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Science, Technology and Experiments; The Natural versus the ArtificialAuthor(s): Peter KroesSource: PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association,Vol. 1994, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1994), pp. 431-440Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192955 .

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Science Technology and Experiments; the Natural Versus the Artificial1

Peter Kroes

University of Technology, Eindhoven

1. Introduction

Against the traditional 'discovery-view' of experiments, Hacking has maintained that in experimental practice natural phenomena are created, not discovered. By intervening in the world with the help of technology, we create and at the same time come to know phenomena. This claim, together with the one that scientific entities are tools for intervening in the world, undermines the classic distinction between the natural and the artificial, more particularly, between science and technology: phenomena become artifacts just as technological products and scientific entities become tools for doing. Hacking's view raises the question whether it can still be said that science studies natural phenomena, and if so, in what sense. Are we not forced to give up the distinction between the natural and the artificial, between science and technology, altogether? Recently, for instance (Lelas 1993) has argued that science is a form of technology.

I shall argue 1) that experimentalists do indeed create phenomena, but in a specific sense which does not undermine the distinction between the natural and the artificial, 2) that scientific entities are used as tools instead of being tools, and 3) that Hacking's view on experiments may be reconciled with the traditional view, on condition that the concept of nature be reinterpreted. I shall suggest a reinterpretation in terms of constraints imposed on action.

The paper starts with a brief discussion of the distinction between the natural and the artificial (sect. 2), followed by a description of the traditional view of the natural and artificial in experiments (sect. 3). Then I will criticize Hacking's claims that phenomena are created and that scientific entities are tools (sect. 4). The paper ends with a proposal for interpreting nature as constraints imposed on action (sect. 5).

2. The natural versus the artificial

A general dividing line between the natural and the artificial is difficult to draw.2 Within the present context it will be sufficient to indicate some of the most salient differences between natural objects/processes as generally conceived within the physical sciences, and artificial objects/processes3 produced by technology.4

The moder physical sciences lack a clear conception of nature and natural objects. The still widespread idea that nature is composed of objects with certain intrinsic properties and interactions between those objects is hardly compatible with mod-

PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 431-440 Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association


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em physical theories. But whatever may be the precise character of the (ultimate) constituents of the world, it is assumed that, contrary to artificial entities, natural entities and their behavior are not man-made. According to moder physical theories it makes, moreover, no sense to attribute some goal or function to natural objects (at least, these notions do not figure in physical theorizing).

Artificial objects, on the contrary, are man-made; they are the outcome of intentional human action.5 I shall concentrate here on technological artifacts.6 Techno- logical artifacts, such as a bicycle, a pencil, a radio or a TV-set, perform a practical function on the basis of a human design. In technology, a design is taken to be a scheme or plan that shows how a particular function may be realized. Technological artifacts have a dual nature. On the one hand, they are physical objects which obey the laws of nature; as physical objects their behavior can be explained in a non-teleological way. On the other hand, they are the physical embodiment of a design that has a teleological character; the whole construction is intended to perform a practical function. This function is an integral part of a technological artefact and without taking it into account, a technological artifact can not be properly understood.

Thus, the distinction between the natural and the artificial is primarily a genetic one.7 Parallel to it runs the difference between discovery and invention/creation: natural objects (relations) are said to be discovered, artificial objects to be invented/created. The common view holds that science discovers what is already present and that technology invents new things.8

3 The traditional view of the natural and the artificial in experiments

Traditional philosophy of science has been preoccupied with the representation (concep- tualization) of reality on the basis of data, particularly with he relation between theory and facts (Hacking 1983, 149 ff). Theory, not experimentation and the use of technology, has been the focus of most work in the philosophy of science. More recently, with the growing interest in the experimental aspects of science, particularly of physics (Hacking 1983; Franklin 1986; Gallison 1987; Le Grand 1990), the role of technology in science has become a topic of discussion, since in most experiments extensive use is made of technology.9

In the traditional view of experiments, technology is only a means to generate new data: once the new data are produced, technology has played its part and the real scientific work, theorizing, may begin. Technology may contribute to the generation of new data in two different ways:

1) it may help to overcome imperfections and limitations in human perception by providing measuring equipment, that is, it may extend and refine our sensory apparatus (Ackermann 1985, 127), or

2) it may provide equipment for studying the behavior of physical systems under very special, artificial conditions which do not occur spontaneously in nature.

According to this view, science is an activity that is primarily concerned with the understanding of nature. The technological/artificial means and processes by which data about nature are obtained play no part in that understanding (Lelas 1993, 423-424; Tiles 1992, 99). Of course, the use of technology in experiments is not unproblematic in the sense that the technological equipment simply delivers the facts or tells us what nature looks like. Many experiments fail due to malfunctioning or to incorrect handling of equipment and the performance of experiments usually requires a lot of technological skills. Moreover, like science, technology is dominated by theory and therefore the ev- aluation and interpretation of the results of experiments may involve the use of a lot of theory. The creation of experimental evidence (facts, data) in experimental practice is thus not a straightforward affair. But when properly performed and interpreted, experiments will deliver reliable facts with the help of technology. These facts constitute the evidence for developing and evaluating theories about the physical world.

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This traditional view is based on a strict separation of the natural and the artificial in experimenting. The equipment through which nature is observed and the conditions under which it is studied are artificial, whereas the objects and/or processes studied be- have naturally in spite of their artificial environment, and thus show their natural properties. Though not man-made, they show themselves through man-made equipment and under man-made conditions. Whereas all technological objects involved in an experiment perform a particular function on the basis of a design, the notions of functionality and design do not apply to the objects/processes studied in the experiment. While a microscope is designed so as to perform a particular function, it makes no sense to say that an electron is based on a design or has an intrinsic functionality.

Given this traditional conception of experimenting, the scientist remains essentially a passive spectator of nature who with the aid of technology gains access to parts of nature that would otherwise remain hidden because of human shortcomings or of contingent boundary conditions prevailing in our universe. The task of technology is to remove any obstacle between the observer and nature which is waiting there to be discovered.

This distinction between the natural and artificial at the object level is reflected at the level of data. It is quite common among experimentalists to speak of artifacts of the measurement equipment or of the experimental setup. They thereby refer to results that are generated by the artificial surrounding or artificial means of observation of the natural phenomenon under study (Franklin 1986, 3). Data are called 'artifacts', as opposed to genuine data, when they carry no information about the object of study, but only tell us something about the equipment used in the experiment.

Many measuring instruments produce artifacts; for instance the early telescopes produced colored fringes due to chromatic aberration. The specific conditions under which an object is observed too may produce artifacts; take for instance a stick that is held partly under water. The stick looks broken, but this effect is caused by the conditions under which the stick is observed; this property of the stick is an artefact. Although the artefact is real and not an illusion in the observation context, is does not say anything about the object itself.

It is, of course, of prime importance in experiments to discriminate between artifacts and genuine results that contain real information about the natural system that is being studied. The results of an experiment are always the outcome of natural objects interacting with an artificial environment, and therefore it is always necessary to filter out the component in the results that tells us something about nature. Although in practice this may be extremely difficult, and may involve long and intricate chains of rea- soning, the traditional view maintains that it is always possible in experimental results to eliminate all that is due to the use of technology. 1V There exists, in other words, an epistemology of experiment, that is, "a set of strategies that are used to provide ratio- nal belief in an experimental result. These strategies distinguish between a valid observation or measurement and an artifact created by the apparatus" (Franklin 1986, 192).

This traditional view of experiments and of the role of technology in science has become under fire from different directions. The most far reaching criticism comes from (social) constructivists quarters, where nature is interpreted as a (social) construction which is the outcome of a scientific practice, not its object. The outcome of an experiment is taken to be a social construction; it is the result of negotiation processes between all actors involved. In these it is not possible to appeal to nature as an indepen- dent arbiter. The outcome of an experiment is ultimately determined by the interests of the actors involved. Nature itself becomes a social construction and thus an artefact.

This position appears untenable for at least the following two reasons. In the first place, it implies that there is in principle no difference at all in the way discussions about the acceptability of respectively physical laws and state laws are conducted, nor in the way these discussions come to an end (that is, how consensus comes about).

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Secondly, if scientific knowledge, particularly the outcomes of experiments, are social constructions conditioned by power structures and interests of actors, how is it possible to explain the successful operation of technological artifacts designed on the basis of that knowledge? The answer, that the successful operation of technological artifacts is itself a social construction, is in my opinion not very convincing.11

In the following I will discuss Hacking's criticism against the traditional view of experiments, which is of a more moderate nature.

4. Hacking's view of experiments

In his famous book Representing and intervening Hacking claims that phenomena are created. He rejects the idea that experimental scientists simply discover phenomena in the world. "To experiment" in his own words "is to create, produce, refine and stabilize phenomena" (Hacking 1983, 230), a phenomenon being "something public, regular, possibly law-like, but perhaps exceptional" (Hacking 1983, 222). Discussing the example of the Hall effect, he states that this effect was not found by Hall simply because it did not exist before Hall succeeded in producing this effect in the laborato- ry. It was literally created by him,12 because this effect does not exist without the appropriate experimental setup. If science should have taken another historical path, the Hall effect might never have been created (Hacking 1989, 21).

The idea that phenomena are created does not imply, according to Hacking, some sort of subjectivism or relativism in the sense that all is possible. The experimentalist cannot create phenomena at will. In his interaction with the world, he is subjected to all kinds of constraints: relativism is barred by the fact that the world seldom does what the experimentalist wants (Hacking 1989, 22).

Hacking uses the creation of phenomena in experiments to defend a 'hard-headed' scientific realism about unobservable or theoretical entities. In his opinion it is not because we can perform successful experiments on them that such entities are real. They become real as soon as they can be manipulated to produce new phenomena (Hacking 1983, 262 & 274):

Experimental work provides the strongest evidence for scientific realism. This is not because we test hypotheses about entities. It is because entities that in principle cannot be 'observed' are regularly manipulated to produce a new phenomena and to investigate other aspects of nature. They are tools, instruments not for thinking but for doing. [...] Hence, engineering, not theorizing, is the best proof of scientific realism about entities.

According to this line of thought, the best evidence for, for instance, the existence of electrons is the common television set using a cathode ray tube (CRT). In a CRT electrons are produced by an electron gun, accelerated and deflected so as to hit appropriate spots on the TV-screen, where they cause a phenomenon known as electrolumlne- scence: the electrons hit a substance that starts to produce light of a certain wavelength. Here, indeed, electrons have become an element of engineering and from an engineering point of view they are as real as the directly observable deflection coils in a CRT.

Hacking's ideas on experiments throw a new light on the role of technology in science. Two differences with the traditional view emerge:

1) with the help of technology the experimentalist does not just disclose or discover phenomena but he creates them; and

2) engineering and technology, rather than theory, determine what is real; thus technology is not a mere instrument for science that leaves no trace at all.

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We will discuss these two points more closely and examine their consequences for the distinction between the natural and the artificial.

5. Creation versus discovery

From Hacking's claim that phenomena are created -a claim which is meant to be taken literally- the obvious conclusion may be drawn that, just like the objects of technology, phenomena belong to the domain of the artificial; they are the product of intentional human activity. The expression 'natural phenomena' would be a contra- dictio in terminis. If phenomena are artifacts, then science apparently investigates an artificial world, created or invented by experimentalists. Contrary to the traditional view, it would, therefore, no longer make sense to distinguish between the natural and the artificial in experiments.

I shall argue that Hacking's view of creating phenomena is much closer to the traditional view than the above suggests. To see this we have to take a closer look at Hacking's use of the expression 'to create phenomena'. This expression can be interpreted in a weak and a strong sense. In the weak sense it means that the experimentalist creates the proper conditions for a phenomenon to take place, but does not create its specific characteristics. In the strong sense he not only causes the occurrence of the phenomenon, but also creates the specific features of the phenomenon itself.

In my opinion, there can be no doubt that Hacking uses the expression 'creating phenomena' in the weak sense. In the first place, to claim that phenomena are created in the strong sense would either lead to "some sort of ultimate idealism in which we make the phenomena",13 whereas Hacking defends scientific realism, or to relativism, which he rules out on the ground that the world imposes constraints on our interaction with it.14 Secondly, Hacking states that science may develop along different historical paths, in each of which different phenomena might be created because other experimental techniques and equipment would be used or be available. Thus, it is possible to imagine that the Hall effect would never have been created, since it can only occur in some type of apparatus. The occurrence of this phenomenon is caused by the experimentalist who builds and operates the necessary apparatus. Creating phenomena, therefore, means that the experimentalist creates the right boundary conditions for the phenomenon to occur. Finally, the Hall effect can not be created in the strong sense, because Hacking states that it cannot be ruled out that the same effect occurs spontaneously in nature, i.e., that it is created by nature itself (1983, 226): "If anywhere in nature there is such an ar- rangement, with no intervening causes, then the Hall effect occurs."

If we accept the weak interpretation of Hacking's expression 'creating phenomena', then we may conclude that the Hall effect itself, the character of the regularity, is not created by man and therefore is not an artefact. Consider another example: the phenomenon that all objects fall with the same speed in vacuum. Clearly, Hacking is right in claiming that this phenomenon was created; it did not exist before man was able to create a vacuum. Nevertheless we are dealing here with a natural phenomenon in the sense that this phenomenon expresses a constraint on the free fall of bodies which is not itself created by the experimentalist. This constraint is dictated by the real world in which we live. That is the reason why it is called a natural phenomenon.15 Hacking's use of the term 'creating' is misleading, because it suggests that phenomena are created in the same way a sculptor creates a statue.

If indeed Hacking intends to claim that phenomena are created in the weak sense, than the distinction between the natural and the artificial can be upheld, and then Hacking' view is much closer to the traditional view of experiments (and on the role of technology therein). At first sight, there seems to be a strong tension between the traditional view that phenomena are discovered and Hacking's claim (1983, 225) that phenomena are created and are not "part of God's handiwork, waiting to be discovered". However, we have to realize that the traditional view that phenomena are dis-

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covered does not exclude that it may take a lot of work and ingenuity to get an experiment going, that is, to let phenomena occur. The experimentalist indeed creates phenomena in the sense that he causes phenomena to occur by producing the proper boundary conditions. To claim that phenomena are discovered does not imply that the phenomena occur spontaneously. There can be no doubt that in complex experiments the occurrence of phenomena is caused by the experimentalist.

Neither does the claim that phenomena are discovered imply "that the phenomena have always been there, waiting to be discovered" (Hacking 1983, 226). This claim may also be interpreted as saying that a particular feature of our world is disclosed or revealed. Here the expression 'our world' is crucial: the phenomenon is a specific feature of our world with its specific experimental techniques and equipment, not of all possible worlds. In other words, the phenomenon does not exist apart from the appropriate apparatus and therefore it can be said to be created by us in our world. Nevertheless, the phenomenon is discovered in the sense that an objective feature of our world, and of all worlds in which the appropriate boundary conditions are realized, is brought to light.

Thus, Hacking's idea that phenomena are created may be interpreted along lines that bring his view close to the traditional view on experiments. The distinction between the natural and the artificial, which is the core of the traditional view, appears to be compatible with the claim that phenomena are created in the weak sense. However, if we accept that phenomena are created in that sense, the idea of a pre-ex- isting nature has to be abandoned. Moreover, our view of the role of technology in science has to be modified. Technology, indeed, creates phenomena, but by creating phenomena, it discloses objective features of our universe.

The discussion of the question, what kind of conception of nature might be compatible with Hacking's idea of creating phenomena, will be postponed until after the examination of Hacking's claim that scientific entities are tools for doing.

6. Scientific entities as tools

It is interesting to note that a hard-headed realist like Hacking characterizes scientific entities as tools, that is, as instruments not for thinking but for doing. Here, realism and instrumentalism come close together: objects are real because they turn out to be effective instruments! But Hacking is not defending some kind of Machian instrumentalism which is based on economy of thought (Hacking 1983, 263):

Electrons are no longer ways of organizing our thoughts or saving the phenomena that have been observed. They are ways of creating phenomena in some other domain of nature. Electrons are tools.

For Hacking scientific entities are tools for doing, for intervening in the world. Such a characterization of scientific entities is remarkable, to say the least; it brings science very close to technology, since an important aspect of technology is the design and production of tools. But technological tools are artifacts based on a human design. Does the same apply to scientific entities, when conceived as tools? Are they artifacts that may be characterized by a human design and a functionality? A positive answer would, of course, completely undermine the distinction between the natural and the artificial. Again, I shall argue that it is not necessary to give up the distinction between the natural and the artificial provided that we modify Hacking's characterization of scientific entities in an important way.

We will first address the question whether scientific entities, conceived as tools, are necessarily based on a human design. Consider again electrons. On Hacking's construal, electrons are real because we know how to exploit their causal properties in building equipment that performs its function well; they are effective tools. May we conclude from this that they are also based on a human design? That conclusion does

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not follow; using an object as a tool, does not mean it is man-made. To clarify this, consider a stone being used as a primitive hammer. Its use as a hammer is based on a specific physical property of the stone, namely its inertia. This property makes it possible to turn the object into an object with a specific functionality, without altering the object itself. Thus the object itself is not artificial, yet it may be used as a hammer.

The crucial point here is the recognition of the dual nature of any technological object: it is a physical object that is the carrier of a (socially constructed) functionality. In some cases the functionality may be carried by natural objects, in others the physical carrier of the functionality must be specifically constructed by man. A stone may be used as a simple hammer on the basis of its inertial mass; for a pair of scissors a specific physical object has to be constructed. To use electrons as tools, therefore, does not imply that electrons are the embodiment of a human design.

What about the functionality of scientific entities? If they are tools, they ought to possess a functionality. Even when the underlying physical object is not based on a human design, tools posses a function; with the help of tools we can achieve certain ends. Without that function, the object is surely not a tool. Therefore, to say that scientific entities are tools, as Hacking does, implies ascribing an (intrinsic?) functionality to those entities. As objects with a functionality, they are not natural objects. Again, the distinction between the natural and the artificial is endangered.

To get out of this predicament, I think we have to adapt Hacking's account. The fact that we become to believe in the reality of scientific entities because they can be used as tools, does not imply that they are tools, as Hacking claims. I guess that when Hacking characterizes scientific objects as being tools, he has in mind natural objects that can function as tools on the basis of their properties, or "causal powers" as he puts it; these causal properties are exploited in engineering (Hacking 1983, 274):

The best kinds of evidence for the reality of a postulated or inferred entity is that we can begin to measure it or otherwise understand its causal powers. The best evidence, in turn, that we have this kind of understanding is that we can set out, from scratch, to build machines that will work fairly reliably, taking advantage of this or that causal nexus.

Consider again an electron in a CRT. As a scientific entity it has certain properties, for instance charge; to say that it has charge is to say that it will show certain types of causal behavior. That causal behavior or causal nexus may be used by engineers to let the electron perform a certain function in producing another phenomenon. In other words, the electron can be used as a tool in a CRT.

In the above way, we can avoid ascribing (intrinsic) functionalities to scientific entities; from the point of view of their causal properties or powers, scientific entities remain natural objects. Through their use as tools, they acquire a functionality; qua scientific entities, however, that functionality is incidental and therefore not the subject matter of scientific inquiry. It is hard to reconcile Hacking's claim that scientific entities are tools with the fact that functions play no role in the vocabulary used in science for describing the physical world. Talk about functions is, of course, part and parcel of the vocabulary of the experimentalist, but only in so far as he is describing the equipment employed in an experiment, not its object of study.

Summing up, neither Hacking's claim that phenomena are created, nor the claim that scientific entities are used as tools, implies in my opinion that the distinction between the natural and the artificial must be abandoned. Even when science is taken to be a form of practice in which intervention in the world through experiments plays a crucial role, science and technology remain two different kinds of activities, dealing with different kinds of entities.

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7. Discussion: nature as constraints in action

In the foregoing, I have argued that Hacking's criticism against the traditional view of experiments does not render the distinction between the natural and the artificial ob- solete. A reconsideration of the concept of nature, however, seems necessary. I will put forward a tentative suggestion for interpreting nature from the perspective of science as a form of experimental practice. Hacking himself gives an interesting clue.He clearly recognizes the danger of a relativistic interpretation of his claim that phenomena are created. To avoid the conclusion that they are created at will, he points out that experimentalists experience all kinds of constraints when intervening in the world. I will take the notion of constraint as the starting point for suggesting a reinterpretation of nature.

Science in the form of theory or representation is usually a form of ontology; it tells what really exists (Lelas 1993, 425). Correspondingly, nature is described as consisting of some sort of entities whose behavior is governed by natural laws. If we consider science as a form of practice or action, another conception of nature, in terms of restrictions on our actions, seems more appropriate. We cannot transform or intervene in our environment in any way we like. We experience all kinds of constraints. Nature might, therefore, be conceived as the totality of constraints imposed on our action.

This characterization of nature is, however, clearly inadequate. Various types of constraints are operative in our interaction with the world. Constraints may find their origin in the individual involved in an action, or may be biological or cultural in origin. Others are due to our limited technological capabilities. These are not the object of study of the physical sciences; they are not considered to be natural constraints.

What kind of constraints, then, are natural constraints? This is a difficult question. At first sight, one might be tempted to answer that nature as the object of science con- sists of those constraints that are valid in our interaction with the material world independently of any specific context (decontextualized constraints), that is, natural constraints are universal constraints. Such constraints are usually called natural laws. But this answer will not do; it is much too restrictive. Take the law of free fall, Ohm's law or the Hall effect; they impose restrictions on the way we may interact with our physical environment (we cannot prepare a system such that objects in vacuum will not fall at the same speed etc.16). They are, however, only valid in highly specific, idealized contexts (which make those constraints amenable to mathematical treat- ment).17 With Hacking I agree that these constraints are created to the extent that they appear only within those contexts; these constraints do not exist apart from these contexts, but are nevertheless natural constraints.

Natural constraints might also be characterized as constraints that cannot be overcome, no matter how we intervene in our physical environment; they transcend human power. For instance, the law of conservation of energy forbids the creation of energy from nothing. This proposal sounds promising, but also raises problems. Only constraints that cannot in principle be overcome qualify as natural constraints, not those that in a given historical situation de facto cannot be overcome. This brings us to the problem of distinguishing between technological and natural constraints.

Technological constraints have a contingent character; they change over time. Let me illustrate this point with the example of the traditional light microscope. The first- microscopes had only a limited resolution power. That was not due to physical constraints, but due to technological imperfections. There was still scope for considerable technical improvement by using better lenses etc. Nowadays, however, the resolution power of these microscopes has reached a certain limit: given their design and the behavior of light, an improvement of resolution power is no longer possible. With regard to this type of microscope we may say that technology has run up against a natural constraint. Note that the design of the microscope plays a crucial role: by changing the design of the light microscope (and by exploiting other properties of light), the resolu-

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tion power of light microscopes may still be improved. Apparently, light has certain properties which makes it in principle impossible to improve on the resolution power of this type of microscope and that is the reason why we call them natural properties.

Other examples may be added, for instance the efficiency of steam engines. By re- moving technological constraints, their efficiency may be improved, but not beyond a certain physical limit described by the second law of thermodynamics. Such examples make clear that technological constraints depend upon human capacities (skills and knowledge) to intervene in the environment. But there is a class of constraints which are not conditioned by human capacities and that is precisely the reason why we call them 'natural' or 'physical' constraints.

Notes

1I thank Guy Debrock, Andries Sarlemijn, Marc de Vries and Menno Hulswit for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper.

2It changes in the course of the history of science and it depends upon the available technology and our understanding of that technology; see Tiles (1993).

3In the following we will restrict ourselves primarily to objects.

4For a more extensive discussion of the distinction between the natural and the artificial, see Feher (1993).

5It is doubtful whether the reverse is true; not every object or state of affairs that is the outcome of intentional human action has to be an artifact. Breeding animals may be a counter example.

6Not all artifacts are technological artifacts (e.g., a painting or sculpture).

7Note that the above distinction between the natural and the artificial presupposes that in some respect man is not part of nature.

8This schematic characterization of the difference between the natural and the artificial is not without problems. In biology, the difference between the natural and the artificial is rather intricate, as recent discussions about the patentability of the Harvard mouse demonstrate. Furthermore, in biology the notion of functionality is also applied to natural objects (the function of the eye or stomach). Finally, from an evolutionary point of view it may be very difficult to draw in general a clear cut borderline between the natural and the artificial. We will leave these problems aside; for our pur- poses, the above characterization is sufficient.

9Not all experiments involve technology; for instance, the real performance of Galilei's alleged experiment of the tower of Pisa would not require any specific technological equipment.

10The traditional view maintains that "anything artificial can be extracted, and its traces erased so that the natural shines out in its full splendour to the glassy essence of scientific apparatuses" (Lelas 1993, 432).

11This rejection of constructivism does not imply that I think that science is free of any constructivist elements. On the contrary, the work of Poincare, Duhem and the logical positivists (in particular Reichenbach), have shown that there is much room for conven- tions (that is, social constructions) in science, because there is no unique correspondence between sets of data and theories (known as the 'underdetermination of theory by facts').

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12See Hacking (1989, 21), where he says that the creation of phenomena has to be taken literally.

13See Hacking (1983, 220). If we assume that creating is a stronger notion than making, it seems to me that Hacking contradicts himself; on the same page (p. 220) he says that on the one hand scientists create phenomena, on the other that we do not make the phenomena.

14See Hacking (1989, p. 22); the following remark by Hacking, however, suggests a possibly relativistic position (1983, 228): "But the phenomena of physics-the Faraday effect, the Hall effect, the Josephson effect - are the keys that unlock the universe. People made the keys-and perhaps the locks in which they turn" (the italics are ours).

15See also Galilei's definition of naturally accelerated motion (Galilei 1974, 153); note that Galilei admits that this kind of motion does not occur in nature (Galilei 1974, 223)!

16Here, of course, we have to add the ceteris paribus clause.

17Of course, given those contexts, the constraints are universally valid. But that is not the point here; the constraints, like the laws of nature, are considered to be universally valid in any context, but because of all kinds of interfering processes, they do not show up in pure form or not at all. Cfr. Nancy Cartwright's idea that the laws of physics lie (Cartwright, 1983).

References

Ackermann, R.J. (1985), Data, instruments and theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cartwright, N. (1983), How the laws of physics lie. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Feher, M. (1993), "The natural and the artificial", Periodica Polytechnica; humani- ties and social sciences (Technical Univ. of Budapest, Budapest) 1: 67-76.

Franklin, A. (1986), The neglect of experiment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Galilei (1974), Two new sciences. transl. S. Drake, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Gallison, P. (1987), How experiments end. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

le Grand, F.E. (ed.) (1990), Experimental inquiries. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and intervening. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_ _ _ ___. (1989), "Filosofen van het experiment", Kennis en Methode XIII: 11-27. Lelas, S. (1993), "Science as technology", Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 44: 423-442.

Tiles, J.E. (1992), "Experimental evidence vs. experimental practice?", Brit. J. Phil. Sc. 43: 99-109.

____ (1993), "Experiment as intervention", Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 44: 463-475.

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psa- proceedings of the biennial meeting of the philosophy of science association volume 1994 issue...

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