ps2 1(south africa)final
TRANSCRIPT
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01210121012101211111
Fifty-Fifth World Health Assembly, Agenda item 13.9/ 18 May 2002
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Threats to Immunization
realitySmallpox
Poliomyelitis
Measles mortality
Burden of preventable disease
perceptionUnsupported safety concerns
Less acceptance of riskOverload of immune system
Polio vaccine and contraception
Bentsi-Enchill A, Duclos P and Folb P (2002)
SmallpoxPoliomyelitisMeasles mortalityBurden of disease
-3-3-3-3
Unsupported safety concernsLess acceptance of risk
Overload of immune system
Polio vaccine and contraception
Bentsi-Enchill A, Duclos P and Folb P (2002)
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Evolution of Immunisation Programmes
I n c
i d e
n c e
VaccineCoverage
Adverse Events(number and/or perception)
Disease
Outbreak
VaccinationStops
Pre-vaccineIncreasingCoverage
Loss ofConfidence
Resumptionof confidence
Eradication
Maturity of Programme
Adapted from: Grabstein JD, Hospital Pharmacy 1996
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Threats to Immunization
realitySmallpox
Poliomyelitis
Measles mortality
Burden of preventable disease
perceptionUnsupported safety concerns
Less acceptance of riskOverload of immune system
Polio vaccine and contraception
Bentsi-Enchill A, Duclos P and Folb P (2002)
Estimated AEFI Rates FollowingChildhood Vaccines
45454545
) 6666
) ,,,,
) 575575575575
) 8-8-8-8-
Supplementary information on vaccine safety: WHO, Geneva, 2000 WHO/V&B/00.36
5--58-55--58-55--58-55--58-5%%%% 5,95,95,95,95555
1/1000 to 1/ 50 000 doses
1/ 3 million doses for 1st dose OPV
1/1 million doses
1/750 000 doses
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VACCINE DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE
100 to 1 000 million USD Into market and beyond
Proof of principle Proof of concept Implementation
Identity ofactivecompound(s)
Chemicalcharacteristics
Identity ofactivecompound(s)
Chemicalcharacteristics
Vaccineformulation
Pharmaco-kinetics
Mechanism ofaction
Bioavailability
Vaccineformulation
Pharmaco-kinetics
Mechanism ofaction
Bioavailability
Animalmodels
Phase I andPhase IIclinical
trials
Advancedtoxicitytesting
Animalmodels
Phase I andPhase IIclinical
trials
Advancedtoxicitytesting
Dialogue withNRAs
Phase III trials
Dialogue withNRAs
Phase III trials
Regulatoryauthorities
Patent
Regulatoryauthorities
Patent
Basic ResearchBasic ResearchDevelopment
andValidation
DevelopmentDevelopment
andand
ValidationValidationUpscale
Post-marketingsurveillance
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VACCINE DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE
100 to 1 000 million USD Into market and beyond
Proof of principle Proof of concept Implementation
Identity ofactivecompound(s)
Chemicalcharacteristics
Identity ofactivecompound(s)
Chemicalcharacteristics
Vaccineformulation
Pharmaco-kinetics
Mechanism ofaction
Bioavailability
Vaccineformulation
Pharmaco-kinetics
Mechanism ofaction
Bioavailability
Animalmodels
Phase I andPhase IIclinical
trials
Advancedtoxicitytesting
Animalmodels
Phase I andPhase IIclinical
trials
Advancedtoxicitytesting
Dialogue withNRAs
Phase III trials
Dialogue withNRAs
Phase III trials
Regulatoryauthorities
Patent
Regulatoryauthorities
Patent
Basic ResearchBasic ResearchDevelopment
andValidation
DevelopmentDevelopment
andand
ValidationValidationUpscale
Post-marketingsurveillance
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VACCINE DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE
100 to 1 000 million USD Into market and beyond
Proof of principle Proof of concept Implementation
Identity ofactivecompound(s)
Chemicalcharacteristics
Identity ofactivecompound(s)
Chemicalcharacteristics
Vaccineformulation
Pharmaco-kinetics
Mechanism ofaction
Bioavailability
Vaccineformulation
Pharmaco-kinetics
Mechanism ofaction
Bioavailability
Animalmodels
Phase I andPhase IIclinical
trials
Advancedtoxicitytesting
Animalmodels
Phase I andPhase IIclinical
trials
Advancedtoxicitytesting
Dialogue withNRAs
Phase III trials
Dialogue withNRAs
Phase III trials
Regulatoryauthorities
Patent
Regulatoryauthorities
Patent
Basic ResearchBasic ResearchDevelopment
andValidation
DevelopmentDevelopment
andand
ValidationValidationUpscale
Post-marketingsurveillance
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Design
Qualitative and quantitative assessment of safety - (192 trialsHIV, sinusitis, AMI, arthritis, H. pylori, others.
Results
Severity of adverse effect reported adequately in 39%Laboratory-determined toxicity reported adequately in 29%Reasons for discontinuation reported in 46%
Median space allocated to safety results 0.3 pages
ConclusionSafety reporting was inadequate in all cases
-Ioannidis JPA and Lau J. JAMA 2001; 285(4):437-443
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5->,4-,4
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86
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Preclinical data identifying possible safety issues
(includes adjuvants, additives, growth medium residuals)
Predetermined method for detection of adverse events
System for clinical assessment of adverse events
Procedures in place to minimise risk of harm
Management strategies for risks that might arise
Communication plan to deal with new safety information
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Causality assessment
consistency
strength of association
specificity
temporal relationbiological plausibility
Weekly Epidemiological Record 23 March 2001, 76, 85-89
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VACCINE DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE
100 to 1 000 million USD Into market and beyond
Proof of principle Proof of concept Implementation
Identity ofactivecompound(s)
Chemicalcharacteristics
Identity ofactivecompound(s)
Chemicalcharacteristics
Vaccineformulation
Pharmaco-kinetics
Mechanism ofaction
Bioavailability
Vaccineformulation
Pharmaco-kinetics
Mechanism ofaction
Bioavailability
Animalmodels
Phase I andPhase IIclinical
trials
Advancedtoxicitytesting
Animalmodels
Phase I andPhase IIclinicaltrials
Advancedtoxicitytesting
Dialogue withNRAs
Phase III trials
Dialogue withNRAs
Phase III trials
Regulatoryauthorities
Patent
Regulatoryauthorities
Patent
Basic ResearchBasic ResearchDevelopment
andValidation
DevelopmentDevelopment
andand
ValidationValidationUpscale
Post-marketingSurveillance/PV
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8888 - diagnosis of ADRs
- spontaneous reporting
- research
%%%% peer review
9999- research- education and training
%%%% communication and training
- education
- 8888%%%%@@@@
ADRs; medication errors; system failures; non-compliance;
treatment failures; irrational drug use.
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Fig, 1. The reporting process for adverse events following
immunization (AEFIs)
Loop 1Loop 2
1 Initial report2 Report to action level3 Investigation4 Send on reports meeting
criteria5 Report for consultation/
action6 Decision communication
(regulatory, public healt
7 Public statement
8 Contract information
UNICEF
Ministry of healthVaccine
manufacturer
Health care worker Supervisor NIP coordinator NRA
Procurement
agency
Hospital
(referred medical
facility)
Public health
community
Patient
Public
1
1
7
3
4
5
66
5
5
8
5
2
3
Health careworker
Recognizes AEFIs
Reports AEFIs
Treats patient/ refers
patient for treatment
Supervisor
Stimulates reports
Investigates
Filters
Provides feedback
Manages data
Proposes classification
NIP coordinator
Receives reports
Transmits reports
Triages
Works with environment
Manages data
Ensures response
NRA
Receives reports
Transmits reports
Shares database
Evaluates reports
Takes action
Notifies
Functions
NIP, national immunization programme; NRA, national regulatory authority
6
6
6
2
1
media
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Widespread use of vaccine in under-serviced communities
Public intolerance of risk to healthy subjects
Political dimensions of the disease
Lack of reporting culture in the countries concerned
Threats to the vaccine of rare adverse events
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