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Analyzing Future Complex National

Security Challenges within the Joint,

Interagency, Intergovernmental, and

Multinational Environment

Proteus Futures Workshop: 2224 August, 2006


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Analyzing Future ComplexNational Security Challengeswithin the

Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental,

and Multinational Environment

Proteus Futures Workshop:

2224 August, 2006


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Analyzing Future Complex National Security Challenges

within the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and

Multinational Environment

Proteus Futures Workshop: 2224 August, 2006

Academic Workshop sponsored by:

The Proteus Management Group, USA

Hosted by the Center for Strategic LeadershipUnited States Army War College

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and donot necessarily reect the ofcial policy or position of the United

States Army War College, the Department of Defense, or any other

Department or Agency within the U.S. Government. This report is

cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013


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COntEnts

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................... 1

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 3Overview. 3

BackgrOund. 3

wOrkshOp.OBjectives. 4

wOrkshOp.design. 4

participants. 4

repOrt.OrganizatiOn. 5

PRESENTATIONS ....................................................................................... 7

intrOductOry.remarks.7

BackgrOund.Briefings:.tuesday,.22.august. 8

Proteus: The Genesis, Then and Now ...........................................................8

Mapping the Global Future: Seeing oer the Horizon ................................ 11

LuncheOn.address:.prOfessOr.LeOn.fuerth. 12

paneL.#1:.geO-strategic.pOLicy.and.strategy. 14Combating Complex Irregular Warare: Grand Strategies andOperational Considerations ........................................................................ 14

Proteus Insights and the Future o Global Jihadism ....................................16

Democracy Promotion and Human Rights Deelopment in the MiddleEast: A Path Dependency Theory Approach ...............................................20

Addressing the Curse o the 21st Century: Considerations and Updatesto National Strategy or Victory in Iraq (NSVI) ......................................... 21

Strength and Honor: The Quest or Sustainable Security .......................... 21dinner.address:.mr.jack.smith. 23

BackgrOund.Briefing:.wednesday,.23.august. 26

Israels Future Security Enironment in the Wake o the Israel-HezbollahWar? ...........................................................................................................26

paneL.#2:.psychOLOgicaL,.reLigiOus,.sOciaL.and.cuLturaL.cOmpLexity.in.future.pOLicy.and.strategy.fOrmuLatiOn.27

A New Angle on the U.S. Militarys Cultural Awareness (CA) Campaign:Connecting In-Ranks Diersity to CA ........................................................28

Holding it All Together: Present and Future National Cohesion in SaudiArabia .........................................................................................................28

Proling International Change Processes ....................................................30


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Proteus Futures AcAdemic WorkshoP: August 2006

iii

LuncheOn.address:.dr.jOhn.aLexander.31

paneL.#3:.future.strategic.and.OperatiOnaL.inteLLigence.chaLLenges. 35

Failed States and Intelligence Collection Missions ...................................... 35

Homeland Security Futures Case Study: Agroterrorism .............................. 37paneL.#4:.future.technOLOgy. 39

An Unmanned Systems Vision ...................................................................39

The Application o Strategic Stress Management in Winning the Peace ...... 41

Relooking the Cyber-terrorism Threat and Military Support to theNational Cyber-warare Response ............................................................... 42

Digital Blitzkrieg: Updating the Pearl Harbor Analogy and CombatingMultiDomain Ciilian Red Cells ..............................................................45

The Sword and the Network: Combining Body-Mind-Spirit Technology ...48

BackgrOund.Briefing:.thursday,.24.august. 49

The Sunni-Shia Diide: Is a Coalition Viable in the Islamist Camp? ..........49

paneL.#5:.future.mOdeLing,.simuLatiOn.and.gaming.technOLOgy.in.strategic.and.OperatiOnaL.anaLysis,.decisiOn.making.and.experientiaL.educatiOn. 52

The Future Confict Game .........................................................................52

Cognitie Assistants or Analysts ................................................................ 55The Future o Joint Modeling and Simulation ............................................ 57

Complexity and Future Gaming .................................................................60

wOrkshOp.wrap-up..61

PROTEAN MEDIA DEMONSTRATION ............................................... 63

prOtean.media.Overview. 63

demOnstratiOn. 64

Protean Medias Current Capabilities and Future Potential .........................64

summary. 65

APPENDIX A AgENDA

APPENDIX B ATTENDEES

APPENDIX C BIOgRAPhICAl SkETChES


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EXECUtIVE sUMMARY

Backgroud: From 22 to 24 August 2006 the Proteus ManagementGroup USA hosted an Academic Workshop to bring together specialistsrom academia, the deense community, and ciilian organizations toshare inormation and insights on analyzing uture complex nationalsecurity challenges.

Forma: The workshop ormat included a series o keynote presentations,panel presentations, and a demonstration o the Protean Media.

Paricipa: There were sixty-three workshop participants rom a broadspectrum o organizations inoled in examining uture complexity. Theexchange between indiiduals representing many dierse organizationalcultures ensured a rich and liely discussion o alternatie ways to analyzethe uture.

Keyoe Preeaio: The workshop included a series o keynotepresentations to proide a broad context within which to examine the

applicability o the Proteus Insights. The presentations included theollowing topics:

Proteus: The Genesis, Then and Now Mr. Chris Schroeder,Northrop Grumman Corporation

Mapping The Global Future: Seeing oer the Horizon Mr.Kenneth Knight, Oce o the Director o National Intelligence

National Security Management in the Age o Complexity Mr.Leon Fuerth, Elliot School o International Aairs, The George

Washington Uniersity

Critical Thinking, Relatie Perspectie, and the Proteus CanadaConnection Mr. Jack Smith, National Research Council, Canada

Israels Future Security Enironment in the Wake o the Israel-

Hezbollah War? Dr. Joshua Teitelbaum, Moshe Dayan Center, TelAi Uniersity

Future Conficts: Values and Paradoxes Dr. John Alexander, SeniorFellow, Joint Special Operations Uniersity


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Possibilities and Prospects or Political Liberalization in the PersianGul Region Dr. Joshua Teitelbaum, Moshe Dayan Center, Tel

Ai Uniersity

The Sunni-Shia Diide: Is a Coalition Viable in the Islamist Camp?Dr Ely Karmon, International Institute or Counterterrorism,Israel

Pael Dicuio: There were e panels which addressed specicaspects o looking at alternatie utures:

Geo-strategic Policy and Strategy

Psychological, Religious, Social, and Cultural Complexity in FuturePolicy and Strategy Formulation

Future Strategic and Operational Intelligence Challenges

Future Technology

Future Modeling, Simulation and Gaming Technology in Strategic

and Operational Analysis, Decision Making, and ExperientialEducation

Proea Media: Mr. Bill Waddell and Dr. Daid Harries demonstratedthe Protean Media application, which is an educational role-playingsimulation that incorporates the use o the Protean Insights. Thedemonstration proided workshop participants an opportunity to examinethe results o human interactions and subsequent reactions, conergence

and diergence, and confict and agreement.


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IntRODUCtIOn

Overview

From 22 to 24 August 2006 the Proteus Management GroupUSA hosted an Academic Workshop to bring together specialists romacademia, the deense community, and ciilian organizations to shareinormation and insights on analyzing uture complex national securitychallenges.

Background

The Proteus project originated as an adanced concepts researchinitiatie at the U.S. National Reconnaissance Oce in 1999, employingcommercially proen scenario-based methodology. In the course oexploring alternate uture scenarios and considering possible nationalsecurity issues, the project team published their interim results in the bookProteus Insights rom 2020. This book has been used as a basis to enableurther strategic research and inspired the initiatie o the international

Proteus Consortium U.S. Army War College (lead and Project Manager),National Security Agency, Oce o the Director o National Intelligence(Central Intelligence Agency), National Research Council o Canada(Proteus & Foresight Canada), National Geospatial Agency, NaalPostgraduate School, and the National Reconnaissance Oce. Today,the Proteus Management Group (PMG) is an international consortiumand think tank ocusing on the renement, continued deelopment,

and practical application o the Proteus set o established insights. Theseinsights will assist decision makers, planners, and analysts in seeralways:

Present strategic and high-operational leel decision makers,planners, and analysts in outside the box consideration andcritical analysis o national military and intelligence issues withinthe Joint, Interagency, Intergoernmental and Multinational (JIIM)

enironmentHelp the strategic decision maker, planner, or analyst to consideralues and perceptions o uture target audiences by systematicallylooking outside o the alues contained in Western ciilization


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when considering the application o all elements o national power(Diplomatic, Inormational, Military, and Economic)

Identiy and consider the second and third order eects and

unintended consequences o policy and strategy decisions

Workshop Objectives

The primary objectie o the workshop was to bring together specialistsrom both military and ciilian organizations to promote urther discourse,study and research on the application o Proteus Insights (PI) to StrategicIssues, ocusing on the renement, continued deelopment and use o the

Proteus lenses in uture scenarios. The workshop also proided a orumor U.S. goernment, academic, and priate organizations to exchangeideas related to Proteus Insights on how to cope with uncertainty, analyze,and plan or and make decisions on uture national security issues in thecomplex geo-strategic enironment.

Workshop Design

The workshop was designed to exchange inormation on alternatieways to iew contemporary and uture national security challenges. There were a series o background presentations and e panels that lookedat alternatie ways to iew the uture. The workshop also included ademonstration o the Protean Media.

Participants

The sixty-three workshop participants represented a broad spectrumo organizations inoled in examining the uture through aried lenses.The discussions between indiiduals representing so many dierseorganizational cultures ensured a rich and liely exchange on ways toanalyze and interpret uture eents. The workshop also presented anopportunity to build relationships and deepen the understanding betweenand among the participants. Each let with a uller appreciation o the

perspectie o attendees rom other organizations. The interpersonalrelationships and contacts created at this workshop will be key elements inmaturing the cooperation and exchange o ideas among the membershipo the Proteus community.


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AnAlyzing Future comPlex nAtionAl security chAllenges

Report Organization

The ollowing chapter contains summaries o the background briengsand the panel presentations. Chapter Three describes the Protean Media

demonstration. This report also contains three appendices. Appendix A is the workshop agenda. Appendix B proides a list o workshopparticipants. Appendix C contains brie biographical sketches o the

workshop presenters.


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PREsEntAtIOns

Introductory Remarks

Major General Daid Huntoon, the U.S. Army War CollegeCommandant, opened the workshop by noting the diculties o comingto closure on the issues and challenges that the group will be examining.He enjoined the group to shed light on the changes that our nation aces.He emphasized that Proteus would be a useul tool or preparing or theineitability o ailure. He concluded by stating that all the resourceso the Army War College were aailable to support workshop attendees

while here and ater they had departed.

Mr. Bill Waddell, Co-Chair o the Proteus Management Group welcomed the participants and introduced the distinguished isitors,guest speakers and panel chairpersons. Ater introductions, he gae abrie oeriew o the oerall Proteus Management Group eort, ollowedby the workshop purpose and objecties as described earlier.

Mr. Waddell noted that the Proteus Management Group (PMG) wasestablished in October 2005 at the Center or Strategic Leadership underthe sponsorship o the Oce o the Director or National Intelligence(DNI). Mr. Bill Wimbish is currently the project coordinator/manager

working with the PMG Board o Directors. The PMG is closely associatedwith Proteus Canada.

He stated that the goal o the PMG is to examine uture complexchallenges, primarily at the national and strategic leels. The methodologyemployed utilizes a set o lenses based on ten uture insights and ekey planes o infuence deeloped during a National ReconnaissanceOce (NRO) study perormed in 1999 and 2000. These lensesproide a nontraditional alternatie or iewing the uture geo-strategicenironment. The methodology also considers the global inormationgrid and adanced technology as key enablers that add more uncertainty,

and complexity and proide both threats and opportunities.

He emphasized that the PMG is not in any way adocating replacingcurrent/uture intelligence analysis or decision-making processes, but is


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suggesting some new angles to be explored as outlined in Proteus. Heexpressed the hope that the organization will continue to grow andbecome an umbrella/catalyst to promote related work in this area, andhe was pleased that some ery positie outcomes to this end had alreadybeen achieed. He urther hoped that the workshop would not onlybe a culmination o this years work, but also a springboard or newand innoatie actiities in the uture. The organization has oer twohundred members rom across the intelligence community, goernment,the interagency, Department o Deense (DoD), academia, he business.He concluded by initing all workshop participants to stay actielyinoled with this new, emerging eort.

Background Briengs: Tuesday, 22 August

There were two background briengs presented during the openingmorning session.

Proteus: The Genesis, Then and Now

Mr. Chris Schroeder o The Analytical Science Corporation (TASC),Northrop Grumman, and ormer program manager o the original ProteusStudy presented an historical oeriew o the Proteus eort. In 1999, histeam was chartered by the NROs Adanced Systems and TechnologyDirectorate to explore the Problem Space or the year 2020 and assistin identiying technology needs or Systems-Ater-Next. The approach

would be in the orm o a Problem Identication and Denition (PID)initiatie to create a 2020 Forecast Document and a 2020 Obserables

Document.

The PID 2020 Forecast Document consisted o Future IntelligenceNeeds (eight categories), Global Trends (e categories), Probable

World Scenarios, Wild Card Eents, Asymmetric Warare Concernsand Global Weapon Trends. The Obserables Document consisted oProblem Description, Time Phases, Target Types, Data Needs, Data

Fusion, Analysts, Sotware, Warning, Area Coerage, Sensor-to-Shooterand Phenomenology: Macro Inrastructures o Intelligence Targets/Micro: Signatures that Sensors Detect.


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The scenario-based planning group ormed a core team, identiedmission driers and planning space dimensions, identied worlds,and wrote narratie histories. They then prepared or and conducted aseries o workshops and synthesized the ndings.

The team deeloped sixteen scenarios. Each scenario planning spaceincorporated a arying transnational openness and mobility, globalstructures o infuence, U.S. goernment global inolement, perceiedthreats to U.S. quality o lie, and U.S. economic position and strength.From these sixteen scenarios, the ollowing e were selected to be thegrist or the workshop problem-soling sessions:

Amazo Plague: The world o 2020 looks bleak! Since2010, the globe has been swept by highly contagious, deadlyiruses that fare up, die down, and then return in mutatedorm. Eorts to contain and counteract the plagues haebeen only marginally eectie. Consequently, the worldeconomy has declined sharply as trade and commerce haedried up.

the Eemy Wihi: The United States o 2020 looks bleak!Oer the past twenty years, the United States has slowly andunexpectedly, but quite dramatically, unraeled. Like othernations at the height o their power, our disagreements,ethnic tensions, and single-issue politics hae torn the socialabric. U.S. society is ractured and ragmented politically,socially, and culturally.

new Camelo: Times are good or the United States andmost o the world! U.S. citizens enjoy economic growth,international stability, technological progress, and the ruitso an energy breakthrough that promises cheap uel and aclean enironment. Most American citizens sleep soundly,

without worries o global conficts, physical threats, or

nancial insecurities.

Yakee Goig Home: The world o 2020 looks like aconused mess! Little is clear except that the world has


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changed in undamental ways. Who is running things? Why are certain decisions being made? What goals arebeing pursued? Who are riends, and who are enemies?The United States has withdrawn rom the world ater aseries o terrible oreign policy blunders and ater a long-standing and deep recession. The world is heaily infuencedby the memories o terrorism, regional war, and worldwideinstability that hae ollowed this U.S. isolationism.

Milia shagri-La: Into this world enters a new,worrisome alliance: South Arica, India, Indonesia, China,

and other pariahs to the Western social philosophy oindiidual liberty and human rights. This alliance operatesboth legitimately as a block o aligned nation-states andillegitimately as criminal cartels. Their Grand Strategy is tokeep the world on the edge o chaos.

The work groups consisted o insiders rom the intelligencecommunity and outsiders rom arious academic and scienticbackgrounds. The groups task was to identiy threats and problems ineach o these scenarios. One o the intriguing ndings was that eachgroup had dierent ideas and experienced arying degrees o dicultyconcerning how to identiy the problem sets and threats. The processalso reealed biases that oten blinded the intelligence community andprecluded creatie thought and alternate means o problem soling whenconronted with uture uncertainty.

The NROs Proteus study spawned numerous technical and classiedproducts, but most importantly, it generated a set o nine key Insights onhow to think about the uture ersus what to think. Those insightsare described in detail in the original book, Proteus: Insights rom 2020.The study was the genesis o the initial Proteus consortium and guidesthe current PMG eort.

Mapping the Global Future: Seeing over the Horizon

Mr. Ken Knight, the National Intelligence Ocer or Warning,Oce o the Director o National Intelligence, described the National


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Intelligence Councils (NIC) 2020 Project: Mapping the Global Future.This project looked at the trends that are shaping the world. He notedthat Proteus will be a useul tool to help the NICs long-range analysis.He then described the projects approach, which was to build on preiouseorts while incorporating other methodologies and studies. There weresome one thousand participants in the approximately thirty national andinternational conerences that the NIC conducted. They employed adedicated, sequential scenario-deelopment process. One o the highlightso their approach was to use interactie, web-based tools that enhancedparticipation and analysis.

Mr. Knight highlighted seen key global themes, while noting thatsomeone else describing the project might highlight others. Transitionand Turmoil would continue to be a constant. New Global Players wouldemerge who would transorm the global landscape; at a minimum, theseincluded China, India, and others. The NIC assessment o Europe wasthat it has enduring adantages but aces signicant challenges. Theiranalysis o Japan in the uture was that it would depend on whether Japan

decided to balance against or bandwagon with China. NIC analystswere diided on whether Russia was an emerging energy superpower ora state in decline. Mr. Knight described Globalization as ubiquitous,dominant, and still being shaped. The major question was whetheranything could derail the globalization trend. The NICs snapshot othe uture identied New Challenges to Goernance. These includetechnology dispersion and globalization, uneen demographic andeconomic trends, the emergence o identity politics and especially religion,

sustaining the democracy wae, migrant populations, and the need toreamp regional and global institutions. The th trend discussed wasPerasie Insecurity resulting rom actors such as signicant economic,cultural, and political conulsions and an enduring sense o ulnerability.This, perhaps, would lead to ewer wars but more conficts. The nexttrend was Transmuting International Terrorism in which NIC analystssaw the root causes enduring but the threat eoling. Al Qaeda would

be superseded by an eclectic array o decentralized groups, cells, andindiiduals who would be internet enabled. The nal trend that Mr.Knight highlighted was the international communitys Reacting to U.S.


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Power. He noted that there was increasing apprehension about the UnitedStates and its role in international aairs.

Mr. Knight concluded his presentation by discussing the policy

implications o these trends. He noted that the United States retainsenormous adantages, but that we are increasingly challenged in ourareas. We are and will continue to be conronted by states, groups, andindiiduals with signicant niche capabilities. The uture will holdproblems that span political, economic, regional, social, technological,and bureaucratic lines. Ethical issues will be prominent. And, nally,the United States will hae to deal with the expectations o oreign and

domestic populations and leaders.

Luncheon Address: Professor Leon Fuerth

Proessor Leon Fuerth rom the Elliot School o InternationalAairs at George Washington Uniersity spoke on National SecurityManagement in the Age o Complexity. Based on his extensieexperience in goernment and his obserations rom the Forward

Engagement project, he reiewed the contemporary structure ogoernance. He noted that the current United States goernmentmodel was an eighteenth century system designed or deliberation. Thechallenge was how to adapt it or use in the 21st century. He asked thequestion is it possible or democratic goernance to surie? He notedthat the current strategy and management systems must be signicantlyreadjusted. While our Cold War world security agenda was essentially

conned to a point-source the USSR the current pattern is muchdierent. Todays problems are more likely to be approximately equalin magnitude; that is, we cannot aord to diert our attention rom anyone o them or long and that designating one issue as dominant could bea serious mistake. These problems require broadened expertise. Today,it is necessary to deploy parallel analytic and policy-making resourcesto deal with concerns such as terrorism. The ery concept o nationalsecurity must be expanded. He noted that with this expansion comes a

major challenge to the organizations upon which we rely or managemento national policy. National security is now a compound unction o how

well the United States manages all o its assets in the present and withhow much oresight we inest them or our uture.


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Refecting on his time in goernment, Fuerth noted that eorts haebeen made to create a more integrated approach to goernance. TheClinton-Gore team designed the National Economic Council or thepurpose o coordinating economic policy among cabinet departmentsand executie agencies and to help work out dicult trade-os betweendomestic and international issues, including many that crossed oerinto matters o national security. He stated that, although the cabinetappears to be an important locus or policy management, it is more o aphoto-op than a goerning institution. Its members do not meet or thepurpose o creating policy, but only to arm it. The Executie Branchin its current incarnation is not able to deal eectiely with complex,

interlocking issues that are major challenges to the uture power positiono the United States and the well-being o its people.

Proessor Fuerths analysis is that redesigning the national securityinrastructure to cope with the new challenges o the 21st century hasto start with recognizing how the world has changed. He noted that

we are no longer in a period when our most serious security problems

were, by nature, stoe-piped, when inormation about these problemswas linear and management was hierarchical. We are now in a periodwhen the problems we ace are themseles networked. Inormation aboutthese problems is marked by complex interaction, and our organizationor dealing with them must become fattened and integrated. He eltthat the United States needs a orm o management that could be calledProtean: able to change its shape rapidly to match eoling challenges.He noted that the most promising response to the increased complexity in

the problems acing goernance is to deelop a networked, small, fexible,task-oriented, managerial supra-structure designed to be retrotted tothe existing system. Where the bureaucracy creates and deends stoe-pipes along jurisdictional and substantie boundaries, the new systemmust allow ocials to think and act across them. The cabinet shouldbe reinented to sere as the primary method or managing-to-task,

with dierent groupings o cabinet ocers operating in mission-oriented

partnerships or the purpose o attaining deeper coordination. Toaccomplish this kind o goernance, not only new systems, but also a newbureaucratic culture is required. He noted that, rom our experience withmilitary reorm, networked command and control are essential, but so


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too is the culture o jointnessthe capacity, based on constant practice,o being able to plan and operate seamlessly across jurisdictional lines.

Proessor Fuerth concluded by noting that the challenges ocomplexity demand that we systematically upgrade sel-goernance inorder to presere it.

Panel #1: Geo-Strategic Policy and Strategy

Lieutenant Colonel Ike Wilson rom the Department o SocialSciences at the United States Military Academy, West Point, chaired theGeo-Strategic Policy and Strategy Panel. He introduced the panelistsand moderated the question and answer period.

Combating Complex Irregular Warfare: Grand Strategies and

Operational Considerations

Mr. Frank Homan, Center or Emerging Threats and Opportunities(CETO), U.S. Marine Corps, reiewed the rise o what some call

Fourth Generation Warare (4GW), or what Mr. Homan preers tocall Complex Irregular Warare (CIW). Todays Long War makes theoriginators o 4GW more than prophetic. Kaplans Coming Anarchyhas arried with ull orce, but with more transnational connectiity andpolitical direction. The uture portends more lethal strains o systemperturbation. While its proponents hae done an excellent job o layingout the nature o the challenge, Homan stressed the need to moe on toprescriptions to combat the rise o 4GW.

Strategic Considerations. In contrast to weighing the traditionalstrategies o annihilation ersus exhaustion, this paper suggests looking atdestructie ersus constructie strategies. This may be a ar better way oexamining oerall strategies and subcomponents in 4GW or CIW in theuture. There are our to e components to each o these undamentalstrategic approaches.

The more destructie approaches emphasize kinetic destruction andphysical properties. Howeer, the more constructie approaches are neededto respond to a 4GW threat. A constructie strategy seeks to undermine


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the true source o strength o the adersary in 4GW, his ideological base,and the attractieness o his appeal or support, intelligence, or resources.There are a number o indirect approaches within this broader and lesskinetic suite o strategies. These two approaches may be also thoughto in terms o being Counter orce or Counter alue. The Counteralue approach is recommended as the primary strategy.

Operational Considerations. Although there is no prescribed set ophases or the conduct o CIW, it is useul or commanders and theirstas to consider the nominal set o actiities listed below. The acronymMINDOPS oers a useul deice or thinking about the operational

eorts needed to successully thwart a cunning 4GW adersary. Thisproides a useul grouping o tasks that may allow the commander toenision the application o an interagency task orces eorts in timeand place. These actiities may be phased but should not be consideredsequential. The actual missions and tasks assigned to the Joint TaskForce commander may ary this set:

Mission Analysis

Isolate Insurgent/Contending Elements rom Support

Neutralize (not destroy) Anti-goernment Forces

Deelop Host Goernance Mechanisms

Organize Indigenous Security and Intelligence Mechanisms

Penetrate (i possible)Sustain and Reintegrate

Conronted by todays global insurgency, our third generationmilitaries are going to hae problems with todays irulent strains oCIW. The conficts in Aghanistan and Iraq reeal how dicult it is orold habits to die. Deeating 4GW threats will require changes in the wayour national security organizations educate their leaders. It will requirecommanders throughout the military who can work without positionalauthority, across organizational boundaries, with coalition members,international organizations, and non-military agencies o goernment.


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It requires entirely new orms o operational art and campaign design.It will also require changes in the way military organizations acquireand exploit intelligence and in how they leerage inormation in theircommand and control systems. Combating 4GW threats is ultimatelyan intellectual challenge, certainly one more complicated than a bayonetcharge (as T. E. Lawrence suggested). The MINDOPS ramework waspurposely constructed to reinorce the cognitie requirements leied bythe rise o 4GW/CIW.

Proteus Insights and the Future of Global Jihadism

Ms. Aidan Kirby and Mr. Shawn Brimley addressed how ProteusInsights can help guide analytical thinking about the current state anduture o transnational jihadist terrorism. Ms. Kirby presented rstand noted that strategic thinking and planning aimed to conront thisinternational security challenge is currently hampered by reliance onparadigms that are rapidly becoming inaccurate. She pointed out thatProteus Insights proide an eectie ramework or assessing the changesthat radical Islamic terrorism has undergone in recent years and or

reasonably predicting the core lines along which its eolution is likely toproceed in the coming years.

While all o the Proteus Insights oer some alue to understandingthe changing nature o the global jihadist moement, six insights areparticularly useul. The presentation used the ollowing six insightsas analytical lenses to bring into ocus current trends in transnational

jihadist terrorism and used those trends to map out potential utures.

Herd: Our success in combating the radical Islamic moement willgreatly depend on the extent to which we can decipher the moement othese ideas and answer ital questions such as, what are most importantchannels or the spread o radical ideologies? Also, what are the linesalong which geographically disparate belieers align themseles? Someo the most important issues to examine through the concepts o herds

hae much to do with globalization and the fow o inormation andhow these actors hae changed the denition o communities. TheHerd insight is apparent in Oliier Roys concept o the deterritorialized


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Muslim community. This lens can help clariy the dynamics betweenlocal grieances and the global moement.

Parallel Uivere: The signicance o the Internet or both radical

Islamic moements and specic terrorist networks such as al Qaeda hasbeen proound. Its impacts hae been both ideological and operational.Since Aghanistan was lost as a physical sanctuary and headquarters, alQaeda has eectiely exploited the Internet or purposes o recruitment,planning, training, and indoctrination, while Western intelligenceagencies hae struggled to respond. We lack many o the crucial toolsnecessary to conront our adersaries in the world o cyberspace. While

the global jihad becomes increasingly more accessible to interestedparties, the sanctuary that terrorists and Islamic radicals hae ound inthe Internet remains almost impenetrable to those seeking to challengethem. The Parallel Unierse insight can be used to help conceptualizethe strategic signicance o the Internet in the Global War on Terrorism(The Global War on Terrorism is also reerred to as The Long War).

threa/Opporuiy Coiuum: Analysts interested in howorganizations change and adapt in the ace o signicant pressure woulddo well to examine how both the United States goernment and ourenemies hae dealt with these issues. For eery successul adaptation orinnoation by the U.S. or its allies, al Qaeda and its aliates hae createdand implemented a corresponding innoation. From implementing amore extensie cellular structure, to depending on sel-starter networks,to acilitating the infux o oreign jihadists into, and out o, Iraq, and

to utilizing the internet as both a strategic and tactical tool, the global jihadist moement is capable o rapid and eectie organizationalchange. Moreoer, the dynamics o these transnational networks is morethe result o eolutionary trends, than eectie hierarchical leadership.The mechanics o these organizational eolutions oers insight into thethreat/opportunity continuum we are likely to encounter in the uture.

Ms. Kirby also addressed a theme o their paper, specically how theal Qaeda brand was eoling. Al Qaeda is just part o a broader jihadistmoement. Some questions include, can al Qaeda control the directiono the jihadist moement? Will it be able to take control o local conficts


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and re-brand them with its own name? And lastly, among which groupsis it likely to exert its infuence? The eolution o al Qaeda in Iraq is aninteresting case study. Ms. Kirby opined that al Qaeda was contending

with other organizations who are resonating better with arious Iraqientities. The al Qaeda brand name may ery well be resonating betterwith groups outside the Muslim world.

Mr. Brimley then addressed three Proteus Insights.

sarligh: Much o the Global War on Terrorism has beencharacterized by retrospectie insights. The introduction o new policies

and the eorts to reorganize the goernment oer the last seeral yearshae largely been guided by a desire to preent a reoccurrence o a 9/11-style attack. Key examples o this pattern include the arious eortsmade to strengthen airline security and the bureaucratic reshufing othe intelligence community in 2004. Furthermore, the understandingo the nature o the threat oten refects a snapshot o al Qaeda takenalmost e years ago. Measurements o progress in this war hae toooten been dened by the capture o key indiiduals. This approachdoes not adequately take into account the dynamic and fuid nature othe radical Islamic threat. Through the spectrum o Starlight one canbetter distinguish between retrospectie insights and strategic oresight.

sacuary: While al Qaeda proed its spectacular capability onSeptember 11th 2001, it displayed its truly reolutionary nature by irtueo its surial ollowing the loss o Aghanistan as a secure state sanctuary.

Analysts need to reconsider the denition o sanctuary as it applies to theuture o transnational terrorism. An examination o al Qaedas relatielysecure presence in Europe and Asia as well as its presence in Aghanistanand Iraq dees the current operating paradigm that sees bin Laden andhis ollowers as perpetually on the deensie. Moreoer, the moementso jihadists need to be more closely examined, as analysis based solely onorigin and destination miss an important dimension o counterterrorism.

Sanctuary will hae new meaning in the decades ahead, and this lensis critical in examining the current and uture dynamics o the jihadistmoement.


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Power: Fie years ater the 9/11 attacks, the United States doesnot appear to hae improed its strategic position in the Middle Eastor with the Muslim world. Recent arrests o al Qaeda-inspired groups

rom Toronto to Miami and London seem to indicate that the jihadistnarratie has increased its infuence since 9/11. At the core o the Long War is the ght oer the type o power most releant to twenty-rstcentury conficts. Has the United States and its allies used their powerecaciously? Do we hae the instruments o power necessary to compete

with transnational groups?

Mr. Brimley noted that two statements rom Proteus: Insights rom

2020 are highly releant when thinking about the current strategicpicture in the context o Power:

When Power erodes or it is an inappropriate match to an adersary,the best case is a sort o strategic impotence. The worst case is thatyou are open to strategic surprise.

Failure to understand the ull dimensionality o Power risks

blindness to instruments o power that can threaten you.

As Hezbollah ghters and supporters emerge rom the rubble osouthern Lebanon with what appears to be enhanced credibility andinfuence, the power o this group to aect the strategic landscape growsas well. With access to the technological means to attack a regional powerlike Israel and the ability to surie any conceiable response, Hezbollahappears to be the best guerrilla orce in the world. It appears that Israelspower has eroded ater their arguably strategically incompetent responseto a strategic surprise. This is not to argue that there were many goodoptions or Israel, but to adance the idea that the lack o aailableinstruments to wage what Frank Homan calls complex irregular

warare is a pernicious and common problem among states threatenedby non-state terror groups.

The characteristics o power are changing as globalization opens newaenues to those interested in conronting strong regional powers andglobal hegemons. Western reactions to the proocations o ideologically


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motiated non-state actors hae not, it seems, been adequate. The LongWar will require better strategic thinking and better operational tools.

Mr. Brimley concluded by describing two themes. He noted the

deelopment o what he termed hybrid cells. These next generationcells will contain local radicals plus eterans rom other conficts. Thenal theme he discussed was the emergence o a Shiite reial. Thismight cause al Qaeda to adopt a more radical Sunni outlook.

Democracy Promotion and Human Rights Development in the

Middle East: A Path Dependency Theory Approach

Ms. Pippi Van Slooten argued that, while the United States is learningthe lessons necessary to wage an ongoing battle against al Qaeda andother international terror organizations that seek to destabilize worldpeace eorts, the United Nations (UN) has already learned the lessonsnecessary to encourage and promote democracy in the global community.She adocated a diision o labor where the United States withdraws roma democracy promotion agenda, which it is not suited or, and that the

UN adopt the path dependency approach to democracy promotion asdescribed by Juan Linz and Alred Stepan in their book, The Breakdowno Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration. Theirapproach takes into account the particular nations start point andguides that nation through the democratic transition process to eentualdemocratic consolidation.

To explain her argument, she discussed the problems with the U.S.role in democracy promotion abroad and the promise o UN democracypromotion and its contribution to global peace and security. Finally,she proided an analysis o the case o Qatar as a promising exampleo internal democracy promotion that should be encouraged along itscurrent path o deelopment to democratic consolidation.

Addressing the Curse of the 21st Century: Considerations and

Updates to National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI)

Major Kathleen Meilhan, U.S. Air Force Resere, discussed theNational Strategy or Victory in Iraq (NSVI) and argued that it was


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essential to add a ourth track, a Strategic Infuence track, thatincludes the counter-insurgency enablers Strategic Insight, Infuence andIdeology Management (SIIIM), to the NSVI (in addition to Security,Economic and Political). She stressed that, i the NSVI included aStrategic Infuence track, a number o important topics would be takeninto account by U.S. goernment agencies as they addressed the Iraqiconundrum. These topics include tribes and culture in Iraq, history,problems, implications, opportunities, and Islamic confict management.She noted that, while, as General John Abizaid has said, the curse o the21st century is undoubtedly going to be getting dierse people o diersereligions to lie together, the problem expands beyond religion. U.S.

goernment leaders must understand the broader cultural context in whichthey nd themseles operating in order to communicate eectiely andto appropriately plan or operations. Major Meilhan described a policypaper she wrote entitled, Iraq Disengagement Twenty Ten Plan towarda Deliberate, Phased Handover. This paper highlighted our essentialcomponents that were needed ensure success: Security, Diplomacy,Deelopment, and Ethos Deelopment/War o Ideas. Howeer, when

the administration deeloped its policy toward Iraq, it identied onlythree tracks: Security, Economic, and Political. She beliees that theDoD could lead the way by integrating the SIIIM concept into its ownstrategic policy, increasing operational eectieness, and proiding anexample or other U.S. goernment agencies.

Strength and Honor: The Quest for Sustainable Security

Lieutenant Colonel Isaiah Wilson described his paper as a uturespiece and, as such, an exploration in heresy. His paper reconsideredwhat we hae come to regard as the modern-age o war and considereda new alternatie uture o war and peace. His specic analytical ocusattempts to go beyond the popular contemporary descriptions o theparadox within the American way o war (the tendency to ail to win thepeace in spite o unmatched prowess at winning the battles in our warare)and een beyond the debates oer whether or not we are witnessing andexperiencing a new era o 4GW. His analysis centers on the how ocontemporary U.S./Western interention practices as a tool o nationaland Westphalian interention policy and strategies and particularly as


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they relate to issues o security. His analytic ocus to is to examine whatcan be seen in our manner o interention (how we tend to wage war and

wage peace), what we can learn about ourseles in terms o how we seewar and warare, and to dierentiate these concepts and practices romhow we hae traditionally tended to iew peace and participate in peaceoperations (peace-are). The theoretical apparatus that allows or thissort o reconsideration goes well beyond traditional modern-era realistsapproaches and explanations to international aairs (which seek answersto the question o why nations confict and cooperate through the lenso material-based power political relationships) toward critical theoryapparatuses specically, constructiism. Constructiism allows one to

consider reconsider the standing notions o war and peace (warareand peace-are) in a dynamic and humanist way...as a creation o manand, thereore, malleable and refectie o any particular gien time andplace in world aairs and human history. In short, this constructiistexamination allows the author to propose that War and Peace at anygien time and place is a sign o the times. As such, the essential question beyond een the important question o whether or not we today lie in

an era o 4GW is the question o whether our current understandingo what constitutes a state, condition, or act o war ersus peace is anaccurate and healthy sign o the contemporary times?

Lieutenant Colonel Wilson noted that there is an essential question:How to Achiee a Viable Peace through Interention? Getting at thisessential question orces one, as a student and as a practitioner o war andpeace, to think beyond the modern-age ocuses on the instrumentality

o warare and peace-are and progress toward refections on the purposeo war and warare. Reocusing on purpose prior to a consideration otasks, it is hypothesized in this paper, rightly aligns our thoughts and newpractices toward both war and peace in this new century new thoughtsand practices that Colonel Wilson proposes will more eectiely andlegitimately refect the challenges and opportunities o the contemporaryenironment o conduct.

He stated that we now ace a global challenge, a challenge aced notonly by the United States o America, but by all Westphalian nation-states: how to eectiely and legitimately apply power, particularly


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military power, in a manner that can ensure a sustainable and legitimate security uture? His paper oers a new look at some o the traditionalideas about the power (strength) and legitimacy (honor) o AmericanSuperPower, the limits o American power, particularly Americanmilitary power (and specically when that power is applied unilaterally)as a cure-all, the rising illegitimacy and illiberalism o the mailed-ststrategic approach to U.S. interention policy, and how abiding by thesetraditional doctrinal approaches to warare ersus peace-are are actuallyeeding international instability and the security dilemmas we ace asnation and as a community o nations rather than sering as a solution tothese ills. Colonel Wilsons paper ends as any utures piece on war and

peace should aspire to end: by oering an alternatie conception o andapproach to war and peace, a conception that better refects the realitieso today and oers more hope in our capacities to sole the dilemmas othe probable tomorrows we ace.

Dinner Address: Mr. Jack Smith

Mr. Jack Smith, Director o Science and Technology Foresight or

the Oce o the National Science Adisor, spoke on Critical Thinking,Relatie Perspectie and the Proteus Canada Connection. Mr. Smithaddressed two areas. First he discussed the Protean Insights, theirreleance in raming the uture, and what challenges he eels we willace in the uture. Secondly he recounted the serendipitous eents thatresulted in the ormation o Proteus Canada and went on to to speculateon the releance o the organizations work to uture innoation as Canada

and the United States look into the uture to address threat and to seizeopportunities.

Mr. Smith began with a brie reiew o the original Protean Insightsand the original Proteus study utures scenarios and discussed thesignicant and releance o each.

He elt that the ten Insights (the original nine, plus one) point toward

a new way o considering unintended consequences and understandingpossible cascading eects o strategic decisions: whether commercial,diplomatic, or military. These Insights can be used as a set o lenses toiew uture issues through a dierent mindset, to consider issues through


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a dierent alue set, and to think creatiely, not traditionally. They canbe helpul in raming complex strategic problems and deeloping holisticsolution sets, and can assist in understanding the characteristics o theuture enironment: the actors, their attributes, where they act, and howthey interact.

He went on to assert that these Insights sere as guideposts or exploringnew ideas, ideas that will be needed to address uture threats in an eer-changing world where complex challenges will abound. He addressedthese challenges, using a comparatie analogy rom Neal StephensonsBaroque Cycle, a three olume set o eight noels set in 1665-1715. The

rst olume described an emergence o complex European national andinternational systems and the study o the sciences during the periodo enlightenment. During the Enlightenment, transition and changeaccelerated. This period witnessed both the emergence o new sourceso authority and the establishment o nation states. These deelopmentshad proound eects on western society, similar in scope to the eects wesee today.

The second olume addressed conusion and charted the mountingambiguities o the world at the dawn o the eighteenth century. Again,this is comparable to what we are witnessing in our world today.

Mr. Smith proposed seen sources o ambiguity and strategicchallenges that will increase uncertainty and thus will aect the worldduring the 21st century:

The rise and continual geometric progression o digital reality andirtualized eerything, rendering replicable our most cherishedhabits and preerences.

The suggestion, rom Stephen Wolram, a theoretical physicistand CEO o Wolram Research, and others, that a new scienceis emerging, that new insights and new manipulatie powers areimminent in terms o physical scale, rom giga to nano possiblytoward understanding what is beyond graity and how time,concurrence, and quantum knowledge can be reconciled.


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The centrality o the mind and its science and composition asan adanced electronic system and the growing relationship withknowledge-base machines and articial lie algorithms to mind-brain simulations.

The emergence o ecosystemic and biosystemic interdependencies inthe orm o sustainability alues and their prospectie, conergentimpacts on how we lie, what we need to respect, and how we asspecies may be directed, restricted, or unleashed to eole.

Global commercial competition challenges arising rom theproductie and consuming power o large populations such as India,

Korea, and China, which are unambiguously seeking to leaproginto the uture and achiee the comorts and benets that hae beenaccrued by afuent western societies.

The gestation and inspiration o a more perasie and deeplyrooted ear on the part o many whose sense o complacency andcontrollable security has been challenged by global terror and its

waes o apparent capability.

The continuing slippage o Newtonian consensus and o the linear,predictie calculus o managed change that has sericed us wellsince 1670.

He summarized that uture change will be rapid, expediential, andthat our societies current conusion on how to approach and keep pace

with uture challenges acing the United States, Canada, and the rest o

the western world is wrought by our lack o knowledge and understandingo other societies and cultures. Thereore, what we may be acing in theuture may ery well be a clash o ciilizations as Samuel Huntingtonsuggests. In any case, the act remains that we will hae to look dierentlyat how we proceed in the uture to preclude strategic surprise rom those

who may be able to do our society great harm. This is the importance olooking orward and gaining new insight and methods in order to gain

oresight and the requisite knowledge and understanding to oercomethese uture challenges.


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In conclusion, he discussed that they were led to the initial studyin 2001 because o its applicability in addressing and soling uturetechnology challenges that his oce had been tasked to explore. Atersome initial act nding eorts and meetings with NRO to discuss theinitial study, the international consortium got o the ground with a groupo charter members rom Canada and the United States. The Canadianteam was inited to the rst workshop at the Naal Postgraduate Schoolin 2002. This meeting inspired the Canadian Connection, and with thelater introduction o the Protean Media Game, een more momentum

was gained. All saw that leeraging the Protean approach as noel andmore sensitie to the emerging realities o asymmetric confict. Oer the

next seeral years, the Proteus Canada eort continued to grow, and in2005, Proteus Canada stood up as a ormal organization and hosted itsrst conerence.

Today, Proteus Canada is a nonprot organization sponsored by theCanadian goernment and is chartered with deeloping and expandingnew and innoatie methods and processes and technology to assistdecision makers in gaining oresight and knowledge about threats andseizing opportunities in a uture complex world.

Background Brieng: Wednesday, 23 August

Israels Future Security Environment in the Wake of the Israel-

Hezbollah War?

Dr. Joshua Teitelbaum shared his thoughts on possible uture directions

in the Middle East. He noted that there are currently many questionsin Israel in both the military and political circles concerning how the

war was conducted. He opined that Israel had suered a Katrina-likedisaster. The war was a tactical ictory or Israel, but it was a strategicsetback because Israel was unable to portray itsel as a country able todeter its enemies.

Dr. Teitelbaum stated that in the current enironment Israel needed toocus on deterrence and the peace process. He stressed that deterrence isa game o perceptions. Although Israel is widely belieed to hae nuclear

weapons, the high price or employing them negates their use in the types


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o localized wars in which Israel nds itsel engaged. He noted that theOslo Accords was a major accomplishment or Yasser Araat because he

was able to bring an armed presence close to the heart o Israel withouthaing to make any major concessions. Israel is now threatened by thePalestinian Authority. Israel decided to unilaterally withdraw romGaza, as it did rom Southern Lebanon. Neighboring states perceiethese withdrawals as a sign o Israeli weakness. Israels timid responseto months o attack has been seen as a urther sign o its weakness andunwillingness to ully use its military capabilities. The recent confict canbe ascribed to a lack o mutual deterrence. When the war erupted, Israelneeded to deal a major blow to Hezbollah, but it ended up seeking to end

the war through confict resolution. The paradox o Israels willingnessto use compromise to sole the situation is that this approach is seen as asign o weakness by Israels enemies.

Dr. Teitelbaum described two general approaches to security. Therst is the Axis o Eil approach that says that Israels enemies need tobe conronted: there needs to be a military action. This is the strategy othe stick. The other approach, the Pragmatic or Realistic approach,sees things in shades o gray. It recognizes the limits o military power.It can be characterized as the strategy o the carrot. What Israel needsto employ is a strategy that is a mix o deterrence and diplomacy withincenties. Israel needs to be open to new possibilities and alignments.Israel needs to reengage Syria. The international community must remainrm on Iran to include the possible use o a military option.

Panel #2: Psychological, Religious, Social and CulturalComplexity in Future Policy and Strategy Formulation

Ms. Cindy Ayers, National Security Agency Visiting Proessorat the Center or Strategic leadership, Army War College, chaired thePsychological, Religious, Social and Cultural Complexity in Future

Policy and Strategy Formulation panel. She introduced the presentersand moderated the question and answer period.


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A New Angle on the U.S. Militarys Cultural Awareness (CA)

Campaign: Connecting In-Ranks Diversity to CA

Major Remi Hajjar presented the cultural imperatie argument. He

called or a rejuenated ocus in the U.S. military on the undamentalskills needed to eectiely process cultural diersity. We are allmembers o arious cultures and subcultures and each o these impactsour world iew. These skills include a sucient understanding o theconcept o culture, a persons own cultural memberships and how themost important cultural memberships can cause mental impediments orbiases, the need or genuine open-mindedness or cultural relatiism while

in a proessional capacity, and a thirst to appreciate and alue dierseothers, or at the ery least the need to respect dierse people during theconduct o the mission. He examined three concerns within the rankso the U.S. military to illustrate the importance o the aorementionedundamentals: spiritual tolerance, womens membership, and anti-homosexual attitudes/conduct. Finally, Major Hajjar argued that buildingthe undamental skills to eectiely process cultural diersity helps themilitary in all o its missions and situations, not just in enhancing in-

ranks cohesion. Insoar as modern operations require increased emphasison multinational, interagency, and joint campaigns, and as they highlightthe crucial nature o eectie interaction with populations (abroad and,as Katrina has shown, at home), these undamental skills will proe mostsignicant. Furthermore, the U.S. military has an opportunity to bolsterthese cultural processing skills by addressing some o the internal issueso the orce. So, in essence, those in-ranks concerns proide another way

to address the transormational cultural awareness initiatie o the U.S.military.

Holding it All Together: Present and Future National Cohesion in

Saudi Arabia

Dr. Joshua Teitelbaum examined the Saudi system in detail and thenpresented the arious centriugal orces that are operating in Saudi Arabia

today: religious, regional, and tribal. He noted that some o these haedeeloped into an insurgency. In the past, the Saudis hae controlled thepublic space. At one time, it controlled the air waes, including satelliteteleision. Today it no longer controls satellite teleision and, despite


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aliant and expensie attempts at ltering, it cannot control the Interneteither. Teitelbaum opined that these deelopments hae the potential toundermine national cohesion.

Dr. Teitelbaum noted that as we look back rom the 21st century,Saudi Arabia seems to be a tremendous success story. Awash in oil, sellingtoday at oer $70 a barrel, Saudi Arabia is expected to earn about $154billion in oil reenues in 2006. Each year, it runs perhaps the largestsocial gathering in the world, the Muslim pilgrimage (hajj), playing hostto around two million pilgrims. Foreign companies ie with each otheror Saudi contracts. For 2005, the goernment reported a thirty-old

increase in oreign inestment, to the tune o SR200 billion. Mightynations try to curry aor with it; een the United States, which sueredtremendously at the hands o Saudi citizens in the attacks o September11, 2001, does little to anger the oil giant. Relations remain good, islightly strained.

With its money, the country is spending more on education anddeelopment, paying down its public debt, increasing security expendituresas a response to domestic terrorism, increasing salaries to the military andthe goernment bureaucracy, and raising payments to the population atlarge through subsidies or health care, welare, education, and housing.

Howeer, the Saudi state was established oer a dierse people thathad no historical memory or much else in common. Oer the years, theSaudi royal amily has deeloped a common historical narratie, which it

has promulgated through the mosque network, the media, and education,that confates the royal amily and Islam throughout history and up tothe present. They become one and the same, mutually reinorcing oneanother. Oer time, this has become a kind o cohesie glue that has keptSaudi society together.

To urther bind the people to the state, as personied by the Saudiroyal amily, an elaborate, cradle-to-grae welare system was deeloped.

Oil resources were distributed to the populace in exchange or opting outo political representation. There was no taxation, but neither was thererepresentation.


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Finally, Dr. Teitelbaum emphasized that the structure o the statedrew on tribal alues o personal contact and corporate group politics.This made the state an extension o a comortable and historical system,although this time around the Saudi amily was placed at the apex o theputatie tribe.

Proling International Change Processes

Dr. Gunther Werther introduced and discussed the core parameterso an approach to predicting emerging trends, styles, and patterns oacting with respect to international change, and hence o predicting

emerging societal, country, and regional utures. His paper arguesthat mathematical modeling, any accretie, parsing, and other externallyoriented comprehensie data gathering approaches, and any rationalactor approaches (including those using biological, chemical, andphysical system templates) are undamentally misdirected as to theirpredictie orientation i they ail to centrally place a thinking withinbias ocus as their grounding.

Dr. Werther noted that bias is, o course, one way o describing howhumans act. Consequently, without centrally and integrally accountingor dierse human, and societally denitie elements o change, no reliablesolution is possible when attempting to predict emerging internationalutures, or methods o moing toward those utures or either societies,countries, or regions.

Change proling, by contrast, can better accomplish this predictietask because it is, in essence, a study o conficting harmonies; it is romthe beginning centrally ocused upon how humans and societies ariouslyact. Dr. Werther ocuses on the change process as a dynamically fuid,contextually nuanced dance inoling internally integrated actors(each acts according to their natures) within their enironment. Themetaphor is music (as to intentional harmonies; the song they sing)and dance (with respect to mutual actions) more than math. The latter,

particularly, is endlessly recursie with respect to the expected utureactions o the other.


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I the aboe is understood, then a proling change processes analyticis to be iewed as a holistically integratie study o change, not o states.It begins with an inquiry into the socio-psychological nature o things asto their character and species (their holistically integrated approach,style, and habitual method o achieing goals within their enironment)and i you will moing thus rom this understanding holisticallyand integratiely again toward expected solutions. It may be better tosay that one studies and proles expected patterns and paths o change,endlessly. Another way to iew this is as moing rom kernel (character,species, nature) toward expanded layers o understanding with respect toprojected actions.

National security challenges are, in this century, increasingly aboutpatterns o national and group reaction to international change pressures(deelopment, globalization, and so orth) that are NOT classicallymilitary operations or state-state conficts. Consequently, a complexchange perspectie o the integratie kind just described is better suitedto the nuanced task o predicting emerging utures than the traditionalaccretie and math modeling approaches. Proling change processesis an important analytical perspectie useul or improing the abilityo organizations and goernments to crat wise understandings aboutemerging international changes in ways that are more accurate and morenuanced than current abilities seem to be capable o.

Luncheon Address: Dr. John Alexander

Dr. John Alexander, Senior Fellow, Joint Special Operations Uniersity,and PMG Fellow, discussed what he titled as Future Conficts: Valuesand Paradoxes. The nature o uture war has changed at the mostundamental leel. There are wars on Poerty, Drugs, Cancer, etc. Itseems that the United States has lost the meaning o war along with anyunderstanding o the current and uture struggle. The Global War onTerrorism (GWOT) is the Long War, as current think tanks call it, and

will denitely be a sustained, multidimensional confict o 50 years or

more. The question will be: Is the public willing to support this?


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He asserted was that Americans will only support such a war onlyunder certain circumstances:

I they understand our enemy and the threat they poses to the

uture o America

I they understand our strategy and how long it will take tocomplete it

I they are condent our leaders know what they are doing

I they know we hae what it takes to deeat the enemy

I leaders communicate U.S. actions plainly and honestly

The diculty in deeloping methods to eectiely ght and win thiscomplex orm o warare is that, in a global and geopolitical enironment,one must deal with the associated conundrums and paradoxes that arecreated. He went on to outline the ollowing key methods: Alter theEnironment, Kill/Capture, Increase Security.

Altering the Enironment, otherwise known as Draining theSwamp, that breeds terrorism, ciil unrest, and confict, has great merit;howeer, careul consideration must be made to ensure that alterationsdo not precipitate unintended consequences. One billion people in the

world lie on less than $1 a day. The Arican continent contains oereleen percent o the worlds population but less than one percent o themedical unds. There are more than a billion people without sae water.

These troubled, under-deeloped and under-goerned areas remain ertileground or the growth o terrorism. Currently this method is the lowestcost option, but it is still unaordable. The United States is building aneight trillion dollar national decit. The questions now are: Are theseeorts sustainable in the long term, and, what has to change?

Kill/Capture is easier said than accomplished. It is wrought withdicult issues and questions. The keys are who is game (innocent or

guilty), how to get the job done, and how much collateral damage toindigenous populations or international and oten domestic condemnationare Americans willing to accept? Where do we conduct these operations?Do we go into a soereign country without permission, as may be necessary


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in time-sensitie preemptie operations, or domestically? Lastly, what isthe status o captured indiiduals: POWs, criminals, or terrorists? And,how long does the United States detain such indiiduals, as exempliedby actions in Guantanamo? What are the legal rights, repercussions, andallout rom such detention, to include dierent treatment?

Attacking terrorist inrastructure is denitely a challenging areabecause o Americas conficting alues between the war on drugs andthe GWOT. In his opinion, America cannot eectiely conduct bothsimultaneously, and Americans alue winning the war on drugs morethat they do the war on terrorism. Although drug tracking is a chie

nancial boon or the terrorist, there has been irtually little return onour counter-drug inestment. With oer a hal-trillion dollars spent onthe drug war, street alue and aailability remains the same. Does theUnited State hae it priorities in the right place? Other commodities andnancial inrastructures support and assist terrorists, including diamonds,art, and other rare commodities. Other challenges and criminal nancetrends, such as international money laundering, are still dicult to trace,

een with recent adancements. Currently, money laundering may equal3-5 percent o global gross domestic product.

Increasing International and Domestic Security, although dicultand manpower intensie, is easible, but it comes with the conundrumo impinging on human and indiidual rights as they are commonlyunderstood. He argued that people who are most aected by an eentin time and physical space will be willing to more readily gie up rights

or security.

He asserted that we hae two wars at hand and or the uture. Therst is ideological, and the second is economic. The rst was spawnedand is being omented by predominately radical Islam and the global

Jihad moement. The second is being exacerbated by America politicsand economic policy. The impact o globalization and the rise o theeconomic prowess o China, India, and others needs close examination toinsure the United States strategic economic sustainability is maintained asbarriers to competition and trade continue to break down. For example,China holds 20-25 percent o Americas debt, and Indian technology


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and intellectual capital is being tapped oten at the expense o U.S.employment. Does Tom Friedman hae the complete picture?

He also proposed that there are two models on how to conduct uture

war and that the United States idea or model is an anachronism. TheGWOT lacks specicity. Competing alues and a ailure to understandbiases preents the United States rom winning. America must cometo grips with the act that World War X (WWX) has begun, and it isreligious. It is all about diergent ideas and belies, or a cataclysmic clasho ciilizations. Most importantly, the media may hold the coin o theuture realm; its application, used as a weapon, can and will determine

winners and losers, as in the case o Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon.Perception management is and will remain key. Without this knowledge,

America does not undamentally understand the threat.

Todays confict trends indicate that it will be increasingly harder orthe United States to delier positie outcomes in the uture. Americasprosecution o uture wars will all into three categories: coert, oertand outsourced. It will be extremely dicult to identiy combatants. Inthe uture, there will be more restrictions on use o orce and a greateremphasis on outsourcing war or those who can aord it. Shiting socialstructures will create an abundance o paradoxes and alue conficts indetermining i, when, where, and how to prosecute war. American publicsupport will remain paramount to successul outcomes. Public support

will be directly correlated to the time and space rom known attack,iolence o attack, and perception o personal threat.

There are seeral key issues that will sere as the spark and tinder oruture regional and global confict:

Deolution o Nation-State Status, which includes redeningAmerican based on new alue sets and the ormation o competingsocial organizations based on dierent hierarchical belies as

Americas ethnic and religious complexion changes. The quest to

determine who we are and who we will be will be a challengingjourney, as Samuel Huntington suggests.


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Population Growth Rate o the third world and the nearexponential impact o amine and disease.

Politicalization o Educational Systems, which will bring to the

oreront key competing and conficting ideologies and alues,especially secular ersus religious education.

Global Ecosystem Instability, ocusing on the magnitude andimpact o climate changes (global warming) and water shortages.

Philosophical Incompatibilities o undamentalism or radicalism(predominantly Islamic) ersus the world. The act is that there

may neer be compatibility.

Unsustainable Legal Constraints. The current national andinternational systems are anachronistic, ponderous, and incongruentto eectiely prosecute criminals and ght the Long War.

In conclusion, he summarized seeral truisms o uture confict thatAmerica must understand and embrace to be successul in the Long War.

First, war is about imposing will, not killing. Second, that the nation-state as we collectiely know it today, is a ailing concept as a result oglobalization. Societies and social groups are centered on hierarchicalbelies, not necessarily geography, and many are incompatible. Someproblems, like the Arab-Israeli confict, may be irresolable. Lastly, wemust understand that iolence, although prealent today and or theoreseeable uture, is optional.

Panel #3: Future Strategic and Operational IntelligenceChallenges

Dr. Dianne Smith, Joint Military Intelligence Traning Center(JMITC), Deense Intelligence Agency, chaired the Future Strategic andOperational Intelligence Challenges panel. She introduced the presentersand moderated the question and answer period.

Failed States and Intelligence Collection Missions

Dr. Ely Karmon, International Policy Institute or Counterterrorism,began by noting that it is his theory that international terrorism since


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the 1960s is the result o state support. In his remarks, he discusseda situation where state ailure has already happened creating anungoernable country or territory, and there is the need to ealuate andconstantly monitor the threat such a situation represents or the UnitedStates and the Western democratic world. He analyzed the intelligencerequirements, methods, and resources needed to coer the threats rompotential targets: the terrorist and guerrilla organizations, organizedcrime and narco-terrorism, prolieration o small weapons, and theprolieration o chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agentsand weapons to terrorist groups. Lastly, he detailed the ideological, geo-political, strategic, and structural enironment and the transnational and

international relationships between the arious actors, including states,non-goernmental organizations (NGOs), and international agencies; hethen presented some proposals or improements in the eld o intelligencecollection and analysis.

Dr. Karmon noted that the question o ailed or weak states hasbeen studied by researchers and by U.S. administrations mainly in theattempt to understand the causes o the ailure o states and the necessityto preent or, at the least, to hae early warning o what has been denedas state ailure. Dr. Karmon reiewed seeral o these research eorts.

The CIAs Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a ChangingWorldasked the international community to help tame the disintegratieorces spawned by an era o change and the growth in potential or stateragmentation and ailure. Analyzing the impact o globalization and

the emerging security paradigms that resulted rom the end o the ColdWar, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century identiedailed and weak states as specic challenges that the United States willace with increasing regularity in the next twenty-e years.

According to Susan Woodward, Proessor o Political Science at theCity Uniersity o New York, while the culprit or both poerty andiolations o human rights since the early 1980s had been the strongstate, the problem by the 1990s had become the weak state. She seesa remarkable international consensus in the past two years that allconcrete threats to security, including terrorism, nuclear prolieration,


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mass iolations o human rights, poerty, armed confict, and reugees,are iewed as the responsibility o states and the consequence o state

weakness.

Beore the 9/11 attacks, U.S. policymakers iewed states withsoereignty decits as o little strategic signicance. Ater the attacks,Secretary o State Condoleezza Rice declared that nations incapable oexercising responsible soereignty hae a spilloer eect in the orm oterrorism, weapons prolieration, and other dangers. Al Qaedas ability toact with impunity rom Aghanistan coninced President George W. Bushand his administration that America is now threatened less by conquering

states than by ailing ones. Stewart Patrick o the Center or GlobalDeelopment stresses that the present lacking U.S. strategy toward weakand ailing states should be based on a deeper intelligence collection andanalysis o the links between state weakness and transnational threats.

According to Ted Robert Gurr, Distinguished Proessor at the Uniersityo Maryland, the structural model or ethnic war, one o the main reasonsor state ailure, includes actors refecting group incenties or collectieaction, group capacity or collectie action, and opportunities or collectieaction. Gurr proposes principles and priorities or the deelopment oconfict early warning: identiying and monitoring latent and emergingcrises well in adance o the outbreak o war; inentory o ethnic, religious,national and political groups at risk; near-real-time tracking o eents inunstable (high-risk) areas; close and regular communications betweenearly warning analysts and ocials with operational responsibility or

preentie action and humanitarian response.

Homeland Security Futures Case Study: Agroterrorism

Lieutenant Colonel Shawn Cupp, U.S. Army Command andGeneral Sta College, described a case study methodology to improethe understanding o a Homeland Security domestic incident during theconduct o consequence management. He presented a uture incident that

takes place within the USNORTHCOM in which participants are parto a standing Interagency Operational Planning Team (IOPT) withinthe Joint Task Force-Ciil Support (JTF-CS). The participants representthe Department o Homeland Security (DHS), Department o Justice


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(DOJ), Department o Agriculture (USDA), Department o the Interior(DOI), Department o Transportation (DOT), DoD and Department oCommerce (DOC) action ocers. This case study is conducted withinthe Joint, Interagency, Intergoernmental, and Multinational (JIIM)enironment.

The consequence management case study inoles an incidentaecting U.S. agriculture. There are seeral ideas within the case studythat hae direct connection to the Proteus insights across the planes oinfuence:

Starlight: Insight exaggerating the psychological plane oinfuence. Leaders must know that the management o theinormation surrounding an agricultural incident wouldsignicantly infuence the worlds iew o the UnitedStates.

Sanctuary: Insight across the terrestrial and, especially,the psychological planes o infuence. The threshold o

repercussions is low or agroterrorist acts.

Veracity: Insight across the terrestrial, and most denitelythe psychological planes o infuence. Natural outbreaksmimic actual possible attacks. The simple act o conrmingor denying o an incident impacting the ood chain wouldrequire an emotion-lled and high-stakes decision.

Herds: Insights across the terrestrial, irtual, andpsychological planes o infuence. People will tend to bemore sympathic toward the terrorists, since ew citizens

will actually die in this incident. This refects the cklenature o public opinion and how a certain terrorist act mayactually cause support or, or at least tacit acceptance o, theattackers and their methods.

Wealth: Insight, its about the economy, not cows. A sae,cheap supply o meat in the United States will not be cheapanymore. The impact on the economy also traels across

1.

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the terrestrial, irtual, and psychological planes o infuence.An accidental or purposeul interdiction o the U.S. oodsupply o a substantial size would create signicant andlasting economic impacts.

This case study takes place in the not-so-distant uture. Howeer,the case study elements are all based on act. The locations are real,and the eents, and their impact are all possible. All aspects o theU.S. agricultural system, including exports, transportation, geneticallymodied oods, imports, production, and policies are detailed. Studentsare gien enough inormation to conduct analysis, and then identiy,

ealuate, recommend, and discuss implementation o actions based onthe case study. The case study begins with the immediate atermath othe incident and its eects. Ater thorough discussion, the successieimpacts o the second stage and third stage are then introduced. Thecase study method allows students to ealuate their prior decisions anddetermine the implications against uture eents.

Panel #4: Future Technology

Mr. Jack Smith, Oce o the National Science Adisor, Industry,

Canada, chaired the Future Technology Panel. He introduced thepresenters and moderated the question and answer period.

An Unmanned Systems Vision

Captain Rand LeBouier, U.S. Nay, retired, addressed the uture

o unmanned systems rom both a technological and a humanitiesperspectie. He started with a ideo-ignette that described a lieutenantoperating in a irtual enironment. He noted that this ignette was not arrom a technical reality. The great hurdle is not encountered in hardwareor sotware, but rather in the lack o a systemic approach to integratingthe required dierse technologies and human capabilities. He proposedthat any system capable o destruction will continue to require actie

human oersight and participation; it will require an interdisciplinaryapproach that combines scientic skill with a philosophical and ethicaloundation.


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He cautioned that the term unmanned needs to be careullyapplied. Only a system where no human interention or oersight ispossible might correctly be termed unmanned. He noted that humanpresence in the decision-making process is an essential part o any systemthat has the power to destroy. He opined that what is needed is a moresystemic approach that would take into account the truly interdisciplinarynature o robotic systems; it must regard and combine the sciences ophysics and chemistry specically materials mechanics, electronics,propulsion, computation, sensors, energy, and communications, with thehumanities disciplines o philosophy and ethics. To exert any control oertechnology, we must know what it is we expect to do with technology.

He noted that it is sae to state as act that technologies created withoutsuch holistic considerations hae proen to do and aect more than wasoriginally enisioned.

Captain LeBouier stressed that ethical, legal, and practicalconsiderations should guide the design o the system and its operationalconcepts. The system described in his ignette compiles input rom more

than a single sensor, enabling corroboration o target data. With theproper protocols in place, the human, augmented by the computer, couldproe to be more reliable than either alone. At the center o it all, thehuman component will need more than mere equipment training to beable to properly use such a complex system. Beside the physical dexterityand mental acuity required, unmanned system oerseers will still requirethe rm ethical grounding required o all our serice members.

He noted that no single part o this ision is achieable or practicalwithout consideration or the rest o the system. Each component mustbe designed with the end in mind: the creation o a human-centered,mechanically and digitally augmented command and control, inormationgathering and disseminating, and ultimately destructie capability. Witha host o sensors and ehicles deployed, the oerseer has a wide arrayo options and backups. In a traditional single-ehicle, single pilot

paradigm, i any part ails to perorm the ehicle, the sensors, thecommunications links, the displays, the computer, the interaces, or, mostimportantly, the human operator then the entire system ails. Such aparadigm, so dependent on technology and subject to single-point ailure,


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oers an ideal target or an asymmetric counter. The enisioned systemis ar less susceptible than a traditional or een a completely autonomoussystem that is correspondingly completely dependent on technology.The human oerseer and multiple ehicle and sensor conguration thusproide a bulwark against asymmetry.

He concluded by stressing that, as we design, produce, and procureunmann

proteuswsstudy

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