On Textbook History of Psychology and Scientizing HistoryAuthor(s): Laurel FurumotoSource: Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1995), pp. 124-126Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1449779 .Accessed: 01/04/2011 00:31

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COMMENTARIES

On Textbook History of Psychology and Scientizing History

Laurel Furumoto Wellesley College

I want to begin by expressing my appreciation for the liberal praise Simonton bestowed on my article on the life and career of the eminent early-American woman psychologist, Christine Ladd-Franklin (Furumoto, 1992). It was appreciated all the more in the context of Simonton' s target article, which had been consistently critical of the historical writing under review up until that point. That being said, I focus the remainder of my commentary on two concerns raised for me by Simonton's article-his assumption that textbook his- tory of psychology constitutes scholarship in the his- tory of psychology and his program for scientizing history.

Simonton' s analysis of generalizations in histories of psychology is confined almost without exception to textbook histories. This is evidenced by the works he cites and by his statement that "almost all the representative quotes were identified not by the au- thor, but rather by a team of research assistants [who] ... independently searched for apparent generaliza- tions in history textbooks in the university library." In published work (Furumoto, 1989), I addressed the issue of the problematic nature of textbook history in science in general and in psychology in particular. For example, in his classic work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn (1970) contended that science textbooks and the historical tradition they supply are rewritten after every scientific revolution to portray the past as developing linearly and cumu- latively toward the present vantage. What this accomplishes, Kuhn, wrote, is that "both students and professionals come to feel like participants in a longstanding historical tradition" (p. 138). The dan- ger that Kuhn pointed out in this practice of rewriting history back from the present is that it truncates scientists' sense of the history of their discipline.

More recently, Mitchell G. Ash (1983), a historian of science and an authority on the history of Gestalt psychology, argued that a distinction should be made between "textbook history" and "historical scholar- ship" in psychology. In the United States, according to Ash, textbook history of psychology has performed primarily an ideological function. More specifically, Ash wrote that it has been used as a "legitimation strategy" portraying the field to beginning and ad- vanced students as both a science and as descended from a venerable tradition of knowledge. Ash main- tained that, of the two (textbook history and historical scholarship), only historical scholarship can lay claim to the production of knowledge. Furthermore, Ash

noted, recent historical scholarship is yielding results that in many cases are incompatible with textbook versions of psychology's past.

Another commentary on the nature of textbook his- tory of psychology recently appeared in a review of a group of four such works by Kerry W. Buckley (1993), historian and biographer of John B. Watson. Buckley maintained that "history textbooks embody and trans- mit not only facts and ideas but values" and that they serve as "windows not only upon history, but upon the arena of shifting values within the profession itself at a given point in time" (p. 359). Therefore, Buckley ar- gued, textbooks themselves can be thought of as "his- torical artifacts, products of a community of interests" at a particular historical juncture; "over time, they may tell us as much about their own era as about the history of their subject" (p. 359).

As previously stated, Simonton's analysis is based almost exclusively on material excerpted from text- book histories of psychology. In fact, Simonton does not even acknowledge the existence of what Ash called "historical scholarship." Taking into account the prob- lematic nature of textbook history of psychology cou- pled with his neglect of scholarship in the history of psychology seriously calls into question Simonton's many claims about what historians tend to do in their accounts. In other words, even if Simonton's general- izations about histories of psychology are true, they apply to textbook history but not necessarily to histor- ical scholarship.

This inattentiveness to historical scholarship may also explain Simonton's restrictive view of histories of psychology as either "[adopting] a 'great person' per- spective" or "[assuming] a 'history of ideas' view- point." True enough 20 years ago, today these alternatives are more accurately described as traditional approaches to the history of psychology. If Simonton were to consult what I have come to call the "new history of psychology" (Furumoto, 1989), he would quickly find that it cannot be contained within the categories he describes.

Before the mid-1970s, work in the history of psy- chology was dominated by the traditional approach to the history of science. That is, history was written by practitioners of the discipline-physicists wrote histo- ries of physics, biologists wrote histories of biology, and so forth. These practitioner-historians, by and large, viewed the history of science as a cumulative linear progression from error to truth. The histories they produced tended to move backward from the present

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state of the field and to concentrate on "great men" and "great ideas."

During the mid-1970s, ideas from the new history that had already challenged the traditional approach within the history-of-science field began to be imported into the history of psychology by some psychologists who had become specialists in history and some histo- rians of science who had become interested in the social sciences. From the 1980s to the present, there has been an outpouring of scholarship-the new history of psy- chology-that poses various challenges to the tradi- tional approach to the history of the field. This new history of psychology is diverse rather than monolithic and includes different varieties of critical history (e.g., revisionist scholarship on the work of Wilhelm Wundt) and social history (e.g., work focusing on the neglect of contributions made by groups other than White males in the history of psychology).

Despite the diversity of the new history of psychol- ogy, it has several characteristics that serve to distin- guish it from the old history:

The new history tends to be critical rather than cere- monial, contextual rather than simply the history of ideas, and more inclusive, going beyond the study of "great men." The new history utilizes primary sources and archival documents rather than relying on second- ary sources, which can lead to the passing down of anecdotes and myths from one generation of textbook writers to the next. And finally, the new history tries to get inside the thought of a period to see issues as they appeared at the time, instead of looking for anteced- ents of current ideas or writing history backwards from the present content of the field. (Furumoto, 1989, p. 18)

Central concerns of much of the new history are to understand how and why the discipline of psychology came to assume the particular form that it did and the nature of the interactions between psychology and so- ciety (see, e.g., Buckley, 1989; Danziger, 1990; Morawski, 1988; O'Donnell, 1985; Sokal, 1987). These issues are typically not addressed by either tra- ditional history of psychology or textbook history, and they do not find a place in what I perceive to be Simonton's conception of history.

Whereas the impetus of the new history overall is toward historicizing psychology, Simonton's goal, as I understand it, is to scientize history. After offering evidence that textbook histories of psychology are rid- dled with meta-historical generalizations, Simonton suggests that it is probably an inevitable state of affairs. However, he recommends that, whenever historians are tempted to transcend "idiographic details," they should "check their assertions against what actually has been found in the scientific literature." Moreover, Simonton exhorts "any scholar planning to write a history or

biography (or even an autobiography)" to peruse the metascientific literature to learn "which claims have been disconfirmed and which vindicated" and to find "behavioral principles that could be especially valuable in interpreting a specific event or personality."

In Simonton's conception, the legitimate sphere of history reduces to recording "idiographic details," whereas all explanation and interpretation become the domain of science. A sharply contrasting view of the nature of historical inquiry-and one to which I sub- scribe-can be found in the writing of Dorothy Ross (1993), historian of American social science and biog- rapher of G. Stanley Hall.

Ross (1993) described two different approaches to knowledge-historicism and scientism-and dis- cussed the relation between them in the social sciences from their origins in the 18th century to the present. Historicism, Ross wrote, "is a mode of reflection about human affairs that developed over the course of several centuries" and "means the understanding of history as a process of qualitative change, moved and ordered by forces that lay within itself' (p. 100).

According to Ross (1993), in Western Europe histor- icism and science temporarily joined in the 18th cen- tury-for example, in the work of Adam Smith. Whereas, in the 19th century, Ross saw them develop- ing in "more self-consciously divergent directions" (p. 101). Historicists, under the influence of romanticism, "grounded reason and value fully within historical ex- perience," whereas theorists of science, under the influ- ence of positivism, "declared that the abstractive method and lawful structure of the natural sciences was the model for all fields of knowledge that aspired to certainty" (p. 101). Ross maintained that, despite this divergence in the 19th century, "the social sciences remained in various ways and to various degrees in- volved with both their inherited traditions" (p. 101).

Turning to the United States, Ross (1993) noted that, from their beginnings in the early 19th century, the varieties of social science that developed here em- ployed metaphors of nature or downplayed the rele- vance of history to their subject matter. Nevertheless, Ross observed that American social science was not bereft of historicism, and, in fact, after the Civil War, historicism became a more influential theme in the culture as well as in the social sciences. Ross observed:

It was not until the 1920s that the mainstream of all the social science disciplines were captured by scientism: the self-conscious determination to model themselves exclusively on the natural sciences, a determination based on some version of the positivist belief that science offered a privileged access to reality. (p. 102)

The social sciences that formed the basis of Ross's (1993) study were economics, sociology, and political science, but certainly what Ross had to say about being

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"captured by scientism" applies to American psychol- ogy as well. Ross made a plea for incorporating histor- icist and hermeneutic approaches to knowledge in the social sciences alongside the natural scientific ap- proach. Pointing to Max Weber's historical model of the social sciences as a basis of bridging these divergent approaches, Ross observed that "Weber's historical social science allowed diversity" and that Weber "rec- ognized that the historical field allowed for different kinds of social studies, that asked different questions and therefore employed different methods and reached different levels of generality" (p. 111).

I am in sympathy with Ross's (1993) view that the social sciences-to which I would add psychology- should acknowledge historicism as a legitimate ap- proach to the production of knowledge. In line with this, I disagree with Simonton's suggestion to historians of psychology that they confine themselves to using knowledge based on natural science to interpret idio- graphic materials, which to me amounts to scientizing history. Rather, I would urge historians, as well as other psychologists, to consider following the lead of the new history of psychology-namely, to move in the direc- tion of historicizing psychology.

Note

Laurel Furumoto, Department of Psychology, Wellesley College, 106 Central Street, Wellesley, MA 02181-8288.

"captured by scientism" applies to American psychol- ogy as well. Ross made a plea for incorporating histor- icist and hermeneutic approaches to knowledge in the social sciences alongside the natural scientific ap- proach. Pointing to Max Weber's historical model of the social sciences as a basis of bridging these divergent approaches, Ross observed that "Weber's historical social science allowed diversity" and that Weber "rec- ognized that the historical field allowed for different kinds of social studies, that asked different questions and therefore employed different methods and reached different levels of generality" (p. 111).

I am in sympathy with Ross's (1993) view that the social sciences-to which I would add psychology- should acknowledge historicism as a legitimate ap- proach to the production of knowledge. In line with this, I disagree with Simonton's suggestion to historians of psychology that they confine themselves to using knowledge based on natural science to interpret idio- graphic materials, which to me amounts to scientizing history. Rather, I would urge historians, as well as other psychologists, to consider following the lead of the new history of psychology-namely, to move in the direc- tion of historicizing psychology.

Note

Laurel Furumoto, Department of Psychology, Wellesley College, 106 Central Street, Wellesley, MA 02181-8288.

References

Ash, M. G. (1983). The self-presentation of a discipline: History of psychology in the United States between pedagogy and schol- arship. In L. Graham, W. Lepenies, & P. Weingart (Eds.), Functions and uses of disciplinary histories (Vol. 7, pp. 143- 189). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Reidel.

Buckley, K. W. (1989). Mechanical man: John Broadus Watson and the beginnings of behaviorism. New York: Guilford.

Buckley, K. W. (1993). Constructing the history of psychology [Review of An introduction to the history of psychology, History of psychology, A history of psychology, & A history of modern psychology]. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 29, 356-360.

Danziger, K. (1990). Constructing the subject: Historical origins of psychological research. Cambridge, England: Cambridge Uni- versity Press.

Furumoto, L. (1989). The new history of psychology. In I. S. Cohen (Ed.), The G. Stanley Hall lecture series (Vol. 9, pp. 5-34). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Furumoto, L. (1992). Joining separate spheres-Christine Ladd- Franklin, woman-scientist (1847-1930). American Psycholo- gist, 47, 175-182.

Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Morawski, J. G. (Ed.). (1988). The rise of experimentation in American psychology. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

O'Donnell, J. M. (1985). The origins of behaviorism: American psychology, 1870-1920. New York: New York University Press.

Ross, D. (1993). An historian's view of American social science. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 29, 99- 112.

Sokal, M. M. (Ed.). (1987). Psychological testing and American society, 1890-1930. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

References

Ash, M. G. (1983). The self-presentation of a discipline: History of psychology in the United States between pedagogy and schol- arship. In L. Graham, W. Lepenies, & P. Weingart (Eds.), Functions and uses of disciplinary histories (Vol. 7, pp. 143- 189). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Reidel.

Buckley, K. W. (1989). Mechanical man: John Broadus Watson and the beginnings of behaviorism. New York: Guilford.

Buckley, K. W. (1993). Constructing the history of psychology [Review of An introduction to the history of psychology, History of psychology, A history of psychology, & A history of modern psychology]. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 29, 356-360.

Danziger, K. (1990). Constructing the subject: Historical origins of psychological research. Cambridge, England: Cambridge Uni- versity Press.

Furumoto, L. (1989). The new history of psychology. In I. S. Cohen (Ed.), The G. Stanley Hall lecture series (Vol. 9, pp. 5-34). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Furumoto, L. (1992). Joining separate spheres-Christine Ladd- Franklin, woman-scientist (1847-1930). American Psycholo- gist, 47, 175-182.

Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Morawski, J. G. (Ed.). (1988). The rise of experimentation in American psychology. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

O'Donnell, J. M. (1985). The origins of behaviorism: American psychology, 1870-1920. New York: New York University Press.

Ross, D. (1993). An historian's view of American social science. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 29, 99- 112.

Sokal, M. M. (Ed.). (1987). Psychological testing and American society, 1890-1930. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Psychology of Science, Cognitive Science, and Empirical Philosophy

Barry Gholson University of Memphis

Psychology of Science, Cognitive Science, and Empirical Philosophy

Barry Gholson University of Memphis

Simonton has challenged investigators to establish a new research program (Lakatos, 1970) within the broad discipline of the psychology of science, the discipline to which he has contributed much during the past two decades. Researchers in this program would seek to empirically investigate meta-historical generalizations that populate the psychological literature, particularly textbooks on the history of psychology. Simonton com- pellingly illustrates the potential rewards of the pro- posed research. His level of scholarship is of a high order, as those familiar with his previous work (e.g., Simonton, 1990) would have anticipated. I find his organization of the historical generalizations-putative

Simonton has challenged investigators to establish a new research program (Lakatos, 1970) within the broad discipline of the psychology of science, the discipline to which he has contributed much during the past two decades. Researchers in this program would seek to empirically investigate meta-historical generalizations that populate the psychological literature, particularly textbooks on the history of psychology. Simonton com- pellingly illustrates the potential rewards of the pro- posed research. His level of scholarship is of a high order, as those familiar with his previous work (e.g., Simonton, 1990) would have anticipated. I find his organization of the historical generalizations-putative

behavioral laws-at the level of individuals, ideas, and groups particularly helpful.

Simonton lucidly describes how to locate, catalogue, and even test many of the various kinds of behavioral laws inferred from historical generalizations in the psychological literature. Given that his challenge is accepted, the resulting research program will indeed constitute an important addition to the psychology of science. Simonton outlines how this new program spans the science of psychology, the history of psychol- ogy, and the psychology of science. Thus, I want to briefly explore two related research programs-one pursued by a group of philosophers and the other by

behavioral laws-at the level of individuals, ideas, and groups particularly helpful.

Simonton lucidly describes how to locate, catalogue, and even test many of the various kinds of behavioral laws inferred from historical generalizations in the psychological literature. Given that his challenge is accepted, the resulting research program will indeed constitute an important addition to the psychology of science. Simonton outlines how this new program spans the science of psychology, the history of psychol- ogy, and the psychology of science. Thus, I want to briefly explore two related research programs-one pursued by a group of philosophers and the other by

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