Public support for the welfare state: does it depend on the group and on the welfare

arrangement?

Judith RavenErasmus Universiteit Rotterdam;

AISSR

3 steps

• Explanations at the micro level

• The macro-micro link

• Causality: does social policy influence public opinion or vv?

Data

• ‘Tisser solidarity study’ (1995) and ‘Labour, Organisation and Social Security’ (2006)

• Longitudinal data to examine trends– ‘Cultural changes in the Netherlands’ (executed

by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP))

– OECD Social Expenditure data (SOCX)

Explaining support at the micro level

• Does support depend on the arrangement?

• Does support depend on the group?

Does support depend on the arrangement?

• The Dutch public distinguishes two types of welfare state reforms:– Retrenchment– Re-commodification

• Re-commodifying reforms receive higher support than retrenchment (compare Achterberg, van der Veen and Raven 2010; Achterberg et al. 2009)

Does support depend on the group?

• Those supporting re-commodification prefer to cut benefits for ‘undeserving, deviant’ recipients, but not for recipients they identify themselves with

• Those supporting retrenchment do not prefer to cut benefits for ‘undeserving’ recipients who do not really need help to a higher than for deserving recipients who need help

Relationship deservingness and support

Macro-micro link

• ‘Explanatory focus should be on the system as a unit, not on the individuals or other components that make it up’ (Coleman 1990: 2; compare also Hedström and Swedberg 1996; Albrekt Larsen 2006; Korpi and Palme 1998; Svallfors 2007)

• Macro-micro link often missing in welfare state legitimacy research

Link: moral economy• Moral economy (Thompson 1971; Scott 1976; Mau 2003;

Svallfors 2007) norms defining the fairness of social contracts between the governed and the authorities (social security institutions are such social contracts)

• Notions of moral economy refer to moral codes (rights and obligations) prevailing in a society

• Social security legitimacy high if congruence between norms incorporated in social security institutions and public preferences

Analysing Dutch moral economy

Soc. ass. scheme

Unempl. scheme

Old-age pensions

Disability scheme

1995 – 2006 1995 - 2006 1995 - 2006 1995 - 2006Control ++ + 0 +

Trust + 0 + ++Obligating reciprocity

++ + 0 ++

Balanced reciprocity 0 + 0 +

-- = strong decrease - = decrease 0 = no change, + = increase, ++ = strong increase

Developments within normative structures of social security schemes between 1995 en 2006

Results moral economy

• Remarkable congruence between norms embedded in schemes and the public’s preferences

• Conclusion: legitimacy of Dutch social security is high because governing powers comply to the moral codes prevailing in Dutch society

Direction of causality?

• One remaining question: – In what circumstances does social policy

influence public opinion (cf. Douglas 1987; Mettler and Soss

2004; Albrekt Larsen 2006; Arts and Gelissen 2001; Svallfors 1997) and in what circumstances does public opinion influence social policy (cf. Brooks and Manza 2006; Korpi and

Palme 1998; Page and Shapiro 1983; Jones 1994; Stimson et al. 1995)?

Relationship policy and opinion

• In the case of highly established and institutionalised policy areas, such as unemployment schemes and old age pensions, public opinion will follow existing social policy designs

• In the case of policy areas where the social policy design has not yet been fully established, such as labour market activation, social policy designs will follow public opinion

Conclusions

• Support for the welfare state is not mainly based on individuals’ self-interest: deservingness perceptions and moral economy determine support as well

• Support depends on the level of identification with recipients

• However, support is also partly determined by existing welfare institutions

Why quantitative analyses?

• Testing hypotheses, because we already have many advanced theory on welfare state legitimacy

• Trends in public support

• Representative samples generalizable results

Thank you for your attention!