public debt as private liquidity: optimal policy
TRANSCRIPT
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Public Debt as Private Liquidity: Optimal Policy
G.M Angeletos?, F. Collard‡ and H. Dellas‡
10/8/2016
MIT?and University of Bern‡
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The Main Issue
• Financial frictions =⇒ public debt can be non-neutral
• Public debt as collateral/buffer stock/outside liquidity =⇒ alleviate frictions
• Woodford, 1990, Aiyagari-McGrattan, 1998, Holmstrom-Tirole, 1998.
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The Main Issue
• Relevant policy implications in the aftermath of the Great Recession
• Mitigate a financial crisis: Level vs portfolio composition
(QE: Curdia and Woodford, 2011, Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2011)
• Relax the ZLB constraint on monetary policy
(Eggertson and Krugman, 2011, Guerrieri and Lorenzoni, 2011)
• Similarities but also differences with Friedman rule literature
(Chari, Christiano and Kehoe, 1996, Correia and Teles, 1999)
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The Main Issue
• Relevant policy implications in the aftermath of the Great Recession
• Mitigate a financial crisis: Level vs portfolio composition
(QE: Curdia and Woodford, 2011, Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2011)
• Relax the ZLB constraint on monetary policy
(Eggertson and Krugman, 2011, Guerrieri and Lorenzoni, 2011)
• Similarities but also differences with Friedman rule literature
(Chari, Christiano and Kehoe, 1996, Correia and Teles, 1999)
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The Main Issue
• Relevant policy implications in the aftermath of the Great Recession
• Mitigate a financial crisis: Level vs portfolio composition
(QE: Curdia and Woodford, 2011, Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2011)
• Relax the ZLB constraint on monetary policy
(Eggertson and Krugman, 2011, Guerrieri and Lorenzoni, 2011)
• Similarities but also differences with Friedman rule literature
(Chari, Christiano and Kehoe, 1996, Correia and Teles, 1999)
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What we do
Missing: Theoretical study of optimal fiscal policy is a Ramsey setting in which
• public debt is non-neutral, because it influences the virulence of financial frictions
• but does not generate a free lunch for the government, because taxation is distortionary
Contribution of this paper: Fill the gap, offer new lessons for
• optimal long-run quantity of public debt
• desirability of tax smoothing
• optimal policy response to shocks (including financial crises)
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How do we do it?
We characterize optimal provision of debt in 3 steps:
1. Setup a micro-founded Ramsey policy problem (as in Barro, 1979, Lucas and Stokey,
1983, and Aiyagari et al., 2002) that allows public debt to affect the bite of a financial
friction (as in Woodford, 1990 and Holmstrom-Tirole, 1998).
2. Obtain a convenient reduced-form representation of the planners problem in terms of a
standard optimal control problem over the rate of taxation and the level of debt.
3. Characterize analytically the solution to a class of reduced-form problems that nests the
one obtained from our model.
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How do we do it?
We characterize optimal provision of debt in 3 steps:
1. Setup a micro-founded Ramsey policy problem (as in Barro, 1979, Lucas and Stokey,
1983, and Aiyagari et al., 2002) that allows public debt to affect the bite of a financial
friction (as in Woodford, 1990 and Holmstrom-Tirole, 1998).
2. Obtain a convenient reduced-form representation of the planners problem in terms of a
standard optimal control problem over the rate of taxation and the level of debt.
3. Characterize analytically the solution to a class of reduced-form problems that nests the
one obtained from our model.
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How do we do it?
We characterize optimal provision of debt in 3 steps:
1. Setup a micro-founded Ramsey policy problem (as in Barro, 1979, Lucas and Stokey,
1983, and Aiyagari et al., 2002) that allows public debt to affect the bite of a financial
friction (as in Woodford, 1990 and Holmstrom-Tirole, 1998).
2. Obtain a convenient reduced-form representation of the planners problem in terms of a
standard optimal control problem over the rate of taxation and the level of debt.
3. Characterize analytically the solution to a class of reduced-form problems that nests the
one obtained from our model.
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Parenthesis: Absent Financial Frictions
• Without financial friction, the model reduces to a deterministic version of Barro and AMSS
• Optimal policy satisfies
3 Tax smoothing: the tax rate (the shadow value of tax revenue) is equated across periods;
3 Steady-state indeterminacy: any sustainable level of debt is consistent with steady state.
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Main Findings: Deterministic
• When the friction is present, a tension emerges between
(i) Easing the friction so as to improve market efficiency/allocation of resources
(ii) Exacerbating the friction so as to raise premia and reduce the government’s cost of borrowing
• Departure from tax smoothing: Optimal path balances the social cost of this departure
against the social value of regulating the financial distortion.
• Steady-state determinacy: A non-trivial theory of the long-run quantity of public debt
• in a benchmark: essentially unique steady state
• more generally: possibly multiple steady states, but each one is locally-determinate
• Depending on primitives, 2 scenarios can emerge
1. Financial distortion vanishes as t →∞ =⇒ Friedman rule applies in LR but not SR
2. Financial distortion preserved as t →∞ =⇒ Friedman rule never applies
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Main Findings: Deterministic
• When the friction is present, a tension emerges between
(i) Easing the friction so as to improve market efficiency/allocation of resources
(ii) Exacerbating the friction so as to raise premia and reduce the government’s cost of borrowing
• Departure from tax smoothing: Optimal path balances the social cost of this departure
against the social value of regulating the financial distortion.
• Steady-state determinacy: A non-trivial theory of the long-run quantity of public debt
• in a benchmark: essentially unique steady state
• more generally: possibly multiple steady states, but each one is locally-determinate
• Depending on primitives, 2 scenarios can emerge
1. Financial distortion vanishes as t →∞ =⇒ Friedman rule applies in LR but not SR
2. Financial distortion preserved as t →∞ =⇒ Friedman rule never applies
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Main Findings: Deterministic
• When the friction is present, a tension emerges between
(i) Easing the friction so as to improve market efficiency/allocation of resources
(ii) Exacerbating the friction so as to raise premia and reduce the government’s cost of borrowing
• Departure from tax smoothing: Optimal path balances the social cost of this departure
against the social value of regulating the financial distortion.
• Steady-state determinacy: A non-trivial theory of the long-run quantity of public debt
• in a benchmark: essentially unique steady state
• more generally: possibly multiple steady states, but each one is locally-determinate
• Depending on primitives, 2 scenarios can emerge
1. Financial distortion vanishes as t →∞ =⇒ Friedman rule applies in LR but not SR
2. Financial distortion preserved as t →∞ =⇒ Friedman rule never applies
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Main Findings: Deterministic
• When the friction is present, a tension emerges between
(i) Easing the friction so as to improve market efficiency/allocation of resources
(ii) Exacerbating the friction so as to raise premia and reduce the government’s cost of borrowing
• Departure from tax smoothing: Optimal path balances the social cost of this departure
against the social value of regulating the financial distortion.
• Steady-state determinacy: A non-trivial theory of the long-run quantity of public debt
• in a benchmark: essentially unique steady state
• more generally: possibly multiple steady states, but each one is locally-determinate
• Depending on primitives, 2 scenarios can emerge
1. Financial distortion vanishes as t →∞ =⇒ Friedman rule applies in LR but not SR
2. Financial distortion preserved as t →∞ =⇒ Friedman rule never applies
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Main Findings: Stochastic
• Mean reversion
• Optimal policy response to “wars”: less persistent and less volatile
• Optimal policy response to “financial recessions”:
• aforementioned tension ⇒ ambiguous effect on planner’s incentives
• response driven by fiscal considerations, not apparent desire to ease the aggravated friction
• a financial crisis presents an opportunity for “cheap borrowing”
• ultimately: optimal deficit is larger than in a comparable traditional recession.
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The Baseline Model
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Micro-Founded Model
• Similar to Barro (1979), AMSS (2002), Lucas-Stokey (1983):
• Infinitely lived agents,
• competitive markets and flexible prices,
• Government issues debt and collect taxes by distorting labor supply decisions only.
• Financial friction as in Kiyotaki-Moore (1997) or Holmstrom-Tirole (1998):
• Agents are hit by idiosyncratic shocks =⇒ reallocation of goods across agents.
• The reallocation requires borrowing, borrowing requires collateral.
• Private supply of collateral is limited as so is the pledgeable income of the private sector.
Public debt can serve as collateral and alleviate financial frictions.
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Micro-Founded Model
• Helps clarify
• role of liquidity: risk sharing
• why debt matters: lack of pledgeable income
• Gives a language to talk about collateral and buffer stock
• Can accommodate effects such as
• fire sales externalities,
• inside/outside money,
• crowding out of capital
• But Importantly: show that although each of these effects is relevant in its own right,
none is key for our results.
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Micro-Founded Model: Timing
t t + 1Morning Afternoon
- Endowment (e) + assets (ait)
- Taste Shock (θit)
- Consumption (xit) and IOU issuance (zit)
- Decide labor supply (hit)
- Receive labor income ((1-τt)wthit)
- Decide savings (ait+1) and consumption (cit)
- IOU repayment
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Micro-Founded Model: Timing
t t + 1Morning Afternoon
- Endowment (e) + assets (ait)
- Taste Shock (θit)
- Decide consumption (xit) and IOU issuance (zit)
- Decide labor supply (hit)
- Receive labor income ((1-τt)wthit)
- Decide savings (ait+1) and consumption (cit)
- IOU repayment
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Micro-Founded Model: Timing
t t + 1Morning Afternoon
- Endowment (e) + assets (ait)
- Taste Shock (θit)
- Consumption (xit) and IOU issuance (zit)
- Decide labor supply (hit)
- Receive labor income ((1-τt)wthit)
- Decide savings (ait+1) and consumption (cit)
- IOU repayment
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Micro-Founded Model
• Households:
max E0
[ ∞∑t=0
βt (cit + θitu(xit)− ν(hit))
]s.t. cit + ptxit + qtait+1 = ait + (1− τt)wthit + pt e
pt(xit − e) ≤ ξwthdefit + ait
− ait+1 ≤ ξwt+1hdefit+1
• Firms: yt = Aht
• Government: qtbt+1 + τtwtht = bt + g
• Market clearing: yt = ct + g ,
∫xt(θ)dµ(θ) = e,
∫at+1(θ)dµ(θ) = bt+1.
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Micro-Founded Model
• Households:
max E0
[ ∞∑t=0
βt (cit + θitu(xit)− ν(hit))
]s.t. cit + ptxit + qtait+1 = ait + (1− τt)wthit + pt e
pt(xit − e) ≤ ξwthdefit + ait
− ait+1 ≤ ξwt+1hdefit+1
• Firms: yt = Aht
• Government: qtbt+1 + τtwtht = bt + g
• Market clearing: yt = ct + g ,
∫xt(θ)dµ(θ) = e,
∫at+1(θ)dµ(θ) = bt+1.
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Micro-Founded Model
• Households:
max E0
[ ∞∑t=0
βt (cit + θitu(xit)− ν(hit))
]s.t. cit + ptxit + qtait+1 = ait + (1− τt)wthit + pt e
pt(xit − e) ≤ ξwthdefit + ait
− ait+1 ≤ ξwt+1hdefit+1
• Firms: yt = Aht
• Government: qtbt+1 + τtwtht = bt + g
• Market clearing: yt = ct + g ,
∫xt(θ)dµ(θ) = e,
∫at+1(θ)dµ(θ) = bt+1.
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Micro-Founded Model
• Households:
max E0
[ ∞∑t=0
βt (cit + θitu(xit)− ν(hit))
]s.t. cit + ptxit + qtait+1 = ait + (1− τt)wthit + pt e
pt(xit − e) ≤ ξwthdefit + ait
− ait+1 ≤ ξwt+1hdefit+1
• Firms: yt = Aht
• Government: qtbt+1 + τtwtht = bt + g
• Market clearing: yt = ct + g ,
∫xt(θ)dµ(θ) = e,
∫at+1(θ)dµ(θ) = bt+1.
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A Convenient Reduced-Form Ramsey Problem
Proposition
The optimal policy path for the tax rate and the level of public debt solves:
maxst ,bt+1∞t=0
∞∑t=0
βt [U(st) + V (bt)] subject to Q(bt+1)bt+1 = bt + g − st
1. U(s): Captures the cost of taxation, s ≡ τwh(τ) and U ′(·) < 0, U ′′(·) < 0
2. V (b): Value of cross-sectional allocation of asset holdings and morning-good
consumption for a given level of public debt, b, with V ′(·) > 0. Program
3. Q(b): Price of a bond that supports this allocation, Q ′(·) < 0.
(π(b) ≡ Q(b)− β is associated liquidity premium)
4. bbliss : There exists bbliss s.t. ∀b > bbliss , V ′(b) = 0 and Q(b) = β (π(b) = 0)
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A Convenient Reduced-Form Ramsey Problem
Proposition
The optimal policy path for the tax rate and the level of public debt solves:
maxst ,bt+1∞t=0
∞∑t=0
βt [U(st) + V (bt)] subject to Q(bt+1)bt+1 = bt + g − st
1. U(s): Captures the cost of taxation, s ≡ τwh(τ) and U ′(·) < 0, U ′′(·) < 0
2. V (b): Value of cross-sectional allocation of asset holdings and morning-good
consumption for a given level of public debt, b, with V ′(·) > 0. Program
3. Q(b): Price of a bond that supports this allocation, Q ′(·) < 0.
(π(b) ≡ Q(b)− β is associated liquidity premium)
4. bbliss : There exists bbliss s.t. ∀b > bbliss , V ′(b) = 0 and Q(b) = β (π(b) = 0)
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A Convenient Reduced-Form Ramsey Problem
Proposition
The optimal policy path for the tax rate and the level of public debt solves:
maxst ,bt+1∞t=0
∞∑t=0
βt [U(st) + V (bt)] subject to Q(bt+1)bt+1 = bt + g − st
1. U(s): Captures the cost of taxation, s ≡ τwh(τ) and U ′(·) < 0, U ′′(·) < 0
2. V (b): Value of cross-sectional allocation of asset holdings and morning-good
consumption for a given level of public debt, b, with V ′(·) > 0. Program
3. Q(b): Price of a bond that supports this allocation, Q ′(·) < 0.
(π(b) ≡ Q(b)− β is associated liquidity premium)
4. bbliss : There exists bbliss s.t. ∀b > bbliss , V ′(b) = 0 and Q(b) = β (π(b) = 0)
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A Convenient Reduced-Form Ramsey Problem
Proposition
The optimal policy path for the tax rate and the level of public debt solves:
maxst ,bt+1∞t=0
∞∑t=0
βt [U(st) + V (bt)] subject to Q(bt+1)bt+1 = bt + g − st
1. U(s): Captures the cost of taxation, s ≡ τwh(τ) and U ′(·) < 0, U ′′(·) < 0
2. V (b): Value of cross-sectional allocation of asset holdings and morning-good
consumption for a given level of public debt, b, with V ′(·) > 0. Program
3. Q(b): Price of a bond that supports this allocation, Q ′(·) < 0.
(π(b) ≡ Q(b)− β is associated liquidity premium)
4. bbliss : There exists bbliss s.t. ∀b > bbliss , V ′(b) = 0 and Q(b) = β (π(b) = 0)
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A Convenient Reduced-Form Ramsey Problem
Proposition
The optimal policy path for the tax rate and the level of public debt solves:
maxst ,bt+1∞t=0
∞∑t=0
βt [U(st) + V (bt)] subject to Q(bt+1)bt+1 = bt + g − st
1. U(s): Captures the cost of taxation, s ≡ τwh(τ) and U ′(·) < 0, U ′′(·) < 0
2. V (b): Value of cross-sectional allocation of asset holdings and morning-good
consumption for a given level of public debt, b, with V ′(·) > 0. Program
3. Q(b): Price of a bond that supports this allocation, Q ′(·) < 0.
(π(b) ≡ Q(b)− β is associated liquidity premium)
4. bbliss : There exists bbliss s.t. ∀b > bbliss , V ′(b) = 0 and Q(b) = β (π(b) = 0)
13
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An (even more) Convenient Reduced Form Representation
• The planner chooses a path for (s, b) ∈ (0, s)× [b, b] that solves
max
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt [U(s) + V (b)]dt
s.t. b = R(b)b + g − s
b(0) = b0
• Dual role of public debt (as in Woodford, Aiyagari-McGrattan or Holmstrom-Tirole):
(i) can improve the allocation of resources (Captured by V )
(i) can be used to manipulate interest rates (Captured by R = ρ− π(b)).Key Trade off
• Non convex problem due to pecuniary externality.
• Key: Dependence of V and R (id. π) on b, not the exact reason of this dependence.
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An (even more) Convenient Reduced Form Representation
• The planner chooses a path for (s, b) ∈ (0, s)× [b, b] that solves
max
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt [U(s) + V(b)]dt
s.t. b = R(b)b + g − s
b(0) = b0
• Dual role of public debt (as in Woodford, Aiyagari-McGrattan or Holmstrom-Tirole):
(i) can improve the allocation of resources (Captured by V )
(i) can be used to manipulate interest rates (Captured by R = ρ− π(b)).Key Trade off
• Non convex problem due to pecuniary externality.
• Key: Dependence of V and R (id. π) on b, not the exact reason of this dependence.
14
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An (even more) Convenient Reduced Form Representation
• The planner chooses a path for (s, b) ∈ (0, s)× [b, b] that solves
max
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt [U(s) + V (b)]dt
s.t. b = R(b)b + g − s
b(0) = b0
• Dual role of public debt (as in Woodford, Aiyagari-McGrattan or Holmstrom-Tirole):
(i) can improve the allocation of resources (Captured by V )
(i) can be used to manipulate interest rates (Captured by R = ρ− π(b)).Key Trade off
• Non convex problem due to pecuniary externality.
• Key: Dependence of V and R (id. π) on b, not the exact reason of this dependence.
14
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Assumptions
Main Assumptions
We consider economies in which the following properties hold:
A1. U, V , and π are continuously differentiable.1
A2. U is concave in s, with maximum attained at s = 0.
A3. There exists a threshold bbliss ∈ (0, b) such that V ′(b) > 0 and π(b) > 0 for all
b < bbliss , and V ′(b) = 0 and π(b) = 0 for all b > bbliss .
A4. π(b) ≤ ρ for all b.
1To be precise, we allow V and π to be non-differentiable at b = bbliss .
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Characterizing Optimal Debt Provision
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Necessary Conditions for Optimality
• Set of necessary conditions λ = V ′(b)− λπ(b) (σ(b)− 1)
b = g + (ρ− π(b)) b − s(λ)
+ transversality condition: limt→∞
e−τ tλ(t)b(t) = 0.
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Euler Equation: λ = V ′(b)− λπ(b) (σ(b)− 1)
• Think of a static problem: max social value+seigniorage revenue for a given λ
maxb
Ω(b, λ) ≡ V (b) + λπ(b)b
• FOC
V ′(b)︸ ︷︷ ︸−λπ(b) (σ(b)− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸ = 0
Marginal social gain from
easing the financial friction
(Allocation Efficiency)
Marginal cost in terms of
seigniorage revenue
(Interest Rate Manipulation)
• Tempting: interpret the above condition as the optimal steady state debt provision
decision =⇒ Misleading!
• Tax Smoothing acts as an adjustment cost.
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Euler Equation: λ = V ′(b)− λπ(b) (σ(b)− 1)
• Think of a static problem: max social value+seigniorage revenue for a given λ
maxb
Ω(b, λ) ≡ V (b) + λπ(b)b
• FOC
V ′(b)︸ ︷︷ ︸−λπ(b) (σ(b)− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸ = 0
Marginal social gain from
easing the financial friction
(Allocation Efficiency)
Marginal cost in terms of
seigniorage revenue
(Interest Rate Manipulation)
• Tempting: interpret the above condition as the optimal steady state debt provision
decision =⇒ Misleading!
• Tax Smoothing acts as an adjustment cost.
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Euler Equation: λ = V ′(b)− λπ(b) (σ(b)− 1)
• Think of a static problem: max social value+seigniorage revenue for a given λ
maxb
Ω(b, λ) ≡ V (b) + λπ(b)b
• FOC
V ′(b)︸ ︷︷ ︸−λπ(b) (σ(b)− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸ = 0
Marginal social gain from
easing the financial friction
(Allocation Efficiency)
Marginal cost in terms of
seigniorage revenue
(Interest Rate Manipulation)
• Tempting: interpret the above condition as the optimal steady state debt provision
decision =⇒ Misleading!
• Tax Smoothing acts as an adjustment cost.
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Optimality Conditions
• Set of necessary conditions λ = V ′(b)− λπ(b) (σ(b)− 1)
b = g + (ρ− π(b)) b − s(λ)
+ transversality condition: limt→∞
e−τ tλ(t)b(t) = 0.
• Non-convex problem =⇒ not sufficient =⇒ Skiba (1978), Brock-Dechert (1983)
• Study the global dynamics.
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A Useful Benchmark
Benchmark
(i) the elasticity σ is monotone;
(ii) the ratio V ′/π is constant.
(i) Guarantees that π(b)b is single-peaked (Laffer curve for seigniorage);
(ii) Any social gain following an increase in liquidity is exactly compensated by an increase in
borrowing cost.
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A Useful Benchmark
Benchmark
(i) the elasticity σ is monotone;
(ii) the ratio V ′/π is constant.
(i) Guarantees that π(b)b is single-peaked (Laffer curve for seigniorage);
(ii) Any social gain following an increase in liquidity is exactly compensated by an increase in
borrowing cost.
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A Useful Benchmark
Result
Under the previous assumptions, there exists a unique pair (b?, λ?), such that for any
b0 6 bbliss the economy converges to (b?, λ?).
Result
There exists a threshold level, g , for government spending such that
• For any g 6 g , b? = bbliss : An analogue to the Friedman rule holds in the long run;
• For any g > g , b? < bbliss : it is optimal for the government to squeeze liquidity to increase
seigniorage revenue to finance expenditures.
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A Useful Benchmark
Result
Under the previous assumptions, there exists a unique pair (b?, λ?), such that for any
b0 6 bbliss the economy converges to (b?, λ?).
Result
There exists a threshold level, g , for government spending such that
• For any g 6 g , b? = bbliss : An analogue to the Friedman rule holds in the long run;
• For any g > g , b? < bbliss : it is optimal for the government to squeeze liquidity to increase
seigniorage revenue to finance expenditures.
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Phase Diagram: Benchmark I: g 6 g .
b
λb = 0
λ = 0
λ = 0
bblissbseig b
ψ(b)
γ(b)
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Phase Diagram: Benchmark II: g > g .
b
λ
bblissbseig bbskiba
λskiba
b = 0
λ = 0
λ = 0
b?
λ?
ψ(b)
γ(b)
Useful Lemma22
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Beyond the Benchmark
• Relax monotonicity of σ and the invariance of V ′(b)/π(b) to b.
• Things get more intricate.
• Many situations can occur =⇒ Only illustrate a typical one
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Beyond the Benchmark: A Typical Situation
b
λ
bbliss bbskiba
b = 0
λ = 0
b]Hb]Mb]L
bb ˜b
λ1
λ2
λ3
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Beyond the Benchmark: A Typical Situation
b
λ
bbliss bbskiba
b = 0
λ = 0
b]Hb]Mb]L bb ˜b
λ1
λ2
λ3
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Optimal Policy
Theorem
Let B# ≡ b ∈ (b, bbliss ] : γ(b) = ψ(b) and γ′(b) ≤ ψ′(b) be the set of the points at which
γ intersects ψ from above. In every economy, there exists a threshold bskiba ∈ [b, b] and a set
B∗ ⊆ B# such that the following are true along the optimal policy:
(i) If either b0 ∈ B∗ or b0 > maxbbliss , bskiba, debt stays constant at b0 for ever.
(ii) If b0 < bskiba and b0 /∈ B∗, then debt converges monotonically to a point inside B∗.
(iii) If bskiba < bbliss and b0 ∈ (bskiba, bbliss), debt converges monotonically to bbliss .
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Optimal Policy
λ
bbbbliss
ψ(b)
γ(b)
b?
λ?
b0
bskiba
bskiba
b0 b0bskiba b0
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Optimal Policy
λ
bbbbliss
ψ(b)
γ(b)
b?
λ?
b0bskiba
bskibab0 b0bskiba b0
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Optimal Policy
λ
bbbbliss
ψ(b)
γ(b)
b?
λ?
b0
bskiba bskibab0
b0bskiba b0
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Optimal Policy
λ
bbbbliss
ψ(b)
γ(b)
b?
λ?
b0
bskiba bskiba
b0
b0
bskiba b0
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Optimal Policy
λ
bbbbliss
ψ(b)
γ(b)
b?
λ?
b0bskiba bskibab0 b0
bskiba b0
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Taxonomy of Economies
Theorem
Any economy belongs to one of the following three non-empty classes:
(i) Economies in which B∗ = ∅ and bskiba = b.
(ii) Economies in which B∗ 6= ∅ and bskiba ∈ (b, bbliss).
(iii) Economies in which B∗ 6= ∅ and bskiba ≥ bbliss .
Furthermore, ψbliss > γbliss is sufficient for an economy to belong to the last class.
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Optimality of Steady State Public Debt
Proposition
Let Ω(b, λ) = V (b) + λπ(b)b be the liquidity plus seignorage. Consider an economy in which
the set B? 6= ∅, then take any b? ∈ B? and let λ? = ψ(b?).
• If γ′(b?) < 0, b? attains a local maximum of Ω(b, λ?).
• If instead γ′(b?) > 0, b? attains a local minimum of Ω(b, λ?).
Economies do not necessarily converge towards the optimal level of debt.
• There exist economies in which B? is a singleton and, nevertheless, b? attains a local
minimum of Ω(b, λ?).
Aiyagari McGrattan
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Optimality of Public Debt
Local Maximum
λ
bbbbliss
ψ(b)
γ(b)
b?
λ?
Non-Optimal Debt
λ
bbbbliss
ψ(b)
γ(b)
b?
λ?
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Additional Insights
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On the Friedman Rule
• Key difference from FR literature: All government liabilities offer liquidity services.
• Assume the Government can issue money like assets (Bonds), m, and hold a position in
non-money asset, n =⇒ b = m + n
m + n = [ρ− π(m)]m + ρn + g − s ⇐⇒ b + s = ρb − π(m)m + g
• For a given level of total liabilities (m + n = 0), the government can change liquidity (m)
w/o affecting neither its fiscal position (b) nor the interest rate (ρ) just by varying the
composition of liabilities (m/n).
Complete separation between liquidity provision and fiscal position
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On the Friedman Rule
• Key difference from FR literature: All government liabilities offer liquidity services.
• Assume the Government can issue money like assets (Bonds), m, and hold a position in
non-money asset, n =⇒ b = m + n
m + n = [ρ− π(m)]m + ρn + g − s ⇐⇒ b + s = ρb − π(m)m + g
• For a given level of total liabilities (m + n = 0), the government can change liquidity (m)
w/o affecting neither its fiscal position (b) nor the interest rate (ρ) just by varying the
composition of liabilities (m/n).
Complete separation between liquidity provision and fiscal position
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On the Friedman Rule
• Formally:
max
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt [U(s) + V (m)]dt s.t. b0 =
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt [π(m)m + s − g ]dt
• s and m are constant over time =⇒ back to tax smoothing.
• m? may or may not coincide with the Friedman rule
• If it does, unlike in our model, it does in each and every period.
• Why? The supply of liquidity is isolated from fiscal policy
• Assume instead that n has (even a tiny) role as liquidity then fiscal and liquidity
considerations are intertwined and we are back to our trade-off,
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On the Friedman Rule
• Formally:
max
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt [U(s) + V (m)]dt s.t. b0 =
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt [π(m)m + s − g ]dt
• s and m are constant over time =⇒ back to tax smoothing.
• m? may or may not coincide with the Friedman rule
• If it does, unlike in our model, it does in each and every period.
• Why? The supply of liquidity is isolated from fiscal policy
• Assume instead that n has (even a tiny) role as liquidity then fiscal and liquidity
considerations are intertwined and we are back to our trade-off,
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Crowding Out Effect of Debt
• Aiyagari-McGrattan (1998): Public debt crowds out capital because debt is a substitute for
capital as a buffer stock
• Model la Holmstom-Tirole (1998): firms have to borrow to finance their capital need
• Agents can relax future financial constraints by saving in the form of capital and debt =⇒Possible crowding out
• But another conflicting effect:
• More debt that serves as collateral alleviate the financial friction
• Improves the allocation of capital and raises the ex-ante return to capital
=⇒ Crowding in
• Overall effect depends on micro details and calibration
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Crowding Out Effect of Debt
• Aiyagari-McGrattan (1998): Public debt crowds out capital because debt is a substitute for
capital as a buffer stock
• Model la Holmstom-Tirole (1998): firms have to borrow to finance their capital need
• Agents can relax future financial constraints by saving in the form of capital and debt =⇒Possible crowding out
• But another conflicting effect:
• More debt that serves as collateral alleviate the financial friction
• Improves the allocation of capital and raises the ex-ante return to capital
=⇒ Crowding in
• Overall effect depends on micro details and calibration
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Borrowing Cheap?
• Recent great recession: low interest rates = signal that it is cheap for the government to
borrow.
• Krugman and DeLong: US government should have run an expansionary fiscal policy
• for Keynesian-stimulus reasons
• but also because interest rates were extraordinarily low.
• Misleading claim!
• Barro/AMSS: Adding deterministic variations in the discount rate does not justify changes
in the optimal fiscal mix!
• Why? The interest rate captures the cost of borrowing but also what a society desires
(No wedge between the interest rate and the CP’s discount rate)
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Borrowing Cheap?
• Recent great recession: low interest rates = signal that it is cheap for the government to
borrow.
• Krugman and DeLong: US government should have run an expansionary fiscal policy
• for Keynesian-stimulus reasons
• but also because interest rates were extraordinarily low.
• Misleading claim!
• Barro/AMSS: Adding deterministic variations in the discount rate does not justify changes
in the optimal fiscal mix!
• Why? The interest rate captures the cost of borrowing but also what a society desires
(No wedge between the interest rate and the CP’s discount rate)
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Borrowing Cheap?
• Our framework: More borrowing may be optimal during a crisis
• But not simply because of low interest rates!
• Because low interest rate is a manifestation of
• the aggravated financial friction
• the associated increase in the liquidity premium the Govt can extract.
Optimal response to adverse financial shocks?
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Borrowing Cheap?
• Our framework: More borrowing may be optimal during a crisis
• But not simply because of low interest rates!
• Because low interest rate is a manifestation of
• the aggravated financial friction
• the associated increase in the liquidity premium the Govt can extract.
Optimal response to adverse financial shocks?
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Effect of shocks
• War shocks: Model departs from standard tax smoothing (both across time and states) and
exhibits mean reversion. See Figures
• Here look at a financial shock that causes
• income to fall
• tax basis to shrink
• private and social value of liquidity to increase
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Effect of shocks
• Both the b = 0 and λ = 0 shift.
• 3 effects drive movements in the debt
• Tax Smoothing (shock is temporary)
• Increase in the marginal value of providing liquidity (Increase liquidity)
• Increase in the opportunity cost of liquidity (Squeeze liquidity)
• Net effect is ambiguous and depends on the calibration and the micro details.
• Consider the case: V ′(b)π(b) and σ(b) remain constant =⇒ λ = 0 locus does not shift
=⇒ Response of b is dictated by fiscal considerations only (increase in tax burden)
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Effect of shocks
• Both the b = 0 and λ = 0 shift.
• 3 effects drive movements in the debt
• Tax Smoothing (shock is temporary)
• Increase in the marginal value of providing liquidity (Increase liquidity)
• Increase in the opportunity cost of liquidity (Squeeze liquidity)
• Net effect is ambiguous and depends on the calibration and the micro details.
• Consider the case: V ′(b)π(b) and σ(b) remain constant =⇒ λ = 0 locus does not shift
=⇒ Response of b is dictated by fiscal considerations only (increase in tax burden)
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Financial Shock: No change in λ = 0
b
λ
bbliss b
λ = 0
b = 0
∆T|∆π(b)b = 0
∆π(b)b
∆π(b)b∆π(b)b
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Financial Shock: No change in λ = 0
b
λ
bbliss b
λ = 0
b = 0
∆T|∆π(b)b = 0
∆π(b)b
∆π(b)b∆π(b)b
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Financial Shock: No change in λ = 0
b
λ
bbliss b
λ = 0
b = 0
∆T|∆π(b)b = 0
∆π(b)b
∆π(b)b∆π(b)b
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Financial Shock: No change in λ = 0
b
λ
bbliss b
λ = 0
b = 0
∆T|∆π(b)b = 0
∆π(b)b
∆π(b)b
∆π(b)b
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Financial Shock: No change in λ = 0
b
λ
bbliss b
λ = 0
b = 0
∆T|∆π(b)b = 0
∆π(b)b
∆π(b)b
∆π(b)b
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Effect of shocks
Case 1: No direct interest rate effect =⇒ traditional recession (raise debt and taxes)
Case 2: Change in interest rate compensates for decrease in tax =⇒ no change in b and τ . The
drop in tax revenue is debt financed (b = 0 and λ = 0 unaffected)
IRF to a Financial Shock
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Period
-0.035
-0.030
-0.025
-0.020
-0.015
-0.010
-0.005
0.000
0.005Interest Rate
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Period
-0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020Primary Deficit
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Period
-0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025Public Debt
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Period
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
0.014
0.016Optimal Tax Rate
∆π(b)b = 0; ∆π(b)b = −∆T
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Summary
• Question: Is it always optimal to supply debt to alleviate financial frictions?
• Not always! The government may wish to exploit its collateral producing capacity in order
to earn rents from the private sector and thus reduce its reliance on distortionary tax
revenue sources.
• Provide a full characterization of
3 long term properties and
3 the global dynamics
of optimal policy in a model where public debt can alleviate the financial frictions created by
lack of sufficient collateral for asset trades.
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2 Topical Insights
• Do low interest rates during recessions make it “cheap” for the Government toborrow?
• Argument has no place in the standard Ramsey framework.
• Why? no wedge between interest rate and discount rate of planner
• May make sense in our framework (if the low interest rate reflects the financial friction.)
• Optimal policy response to a financial crisis
• crisis raises the marginal value of providing liquidity =⇒ Increase debt
• but it also raises the opportunity cost of doing so =⇒ Squeezing liquidity
Not clear!
• In a benchmark (one where these 2 effects cancel each other), optimal policy response
dictated by budgetary considerations (λ) rather than by the apparent increase in the social
value of easing the friction
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2 Topical Insights
• Do low interest rates during recessions make it “cheap” for the Government toborrow?
• Argument has no place in the standard Ramsey framework.
• Why? no wedge between interest rate and discount rate of planner
• May make sense in our framework (if the low interest rate reflects the financial friction.)
• Optimal policy response to a financial crisis
• crisis raises the marginal value of providing liquidity =⇒ Increase debt
• but it also raises the opportunity cost of doing so =⇒ Squeezing liquidity
Not clear!
• In a benchmark (one where these 2 effects cancel each other), optimal policy response
dictated by budgetary considerations (λ) rather than by the apparent increase in the social
value of easing the friction
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THANK YOU!
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Social Value of Debt
• V (b) is the value of the following problem:
max(p,q)∈R2
+&(x,a):[θ,θ]→R+×[−φ,+∞)
∫θu(x(θ))ϕ(θ)dθ
subject to
∫x(θ)ϕ(θ)dθ = e∫
a(θ−)ϕ(θ−)dθ− = b
φ+ a(θ−)− p(x(θ)− e) ≥ 0 ∀(θ, θ−)
θu′(x(θ)) ≥ p ∀θ[θu′(x(θ))− p
][φ+ a(θ−)− p(x(θ)− e)] = 0 ∀(θ, θ−)
a(θ−) + φ ≥ 0 ∀θ−β + Ua(a(θ−), θ−, p) ≤ q ∀θ−
[Ua(a(θ−), θ−, p)− π] [a(θ−) + φ] = 0 ∀θ−
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APPENDIX
Define H(b, λ) = maxs
H(s, b, λ) ≡ U(s) + V (b) + λ(s − [ρ− π(b)]b − g), we have
Lemma (Skiba, 1978, Brock and Dechert, 1983)
For any b0 and any λ0 ∈ Λ(b0), the path in P(b0) that starts from initial point (b0, λ0) yields
a value that is equal to H(b0, λ0)/ρ.
Lemma
H(b, λ) is convex in λ (upper envelop of linear functions of λ).
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Departure from Aiyagari-McGrattan (1998)
• Aiyagari-McGrattan use a shortcut to avoid the computational challenge of studying optimal
debt in incomplete market economies
=⇒ Restrict debt and taxes to be constant, abstract from transition and study Steady State
welfare
• Using our notations, amounts to maximize U(s) + V (b) s.t. r(b)b = g − s
=⇒ bAMG = argmaxb
[V (b)− λAMG (ρ− π(b))b
]= argmax
b
[Ω(b, λAMG )− λAMGρb
]• FOC: Ωb = λAMGρ > 0 while we get Ωb = 0 =⇒ bAMG < b?.
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Departure from Aiyagari-McGrattan (1998)
• Aiyagari-McGrattan’s exercise
• underestimates the optimal long-run level of debt
• results in a debt level below bbliss even when long-run satiation would be optimal
• Why? Because this exercise treats the entire payments on debt, r(b)b, as a cost, while the
social planner should view debt issuance as a profit generating exercise (seignorage) to the
tune of π(b)b.
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Effect of a WAR – AMSS (2002) Version
i.i.d. Case
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Period
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020Public Debt
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Period
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020Optimal Tax Rate
Debt and Taxes in our Model; Debt and Taxes in AMSS; Government Spending.
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Effect of a WAR – AMSS (2002) Version
Persistent Case
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Period
0.000
0.010
0.020
0.030
0.040
0.050
0.060
0.070
0.080Public Debt
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Period
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020Optimal Tax Rate
Debt and Taxes in our Model; Debt and Taxes in AMSS; Government Spending.
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Effect of a WAR – Lucas-Stokey (1983) Version
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Period
-0.080
-0.060
-0.040
-0.020
0.000
0.020Public Debt
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Period
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020Optimal Tax Rate
Our Model; Lucas-Stokey; Government Spending Shock
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