prov rem digest of cases re contempt

8/10/2019 Prov Rem Digest of Cases Re Contempt

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RUPERTA CANO VDA. DE VIRAY and JESUS CARLO GERARD VIRAY vs SPOUSESJOSE USI and AMELITA USI

G.R. No. 192486, November 21, 2012 (Nalisod kog connect sa topic. Kani ra gyuymakaya. Peace. )

Facts: This case involves Lot 733 located in Brgy. Bebe Anac, Masantol, Pampangaregistered under the name of Ellen Mendoza married to Moses Mendoza.

* That on April 28, 1986, Geodetic Eng. Fajardo prepared a subdivision plan(Fajardo plan) which was divided the said lot into six smaller parcels designatedas:

Lot 733-A,

Lot 733-B,

Lot 733-C,

Lot 733-D,

Lot 733-E, and

Lot 733-F.

* Mendoza executed 2 separate deed of sale:

1. Transferring lot 733-F to Jesus Viray (survived by Vda. De Viray hereinpetitioner)

2. Transferring lot 733-A to Spouses Viray

* That time, the said Fajardo plan has not been officially approved by the LandManagement Bureau. Jesus Viray (survived by Vda. De Viray) and Spouses Virayas purchasers did not annotate the conveying deed of sale.

* The aforementioned conveyances notwithstanding, Mendoza, Emerenciana M.Vda. de Mallari (Vda. deMallari) and respondent spouses Jose Usi and Amelita T.Usi (Sps. Usi or the Usis), as purported co-owners of Lot 733, executed aSubdivision Agreement. Pursuant to this agreement which adopted, as base ofreference, the Land Management Bureau - approved subdivision plan preparedby Geodetic Engineer Alfeo S. Galang (Galang Plan), Lot 733 was subdivided intothree lots: (take note dili ni same sa pagkadivide sa first)

1. Lot 733-A to Vda. Mallari

2. Lot 733-B to Spouses Usi

3. Lot 733-C to Ellen Mendoza

* As a result, there were overlapping transactions involving same property orportions thereof which spawned to several suits and counter suits.

* In sum, of the six (6) cases filed. One of which is a forcible entry cas e which wasfiled by late Jesus Viray against Spouses Usi and which was decided by the RTC infavor of Viray wherein the court ordered the spouses to vacate the premises. Thespouses did not opt to appeal. On the other hand, an accion publiciana and/oraccion reivindicatoria was maintained by spouses Usi in order to seek for therecovery of their possession to the subject property.

Issue (among others) : Whether or not the action by the respondents willprosper.

Held: No because the action is barred by res judicata.

Notably, the Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray, after peremptorily prevailing in theircases supportive of their claim of ownership and possession of Lots 733-A and733-F (Fajardo Plan), cannot now be deprived of their rights by the expediency ofthe Sps. Usi maintaining, as here, an accion publiciana and/or accionreivindicatoria, two of the three kinds of actions to recover possession of realproperty. The third, accion interdictal, comprises two distinct causes of action,namely forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the issue in both cases being limitedto the right to physical possession or possession de facto, independently of anyclaim of ownership that either party may set forth in his or her pleadings, albeitthe court has the competence to delve into and resolve the issue of ownershipbut only to address the issue of priority of possession. Both actions must bebrought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case offorcible entry, and from the date of last demand to vacate following theexpiration of the right to possess, in case of unlawful detainer. When the

dispossession or unlawful deprivation has lasted more than one year, one mayavail himself of accion publiciana to determine the better right of possession, orpossession de jure, of realty independently of title. On the other hand, accionreivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership which necessarily includesrecovery of possession.

Now then, it is a hornbook rule that once a judgment becomes final andexecutory, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification ismeant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless ofwhether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or bythe highest court of the land, as what remains to be done is the purely ministerialenforcement or execution of the judgment. Any attempt to reopen a close casewould offend the principle of res judicata.

The better right to possess and the right of ownership of Vda. de Viray (vice JoseViray) and the Sps. Viray over the disputed parcels of land cannot, by force of theres judicata doctrine, be re-litigated thru actions to recover possession andvindicate ownership filed by the Sps. Usi. The Court, in G.R. No. 122287 (Ellen P.Mendoza and Jose and Amelita Usi v. Spouses Avelino Viray and MargaritaMasangcay and Jesus Carlo Gerard Viray), has in effect determined that theconveyances and necessarily the transfers of ownership made to the Sps. Virayand Vda. de Viray (vice Jose Viray) on April 29, 1986 were valid. Thisdetermination operates as a bar to the Usis reivindicatory action to assail theApril 29, 1986 conveyances and precludes the relitigation between the sameparties of the settled issue of ownership and possession arising from ownership.

[G.R. No. 184253 : July 06, 2011]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE PHILIPPINE NAVY,REPRESENTED BY CAPT. RUFO R. VILLANUEVA, SUBSTITUTED BY CAPT.PANCRACIO O. ALFONSO, AND NOW BY CAPT. BENEDICTO G. SANCEDA PN,PETITIONER

VS.

CPO MAGDALENO PERALTA PN (RET.), CPO ROMEO ESTALLO PN (RET.), CPOERNESTO RAQUION PN (RET.), MSGT SALVADOR RAGAS PM (RET.), MSGTDOMINGO MALACAT PM (RET.), MSGT CONSTANTINO CANONIGO PM (RET.),AND AMELIA MANGUBAT, RESPONDENTS. MSGT ALFREDO BANTOG PM (RET.),MSGT RODOLFO VELASCO PM (RET.), AND NAVY ENLISTEDMEN HOMEOWNERSASSOCIATION, INC., RESPONDENT-INTERVENORS

• Respondents and Intervenors were awarded military quarters at the MEQ(Military Enlisted Quarters) located inside the BNS (Bonifacio Naval Station) whilestill in the active service.

• Respondents and Intervenors entered into contracts of lease with the BNSCommander for their occupation.

• NEHAI (Navy Enlisted Homeowner's Association, Inc.) is composed of themembers of the Phil. Navy and Marines occupying the BNS Quarters.

• Respondents and Intervenors continued to occupy their assigned quarterseven after their retirement.

• March 1996: The BNS Commander, through letters, advised respondentsEstallo, Raquion and Raagas to vacate their respective quarters

• NEHAI's counsel replied and informed the BNS Commander of their pendingPetition for a Declaratory Relief (in February 1996) and asked that the eviction bedeferred until the court has rendered a decision --- BNS Commander denied this.

• Respondent filed a Complaint for Injunction with a prayer for the issuance ofPreliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order against the Phil. Navyto forestall their ejectment.

• Intervenors Bantog and Velasco joined respondents' cause.

• NEHAI also acted as a representative of its members who have legal interest inthe subject matter.

Trial Court:

- Granted the Preliminary Injunction



- Held that BNS Commander cannot forcibly evict respondents without any courtorder pursuant to RA 7279

- Added that the proper recourse of the BNS Commander was to file a complaintfor Unlawful Detainer against them

Court of Appeals:

- Affirmed the RTC

- Procedural due process dictates that petitioner resort to judicial processes toquestion their right to occupy the leased quarters

- Ejectment suit is necessary to resolve the issue

Petitioner's Argument:

- Judicial action is not necessary to evict respondents and intervenors from theleased military quarters because their contracts of lease have long expired and itauthorized petitioner to extrajudicially take over possession of the leased militaryquarters after the expiration of their contracts [after retirement].

- Contractual stipulations must be respected being the law between the parties

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner has to file an ejectment suit before it may evictrespondents and intervenors

Held: NO

• The occupancy by respondents and intervenors of the military quarters iscovered by contracts of lease

• Since respondents and intervenors agreed to abide by the foregoingregulations of the military facility, judicial action is no longer necessary to evict

respondents and intervenors from the military quarters. Respondents andintervenors authorized petitioner to extrajudicially take over the possession ofthe leased military housing quarters after their retirement.

- This is also in line with the policy of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and thePhilippine Navy to provide military quarters for the exclusive use of militarypersonnel who are in the active service.

• BASIS:

One of these regulations is PN Housing Administration, which provides thefollowing rules:

6. Tenancy

x x x

g. The awardee shall be allowed to occupy military quarters until his retirement,separation, reversion or discharge from the active service or unless soonerterminated for cause or other authorized purposes. The termination ofoccupancy shall be made in writing and with appropriate termination orders inaccordance with sub para 8 below.

h. Thirty (30) days before retirement/separation/reversion/discharge from theservice of the occupant, the Post Commander shall inform the occupant in aformal letter that the quarters assigned to him shall be vacated immediatelyupon retirement/separation. For valid reasons, a written request for extension,not to exceed sixty (60) days, may be granted by PNHB upon the

recommendation of the Post/Station Commander. Positional Quarters shall bevacated immediately upon relief from position.

x x x

l. Forcible eviction shall be instituted against military personnel who haveviolated this Circular, Post regulations, conditions of the contract, shownundesirable habits and traits of character, or have become security risks.[26]

There is also Standing Operation Procedure No. 6 regarding the forcible evictionof tenants/occupants from military quarters which provides:

III. POLICIES:

x x x

b. Occupants of such quarters/similar structures/housing facilities shall, upontheir retirement, discharge and/or separation from the service, cease to beentitled to the privilege of occupying such dwelling. They must, therefore, vacatethem within sixty (60) calendar days from the effective date of their retirement,discharge and/or separation.

x x x

e. Occupants/tenants covered by paras b, c and/or d hereof who refuse to vacatetheir quarters/similar structures/housing facilities shall be summarily forciblyevicted.

IV. PROCEDURES:

x x x

d. Upon determination by the Executive committee that there is a ground for thesummary/forcible eviction of a tenant/occupant, the Committee, thru itsChairman, will notify in writing the tenant/occupant concerned about theviolation. Said letter will be personally delivered by the Deputy TPMG and/or hisauthorized representative to the concerned tenant/occupant.

e. If no positive action is taken by the tenant/occupant concerned to voluntarilyvacate the quarters within seven (7) days from receipt of the notice, theCommittee shall then summon the Post Engineer and Post MP to execute theforcible eviction. (Emphasis supplied)

• Republic of the Philippines, through the Philippine Navy, may extrajudiciallyevict respondents from their military quarters

9. LARANO VS. CALENDACION

FACTS: Petitioner owns a parcel of Riceland. She executed a Contract to Sell infavor of the respondents. Pending full payment of the purchase price, possessionof subject riceland was transferred to respondents subject to accounting anddelivery of the harvest to petitioner. Respondents failed to pay the installmentsand to account for and deliver the harvest. Hence, petitioner sent respondents ademand letter to vacate the riceland w/in 10 days from receipt thereof, but as herdemand went unheeded, she filed a complaint against respondents for unlawfuldetainer before the MTC.

I: W/N the complaint is one for unlawful detainer.

H: No. Petitioner, as vendor, must comply with 2 requisites for the purpose ofbringing an ejectment suit: (a) there must be failure to pay the installment due or

comply with the conditions of the Contract to Sell; and (b) there must be demandboth to pay or to comply and vacate within the periods specified in Section 2 ofRule 70, namely: 15 days in case of land and 5 days in case of buildings.

Both demands – to pay installment due or adhere to the terms of the Contract toSell and to vacate are necessary to make the vendee deforciant in order that anejectment suit may be filed.

Thus, mere failure to pay the installment due or violation of the terms of theContract to Sell does not automatically render a person's possession unlawful.Furthermore, the giving of such demand must be alleged in the complaint;otherwise, the MTC cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case.

The court ruled that the allegations in the Complaint failed to constitute a case of

unlawful detainer. What is clear is that in the Complaint, petitioner alleged thatrespondents had violated the terms of the Contract to Sell. However, theComplaint failed to state that petitioner made demands upon respondents tocomply with the conditions of the contract – the payment of the installments andthe accounting and delivery of the harvests from the subject riceland. The 10-dayperiod granted respondents to vacate even fell short of the 15-day periodmandated by law. When the complaint does not satisfy the jurisdictionalrequirements of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the MTC does not havejurisdiction to hear the case.



MARGARITO SARONA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FELIPE VILLEGAS andRAMONA CARILLO, defendants-appellees.

FACTS:

Plaintiffs lodged with the Municipal Court of Padada, Davao, against defendantsas complaint, styled "Unlawful Detainer." They there aver that they are the

absolute owners and in possession of a parcel of land in Paligue, Padada.

That on April 1, 1958, defendants entered upon said land Lot "F" constructed theirresidential house thereon and up to date remain in possession thereof,unlawfully withholding the possession of the same from the plaintiffs. That thereasonable rental for said Lot is P20.00 per month. That on December 28, 1962,plaintiffs demanded of defendants to vacate the premises and to pay the rentalsin arrears but then defendants failed to do so; that defendants' possession thusbecame clearly unlawful after said demand.

They asked that they be restored into possession, and that defendants be madeto pay rents, attorneys' fees, expenses of litigation, and costs.

Defendants met the complaint with a motion to dismiss on the sole ground of

lack of jurisdiction of the municipal court. They say that the case is one of forcibleentry, and the reglementary one-year period had elapsed before suit was started.

ISSUE:

Whether the present is a case of forcible entry or one of unlawful detainer.

HELD:

It is then too plain for argument that defendants entered the land on April 1, 1958without plaintiffs' consent and permission; that plaintiff Margarito Sarona"requested the defendants not to place the said house in the litigated area butthe defendants refused."

The findings of the municipal court itself may not be downgraded in the presentcase. And this, for the reason that the complaint did not specifically state themanner of entry of defendants into the land — legal or illegal. Since the partieswent to trial on the merits, and it came to light that defendants' entry was illegalat the inception, the municipal court should have dismissed the case. That courtcannot close its eyes to the truth revealed by plaintiffs' own evidence before it. Acourt of limited jurisdiction, said municipal court, should not have proceeded torender an on-the-merits judgment thereon.

Clearly, plaintiffs' case fits in the jurisprudential precept of forcible entry.Because the entry is forcible. Long had it been made evident that in forcible entrycases, no force is really necessary —

In order to constitute the use of "force," as contemplated in this provision, the

trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. Nor is it even necessary thathe should use violence against the person of the party in possession. The act ofgoing on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarilyimplies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary.Under the statute entering upon the premises by strategy or stealth is equally anobnoxious as entering by force. The foundation of the action is really the forcibleexclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without right.The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include everysituation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon realproperty and exclude another, who has had prior possession, therefrom. If atrespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of the personalready clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, andthere plants himself and excludes such prior possessor from the property, theaction of forcible entry and detainer can unquestionably be maintained, eventhough no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarilyimplied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the

other party.

[G.R. No. 127850. January 26, 1998]

MARIA ARCAL, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the MTC of Tanza, Caviteagainst private respondents as defendants. Subject of the complaint was a 21,435square meter parcel of land in Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate Subdivision, Cavitewith title in the names of Maria, Josefina, Marciana and Marcelina Arcal. It wasalleged that defendants occupied the subject land thru plaintiffs’ impliedtolerance, or permission but without contract with plaintiffs. From the dates oftheir occupancy, plaintiffs did not collect any single centavo from defendants,nor the latter pay to plaintiffs any rental for their occupancy therein;

Meanwhile, Lucio Arvisu and substantially all defendants filed with RTC of Cavite,a civil case for ‘Annulment of Title, with Reconveyance and Damages’ againstSalud Arcal Arbolante, Marcelina Arcal (deseased), Maria Arcal, Josefina Arcaland Marciana Arcal. The said complaint was ordered to be dismissed by the trialcourt for failure to prosecute. An appeal was made to the Court and said appealwas considered abandoned and dismissed.

With regard to the ejectment suit filed by plaintiffs, except Virgilio Arcal, MTCrendered a favorable judgment in favor of plaintiffs ordering defendants amongothers, to vacate the property in question and remove residential houses andimprovements introduced therein and return the possession thereof to plaintiffs.

On appeal with the RTC by defendants, the foregoing decision was reversed andset aside, and the said complaint for ejectment was dismissed without prejudiceto the filing of the proper action after the prejudicial question is resolved in a fair

and adversary proceeding.

Several demands were made by plaintiffs for defendants to vacate the premisesin question, but they proved futile as they refused and failed, and still refuse andfail to vacate the premises, to the damage and prejudice of plaintiffs.

Private respondents failed to file their answer, prompting petitioners to file amotion to render judgment. MTC held that petitioners are registered owners ofthe property and as much they have the right to enjoy possession thereof. Onappeal, RTC affirmed in toto the MTC's decision.

Private respondents filed a petition for review with CA. CA, ruled in favor of theprivate respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the complaint filed does not constitute an unlawful detainer suit.(NO)

HELD:

CA made the conclusion that from the allegations in the complaint, it can begleaned that private respondents “did not actually occupy the subject propertyupon the tolerance of petitioners”, as tolerance was withdrawn when demandsto vacate were made on private respondents prior to the commencement of theejectment case; therefore, unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy. The SCdisagreed with CA.

The rule is that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomesunlawful upon demand to vacate made by the owner and the possessor bytolerance refuses to comply with such demand. A person who occupies the landof another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract betweenthem, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upondemand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedyagainst him. The unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to becounted from the date of the demand to vacate.

The filing of the first ejectments case signified that petitioners sought the ousterof private respondents from

possession of the property. Proceeding in the case were suspended with thefiling for “Annulment of Title with Reconveyance and Damages” by Lucio Arvisuand several of private respondents. The first ejectment case was eventually

dismissed and the judgment of dismissal attained finality. The ejectment case waslater resolved in favor of petitioners, but on appeal, the case was dismissedwithout prejudice to the filing of the proper action after the prejudicial questionin the second case filed by Lucio Arvisu against petitioners.

Because of the pendency of the cases involving ownership, the proceedings inthe first ejectment case were suspended. Petitioner could not but await theoutcome of these case and preserve the status quo.

The rule is that a complaint for unlawful detainer must be filed within one yearfrom demand, demand being jurisdictional. This one-year period is counted fromthe last demand. An unlawful detainer suit involves solely the issue of physical ormaterial possession over the property or possession de facto, that is whobetween the plaintiff and the defendant has a better right to possess theproperty in question. In the case at bar, petitioners’ complaint for unlawful



detainer was confined to recovery of de facto or physical possession of theproperty and was resorted to after private respondents has indubitably failed intheir suit assailing petitioners’ right to ownership.

Tirona vs. Alejo

This petition for review assails the joint decision dated April 10, 1997, of theRegional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, in Civil Cases Nos. 5169-V-97 and5093-V-97.

The factual background of this petition are culled from the records of the cases.

FACTS:

(1st case) Civil Case No. 5093-V-97

Herein petitioners sued private respondent Luis Nuñez for ejectment before the

Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzue. Petitioners claimed to be owners of variousfishpond lots located at Coloong, Valenzuela. They alleged, among others that:

(1) private respondent Nuñez, “by means of force, stealth, or strategy, unlawfullyentered the said fishpond lots and occupied the same” against their will, therebydepriving them of possession of said fishponds;

(2) Nuñez illegally occupied a house owned by and built on the lot of petitionerDeo Dionisio; and

(3) Nuñez unlawfully operated and used petitioners’ fishponds, despite theirdemands to vacate the same.

Petitioners prayed that the court order Nuñez to vacate Dionisio’s house;

surrender possession of the fishponds to them; remove all milkfish fingerlings athis expense; and pay a monthly compensation of P29,000.00 from January 20,1996 to the time he surrenders possession, with interest at twelve percent (12%)yearly until fully paid.

Nuñez admitted in his answer that petitioners owned the fishponds, but deniedthe other allegations.

The MeTC’s judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and a gainst thedefendant and all persons claiming rights under him. Nuñez appealed saiddecision to the RTC.

(2nd case) Civil Case No. 5169-V-97

Petitioners also instituted Civil Case for ejectment against private respondentJuanito Ignacio. The allegations were essentially the same as those againstprivate respondent Nuñez, except it is alleged that Ignacio “also illegallyoccupied the house constructed on the lot of, and belonging to the plaintiffSpouses Ma. Paz D. Bautista and Cesar Bautista.” Petitioners s ought the samerelief prayed for.

Ignacio raised similar defenses as those offered by Nuñez. And he also moved fordismissal of the ejectment suit against him.

The MeTC dismissed the case against Juanito Ignacio. Ignacio appealed to theRTC.

Since the two Civil Cases involved essentially the same parties, the same subjectmatter, and the same issues, the cases were jointly heard.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case at bar is an action for forcible entry.

RULING:

Yes. The Court held upon reading of the allegations in the complaints thatpetitioners’ action was one for forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. Thedistinctions between the two actions are:

(1) In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege and prove that he wasin prior physical possession of the premises until deprived thereof, while in illegaldetainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; and

(2) in forcible entry, the possession by the defendant is unlawful ab initio becausehe acquires possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, while inunlawful detainer, possession is originally lawful but becomes illegal by reason ofthe termination of his right of possession under his contract with the plaintiff.

In pleadings filed in courts of special jurisdiction, the special facts giving the courtjurisdiction must be specially alleged and set out. Otherwise, the complaint isdemurrable.

Hence, in actions for forcible entry, two allegations are mandatory for themunicipal court to acquire jurisdiction: First, the plaintiff must allege his priorphysical possession of the property. Second, he must also allege that he wasdeprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70of the Rules of Court, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth.Recall that the complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 failed to allege priorphysical possession of the property on the part of petitioners. All that is alleged isunlawful deprivation of their possession by private respondents. The deficiency isfatal to petitioners’ actions before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela.Such bare allegation is insufficient for the MeTC to acquire jurisdiction.

G..R. No. 132424 May 2, 2006

SPOUSES BONIFACIO R. VALDEZ, JR. and VENIDA M. VALDEZ, Petitioners, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GABRIEL FABELLA and FRANCISCAFABELLA, Respondents.

FACTS:

This case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitionersBonifacio and Venida Valdez against private respondents Gabriel and FranciscaFabella before the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint allegesthese material facts:

2. That plaintiffs are the registered owner[s] of a piece of residential lotdenominated as Lot [N]o. 3 Blk 19 located at Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. Sta.Cruz, Antipolo, Rizal which [they] acquired from Carolina Realty, Inc. Sometime[i]n November 1992 by virtue of Sales Contract, xerox copy of which is heretoattached marked as Annex "A" and the xerox copy of the Torrens Certificate ofTitle in her name marked as Annex "B";

3. That defendants, without any color of title whatsoever occupie[d] the said lotby building their house in the said lot thereby depriving the herein plaintiffsrightful possession thereof;

4. That for several times, plaintiffs orally asked the herein defendants topeacefully surrender the premises to them, but the latter stubbornly refused tovacate the lot they unlawfully occupied;

5. That despite plaintiffs’ referral of the matter to the Barangay, defendants stillrefused to heed the plea of the former to surrender the lot peacefully;

X X X

In their answer, private respondents contended that the complaint failed to statethat petitioners had prior physical possession of the property or that they werethe lessors of the former. In the alternative, private respondents claimedownership over the land on the ground that they had been in open, continuous,

and adverse possession thereof for more than thirty years, as attested by anocular inspection report from the Department of Environment and NaturalResources.

MTC RULING

The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners,ordering private respondents to vacate the property and to pay rent for the useand occupation of the same plus attorney’s fees.

RTC RULING



Private respondents appealed the MTC’s decision to the Regional Trial Court(RTC). The RTC, in a decision dated 8 January 1997, affirmed in toto the decisionof the MTC.

CA RULING

Undeterred, the private respondents filed a petition for review with the Court ofAppeals on 10 March 1997 questioning the decision of the RTC.

In a decision dated 22 April 1997, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside thedecision of the RTC. It held that petitioners failed to make a case for unlawfuldetainer because they failed to show that they had given the private respondentsthe right to occupy the premises or that they had tolerated private respondents’possession of the same, which is a requirement in unlawful detainer cases.

ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLYMADE OUT A CASE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.

The petition is not meritorious.

Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions availableto recover possession of real property: (a) accion interdictal; (b) accionpubliciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.6

Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry(detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico).7 In forcible entry, one isdeprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation,strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholdspossession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possessionunder any contract, express or implied.8 The two are distinguished from eachother in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from thebeginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while inunlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but becameillegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.9

The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in theproper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court.10 Both actions must bebrought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of

forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer.11The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession whichshould be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession haslasted for more than one year.12 It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determinethe better right of possession of realty independently of title.13 In other words, ifat the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed sincedefendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession hadbecome illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer,butan accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action torecover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinarycivil proceeding.14

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’ssupposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of thepossession which is later sought to be recovered.15 Otherwise, if the possessionwas unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be animproper remedy.16 As explained in Sarona v. Villegas17:

But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still,distinction should be made.

If right at the incipiency defendant’s possession was with plaintiff’s tolerance, wedo not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and suebefore the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from thedate of the demand to vacate.

x x x x

A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirmsour view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right fromthe start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action asone of unlawful detainer - not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise wouldespouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into theland is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that rightauthorizes the speedy redress – in the inferior court - provided for in the rules. Ifone year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then theremedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived hisright to seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in theinferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result maywell be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how longsuch defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand,bring suit in the inferior court – upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription

to set in - and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion isunreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings offorcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one yeartime-bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action.18(Underlining supplied)

It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause ofaction, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, thenthe action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however,the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case isunlawful detainer.

The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at theinception and not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering thatdefendant started to occupy the subject lot and then built a house thereonwithout the permission and consent of petitioners and before them, theirmother. xxx Clearly, defendant’s entry into the land was effected clandestinely,without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized aspossession by stealth which is forcible entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas,cited in Muñoz vs. Court ofAppeals [224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must bepresent right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorizea cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry x x x.

ABAD VS. FARALLES

FACTS:

This case is about a) the need, when establishing the jurisdiction of the court overan action for forcible entry, for plaintiff to allege in his complaint prior physicalpossession of the property and b) the need for plaintiff to prove as well the factof such prior physical possession.

Petitioner Servillano Abad claims he and his wife, Dr. Estrella E. Gavilan-Abad,

bought a registered property from Teresita, Rommel, and Dennis Farrales. Thelatter were the wife and sons, respectively, of the late brother of respondentsOscar Farrales (Oscar) and Daisy Farrales-Villamayor (Daisy). Teresita operated aboarding house on the property.

Because the Abads did not consider running the boarding house themselves,they agreed to lease the property back to Teresita so she could continue with herbusiness. But, although the lease had a good start, Teresita suddenly abandonedthe boarding house, forcing the Abads to take over by engaging the services ofBencio Duran, Teresita's helper, to oversee the boarding house business.

Dr. Abad went to the boarding house to have certain damage to some toiletsrepaired. While she was attending to the matter, she also hired house painters togive the boarding house fresh coat of paint. Oscar and Daisy came, accompaniedby two men, and forcibly took possession of the boarding house. Frightened, the

painters called the Abads who immediately sought police help. The Abads werelater appeased, however, when they learned that the intruders left the place.Two days later, the day the Abads left for abroad, Oscar and Daisy forciblyentered and took possession of the property once again. Because of this,petitioner Servillano Abad (Abad) filed a complaint for forcible entry against thetwo before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). Oscar and Daisy vehementlydenied that they forcibly seized the place. They claimed ownership of it byinheritance. They also claimed that they had been in possession of the same fromthe time of their birth. That Oscar had been residing on the property since 1967 asattested to by a March 31, 2003 certification issued by Barangay Bahay Toro.While the defendants admitted that Daisy herself ceased to reside on theproperty as early as 1986, they pointed out that she did not effectively give upher possession. Oscar and Daisy further claimed that when their parents were stillalive, the latter mortgaged the property to a bank to secure a loan. After theirmother passed away, they decided to lease portions of the property to help paythe loan. Daisy managed the operation of the boarding house. To bolster theirclaim, Oscar and Daisy presented copies of rental receipts going back from 2001to 2003. They would not have been able to lease the rooms unless they were inpossession. Further, Oscar and Daisy asked the MeTC to dismiss the action on theground of failure

of Abad to show that he and his wife enjoyed prior physical possession of theproperty, an essential requisite in forcible entry cases. Abad's allegation that heand his wife immediately leased the property after they bought it was proof thatthey were never in possession of it for any length of time. The MeTC rendered adecision in favor of Abad, stating that Oscar and Daisy could not acquireownership of the property since it was registered. And, as owner, Abad wasentitled to possession. Disagreeing with the MeTC, Oscar and Daisy went up tothe Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. The RTC affirmed the decision ofthe MeTC in its totality. It held that Oscar and Daisy could no longer impugn thejurisdiction of the MeTC over the action since they raised the ground of Abad's



failure to allege prior physical possession in his complaint for the first time onappeal. Besides, said the RTC, since the complaint alleged that Servillano ownedthe property, it may be presumed that he also had prior possession of it. Noevidence to the contrary having been presented, the presumption stood.Undaunted, Oscar and Daisy filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals(CA). The CA rendered a decision, annulling the decisions and orders of both theMeTC and the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The CA pointed out thatAbad merely alleged in his complaint that he leased the property to Teresita afterhe and his wife bought the same and that, thereafter, Oscar and Daisy forciblyentered the same. Since Abad did not make the jurisdictional averment of prior

physical possession, the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his action.Further, Oscar and Daisy ably proved actual possession from 1967 through thebarangay certification. Since the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case, all theproceedings in the case were void. Abad moved for reconsideration but the CAdenied the same, hence, in the present petition for review.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Abad sufficiently alleged in his complaint thejurisdictional fact of prior physical possession of the disputed property to vestthe MeTC with jurisdiction over his action; and 2. In the affirmative, whether ornot Abad sufficiently proved that he enjoyed prior physical possession of theproperty in question.

HELD:

AS TO THE FIRST ISSUE

Yes, Abad sufficiently alleges in his complaint the jurisdictional fact of priorphysical possession of the disputed property to vest the MeTC with jurisdictionover his action. Two allegations are indispensable in actions for forcible entry toenable first level courts to acquire jurisdiction over them: first, that the plaintiffhad prior physical possession of

the property; and, second, that the defendant deprived him of such possessionby means of force, intimidation, threats, strategy, or stealth. There is no questionthat Abad made an allegation in his complaint that Oscar and Daisy forciblyentered the subject property. The only issue is with respect to his allegation,citing such property as one "of which they have complete physical and materialpossession of the same until deprived thereof." Abad argues that thissubstantially alleges plaintiffs prior physical possession of the property before

the dispossession, sufficient to confer on the MeTC jurisdiction over the action.The Court agrees. The plaintiff in a forcible entry suit is not required to use in hisallegations the exact terminology employed by the rules. It is enough that thefacts set up in the complaint show that dispossession took place under therequired conditions. It is of course not enough that the allegations of thecomplaint make out a case for forcible entry. The plaintiff must also be able toprove his allegations. He has to prove that he had prior physical possession forthis gives him the security that entitles him to remain in the property until aperson with a better right lawfully ejects him. Here, evidently, the Abads did nottake physical possession of the property after buying the same since theyimmediately rented it to Teresita who had already been using the property as aboarding house. Abad claims that their renting it to Teresita was an act ofownership that amounted to their acquiring full physical possession of the same.But the Abad's lease agreement with Teresita began only in September 2002.Oscar and Daisy, on the other hand, have proved that they had been rentingspaces in the property as early as 2001 as evidenced by receipts that they issued

to their lessees. This was long before they supposedly entered the property,using force, in 2002. Of course, Abad pointed out that the cited receipts coveredrents in a place called "D's Condominium" in Sampaloc, Manila, and were onlymade to appear through handwritten notations that they were issued for roomsin the property subject of the suit. But a close examination of the receipts showsthat "D's Condominium" was just the name that Daisy employed in her businessof renting rooms. The receipts did not necessarily describe another place. Indeed,they provided blank spaces for describing as the subject of rent the propertysubject of this case. And, except for Abad's bare claim that Teresita and his sonshad long been in possession before they sold it to him and his wife, he offered noevidence to show that this was in fact the case.

AS THE SECOND ISSUE

Abad failed to prove that he enjoyed prior physical possession of the property inquestion.

Finally, Abad argued that with the title to the property in his name, he has in hisfavor the right to the actual, physical, exclusive, continuous, and peacefulpossession of the same. He pointed out that his possession de facto began fromthe time of the signing and notarization of the deed of absolute sale, becomingde jure once the title was issued in his name.

It is of course true that a property owner has the right to exercise the attributesof ownership, one of which is the right to possess the property. But Abad ismissing the point. He is referring to possession flowing from ownership which isnot in issue in this case. Possession in forcible entry cases means nothing morethan physical possession or possession de facto, not legal possession in the sensecontemplated in civil law. Only prior physical possession, not title, is the issue. For

these reasons, the Court finds that Servillano utterly failed to prove prior physical

possession in his favor. The absence of prior physical possession by the plaintiffin a forcible entry warrants the dismissal of the complaint.

Quinagoran v CA and Heirs of Juan dela Cruz

Facts: The heirs of Juan dela Cruz filed a Complaint for Recovery of Portion ofRegistered Land with Compensation and Damages against Quinagoran beforethe RTC Cagayan. They alleged that they are the co-owners of a parcel of land atCentro, Piat, Cagayan, which they inherited from the late Juan dela Cruz.Quinagoran started occupying a house on portion of the property, by toleranceof the heirs. The heirs asked petitioner to remove the house as they planned toconstruct a commercial building on the property but petitioner refused, claimingownership over the lot.The heirs prayed for the reconveyance and surrender ofthe disputed lot and to be paid the amount of P5,000 monthly until the propertyis vacated.

Quinagoran filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the RTC has no jurisdictionover the case under RA 7691, which expanded the exclusive original jurisdictionof the MTC to include all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real

property, or any interest therein which does not exceed P20,000. He argued thatsince the lot which he owns adjacent to the contested property has an assessedvalue of P1,730 the assessed value of the lot under controversy would not bemore than the said amount.

The RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the action isaccion publicciana and therefore, its jurisdiction lies in the RTC, regardless of thevalue of the property. The CA affirmed decision of the RTC.

Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possessionregardless of the value of the property involved.

Held: NO. Jurisdiction lies in the MTC.

The doctrine that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies withthe RTC regardless of the value of the property -- no longer holds true. As thingsnow stand, a distinction must be made between those properties the assessedvalue of which is below P20,000 if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000, if within.

RA 7691, which amended BP 129, and which was already in effect whenrespondents filed their complaint with the RTC in 1994, expressly provides:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusiveoriginal jurisdiction:

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of, real property, orany interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceedsTwenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where

such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except for forcible entryinto and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which isconferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, andMunicipal Circuit Trial Courts.

In Atuel v. Valdez, the Court likewise expressly stated that:

Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general jurisdiction.Specifically, the regional trial court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction “in allcivil actions which involve x x x possession of real property.” However, if theassessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000 in MetroManila, and P20,000 outside of Metro Manila, the municipal trial court exercisesjurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real property.

Issue: Whether the complaint must allege the assessed value of the propertyinvolved

Held: Yes. The Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessedvalue of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon todetermine which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is because the natureof the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over thesame is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of reliefprayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed,irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claimsasserted therein

In the case at bar, however, nowhere in said complaint was the assessed value ofthe subject property ever mentioned. There is therefore no showing on the faceof the complaint that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the



respondents. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of theproperty, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has original andexclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's action. The courts cannot take judicialnotice of the assessed or market value of the land.

Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their complaint the assessedvalue of the subject property, the RTC seriously erred in denying the motion todismiss. Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void. The CA alsoerred in affirming the RTC.

Marciano Serdoncillo vs Sps. Fidel and Evelyn Benolirao, Meliton Carisima andCA

This petition for review assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 14,1994 in CA G.R. CV No. 39251 1 which affirmed the decision of the Regional TrialCourt of Pasay City, (Branch 108) in Civil Case No. 7785, dated June 30, 1992directing herein petitioner to demolish and remove all illegal structures which sheconstructed in front of the subject lot, to vacate the said property and right ofway, and return possession thereof to the respondents.

Facts: Petitioner is a tenant in the disputed land. In an action to recoverpossession filed by the private respondents as purchaser of aforesaid propertybefore the RTC, petitioner was ordered to vacate the premises and to demolishall the improvements he constructed thereon. On appeal, petitioner assailed thejurisdiction of the RTC on the ground that the action filed should have beenunlawful detainer or forcible entry of which the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction.This predicated on the fact that the final demand was made on November 20,1990 and the action was filed December 13, 1990, thus, the one-year period hasnot yet elapsed. The Court of Appeals deciding in favor of the pruvaterespondents, hence, petitioner instituted this action.

Issue: whether the action to recover possession filed by private respondents isaccion publiciana cognizable by the RTC or, unlawful detainer or forcible entrycognizable by MTC.

Held: The allegations in the complaint are of the nature of accion publiciana ofwhich the RTC has jurisdiction. The averments of the complaint clearly show thatprivate respondents clearly set up title to themselves, as being the absoluteowner of the disputed premises by virtue of their Transfer Certificates of Titleand pray that petitioner be ejected therefrom. There is nothing in the complaintalleging any of the means of dispossession that would constitute forcible entry,nor is there any assertion of petitioner's posession which was originally lawfulbut ceased to be so upon the expiration of the right to possess. It does not allegewhether the entry is legal or illegal. The action therefore is neither on of forcibleentry nor unlawful detainer but essentially involves a dispute relative toownership of land alledgedly encroached upon by petitioner. It is immaterialwhether or not the complaint was instituted one month from the date of lastdemand or a year thereafter.

Case No. 11 Antonio vs. Geronimo

Facts:

-alexander Catalos (respondent) filed a complaint for unlawful detainer beforethe MTC of Antipolo. He alleged that he was the owner of 4 parcels of landsituated at Mayamot, Antipolo Rizal. And the petitioners were occupying the saidproperties.

- Catalos claimed that he allowed petitioners to occupy portions of his landwithout requiring them to pay rent, on the condition that the latter wouldimmediately vacate the same in the event that the former would need thepremises.

- However, when Catalos did notify petitioners of his need to use the premises,

petitioners refused to vacate the land even after demand.

- The complaint was resolved in favor of private respondent.

- Private respondent filed a motion for issuance of a writ of demolition. The lowercourt granted the motion and directed the issuance of a writ of demolition

- Lately, the sangguniang bayan of Antipolo passed a resolution authorizing theMayor of the town to acquire thru expropriation or purchase the subjectproperties for public purposes/ socialized housing. Though the writ of demolitionhad not yet been fully implemented, the demolition proceeded despite saidresolutions of Sangguniang Bayan.

-petitioners filed a motion to stay, invoking the commonwealth Act No. 538 inasking respondent judge to suspend the action for ejectment in view of theannounced expropriation of subject properties.

- The motion was denied . Respondent judge reasoned out that no action forexpropriation had yet been filed in court and that petitioners had not compliedwith Commonwealth Act No. 538 in paying the current rents.

- On the basis of this factual backdrop, petitioners filed the present petition forcertiorari under Rule 65. Petitioners seek to set aside the Order denying theirmotion to stay execution and to enjoin respondents from continuing with thedemolition of their homes. They likewise pray for the issuance of writs ofpreliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.

Issue:

Whether or not a resolution for expropriation by a local government unit cansuspend the writ of execution and demolition in an ejectment case.

Held:

NO. In actions for ejectment, the general rule is if judgment is rendered againstthe defendant, it is immediately executory. Such judgment, however, may bestayed by the defendant only by: (a) perfecting an appeal; (b) filing asupersedeas bond; and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or thereasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property during thependency of the appeal. These requisites must concur. Thus, even if thedefendant had appealed and filed a supersedeas bond but failed to pay theaccruing rentals, the appellate court could, upon motion of the plaintiff withnotice to the defendant, and upon proof of such failure, order the immediateexecution of the appealed decision without prejudice to the appeal taking itscourse. Such deposit, like the supersedeas bond, is a mandatory requirement;

hence, if it is not complied with, execution will issue as a matter of right.Jurisprudence is replete with cases which provide for the exceptions to the rulecited above. These are the existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusablenegligence which prevented the defendant from making the monthly deposit, orthe occurrence of supervening events which have brought about a materialchange in the situation of the parties and would make the execution inequitableor where there is compelling urgency for the execution because it is not justifiedby the prevailing circumstances.

Furthermore, The fundamental precept that underlies this case is thatexpropriation has no binding legal effect unless a formal expropriationproceeding has been instituted.

the Sangguniang Bayan, being a local legislative body, may exercise the power toexpropriate private properties, subject to the following requisites, all of whichmust concur:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the localchief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power ofeminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular privateproperty.2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare,or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article IIIof the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of theproperty sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

In the instant case, no ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan ofAntipolo.It in instead were resolutions and it was emphasized in previous decisions that alocal government unit cannot authorize an expropriation of private propertythrough a mere resolutions of its lawmaking body. These Resolutions cannot

partake of a supervening event so as to suspend the writ of execution in theejectment proceedings. As to the suspension of ejectmet proceedings, thecommonwealth act no. 538 applies only to cases where there exist actualexpropriation proceedings.

Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Digest

G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991

Facts:

1. Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the governmentwith the Sandiganbayan for the alleged anomalous sale of Kokoy Romoaldez ofseveral government corporations to the group of Lopa, a brother-in-law of Pres.Aquino.

2. By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to lookinto the transactions, an investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue RibbonCommittee. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee toappear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six(36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."

3. At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may"unduly prejudice" the defendants in civil case before the Sandiganbayan.



4. Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the inquiry wasbeyond the jurisdiction of the Senate. He contended that the Senate Blue RibbonCommittee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. One of thedefendants in the case before the Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed with the Courtof motion for intervention. The Court granted it and required the respondentSenate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in intervention.

ISSUE: W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of legislation

NO.

1. There appears to be no intended legislation involved. The purpose of theinquiry to be conducted is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction ofCongress, it was conducted to find out whether or not the relatives of PresidentAquino, particularly Mr. Lopa had violated RA 3019 in connection with the allegedsale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez tothe Lopa Group.

2. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislationis not absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the Constitution. Asprovided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordancewith its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of personsappearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then thatthe rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the

right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one'sself.

3. The civil case was already filed in the Sandiganbayan and for the Committee toprobe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy would be anencroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had alreadyearlier set in. The issue sought to be investigated has already been pre-empted bythe Sandiganbayan. To allow the inquiry to continue would not only pose thepossibility of conflicting judgments between the legislative committee and ajudicial tribunal.

4. Finally, a congressional committee’s right to inquire is subject to all relevantlimitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action ‘including therelevant limitations of the Bill of Rights. One of these rights is the right of anindividual to against self-incrimination. The right to remain silent is extended to

respondents in administrative investigations but only if it partakes of the natureof a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. Hence, thepetitioners may not be compelled by respondent Committee to appear, testifyand produce evidence before it only because the inquiry is not in aid of legislationand if pursued would be violative of the principle of separation of powersbetween the legislative and the judicial departments of the government asordained by the Constitution.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINEISLANDS v LABOR ARBITER RODERICK JOSEPH

CALANZA, SHERIFF ENRICO Y. PAREDES, AMELIA ENRIQUEZ, and REMO L. SIA,

Facts: Enriquez and Sia were the branch manager and the assistant branchmanager, respectively, of Bacolod-Singcang Branch of BPI. On 2003 they weredismissed from employment on grounds of breach of trust and confidence anddishonesty. The following day, they filed separate complaints for illegal dismissalagainst petitioner before the (NLRC),

Executive LA Danilo C. Acosta rendered a decision finding that Enriquez and Siahad been illegally dismissed from employment. Hence were reinstated inpetitioner’s payroll.

Petitioner appealed then NLRC ruled that petitioner had just cause to terminateEnriquez and Sia. Hence, it reversed and set aside the LA decision and, although itdismissed the complaint, it ordered petitioner to give the dismissed employeesfinancial assistance.

Enriquez and Sia elevated the matter to the (CA), but failed to obtain a favorabledecision. On . The case eventually reached this Court.

During the pendency of the petition before this Court, Enriquez and Sia filed aMotion for Partial Execution[6] of the LA decision claimed that the reinstatementaspect of the LA decision was immediately executory during the entire periodthat the case was on appeal.

LA Calanza granted Enriquez and Sia’s motion, upon service of the writ, SheriffParedes served on petitioner a notice of sale of a parcel of land owned bypetitioner to satisfy its obligation.

Petitioner immediately filed an Urgent Petition for Injunction with prayer for theissuance (TRO) and/or WPI with the NLRC and issued the TRO.

Disappointed with the conduct of LA Calanza petitioner instituted the presentpetition for indirect contempt.

Issue: Do the acts of respondents Enriquez and Sia in filing a motion for partialexecution; of LA Calanza in granting the writ of execution and applying or notapplying established jurisprudence; and of Sheriff Paredes in serving the notice of

sale of the real property owned by petitioner guilty of indirect contempt?

Held: NO.Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting inopposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willfuldisregard or disobedience of the court’s order. It is a defiance of the authority,justice, or dignity of the court which tends to bring the authority andadministration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice party-litigants or their witnesses during litigation.

We find that their motion for partial execution was a bona fide attempt toimplement what they might have genuinely believed they were entitled to inaccordance with existing laws and jurisprudence.[22] This is especially true in theinstant case where the means of livelihood of the dismissed employees was atstake. Any man in such an uncertain and economically threatened conditionwould be expected to take whatever measures are available to ensure a means

of sustenance for himself and his family. Clearly, Enriquez and Sia were merelypursuing a claim which they honestly believed was due them. Their act is far frombeing contumacious.

On the other hand, LA Calanza, the erroneous issuance of the writ of executionby LA Calanza can only be deemed grave abuse of discretion which is moreproperly the subject of a petition for certiorari and not a petition for indirectcontempt. No one who is called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in theprocess of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.

Finally, Sheriff Paredes, in serving the notice of sale, was only performing his dutypursuant to the writ of execution. No matter how erroneous the writ was, it wasissued by LA Calanza and was addressed to him as the sheriff, commanding himto collect from petitioner the amount due Enriquez and Sia. Thus, any actperformed by Sheriff Paredes pursuant to the aforesaid writ cannot be

considered contemptuous. At the time of the service of the notice of sale, therewas no order from any court or tribunal restraining him from enforcing the writ.It was ministerial duty for him to implement it.

To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibitedby the order of the court or tribunal. A person cannot, for disobedience, bepunished for contempt unless the act which is forbidden or required to be doneis clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt oruncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required.[30]

Dismissed for lack of merit.

Siy vs. NLRC

GR 158971, August 25, 2005

FACTS:

This case originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment ofholiday pay and holiday premium pay filed by Embang against Siy and PhilippineAgri Trading Center. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Embang. The decisionthrice-affirmed: first by the NLRC; then by the CA; and finally by the SupremeCourt.

In accordance with the rules of procedure of the NLRC, Embang’s counsel filed amotion for the issuance of a writ of execution dated February 16, 2004 before thelabor arbiter. Subsequently, Atty. Quevedo entered his appearance for thepetitioner and filed a comment to the motion for writ of execution. He allegedthat Embang rejected the various offers of reinstatement extended to her bypetitioner; hence, she should be entitled to backwages only up to September 29,2000, the date of the promulgation of the labor arbiter’s decision.

Finding that his office was never informed by petitioner and Philippine AgriTrading Center of any intention on their part to reinstate Embang to her formerposition, the labor arbiter issued an order dated July 30, 2004, granting theFebruary 16, 2004 motion and directing that a writ of execution be issued.



Atty. Quevedo refused to be deterred. He filed an appeal with the NLRC onAugust 12, 2004.

Pending the resolution of the appeal, Embang filed the instant motion to citeAtty. Quevedo in contempt of court.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Frederico P. Quevedo is in contempt of court.

HELD: YES.

Contempt of court is disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to itsauthority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard ordisobedience of the court’s orders but also conduct tending to bring theauthority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in somemanner, to impede the due administration of justice.[ Under the Rules of Court,contempt is classified into either direct or indirect contempt. Direct contempt iscommitted in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct orinterrupt the proceedings before the same. Indirect contempt is one notcommitted in the presence of a court. It is an act done at a distance which tendsto belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and justice.[

Atty. Quevedo should be sanctioned for indirect contempt. Indirect contempt iscommitted by a person who commits the following acts, among others:disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order or judgment of acourt;] any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes orproceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt;[ and any improperconduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade theadministration of justice.[

We denied with finality the petitioner’s petition for review on certiorari almosttwo years ago. But the decision of the labor arbiter (affirmed with modificationby the NLRC and upheld by the CA and this Court) remains unsatisfied up to nowbecause of Atty. Quevedo’s sly maneuvers on behalf of his client.

Once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter islaid to rest. The prevailing party is entitled to enjoy the fruits of his victory whilethe other party is obliged to respect the court’s verdict and to comply with it. Wereiterate our pronouncement in Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals:

…well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomesimmutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even ifthe modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law andwhether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court ofthe land.

The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate sometime andsomewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration ofjustice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be notdeprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must guard against any schemecalculated to bring about that result and must frown upon any attempt toprolong the controversies.

LORENZO SHIPPING v DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT (DMAP)

FACTS

* a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for preliminarymandatory injunction or temporary restraining order was filed to challenge theconstitutionality of EO 213, Memorandum Circular 153, and the Letter-Resolutiondated June 4, 2001, which deregulated shipping rates in effect increased costs byup to 20%.

* Court denied DMAP’s petition for review on certiorari "for petitioners’ failureto: (a) take the appeal within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days inaccordance with Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5(a), Rule 56, in view ofthe foregoing denial of petitioners' motion for extension of time to file thepetition; and (b) pay the deposit for sheriff's fee and clerk's commission in thetotal amount of P202.00 in accordance with Sections 2 and 3, Rule 45 in relationto Section [c], Rule 56 and paragraph 1 of Revised Circular No. 1-88 of this Court."

* DMAP held a general membership meeting (GMM) on the occasion of whichDMAP publicly circulated the Sea Transport Update, which is reproduced asfollows:

* SEA TRANSPORT UPDATE

Oct. 2002 GMM

20% GRI RATE INCREASE ISSUE

1. The Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court was deniedbased on technicalities and not on the legal issue DMAP presented.

Small technical matter which should not be a cause for denial (like the amount offiling fee lacking & failure to indicate date of receipt of court resolution)

> Some technical matters that could cause denial

- Failure to file on time and to file necessary pleadings

- Failure to provide copies to respondents.

> Legal issue DMAP presented

- Public Service Act

- Regulated or Deregulated

- MC 153

- Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to6 months.

WHAT TO EXPECT?

1. Liners will pressure members to pay the 20% GRI

WHAT TO DO?

1. As advised by DMAP counsel, use the following arguments:

- DMAP case was denied based on technicalities and not on merits of the case

- Court of Appeals has ruled that computation of reasonableness of freight is notunder their jurisdiction but with MARINA

- DSA's argument that DMAP's case prematurely (sic) file (sic) as there is apending case filed before MARINA.

- Therefore, DSA & DMAP will be going back to MARINA for resolution

2. Meantime, DMAP members enjoined not to pay until resolved by MARINA

3. However, continue collaboration with liners so shipping service may not suffer

NEXT MOVE

Another group (most likely consumers) or any party will file the same case andmay be using the same arguments. (emphasis supplied)

* Petitioners brought this special civil action for contempt against therespondents, insisting that the publication of the Sea Transport Updateconstituted indirect contempt of court for patently, unjustly and baselesslyinsinuating that the petitioners were privy to some illegal act, and, worse, thatthe publication unfairly debased the Supreme Court by making "scurrilous,malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo" to the effect that the Supreme Courthad allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners as to lead the respondentsto conclude that the "Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal

lead time is at least 3 to 6 months." They averred that the respondents’ purpose,taken in the context of the entire publication, was to "defy the decision, for itwas based on technicalities, and the Supreme Court was influenced!"

* Respondents denied any intention to malign, discredit, or criticize the Court.They explained that their statement that the "Supreme Court ruling issued in onemonth time only, normal lead time is at least three to six months" was not per secontemptuous, because the normal and appropriate time frame for theresolution of petitions by the Court was either less than a month, if the petitionwas to be denied on technicality, and more or less from three to six months, ifthe petition was to be given due course; that what made the petitioners describethe statement as contemptuous was not the real or actual intention of theauthor but rather the petitioners’ false, malicious, scurrilous and tastelessinsinuations and interpretation; and that the petitioners, not being themselvespresent during the GMM, had no basis to assert that the DMAP’s presentor, the



author of the material, or any of the speakers during the GMM had any evilintention or made any malicious insinuations

Issue

* WON the statements contained in the Sea Transport Update constitute oramount to indirect contempt of court?

Ruling

* NO. Utterances in Sea Transport Update, Not Contemptuous

The petitioners did not sufficiently show how the respondents’ publication of theSea Transport Update constituted any of the acts punishable as indirectcontempt of court under Section 3 of Rule 71, supra.

The petitioners’ mere allegation, that "said publication unfairly debases theSupreme Court because of the scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baselessinnuendo therein that the Court allowed itself to be influenced by the petitionersas concocted in the evil minds of the respondents thus leading said respondents

to unjustly conclude: Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal leadtime is at least 3 to 6 months," was insufficient, without more, to sustain thecharge of indirect contempt.

The test for criticizing a judge’s decision is, therefore, whether or not thecriticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls ofdecency and propriety. Viewed through the prism of the test, the Sea TransportUpdate was not disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and did not spill over thewalls of decency and propriety. Thereby, the respondents were not guilty ofindirect contempt of court. In this regard, then, we need to remind that thepower to punish for contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and noton the vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke itsinherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administrationof justice must falter or fail. As judges we ought to exercise our power to punishcontempt judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end inview of utilizing the power for the correction and preservation of the dignity ofthe Court, not for retaliation or vindictiveness

DICUSSIONS FROM THE BOOK: (the case gave several distinctions on contempt.)

Contempt of Court: Concept and Classes

Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or

orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its

proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a

court. The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, and need not be specifically granted by statute. It lies at the core of the administration of a judicial system.

Indeed, there ought to be no question that courts have the power by virtue of their very creation to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to their

lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and insults of pollution. The power to punish for contempt essentially exists for the

preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the due administration of

justice. The reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution; without such guarantee, the institution of

the courts would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

direct contempt indirect contempt

committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice consists of willful disobedience of

the lawful process or order of the

court



Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice; and

constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court.

Plainly, therefore, the word summary with respect to the punishment for contempt refers not to the timing of the action with reference to the offense but to the procedure

that dispenses with the formality, delay, and digression that result from the issuance of process, service of complaint and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to

arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with a conventional court trial.

A distinction between in-court contempts, which disrupt court proceedings and for which a hearing and formal presentation of evidence are dispensed with, and out-of-court

contempts, which require normal adversary procedures, is drawn for the purpose of prescribing what procedures must attend the exercise of a court’s authority to deal with

contempt. The distinction does not limit the ability of courts to initiate contempt prosecutions to the summary punishment of in-court contempts that interfere with the

judicial process.

The court may proceed upon its own knowledge of the facts without further proof and without issue or trial in any form to punish a contempt committed directly under its eye

or within its view. But there must be adequate facts to support a summary order for contempt in the presence of the court. The exercise of the summary power to imprison for

contempt is a delicate one and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions. The reason for the extraordinary power to punish criminal contempt in summary

proceedings is that the necessities of the administration of justice require such summary dealing with obstructions to it, being a mode of vindicating the majesty of the law, in

its active manifestation, against obstruction and outrage.

Proceedings for contempt are sui generis, in nature criminal, but may be resorted to in civil as well as criminal actions, and independently of any action . They are of two

classes, the criminal or punitive, and the civil or remedial.

In general, the character of the contempt of whether it is criminal or civil is determined by the nature of the contempt involved, regardless of the cause in which the contempt

arose, and by the relief sought or dominant purpose.

criminal or punitive civil or remedial

consists in conduct that is directed against the authority and dignity of a court or ofa judge acting judicially, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority and

dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act

consists in the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or judge in acivil case for the benefit of the opposing party therein

purpose is primarily punishment purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial

dominant purpose is to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court, and to

protect the interests of the general public

dominant purpose is to enforce compliance with an order of a court for the benefit of

a party in whose favor the order runs

vindicate the dignity of the courts protect, preserve, and enforce the rights of private parties and compel obedience to

orders, judgments and decrees made to enforce such rights

Misbehaviour means something more than adverse comment or disrespect. There is no question that in contempt the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense.

Thus, the good faith, or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor should be considered. Where the act complained of is ambiguous or does not clearly show on its face that it is

contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in good faith, is within his rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in some instances, held to be

determinative of its character. A person should not be condemned for contempt where he contends for what he believes to be right and in good faith institutes proceedings for

the purpose, however erroneous may be his conclusion as to his rights. To constitute contempt, the act must be done wilfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.

Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the court or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful

purpose. On the contrary, they constitute direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and, when committed by a lawyer, a violation of the lawyer’s oath and a

transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Punishment is generally summary and immediate, and no process or evidence is necessary because the act is committed in

facie curiae.

The inherent power of courts to punish contempt of court committed in the presence of the courts without further proof of

facts and without aid of a trial is not open to question, considering that this power is essential to preserve their authority and

to prevent the administration of justice from falling into disrepute; such summary conviction and punishment accord with due

process of law

There is authority for the view, however, that an act, to constitute direct contempt punishable by summary proceeding, need

not be committed in the immediate presence of the court, if it tends to obstruct justice or to interfere with the actions of thecourt in the courtroom itself

Contemptuous acts committed out of the presence of the court, if admitted by the contemnor in open court, may be

punished summarily as a direct contempt, although it is advisable to proceed by requiring the person charged to appear and

show cause why he should not be punished when the judge is without personal knowledge of the misbehavior and is informed

of it only by a confession of the contemnor or by testimony under oath of other persons

Requires proceedings less summary

than the first. The proceedings for

the punishment of the contumacious

act committed outside the personal

knowledge of the judge generally

need the observance of all the

elements of due process of law, that

is, notice, written charges, and an

opportunity to deny and to defend

such charges before guilt is adjudged

and sentence imposed

prov rem digest of cases re contempt

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