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DUKEPOWER

Juyly 1, 1991

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionDocument Control DeskWashington, DC 20555

Subject: McGuire Nuclear ' tationDocket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370Catawba Nuclear StationDocket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414Oconee Nuclear StationDocket Nos. 50-265 50-270, and 50-287Crisis Management In,si: enting Procedures

Gentlemen:

Attached for NRC 6:a and review is a revision to the followingDuke Power Company Crisis Management Implementing Procedure:

CMIP-12 REV. 13

Please delete privacy material in the form of personaltelephone numbers prior to placing in the Public Document Room.

By copy of this letter two revisions are being provided to NRC,Region 11, Atlanta.

Very truly yours,

h s%'e

M. 5. Tuckman

HAF:haf

Attachment

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l'9107220316 910701 #(PDR ADOCK 05000269F PDR

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DUKE POWER COMPANY

CR. ISIS MANAGEMENT

IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

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June 11, 1991

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* TABLE OF CONTENTSjVolume 2

Igh Procedure Descrintion

CHIP-8 Oconee Crisis Phone Directory (Rev. 30)

CMIP-9 McGuire/ Catawba Crisis Phone Directory(Rev. 39)

CMIP-10 Emergency Classification - Catawba (Rev. 3)

'P-11 Emergency Classification - McGuire (Rev. 10)

CM t .'- 12 Emergency Classification - Oconee (Rev. 13)

CMIP-13 Notifications to States and Counties from theCrisis Management Center (Rev. 22)

CMIP-14 Crisis Management Data Transmittal SystemAccess for Offsite Agencies - (Rev. 3)

CMIP-15 Reserved for future use

CMIP-16 Crisis Management Data Transmittal SysteinAccess from the Crisis Management Center -(Rev. 11)

CMIP-17 Reserved for future use

CMIP-18 Maintaining Emergency Preparedness (Rev. 5)

CMIP-19 Communications Test for McGuire/ Catawba CMC(Rev. 16)

CMIP-20 Communications Test for Oconee CMC (Rev. 10)

CMIP-21 Quarterly Inventory Equipment Check (Rev. 35)

CMIP-22 Telephone Number Updates (Rev. 3)

June 11, 1991

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CRISIS MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE |

CHIP-12.

Classification of Emergency for '

Oconee Nuclear Station.

Rev. 13June 11, 1991

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CMIP-12-

( CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY FOROCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

1.0 SYMPTOMS,

1.1 Notification of Unusual Event

1.1.1 Events are in process or have occurred which indicate apotential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

1.1.2 No releases of radioactive material requiring offsiteresponse or monitoring are expected unless furtherdegradation of safety occurs.

1.2 Alert

'1.2.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve anactual or potential substantial degradation of the level of

-safety of the plant.

1.2.2 Loss of one fission product barrier.

1.2.3 Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions ofthe EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

1.3 Site Area Emergency

1.3.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve actualor likely major failures of plant functions needed forprotection of the public.

1.3.2 Loss of two fission product barriers.

1.3.3 Releases do not, nor are they expected to, exceed EPA Protec-tive Action Guideline exposure levels outside the SiteBoundary.

1.4 General Emergency

1,4.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve actualor imminent substantial core degradation or melting withpotentiel for loss of containment integrity.

1.4,2 Loss of two fission product barriers and failure or imminentfailure of the third barrier.

1.4.3 Releases, if made, could be expected to exceed EPA ProtectiveAction Guideline exposure levels outside the Site Boundary.

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I.2.0 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS'-

2.1 Compare actual plant conditions to the Emergency Action Level (s)listed in Enclosure 4.1 then declare the appropriate Emergency Classas indicated.

If a change in the emergency class is made, perform steps 2.2, 2.3,and 2.4 below.

2.2 Instruct the State / County Communicator to notify the state (s) andcounties per CMIP-13 of any change in the emergency class. If theemergency class is SITE AREA EMERGENCY or GENERAL EMERGENCY,determine protective action recommendations per CPIP-1 and transmitthese recommendations.

NOTE: Notifications to the state (s) and counties must be madewithin 15 minutes whenever there is a change in the emergencyclassification.

2.3 Announce the change in the emergency class to all CMC personnel andto the Emergency Coordinator at the TSC.

2.4 Instruct the NRC Communicator in the CMC Plant Assessment Group tonotify NRC immediately and within one hour per CMIP-15,

3.0 SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS

3.1 To de-escalate the Emergency, compare plant conditions to theInitiating Conditions of Enclosure 4.1. To terminate the emergency,refer to the Termination Criteria in Enclosure 4.3.

Notify state (s), counties, and NkC by verbal summary of anyreduction or termination in the emergency class followed by awritten summary within eight (8) hours.

4.0 EHCLOSURES

4.1 Emergency Action Level (s) for Emergency ClassesEvent No. Pagels)

4.1.1 Primary Coolant Leak 1&2

4.1.2 Fuel Integrity 3

4.1.3 Steam System Failure 4

4.1.4 High Radiation /Radiciogical Effluents 5

4.1.5 Loss of Shutdown Function 6

4.1.6 Loss of Power 7

4.1.7 Fires and Security Actions 8

4.1.8 Spent Fuel Damage 9

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,. 4.1.9 Natural Disasters and Other Hazards 10(

4.1.10 Other Abnormal Plant Conditions 11 & 12"

4.2 Area Monitors and Process Monitors

4.3 Termination Criteria

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CMIP-12EHCLOSURE 4.1.1 PAGE 1 of 12

PRIMARY COOLANT LEAK

ALERT SITE AREA Erf9CENCY CENERAL ENE9CENCY17aEUAL EVENT

1. REACTUR SM.fTDO@f REEKf1Rf D BY RCS 1. RCS LEAKAGE CpfATER TMAN OR 1. E LEAfutE E3tEATER TMApt 1. " MALL ABER LAfEE s rirat MET 1B

AVAILABLE MAKIW PtDP CAPACITY FAILLAEE OF ECCS-tEAAG.TD NII AIUlCE T*, 3.1.6 EillALL TD 50 CPM NLT

OPERATTDC 9mE: DE3T 9RITDED44 (PERATTDC IME: MDT $1RITIND98 Prismary or Pri g /* A' - IIEA SAE S1 EAL~ Ape ETTER

THEU PortR EPfRATICM TNitt POER (PERATTtDG - Full HPI tsiecle to musintain Loss of all injecticn or

peacto, sNicken initiated Priseery or PrismaryEmerwwiery st6ccoling >0* F isseinant loss of inyection,

capability j

|$msesuan t to TS 3.1.6 2. STEAM LIK SIEEAft MITM F/S- Leak 2 50 gpm ORLEAst equal TD GR EMIEATER TMAN ~

~~AMD ANY DK or TM f DLtEMDs E-. s y actions per EOP~

Ape 50 Crn inadequate core cooling- Primary leakage etnidentifiede SeAccoling > 0*F section are unsuccessful -GPERATI7C teDE: IEUT 9EJTDupesexceeds 1 gpm T15El MBER OPERATTGPG CETC 2 It00*FAse

- Total prinary leakage Leak CAf*EUT be isolated. IWJDE CaffADeENT MTTM-- 'T7erCAlltM OF-FAIUDftfL 2. LDCA METM IMITIALLY aerswtg.~

tsdeiniifiedI ewceeds 10 gun DMesa lane Pressure rapidly ECE5 ptITH SUERSE4ptR3tr F Altl.5IE OF2. STEAM LIK PJtEAK OLITTJDE ECES KAT SDet Ape f AI115tE Or

- Total prinary leakage CIDETADOENT MITM P/S LIAK decreasingCENTADetDET MAT 8tDENALApe

i incitaling returesnble 4 CptEATER TMAM OR teuRL TO 10 CPM CAPA81tJTYSG ttbe lee 2 50 gueexceeds 30 gp== Are

- SG tche leakaoe >.35 gpn OPERATDC SME: MGT S3EJTDCD M Valid pla S for 58 alarm - LOCA SAE SI EALEt.kiit 112 MICM - 630 RherB _AfeT751LI MBER (PERATTEDG

- Any reactor coolant leakaa. - Failure on secondary side of SG sL>3it 3 ALERT - 286 R/hrt Loss of LPI hast removelevaluated as sesafe results in a direct opening to

the erwironment GUTT.JDE CDptTADOOff

Aped EITW R CF T K FOt1 D>tD C - Failure on secondery side of _ADSD- Any leakage exists through SG results in a direct waning Loss of heet reenovel

the RCS strength txnsularyf encept SG ttees b Ttee leak 210 cpm in either to the erwirunment capability of RBCDs.

Apesieme generator

Tshe leek [50 grwe existsOutActiwity deteeted at the in the same stease genereior

Protected Aree Fe-ee:

2 2 mR/br HB

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CPt1P-12ENCLOGURE 4.1.2 PAGE 3 of 12FUEL INTEGRITY

SITE AR! A ENERGENCY GENERAL fNERGENCYALERTUNtI;UAL EVENT

I. irm OF 2 OF 3 FISSItSt FWEET1. C2IQt IECS ACTIVITY 1. SEVERE ED3S OF FML CNDE 1. DEMADED CDIIE DETTDI POSSIBLE trm

BARRIm stITM A POTEWrIAL F15tOF CDDtJetr CEGETRY t tr*- OF 3se SAdutITR

- Total failed fuel is betwawi - Total f ailed ftel > 5% per - Avew of f rve highest CETC8035 OF CLAssDec aAsutITR

1% - 5% per Chmistry onelysis Chemistry analysis'- reading 3 70C*rCondition 1 - tDuble to emintain stbcooling - Total failed fuel is 2 5Z pee

Channistry onelysis -- Total activity of RCS da. > 0* Fto isotopes with half lives - Area ce process RI A sons tors ~ Cendition 2

ir. the R9 anml or eweeedlonuer than 30 einutesexceeds 224/E pei/el 4wn lieits stated in Enclosure 4.2 - RB bydrooses ccccentration

> 0.5% and ircreesing at = - RIA 57 or 58 ALAfstathit 152 ARIRT - 2500 R/he athe RX is critical ~rste of > C.1% per hourethit 3 IEIm - 1.2E 3 R/hr t

- I-131 on secondary sideexceeds 1.4 pei/e1 - valid RIA 57 or 58 Alare - Aver.g of five hidwst

(thit 182 BEIm - 430 R/hr B CETC reading 3 790*Fttbit 3 AlfRT - 286 R/ bel

Z. ARNusgMAL C00UtMT TEMYRAftstE LD35 CEDfTADOOfT SAflRITRAM3/ tnt PRESEEE GR51DETS LIMITS - RB ponetratiW s I are cet

Iisolated

OPERATING MODE: AROVE COLD2 c e tration is > 92*2tittitDN - RB 99

- An event has nocurred A ich - Contairww.st leak. age ewesedsrwqsi_rm operstion in the E.6E6 el/hrThermal Shock OperatingRegion - RB peessure > 5* psig

- TS pressure /teeserature *HDTI tocs Or aCs encam!E SAsutTTRlimits violated

- LOCA 3 50 g- Inon-isolable

fault 8

- SG ts6e leek 2 50 gzs

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ENCLOSURE 4.1.3 CMIP-12 i

STEAM SYSTEM FAILURE PAGE 4 of 12 I

L'etfSUAL EvtNT ALERT SITE ARE A EMERGENCY GEPEERAL EMERGENCY

1. RAPID DEPerwarrraTitpe os' 1. STEMI LIBE SEAst WJSE 1. STEmt LDE 86 SETMSrtmeeWdrf SIDE EIBUTADeptr 8EITM F/S LDWL P/S 11Ast EMEATER TIGAN

'ssIEATER Titass OR EguRL in le Ern cR equal TD 54 EFM

OPERATDC PEIDE: petrT SNnnarpse

T19tU P(DE R EFERATitBG GPERATIDE DEeE: letN SseMDEBet (FEMATTIE DEeE: IENT SutNEGBS819mJ PtBER (FERATItBG TIM 3 PEBER EMBATitBE5

- Visual observation of rwn-isolable tank on semin s tespa - Failure on secondary side of SG _DE15E_CfDetADenft 98tTMline requiring plant shutck c results in a direct epaning to _Det_CA_Titse OF FAIB E0 FUEL

the erwirtreamt - Steen line pressure rapidly- Steam line pressure rapidly- cheerensingdecreasing Ape EITWR OF TIE F13LitBEDG _M

SG ttee leek 2 50 gram- Steam line besak requiring Tsaw le=A > 10 gpa in either _ase

isolation purstent to the steam generator Valid RIA 57 or 58 alaru; a m p operating procedure, tur ILMit 182 90438 - 630 R/hrt

t thit 3 ALFRT - 28. R/he t+

; Activity detected at the'

Protected Area fence: WJBE CIBfTADSOWT- Failure on secondary side of

2 2 esR/hr DO SG results in a direct weningto the erwircrwent

meeTskm lenAT50 gror exists inthe same steem omneratoe.

- Failure en s- " p side ofj SG results in a direct opening

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to the erwironmentase

Tsee le=A T 50 g m ewists inthe other steem generator s

*SG with the secondary sidefailurr a s being fed FDM fetxethe e rected snit.

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CMIP-12ENCLOSURE 4.1.4 PAGE 5 of 12 |HIGH RADIATICM/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

SITE ARE A EMEPGDCY GEMRAL EMERGENCYALERTL W SUAL EvtPfT '

1. RADIDtOGICAL EFTitDG TS 13MTTS 1. KIGDI RASI AT1tBf tiVEL m stTEug 1. ACCIgDdTAL REll.ASE OF GASES 1. ACCISDtTAL Ea rnes gr can

AImosmE ODETaftDeLTIED6EXCEEDED- RIA 45 IIIGN Alerw- RI A 45 ftIGpt Alacw

- Geseous/11cpJad ef fluent being - Ae a or process RIA ennators==ceed limits s tated inreleased ==ceed SLC 16.11.2 or ADED -Ase

.

SLC16.11.2 limits as deterwined Enclosure 4.2 -

by RP or CNweistry Prtcerbres. | RIA 46 reading 2 3000 cpie RIA 46 reading 3 60.500 cpe- Activity detected at the

Protected Area fence: - Gose calculations or field- Calamletions determine dose12 e t/Sr te retes or Field Nnitoring Teams etmitorig team emess. tss

2. RADIDLEGICAL EFTL1DETS DCILCDCsumesure activity at the Site result in a 2 hour dose

projection et the siteW:19 TIFES TS txandery ef:

2 50 mR/hr te ce 250 wiR/hr- Gaseous /Ligsid effluents being Thyroid 2 1 Ree h ie Body

released owceed 10 tiess SLC cut16.11.1 or SLC 16.11.2 limits asdetermined try RP or Chemistry g 3 5 See ThyroidProcochmes

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DCLOSURE 4.1.5 OCP-12t OSS OF SHUTD0 pet FUCT10pG PAGE 6 of 12

LMEUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMEWGENCY GDdEDAL EMEDGEACY

t. toss or n.cn0.o .ETw. 1. . m F n.cn.c -Em To 1. toss or n Cn.e .rEw. roR 1. n.sID.r D ET1A1E. = uns orTD MAIMT AIM P13987 CDtD 94kDtTAD8 PUWWT COtB SBENBOppt PUpgr sept $3ENBE308 FWsAge - TE SYSTB G

'SSEffBest EDLimEB SY FAIUK OF ETWC FWt_

M RATDG SEEBE: COLD SSEJTWEDSG OPERATDG PEME: NUT 53Eri3300 AttEXYD GES PERIMT W 8!Enft.DE TM PtBER EMRATItBG

OPERATIDG PEIBE: CDLD - Innbalaty to feed steenSMllTDupee T354tJ REMEL.DC - tawnble to ammintain core - SSF feodang steers gesnerators panersters from mff source

s e ture< 200*F tincludes the SSFt- Loss of residual twat - MPI forced cooling snable -ABSremoval for greater to musintain seccoling > 0*F MP3 forced cooling notthan 10 aira.stes. 2. WEND FiscT1tBE OF SYSTDetSt swailable

DEESFS TO HADtTAIN PUlfET BE3T - (kable to meintain reactorSSEJT3tpet CWeTTItBG subcritical 2. TRASCIDST SERNRDE EK TWIP

DEETW FAlt1 K TO M ABSOPERATDs PDBE: SIUT 53EMBIBes 2. A8877CIPATED THASCIDfT DETTIERJT FAltl5E OF N run wasT35El PtBER trEDATitBG SENMt

- 2 or more RFS channels trap- No HPI ficne available OPERATDG SENE: C- wi +wn.rt autammHc reactor

(EsERATitpG trap- HPI forced cooling initiated _Aue

- 2 or more RPS dernels trip Em actions sw EOP'

3. AffTICIPATED TResEIENT BEIT1ERJr withou". autosamtic reactor trip f ail to bring reactor. SCRApt A88 subcritical

Cen teci rods resumin withOPORATDG PEBE: POER and CApost be immnuelly trigynod Age

EPERATitDe or inserted frese ther control PCS S e coulTrwy < C*F~

;- 2 or *= ore R*S charnels trip roomwithout automatic reactor trip

AfSCentrol rods ~ere e=p= Ale ofbeing inserted saanuel trip ordesvent fec= the control room

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ENCLOSURE 4.1.6 OGP-12LOSS OF PONER PAGE 7 of 12

UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENEDAL EMEWGENCY

1. . IRSS OF OFT *ITE AC PEBER tm a ant: . 1. Im OF EETSITE AC PEBER ABS 1. IN OF OFFSITE AC PtBER Age 1. FAI1M SF N MS FEOF sptGITE AC PtpeR CAPAIBILITY- HEES OF ALL (ptSITE AC PtBER am OF Att 13e5ITE AC PEBER AC PEBER RWE BETN M 19tAL

q fR'i OF EFWDS MIWCHF CAPMLITYOfTRAT1DE 9mBE.: CDtB Span 30 pet ENEltATTNG SWEX: CDLB SsRFTWEDes trERATDE TEBE CDLS SetKSEmesTiegt7 REFWLDE TymJ KF1KL1% TimJ NEf1ELDE trEmaTDS fEWE: MN

SBENEpet *

- MTB 1 and 2 & ;-.wgized for - MFB 1 and 2 de-erwrgized for - MFB 1 and 2 e - vized for! >1 but <15 mamtes > 15 minutes >15 minutes - No AC pr=ser iBlach utI

Age-

OPERATING teSE: AftoVE CDtB OPEltATDC 9EBE: ABOYE CDLS Temperature sn the core is _ ABSSMUTDopet $3EJTBEBet: s200* F

j Inability to feed steen- Shutdown initiated pursuant - MFB 1 and 2 a a +;gized EFERATDC IEBE: ASOWE CDL3 ponerators from ANY source

to T.S. 5.7 for >l but <15 annutes Spanttgot sincludes the SSF5

- Loss of of fsite AC power 2. t er:": Or ALL VITAL EBCITE SC - MFB 1 and 2 O - - wiredand usit auwiliaries being PEBER > 15 minutespowered through CTve or CT5

trERATDE DEBE: CDLS LSEMBEBet 2. 88M't OF ALL VITAL EDESITE SCLOSS OF ALL VTTAL EBCITE SC T15El WiFtELDE PtBER'

PtBE R- Loss of DC power to all vital trERATDE 8WWE: CDL3 SISKDEBet

OPERATDE MUDE: CDLD SPUratmos panelhoords for >15 minutes 7tm3 NEf1ELDETlWIO IEEF1KLDS

crutATTNG 9WWE: AnovE CDLS - Sustained loss of DC power to- m nentary loss of DC power to SeanaDuet all vital panelbaards forall vital penalbomeds >l but >15 minutes<15 minutes - Momentary loss of DC power _Afe

to all vital panelboards Temperature an the core is> 1 but < 15 mirutes >200*F

3. STEArt GOERATUR 7tBE LEAft et[TM GPURATDE DWWE AAOWE COLD;

n m Or OFFSITE AC PtBER SIRITDEBSE4

OPERATDE 84BE: ASOWE CULB - Sustained loss of DC pcmer to$senarset a11 vita 1 pan Ibo.eds for

4.

> 15 minutes- SG tsee leak > 10 gpm

AseS.bcooling Wegin > 0*r

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***Loss of 4900v prwer to iall PCPs i

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CMIP-12ENCLOSURE 4.1.7 PAGE 8 of 12

FIRES AND SECURITY ACTIONS

SITE ARE A EMERGENCY CENERA: EMEPGENCYALERTt#ULUAL EVENT

1. FTRE MITNTM Pt#fr LASTDG 1. FTRE POTINTIALLY AFfTCTING SAFETY 1. FIRE CDFWDPGSDE TK H.DCTIt3G 1. Aser 9tunut 1NTTEBent (Et EXTEtWentEWir seGC8 CsutA CMM saav3VEOF SAFETY SYSTDES

ImRE TitRN 10 KiVTES SYSTTMS CIDTGM SAftpK TO TIE Pustr

- vasual obsN vataan of fire - Observation of a fare causing the

Aux Bldg. TB, PB,D.cowee poten+~-'Iv affecting s.afety loss oii red edant traits of safety - Unst cannot be sumtntained atPOTE: Mathan the plont means:

ifydro egai. .% ; e wirvd by Teck1r ical ocp.sipement required by Tectnical hot shutdcaen frose any location

Spn: it su tw *s for current Specs. for current mode M operation2. M OF PfrfSICAL CtptnUL OF TN y

- E f f orts to ewtirgsish a fire mode -f c,ec lion - Fire in Contml Room rm.p. airing Pl. ANT ISEI SUTEulwithin the plant last> 10 minutes - Fire in c -oritrol Roose swacuation and thit carnot be

requiring evacuttien and thit maintain >d at hot shstchwnkeing maintainert at bot from the auxiliary shutdcaes - Physacal attac$t resulting an

tsinuthorized pervnnel

2. SEC15tTTY algtEAT OR ATTUW'TED shutckwi f row the auxiliary panel ocercying the CR or any otherENTRY OR SARDTAE ESEE PUTEs t shutdown pariel vital areas

2. D9GMNT Im OF 79fYSICAL2. (DE23DG SECUtI(Y CJPHmESE CtptinDL OF TE PLAffT (SEE DUTEul

- Diservery of bOPib within the (*.EE DUTEs tsi te barwtary - Pnysical aitack e ,sulting

- Civil disturbance thostile s - Adversaries coresandeer an area in inseinent ocotpancy ofof the plant but not control control room or other vital

- IntrusiorVAt teepted Intrusics over tnit shutdown capahility areas

(Protected Areal - Disa.nery of breached barrier - Discovery of bcad> in the

- Hostage situation / extortion (security-relatede caused by vital Areas

intrusion or sabotage in Vita' Area

DCTEn: RP/D/B/1000/07 shall beused in conjtsiction with - Discovery of bos6 in the

all sea.srity related Protected Arean. r ,.f classifications

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CMIP-12ENCLOSURI 4.1.8 PAGE ? of 12

SPENT FUEL DAPtAGE

SITE AREA EMERGENC( GEMRAL EMERGENCYALERTLDAfSUAL EVENT

I. treAE TD SPDfT fML MTTH 1. IEJOR DAPtAE TD SPDfT F1EL METH-

anJASE OF RADIDACTIVITY IEELEASE OF RADIDACTIVITY

CDMTADOENT ,

- Activity at protected area fence:

> 2 mRAw >E - Valid RIA 57/58 AlarmtLhit 142 MIQt - 630 R/hri

CCMTAIWW3fT (thit 3 AtElff - 286 R/hr t|

- thit 152 valid RIA 2. 3, 4 - Valid RIA 49A > 1.13E6 cpas !1

or 49 MItat alarm- Dose rate inside RB cm4>1ed

with RB leak rate results in- Lhit 3 - Valid RIA 3, 4, or

calculated dose rate at Site49 MIDI alarmBoundary:

'~~Are~> 50 mR/hr NB or 250 mR/hr

Open flow path exists fron Thyroid

coniairwennt FWL MApeLDC MIILSDE

FWL MApellNG BUILDDE- Valid RI A-6 IGO' ar RIA 41

- Valid RI A 6 HItal Alarm or A11RT Alarm

RI A 41 ALERT alaru***

~~ apeRIA 45 ALENT alarm

RIA 46 HIGt Alarmiverified by RIA 458 _Afe

RIA 46 reading > 3000 ctwoApe

Release rate calculationsusing vent secole analysis arvificw rate data are in excessof 10 times limits establishedby Tee nical Specifications

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ENCLOSURE 4.1.9 CMIP-12NATURAL DISASTERS AND OTHER HAZARDS PAGE 10 of 12

LNLfSUAL EVENT ALE RT SITE ARE A EERGENCY GOERAL EMERGENCY

1. EARTH 4UAKE DCTECTED 1. DESIE3 matit EAftTyganar 1. 3Apeng ratBt EAftTimanarr, ADIERAFT 1. Affr ftL3EBt INFEEWERL GR EXTUWERLromans, T1354A30, femiti OR EYHettSt ti.e., FI M S , Fi m .

- 1 rem >r felt and strong motson - Treror. felt and sensmic EAufflamaAILE " EAfrpmannert StBSTAffr1 ALLY SEYEBSaccelerograph actuates 40.01 gi trigger alarm actuales WES2438 LEVELSI DOEICIe metre

40.05 gl DPERATIDEG MDDE: ASUWE COLD penSSIVE CIBGEst BArthE TD PtJIffr2. LAKE L1 VEL EKEODE~E l SSEUTWEDOS SYSTDES *

2. DaftmE flitDe AIRC3tAFT CatASft,

- Level < 780 ft. T1334400, IENTLE OR EXPtDSION - Damage c6 served to safety - Unit carvet be ausantaanori atAfe) ogsipment causing the inability . bot shutdram from any location

Unit shutdom initiated per to establish and unintain hotTS 3.3.7 ILPSH operabilityl - Damage observed to shuidown from 'he control

safety equipment causing room or the auxiliaryi 3. DAMAGE FlIDM AIRCRAFT C3tASH the inability to establish stustdown panel

TURNADO, MISSLE Oft EXPLDSION and emintain cold shut-'

do n - Tremor felt and peak acceleration- Damage ancmarred to recorder reading > 0.10g

equipment / structures evithin 3. IIAZAIEBERS MERSTAfCE OR FLAf9 tastethe Site Bouviary GAS BEELEASE 2. learamatu r: SEERSTAfqCE OR FLAf9 TABLE

CAS NELEASE4 MAZAltDOLE $1ERSTANCE OR FtJRf9tASLE - 4.hcontrolled eritry of a

GAS REtEASE toxic sthstance or flassemble GPERATDeGPEBE Alt 0VE CDLDgas into an area of the plant SpeK 3tpOE

- A spill or release determined ...ich jeopardizes the operation'

to be reportable pursuant to of equipment necessary - t.hoontrolled entry of a toxicRP/0/B/1000/17. Hazardous to establish and maintain stestance or flanumable gas.Sahstance Release cold shutdown into any area of the plant

eAich prevents the operatiro ,

of ocpipment necessary toestablish and maintain hotstastdown

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CMIP-12EtCLOS: E 4.1.10 PAGE II of 32TOTHER ABNORMAL PLANT CONDITIOpG

SITE ARE A EMERGENCY GEMERAL EMERGENCYALERTLDAEUAL EVENT

OTER PUMT CEBeITIEDG bGST1. ECCS IMITIATED 1. OTER PLANT CIBeITIOp6 EXIST 1. OTER PLANT CGWITTIBES EXIST 1.

T1 TAT V W PitECAUTJtDeARY THAT MARRANT CLASS 3FICATIEDt OF A FREBt 9084TEVUt aumT TMAT MilEEN F A K LEASE OF N

(PERATDE fG E: FDER MTRATitDG CLASS JCATitDe OF A88 ALTNT SITE AAEA DEREE)CY ApelatT5 OF SEASIGACTIVITY IN A

- ES systemiss required to be - Er .,rtrauncy Coordanator - Esmerpecy Coordanator or Recovery SetDWT TIPE PERIOD*

operable per TS judrpent ftanager judgn=nnt- Emerspency actacns per the

Automisc or marual ES 2. EVACUATTED4 OF CIDtTitDL RotDe 2. EVACUATTG4 OF (IDrillDL REXMEOP inedequate core coolingt.HCsection are msuccessful -

actuation on VALID sicpal er -

- Evacuat2on of Control Room CETC > 1200* Findication - Evacuataan of Control Room

ApeApe - AfeHeter injected to RCS or core unit beirwi mmintained at hotas a result of ES actuation shutdown f rom the Ataciliary thit comot be sumintained at

shutdown Panel hot shutdown from thee.briliary shutdown panel

2. LfES OF EIDtTAD#ENT INTTCRITYRf 4tJTRDE SIRTI1EDet BY TS 3. LOSS OF ASS [S3R3tT

- LMs t shutdown 2nitanted per EFERATDE teDE: HEIT SNJTDG94TS 3.6 ICentainment Integrityi T15tU FGER OPERATICDG

- Loss of 50% or ow>re of a3. 1D55 OF ES ITAT1stE OR FIRE mit's applicable statalern

F5tDTECTICM SYSTDI T1DCTION panels for > 15 minutesRE*JtfINDE SMITDGee BY TS

APPtJCABLE STATALAfEH PAfELS

- Unit stoicbwn initiated per(MIT 143TS 3.3 IES systeest

1 sal-9, 14-16, 16

- Unit shutdown initiated per 3SA1-9, 14-16, 18

TS 3.17 (Fire PrefectionLMIT 2Systems includes groowee

Hydrol fctrwi innperable 2 sal-9, 14-16

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ENCLOSURE 4.1.10 - CPGP-12 ~..OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT CtmOITIONS - PAGE 12 of 12? - |

!

LNf2JAL EVENT ALERT SITE ARE A EPERGENCY GENERAL EFENGOCY ' '~? *

A 23GHf 3CAffT LIISS OF N 3. TMDE MKLMBE FLNa DR CIB98DelCA11tBI CAPABILITY

- TB flood regtJarang use ofAP/1.2,3/A/1700/10 procedtsre

- Loss of accident monitoring in- unecntrollable Flooding ofstrsmentation iTable 3.5.6-1: Turbine Building *

and init shutdown initiatedper TS 3.5.6

- Loss of ONS comwamicationscapability with all OffsiteAgencies from the' Control Room

5. TREA17HET OF P' TMpeEL AT-

.OFFSITE MGSP.aAL,

- Decontamination offorts failto reduce enternal

, contamination below 150 com !l beta-gama 1

j - M-

Rad Protection determines thatradiological antrols are,

required for offsite medicaltreatment,

- Interrini contaminationt requ'eing medical assessment / '

trea ment

; - Extemal exposure recpJiringmedical assessment / treatment

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CMIP-12* Enclosure 4,2

7Page 1 of 1

( AREA MONITORS

Mr/HrMonitorNumber Unf1_1 Unit 2 Unit 3

RIA-1 10 10

(RB) RIA-4 40,000 55,000 80,000

RIA-7 25,000

RIA-8 40,000

RIA-9 15,000

RIA-10 15,000 35,000 50,000

RIA-11 10,000 20,000

RIA-12 35,000 40,000

RIA-13 45,000 50,000

RIA-15 NIS 25,000

PROCESS MONITORS

CPMMonitorNumber un11_1 Unit 2 Unit 3

RIA-31 1,000,000 1,000,000

(RB) RIA-47 10,000,000 10,000,000 1,000,000

(RB) RIA-48 10,000,000 10,000,000 1,000,000

(RB) RIA-49 1,400,000 1,400,000 1,000,000

(RB) RIA-49A 5,000 5,000 5,000

RIA-51 1,000,000 1.,000,000

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CMiP-12*Enclosure 4,3. .

4

TERMINATION CRITERIA-

f-1. Existing conditions no longer meet the emergency classification

criteria and it appears unlikely that conditions will deterioratefurther.

2, No surveillance relative to off-site protective actions is needed,except for the control of foodstuffs and water, and off-sitecontamination, or environmental assessment activities.

3. Radiation levels in affected in plant areas are stable or decreasingto below acceptable levels,

4. Releases of radioactive material to the environment greater thanTechnical Specifications are under control or have ceased.

5. The potential for an uncontrolled release of radioactive material isat an acceptably low level.

6. Containment pressure is within Technical Specification requirements.

7. Adequate long-term core cooling is available.

8. Adequate shutdown margin of the core has been verified.

9, A fire, flood, earthquake or similar emergency condition iscontrolled or has ceased.

10. Offsite power is available per Technical Specifications.

11. Any contaminated / injured personnel have been transported offsite andare receiving appropriate medical care,

12. All emergency action level notifications have been completed.,

L 13. Access to radiologically controlled areas of the plant necessary foroperation during recovery are being monitored by the RadiationI

Protection Section..

| 14. Offsite conditions will not limit access of personnel and support| resources.

15. Discussions have been held with the News Director to determine theimpact of termination on public information management.

| 16. Discussions have been held with Senior NRC and State Representativesto determile the impact of termination on their activities.

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