• Ps 1-- .' o~s

f8P S!CIEf

** * *** * • * * * * *

This study is based on information secur ed from hichly eval uated, TOP ~~CR~ sources . In order to protect these sources , and thus assure the continuous flow of t his i ntel l i ­cence , greatest care must be used t o safecruard and maintain t he secrecy of the material pr e­sented .

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

OoP7 Ro, l ot 4 oop1ea.

'm.BLB OJ' OONTIN'lS

INTROWCTION

A. Rm:>RGANIZA.TION OF G~.AN INTXLLI01!NCE SKRVICES •• • • ••• , •• , •••• • • • •

B. 'll1E Om:AN INTELLIGENCE SKRVICE AB IT REIATl!S 'ro Oll:IWN OP"B:til ~ISTAN'CK PI.A:ta ••• • •• • ••• • ••••••••••••••••• • • • •• • •••••••••• 'DU! B

C. PIDBABLB PUTIJRE OF Gm.'AN INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICE, S.llXlRE'l' POLICE AND CRniINAL POLICE BURKA.US ••• •• •• •••• ••••••• • •• •• ••• ••••• 'l)U! c

D. PROBABLE FU'IDRE OF GERMAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BURmU AND m.E MII.ITARY BlJRFA.U •••• ••• • • • • •••••• • • • • • • • •• • • • • • •••••••••• • • ••• 'DUl D

INTEI..I..IG~CE OPERATIONS. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • '11\.B .I

F. EVID.liNCE FROM GER!i1N AND OnmR SO~ES IN WHICH 'IRE J!lm,!Y•S CONCERN WI'ffi FQS'l\-Dl!:P'BAT ACTIVITY MAY BE INFERRED., •• ,,,, ••• ••• • •

G. OTHER »J~fY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ••••.•••.•.. . ......•..•••••• ••

XXHIBI'l'3

'DUl G

l. Absorption of Abwebr by &SHA. • •• • ~. . . . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 'D\B l

2 . Preeen t Gel'Dlan Intelligence • . •. • •• • • • ••.•••.••• •• •. •.•••••••• ••• • 'l)\B 2

3, Post-Hostilities Oerme.n Intelligenoe.. ... . . . . .... . . ....... ... .... TAB 3

4, Use of Parti Populaire F:rGllcaise Stay-Behind Network bT RSP.>. •• • • • 'DUl 4

!I . Germen Intelligence Networks in the Bbineland, Lowlands...... .... 'n\B 5

6 , Geman Intelligence Networks reoentl.y Set Up t o Operate trom .French llcl rts •.•••••• ••• .••••. • ••..••.•••• . ••. • • · . • • • · • • • • • • • TAB 6

FU'ruRX PIANS OF 'll!E Om'.AN Ill'l'ELI.I OPNCE Sl!!l'IIC!

Ill rn:> IX.JC TI ON

'!be Oennan Intell igence Sel"Vioo 1s now controlled by Heinrich Himnler

and his 9ubol'dinetes . 'Ib18 centralization or all German int elligence resul ted

fro"' the r ecent absor , tioo of the t:reditioneJ. l:ilitery Int elligence Organi7litioo

by the l•azi Party Intell i £eoce Sel"Vices. l\'hatner military considsratiooa ~

have pl ayed a part in t his move , the fact to be reckoned tlith i e thnt the Nazis

0011 possess an i ndispensable weapon for survival. '.:bey ar e prepared to est ablish

and control completely n~Tl:liIOE!ICE, SUBVERSION and SABO'lll.GE for underground

operations .

llhile t he compl ete , factunl gl ens of t·uture Germen iotolliaence ere

not in -•llied hanC:s , 1t is poss ible to trace, from availabl e i nformation, an

outline of the pl annt>d Cierman prog:rem t or developing the lnte lli'l'.enoo Sel"Vice

into an underground 01•g0J11zat ton.

'lhe source mnterie.1 for the followi ng outline of the C'.onnan Intelli-•

eooco plans corr.es from captured documents , prisoner or war int errogations, and

o:os t reliabl e 1'op .. ecrct and Secret s ources .

l . '!he Cerruen Int ol l 1gence Services have evolved duri ne t he pest year

from two coi::pet1n: or3an1zo.tions int o a s1nsJ.e unified syst em. The bitter com-

pet l t1oo between the Naz i Port y Intelligence Service (Reichssicberheitahauptomt ,

hore1narter referred~ as RS!lk) and the secret ~111tary Intelli ·eoce , (AB~) .

ceased wt:on t he .sJ-;. , controlled by Heinri ch Hilmller , ousted Admiral Ce.naris and

e baor bed t he >Js"n'Uill as one of 1 ts bureaus. ·n.a ner1 RS!lA bureau i s called t he

t.111 t 11ry 6ureo.u . The unificat ion left a hi ghly tre1oed , centralizod Kroup

-- - _)

I

...... Page 2 ,

or rena tioal Nazis in charge or the Gel'WlJl Secret Int elligenco Service.

'•11 t h i n e. tew months , e.ft er contro l hod been aesumed by the RSHA ,

it became obYi ous that dre.sti c personnel changes were being made within the

Genr.an Intelligence Service. 'lhe aeleotion or Ven:tan agen t s , their training,

e.n<i t he rooults of t heir m1 88ions illloodietely improved under tho more er fic ient

RSHA l eeuo r s hip .

llhetber this roorganl.zation or t he Gentan Intelligence Services

developed from e s t ruggle for po.,,.er between two cOlllpet1ne orgoni zo.tions , o r

fib ether it was e s t ep in n pl e.n to perpetuate the Nazi i deal in th A race or a

recognized m111 t ary defeat, !s not e t this time clear.

2 . Chart l\o . l , Af!SOi!PTIO,; OF ABl/ffiR BY REl C"r.SSI Cl'.ERl-:EI'ISHAv"P.'.llUuT,

shows t h'l o.ssim1le. tion of tho old Abwehr by the RSHA , Thia commenced in tho

sp~in~ of 1944, In tho first stages , the RSHA took control of everything

except ~bwehr field int.lli~ence units operating directly with the unn.ies .

!liter, tf.o control oi thns~ Abwehr 1ntelli;;ence units also passed to the RSHA .

ilie 1\ezi i'erty Int9ll i ·enco Cr geniza tion thus gained 'ro..Y<l. control over all

3 . Cbsrt 2 , PJ,&;;E:;T Gl:X.NI 1:>'1'21.LICLi/CE, shows tbo reorganized !lild

unifi ed r;c.>.um Intelligonce Service . It 1e o cent ralized intelligence organi­

zation (positive , counter o.nd sabotage) which cen be used for nn underground

Mrv1ce srtor c!et'e'1t , On the cbe.rt tho subdirtsions of the RS!J;.. are called

NltS - - t ho Ceman 11<>rd for Bureaus ,

'ihese bureaus e. r e divided lnto t•:o general sections.

(a) Int•u":lnl Ceritan Iotelli~ence, (1 . e ., ;>os1t1ve and counter­

intelligence , Security and tte Cr!Juinal Police) . 'Illese

ere controlled by Bureau III , tho Internal Soourity Service;

Bureau IV, tho Secret Folice or Gea t eix>; and Bureau v , the

Criminal Police Bureeu,

ABSORPTION OF ABWEHR BY REICHSSICHERHEITSHAUPTAMT.

AMT 1

Pu1CN111J.

HIMMLER

NAZI PARTY INTELLIGENCE R5HA

AMT /\•fr A11T AMT AMT II: 1[ 11[ 1l "Sil

UGAI.. SrnJllrt'< S£C11ET CRIMI foREIGH SeRv1ce: STATE. PoLICE lwru.u

fbLICE PusulU>S

IN~IDE. GERl'IAN'C'

HITLER

AMT w MILAHT

locllltJGO MtuT--RE!>EAl\CH -ll.C~(S

OUTSIDE GERMA NY.

OKW ,, .-----'------. I

JOINT INTELLI GENCE ~_) AB WEHR ~-~

~----.-------' C.?

toooMI- 5~MTl\GE: C....n'~ -~OH ESPIOIW.E

O'P£RATIONAL AREA:>

r •J

AlllD\.OHG

z AM."lllSl"RlmlM<

f->RESE t-JT GE RMAf\J lt--.1TE LL \G E t-J CE

HITLER

HIMMLER

REIC\-\S S I C HE ~HEIT5HAUPTAMT KALTEt\lBRUtJtJER.

No. 2 n f '. ( . (.} _ ....

I ::1 ~) ,,... ' ' ~) (

I I ' ,,1 (~ c' ..--~~~~~~~~~~~-'-~~~......_~......,....~~~~....-~~~~~~~----. ~

AMT I . PERSOIJIJEL

AMTil L E.GAL

Awn 111 SECU~ITY S t:R.VICE

S.D.

!~ S IDE G ERMANY

AMTN SECRET 5TATE

POLIC.E GESTAPO

AMT1f C R IMlllJAL

Pouce. KRI PO

O UTSIDE

G ER.MA"-IY

AMT1II f ORf:IG l\l

l~TELUGDJCE SERVICE

AUSLAf\.JDS

AMTW IDEOLOGICAL

Rt:.'5EAR.CH

0 PERA1'10hlAL

Ar::.EA5

MIL AMT

M1uTAO.:IS(H~ A MT

........ Pago 3 ,

(b) External Ce~n Int elligenco, Subver sion, Sabot age and

Oount er-intolligenoo, 'lboao are oontro l l od by Bureau VI ,

t he ?orei gn I n tell i gence Bureau , and by the most recent

addit ion, t he Lli litary Bureau which m a sot up to tak'l

over most of t ho func tions of the o l d Abwohr,

4 , Chart 3, PU'l\JRE .PO.ST HOSTILITIES Gft:All nf7ELLIGENCE, shows tbe

probably l'uture o rGanlza tion of the Gen..an In telligence Servico. 'lbe bureaus

outlined in red are t l.ose >411cb will continue in the post - defeat period. The

basis for ti.is chart l s tho mos t recent i ntelligence report s 1·~1 ich explici t ly

set out l'uture pl ens 1 or tl.ese RSHA bureaus. 'Ihe dotted Uno a indicate those

bU!"enus whose t'U tuxe i$ n-.t entirely clear et present ,

B. 'lhZ C:ZRl•Al~ Di'l'i!..L!GE'ICE SERVICE A!:l I'.!' RELATE:> 'ID CER . .AN OPFl'I l'.ESISTANCE PLAN/:j •. • • l . Infon:iation has been received that the officers for a Ge:m.e.n Army

of from 3!>,000 to 40 ,000 men are nolf being tra ined in special Nazi 1!'\lebrer school s

for use in resist ance and i'\ler illa warfare . 'Illis crmy is under the control or

c central sto.rr . Its troops ere sel9oted volunteere dre.wn froc' Nazi party ir.em­

bers , hi tlor Youth , the \la!fen SS end special Sebot age uni ts , t.c.ny o~ >.bom hcve

been Nitbdrawn from tho fighting fronts for this training.

Prepara t ions f or port isun end tor1~rist acti vity have alrea~y been

made by cachin~ supnlies tbroJ.ghou t Germany, '!be scale of these prepe.retions ia

l.ndictted b;. experience in France and Italy Where over 800 se.botase and post­

invnsion 11upply dumps nlreed;• have be11n uncovered ,

RSHA plans for tt.e future are closely essociated wi tb Ceman Re­

s1sta."lce pl!lns but t eir coordina tion 1s not yet •1bolly clear. From a number

01· reliable 5,,urces , 1 t t.os been reportod tl:a t t he RSRA bas i ssued directions

for under&round resistsnce . At present it is presU!ll8d t hat tbeae

PosT Hosr1 L1T1Es GERMAt-J l~TE.LLIGEtJCE.

r - -- - ---------I

, __ ............. I AMTI , , 'PERSONNEL I I

I AMI TI I

I LEGAL I

I I I I f I _______ .. , ______ __ !

,_

AMTfil. St:t:URITY SERVICE.

S.D.

/

it-JSIDE

GERMAt.JY

'

/

-

I AMTN I A MT1l.

I I I

:st:cRET I STATE I

:c RIM I IJAL : 1 Pouc.E ,

1 Pouc.E 1 : KRIPO I

:GESTAPO: I I I - - -7-- -- - -- ;:.; -- --

...... / ..--/ ...... ..... -...-

AMT1IT I AMT.W. : foRE161J :IDEOLOGICAL I

I ~TELUC.E\JO: I RE.SEARCH I

AU5LANDS I

I __ ___ _ _ J

OUTSIDE GERMANY

MILAMT

MIUTAERISlHES AMT

- · P&g• 4

diroctiona apply to intolligonoo, aubYeraion and aabotago r ather than to continued guerrilla roe iatance.

z. It 1a definitely know n that 1poeitio_ u1 ignmont a for the poet-aurrander pe riod h&V'9 already been made to buroaua of tho RSl!A , u followe r {Seo Ch.art S). . .

{a) The INTERNAL SEC;JRITY SERVICE BtlllEAU 1a oharged wi th t he collection of politioal and ooonomio infornation inside

Ge~.

(b) The FOREIGll IlfTELLIGEHCE BUREAU and the ICILITARY BUREAU are to coll eot political , economic and military information outside German~'"

{o) The l.!ILI TARY BUREAU will form at ay-bohind not • in Weatorn Germany for military reporting, pro1umably for guerrilla neod1 .

C, PROBABLE Pll'l'URE OF GER!.!AN INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICE, SECRET POLICE A.ND ~

CRU.UNAL POLICE BUREAUS ,

1. BUREAU I I I , Tl!E INTER..ijAL SECURITY SERVICE, conduct1 in..,.,1tigationa and diroota i ntelligonoo within Gormal°IY• while tho Soorot Police or Ges t apo, Bureau IV, i i t he exooutive agonoy for making arrea ta and oarrying out interrogations. Tho offeeti veno1e of tho Go1tapo l a l ar gely duo to the t horoughneaa of the Internal Securi ty Service .

Reoont reliable reports indioat o that the I nt erna l Security Service wi ll continue in ita intelligence rwtotion and will al ao have the ros ponaibi l l t y fer t he eatabli1hlonnt of po1t-def eat networlca within the Reioh,

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

•

.._. Prob&ble Future of Germ&n In tern&l Seouri t y Servioe, Secret Polio• and Crimina l Polioe Bureaua , oontinued1 -

P&ge 6

It ia oonaider ed that t~e peraoTIAlity recorda under the control

of t he Intern&l Seourity Bureau &re moat complete &nd will be ueed 1110at

ef fe otively in c&rrying out underground activiti ea • •

2 . THE GESTAPO BllRSAU, &ooording to reliable reporta, went through

& considerable reorganiiat ion during the p,..t eunmier. Thia r eorgani t&tion

followed the assignment to it of Counter-Eapion&ge within Germ& r\Y &nd the

occupied areaa , formerly conducted by the Abwehr. It i • not known yet

whet~er its functiona will be maint&i n"d in a eep&rat e Ges t apo Bureau or

merged with Bureau III , the Inte rnal Security Service.

3. THE CRI /.IINAL POLICE BUREAU haa , for the moat part , oooupied

itse lf with straight criminal activity in the pe.at . Recent reports i ndicate

that the Germans belie""' that the Allied Cont r ol Comntlssion wi ll have to

utilite the eervicea cf the Cr indnal Police, now contr ol led by Bureau v. '

In antioip&tion of euoh al lied ac t ion / both the Gesta po Buraau and Internal

Se ourity Sorvioe Bureau peraonnel &re being planted in tho Criminal Police.

D. PROBABLE FUTURE OP GBRJ!AN FCl\EIGll I!ITELLIGE!ICB BUREAU AND THE

1!ILITARY BUREAU.

t . THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (NO. VI) has been given the

primary reeponeibility for poat-defe&t inte lligence network.I out1ide Ge,.,..,y .

Thia w111 ino lude t he oounter- intel ligence f'unotiona &broad

t aken over when the Abwehr was absorbed into the RSHA. The Foreign Intelligence

Bureau directs the forei~ intelligence polioy G:l oonduota cert&in independent

operation.a .

Probable l'\lture ot Ge rman Foreign Intelll.p;enoe Bureau 111d t hot Military Bureau, continued •-

Page 6

2. THE MILITARY Bl/REAU , into • hioh the remt.inder of the Abwehr WU incorporated, ha• allo been e.aaigned the duty or carrying on foreign espionage dur ing the poet-def eat peri od, At present , the ~lilitary Bureau maintain.I operational oontrol over foreign intolligenoe activities in addition to 1 ta straight mlli tary fie ld intelligenc e funct ions .

3. Both the Foreign Intelligence Bureau a.nd the Military Bureau are headed by l>r . Walter Schellenberg. Ali a r esult thei r 1'1notion.t are well coordin&t ed, It is believed that the afU!le relationship between t he two bureaus will carry on into the post-defeat period.

E, EVIDEllCE ESTABLISHHIO EX:ISTf:~fCE OF GERMAN POST DEFEAT WTELLIOEllCE

OPERATIONS,

1, Plana f or Operat ions .

( t.) Detinite instructions for post -defeat operations have been iuued by the RSHA. Responsibility he.a been e.aaigned functionally a.nd

geographically, •ithin a.nd without the Reioh, to s pecifio RSHA bureau• .

(b) A central controlling staff, it ia reported, baa been selected, of which the follo•ing mambert are knownr HtMMLE'.R , 1\'.ALTENBRUNNER {chief of the RSHA) , DALllEGE {former Chief of the Civil Polioa) , BACS-ZELEWSKI ( head of the German anti -Guerrilla or&a.nization) , REDIESS (auperior SS and police comunder for llorway) , PAHCKE (superior SS and police commander for

Denmark) , HOFFLIA:llll (SS officer, probably from Russia ) , BOR11MIN, FRANK (s uperior SS a.nd police com:oander in Prague) .

BBC'

Evidence Eatabliahing Exiatence of German Poat-Defeat Intelligence Operatiorus , continued1-

Page 7

(c) Group1 of Pive (Fuentergruppen) have been created,

subject only to the SuprelDft Centrll Conmw.nd. Theae are operational unita

for aaaigned area.a within the underground movement which ia be ing organiied

on a territor!&l baBia. Each unit ie to work independently without knowledge

ot the identities of neighboring Groupe of Five . They will exerclee tho

t hree functions , corres pondin11; to the s!'le t ions of the old Abwehr, of

Intelligence , Sabota&e and Security. It I• stated that the fundamental duty

of each Group ot Five ia to aot a• an intelligence reporting unit . They~

recruit a gents at their discretion. Ea ch group will have at i ta disposal

extensive equip:oent fbr t he execution of the three funct ions . This equipment

con11 iats of 1 a secret arl!lS depot, a hospitli, a -,hemicli.l l aboratory, forging

equipment, a prlntin& plant, a telephone exohan~e 9'd radi~ 00""1\lllication.

(d) Regional Un i t s ( Landeaverbaende) tre.l.ned in radio, have

been newly formed for po$t-defeat operatio11J1 . They are located in German

cities where in some oases their headquarters , their des ir;nations o.n:l their

leadera are kno\C\ . They operate w1 th and per ha pa under tlD or thr ee ru.in

divisions of the Geriaan Intelligenee Service , a factor indicating the

flexibility whloh has characteri1ed Ger man Intelligence operations in recent

months ,

2, Personnel.

(a) necent inform&tion ahowa a new trend in the selection of

enemy intellir,ence personnel . Rooruits are bein~ selected with tho

greatoat care and the knowledge of the poet-defeat and stay-behind operations > conte'llpl&ted i•, by order , limited to the smallest posaible number. Thia

Evidenoe Eatabl i ahi ng Exiat enoe of German Poat-Defeat I nt elligence Opera t i ona , Pereonnel , oontinued1-

meaaure i a t aken purpoaely to avoid t he 1mpreaaion of def eatism whioh would

ariae 1t t he exia t enee or auch pl ana a hould become generally lcncwn.

(b) The l eaders of the Groupe of Fi ve deaor ibed abo'nl are

ohosen by high aut hority in the Security Bur eau f r om among t he most highl y

t r a i ned of t he Waff en- SS personnel who i n many ou es have been recal led f r om

the front f o r a pooial t r ainine;.

(o) Agents are be ing withdrawn fr om other aa• i9'-~•nta, auoh

as air for ce int elligence, f or pos t - occupational work.

(d) Recently o rganized cadraa under t ho di rection of the

well-known Otto SKORZF.llY, head or Sabot&go and Subvers ion, a r e ear- marked

for t he r esis tance.

( e) 1\'')rten are be i ng r ecruited aa agenta for post- def eat

Int elli gence Repor ting and Secur i t y.

3. Met hods .

(a ) lnstruotiona have been i ssued generally t o Intel li r;once

perso nnel to ~ int o hiding, in the event of defeat , and/or to paaa t hem.selves

off aa priva t e citizens . It is further r eported that Himmle r he.a given

secret nrders recently to SS t r oopa to a urrender where the a i t uat ion 1•

hopel eas aa a measur e of conservation f o r l ter under ground operations .

Sel ected i:e r aonnel will t hua ~o undergr ound aa pr isoners of war.

(b) I t is also r eported that SS personnel ii being t r.i. ned

i n Communist method• with a Tiew t o i nfil tra tion.a o f t he Communist Party

aft er defeat . Former Conmrunia t s who have become ?lad• i.n r ecent year• are

to be used in t hia operat i on for the doubl e purpoe~ of keeping t he Part y

al ivo undercover and fomenting diaoord between the occupying armiea.

REGP.AD£v U.1.~v_..:,_::,:_,1/H:.:.

Page 9

Evidenoe E1tabli1hing Sxi1tenoe of German Poat-Defeat Intelligence Operationa , Methoda, oontinueds-

(o) The Foreign Intelligence Bureau haa been inatruoted to

malce uae or busineaa and oommerci&.l oontaota aa a meana of r.a thering poet-

def eat intelligenoe • . . (d) •Land mines for operation by ata.y- behind networlca are

beini; le.yed i n a re&a which the ene?lly expec ts wil l be occupied. According to

our reports , thi1 is planned aa post- defeat operation.

(e ) Cover addresses in Switterland have been arranged for

the uae of a gents when Allied postal control 'Iii ll have been established tn

Germany,

4 . French Elements .

tar&• s cale a.otivity with French e l ements i i in progr••••

Pro-~ati organitations such aa the PIU"ti Populaire Frauc&i• and other groups

of Frenoh !iationo.l , , have been organized as a pt.rt of the German Intelli~nce

Servioe both for immediat e t aot ioal military use , s t ay-behind and post-

hostilities res ia tanoe , and for subver~ive , political and economic r eporting.

Another report states that there is a110 a s abotage ft chool ror the trai nin&

of French lll\tion11l s . Undergrnund cabl e lines are being layed from wes t of

t he Rhine es..s t to Stutt gart as an in.atrument , it i 1 bel i eved, ror poet-

occupa t tonal a ubvers • . .., acti vtty. Fa nner a , sone of them identified, are to

act IUl a1;ents. To rminal points along this system are lcnown. (SEE CHA.'lT

110. 4 . )

REGRAD.t:<:D UHCLASSIFIED

•

G E

'·- / --. .__

F .lANCE

R

/ / //// /

0 H El DE l-'84.JRG / ,

A N V o B1eERACH. /

W /T 0U1"STAT ION

,. /,. ,

//

Ut..M 0 • ,,'~ ,,

,' J , . ,' , .

otot..MAR •

0 HE CHINGEN STOP.l\GE !JEPOT

oGE.ISUNG~N W/ T 0uT5TA,.ION ,.

,

J ° FRE\BURG No. 4 W/ T OIJ\:;ITATION

• ~

l'Pf 5 TAY· BEHIND NE:TWORKANo LINES or TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION

J 5PHERE Of INTERE$T REGRADEn rn.r0LA. ·~WIED TELE.PHONE CA"Bl.E L INE.5. -----

Page 10,

F . EVIDENCE FRO:t.l GERMAN AND O'll!ER SOlffiJES IN WHICH 'llU: E?m.;y• S CONCERI 11/I'IH R>ST-Im'EAT ACTIVITY h'AY BE INFERRED

1 , Lon,:;- Range Reporting

(a ) In recent months tbe Ge:nnan Intel l i gence has begun shi fti ng

i ts at ~ention more and more to l ong- range reporting, Field uni ts f ormerly en-

gaged in pure l y tactical int e l lii;enoe for immediate mil l tary use have bee.n in-

s~ructgd to gather poli tioel and econom.ic material . '!hi s eddi t i on to t heir

duties bas caused some compl aint• Simil a r i nstll!Uotions have been i ssued gener-

ally thro~ghout t he Germen Intelli gence Service and especia lly t o stay- behinds ,

Thlphesis is placed in forei gn report ing on the g ro v1t h of t he Comnunist movement .

These instructions are 1 ssued by t he se bureaus who are en t rusted wit h poet-

defea t ope itl. tions ,

(b) I t is reported a l so from Italy t hat the Gem<>n Intelli gence

Service i s stressing poli t i cel t rends and t he winning of post-war sympathy for

Gem.any .

2. South Germaey

A st ruggle for power among leading Rl>'HA off icers i s in progress , •

This is reported t o be a confli ct between No rth and South German element s , '.Die

preponderance of' s trength lies with t he Sout h Germans . Moreover , the centers

of resistanlre both mili te.ry and clandest ine , e.s p r esent l y report ed , are t o be

located i n Southorn o.nd Sout hwes t Germany. The 1mpl1c11t1ons of this develop-

ment for "meriolill operat ions in the period of occupat i on need not be stressed.

One leading Sou th Gennan personali ty is worth ment i oni ng , Otto

SJ :OP.z2:11Y , head of Sabotage and Subversion. He bas been acti ve in Greece, I~ly

end .ies t ern Europe and has been engaged in various gl amorous exploits such a s

the r escue of h:Ussolini . Hi s recent suceessas have won him a roving commission

a nd ha ve raised him t o a powerful position within the bureaus of t he R.SHA , which

n r e to be tnvolved in unde r ground opere.tioos , Information concerning his uni ts ,

~GRADED UNCLARSIFIED

Pase 11.

South Gonnan.y , continued: -

nowly ronned, states t hat t hey will be centers or underground resis t ance ,

3 . Opera tional Networks

(a) '.!he Rhine (sEg '!Y.B 1;o. 5)

There ie i ntonsivo activity in setting up e.geni-networks

along t he right bank or the RbiM . l<etworks, bordering on operational areas ,

ordinarily a rospons1b1l1ty of German l.iili tary I ntelligence, are dec l ared not

to be c militbl'y ir.atter but one or particule.r interest to the trazi Party,

(b) '.!he West Coast or Fl"61lce (SEE TJ<B i;o, 6)

Great interest is shown by Gern.o..n Intell i gence in t he fort -

resses on t l.e i/e- s t Coas t of France wh i ch arc still in Ceman hunds , Agents

hL ve been v~thciN1m froii. unHs on the .lestern Fr ont for e spionage in the Eor-

denW< nree •• be tar·ets are political lllld econooic c s well es military and

nnval . 'll:ll s les t factor is dif1'i cult to expl a in , tor t his area , on o t her than

(c) 'L'he Lo" Countries. (SEL TAB NO. 5)

~.n activity sitlila r to t hat described in the preceding pare-

~11l ph i s in yro~resa t hroughout Holl and and alone the channel coast . 'lbese

opol·atlons are in t he chc rge of one of the nblost members of the Gennan Intel-

11 ;ence Service , l\ap i taenleut 11..nt SCAUCE!.:iUlli.

4 , SP:?. in

'Ihe Cel:!J.nn Intelligence Service in Spain bas been decentralized,

It is controlled both from .:1 thin ~pain and from vnrious po in t8 in Germany . Thie

rtutd condition indicates tbat t he Ceti'IRn Intellig8nce Service i s prepared tor

any emergency in Spe.in , political o r ot hennse, for example:

No. 5 52

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Spain, continuedt- Page 12

(a ) In1tr uctiona ha.ve been hsued to an at;ent in Spa in to r emain

there whatever h&ppena. Thia man ia to agent of tho section of the 11erman In-

telligencft Servioe responsible for intel ligence in the Uni t ed Kingdom and t he

Weatem 11.<>misphero , r::ommerci&l cover haa been aas l~od and no target gi ven .

(b) Plana have been made to penetre.te Pro.nee under German lntel-

l igenoe control from Spe.in. Vichyite refugeoa, black-nailed Spanish Loyallats

and Spanish businessmen are to be used. It has been agr-eed 111'\ong German Intel-

ligenoe o.uthorities in Spa ln and Germ~ tlvlt certain Gert:lll1la in Spain are to be

naturalltod in the interest of r.erman Intelligence, to foreatall expula ion.

(c) Genn&n Intelligence Service in Spain hu been instructed to

""" Swiss l etter drops for secret ink conmunice.tions. I t is implied in current

info rm.a ti on that this ia a lon&- rllnge me&Sure ,

s. Portug&l.

Lisbon h&a been ordered to obtain specific economic intelli&ence,

md to study arrangements for continuinr, work should German relations with

Portugal be broken.

' 6 , It&ly.

SS oor:tma.nda in Ita ly have been ordered by !ll.lmlller to ea tabliah

in each Italian province groups composed of Genne.ns and lto.li11r1 ~ , tor 1abot11.ge ,

in!'ol"lll&tlon and propagand& a~er Germa.n withdraw& , Punda adequate for three

yeara will be provided. Female person.~el to work in the highest social oirolea

will be recruited. Re.die communication will be s ot up. Elements of the c lergy

will be recruited wi t h the greatest care.

7 . De nmark.

Danis h Counter-Intelligence haa reported extenaive preparations by

the Gerr.an Intelligence Service for the continuance of ita aotivitiea arter the

._. IlliGRA..u.u.u ui,....,~.-...iSIFIED

Page 13.

De11111ark , coptinued: -

liberation ot Denmark , A plan hae been prepared tor an upri aing in Denmer.k,

following the German collapse there. 'Ille ac t ion Will be camouflaged as Danish

patriotism and nationalist propaganda. lbphaaia will be placed on the Com:;.un-

1st !Lenace .

a. Rou.me.nian Elements .

Cons iderable activity among disatiatied Roumanian elements is

being developed by the German Intellige.nce Service. Pro-Nazi organizations,

such as t he Iron Guards and Roumanian p arty groups of German extraction are

being used by t he Germans for political intelligence reporting. Small , inte-

grated, action groups have been ordered to remain underground. 'lhe ee groups

have been instructed to collll11 t no a cts ot sabotage and to take no action un-

t il some l a ter date. The Roumanian plane are being worked out by nlllllerous

Gennllll agents in such de t ail within t be framework or local organizations t hat

i t i s believed that these organizations and groups are being set up for post-•

hostility actiTities.

9, Far Ela.st

The Clennan Intelligence Service in the Far Be.et has relied lergaly

on diplomatic repor t s from J"APAN and on a secret organization wb i ch has oper-

ated in China , '!his organization baa ha d its haadqllllrtera in Sh8llgba1 , Canton ,

Peiping and Harbi.n. Recent reports indicate that plans haTe been approved i n

Germany to 1noree.se the size ot t he stai't in China by sending out a f ew spec­

ially qualified personnel from Germany. The time wbioh auch a trip ta.kee to­

day is an indication ot plane to maintain the China network tor long- range

operations .

~GRADED UNCLASSIFIED

• T9F 3£CR£1 Page 14.

G. OTHER EllEMY I NTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

There are a number ot enelll)' intelligenoe operation& in progress whioh

me.y wel l bo oxtondod into the post- defeat period, Indood, the continuanoo

ot oertain or thoao operation& at thi1 time eeom to ht.Te no explam tion

other than a concern with poet-defeat plannint; dthough t here 11 no oonolu-

sivo proof that t hey ha"" boon definitely aet up tor thie purpo10, Thol e

oporat i orw cannot be reviewed here in detail oinoe attention ln this momor-

andlllll is tocueed on tacts from first- hand eourcoa whioh either certainly or

beyond reaoonable doubt are related to the post- defeat pl an.a or the Gonna.n

Intollif;enco Service.

so~e or tho operations on which data i• avai lable are li•tod ... follow• •

1. The Gorm..n Intolli~ence Sorvioe continue• with undimishod ao­

tl vi ty to dispatch a gents to 1he He stern Hem.is phe re .

( a) l.!l• s!. ons , w1 th oerta ln exceptions , ..re political and oco-

nomic or ~ long- ran&e nature .

2 . Transf~r of l'unda and l'\OVtlblo aaacta to neutral areas by intelli-

genoe personnel or by those connected with them.

3, Penetration or disaffected political groups by Gonta.n I ntelligence Service reproaontativos .

4. Penetration of roligioua ~roupa by Gorman Tntolligonco Servioo

representative• .

5. Possible penetration or All ied Intelligence by tormor Germt.n

Intolligenoe officer• to.kin~ refuge in neutral , liberated and operational

arena , renounoin~ their allecianoe to the Nati oauao.

6 . Purchaao of r oa l property in neutral areas by high- ranking German Intelligence oftioer1,

7. Large acale trt.ff io in vi1aa tor the movement ot Gorman lntelli-

genco personnel to noutro.1 &re&a . ~ - . ~ED UNCLASSIFIED