Readers' Cognitive Responses. Communication Research, 24(5), 481- 506. Ramirez, M. (2009). The dynamics of partisan conflict on congressional approval. American Journal of Political Science , 53(3), 681-694. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/25548145. Sacchetti, F. (2008). “Political representation”. 10. Retrieved from http://www.imtlucca.it/_documents/courses/005794-ML8TI-Political_Representation.pdf. Sinclair, B. (2001). Bipartisan governing: Possible, yes; likely, no. PS: Political Science and Politics , 34(1), 81-83. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1350314. Valentino, N. A., Hutchings, V. L., & White, I. K. (2002). Cues that matter: How political ads prime racial attitudes during campaigns. The American Political Science Review, 96(1), 75-90. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3117811



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IV. Appendices

1) Operationalized Data Chart

2) Pre-Focus Group Survey

2) Focus Group Consent Form

3) Moderator Guide

4) Constituent Survey



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Consent to Participate in Focus Group LCD Research Company

Purpose of Study The purpose of this focus group is to determine under what conditions members of Congress publicize bipartisan behavior. You have been asked to take part in this research study because of your experience serving as a member of Congress. Participation Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You have the right to leave the group at any. Privacy Discussion within the group will be kept strictly confidential. A tape recorder will be used during the study for researcher use only. Your name will not be released or published in association with this study or anything you say during the course of the focus group. If you at any point decide to cease participation, your anonymity will remain. Risks We are not aware of any risks associated with participation in this study. Payment You will receive compensation for any travel and hotel expenses plus $1000 for your participation. If you have any questions regarding this study, please contact researchers David Carter, Camille Ivy-O’Donnell, or Lauren Leist at (601)319-5563. I understand this information and agree to participate under the conditions explained above. __________________________________ _______________ Please print your name Date __________________________________ _______________ Please sign your name Date



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Moderator Guide

INTRODUCTION Welcome and thank you for agreeing to participate in this focus group held by LCD Research Company. The purpose of this study is to determine under what conditions members of Congress publicize bipartisan behavior. During the next hour, I will be asking a series of questions regarding Congressional bipartisanism. We value your input and encourage you to contribute to the discussion as much as possible. We would like to remind you that a tape recorder will be used during the course of this focus group. However, your identity will not be associated with this study or anything you say during the focus group. QUESTIONS *Space is provided for notes on additional questions or comments. 1) What does the word bipartisan mean to you as a member of Congress? 2) How have partisan interactions changed over your time in office? 3) What types of legislation has led you toward a bipartisan vote? 4) Did you experience party backlash when you crossed the aisle?



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5) What advertising strategies did you use to publicize your policies and voting records? 6) When do congress members most often feel pressured to engage in bipartisan behavior? 7) How has media coverage influenced your bipartisan behavior? 8) How do partisan news outlets influence the way you publicize your bipartisan policy? CLOSING That concludes our study. Again, thank you for your willingness to participate.



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Country: United States

Title: Leist – Carter – Ivy-‐O’Donnell Poll: October, 2015 –

Representative Partisan Publication

Survey Organization: LCD Research Companies

Sponsor: Bipartisan Policy Center

Field Dates: October 2015 + Annual Redistribution of Survey

Sample: Specific sample of district adults beyond voting age

(Ages 18+). Comprised of constituents of

Congressman/woman utilized in related focus group.

Sample Size: 10,000

Sample Notes: This study contains sampling using only one response

per household. This survey is conducted annually

disregarding any responses from the previous year, in a

specific household where the respondent is not the

same individual.

Interview Method: Cellular Telephone



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SURVEY QUESTIONAIRE Hello, my name is ____(Insert Name)____ and I am calling on behalf of LCD Research

Companies. I am calling today to conduct a survey to try and understand the behavior of

_______(Insert Congress Members Name)________. Your responses will be completely

anonymous and analyzed using a numerical system that is applied to each response. Before

we can continue I need to know if you are of voting age. Are you of voting age Yes or No? [If

respondent responds with “No” respond with: [Ok, thank you very much for your time

today but for this specific survey you must be above the age of 18. CLICK] Would you be

able to spare 5 minuets today for this survey?

Q1 Q1. For statistical purposes only, would you please tell me your sex? Value Label

1 Male 2 Female 3 Other ______ 4 Not sure/refused

Q2 Q2. For statistical purposes only, would you please tell me how old you are? Value Label

1 18-‐24 2 25-‐29 3 30-‐34 4 35-‐39 5 40-‐44 6 45-‐49 7 50-‐54



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8 55-‐59 9 60-‐64 10 65-‐69 11 70-‐74 12 75 and over 13 Not sure/refused

Q3 Q3. For statistical purposes only, would you please tell me what is your race – black, white, Hispanic, Asian or something else? Value Label

1 Black 2 White 3 Hispanic 4 Asian 5 Other 6 Not sure/refused

Q4 Q4. In general, do you approve or disapprove of the job that ______(Insert Name of Congress Member)______ is doing as your representative? Value Label

1 Approve 2 Disapprove 3 Not sure 4 Indifferent

Q5 Q5. In general, do you approve or disapprove of the job that ______(Insert Name of Congress Member)______ is doing in handling the economy? Value Label

1 Approve 2 Disapprove



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3 Not sure 4 Indifferent

Q6 Q6. In general, do you approve or disapprove of the job that Congress as a whole is doing? Value Label


Q6 Q6. In general, do you approve or disapprove of the cooperation levels in Congress? Value Label


Q7 Q7. In the next election for U.S. Congress, do you feel that your representative deserves to be reelected? Value Label

1 No 2 Yes 3 Indifferent



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Q8 Q8. How well do you feel your Congressman/woman participates in bipartisan legislation? Value Label

1 5, good rating 2 4 3 3 4 2 5 1, poor rating 6 Cannot rate



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publicizing bipartisan behavior · hacker (1995) notes that “advertising, speeches, and the...

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