public il case digests

7/26/2019 Public IL Case Digests

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1. VINUYA VS. SEC. ROMULO

This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the issuance of

a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA,

the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the SEC,

established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines

during the Second World War.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and

OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the

establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department

declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for

compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan‟s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines

and Japan.

Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against

humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims forofficial apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and

other international tribunals.

Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the

San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.

On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women‟s Fund and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of

Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these

were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

ISSUE:

WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners‟ claims for

official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

RULING:

Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to

determine whether to espouse petitioners‟ claims against Japan.

Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their

sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or

executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a

particular measure.”

One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well- established that “the conduct

of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative –„the

political‟– departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political

power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.

They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or

imperil.

But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority

to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine

government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the

authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In

this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all



claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is

not for the courts to question.

The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries,

and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the

form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners‟ cause would be inimical to our country‟s

foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability

in this region. For the to overturn the Executive Department‟s determination would mean an assessment of the

foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been

constitutionally committed.

From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an extraordinary length

of time has lapsed between the treaty‟s conclusion and our consideration – the Executive must be given ample

discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both

the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and

whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the

international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on theindividual‟s behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international

judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects,

respect for the rules of international law.

Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and

to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on

whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international

law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or

obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position

internationally.

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners have not

shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty ofPeace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or

has attained the status of jus cogens.

The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term describing

obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn

between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis

another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In

view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they

are obligations erga omnes.

The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that command peremptory authority,

superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are

mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent

authority

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA vs. JAMES VINZON [G.R. No. 154705. June 26, 2003]



FACTS: Petitioner Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent. The maintenance agreement

includes the following specific equipments: air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters

and water motor pumps. The agreement shall be effective for 4 years.

The new Minister Counsellor allegedly found respondent's work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance

with the standards set in the Agreement. The respondent terminated the agreement with the respondent. The latter

claim that it was unlawful and arbitrary. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the Republic of

Indonesia, as a foreign state, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as party-defendant in the

Philippines.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in sustaining the trial court's decision that petitioners have waived their immunity from

suit by using as its basis the provision in the Maintenance Agreement.

HELD: The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate

test of whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. There is no

dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state may enter into contracts with

private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The Republic of Indonesia is

acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with the respondent. The maintenance

agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. It cannot be

deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.

BAYAN MUNA VS. ROMULO

G. R. No. 159618, February 01, 2011 Facts:

Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the marginalized sectors of

society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to

this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court

(ICC) with “the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern xx x and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.” The serious crimes adverted to cover those

considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of

aggression.

On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d‟Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by

its terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant

petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and

concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the 92.

RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the Department of

Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter)

between the USA and the RP.

Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter), the RP, represented

by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note

adverted to and put in effect the Agreement with the US government. In esse, the Agreement aims to protect what it

refers to and defines as “persons” of the RP and US from frivolous a nd harassment suits that might be brought

against them in international tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security and defense

partnership between the two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements have been effected by and

between the US and 33 other countries.

The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:



1. For purposes of this Agreement, “persons” are current or former Government officials, employees (including

contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party.

2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the express consent of the first Party,

(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any purpose, unless such tribunal has

been established by the UN Security Council, or

(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or expelled to a third country, for

the purpose of surrender to or transfer to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the

UN Security Council.

3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the Philippines to a third country, the

[US] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to any international tribunal,

unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the Government

of the Republic of the Philippines [GRP].

4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the [USA] to a third country, the [GRP]

will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to any international tribunal, unless such

tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the

[US].

5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which one party notifies the other of its

intent to terminate the Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement shall continue to apply with respect to any act

occurring, or any allegation arising, before the effective date of termination.

In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the non-surrender agreement,

Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a

legally binding agreement under international law; and that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the

advice and consent of the US Senate.

In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the

Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.

Issue: Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for contracting obligations

that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of international law.Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.

Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

Petitioner‟s initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture being that E/N BFO-028-03

cannot be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.

Petitioners‟ contention–– perhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international doctrines, practices, and

jargons –– is untenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the

Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law and international

jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all

nations. An exchange of notes falls “into the category of inter -governmental agreements,” which is an

internationally accepted form of international agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections (Treaty Reference

Guide) defines the term as follows:

An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine agreement, that has many similarities with the private law contract.

The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one

signed by the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the

offering State to record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or

departmental heads. The technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy

procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval.



In another perspective, the terms “exchange of notes” and “executive agreements” have been used interchangeably,

exchange of notes being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding through executive action.

On the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the President “sometimes take the form of exchange of notes

and at other times that of more formal documents denominated „agreements‟ or „protocols.‟” As former US High

Commissioner to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in his work, The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement

Acts:

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements – whether

denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise – begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready

ascertainment. x x x

It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03 –– be it viewed as the Non-Surrender

Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent to be bound –– is a recognized

mode of concluding a legally binding international written contract among nations.

Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance

with Principles of International Law

Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being

at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from

the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, “leaves criminals immune from responsibility for

unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it precludes our country from delivering

an American criminal to the [ICC] x x x.”63

The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioner‟s earlier position, which, as already discussed, contends that

the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty

obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.

The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by

the Solicitor General, “is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law.

x x x The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the country‟s judiciary to try offenses under

its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously.”

Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and

Americans committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is

manifestly incorrect. Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted

and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, forthe nonce, that all the formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For

perspective, what the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international

tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its

existing laws. With the view we take of things, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in

the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense

considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute.

Gov¶t of Hong Kong vs. Olalia, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007

This case discusses whether the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extradite in an extradition

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proceeding.On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kongsigned an "Agreement for

the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20,1997.

The Petitioner is the Government of Hong Kong Special AdministrativeR egion, represented by the Philippine Department

of Justice The Respondents are Judge

Felix Olaliaand Juan Antonio Muñoz

Facts: Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3)counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as

agent ," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the



offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he

faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge. On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong

Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest

against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him. Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was

opposed by petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law

granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the

case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order

denying his application for bail and this was granted by respondent judge. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it

was denied by respondent judge. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent judge acted withgrave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in

the Constitutiongranting bail to a potential extraditee.

Held:

No. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuanceof the arrest warrant and the "temporary

detention" is the possibility of flight of the potentiale xtraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice.

Given theforegoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears theonus probandiof showing that he or she is not aflight risk and should be granted

bail.

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

Facts:Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a

petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter

denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their

decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered

nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the

ROC. Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious

dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the

Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines‟ international obligations against

discrimination based on sexual orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political

agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first

time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner

made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports

by COMELEC‟s field personnel.

Issue:

WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;

WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.

Held:

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those

sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,

indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and

professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW

Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under -represented sectors is not

exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a pa rticular

organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is



“government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is

inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the n on-establishment clause

for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that

government action must have a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required

for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner‟s admission into the

party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.

We also find the COMELEC‟s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;

disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment,

condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for

which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without

judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond

reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation

of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal

proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion

of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad‟s registration on purely moral

grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further anysubstantial public interest.

MAGALLONA vs ERMI TA

55 SCRA 476 – Political Law – National Territory – RA 9522 is Constitutional

In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was enacted – the

law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984.

Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the law

decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular

arguments are as follows:a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties – this also resulted to the

exclusion of our claim over Sabah;

b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, terms the Philippine waters a “archipelagic” waters which, in international

law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts

(overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country‟s nuclear -free

policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions;

c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal ( bajo de masinloc), as a

“regime of islands” pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the

livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire, or lose,

territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the

Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle

on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations

of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty‟s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental

shelves.

The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law amended by RA

9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was

440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic zone,

the extent of our maritime are increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image below for comparison)



If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine

areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.

Anent their particular contentions:

a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section 2 of RA 9522:

Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this

Act is without prejudice to the deli neation of the baseli nes of the terr itor ial sea around the terri tory of Sabah,

situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Phil ippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty .

b. UNCLOS may term our waters as “archipelagic waters” and that we may term it as our “internal waters”, but the

bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that.

However, due to our observance of international law, we allow the exercise of others of their right of innocent

passage. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised

in accordance with customaryinternational law without risking retaliatory measures from the international

community.

c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratly‟s), as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands did not

diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they

generate their own maritime zones – in short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines of the main

archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a larger

area which would already depart from the provisions of UNCLOS – that the demarcation should follow the natural

contour of the archipelago. Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal through effective occupation.

NOTES:Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where we exercisetreaty-based

rights:

a. territorial waters – 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise sovereignty

b. contiguous zone – 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can enforcecustoms, fiscal,

immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).

c. exclusive economic zone – 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have the right to exploit the living and

non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone

Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf – this is covered by Article 77 of the UNCLOS.

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