ps2 1(south africa)final

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    !"#!$!"#!$!"#!$!"#!$%%%%&"&''(!&"&''(!&"&''(!&"&''(!

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    //*+"&''&//*+"&''&//*+"&''&//*+"&''&

    01210121012101211111

    Fifty-Fifth World Health Assembly, Agenda item 13.9/ 18 May 2002

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    Threats to Immunization

    realitySmallpox

    Poliomyelitis

    Measles mortality

    Burden of preventable disease

    perceptionUnsupported safety concerns

    Less acceptance of riskOverload of immune system

    Polio vaccine and contraception

    Bentsi-Enchill A, Duclos P and Folb P (2002)

    SmallpoxPoliomyelitisMeasles mortalityBurden of disease

    -3-3-3-3

    Unsupported safety concernsLess acceptance of risk

    Overload of immune system

    Polio vaccine and contraception

    Bentsi-Enchill A, Duclos P and Folb P (2002)

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    Evolution of Immunisation Programmes

    I n c

    i d e

    n c e

    VaccineCoverage

    Adverse Events(number and/or perception)

    Disease

    Outbreak

    VaccinationStops

    Pre-vaccineIncreasingCoverage

    Loss ofConfidence

    Resumptionof confidence

    Eradication

    Maturity of Programme

    Adapted from: Grabstein JD, Hospital Pharmacy 1996

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    Threats to Immunization

    realitySmallpox

    Poliomyelitis

    Measles mortality

    Burden of preventable disease

    perceptionUnsupported safety concerns

    Less acceptance of riskOverload of immune system

    Polio vaccine and contraception

    Bentsi-Enchill A, Duclos P and Folb P (2002)

    Estimated AEFI Rates FollowingChildhood Vaccines

    45454545

    ) 6666

    ) ,,,,

    ) 575575575575

    ) 8-8-8-8-

    Supplementary information on vaccine safety: WHO, Geneva, 2000 WHO/V&B/00.36

    5--58-55--58-55--58-55--58-5%%%% 5,95,95,95,95555

    1/1000 to 1/ 50 000 doses

    1/ 3 million doses for 1st dose OPV

    1/1 million doses

    1/750 000 doses

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    ****

    :$''''':$''''':$''''':$'''''

    8-8-8-8-

    ::::

    $'''''$'''''$'''''$'''''

    600 8 000 0.3 90

    5:5:5:5: 90- 4 000

    0 0.1

    600-2 000 0

    8888 100-4 000 0

    ;;;; 0 2

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    *+,

    )

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    VACCINE DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE

    100 to 1 000 million USD Into market and beyond

    Proof of principle Proof of concept Implementation

    Identity ofactivecompound(s)

    Chemicalcharacteristics

    Identity ofactivecompound(s)

    Chemicalcharacteristics

    Vaccineformulation

    Pharmaco-kinetics

    Mechanism ofaction

    Bioavailability

    Vaccineformulation

    Pharmaco-kinetics

    Mechanism ofaction

    Bioavailability

    Animalmodels

    Phase I andPhase IIclinical

    trials

    Advancedtoxicitytesting

    Animalmodels

    Phase I andPhase IIclinical

    trials

    Advancedtoxicitytesting

    Dialogue withNRAs

    Phase III trials

    Dialogue withNRAs

    Phase III trials

    Regulatoryauthorities

    Patent

    Regulatoryauthorities

    Patent

    Basic ResearchBasic ResearchDevelopment

    andValidation

    DevelopmentDevelopment

    andand

    ValidationValidationUpscale

    Post-marketingsurveillance

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    VACCINE DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE

    100 to 1 000 million USD Into market and beyond

    Proof of principle Proof of concept Implementation

    Identity ofactivecompound(s)

    Chemicalcharacteristics

    Identity ofactivecompound(s)

    Chemicalcharacteristics

    Vaccineformulation

    Pharmaco-kinetics

    Mechanism ofaction

    Bioavailability

    Vaccineformulation

    Pharmaco-kinetics

    Mechanism ofaction

    Bioavailability

    Animalmodels

    Phase I andPhase IIclinical

    trials

    Advancedtoxicitytesting

    Animalmodels

    Phase I andPhase IIclinical

    trials

    Advancedtoxicitytesting

    Dialogue withNRAs

    Phase III trials

    Dialogue withNRAs

    Phase III trials

    Regulatoryauthorities

    Patent

    Regulatoryauthorities

    Patent

    Basic ResearchBasic ResearchDevelopment

    andValidation

    DevelopmentDevelopment

    andand

    ValidationValidationUpscale

    Post-marketingsurveillance

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    VACCINE DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE

    100 to 1 000 million USD Into market and beyond

    Proof of principle Proof of concept Implementation

    Identity ofactivecompound(s)

    Chemicalcharacteristics

    Identity ofactivecompound(s)

    Chemicalcharacteristics

    Vaccineformulation

    Pharmaco-kinetics

    Mechanism ofaction

    Bioavailability

    Vaccineformulation

    Pharmaco-kinetics

    Mechanism ofaction

    Bioavailability

    Animalmodels

    Phase I andPhase IIclinical

    trials

    Advancedtoxicitytesting

    Animalmodels

    Phase I andPhase IIclinical

    trials

    Advancedtoxicitytesting

    Dialogue withNRAs

    Phase III trials

    Dialogue withNRAs

    Phase III trials

    Regulatoryauthorities

    Patent

    Regulatoryauthorities

    Patent

    Basic ResearchBasic ResearchDevelopment

    andValidation

    DevelopmentDevelopment

    andand

    ValidationValidationUpscale

    Post-marketingsurveillance

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    Design

    Qualitative and quantitative assessment of safety - (192 trialsHIV, sinusitis, AMI, arthritis, H. pylori, others.

    Results

    Severity of adverse effect reported adequately in 39%Laboratory-determined toxicity reported adequately in 29%Reasons for discontinuation reported in 46%

    Median space allocated to safety results 0.3 pages

    ConclusionSafety reporting was inadequate in all cases

    -Ioannidis JPA and Lau J. JAMA 2001; 285(4):437-443

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    5->,4-,4

    )

    ) 8."

    ) .?"""

    )

    )

    86

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    Preclinical data identifying possible safety issues

    (includes adjuvants, additives, growth medium residuals)

    Predetermined method for detection of adverse events

    System for clinical assessment of adverse events

    Procedures in place to minimise risk of harm

    Management strategies for risks that might arise

    Communication plan to deal with new safety information

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    Causality assessment

    consistency

    strength of association

    specificity

    temporal relationbiological plausibility

    Weekly Epidemiological Record 23 March 2001, 76, 85-89

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    VACCINE DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE

    100 to 1 000 million USD Into market and beyond

    Proof of principle Proof of concept Implementation

    Identity ofactivecompound(s)

    Chemicalcharacteristics

    Identity ofactivecompound(s)

    Chemicalcharacteristics

    Vaccineformulation

    Pharmaco-kinetics

    Mechanism ofaction

    Bioavailability

    Vaccineformulation

    Pharmaco-kinetics

    Mechanism ofaction

    Bioavailability

    Animalmodels

    Phase I andPhase IIclinical

    trials

    Advancedtoxicitytesting

    Animalmodels

    Phase I andPhase IIclinicaltrials

    Advancedtoxicitytesting

    Dialogue withNRAs

    Phase III trials

    Dialogue withNRAs

    Phase III trials

    Regulatoryauthorities

    Patent

    Regulatoryauthorities

    Patent

    Basic ResearchBasic ResearchDevelopment

    andValidation

    DevelopmentDevelopment

    andand

    ValidationValidationUpscale

    Post-marketingSurveillance/PV

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    8888 - diagnosis of ADRs

    - spontaneous reporting

    - research

    %%%% peer review

    9999- research- education and training

    %%%% communication and training

    - education

    - 8888%%%%@@@@

    ADRs; medication errors; system failures; non-compliance;

    treatment failures; irrational drug use.

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    Fig, 1. The reporting process for adverse events following

    immunization (AEFIs)

    Loop 1Loop 2

    1 Initial report2 Report to action level3 Investigation4 Send on reports meeting

    criteria5 Report for consultation/

    action6 Decision communication

    (regulatory, public healt

    7 Public statement

    8 Contract information

    UNICEF

    Ministry of healthVaccine

    manufacturer

    Health care worker Supervisor NIP coordinator NRA

    Procurement

    agency

    Hospital

    (referred medical

    facility)

    Public health

    community

    Patient

    Public

    1

    1

    7

    3

    4

    5

    66

    5

    5

    8

    5

    2

    3

    Health careworker

    Recognizes AEFIs

    Reports AEFIs

    Treats patient/ refers

    patient for treatment

    Supervisor

    Stimulates reports

    Investigates

    Filters

    Provides feedback

    Manages data

    Proposes classification

    NIP coordinator

    Receives reports

    Transmits reports

    Triages

    Works with environment

    Manages data

    Ensures response

    NRA

    Receives reports

    Transmits reports

    Shares database

    Evaluates reports

    Takes action

    Notifies

    Functions

    NIP, national immunization programme; NRA, national regulatory authority

    6

    6

    6

    2

    1

    media

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    *+,,

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    +%$3

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    47,857,+4547,857,+4547,857,+4547,857,+45

    2.2.2.2.

    3+3+3+3+

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    ----%%%%

    8888

    ,6H5-5,6H5-5,6H5-5,6H5-5 %%%%

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    7-

    5

    7-

    +54,5

    H,545H,545H,545H,545CCCC """"""""

    597-,>545597-,>545597-,>545597-,>545CCCC """"""""

    5,>5455,>5455,>5455,>545CCCC """"""""

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    Widespread use of vaccine in under-serviced communities

    Public intolerance of risk to healthy subjects

    Political dimensions of the disease

    Lack of reporting culture in the countries concerned

    Threats to the vaccine of rare adverse events

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    .

    8+8+8+8+

    +"I+"I+"I+"I

    ....

    *.*.*.*.%%%%.I.I.I.I

    *.I*.I*.I*.I

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